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Talk about what people are able or unable to do is ubiquitous. Despite that fact it's unobvious just what it comes to to be able to do something. For that reason alone it would be worthwhile to explore what our abilities consist in, but another reason is the traditional philosophical question about whether we are ever able to do otherwise than we in fact do, a question that has played a large role in the debate regarding free will and moral responsibility. My goal is to explain what it is to be able to do something and to argue that we are often able to do otherwise than we do, even if determinism is true. To that end I draw on work done to understand the causal powers and dispositions of inanimate objects, like the fragility of a vase or the conductivity of a wire. Our abilities can be understood as phenomena of the same kind, differing in part that our abilities are exercised for reasons while the powers of inanimate objects are not. First, I argue that one and the same object can have opposing powers, that is powers that have compatible stimulus conditions and incompatible manifestations, so that if both stimulus conditions occur at most one of the powers will manifest. Second, I argue that if externalism about mental content is true, then many of our abilities, even to perform mental actions, are extrinsic properties. That is, if what mental states we are in depends on some of our extrinsic properties, like what exists in our environment, then many of our abilities are also extrinsic properties, even when those are abilities to perform mental actions, like deciding to get a glass of water. Third, I critique existing attempts to understand our abilities along the lines of causal powers or dispositions more generally. The extant proposals all face significant shortcomings of various kinds. Finally, I propose a theory that overcomes the shortcomings of the existing theories, and that claims that we are able to do otherwise by having opposing powers of the sort discussed above, along with some other conditions.