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## The Racial and Ethnic Typification of Crime: Exploring the Potential Causes of Criminal Stereotypes

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THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY  
COLLEGE OF CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

THE RACIAL AND ETHNIC TYPIIFICATION OF CRIME: EXPLORING THE POTENTIAL  
CAUSES OF CRIMINAL STEREOTYPES

By

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This is dedicated to my family, especially my mother and my husband. Thank you for your love and support over *all* these years of school. Finally.

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## **ABSTRACT**

The racial typification of crime refers to the extent to which crime is represented as a Black phenomenon. Additionally, the ethnic typification of crime, where crime is represented as a Latino phenomenon, has received recent attention. Research on these concepts has found them to be predictive of punitive attitudes toward criminals. However as fairly new concepts, research has yet to clearly identify the factors that may contribute to the formation of these stereotypes. Using a national sample, this paper evaluates whether three potential factors influence attitudes that express the racial/ethnic typification of crime: symbolic or modern racism, media exposure and consumption, and inter-group contact. The results reveal that group contact is the only consistent predictor of both the racial and ethnic typification of crime; group contact is positively associated with the racial and ethnic typification of crime. Implications and directions for future research are discussed.

# CHAPTER ONE

## INTRODUCTION

Race and crime have long been linked in popular culture (Mann, 1993; Sampson & Wilson, 1995). The Rev. Jesse Jackson said, during a 1993 convention: “There is nothing more painful to me at this stage of my life than to walk down the street and hear footsteps and start thinking about robbery -- then look around and see somebody white and feel relieved” (Jackson, 1993). Researchers have noted the depiction of crime as a racial phenomenon for decades, suggesting it reached its height during the Civil Rights Movement (Barlow, 1998). Unnever and Cullen (2010) suggest that for “Americans, when they think about crime, the picture in their head illuminates a young, angry, Black, inner-city male who offends with little remorse” (2010:106). Research has suggested that the repeated presentation of criminals as Blacks represents the racial typification of crime. At the same time the repeated presentation of criminals as Latinos represents the ethnic typification of crime. These typifications have been found among individuals’ perceptions as well as among media representations (Chiricos, Welch, and Gertz, 2004; Dixon, 2006; Dixon, Azocar, and Casas, 2003; Dixon and Linz, 2000). However, researchers have not clearly identified where these criminal stereotypes of crime originate, since research has focused exclusively on the effects of such typifications.

According to Chiricos and Eschholz (2002: 402), the racial typification of crime is the process whereby “crime is stereotypically portrayed as a Black phenomenon.” Researchers have examined this phenomenon as an extension of racial and criminal threat and found racial typification to be predictive of a number of race and crime related attitudes, (Chiricos, Welch, and Gertz, 2004; Hurwitz and Peffley, 1997; Peffley, Hurwitz, and Sniderman, 1997; Welch, Payne, Chiricos, and Gertz, 2011) often specifically focusing on punitive attitudes. When Whites are presented with the image of Blacks whose behavior is consistent with negative stereotypes, like being on welfare or being criminal, more punitive measures in the form of police searches are supported to deal with such individuals (Peffley, Hurwitz, and Sniderman, 1997). Additionally, individuals who hold negative stereotypes of Blacks (prone to violence, hostile, short-tempered, lazy, and living off of welfare) are more supportive of punitive measures, especially when these

punitive measures are connected to crimes assumed to be more typical of Blacks (e.g. violent crimes rather than embezzlement) (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1997).

Latinos (especially Mexicans) have been portrayed as violent bandits or “banditos,” “zoot-suiters,” “gang bangers,” and illegal aliens (Bender, 2003; Escobar, 1999; Martinez, 2002; Rosales, 1999).<sup>1</sup> Most commonly, Latinos and Hispanics are typified in connection with their immigration status. Interviews with police and criminal justice officials find that these individuals strongly believe that there is an immigrant crime problem (Tonry, 1997). Similarly, public opinion as measured in the General Social Survey indicates that 73.4% of respondents felt that it was either very or somewhat likely that more immigrants caused higher crime rates (General Social Survey, 2010). Like racial stereotypes, those of Hispanics are also related to attitudes; persons who believe that more immigrants increase crime are likely to be unsupportive of immigration policies that increase the number of immigrants allowed (Lu and Nicholson-Crotty, 2010).

Research has suggested that when individuals are asked to give their opinion on crime policy or whether they support punitive policies, the image of a Black criminal more often comes to mind than a white criminal (Peffley and Hurwitz 2002). Determining the potential sources of these typifications can help researchers more fully understand racial interactions. If individuals, both inside and outside of the criminal justice system typify racial and/or ethnic minorities as criminal, the effects of such stereotypes can be far reaching. Examining the possible antecedents or correlates of such stereotypes can help social scientists draw more firm conclusions about the treatment of individual racial and ethnic minorities in the criminal justice system.

The research proposed herein will explore whether the racial typification of crime represents a new, more subtle, manifestation of prejudice known as symbolic racism; whether a lack of contact with minorities can explain their assumed criminality, or whether the images prevalent in the media can account for such negative stereotypes. The following sections elaborate the theoretical linkages and prior research findings that motivate the empirical analyses to be explored in this research.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **SYMBOLIC RACISM**

The racial typification of crime may be a manifestation of symbolic racism (Chiricos et al., 2004). Symbolic racism is the name given to beliefs about Blacks that do not overtly reflect traditional prejudice or racism and animosity, but rather more subtly deny the benefits and aid given to Blacks to cover feelings of resentment or negative affect. Researchers have found symbolic racism to be predictive of various stereotypes and opinions about crime and minorities, including laziness and violence, (Matsueda & Drakulich, 2009; Wilson and Nielsen, 2011) but have not tested whether it directly contributes to stereotypes such as the racial typification of crime. If racial typification is explained in part by symbolic racism, then the current views toward racial and ethnic minorities may be deep seated, rooted in the historical events of this country and reflective of prejudice toward these groups. However, it is also possible that symbolic racism does not necessarily predict the racial and ethnic typification of crime but rather, that the racial and ethnic typification of crime and symbolic racism are actually expressions of the same underlying phenomenon. Whether criminal stereotypes like the racial and ethnic typification of crime are the result of symbolic racism will be explored in addition to any possible commonality between typification and symbolic racism.

#### **Basic Concepts & Theoretical Development**

Symbolic (or modern) racism has been conceptualized by several researchers as the predominant form of racism within the U.S. today and as distinctively different from traditional racism. Traditional racism often involved expressions of overt attitudes and actions like lynching or protesting integration. However, symbolic racism (also known as new, modern, or laissez faire racism) is hypothesized to use subtle actions such as a lack of support for policies that benefit minorities and the adoption of negative stereotypes. This shift has occurred as overt racism has become less socially acceptable. Traditional and modern racism may both be manifestations of the same anti-Black affect, with the modern version being more subtle (McConahay & Hough, 1976). McConahay and Hough (1976: 38) offered the following definition of symbolic racism. It is

*The expression in terms of abstract ideological symbols and symbolic behaviors of the feeling that blacks are violating cherished values and making illegitimate demands for changes in the racial status quo.*

While the symbolic racism literature is not a unified body, there are several apparent themes associated with the concept. These include the belief that Blacks no longer face much prejudice or discrimination, the belief that their failure to progress results from their unwillingness to work hard, the belief that Blacks have demanded too much too fast, and the belief that Blacks have been given more than they deserve (Sears and Henry, 2005). It is also suggested that symbolic racism is expressed in symbols and that those who are exhibiting symbolic racism have a lack of personal reference in making judgments about Blacks (McConahay and Hough, 1976).

Symbolic racism beliefs are thought to be influenced by early socialization experiences, education, party identification, and a concept termed Black individualism (McConahay & Hough, 1976; Sears and Henry, 2005). This individualism is the combination of anti-Black attitudes as well as the holding of race-neutral traditional values that hard work and perseverance will bring success rather than handouts and aid. The shift from traditional to symbolic racism has been described as including a shift from the thought that racial minorities are biologically inferior to the thought that racial minorities are culturally inferior (Buckler, Wilson, and Salinas, 2009). Symbolic racism is said to “consist of a belief that African-Americans have not achieved the same level of social status as Whites because they do not share the specific values and qualities with Whites that have helped Whites achieve their elevated social status” (Buckler et al., 2009: 240). Opposition to policies like affirmative action and welfare stems from Blacks’ collective demands for solutions to issues where American mores dictate preferences for individual work ethics (Weigel & Howes, 1985).

Symbolic racism is described as involving “a set of acts or behaviors justified on a nonracial basis but operate to maintain the racial status quo” (McConahay and Hough, 1976:38). For example then, opposition to affirmative action and welfare policies can be justified based on traditional conservative values that do not view this type of aid as a worthy solution to the plight of the poor. Symbolic racism would argue that the opposition to these policies may truly stem from the fact that Blacks and other minorities are the common beneficiaries of such policies. Over time it appears to be more respectable to justify one’s racism with “principled” opposition

to policies that benefit Blacks like affirmative action and busing (Weigel & Howes, 1985). Individuals may oppose these policies because they benefit a group toward whom a sense of animosity is felt. But it is possible to disguise prejudice by supporting elements of the conservative value system. Other researchers in symbolic racism would argue this very point, suggesting that such explanations tend to label individuals as racist or prejudice when they are not (Sniderman and Tetlock, 1986).

The potential exists for modern racism to be as much if not more pernicious than historical examples of racism despite modern racism involving less overt behavior. As Ramasubramanian points out, “implicit stereotypes... can influence judgments in subtle, subconscious ways, even among persons who believe that they are not overtly prejudiced” (2007: 258). While overt linkages of race and crime and forms of traditional prejudice may have historically been problematic, more implicit stereotypes, like those of modern or symbolic racism, may be just as problematic, simply because individuals who hold such beliefs do not identify themselves or their beliefs as prejudiced. Thus, in terms of racial typification, many who typify may not view themselves as prejudiced though their attitudes may reflect the same negativity toward minorities as prejudice does.

### **Tests of Symbolic Racism**

Research on symbolic racism indicates that it is often a predictor of a variety of racially linked policies and opinions. Symbolic racism was found to be more strongly related to racial policy positions on topics such as equal housing, fair treatment, hiring quotas, integrated schools, jobs, and housing than traditional racism (Sidanius, Devereux, and Pratto, 2001). Using national data from 1990, symbolic racism was measured using opinions of Blacks getting less than deserved, that they should work their way up, that they are not working hard enough, and that history has made it difficult for Blacks, that discrimination is no longer a problem, and whether it is difficult to understand the anger of Black Americans. This measure was shown to be positively related to opposition to preferential hiring (Rabinowitz, Sears, Sidanius, and Krosnick, 2009). For data from 2000, symbolic racism was a positive predictor of opposition to preferential hiring, opposition to compensatory affirmative action, opposition to welfare, and opposition to food stamps. Kinder and Sears (1981) also found that symbolic racism was a significant predictor of voting against a Black mayoral candidate. Symbolic racism beliefs are negatively related to

affirmative action support (Hughes 1997; Matsueda and Drakulich. 2009). Sears, van Laar, Carrilo, and Kosterman (1997) concluded that symbolic racism consistently predicted opposition to policies that help ensure equal opportunities for Blacks, opposition to federal assistance for Blacks, opposition to affirmative action for Blacks, opposition to Democratic candidates and support for Republican candidates. Symbolic racism was found to be a stronger predictor than threat measures in accounting for anti-Black voting behavior (Kinder and Sears, 1981). Racial resentment, operationalized by items utilized in Sears' symbolic racism scale, was found to be the strongest predictor of racial policy attitudes (affirmative action and welfare) (Tuch and Hughes, 2011).

Specifically referring to crime related opinions, those who held beliefs consistent with modern racism were more likely to support stricter policies for crime control (Matsueda and Drakulich, 2009). Additionally, symbolic racism was significantly related to crime policies and support for punitive policies that target Blacks rather than preventative policies (Green, Staerke, and Sears, 2006). Buckler et al (2009) found both symbolic racism and stereotypes of Blacks as lazy, unintelligent, and untrustworthy to be predictive of criminal justice policies favoring punishment.

A common component of symbolic racism scales measures whether respondents feel that Blacks should not push themselves into contexts where they are not wanted. Wilson and Nielsen (2011) found that this specific measure was significantly related to beliefs about crime spending. Those who agreed that Blacks should not push felt that there was too much crime spending while those who disagreed with the push statement felt that there was not enough crime spending. Crime spending was measured by the question: "We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I am going to name some of these problems, and for each one I would like you to tell me whether you think we are spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount: 1) solving the problems of the big cities (urban spending); 2) halting the rising crime rate (crime spending); and 3) dealing with drug addiction (drug spending)" (Wilson and Nielsen, 2011: 180). "Push" refers to the attempt by Blacks to integrate into areas, schools, jobs, or organizations that have traditionally been occupied by Whites or where they are not especially wanted. Thus, those who think that Blacks should not be attempting to integrate as much, view crime spending as too much. This may indicate that respondents are thinking of Blacks when thinking about crime and criminals. Not

only does this relationship suggest a tie between race and crime, but it also indicates that this specific component of symbolic racism does help to predict crime policy attitudes.

Related to the racial typification of crime, some have argued that the overrepresentation of Blacks among threatening criminal suspects in the media illustrates the presence of symbolic racism. This results from Blacks being the disproportionate recipients of negative labels (Entman, 1990; 1992). As Chiricos et al. (2004) suggest “there may be no more apposite expression of what has been called “modern racism” than the simple equation of violence, gangs, drugs, and crime with Blacks” (2004: 380). Entman (1992) thought that media depictions of Blacks in both criminal and noncriminal images encouraged levels of modern racism. To Entman (1992), noncriminal images of Blacks in the news that included the use of Black news anchors implies that racial discrimination is no longer a problem since Blacks are involved in positions that had historically belonged primarily to whites. This suggests that Blacks in society are no longer subject to discrimination. The fact that Blacks are shown as criminals and news anchors implies that racial discrimination is no longer a problem but also promotes stereotypes of Blacks as criminals.

Using data from the American National Election Survey, Tuch and Hughes (2011) found that levels of racial resentment<sup>2</sup> have not declined in the period from 1986 to 2008. Similarly, data from the General Social Survey from 1994 to 2008 indicate a similar lack of decline in racial resentment. Even in recent times, levels of negative opinion and resentment toward minorities remain relatively constant despite cultural changes and calls for increased levels of tolerance.

The body of literature linking symbolic racism to racial attitudes and opinions implies that it is plausible for the racial typification of crime to result from symbolic racism. Because research has shown that criminal stereotypes (i.e. violence) and negative opinions in general can stem from symbolic racism, it is possible that the racial typification of crime is truly a reflection of these beliefs.

### **Symbolic Racism, Resentment & Stereotypes**

Sears and Henry (2005) reviewed several common criticisms of symbolic racism. One focused on the potential for tautology between the policies that symbolic racism is said to predict and the tenets of symbolic racism. In its early stages, researchers used opposition to busing



policies and affirmative action as indicators of symbolic racism to then predict other racial policy attitudes. The criticism was that all of these opinions likely shared the same root cause. Sears and Henry (2005) point out that such tautologies have been corrected, as the measures used to indicate symbolic racism have been refined and no longer mention such policies. However, the potential for an additional concern may still be present in terms of using symbolic racism to predict the racial typification of crime.

It can be argued that the racial typification of crime is akin to saddling minorities with a negative stereotype, and that it is an expression of symbolic racist beliefs (Chiricos et al. 2004). The possibility remains that the measures commonly identified as “symbolic racism” really only reflect racial resentment, a component of symbolic racism. Recent extensions of symbolic racism have summarized the four main themes as indicative of racial resentment rather than the whole concept of symbolic racism (Unnever and Cullen, 2010; Buckler et al. 2009). The racial typification of crime then reflects the continuation of these resentments and the expression of these resentments in a negative stereotype. The racial typification of crime may also be used as a justification for prejudice. Individuals do not want to seem racist or prejudiced and so claim that their lack of support for policies directed toward minorities is due to minorities’ association with criminality rather than due to prejudice. Unnever and Cullen (2010) suggest that those who harbor prejudice against minorities have their beliefs justified when that group is saddled with a criminal label.

The full concept of symbolic racism may be a combination of the measures of racial resentment and some form of negative attitude toward racial minorities- like opposition to affirmative action and the belief that racial minorities are lazy, unintelligent, or criminal. Indeed, other researchers have recently suggested such a phrasing of traditional symbolic racism measures. Unnever and Cullen (2010) created a racial resentment scale that corresponds to a measure of the four core symbolic racism measures and a racial stereotype scale composed of stereotypes about racial minorities as lazy, unintelligent, and untrustworthy. They tested whether racial resentment and racial stereotypes reflected a single underlying construct, which might indicate the larger concept of symbolic racism, but their results indicated that the two were separate and distinct concepts. Similarly, Sears and Henry (2003) also tested whether symbolic racism loaded on a scale with political conservatism or traditional racial attitudes and prejudice over several years of data. Their results revealed that conservatism and prejudice are separate

and that symbolic racism loads on both at different times, but not consistently. Sears (1988) suggested that anti-Black attitudes, a component of symbolic racism, encompass “fear, avoidance, and a desire for distance, anger, distaste, disgust, contempt, apprehension, unease, or a simple dislike” of African Americans (page 70). This negative attitude could easily include negative stereotypes like the racial typification of crime. The question to be answered is whether the racial typification of crime is just anti-Black affect or if such stereotypes truly reflect a distinct concept that results from symbolic racism.

Overall, the symbolic racism perspective would argue that to characterize minorities with negative stereotypes and labels- lazy, criminal/violent, unintelligent- is the result of prejudiced views toward those groups. Rather than stating outright that these groups are not liked or that one would prefer to not interact with these groups, the stereotypes may justify resistance toward minorities. Based on the conceptual theoretical model of symbolic racism, proposed by Sears and Henry (2005), attitudes toward crime and opinions on crime related policies may stem from symbolic racist beliefs. Those who hold beliefs consistent with the themes of symbolic racism (that Blacks push too hard, that other groups have worked their way up so Blacks should too, that Blacks have gotten more than their fair share, and that Blacks really do not face much discrimination) are those who will also oppose policies that directly and predominantly benefit Blacks. These individuals also hold stereotypes that Blacks do not hold traditional values like hard work and perseverance. Thus it might be expected that stereotypes, like the racial typification of crime, may be derived from attitudes consistent with symbolic racism.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **GROUP CONTACT**

Ramasubramanian (2007) suggests that “stereotypes are created and altered based on first-hand experiences with members of stigmatized groups and second-hand information from sources such as mass media, friends, and family” (2007: 249). First hand experiences with out-group members often come in the form of contact at work, in the community, and with friends. Levels of group contact have been found to be predictive of stereotypes of minorities such that increased contact reduces adherence to negative stereotypes (Dixon and Rosenbaum , 2004; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). However, recently, researchers have suggested that increased intergroup contact may actually activate negative stereotypes about minority groups (Mears, Mancini, and Stewart, 2009; Mears and Stewart 2010). Rather than allowing individuals to develop positive attitudes, contact may educate about a group’s criminal behavior. As the racial and ethnic typification of crime are stereotypes that associate race and crime and ethnicity and crime, levels of intergroup contact will be examined here to determine their possible effects on criminal stereotypes.

#### **Basic Concepts & Theoretical Development**

According to Allport’s contact hypothesis, increased contact among racial or ethnic groups leads to decreased prejudice (Allport, 1954). Exposure to members of out-groups will curtail negative attitudes and resentment that have developed. The contact hypothesis is based on the idea that familiarity breeds fondness; increased interaction will lead to positive perceptions and views. Increased contact reduces prejudice by reducing anxieties about the out-group and by increasing empathy toward the out-group more so than just increasing knowledge about the out-group (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2008).

Allport’s hypothesis does not suggest that contact will always breed positive outcomes; he views the relationship as conditional rather than absolute. Allport identified four required conditions for contact to lead to positive attitudes: the group members in contact need to have an equal status, intergroup cooperation needs to be present, the groups need to have common goals, and overall, authority endorsement of the contact needs to be present. Pettigrew (1998) states that

equal status is “difficult to define” insinuating that equal status may either be present at the onset of contact or that equal status may be developing. However, recent advances in group contact theory have challenged the necessity of Allport’s conditions (Pettigrew, Tropp, Wagner, Christ, 2011; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). A meta-analysis composed of 515 studies with more than 250,000 subjects concluded that Allport’s conditions are not actually necessary for contact to lead to positive attitudes (Pettigrew, Tropp, Wagner, Christ, 2011). The review indicates that the prejudice reduction effect is indeed greater in those studies where all conditions are met, but a non trivial number of studies also exhibit the same end result without the conditions of intergroup cooperation, common goals, equal status, and authority support. Recent research on group contact suggests that these goals are not all equally important (Koschate and van Dick, 2011); only common goals and equal status were found to have the effect of reducing bias.

Some research has shown that the positive effects of inter-group contact may be generalizable to the out-group as a whole and to other situations (Pettigrew et al., 2011; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). Interaction with a few group members can lead to positive attitudes and effects that extend beyond that one situation, potentially to all members of that group and all future interactions with that group. Generalizations to all out-group members are more likely to occur when group salience is present (Hewstone and Brown, 1986). That is, in order for the contact to have the effect of reducing negative attitudes and stereotypes, the group distinctions need to be noticeable. Researchers imply that “the more actual interactions that take place between cross-group friends over the course of the relationship, the more opportunities exist for friends both to be reminded of their differing group memberships as well as to learn that they are each unique individuals who may share some meaningful commonalities” (Davies, Tropp, Aron, Pettigrew, Wright., 2011: 341).

Other researchers have refuted the likelihood of contact with out-group members where group distinctions and boundaries are absolutely clear. Pettigrew (1998) suggests that since individuals tend to seek others like them, when inter-group contact occurs it is likely between two individuals who are more similar than different. It is likely then, that the out-group member involved in the contact is actually not a typical group member, their group membership is not as salient and the contact is not viewed as inter-group but rather interpersonal (Hewstone and Brown, 1986; Ortiz and Harwood, 2007). Further, contact with atypical group members is a type of contact that is not likely to lead to diverse and generalizable results (Pettigrew, 1998).

## **Tests of Group Contact**

A meta-analysis of research dealing with group contact theory concluded from over 500 studies that increased contact between groups does indeed decrease intergroup prejudice (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). Their results indicate that these effects are stronger for experimental vs. non-experimental studies and for those instances when the contact is not voluntary (as would be found in an experiment rather than general social interactions).

Other recent studies on intergroup contact have focused on the effects of contact via cross-group friendships (Davies et al., 2011; Pettigrew 1997, 1998; Turner and Feddes, 2011). Pettigrew (1997, 1998) felt that friendship contact should be the focus of research, as these types of contact generally occur over time, involve a higher quality of contact leading to a deeper relationship, and are more likely to conform to all of Allport's ideal conditions. Pettigrew (1997) found that friendships have stronger and more consistent effects on prejudice than co-worker and neighborhood contacts across samples from 7 European countries. A meta-analysis of friendship contact found a strong positive effect of friendship contact on attitudes toward out-groups (Davies et al., 2011). Their analysis found little variation based on the type of cross group friendship (identified as time spent, self-disclosure, closeness, perceived inclusion, number of out-group friends, and percentage of all friends who are out-group members), but the strongest effects were for time spent and self disclosure. Examining the effects of out-group friendship over time, Turner and Feddes (2011) found that intimate self-disclosure to an out-group friend resulted in more positive attitudes toward the out-group 6 weeks later. The authors found that this reduction of negative attitudes was accomplished by reducing levels of anxiety toward the out-group. A recent study examined the relationship between Latino contact and attitudes toward Latino groups and found that close and consistent non-kin contact with Latinos can reduce negative attitudes like stereotypes and opinions regarding policies targeted toward Latinos (Ellison, Shin, and Leal, 2011). The authors suggest that this type of contact is most often found in the form of friendships rather than through contact within the context of community or by living in an area with large concentrations of Latino populations.

Other researchers have also examined the effects of contact with out-group members via work, school, and community interaction. Dixon & Rosenbaum (2004) found that contact with out-group members at work, school, and in the community may meet Allport's conditions of common goals, authority sanctioning, equal status, and intergroup cooperation. School and

community contact were more consistently linked to promoting positive relationships while contact at work only did so for certain groups. The desegregation of the Merchant Marines, while not being a traditional work environment, is an example of work contact affecting attitudes toward out-group members. This resulted in cooperation and cohesion among the Black and White seamen despite coming from diverse and historically prejudiced backgrounds (Brophy, 1946). Regardless of their background and overarching views toward minority groups during that time period, many of the Merchant Marines had low levels of prejudice that appeared to result from the number of times that they had served with minorities. In a recent study testing the effects of each of the hypothesized constructive conditions of group contact, Koschate and van Dick (2011) found that goal interdependence and equal status reduced levels of discord between work groups. It appears then, that work contact may be an appropriate form of contact to reduce negative attitudes.

While group contact does not usually discuss geographic context, it does discuss community contact. A proxy for this type of contact is the size of a group's population in a given geographic area, which can affect how likely or how unlikely group contact is. The size of a minority population is a central feature of threat hypotheses (power threat, social threat, and racial threat). This body of literature generally asserts that the increasing size of minority populations may lead to perceptions of threat by the majority, which will lead to increased social control (Blalock, 1967; Liska, 1992). Social control measures directed against Blacks will intensify as the size of the Black population increases (Liska and Chamlin, 1984). Prejudice and inter-group resentment are viewed as reactions to the presence of a threatening group (Blalock, 1967). The racial typification of crime or the conflation of race and crime is a factor that may link minority presence and support for social control and punitive measures. The idea of a 'criminal Blackman' has been conceptualized as a way to succinctly represent whites' fears about the perceived criminality of Blacks (Russell, 1998). The presence of people stereotyped as associated with crime and deviance is hypothesized to influence the perceived threat of or the level of crime (Chiricos et al., 2004; Liska, Chamlin, and Reed, 1985; Quillian and Pager, 2001). Thus, the association of Blacks and crime, or the racial typification of crime, may be a response to or an expression of the threat that they are perceived to represent. The linkage of minorities and crime may be one method to express the threat that they are perceived to represent.

Researchers have long studied the effects of community on individual opinions and attitudes. Traditionally, the effect of the size of a minority population, which has been used as a measure of community contact, on specific attitudes has been understood in terms of the threat hypothesis. Context, in the form of minority concentration may be relevant to the relationship between contact and attitudes (Stein, Post, and Rinden, 2000). Research has found that context, generally larger concentrations of minority populations, promotes negative attitudes or stereotypes like concern about and fear of crime, and the racial typification of crime (Covington and Taylor, 1991; Chiricos et al., 2004; Eitle and Taylor, 2008; Quillian and Pager, 2010; Taylor and Covington, 1993). Havekes, Uunk, and Gijsberts (2011) used data from the Netherlands and found a U-shaped relationship between community contact, measured as the percent of particular ethnic groups in a neighborhood, and attitudes. At first, the increase in the population size lead to positive attitudes but as the population continued to grow, larger population sizes led to negative attitudes, like stereotypes.

Stein et al.'s (2000) findings suggest that intergroup contact can overcome the negative effects of the size of a minority population. Specifically, they found that the percent Hispanic in a county was associated with less tolerable attitudes toward Hispanics. However, the researchers noted that the interaction between context and contact had a positive relationship with attitudes toward Hispanics. While population size generally promotes negative attitudes, the larger concentration of minorities allows for a greater likelihood of group contact, which could then lead to positive attitudes. Similarly, Sigelman and Welch (1993) found that contact and minority concentration had a positive effect on perceptions of minorities and racial attitudes. Specifically, friendship was found to lower blacks' feelings of hostility toward whites and neighborhood contact (measured as all white, mostly white, about half black and half white, mostly black, and all black) lowered whites feelings of hostility. They make special note that they did not find evidence that neighborhood context led to negative attitudes and emotions toward out-group members.

Proximity, or physical and cultural (i.e. language) proximity, to minorities, specifically Latinos is a "necessary but not sufficient, condition for turning casual contact into close friendship" (Ellison et al. 2011: 952). This suggests that merely living in an area with large concentrations of minorities or merely coming into contact with minorities in the context of living in a community, may not lead to the positive attitudes purported by the contact hypothesis,

especially considering that many of these encounters may involve nothing more than cordial “hellos” and “goodbyes”.

An obvious and understudied question for the contact hypothesis is that of negative contact or contact that is not necessarily pleasant. Not all social interactions involve enjoyable and satisfying exchanges between individuals, and may actually be harsh, difficult, and unfriendly, especially between individuals of different groups. In a meta-analysis on the contact hypothesis, Pettigrew et al. (2011) found that overall, the role of negative contact may not be that important inasmuch as respondents generally, reported more positive contact than negative contact with out-groups. In addition, they note that involuntary negative contact enhances prejudice, which is not the consequence of voluntary negative contact. Paolini, Harwood, and Rubin (2010) found that negative contact increased group salience which may promote prejudice by reinforcing perceived differences between an individual and out-group members, which in turn promoted more negative contact.

Examining whether personal or vicarious contact are sufficient for the development of positive perceptions Ortiz and Harwood (2007) concluded that viewing out-group members vicariously, (i.e. on television) did lead to slightly more positive attitudes toward these groups. However, these results are cautionary due to the inability to control for reverse causality; that those with positive attitudes toward these groups seek out media images of these groups. A test of personal intergroup friendships and extended cross group friendships, where an individual has knowledge that their friends have friends from another group, found that while personal intergroup friendships were more strongly related to positive out-group attitudes, the indirect form of friendship was also found to have an impact (Turner, Hewstone, Voci, Paolini, and Christ, 2007).

Few studies have examined the effects of contact on attitudes toward Latinos. Dixon and Rosenbaum (2004) studied the sources of anti-Black and anti-Hispanic stereotypes and found that group contact does help to overcome these negative stereotypes. However, the type of contact was integral to this relationship. Specifically, whites’ contact with Blacks at work, at school, and in their communities and contact with Hispanics at school and in the community decreased anti-Black and anti-Hispanic stereotypes (Dixon and Rosenbaum, 2004). Ellison et al. (2011) examined the relationship between contact and attitudes toward Latinos. In this study, the results indicated that those with close contact, generally friendships, had lower levels of negative



stereotypes toward Latinos like laziness, unintelligence and a lack of commitment to family. However, the concentration of Latinos in a respondents SMSA was not significantly related to attitudes toward Latinos. These researchers also found that this contact predicted favorable views on immigration policies. The findings from this study also suggest that Blacks have more favorable views of Latinos than do whites.

While there appears to be much research that does support the contention that intergroup contact leads to positive attitudes toward out-group members, not all research findings are consistent in this regard. In a study of concern about crime, Mears, Mancini, and Stewart (2009) found that increased group contact was actually related to more concern about crime. The authors suggest that this is possibly the result of group contact activating stereotypes about Blacks. Mears and Stewart (2010) also found that increased contact with Blacks increased fear of crime for whites. While these studies do not explore the effect of contact on attitudes toward the out-group, they are relevant as they explore the effects on a subject that has been inextricably linked to minority groups. On the surface, these studies appear to offer evidence counter to the group contact hypothesis. However, the exact pathway between contact and opinions about crime is not known. While the authors speculate that stereotypes are being activated by contact, the possibility remains that the increased concern about crime results from gaining knowledge about another group's experience with crime and the criminal justice system, which is typically more common.

Related to this, researchers have criticized the group contact hypothesis as being Utopian and unlikely in the real world. Critics of the experimental and controlled studies of group contact suggest that it is not surprising when no support or results contradictory to Allport's expectations are found (Dixon, Durheim, and Tredoux, 2005). Intergroup contact does not occur inside a vacuum, there are a number of contextual factors that can affect the tone of contact including the larger political and social climates in society.

Overall then and in relation to racial and ethnic groups, the group contact theory would predict more favorable perceptions of these groups with more contact. Thus, the contact hypothesis would suggest the opposite of the racial threat perspective. Rather than breeding animosity and threat, increasing minority populations would be expected to promote acceptance and in the case of negative stereotypes, reduce levels of racial typification. Individuals who come in contact with Blacks may be less likely to racially typify crime despite media exposure or the

presence of symbolic racism. Drawing on the fact that most Blacks are not actually criminal, it is expected that individuals who have more interaction with Blacks will generally, be less likely to hold views consistent with the racial typification of crime and that the type of contact will also matter.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **MEDIA**

Though Blacks and Latinos comprise 12.6 and 16.3% of the United States population, respectively (Census, 2010), there are still many places in the United States that remain segregated. For some individuals then, images of these minority populations may not come from direct contact, but rather vicarious contact via the media. Research on the media is mixed; some find that there is an overrepresentation of minorities in terms of crime. Others suggest that they are not overrepresented compared to their proportion of actual crime, but when they are represented they are more likely to be shown in connection with crime than not (Barak, 1994; Dixon, 2008a). The repeated association of minorities and crime could potentially lead to the stereotype that minorities are criminal. In fact, research has found that the repeated presentation of Blacks and criminal images in the media is associated with adoption of criminal stereotypes about Blacks (Dixon, 2008a). Due to the fact that some individuals may obtain information about minorities almost exclusively from the media, it is expected that media consumption may be a driving force behind the racial typification of crime.

#### **Basic Concepts & Theoretical Development**

For decades, researchers in communication and sociology alike have been documenting the portrayals of race and crime in the media (Barak 1994; Barlow, 1998; Chiricos & Eschholz, 2002; Entman, 1992; Eschholz, Chiricos, & Gertz, 2003; Lowry, Nio, & Leitner, 2003). Media characterizations are “viewed as the principal representations by which the average person comes to know or make sense out of crime and justice in America” (Barak, 1994: 3). Additionally, as Chiricos and Eschholz point out, “it is widely assumed that the popular conflation of crime and race is tied to media images of race and of crime” (2002: 402). For many researchers, the assumption that the media is responsible for stereotypes conflating race and crime is highly plausible.

It has been claimed that the television media (news programs and television shows) has a large effect on the public (Chiricos, Eschholz, & Gertz, 1997; Chiricos, Padgett, & Gertz, 2000; Dowler, 2006; Dowler, 2003; Eschholz, Chiricos, & Gertz, 2003; Gerbner & Gross, 1976). Research has indicated that the media’s fascination with crime and its continued presentation

through the news creates an increased fear of crime in the public (Chiricos et al., 2000; Chiricos et al, 1997; Dowler, 2006; Eschholz et al., 2003; Gerbner, Gross, Morgan, & Signorelli, 1980; Holbert, Shah & Kwak, 2004; Robbers, 2005; Romer, Jamieson, & Aday, 2003; Weitzer & Kubrin, 2004). In some areas, crime accounts for over 75 percent of news coverage (Gilliam & Iyengar, 2000). A recent public opinion poll (60 Minutes, Vanity Fair, CBS News, June, 2011), indicated that 28% respondents felt that there are “too many stories on television about crime.” This response was even stronger among those who are 65 or older.

The prevalence of crime on television shows and news programs creates a constant presentation of crime to the public which can lead to the development of stereotypes about crime and criminals. Cognitive psychologists point to the "availability heuristic," a strategy used by the brain to assess the likelihood of some event or object as a potential explanation for stereotypes (Reisberg, 2006). This “shortcut” is based on the ease with which something comes to mind; the faster the recall, the more available the event or object. Presented with the consistent focus of crime in the media, many may develop images about crime and criminals from what they see or hear in the media. In many cases, the depiction of crime and the criminal justice system presented through news programs and dramatic television shows may be taken as reality despite its possible distortions (Eschholz et al. 2003). The media disproportionately portrays homicide and other violent crimes as common despite their relative infrequency compared to other crimes (Casey & Mohr, 2005; Eschholz et al., 2003; Gilliam and Iyengar, 2000). A dramatic increase in the number of respondents indicating crime as the most important problem facing society in the 1990’s, was found and attributed to the increase in television portrayals of crime and criminals (Lowry, Nio, and Leitner 2003). Thus, the media is believed to be instrumental in developing views on crime and criminals.

The media are not constant, they have changed over decades and years to more appropriately reflect the needs and values of the time. Tracing the evolution of media depictions of criminals, Barak suggests that overtime these depictions have become “less human, less rational, and less Eurocentric; they have become more animalistic, vengeful, and ethnic/racial” (1994: 4). Further, he asserts that “criminal predator has become a euphemism for young, Black males” (1994: 5). Barlow (1998) reviewed the coverage of crime in Time & Newsweek magazine from the mid 1940s through the mid 1990s. She concluded that the linkage of race and crime has evolved over the past 50 years, from more direct linkages in the 1960s to more indirect

linkages beginning in the 1970s. These indirect linkages are made by references to "inner city areas" and Blacks as victims of crime rather than overtly saying Blacks are criminals. Kellstedt (2003) reported that as media depictions of Blacks change, so does public opinion on race policy. For example, when the media portrays Blacks as being treated unfairly, public opinion is more liberal whereas when Blacks are portrayed as being treated more fairly, public opinion is more conservative.

### **Over or Under-Representation?**

Prior research on the presentation of offenders in the media shows inconsistent results. Some researchers conclude that minorities in general, and Blacks in particular are over represented among criminal images (Dixon, 2006; Dixon, Azocar, and Casas, 2003; Dixon and Linz, 2000). These individuals may be often overrepresented as perpetrators (Dixon 2006) or under represented among non-criminal images (Chiricos and Eschholz, 2002). Poindexter, Smith, and Heider's (2003) results indicated that stories, in which Blacks were the main subject, were more likely to be about crime than stories where whites are the focus. On the other hand, some researchers find that compared to their proportion of crimes reported to the FBI, Blacks are actually underrepresented as criminals in the media (Eschholz, 1998). A content analysis of television news programs in Orlando, Florida found that Blacks were not overrepresented on television news relative to their proportion of the general population or their proportion of all arrests, but they were likely to be portrayed as more threatening criminal suspects (Chiricos and Eschholz, 2002). Specifically, Blacks were more likely to be shown as more menacing or threatening criminal images than whites. In relation to ethnic typification, Hispanics were slightly overrepresented as crime suspects compared to their proportion of the general population. Additional research has also found Blacks to be overrepresented among threatening criminal images in the media (Entman, 1992; Gilliam and Iyengar, 2000). Research assessing the perceived culpability of television news suspects suggests that heavy television news viewers are more likely to judge a Black suspect as guilty than they are to judge a white suspect as guilty (Dixon, 2006).

In a recent study, Bjornstrom, Kaufman, Peterson, and Slater (2010) examined the racial and ethnic representations of crime and criminals in news portrayals. Their results did not

indicate a significant difference between the representations of white criminals compared to Black criminals, meaning their levels of representation were not statistically different. Because there are more white offenders, Bjornstrom et al. expected there to be a difference between levels of representation, specifically, that whites would be represented more. Since the levels of representation in the media were not different, this indicates an overrepresentation of Blacks, who should have had lower levels of representation compared to whites. Additionally, the portrayal of Hispanic criminals was found to be under-representative of their portion of crime and the population.

### **Media & Stereotypes**

Through the depictions of Blacks and Latinos as criminals in the media, stereotypes may be formed about these groups as criminal and violent. The messages the media sends regarding race and crime can serve to prime individuals' minds which then may evoke stereotypes, like the racial typification of crime (Mendelberg, 2008). Similarly, Dixon & Azocar (2007) suggested that the repeated presentation of Blacks as criminal in the media "leads to repeated cognitive activations of stereotypes[s]" of Blacks as criminal which in turn increases the likelihood of drawing on the stereotype in the future.

In an experimental study, Gilliam and Iyengar (2000) assessed the impact of racial priming or cues. They found that even among subjects who were shown a crime story without an image of the culprit, respondents more often reported that the suspect in the story was Black, producing similar results to those who were actually shown an image of a Black person along with the story. Additionally, the researchers found that the use of race cues in the form of images led to higher levels of racial resentment.

Dixon (2008a) examined the relationship between viewing local news and opinions about crime and Blacks. Using a measure of the degree to which each television station overrepresented Blacks as criminals, he found a positive association between overrepresentation and stereotypes of Blacks as violent. "Alertness" to the news also increased concern about crime and perceived culpability of Black suspects. Further, Dixon suggests that this overrepresentation exposure and attention to crime news may create "repeated cognitive activation of the stereotype linking Blacks with criminality" (2008a: 121). In another study, Dixon (2008b) explored the effects of viewing network news on perceptions of Blacks in LA County. The results indicated

that increases in the number of hours spent watching network news are associated with an increase in stereotypes of Blacks (the 7-item stereotype measure was not defined), an increase in modern racism, and a decrease in assessments of Blacks' incomes.

Dixon and Maddox (2005) found that heavy viewing of media stories with Black perpetrators who have a darker skin tone led to feelings of concern about the crime story. They concluded that the "dark skin tone of a Black target was necessary to achieve the threshold toward activating racial stereotypical associations with Black criminals" and that crime news primed individual stereotypes (Dixon and Maddox, 2005: 1564). Also, victims of Black perpetrators were rated more positively (i.e. friendly, attractive, intelligent, and sympathetic) while the ratings of perpetrators as either positive or negative were not significant. Media presentations can have the power to influence public opinion toward minorities and criminals.

Providing support for the assertion that the media can foster the development of negative stereotypes, Ramasubramanian (2010) modeled how media consumption can lead to stereotypes, prejudice, and reduced support for racially linked policies. There was a positive relationship between depictions of Latinos and Blacks as criminal and lazy on TV and stereotypes about these groups. The stereotype of laziness was related to prejudiced feelings and attitudes, which in turn led to less support for affirmative action. The criminal stereotype directly reduced support for affirmative action.

By viewing depictions of Blacks and Latinos as criminals and involved in crime in the media, stereotypes may develop in line with these images. Ramasubramanian (2007: 250) suggests that "stereotypical thoughts about out-groups are readily *activated* at the *implicit* level even though they are not *applied* consciously at the *explicit* level." Even implicit presentations in the media, the mere repeated presentation of stories where a criminal is Black can lead to crime stereotypes. Additionally, frequent and recent stereotypes are more readily activated, thus the frequent media presentation may lead to more activation of the stereotype in the future. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that levels of media consumption would impact racial and ethnic typifications of crime.

# CHAPTER FIVE

## CURRENT STUDY

The goal of the current study is to examine the development of the racial and ethnic typification of crime, by assessing the relative importance of several key factors that may potentially affect these stereotypes that so persistently link minorities and crime.

Based on the bodies of literature just reviewed that deal with symbolic racism, intergroup contact, and media consumption, the hypotheses I examine are as follows. Each of the hypotheses will be examined in terms of both racial and ethnic typification.

- Hypothesis 1a: The association between racial resentment and the racial/ethnic typification of crime will be positive; individuals who exhibit beliefs consistent with the racial resentment portion of symbolic racism will also racially typify crime.
  - Hypothesis 1b: McConahay & Hough (1976) suggest that those who have beliefs consistent with symbolic racism resentment often have little personal reference in making judgments about Blacks. Thus, it is expected that racial resentment will predict racial typification for those who have low levels of contact with minorities.
- Hypothesis 2a: Based on traditional tests of group contact theory, the association between group contact and the racial/ethnic typification of crime will be negative; individuals with increased overall contact with racial minorities will be less likely to typify crime in racial/ethnic terms.
  - Hypothesis 2b: Based on recent extensions of group contact theory, it can also be expected that the association between group contact and the racial/ethnic typification of crime will be positive with increased group contact supporting stereotypes about minorities and crime.
  - Hypothesis 2c: Additionally, since researchers have found that group contact among friends, schoolmates, and community members are the types of contact more likely to promote positive affect than contact with co-workers, it is expected that friendship and community contact will lead to decreases in racial typification.



- Hypothesis 3a: The association between media consumption and the racial/ethnic typification of crime will be positive; individuals who more frequently utilize the media by watching TV news programs, crime drama programs and looking at news on the internet will typify individuals as criminal in accordance with stereotypes often portrayed in the media.
  - Hypothesis 3b: As Entman (1992) suggested that media presentations of Blacks may promote beliefs consistent with modern racism, it is also expected that beliefs consistent with racial resentment will mediate the relationship between media consumption and the racial/ethnic typification of crime.
  - Hypothesis 3c: Because viewing out-group members in the media could be considered a form of vicarious group contact, it is possible that an interaction exists between group contact and media consumption. Those who lack contact with minorities may be more influenced by media presentations of criminals than those who have contact with minorities. It is expected the viewing out-group members in the media will matter more for those with less intergroup contact. The expected positive association between media and intergroup contact will be stronger for lower levels of contact than for higher levels.
  
- It is unclear whether the racial typification of crime is a result of racial resentment, or whether the racial typification of crime and racial resentment are separate parts of the larger concept of symbolic racism. Potential commonality between these two concepts will be assessed.
  - Hypothesis 4: Racial resentment and the racial typification of crime are not by themselves representative of symbolic racism, but together may represent the full concept of symbolic racism that includes both resentment and negative stereotypes. It is expected then, that the measure of racial resentment and racial typification will load on the same factor.
  
- Research has long explored the effects of community context (i.e. the size of a minority population on attitudes and opinions, generally finding support for the threat hypothesis.

However, recent studies (Soss et al. 2003; Stein et al, 2000) have found that group contact mitigates the effect of population composition on attitudes.

- Hypothesis 5a: Based on research that finds minority concentration can lead to negative attitudes toward minorities, it is expected that minority concentration will exacerbate the effects of prejudice (racial resentment) on racial typification.
  - Hypothesis 5b: It is expected that group contact (the scale measure indicating contact at work, in the community, and with friends) will counteract the often negative effect of minority concentration (measured as the percent of Blacks/Hispanics in a ZIP code). As such, the effects of group contact on racial and ethnic typification of crime will appear smaller based on minority concentration.
- The racial typification of crime is a continuous measure, so some respondents will have higher levels of typification than others. In addition to the general relationship between the predictors and typification, the effect of these predictors on differing levels of typification will be examined. The rationale behind this is to determine whether the same processes are involved in predicting higher and lower levels of typification. For example, if symbolic racism predicts only high levels of typification, it might suggest that high levels of typification are due to prejudice while those who typify at low levels do not exhibit such prejudice. Since the racial typification of crime is not a measure of the extent to which stereotypes represent an exaggeration, but simply a measure of the degree to which individuals associate minorities and crime, it is expected that high levels of this measure may be fundamentally different from low levels.
    - Hypothesis 6: Though not rooted in prior empirical results of specific theoretical positions established in the literature, it seems logical and reasonable to conjecture that the effects of racial resentment and group contact will differ based on levels of racial and ethnic typification.
  - Race and ethnicity are not mutually exclusive categories. Individuals who identify themselves primarily as Latino can also identify themselves racially, as either white or Black. Additionally, in some instances, race and ethnicity may not be readily identifiable

by others. Since a number of the survey questions here asked respondents to indicate their level of contact with members of other groups, it is possible that respondents may have been thinking of individuals who could have been classified as either Black or Latino. Also, it is possible that opinions about out-group members may not be as specifically classified as Blacks and Latinos but may be more generally grouped as “minorities”.

- Hypothesis 7a: Given that the differentiation between Latino and Black categorization may be fluid for some, it is expected that black contact will have a positive effect on the ethnic typification of crime.
- Hypothesis 7b: It is expected that Latino contact will have a positive effect on the racial typification of crime.

### **Data & Methods**

The data used to test these hypotheses come from a national random telephone survey collected from December 2009 to January 2010. Respondents are all adults (18 years or older) and chosen using the “most recent birthday” method (Kish, 1965). Interviews were conducted using computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) by trained interviewers from Research Network<sup>3</sup>. The response rate for this survey, calculated in accordance with the AAPOR (2008) is 30%. While the response rate may be low compared to traditional phone research, when compared to recent studies utilizing random digit dialing (e.g. Hirschfield and Piquero, 2010; King and Wheelock, 2007), this is a comparable response rate. In addition, of those who began the survey, 89% did complete the survey. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for all variables in the analyses.

The first dependent variable, the *racial typification of crime*<sup>4</sup>, is an index comprised of 4 variables measuring what percentage of certain crimes respondents feel are committed by racial and ethnic groups. Respondents were asked “When you think about people who break into homes and businesses, approximately what percent would you say are White, what percent would you say are Black, and what percent would you say are Latino?” This question was asked in reference to breaking into homes and businesses, robbing other people at gunpoint, selling drugs, and about juveniles who commit crime. The racial typification index included those measures referring to Blacks. Using factor analysis, all four items loaded with an Eigen value of 2.277, and factor loadings above .78. The index obtained an alpha value of .84. The second

dependent variable, the *ethnic typification of crime*, is an index similar to the racial typification index except the questions pertaining to Latinos were used to create the index. All items included in the ethnic typification index loaded with an Eigen value of 2.675 and factor loadings of .74 or higher. The alpha coefficient for this index is .89.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N	Skewness	Kurtosis
Index of Racial Typification	39.95	15.76	484	0.892	1.873
Break into homes and businesses	40.461	18.605	463	0.862	1.131
Robbing others at gun point	42.276	19.077	462	0.704	1.029
Selling Drugs	38.649	20.5	473	3.103	26.092
Juveniles who commit Crime	39.662	17.536	467	0.914	1.727
Index of Ethnic Typification	32.33	16.49	483	1.284	3.307
Break into homes and businesses	31.516	18.25	459	1.171	2.691
Robbing others at gun point	31.247	18.986	457	1.1	2.443
Selling Drugs	33.459	19.979	473	1.175	2.012
Juveniles who commit Crime	32.919	17.644	466	1.122	2.627
Index of Racial Resentment	2.456	0.403	515	0.064	-0.135
Index of Ethnic Resentment	2.469	0.396	512	-0.222	0.032
Media Consumption					
TV news hours/week- logged	1.814	0.947	449	-0.267	2.588
Crime Drama hours/week- logged	1.513	1.001	326	0.214	2.307
Internet news/week- logged	1.179	0.936	262	0.359	2.585
Index of Black contact	0	1	441	1.758	4.267
Black close friends	13.736	20.514	455	2.111	4.805
Black co-workers	12.037	14.95	511	1.909	5.076
Blacks within a mile	12.1	17.537	508	2.062	4.631
Index of Latino Contact	0	1	442	2.017	6.01
Latino close friends	11.861	19.698	454	2.353	5.904
Latino co-workers	72.971	27.182	509	-0.94	0.011
Latinos within a mile	13.306	22.608	507	5.013	49.353
Index of Perceived Risk	0	1	496	1.077	0.8
Control Variables					
Age	56.701	16.332	520	-0.312	-0.542
Female	0.558	0.497	520	-0.233	-1.953
Education	5.3	1.208	512	-0.021	-0.19
Conservative	0.479	0.5	495	0.085	-2.001
Income	3.608	1.602	391	0.038	1.849
Black	0.064	0.245	516	3.575	10.821
Latino					
Racial Composition- logged	9.881	2.501	514	-0.226	2.441

Ethnic Composition- logged	9.546	2.551	514	-0.693	2.961
Violent Crime Rate- logged	4.829	0.778	467	-0.383	4.791

The *racial resentment* measure is an index comprised of four items taken from Sears and Henry (2005) and Unnever and Cullen (2010). These measures are: “There is a lot of discrimination against Blacks in the US today, limiting their chances to get ahead;” “Other minorities such as the Irish, Italians, and Jews overcame prejudice and worked their way up without special favors, Blacks should do the same;” “Over the years, Blacks have gotten more than they deserve;” and “Historical events have made it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class.” The questions pertaining to working their way up and getting more than they deserve are recoded to ensure that all variables are in the same direction—strongly agree became number 5, etc. These items were factor analyzed with an Eigenvalue of 1.129, factor loadings above .50, and an alpha coefficient of .62. The same indices have been created for questions pertaining to Latinos. The *ethnic resentment* scale has an Eigenvalue of 1.159 and an alpha value of .59.<sup>5</sup>

Three questions are used to assess a respondent’s *media consumption*. The questions asked respondents to indicate “Approximately how many hours a week do you spend... watching TV news programs/ watching crime drama programs/ looking at news on the internet.” These items did not load together to form a single measure, instead they are used individually in models and VIF and tolerance statistics will be calculated<sup>6</sup>.

Interracial contact is assessed using three questions referring to friends, co-workers, and neighbors. Respondents were asked to indicate “How many of your close friends would you say are... White/ Black/ Latino;” “How many of the people you talk to at work are... White/ Black/ Latino;”; “How many of the people living within a mile of your home are... White/ Black/ Latino.” These items were used to create composite measures of *Black* and *Latino contact*. The Black contact measure achieved an alpha of .66, an Eigenvalue of 1.058, and all items loaded above .72. The Latino contact measure achieved an alpha of .62, an Eigenvalue of .999, and all items loaded above .74. Additionally, the contact measures will be used individually as research suggests that the type of contact may have different effects on stereotypes.

An index of *perceived risk*<sup>7</sup> is used to control for crime salience in the relationship between these predictor variables and racial typification. This measure is included as a control because those who are more fearful of crime could also be more likely to typify crime simply because crime is a more relevant idea to them. The scale is comprised of six items assessing a

respondent's perceived likelihood of being victimized. Respondents were asked "On a scale from 0 to 10, with 0 being not at all likely and 10 being very likely, how likely is it that you will... have your car stolen/have your home broken into when no one is there/ have your home broken into when someone is home/ be robbed or mugged on the street/ be raped or sexually assaulted/ be murdered." The alpha for this index was .903, all items loaded above .78, and the Eigenvalue for the factor was 3.576.

The county level *crime rate* was included in models to control for the possibility that those living in areas with high crime might tend to typify crime in racial and ethnic terms more than others. This measure was taken from the 2008 Uniform Crime Report County level data available on ICPSR. Due to high levels of skewness, the log of this variable was taken. The mean for this variable is 4.74.

Measures of the racial and ethnic composition of each respondent's ZIP Code are included in the analyses to provide a measure of potential community contact and also to provide context to analyses. Because aggregate areas are not uniform and the size of a minority population can vary dramatically from one area of a county to another, the ZIP Code level of minority concentration is used. These measures are taken from the 2010 Census and indicate the percentage of an area that is composed of Black individuals and the percentage of an area that is composed of Latino individuals. The log of each measure was taken to normalize the variables. The mean for *Racial Composition* is 9.88 and the mean for *Ethnic Composition* is 9.55.

Control variables involved in these analyses include a number of variables presumed to impact public opinions on crime and criminals. These are race, gender, education, political conservatism, and age. Race was measured by a question asking respondents "What race do you consider yourself?" The coded responses were White, Black, Hispanic/Latino/Mexican American, Asian/Pacific Islander, American Indian/Eskimo/Aluet, or Other. A dummy variable that indicates whether a respondent is Black was created. Additionally, a separate question asked respondents whether they considered themselves to be of Latino or Hispanic origin, this variable is used in the analyses. The sample was 85% White, 6% Black, and 6% Latino.

The education variable asked respondents to indicate "What is the highest grade or year of formal education that you completed". Potential responses to this question were "1<sup>st</sup> through 7<sup>th</sup> grade," "8<sup>th</sup> grade," "9<sup>th</sup> through 11<sup>th</sup> grade," "12<sup>th</sup> grade (finished high school)," "Some college, no degree, or AA degree," "Bachelor's degree," "Master's degree, law or similar

graduate degree,” “PhD, MD, or other degree beyond Master’s,” and “other.” The average for this variable is 5.3, which corresponded to the some college category. Political Conservatism indicates whether respondents consider themselves to be politically conservative or not. Respondents were asked “How would you describe yourself politically?” Responses to the question were: very liberal, liberal, middle of the road, conservative, or very conservative. This variable was collapsed so that respondents who indicated that they were conservative or very conservative received a value of 1 while other respondents received a value of 0. The average for this variable indicates that 47% of the sample identifies themselves as conservative or very conservative. Though research on symbolic racism suggests that symbolic racism has roots in conservative views, Sears and Henry (2003) suggest that conservatism measures and racial resentment measures can be used in the same model because they are distinct and not identical.

### **Analytic Strategy**

Because the racial and ethnic typification of crime variables are continuous, the hypotheses will be tested using Ordinary Least Squares Regression with robust standard errors.<sup>8</sup> Since aggregate level measures of the crime rate and population composition are included, a cluster option will be included in models to account for potential autocorrelation. For all models, tolerance and VIF statistics were examined and revealed no apparent issues of multicollinearity, unless otherwise noted.

The first models will test the effects of each independent variable on the racial typification of crime (Table 2) and the ethnic typification of crime (Table 3). Each independent variable will be used in a partial model and then a full model with all three of the hypothesized causes of typification.

Tables 4 and 5 present models testing the effects of several interactions on the racial and ethnic typification of crime. First, as hypothesized, the interaction between group contact and symbolic racism/ethnicism is tested. This is based on the suggestion that those who have beliefs consistent with symbolic racism lack personal references (i.e. contact with minorities) in making decisions about minorities. Additional interactions between group contact and media consumption are also tested in these tables. The rationale for the media-contact interaction is to determine whether group contact can moderate the relationship between the media and typification. Those who lack contact with minorities may be more influenced by indirect

minority representations, like the media than those who have contact with minorities. Tables 6 and 7 further examine these interactions involving group contact by contextualizing respondents into high and low levels of group contact as multiplicative interaction terms may mask effects that differ at high and low levels of contact.

Tables 8 and 9 contextualize the relationships between the predictors and typifications based on minority composition in the respondents' ZIP code. Respondents who live in areas of lower minority composition may have less interaction with minority groups and thus might be more likely to utilize indirect sources (media, already existing attitudes) to form opinions of such groups. On the contrary, those living in higher levels of minority concentration may not be as influenced by the pictures they see in the media as they are by their daily interactions.

The racial typification of crime is a continuous measure; some respondents will have higher levels of typification than others. In addition to the general relationship between the predictors and typification, the effect of these predictors on differing levels of typification will be examined. The general models will be used in Tables 10 and 11 to predict lower and higher levels of typification. The rationale behind this is to determine whether the same processes are involved in predicting higher and lower levels of typification. For example, if symbolic racism predicts only high levels of typification, it might suggest that high levels of typification are due to prejudice while those who typify at low levels do not exhibit such prejudice.

Tables 12 and 13 present results testing the effects of several types of group contact (friends, co-workers, and community) on the racial and ethnic typification of crime. These models are based on prior research (discussed above) that has found that only certain types of contact foster positive relationships between groups.

Table 14 presents the results for the hypothesis testing whether racial resentment and the racial typification of crime load on the same factor. This tests the potential that resentment and stereotypes together form the concept of symbolic racism.

Because group membership may not always be correctly assessed, it is possible that contact with an ethnic group may affect racial attitudes. Additionally, race and ethnicity are mutually exclusive categories. Table 15 presents the results testing whether contact with Latinos can affect opinions about the racial typification of crime and whether contact with Blacks can affect opinions about the ethnic typification of crime.

Finally, Table 16 summarizes the level of support each hypothesis did or did not receive.



## CHAPTER SIX

### RESULTS

#### **Predicting the Racial & Ethnic Typification of Crime**

Table 2 presents clustered OLS results testing hypotheses 1a, 2a, 2b, and 3a that examine the effects of the three main independent variables. Model 1 presents the baseline model that includes only control variables. Individuals who perceive more crime risk, are less educated ( $p < .001$ ), and are male ( $p < .05$ ) racially typify crime more than those with who perceive less crime risk, are more educated, and female. Model 2a indicates that racial resentment is not a significant predictor of the racial typification of crime, contrary to the hypothesized relationship. Model 2b introduces the group contact variable indicating contact with Blacks, and shows it is positively related to the racial typification of crime ( $p < .10$ )<sup>9</sup>. It appears then that those with more contact have higher levels of typification. Model 2c introduces measures that capture the amount of media consumption for each respondent. None of these variables are significant; hours spent watching TV news, watching crime drama programs, or looking at news on the internet were not predictive of levels of racial typification of crime. Model 3 presents the full model, which incorporates all independent variables-racial resentment, group contact, and media consumption. The results for this model show that none of the main predictors are significant. Overall, the results in Table 2 are contrary to Allport's expectations of group contact and are consistent with more recent research. More contact with Blacks may be indicative of higher levels of racial typification rather than lower levels of typification. Additionally, education and gender are consistent predictors in these models; lower levels of education and being male are associated with higher levels of typification.

Table 2: Regression of the Racial Typification of Crime on Main Explanatory Variables and Additional Controls

	Model 1	Model 2a	Model 2b	Model 2c	Model 3
Racial Resentment		1.478 (.909)			1.335 (.992)
Group Contact			2.038* (1.096)		1.384 (1.366)
TV News				.034 (.118)	.068 (.185)
Crime Drama				-.006 (.096)	-.063 (.115)
Internet				.052 (.151)	.105 (.200)
Perceived Risk	1.727* (.990)	2.340** (1.218)	1.352 (1.125)	1.651 (1.064)	1.900 (1.327)
Age	.034 (.048)	-.014 (.058)	.039 (.054)	.048 (.051)	.010 (.075)
Black	3.770 (3.482)	9.131** (3.976)	.592 (4.126)	4.435 (3.687)	7.455 (5.385)
Female	-3.938** (1.827)	-4.202** (2.107)	-3.434* (1.977)	-3.736** (1.892)	-3.655 (2.335)
Education	-2.781**** (.800)	-2.269*** (.827)	-2.687*** (.855)	-2.847**** (.839)	-2.218** (.982)
Income	.066 (.662)	-.527 (.704)	.069 (.724)	.155 (.691)	-.713 (.824)
Political Conservatism	2.141 (1.658)	1.850 (2.011)	2.715 (1.816)	2.093 (1.713)	2.816 (2.149)
Racial Comp- Logged	.308 (.350)	.273 (.387)	.135 (.387)	.211 (.358)	-.076 (.415)
Violent Crime-Logged	-.008 (1.081)	.856 (1.184)	.190 (1.116)	.474 (1.179)	1.385 (1.336)
	R <sup>2</sup> =.094 N=306 F(9,302)=3.53 prob F<.000	R <sup>2</sup> =.150 N=220 F(10,219)=4.08 prob F<.000	R <sup>2</sup> =.108 N=266 F(10,262)= 3.34 prob F<.000	R <sup>2</sup> =.097 N=297 F(12,293)= 2.69 prob F<.001	R <sup>2</sup> =.163 N=195 F(14,194)= 2.87 prob F<.000

\*p>.1; \*\*p<.05; \*\*\*p>.01; \*\*\*\*p<.001

Table 3: Regression of the Ethnic Typification of Crime on Main Explanatory Variables and Additional Controls

	Model 1	Model 2a	Model 2b	Model 2c	Model 3
Racial Resentment		.412 (.921)			.454 (.998)
Group Contact			4.128**** (1.138)		4.334*** (1.455)
TVNews				-.098 (.109)	-.171 (.127)
Crime Drama				-.096 (.086)	-.177* (.104)
Internet				-.119 (.136)	.018 (.162)
Perceived Risk	1.924* (1.012)	2.165** (1.100)	1.509 (1.156)	2.320** (1.079)	2.251* (1.241)
Age	-.020 (.048)	-.050 (.063)	.046 (.050)	-.023 (.052)	.057 (.069)
Black	.736 (3.400)	2.529 (4.553)	.453 (3.099)	1.804 (3.578)	3.448 (4.261)
Female	1.936 (1.722)	1.506 (2.060)	3.335* (1.826)	1.664 (1.780)	2.698 (2.348)
Education	.723 (.801)	.620 (.962)	.669 (.803)	.647 (.856)	.593 (1.084)
Income	-1.525** (.594)	-1.415** (.711)	-1.370** (.636)	-1.757*** (.622)	-1.603* (.865)
Political Conservatism	.880 (1.659)	1.508 (2.123)	.231 (1.744)	.733 (1.699)	1.373 (2.330)
Ethnic Comp- logged	.850** (.361)	.999** (.453)	.423 (.426)	.923** (.371)	.459 (.583)
Violent Crime-logged	.773 (1.224)	1.456 (1.337)	.601 (1.262)	.281 (1.362)	.915 (1.568)
	R <sup>2</sup> =.084 N=305 F(9,301)= 2.81 prob<F .003	R <sup>2</sup> =.105 N=215 F(10,214)= 2.49 prob<F.007	R <sup>2</sup> =.156 N=266 F (10,262)= 4.41 prob<F.000	R <sup>2</sup> =.101 N=296 F (12,292) = 2.47 prob<F .004	R <sup>2</sup> =.189 N=188 F (145,187)= 3.37 prob<F .000

\*p>.1; \*\*p<.05; \*\*\*p>.01; \*\*\*\*p<.001

Table 4: Regression of the Racial Typification of Crime on Group Contact Interaction Variables and Additional Controls

	Model 1a	Model 1b	Model 2
Group Contact*Media	-.000 (.001)		-.000 (.001)
Group Contact*Racial Resentment		-.180 (.957)	-.003 (.976)
Racial Resentment		1.202 (.984)	1.362 (1.000)
Group Contact	2.049* (1.217)	1.226 (1.387)	1.337 (1.430)
TV News	.074 (.149)		.049 (.200)
Crime Drama	-.045 (.118)		-.064 (.115)
Internet	.087 (.168)		.113 (.204)
Perceived Risk	1.235 (1.168)	2.042 (1.282)	1.877 (1.322)
Age	.047 (.058)	.001 (.065)	.012 (.077)
Black	.973 (4.189)	6.534 (5.190)	7.640 (5.661)
Female	-3.355 (1.065)	-3.615 (2.243)	-3.738 (2.379)
Education	-2.725*** (.904)	-2.133** (.900)	-2.182** .995
Income	.054 (.764)	-.628 (.793)	-.779 (.851)
Political Conservatism	3.129* (1.880)	2.163 (2.127)	2.787 (2.164)
Racial Comp	.007 (.392)	.111 (.415)	-.070 (.417)
Violent Crime Rate	.489 (1.232)	.965 (1.199)	1.319 (1.356)
	R <sup>2</sup> =.115 N=262 F(14,258)= 2.49 prob<F.002	R <sup>2</sup> =.154 N=199 F(12,198)= 3.28 prob<F.000	R <sup>2</sup> =.164 N=195 F(16,194)= 2.50 prob<F.001

\*p>.1; \*\*p<.05; \*\*\*p>01; \*\*\*\*p<.001

Table 5: Regression of the Ethnic Typification of Crime on Group Contact Interaction Variables and Additional Controls

	Model 1a	Model 1b	Model 3
Group Contact*Media	-.002* (.001)		-.002 (.001)
Group Contact*Racial Resentment		-.371 (.876)	.073 (.955)
Racial Resentment		.319 (.977)	.232 (1.002)
Group Contact	4.658**** (1.172)	3.836*** (1.366)	4.487*** (1.491)
TV News	-.131 (.118)		-.127 (.131)
Crime Drama	-.117 (.095)		-.187* (.106)
Internet	.128 (.159)		.141 (.214)
Perceived Risk	1.744 (1.158)	2.013* (1.216)	2.220* (1.233)
Age	.073 (.054)	.033 (.065)	.055 (.069)
Black	1.596 (3.081)	1.596 (4.102)	3.832 (4.277)
Female	3.132 (1.895)	3.185 (2.182)	2.624 (2.382)
Education	.620 (.884)	.816 (.996)	.695 (1.102)
Income	-1.601** (.671)	-1.298 (.784)	-1.729** (.872)
Political Conservatism	-.014 (1.814)	1.616 (2.272)	1.492 (2.346)
Ethnic Comp	.314 (.439)	.536 (.546)	.474 (.581)
Violent Crime Rate	.517 (1.387)	.830 (1.390)	.692 (1.582)
	R <sup>2</sup> =.181 N=262 F(14,258)= 4.29 prob<F.000	R <sup>2</sup> =.164 N=191 F(12,190)= 3.39 prob<F.000	R <sup>2</sup> =.194 N=188 F(16,187)= 3.27 prob<F.000

\*p>.1; \*\*p<.05; \*\*\*p>.01; \*\*\*\*p<.001

Table 3 presents the basic results predicting the ethnic typification of crime, testing hypotheses 1a, 2a, 2b, and 3a. The baseline model indicates that perceived risk and ethnic composition are positively related ( $p < .05$  and  $p < .05$ ) and income is negatively related to the ethnic typification of crime ( $p < .01$ ). Those who perceive that they have a higher chance of being victimized, live in areas with a larger ethnic concentration and have lower incomes have higher levels of ethnic typification. Racial resentment is not a significant predictor in Model 2a but perceived risk is positively ( $p < .05$ ) related and income is negatively related ( $p < .05$ ) to the ethnic typification of crime. Group contact here is defined as contact with Latinos and is positively related to the ethnic typification of crime, as was found for the racial typification models ( $p < .001$ ). Individuals with more Latino group contact have higher levels of ethnic typification of crime than those with lower levels of Latino group contact. Model 2c assesses the effects of media consumption on ethnic typification and shows that no measures are significant. Finally, the full model reveals that group contact is still positively significant ( $p < .01$ ) and crime drama viewing is negatively related to the racial typification of crime ( $p < .10$ ). Overall then, these models again suggest a positive relationship between group contact and typification. The only other consistent predictor was income which was negatively related to ethnic typification.

Table 4 explores interactions between group contact and both racial resentment and media consumption, testing hypotheses 1b and 3c. It is expected that for those with low levels of contact with minorities, racial resentment and media consumption will be stronger predictors of racial typification. Model 1a presents the multiplicative interaction between media consumption and group contact. The results indicate that this interaction term is not significant. However, group contact itself is still marginally significant and positively related to the racial typification of crime ( $p < .10$ ). Model 1b presents the multiplicative interaction term between symbolic racism and group contact. Again, this interaction is not significant. Model 2 presents the full model with both interaction terms, neither are significant. Contrary to expectations, neither racial resentment nor media consumption are more or less salient for the racial typification of crime in varying contexts of group contact. The control variables indicate that ethnicity is consistently negatively related to the racial typification of crime, those with less education have higher levels of racial typification.

Table 5 presents results for ethnic typification involving several interactions with group contact. The variable measuring the interaction between group contact and the media measures was created by mean centering each variable and multiplying them together. Model 1a tests for an interaction between group contact and media consumption, revealing a marginally significant finding ( $p < .10$ ). This interaction term is negative, supporting the expectation that media consumption will matter more for those individuals with less group contact. Group contact itself is still a strong positive predictor ( $p < .001$ ) and income is negatively ( $p < .05$ ) related to the ethnic typification of crime. Model 1b examines the effect of an interaction between group contact and racial resentment and reveals a non-significant finding. Again in this model though, group contact is a positive predictor of the ethnic typification of crime ( $p < .01$ ). Finally, the full model reveals that neither interaction is significant but as has been seen thus far, group contact is positively related to the ethnic typification of crime ( $p < .01$ ).

Table 6 presents contextual models that further explore the interaction between group contact and predictors of racial typification (hypotheses 1b and 3c). While the multiplicative interaction terms are not significant in Table 3, the possibility remains that predictors of the racial typification of crime could act differently in settings with high contact versus low contact and a multiplicative term could hide this effect. High levels of contact are identified as values higher than the median and low levels of contact are identified as values lower than the median. Model 1 presents the base model for low contact. There is a strong positive significant relationship between race and the racial typification of crime ( $p < .001$ ). Blacks who have low levels of contact with other Blacks have higher levels of racial typification. Model 2a introduces the measure for racial resentment into the model but it is not significant for those with low levels of racial typification. Model 2b adds the media measures, which are also not significant. Finally, the full model is presented in Model 2c, indicating that none of the primary independent variables are significant. In all four models, race is a strong and significant positive predictor of the racial typification of crime. Respondents who are Black and have lower levels of contact with Blacks have higher levels of racial typification than Whites with low levels of contact with Blacks. What could possibly explain this finding? Perhaps as, Mears et al. (2009) and Mears and Stewart (2010), this contact serves an informative function that educates these individuals about the realities of crime and criminals, regardless of race. This education may be as simple as indicating that crime actually happens, it is not an abstract concept or far off event; crime

happens and these individuals now know others who may have perpetrated or been victims of crime.

In the High Contact panel, model 3 presents the baseline model. Perceived risk is positively related to racial typification ( $p < .05$ ); those who have high levels of intergroup contact and who perceive that they have a higher risk of being victimized also have higher levels of racial typification. Education is also negatively and significantly related to the racial typification of crime for those with high levels of contact with Blacks ( $p < .05$ ). The less educated who have high levels of contact with Blacks have higher levels of racial typification than those with higher levels of education. Turning to the additional models for high contact, the results indicate that racial resentment and media consumption are not significant predictors in the context of high contact. Perceived risk, education and ethnicity are fairly consistent across all models. The results presented in this table suggest the presence of racial disparities in the racial typification of crime based on levels of group contact, but there does not appear to be differing effects of racial resentment and media consumption based on group contact.

Table 7 contextualizes models for the ethnic typification of crime based on the level of group contact because the interaction terms may mask different effects at high and low levels. Low group contact is defined as values that fall below the median and high group contact are those values that were larger than the median. Model 1a presents the baseline model for those with low levels of contact with Latinos. In the baseline model, those with low levels of contact who have more education, lower incomes, higher levels of Latino concentration, and lower crime rates have higher levels of ethnic typification than those with less education, more money, low levels of Latino concentration, and higher crime rates. Introducing the resentment predictor shows that this variable is not a significant predictor of ethnic typification. However, education ( $p < .10$ ), income ( $p < .10$ ), ethnic composition ( $p < .05$ ) and the violent crime rate ( $p < .05$ ) are significant. None of the media consumption variables are significant predictors and in model 1c, while ethnic composition, violent crime, education and income remain significant predictors. The full model with all predictors reveals none of the main hypothesized predictors are significant. Race is a strong predictor of the ethnic typification of crime ( $p < .05$ ) and the other control variables remain significant. For those with low levels of contact then, it appears that the most consistent predictors of the ethnic typification of crime are education level, income, the size of the Latino population, and the crime rate. Higher concentrations of Latinos increase levels of the



ethnic typification of crime for those with low levels of contact. Interestingly, lower crime rates are associated with higher levels of typification for those with low levels of Latino contact.

Turning to the estimates for High levels of group contact, none of the models are significant. The baseline model shows that gender ( $p < .05$ ) and the violent crime rate ( $p < .05$ ) are positively related to the ethnic typification of crime. For those with high levels of contact with Latinos, females and those who live in counties with higher crime rates have higher levels of ethnic typification. Introducing the main predictors, Model 2b reveals that ethnic resentment is not a significant predictor nor is the model itself ( $\text{prob} < F.387$ ). Model 2c utilizes the media consumption variables, which are also non-significant. The violent crime rate is positively significant in this model ( $p < .05$ ); for those with high levels of Latino contact, increases in the violent crime rate, correspond to increases in the ethnic typification of crime. Finally, the full model is not a significant model overall ( $\text{prob} < F.538$ ).

Overall then, Table 7 reveals some contingent effects based on levels of group contact. Increases in ethnic composition are associated with increases in ethnic typification of crime at low levels of contact, but as contact increases to higher levels, the effect of ethnic composition is no longer significant. Also, increases in the violent crime rate are associated with decreases in ethnic typification for those with low levels of contact with Latinos, but as contact increases to higher levels, the effect of violent crime becomes positive. This may indicate that increases in violent crime may not be salient when there are low levels of inter-group contact, but when contact is high, violent crime and any increases in the level of crime may be more relevant. The higher relevance of crime resulting from higher group contact may lead to increases in crime related opinions, like the ethnic typification of crime. Perhaps at high levels of contact, the increase in the crime rate may lead to more typification because the increased contact may educate respondents about the reality of crime for the contacted group. In this context, it may be assumed that the higher levels of crime are attributable to Latinos.

Table 6: Regression of the Racial Typification of Crime on Key Explanatory Variables, with Additional Controls within Contexts of High and Low Group Contact

	Low Group Contact				High Group Contact			
	Model 1	Model 2a	Model 2b	Model2c	Model 3	Model 4a	Model 4b	Model 4c
Racial Resentment		2.231 (1.552)		2.377 (1.654)		.899 (1.150)		.809 (1.221)
TV			-.024 (.180)	.086 (.307)			.206 (.201)	.086 (.210)
Crime Drama			.251 (.326)	.106 (.331)			-.060 (.126)	-.027 (.120)
Internet			.071 (.414)	.091 (.450)			-.213 (.181)	-.067 (.194)
Perceived Risk	-.010 (1.567)	1.636 (1.640)	-.029 (1.599)	1.566 (1.690)	3.550** (1.515)	4.092* (2.099)	3.509** (1.654)	3.962* (2.226)
Age	-.025 (.076)	.037 (.095)	-.009 (.090)	.037 (.115)	.076 (.078)	-.046 (.085)	.079 (.090)	-.017 (.116)
Black	18.222**** (2.825)	22.504**** (3.419)	18.074**** (2.915)	22.771**** (3.548)	2.394 (3.825)	7.046 (4.092)	2.465 (3.828)	7.299 (4.749)
Female	-.870 (2.956)	-4.011 (3.326)	-.607 (2.977)	-3.733 (3.239)	-5.473** (2.489)	-2.869 (2.773)	-6.021** (2.743)	-3.422 (3.138)
Education	-2.599** (1.279)	-1.142 (1.325)	-2.448* (1.369)	-1.058 (1.426)	-3.109** (1.221)	-3.623*** (1.365)	-2.822** (1.287)	-3.416** (1.516)
Income	-.393 (1.002)	-1.100 (1.052)	-.391 (1.034)	-1.071 (1.079)	.812 (1.030)	.735 (1.225)	.675 (1.092)	.505 (1.330)
Political Conservatism	4.534 (3.025)	4.163 (3.184)	4.438 (3.116)	4.254 (3.219)	1.298 (2.377)	.902 (2.729)	1.551 (2.490)	1.246 (2.904)
Racial Comp	.116 (.466)	-.032 (.459)	.072 (.480)	-.075 (.471)	.868 (.657)	1.191 (.849)	.642 (.682)	.831 (.879)
Violent Crime Rate	2.472 (1.661)	3.022* (1.815)	2.511 (1.708)	3.101 (1.875)	-2.876* (1.522)	-2.331 (1.605)	-3.077* (1.711)	-2.131 (1.927)
	R <sup>2</sup> =.096 N=134 F(9,133)=13.00 prob<F .000	R <sup>2</sup> =.156 N=108 F(10,107)=11.12 prob<F.000	R <sup>2</sup> =.100 N=133 F(12,132)=10.36 prob<F.000	R <sup>2</sup> =.158 N=107 F(13,106)=9.33 prob<F.000	R <sup>2</sup> =.164 N=131 F(9,129)=2.22 prob<F.024	R <sup>2</sup> =.241 N=90 F(10,89)=2.43 prob<F.013	R <sup>2</sup> =.184 N=128 F(12,126)=1.86 prob<F.046	R <sup>2</sup> =.239 N=87 F(13,86)=1.74 prob<F.066

\*p>.1; \*\*p<.05; \*\*\*p>.01; \*\*\*\*p<.001

Table 7: Regression of the Ethnic Typification of Crime on Key Explanatory Variables, with Additional Controls within Contexts of High and Low Group Contact

	Low Group Contact				High Group Contact			
	Model 1a	Model 1b	Model 1c	Model 1d	Model 2a	Model 2b	Model 2c	Model 2d
Ethnic Resentment		-1.570 (1.697)		-1.769 (1.823)		.061 (1.193)		.075 (1.278)
TV News			-.249 (.175)	-.370 (.300)			-.070 (.217)	-.000 (.237)
Crime Drama			-.128 (.202)	-.114 (.237)			-.017 (.115)	-.034 (.123)
Internet			-.022 (.339)	-.089 (.430)			-.058 (.381)	.001 (.441)
Perceived Risk	2.277 (1.970)	1.397 (2.127)	2.864 (2.057)	2.492 (2.202)	-1.150 (1.420)	.019 (1.774)	-1.094 (1.465)	.029 (1.839)
Age	.007 (.094)	.029 (.112)	.018 (.105)	.014 (.120)	.027 (.071)	-.065 (.098)	.033 (.078)	-.065 (.109)
Black	-2.070 (6.500)	1.827 (8.667)	5.069 (5.997)	15.535** (6.912)	4.073 (4.832)	8.616 (6.468)	4.107 (4.852)	8.617 (6.626)
Female	.061 (3.087)	-.182 (3.761)	-.828 (3.428)	-1.312 (4.526)	5.257** (2.273)	4.720 (2.968)	5.131** (2.346)	4.608 (3.193)
Education	3.676*** (1.344)	2.986* (1.684)	3.498** (1.524)	3.536* (2.001)	-1.377 (1.392)	.095 (1.782)	-1.406 (1.427)	.031 (1.921)
Income	-3.107** (1.219)	-2.803* (1.560)	-3.935*** (1.283)	-4.680*** (1.611)	-.807 (.853)	-1.168 (.994)	-.866 (.860)	-1.193 (1.014)
Political Conservatism	2.631 (3.141)	7.376* (4.249)	2.734 (3.340)	8.504* (4.361)	-.148 (2.340)	-.299 (3.224)	-.304 (2.417)	-.290 (3.199)
Ethnic Comp	1.219** (.521)	1.643** (.657)	1.261** (.557)	2.050*** (.665)	.184 (.803)	.168 (1.001)	.147 (.830)	.157 (1.047)
Violent Crime Rate	-4.832*** (1.708)	-4.331** (2.042)	-5.136*** (1.866)	-5.300** (2.074)	3.869** (1.895)	3.607* (2.045)	3.967* (2.029)	3.612 (2.294)
	R <sup>2</sup> =.167 N=101 F(9,100)=2.18 prob<F.000	R <sup>2</sup> =.182 N=70 F(10,69)= 1.47 prob<F.000	R <sup>2</sup> =.211 N=98 F(12, 97)= 2.71 prob<F.003	R <sup>2</sup> =.289 N=67 F(13,66)= 2.93 prob<F.002	R <sup>2</sup> =.115 N=133 F(9,130)= 1.40 prob<F.196	R <sup>2</sup> =.122 N=97 F(10,96)= 1.08 prob<F.387	R <sup>2</sup> =.117 N=133 F(12,130)= 1.11 prob<F.082	R <sup>2</sup> =.122 N=97 F(13,96)= .92 prob<F.538

\*p>.1; \*\*p<.05.; \*\*\*p>.01; \*\*\*\*p<.001

Table 8 presents models for the racial typification of crime contextualized by the racial composition of those living within a respondent's ZIP code area based on prior research looking at the interaction between contact and context and testing hypotheses 5a and 5b. Prior research has found that intergroup contact can overcome the negative effects of minority concentration on public opinion and attitudes. The predictors of the racial typification of crime are contextualized based on high (above the median) and low (below the median) levels of racial composition. Model 1 presents the baseline model for those in ZIP codes with low levels of racial composition. As can be seen from this model, only education ( $p < .01$ ) is a significant negative predictor of racial typification in areas with low levels of racial composition. Those with less education have higher levels of racial typification in areas with low concentration of Blacks. Model 2a indicates that racial resentment is not a significant predictor. Group contact is again a significant predictor in Model 2b ( $p < .01$ ). In areas of low minority concentration, those having more contact with Blacks have higher levels of racial typification than those with less contact. The media consumption variables are not significant predictors for those in areas with a low Black concentration. Finally, the full model reveals the consistent effects of group contact, showing a positive relationship to the racial typification ( $p < .01$ ). Overall, for those residing in areas with lower levels of racial composition, the racial typification of crime seems to be influenced by levels of group contact and education.

The second panel of Table 8 presents the results for those in areas with a high concentration of Black residents. The baseline model indicates a negative association for education ( $p < .05$ ) and gender ( $p < .10$ ). Among respondents who live in areas where the racial composition is higher than the median, those who are less educated and who are male have higher levels of racial typification. Racial resentment, group contact, and media consumption are not significant predictors in their models. The only somewhat consistent predictors are gender and education which are significant in all models except for 4b for gender and 4c for education. In the full model race is a strong predictor such that Blacks who live in areas with a high racial composition have higher levels of racial typification than non-Blacks ( $p < .05$ ). Overall, these contextual results reveal that group contact does not have a uniform effect on racial typification in areas with differing levels of racial composition; group contact matters for those in areas of low Black composition, but not high Black composition. It was expected that the racial composition of an area would lessen the effect of group contact on attitudes because contextual

composition was assumed to have a negative effect overall. However, in models contextualized by the percentage of blacks, group contact is stronger for lower levels of concentration and not significant for high concentrations, suggesting hypothesis 5b is not supported. It is also possible that contact has a larger impact in areas where contact is less likely to occur, areas with lower concentrations of minorities. In areas with higher concentrations of minorities, contact or changes in contact may not be noticed and thus affect opinions since contact is more likely to occur anyway.

Table 9 contextualizes results for the ethnic typification of crime based on high and low levels of ethnic composition. Low levels of ethnic composition are those with values below the median and high levels are those with values above the median. The baseline model reveals that income is negatively and significantly related to ethnic typification ( $p < .01$ ), education is positively significant ( $p < .10$ ), and ethnic composition is a positively significant ( $p < .05$ ) predictor of the ethnic typification of crime. For those living in ZIP codes with low levels of ethnic composition, respondents who have more education, a lower income, and higher levels of ethnic composition have higher levels of stereotypes of Latinos as criminals. Model 1b introduces the ethnic resentment variable, which exerts a positively significant ( $p < .05$ ) effect on the ethnic typification of crime. For those who live in areas with low levels of ethnic composition, higher levels of ethnic resentment correspond to higher levels of the ethnic typification of crime, suggesting that this criminal stereotype may have some roots in prejudice. Income also retains significant effects in this model and age is positively related to the ethnic typification of crime ( $p < .05$ ). The model introducing group contact once again shows a positive association between contact and the ethnic typification of crime ( $p < .05$ ). Media consumption is not a significant predictor of the ethnic typification of crime. In the full model, ethnic resentment and group contact remain positive and significant ( $p < .10$  and  $p < .05$ ) while viewing crime drama programs reduces ( $p < .05$ ) levels of typifying crime in Latino terms. The results for those living in areas with low levels of ethnic composition indicate that ethnic resentment is a positive predictor and income is a consistent negative predictor of the ethnic typification of crime.

Examining results for those who live in areas with high levels of ethnic composition, the baseline model reveals that gender ( $p < .05$ ) and ethnic composition ( $p < .05$ ) are positively related to the ethnic typification of crime. Respondents living in areas with higher levels of ethnic composition, within the context of high Latino concentration, and who are female have higher

levels of ethnic typification. Even among respondents in areas of high Latino concentration, increases in this concentration are associated with increases in typification. Overall, the effect of Latino concentration on typification is positive, both in areas of low and high concentration. Contrary to the results for low ethnic composition, ethnic resentment is not a significant predictor of the ethnic typification of crime for those who live in areas with high levels of ethnic composition. Group contact exerts a positive effect on the ethnic typification of crime in areas with high levels of Latino composition ( $p < .01$ ). Model 2d shows that media consumption is not a significant predictor of ethnic typification, as has been the case in most other models. Finally, the full model reveals that group contact remains a significant predictor ( $p < .01$ ) independent of the effects of all other variables examined and watching TV news is negative and significant ( $p < .05$ ). Gender is positively related to ethnic typification for those living in areas with high levels of ethnic composition in all models; females have higher levels of typification than males in this context. Taken with the results for low ethnic composition, group contact predicts ethnic typification regardless of the context of ethnic composition. There does not appear to be an interaction between composition and group contact. Overall, the results suggest that the context of ethnic composition moderates the relationship between ethnic resentment and ethnic typification however, the relationship between group contact and ethnic typification remains, regardless of context of composition.

Table 8: Regression of the Racial Typification of Crime on Key Explanatory Variables, with Additional Controls within Contexts of High and Low Racial Composition

	Low Racial Composition					High Racial Composition				
	Model 1	Model 2a	Model 2b	Model 2c	Model 2d	Model 3	Model 4a	Model 4b	Model 4c	Model 4d
Racial Resentment		1.404 (1.518)			.833 (1.679)		1.493 (1.159)			2.183 (1.322)
Group Contact			4.341*** (1.439)		4.313*** (1.505)			.300 (1.538)		-2.044 (1.660)
TV				-.163 (.156)	-.300 (.223)				.231 (.160)	.321 (.262)
Crime Drama				.061 (.125)	-.067 (.112)				-.100 (.160)	-.171 (.247)
Internet				.101 (.361)	-.338 (.502)				-.082 (.197)	.048 (.267)
Perceived Risk	1.480 (1.355)	2.916 (1.920)	.023 (1.376)	1.217 (1.430)	1.318 (1.921)	2.316 (1.495)	2.016 (1.548)	2.876 (1.767)	2.693* (1.604)	2.086 (1.696)
Age	.050 (.074)	-.015 (.089)	.061 (.081)	.067 (.076)	.121 (.116)	.023 (.068)	-.008 (.089)	.044 (.083)	-.041 (.076)	-.037 (.102)
Black	8.433 (6.875)	11.245 (7.749)	1.529 (6.079)	8.100 (6.826)	3.786 (7.060)	.415 (4.042)	8.526** (4.291)	.035 (6.407)	1.424 (4.329)	14.065** (6.888)
Female	-2.856 (2.575)	-2.529 (2.983)	-2.063 (2.694)	-2.519 (2.620)	-2.793 (3.257)	-5.095* (2.611)	-6.602** (2.992)	-4.676 (3.022)	-5.503** (2.773)	-5.184* (3.275)
Education	-3.335*** (1.190)	-2.262* (1.243)	-2.367* (1.268)	-3.627*** (1.203)	-1.964 (1.515)	-2.239** (1.128)	-2.125* (1.200)	-2.828** (1.198)	-2.018 (1.267)	-2.553* (1.449)
Income	.413 (1.032)	-.096 (1.070)	.286 (1.143)	.554 (1.072)	-.218 (1.273)	-.418 (.849)	-1.196 (.903)	-.084 (.899)	-.415 (.915)	-.822 (1.105)
Political Conservatism	1.836 (2.609)	2.183 (3.053)	4.366 (2.678)	1.081 (2.797)	3.420 (3.061)	2.115 (2.377)	1.249 (3.126)	1.584 (2.826)	1.796 (2.437)	.977 (3.593)
Racial Comp	-.073 (.590)	.055 (.728)	-.768 (.629)	-.151 (.602)	-.564 (.747)	1.347 (1.294)	1.502 (1.680)	.571 (1.453)	.662 (1.310)	-.141 (1.728)
Violent Crime Rate	.270 (1.817)	1.559 (1.962)	.986 (1.878)	.655 (1.887)	2.442 (1.987)	.194 (1.182)	.432 (1.327)	.230 (1.277)	.391 (1.376)	1.136 (1.661)
	R <sup>2</sup> =.103 N=149 F(9,147)=2.28 prob<F.020	R <sup>2</sup> =.137 N=112 F(10,111)=2.02 prob<F.037	R <sup>2</sup> =.151 N=133 F(10,131)=2.35 prob<F.013	R <sup>2</sup> =.107 N=146 F(12,144)=2.07 prob<F.022	R <sup>2</sup> =.195 N=102 F(14,101)=2.19 prob<F.013	R <sup>2</sup> =.107 N=157 F(9,145)=1.81 prob<F.070	R <sup>2</sup> =.193 N=108 F(10,107)=2.93 prob<F.002	R <sup>2</sup> =.117 N=133 F(10,130)=1.55 prob<F.127	R <sup>2</sup> =.130 N=151 F(12,148)=1.40 prob<F.172	R <sup>2</sup> =.244 N=93 F(14,92)=1.84 prob<F.043

\*p>.1; \*\*p<.05; \*\*\*p>.01; \*\*\*\*p<.001

Table 9: Regression of the Ethnic Typification of Crime on Key Explanatory Variables, with Additional Controls within Contexts of High and Low Ethnic Composition

	Low Ethnic Composition					High Ethnic Composition				
	Model 1a	Model 1b	Model 1c	Model 1d	Model 1e	Model 2a	Model 2b	Model 2c	Model 2d	Model 2e
Ethnic Resentment		4.824** (2.241)			2.812* (1.551)		-.540 (.837)			-1.438 (.952)
Group Contact			4.615** (2.065)		5.324* (3.008)			3.680*** (1.203)		3.762*** (1.375)
TV				-.137 (.183)	-.076 (.276)				-.093 (.166)	-.454** (.224)
Crime Drama				-.146 (.128)	-.275** (.129)				.010 (.161)	.019 (.246)
Internet				.102 (.453)	-.161 (.531)				-.025 (.148)	.214 (.181)
Perceived Risk	2.363 (1.558)	1.765 (1.755)	1.731 (1.792)	3.169* (1.688)	1.347 (1.914)	1.743 (1.327)	1.572 (1.485)	1.396 (1.557)	1.688 (1.372)	.428 (1.542)
Age	.101 (.074)	.164** (.078)	.167** (.081)	.113 (.088)	.190 (.120)	-.067 (.065)	-.164* (.085)	-.014 (.066)	-.077 (.073)	-.074 (.086)
Black	4.689 (4.951)	3.322 (4.339)	3.484 (4.408)	5.481 (5.142)	5.411 (5.637)	-4.080 (3.953)	1.082 (4.358)	-4.106 (4.190)	-3.217 (4.526)	4.755 (5.379)
Female	-1.379 (2.988)	-.313 (3.135)	-.246 (3.128)	-1.004 (3.084)	-.983 (3.975)	4.777** (2.020)	8.015**** (2.378)	7.215**** (2.159)	4.489* (2.190)	10.112**** (2.813)
Education	2.754* (1.456)	2.433 (1.488)	2.395* (1.431)	2.251 (1.541)	1.979 (2.087)	-1.214 (.849)	-.710 (.982)	-.910 (.867)	-.977 (.908)	-.769 (.971)
Income	-2.429*** (.233)	-2.309** (.951)	-2.310** (.955)	-2.467*** (.909)	-2.874** (1.336)	-.293 (.813)	-.454 (.961)	-.367 (.822)	-.590 (.884)	-.871 (1.018)
Political Conservatism	.233 (2.755)	-.011 (2.765)	-.003 (2.769)	-.262 (2.858)	-.303 (3.291)	1.816 (1.986)	4.016* (2.384)	1.177 (2.119)	2.064 (2.104)	4.257 (2.574)
Ethnic Comp	1.694** (.780)	.727 (.947)	.743 (.939)	1.665** (.796)	1.360 (1.282)	1.813** (.868)	1.801** (.884)	1.538 (1.025)	1.779* (.907)	1.281 (1.050)
Violent Crime Rate	-.144 (2.333)	.894 (2.478)	.943 (2.443)	-.424 (2.465)	1.462 (3.175)	.410 (1.204)	.434 (1.169)	-.362 (1.201)	.452 (1.345)	-.218 (1.516)
	R <sup>2</sup> =.121 N=146 F(9,145)=2.43 prob<F.013	R <sup>2</sup> =.160 N=130 F(10,129)=2.28 prob<F.017	R <sup>2</sup> =.160 N=130 F(11,129)=2.05 prob<F.028	R <sup>2</sup> =.133 N=141 F(12,140)=1.73 prob<F.067	R <sup>2</sup> =.228 N=92 F(14,91)= 1.92 prob<F.034	R <sup>2</sup> =.143 N=153 F(9,149)=2.19 prob<F.025	R <sup>2</sup> =.239 N=108 F(10,107)=2.79 prob<F.004	R <sup>2</sup> =.266 N=130 F(10,126)=3.32 prob<F.000	R <sup>2</sup> =.146 N=149 F(12,145)=1.77 prob<F.059	R <sup>2</sup> =.370 N=93 F(14,92)=3.50 prob<F.000

\*p>.1; \*\*p<.05; \*\*\*p>.01; \*\*\*\*p<.001



The possibility of a nonlinear effect of the main predictors on racial typification is explored in Table 10 by contextualizing models based on low and high levels of racial typification (hypothesis 6). Low levels are those below the median and high levels are those above the median. The baseline model for low racial typification indicates that race ( $p < .10$ ) and income ( $p < .05$ ) are positive predictors of low levels of racial typification. Model 2a indicates that racial resentment is positively related to low levels of racial typification ( $p < .05$ ). Individuals who have views that rank higher on the racial resentment scale have higher levels of racial typification. Group contact is also a significant predictor of low levels of racial typification of crime ( $p < .05$ ). Viewing crime drama programs is positively related to the racial typification at low levels of typification ( $p < .05$ ), as would be expected by the general media hypotheses. Finally, the full model is not a significant model based on the F statistic. Turning to high levels of typification none of the predictors, or the model itself, are significant in the baseline model, suggesting that race and income are exhibiting non-linear effects on the racial typification of crime. Examining the effects of racial resentment on high levels of racial typification reveals non-significant findings. Increases in racial resentment correspond to increases in racial typifications only at lower levels of typification; racial resentment is not related to the racial typification of crime at higher levels of typification. Group contact is not significant at high levels of racial typification but was significant at lower levels of contact. Increases in group contact then, increase levels of racial typification only at low levels of typification. However, these results should be taken with caution as the p value for the F statistic indicates that the high typification model is not significant. Examining media consumption also reveals that crime drama program viewing was significant at low levels of typification but not at high levels of typification. The full model for high levels of racial typification is significant, but only perceived risk is positively and significantly related to the racial typification of crime ( $p < .01$ ). Each predictor exerts an effect at low levels of racial typification, but high levels of racial typification appear to not be influenced by concepts like racial resentment, media consumption, or group contact.

The findings presented in Table 11 are contextualized by high and low levels of ethnic typification to determine whether the independent variables differentially predict high and low levels of the Latino typification of crime. Low ethnic typification is defined as below the median and high levels are those above the median. The baseline model predicting lower levels of ethnic

typification indicates that income ( $p < .05$ ) and ethnic composition ( $p < .01$ ) are positive and significant. Model 2a adds the ethnic resentment variable, and as has been the case in most other estimates of crime typification, it is not significant. Model 2b shows that group contact is once again a significant and positive predictor ( $p < .01$ ). Increases in group contact with Latinos are associated with increases in lower levels of ethnic typification. Media consumption is not a significant predictor of low levels of the ethnic typification of crime and the full model, presented in Model 2d, indicates that only group contact is significantly related to the ethnic typification of crime ( $p < .05$ ). Overall then, group contact appears to be the only consistent predictor of low levels of ethnic typification such that increases in contact increase typification.

Turning to the estimates predicting high levels of ethnic typification, only one model is significant (Model 4b), as indicated by the probability values for the F statistic. In this model, income is negatively related to the ethnic typification of crime ( $p < .10$ ). Individuals with lower incomes, have higher levels of racial typification.

While group contact is a consistent predictor in most of the tables already discussed, research has suggested that certain types of contact should be variably consequential for race related attitudes. Pettigrew (1997, 1998) suggests that friendship contact is most likely to have beneficial effects. In Table 12, the effects on racial typification of work contact, friendship contact, and a proxy for community contact are examined. The results reveal that work contact is positively related ( $p < .05$ ) to the racial typification of crime. Respondents who have more contact with Black co-workers have higher levels of racial typification. Friendship contact is not a significant predictor of the racial typification of crime, as Pettigrew (1997, 1998) expected it to be a negatively significant predictor. Finally, perceived racial composition, a measure that assesses the number of Blacks who lived within a mile of a respondent's home, was used as a proxy for intergroup contact in the community. The higher the levels of such contact, the more respondents typify crime in racial terms ( $p < .10$ ).

Table 10: Regression of the Racial Typification of Crime on Key Explanatory Variables, with Additional Controls within Contexts of High and Low Racial Typification

	Predicting Low Levels of Racial Typification					Predicting High Levels of Racial Typification				
	Model 1	Model 2a	Model 2b	Model 2c	Model 2d	Model 1	Model 2a	Model 2b	Model 2c	Model 2d
Racial Resentment		1.497** (.663)			1.391* (.778)		-.163 (1.040)			-.062 (1.114)
Group Contact			1.688** (.813)		.924 (1.043)			-.004 (1.112)		.206 (1.242)
TV				.037 (.066)	.142 (.144)				.083 (.157)	-.129 (.203)
Crime Drama				.124** (.049)	.106 (.068)				-.042 (.150)	-.019 (.195)
Internet				-.132 (.178)	-.135 (.271)				.023 (.166)	.154 (.191)
Perceived Risk	1.083 (.796)	2.514** (.969)	1.399 (.854)	.888 (.844)	1.730 (1.130)	1.620 (1.070)	1.849 (1.211)	2.087* (1.260)	1.425 (1.163)	2.354* (1.326)
Age	.014 (.035)	.005 (.043)	.014 (.039)	-.012 (.040)	-.040 (.066)	.021 (.055)	-.044 (.068)	.032 (.067)	.005 (.059)	-.006 (.084)
Black	2.843* (1.516)	4.493** (1.815)	.091 (1.574)	3.226* (1.671)	3.358 (3.072)	4.561 (4.295)	4.328 (4.509)	3.947 (4.766)	5.247 (4.681)	5.623 (5.143)
Female	-.029 (1.382)	-1.030 (1.647)	-.701 (1.559)	-.119 (1.386)	-1.525 (2.899)	-2.146 (2.140)	-.470 (2.494)	-1.481 (2.420)	-2.058 (2.300)	.013 (2.924)
Education	-.994 (.697)	-.154 (.763)	-.659 (.769)	-.607 (.723)	.406 (.925)	-1.288 (.977)	-1.048 (.949)	-1.350 (1.096)	-1.302 (1.048)	-1.222 (1.275)
Income	1.069** (.478)	.801 (.482)	.778 (.490)	1.096** (.471)	.547 (.596)	-.188 (.773)	-.792 (.829)	-.070 (.902)	-.224 (.835)	-1.013 (1.078)
Political Conservatism	2.187 (1.388)	1.583 (1.514)	2.237 (1.418)	2.468* (1.433)	2.130 (1.695)	-1.174 (1.885)	-3.269 (2.344)	-.472 (2.098)	-.818 (2.004)	-2.026 (2.587)
Racial Comp	.124 (.294)	.079 (.307)	-.053 (.308)	.108 (.313)	.012 (.373)	-.203 (.391)	-.347 (.447)	-.1644 (.439)	-.271 (.396)	-.423 (.499)
Violent Crime Rate	.372 (1.029)	.149 (1.028)	-.617 (.933)	.410 (1.138)	-.096 (1.217)	1.903 (1.194)	2.713** (1.265)	2.091 (1.273)	2.345* (1.405)	3.089 (1.614)
	R <sup>2</sup> =.079 N=150 F(9,149)=2.18 prob<F.026	R <sup>2</sup> =.165 N=111 F(10,110)=2.79 prob<F.004	R <sup>2</sup> =.097 N=129 F(10,128)=1.58 prob<F.092	R <sup>2</sup> =.100 N=146 F(12,145)= 1.87 prob<F.040	R <sup>2</sup> =.186 N=97 F(14,96)= 1.57 prob<F.101	R <sup>2</sup> =.086 N=148 F(9,146)= 1.62 prob<F.114	R <sup>2</sup> =.160 N=105 F(10,104)= 2.98 prob<F.002	R <sup>2</sup> =.091 N=130 F(10,128)= 1.42 prob<F.177	R <sup>2</sup> =.094 N=143 F(12,141)= 1.30 prob<F.222	R <sup>2</sup> =.185 N=94 F(14,93)=2.99 prob<F.000

\*p>.1; \*\*p<.05; \*\*\*p>.01; \*\*\*\*p<.001

Table 11: Regression of the Ethnic Typification of Crime on Key Explanatory Variables, with Additional Controls within Contexts of High and Low Ethnic Typification

	Predicting Low Levels of Ethnic Typification					Predicting High Levels of Ethnic Typification				
	Model 1	Model 2a	Model 2b	Model 2c	Model 2d	Model 3	Model 4a	Model 4b	Model 4c	Model 4d
Ethnic Resentment		-.291 (.625)			-.564 (.696)		-1.394 (1.325)			-1.962 (1.509)
Group Contact			2.285*** (.743)		2.240** (1.019)			.1191 (1.398)		1.411 (1.818)
TV				-.068 (.069)	-.108 (.084)				.086 (.119)	.194 (.143)
Crime Drama				-.054 (.098)	-.126 (.117)				-.111 (.082)	-.258* (.092)
Internet				-.080 (.067)	-.038 (.093)				.135 (.251)	.308 (.340)
Perceived Risk	.208 (.662)	-.079 (.763)	-.045 (.784)	.371 (.720)	.030 (.909)	1.166 (1.195)	.820 (1.128)	.785 (1.354)	1.216 (1.271)	.722 (1.327)
Age	-.036 (.035)	-.016 (.041)	-.037 (.040)	-.022 (.035)	.023 (.046)	-.085 (.078)	-.072 (.101)	-.036 (.077)	-.082 (.088)	-.053 (.122)
Black	.918 (2.771)	-.841 (3.901)	1.859 (2.597)	2.014 (3.273)	1.028 (4.791)	-.573 (3.237)	1.489 (4.078)	.015 (3.362)	.134 (3.497)	1.558 (4.676)
Female	.850 (1.220)	1.087 (1.440)	2.340* (1.300)	.616 (1.275)	2.840 (1.743)	-.822 (2.227)	-.843 (2.855)	-.466 (2.471)	-.284 (2.231)	.446 (3.038)
Education	1.294** (.538)	.660 (.586)	1.684*** (.615)	1.340** (.552)	.935 (.714)	1.071 (1.094)	.309 (1.348)	.647 (1.162)	.911 (1.245)	-.181 (1.613)
Income	-.400 (.375)	-.022 (.425)	-.314 (.438)	-.572 (.396)	-.042 (.662)	-2.187** (.947)	-1.673 (1.000)	-1.647* (.970)	-2.261** (.984)	-1.574 (1.185)
Political Conservatism	.894 (1.178)	1.576 (1.486)	1.151 (1.260)	.691 (1.222)	1.622 (1.603)	-.195 (2.231)	.322 (2.873)	-.714 (2.391)	.050 (2.371)	2.288 (3.345)
Ethnic Comp	.698*** (.257)	.808*** (.305)	.410 (.297)	.748*** (.271)	.714 (.435)	-.516 (.563)	-.679 (.713)	-.442 (.655)	-.550 (.611)	-1.007 (.908)
Violent Crime Rate	.651 (.812)	.743 (.954)	.519 (.816)	.309 (.860)	.274 (1.072)	.817 (1.870)	2.080 (1.993)	1.944 (1.871)	.892 (2.098)	1.880 (2.461)
	R <sup>2</sup> =.143 N=166 F(9,165)=3.18 prob>F=.001	R <sup>2</sup> =.139 N=121 F(10,120)=1.93 prob>F=.046	R <sup>2</sup> =.199 N=142 F(10,141)=4.59 prob>F=.000	R <sup>2</sup> =.150 N=163 F(12,162)=2.73 prob>F=.002	R <sup>2</sup> =.241 N=104 F(14,103)=4.11 prob>F=.000	R <sup>2</sup> =.091 N=139 F(9,137)=1.10 prob>F=.370	R <sup>2</sup> =.108 N=94 F(10,93)=.85 prob>F=.659	R <sup>2</sup> =.088 N=124 F(10,122)=.94 prob>F=.088	R <sup>2</sup> =.097 N=133 F(12,131)=.96 prob>F=.494	R <sup>2</sup> =.139 N=84 F(14,83)=1.17 prob>F=.312

\*p>.1; \*\*p<.05; \*\*\*p>.01; \*\*\*\*p<.001

Table 12: Regression of the Racial Typification of Crime on the Type of Group Contact with Additional Controls

	Model 1	Model 2a	Model 2b
Work Contact	.105** (.044)		
Friend Contact		.022 (.061)	
Perceived Racial Composition			.115* (.060)
Perceived Risk	1.348 (1.040)	1.839* (1.016)	1.127 (1.061)
Age	.038 (.052)	.037 (.050)	.031 (.047)
Black	2.144 (3.687)	3.499 (4.307)	1.113 (3.267)
Female	-3.032 (1.934)	-4.071** (1.864)	-3.676** (1.835)
Education	-2.935**** (.827)	-2.632**** (.819)	-2.591**** (.799)
Income	.193 (.705)	-.029 (.683)	.096 (.651)
Political Conservatism	2.574 (1.739)	2.015 (1.684)	2.757 (1.726)
Racial Comp- Logged	.180 (.377)	.266 (.354)	.176 (.363)
Violent Crime- Logged	.023 (1.103)	.110 (1.094)	.080 (1.080)
	R <sup>2</sup> =.116 N=274 F(10,270)=3.82 prob<F.000	R <sup>2</sup> =.095 N=302 F (10,298)= 3.11 prob<F.000	R <sup>2</sup> =.106 N=302 F (10,298)= 3.44 prob<F.000

\*p>.1; \*\*p<.05; \*\*\*p>.01; \*\*\*\*p<.001

Table 13: Regression of the Ethnic Typification of Crime on the Type of Group Contact with Additional Controls

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Work Contact	.069 (.043)		
Friend Contact		.206*** (.076)	
Perceived Ethnic Comp.			.190**** (.055)
Perceived Risk	1.424 (1.080)	1.576 (1.127)	1.749 (1.075)
Age	.028 (.052)	-.007 (.048)	.018 (.045)
Black	1.070 (3.480)	.307 (2.941)	.542 (3.128)
Female	2.489 (1.854)	2.227 (1.726)	2.584 (1.682)
Education	.573 (.824)	.982 (.798)	.631 (.766)
Income	-1.529** (.616)	-1.454** (.601)	-1.120* (.592)
Political Conservatism	.604 (1.751)	.989 (1.654)	.003 (1.616)
Ethnic Comp- Logged	.771* (.412)	.538 (.377)	.459 (.400)
Violent Crime- Logged	1.121 (1.244)	.594 (1.266)	.396 (1.230)
	R <sup>2</sup> =.095 N=273 F(10,269)= 2.85 prob<F .002	R <sup>2</sup> =.122 N=301 F (10,297)= 3.23 prob<F.000	R <sup>2</sup> =.147 N=300 F (10,296)= 4.40 prob<F.000

\*p>.1; \*\*p<.05; \*\*\*p>.01; \*\*\*\*p<.001

Finally, Table 13 presents results that explore whether the type of group contact matters in predicting the ethnic typification of crime. In Model 1, work contact is not significantly related to the ethnic typification of crime. Friend contact, shown in Model 2, is positive and significantly related to the ethnic typification of crime ( $p < .01$ ). Finally, perceived ethnic composition is positive and significantly related to the ethnic typification of crime ( $p < .001$ ). Contrary to Pettigrew's (1997, 1998) assertion, it appears that more contact with Latino friends and with Latinos in the community is associated with increases in the level to which crime is typified as a Latino phenomenon.

The aggregate group contact measure and the individual group contact measures have a positive relationship with the racial typification of crime, contrary to the effects expected from the group contact hypothesis. Racial resentment and media consumption were only significant predictors for low levels of racial typification. The results for all models that predict the ethnic typification of crime indicate that group contact is a consistent and positive predictor; higher levels of contact are related to higher levels of typification. At face value, this finding appears counter to the group contact hypothesis, which expects group contact to breed positive and tolerant opinions of minorities. However, as will be explored in the discussion, these results are consistent with more recent research finding a positive relationship between contact and stereotypes.

### **Symbolic Racism: Resentment and Typification**

The literature on symbolic racism often looks at opinions and attitudes toward minorities, including negative stereotypes. While research generally examines the effect of symbolic racist beliefs on such stereotypes, it is not necessarily clear that stereotypes are a completely separate concept from symbolic racism. As such, the scales used in this study have been termed racial resentment and ethnic resentment, because the measures truly only capture levels of resentment toward minorities and represent the themes of the concept, not the resulting actions. Definitions of symbolic racism often discuss it as a less overt form of traditional racism that focuses on more subtle actions, like opposing policies that benefit minorities. Thus, it could be argued that *actions* are actually part of symbolic racism and not a consequence. Because of this possibility, a test scale was created to determine whether the racial typification of crime and racial resentment are actually elements of the same concept (the same scale was created for ethnic typification). The

items tested in the scale were all of those that were placed in the separate racial resentment and racial typifications scales.

Table 14 presents the factor loadings for all measures tested. The scale pertaining to symbolic racism, which included racial typification and racial resentment, loaded with an alpha value of .740, indicating good reliability. The results indicate that the factor had an Eigenvalue of 2.438. However, upon further investigation, the factor loadings for all of the variables that went into the model reveal that not all variables loaded well. Specifically, the variables that measured racial resentment displayed mediocre loadings at best, the highest value being .335. The variables that measure the racial typification of crime all loaded at about .535 or higher. This suggests that the racial resentment variables and racial typification variables do not truly reflect the same underlying concept.

Table 14: Factor Loadings for Symbolic Racism Scale & Symbolic Ethnicism Scale

	Blacks	Latinos
Break into homes and businesses	0.762	0.75
Robbing others at gun point	0.801	0.828
Selling Drugs	0.535	0.848
Juveniles who commit Crime	0.799	0.899
There is no more discrimination against Blacks/ Latinos	-0.335	-0.138
Blacks/Latinos should work their way up	-0.318	-0.137
Blacks/Latinos are given more than they deserve	0.221	0.129
Historical Discrimination against Blacks/Latinos	0.158	0.17
Alpha	0.740	0.781
Eigenvalue	2.438	2.861

The alpha value indicating whether the ethnic resentment and the ethnic typification variables load on one factor is .781, an acceptable value. The Eigenvalue for this factor was 2.861. However, as with the racial variables, the variables measuring resentment did not load well; the highest loading was .138. Again, this indicates that the variables are not necessarily



measuring the same underlying concept. In both cases, the high alpha value may be attributable to the number of items tested; as the number of items increases, the alpha value generally increases too.

Additionally, for both the symbolic racism and the symbolic ethnicism scales, the variables loaded on a second factor. These second factors both had Eigenvalues above the standard cutoff of 1. On this second factor, the racial and ethnic resentment measures loaded well while the typification measures did not.

In models, not shown, the general predictors of resentment and typification relating to Blacks and Latinos are examined. An interesting finding from these models is that political conservatism is positively and significantly related to both the racial and ethnic resentment variables. Conservatism was not related to either the racial and ethnic typification; these variables were generally predicted by levels of perceived risk. This is consistent with literature on symbolic racism identifying conservatism as a source for such prejudice. In terms of the question at hand, resentment and typification do not appear to have commonalities as they do not load well on factors and since they are predicted by different measures.

Models predicting these new Symbolic Racism and Symbolic Ethnicism variables are presented in the appendix. Overall, the pattern of these results is the same as the models predicting the racial and ethnic typification of crime. Group contact is a consistent and positive predictor of symbolic racism. As levels of intergroup contact increase so too do levels of symbolic racial and ethnic prejudice.

### **Generalizability of Group Contact on Typifications**

Given that race and ethnicity can often overlap whereby one person may be White and Latino or Black and Latino, the effect of racial group contact on the ethnic typification of crime and the effect of ethnic group contact on racial typification are tested. Specifically, the effects of contact with Latinos on racial typification and the effects of contact with Blacks on the ethnic typification of crime are tested. Exploring these effects can indicate the potential for generalizability of the effect of group contact on opinions of all minority groups. If the distinctions between racial and ethnic groups are blurred, the potential exists that these groups may be identified solely as “minorities” and any effect of contact on opinions and attitudes may generalize to more than one minority group.

The first panel of Table 15 presents results for the racial typification of crime. Model 1a presents the basic contact model seen earlier and indicates that black contact is positively associated with the racial typification of crime ( $p < .10$ ). Model 1b shows the effect of Latino contact, which is negatively related to racial typification ( $p < .01$ ), suggesting that more contact with Latinos decreases levels of racial typification. Model 1c puts both types of contact in the same model and both retain their significance; black contact is positively related ( $p < .05$  and  $p < .01$ ). Also, the size of the black population and Latino population are significant ( $p < .05$  and  $p < .05$ ); increases in the size of the black population and decreases in the size of the Latino population are associated with increases in the level of racial typification of crime. However, the VIF and tolerance statistics indicate the potential for issues of multicollinearity when both Black and Latino composition are included in the same models.

The second panel of Table 15 presents the results for ethnic typification. Model 2a shows that black contact is not significantly related to ethnic typification. Model 2b presents the basic model with Latino contact predicting the ethnic typification of crime, showing that Latino contact is positively associated with the ethnic typification of crime ( $p < .001$ ). Model 2c shows that black contact is not significant, but Latino contact is positively related ( $p < .05$ ). Additionally, the size of both the black and Latino populations are significant ( $p < .001$  for both) predictors.

These tests indicate that the potential for the generalizability of contact is likely low. Black contact is positively associated with racial typification while Latino contact is negatively related. Latino contact is positively associated with ethnic typification while Black contact is not related. Evidence of generalizability of contact would be found if both types of contact had similar effects on each typification. Because these effects of contact differ, it is possible that distinctions between Latino and Black groups are being made and there is no indication of a general effect of minority contact reducing minority stereotypes.

Table 15: Regression of the Racial and Ethnic Typification of Crime on the Generalized Group Contact with Additional Controls

	Predicting Racial Typification			Predicting Ethnic Typification		
	Model 1a	Model 1b	Model 1c	Model 2a	Model 2b	Model 2c
Group Contact- Blacks	2.038*		2.357**	.613		.373
	(1.096)		(1.156)	(1.147)		(1.015)
Group Contact- Latinos		-2.890***	-2.778***		4.128*****	3.095**
		(1.027)	(1.005)		(1.138)	(1.306)
Perceived Risk		1.959*	.999	1.549	1.509	2.041
		(1.102)	(1.050)	(1.200)	(1.156)	(1.241)
Age	1.352	-.020	-.004	-.015	.046	.038
	(1.125)	(.054)	(.054)	(.055)	(.050)	(.049)
Black	.039	4.038	-1.953	-1.053	-.43	2.205
	(.054)	(3.879)	(4.124)	(3.55)	(3.099)	(3.195)
Female	.592	-3.814*	-3.403*	3.167	3.335*	2.960
	(4.126)	(1.951)	(1.881)	(1.921)	(1.826)	(1.829)
Education	-3.434*	-2.563*****	-2.498***	.919	.669	.623
	(1.977)	(.830)	(.807)	(.846)	(.803)	(.795)
Income	-2.687***	-.113	-.147	-1.593**	-1.370**	-1.312**
	(.855)	(.720)	(.693)	(.635)	(.636)	(.606)
Political Conservatism	.069	2.681	3.560**	.810	.231	-.359
	(.724)	(1.757)	(1.712)	(1.802)	(1.744)	(1.654)
Racial Comp	2.715		1.468**	-.326		-2.298*****
	(1.816)		(.616)	(.431)		(.712)
Ethnic Comp	.135	-.321	-1.639**		.423	2.470*****
	(.387)	(.422)	(.664)		(.426)	(.749)
Violent Crime Rate	.190	1.503	1.596	2.718**	.601	.895
	(1.116)	(1.109)	(1.125)	(1.357)	(1.262)	(1.266)
	R <sup>2</sup> =.108	R <sup>2</sup> =.134	R <sup>2</sup> =.181	R <sup>2</sup> =.070	R <sup>2</sup> =.156	R <sup>2</sup> =.205
	N=266	N=267	N=266	N=265	N=266	N=265
	F (10,262)=3.34	F(10,263)=4.43	F(12,262)=5.00	F(10,261)=1.81	F(10,262)=4.41	F(12,261)= 4.83
	prob>F=.000	prob>F=.000	prob>F=.000	prob>F=.058	prob>F=.000	prob>F=.000

\*p>.1; \*\*p<.05; \*\*\*p>.01; \*\*\*\*p<.001

# CHAPTER SEVEN

## DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION

### Discussion

The results presented here show that of the three hypothesized predictors of the racial and ethnic typification of crime, only group contact is a consistent predictor. Generally, racial resentment and media consumption are not significantly related to the racial and ethnic typifications of crime. Additionally, when significant, the effect of group contact on the typification of crime is consistently positive, indicating support for hypothesis 2b and none for 2a. Hypothesis 2c is technically not supported as it predicted negative effects of each type of contact on racial and ethnic typifications of crime, but there were positive effects of these predictors. Friendship, community, and work contact are positively related to typification, as are the overall group contact measures. In terms of the possibility of non-linear effects, resentment is a significant predictor for low levels of typification, but not at high levels. Group contact exhibited a non-linear effect on the racial typification of crime, but a linear effect for ethnic typification.

Table 16 outlines the expected outcomes for each hypothesis and whether each was supported. Allport's contact hypothesis suggests that increased contact with out-group members will lead to more favorable attitudes toward that group. Researchers have concluded that generally, this hypothesis is supported (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006; Pettigrew et al., 2011). However, the results presented here indicate the opposite, that contact actually increases levels of stereotypes or typification. Allport suggests that there are certain conditions under which contact will be beneficial- equal status, common goals, authority endorsement, and cooperation. It is possible that the contact respondents were involved in did not mirror such conditions, which might explain the contrary findings. While most recent research (Pettigrew et al., 2011) suggests that Allport's conditions may not be necessary, but can lead to more positive results, it is possible that all conditions were missing during respondents' intergroup contact.

Table 16: Summary of Results for each Hypothesis

Hypothesis	Expected effect on typification	Tables	Support
1a:	Racial resentment (+)	2, 3	No
1b:	Racial resentment (+) for low levels of group contact	6,7	No
2a:	Group Contact (-)	2,3	No
2b:	Group contact (+)	2,3	Yes
2c:	Friendship (-)	12,13	No
	Community (-)	12,13	No
	Work (-)	12,13	No
3a:	Media (+)	2,3	No
3b:	Interaction between media and racial resentment (-)	4,5	No
3c:	Interaction between media & contact (+)	4,5,6,7	No
4:	Racial resentment & racial typification load together	14	No
5a:	Interaction between resentment and minority concentration (+)	8,9	No
5b:	Interaction between group contact and minority concentration (-)	8,9	No
6:	Non-linear effects	10,11	Yes
7a:	Black contact on ethnic typification (+)	15	No
7b:	Latino contact on racial typification (+)	15	No

Critics of the contact hypothesis suggest that most tests of the hypothesis are too sterile and unrealistic. Dixon et al. (2005) feel that the conditions under which group contact research has taken place are ideal and not likely in real settings. Studies finding a positive effect often do not accurately depict intergroup contact, which is likely to be “occasional, fleeting, and superficial” rather than deep, meaningful, and evocative of good feelings (Dixon et al., 2005:699). If contact is often shallow, this may help explain the effects found here. The potential still exists for more meaningful contact to reduce stereotypes and negative affect.

The positive effect of contact on the racial and ethnic typification of crime may also result from the behavior of out-group members and their role as out-group members. Rothbart and John (1985) suggest that contact would only change stereotypes when the behavior of out-group members is drastically different from existing stereotypes, occurs often and frequently, and when the out-group members are assumed to be typical members of the group. Contact with

out-group members in which behavior is not all that different from a stereotype, which in this case might mean criminal or delinquent, would not be expected to lead to a reduction of stereotypes because the behavior reinforces such a stereotype. It is possible that behavior that is even remotely antisocial would have the same effect simply because it is not all that different from the stereotype of criminal. For contact to lead to a reduction of stereotypes, it needs to be inconsistent with the stereotype, frequent, and with members who are seen as typical. Related to the typicality of members, Havekes et al. (2011) suggest that the effects of reducing negative affect and stereotype are likely only when the in-group and out-group are similar in terms of social and economic standings. The stereotype reinforcement found here may result because in-group and out-group members are relatively different, but also because the members with which contact is occurring are not seen as typical out-group members.

Wiegel and Howes (1985) and Hartley (1946) suggest that prejudice may be the result of general animosity toward out-groups who pose a threat to the general social order. The racial and ethnic typification of crime could exist because groups, like minorities, are assumed to pose a threat to the social order. As the size of a group's population increases, the likelihood of contact may increase. It is possible that the positive effect of contact on the racial typification of crime is explained by the size of these populations. That is, as minority populations become larger in some geographic context, there may be increasing levels of group contact, and in turn, increasing the levels of racial and ethnic typification. Then, the effect of contact observed here may merely be indicative of perceived threats rather than prejudice or images of minorities in the media. Though the size of the Black population is generally not significant, it was usually positive. The Latino population size was fairly consistently positively related to the ethnic typification of crime. Perhaps this indicates support for the suggestion that typification results from perceived threats stemming from minority presence.

Mears et al. (2009) found a positive effect of group contact on concern about crime and Mears and Stewart (2010) found a positive effect of interracial contact on fear of crime for Whites. They suggest that contact with out-group members served to either educate others about the realities of crime or to reinforce stereotypes. In a recent paper, Mears, Pickett, Chiricos, Golden, and Gertz (*forthcoming*) argue that interracial contact increases the perceived criminality of all others, not only of Blacks. The authors conclude that this finding, in conjunction with prior research, may indicate that contact simultaneously reduces prejudice while educating about the

realities of crime. The findings here are consistent with this interpretation; contact with minorities may be educating about crime and thus leading to higher levels of racial typification. However, an interesting finding is that contact with Latinos reduces levels of racial typification of crime and contact with Blacks is not related to the ethnic typification of crime. If contact truly served to educate about crime and lead to perceived criminality of others, why would a negative effect be found for Latino contact on racial stereotypes?

The negative effect of Latino contact on racial typification could be indicative of educative contact. That is, interacting with Latinos may reduce racial typification because it may inform individuals that other groups engage in criminal behavior, not just Blacks. If Latino contact provides information that Latinos are also criminal, it could lead individuals to question their assumption that crime is a Black phenomenon; perhaps crime is really just a human (or minority) phenomenon. Correlations between the racial and ethnic typifications of crime are positive and relatively weak (.208), suggesting that the negative effect of Latino contact on racial typification is not likely because individuals only think of *either* Blacks or Latinos as criminals in a sort of zero sum framework. Alternatively, this negative effect could indicate higher levels of tolerance for minority groups in general. The effect may be negative not because Latinos are assumed criminal but perhaps diverse minority group contact breeds favorable attitudes toward all minorities.

The lack of consistent significant effects of the racial resentment measures suggests that the racial and ethnic typifications of crime are not fully explained by such prejudiced beliefs. The inability for these measures to load together on one concept also suggests that the criminal stereotypes associated with race and ethnicity, are not simply expressions of modern or symbolic racism. McConahay and Hough (1976) argued that symbolic racism was a reaction to the civil rights movement and its ongoing consequences. It is possible then, that beliefs consistent with symbolic racism may not be as relevant today or that racial stereotypes are no longer rooted in such prejudice. These results may also stem from problems with the variables composing the racial resentment and ethnic resentment scales loading low in factor analyses.

In an unreported analysis, the effect of racial typification on racial resentment is explored. The results indicate that racial typification does predict racial resentment. Is it possible that the lack of a relationship here is due to a misspecification of causal order? Views that minorities are not working hard enough to succeed and that they demand too much could easily

stem from negative stereotypes of these groups. A group associated with crime may not be deemed worthy of special treatment and assistance, whereas a group not associated with crime, may not elicit such opposition when given similar benefits. Ramasubramanian (2010) suggests that stereotypes may lead to prejudice; the negative stereotype of criminality could lead to beliefs that the group is inferior in some way. Perhaps negative stereotypes are part of a host of beliefs that help to inform what is understood as symbolic racism. Racial resentment is just one part of this concept, which could be born out of the association of minority groups with negative stereotypes. Examining the bivariate correlation matrix presented in the Appendix reveals that the racial and ethnic typifications of crime are related to a number of measures. Relevant to the topic at hand, the racial typification of crime is positively associated with racial resentment while the ethnic typification of crime is positively associated with both racial and ethnic resentment. While a number of measures are related to the racial and ethnic typifications of crime, a small number of measures are related to the racial and ethnic resentment. Notably, group contact is unrelated to resentment levels and political conservatism is moderately related. The lack of relationship between contact and resentment levels implies that resentment is not rooted in interactions with minority groups, but rather appears for those who lack first-hand knowledge of minority groups. On the other hand, typifications are consistently related to group contact; these stereotypes do not result from a lack of experience with a group but rather more experience with groups.

The findings related to media consumption measures do not indicate that they explained the racial and ethnic typification of crime. First, it should be noted that these measures were subject to reasonable amounts of missing data. Less than 400 (of a possible 520) respondents answered all of the media questions, which drastically reduced the sample sizes of models using these measures. It is also possible, that the media may not be a salient feature of life for the respondents of this survey, who were slightly older than the average US citizen and may not utilize media venues like the internet or crime drama programming. Additionally, it could be argued that we currently live in culture with awareness that the media is a business, whose primary functions are to entertain and inform. Many may recognize that what is depicted on television is not necessarily the whole story, or even the most important part of the story. It has been recognized that what is depicted on television, especially in terms of crime, is chosen based on the expected interest it will garner among viewers (Gilliam and Iyengar, 2000). Stories of



mundane crimes and criminals may not receive any attention at all. Recently, the media itself has become sort of self-aware, reporting on differences in the media attention devoted to stories, particularly those involving victims of different races. For example, in October two girls were reported missing: a White child named Lisa and a Black child named Jahessye. While Lisa's photo was plastered across various national television news programs and news magazines (People), Jahessye's story only broke national headlines in respect to the lack of reporting in response to a missing Black child. The conflation of race and crime has contributed to stereotypes like the racial/ethnic typification of crime. If Blacks and Latinos are presumed to be more typically criminal, how entertaining or informative would it be to present a news story about crimes involving such individuals?

### **Limitations**

No research is without limitations, and this study is no exception. Considering the nature of the questions asked of respondents, which dealt with opinions and attitudes toward minority groups which could easily be construed as indicative of racism, the potential for social desirability bias to affect answers is likely high. Respondents may have altered their answers to the questions measuring racial resentment, group contact, and the racial and ethnic typification of crime. In a similar survey, conducted by the author, face to face at a women's prison, several individuals commented that they thought the questions assessing resentment and typification were racist and refused to provide answers because of this. It is possible that the telephone survey respondents were concerned that the interviewer or authors of the survey might judge them based on their responses, and so answered untruthfully. It is possible that the values recorded for racial resentment are under-estimated and those for group contact are over estimated; respondents may not want to seem prejudiced and may not want to seem like they have no contact with minorities.

As has been noted several times, the respondents in this survey had an average age of 56.7. Considering no one under the age of 18 was eligible for the survey, this may indicate a slightly skewed sample. Because the respondents tended to be slightly older, the generalizability of the sample can be questioned. There are a number of factors, namely the experience of living through the Civil Rights Movement and in times where racial tensions were higher, that may have affected a number of measures and outcomes in the survey.

The group contact measures utilized in this survey may not fully capture the nature of contact. Pettigrew (1997) suggests that it is deeper contact that leads to positive attitudes toward out-group members. Contact that is superficial is not assumed to have the necessary components of empathy and self-disclosure that may lead to desired outcomes (Turner and Feddes, 2011). The measures used in this survey merely measured the number of out-group members spoken to at work, the number of close friends a respondent has who are identified as out-group members, and the perceived number of those in the community who are out-group members. These measures do not capture the nature of contact with minorities; they do not measure whether contact involves anything more than just fleeting interactions. The measure of friendship does ask respondents to indicate “close” friends; however, close was not defined to respondents. What one person considers close another may only consider an acquaintance. These superficial contact measures then, may also account for the positive relationship found between contact and typifications of crime.

Similarly, the media consumption measures only capture the amount of time spent watching TV or looking at the internet. There is no assessment of how respondents view what they see in the media and whether they think the depictions shown are accurate. Additionally, there is no indication whether the media respondents view shows minorities or crime at all, let alone depicting minorities as criminals. One question does specifically ask for the amount of time spent watching “crime drama” programming, however this type of programming is entertainment and not informative. Individuals, then, may be more cognizant that these depictions are fictionalized and likely not accurate portrayals.

While the limitations discussed here are relevant, the importance of this research should not be undersold. The data utilized in this study are unique for several reasons. First, the data are from a national probability sample of the U.S. adult population. Traditionally, research on topics like group contact has utilized samples drawn from colleges or universities, which could not generalize to the U.S. as a whole. Thus, the greatest strength of this study is its external validity. The results found here, are likely to generalize to a larger number of individuals within the United States.

## Conclusions

Overall, the results presented here should be taken with caution, in terms of potential implications. While more contact was found to lead to higher levels of typification and stereotyping, this does not indicate that intergroup contact should be kept to a minimum. No model in this study had an  $R^2$  value of more than .2, so we do not fully know what predicts the racial and ethnic typification of crime. Ceasing intergroup contact would not necessarily eliminate stereotypes and racial issues.

The contact literature explains how contact leads to positive attitudes and affect toward minorities. It is not just increasing information about the out-group that is required, but a more in depth emotional transformation requiring empathy to reduce anxiety caused by group differences (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2008). Much of the research finding anxiety reduction suggests that it is friendships that are the key rather than merely knowing someone of the opposite group, working with a minority, or living in an area with a number of minorities. The contact measures used here really only capture superficial levels of contact and may have also been the subject of exaggeration due to social desirability. Overall though, these results suggest the continued need for research on the effects of group contact. Even more so, the findings highlight the need for research to identify the causes of stereotypes like the racial and ethnic typification of crime, especially in light of the effects of such stereotypes on racial policies, opinions, attitudes.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup>It should be noted that being Hispanic or Latino has only recently become an important distinction in terms of race and ethnicity. Often, many Hispanics or Latinos are identified racially, as either white or Black (Omi and Winant 1986). Thus, Hispanics or Latinos may be subsumed under the stereotypes of Blacks as criminals.

<sup>2</sup>Racial resentment is a composite measure designed to capture opinions and attitudes about the current status of Blacks and whether this standing is due to motivational differences (i.e. laziness) and the determination of other groups. “On average blacks have worse jobs, income, and housing than white people. Do you think these differences are: (1) Mainly due to discrimination?” (1 = yes, 2 = no), (2) “Because most blacks just do not have the motivation or willpower to pull themselves up out of poverty?” (1 = no, 2 = yes), (3) “Do you strongly agree, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly with the following statement? Irish, Italians, Jews, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without special favors” (1 = *disagree strongly*, 2 = *disagree somewhat*, 3 = *neither agree nor disagree*, 4 = *agree somewhat*, 5 = *strongly agree*)” (Tuch & Hughes, 2011).

<sup>3</sup>The Research Network is a public opinion poll firm in Tallahassee, FL.

<sup>4</sup>The racial and ethnic typifications of crime are viewed as continuous measures. They do not indicate the extent to which respondents over- or under-exaggerate the level of criminal involvement of each group. Rather, the racial and ethnic typification of crime are representations of the extent to which individuals associate crime and race. They are empirical dimensions not necessarily rooted in realistic assessments of crime. Accordingly, some individuals will have higher levels of this dimension than others, but that does not indicate that they are necessarily over-exaggerating the relationship between crime and minorities.

<sup>5</sup>Because of this low alpha, which may indicate that the measures do not load together well, a test index was also created, removing the measure pertaining to getting more than is deserved. In this index, all items loaded above .5 and had an alpha coefficient of .66. Because traditional tests of symbolic racism utilize all measures, both scales are tested in these models. The results with the

test scales do not differ from those with the full measure. In results discussed here, only the full models are shown.

<sup>6</sup>The age distribution of the sample may have affected the media measures. The median age for the sample is higher than that of the United States, a commonality in telephone research (as older individuals tend to be home, have a home phone line, and answer their phones). Because the mean age is 56.7 and the median age is 59, the likelihood that such individuals are utilizing technology, like the internet is unlikely- this demographic group did watch television news programs frequently though.

<sup>7</sup>It might be expected that opinions of crime risk are rooted in the level of actual crime. As such, whether the violent crime rate influenced perceptions of risk was examined. The violent crime rate is not a significant predictor of perceived risk. It appears then, that levels of perceived risk do not stem from the level of actual crime in an area.

<sup>8</sup>Readers might notice that the N's for each vary and that they are smaller than the 520 respondents surveyed. This is due to missing data, especially in relation to the variables measuring internet usage, crime drama program watching, and income. Table 1 indicates the number of respondents who answered these questions. As can be seen, only 262 answered the internet question, 326 the crime drama question, and 391 the income question.

<sup>9</sup>Though statistical significance has been argued to be an arbitrary cut-off, many researchers utilize the standard of  $p < .05$ . However, considering the restricted sample size used in these analyses, significance values less than .10 were flagged as significant.

# APPENDIX A

## PREDICTING SYMBOLIC RACISM

Table 17: OLS Regression Predicting Symbolic Racism & Symbolic Ethnicism

	Predicting Symbolic Racism				Predicting Symbolic Ethnicism			
	Model 1	Model 2a	Model 2b	Model 2c	Model 3	Model 4a	Model 4b	Model 4c
Group Contact		.807 (.642)		.803 (.690)		1.748*** (.666)		1.893*** (.694)
TV News			.032 (.078)	.087 (.098)			-.067 (.058)	-.083 (.063)
Crime Drama			-.002 (.054)	-.009 (.067)			-.036 (.046)	-.039 (.053)
Internet			.087 (.092)	.075 (.110)			.011 (.088)	.065 (.095)
Perceived Risk	1.714** (.679)	1.855** (.782)	1.633** (.706)	1.733** (.786)	1.917** (.762)	1.767** (.894)	1.997** (.793)	1.847** (.894)
Age	.030 (.032)	.038 (.034)	.036 (.032)	.035 (.035)	-.008 (.028)	.016 (.029)	-.010 (.030)	.027 (.032)
Black	1.968 (1.681)	.725 (2.101)	2.366 (1.776)	.824 (2.098)	1.508 (1.989)	.990 (1.907)	1.775 (2.015)	1.684 (1.892)
Female	-2.461** (1.204)	-2.554** (1.274)	-2.245* (1.213)	-2.364** (1.289)	.318 (1.188)	.877 (1.280)	.291 (1.206)	.791 (1.322)
Education	-1.714**** (.527)	-1.616**** (.579)	-1.800**** (.544)	-1.628**** (.592)	.364 (.463)	.300 (.466)	.236 (.490)	.229 (.497)
Income	.088 (.445)	.106 (.493)	.166 (.459)	.142 (.504)	-.826** (.386)	-.797* (.417)	-.924** (.400)	-.883** (.431)
Political Conservatism	.202 (1.058)	.580 (1.141)	.129 (1.093)	.969 (1.196)	-.312 (1.061)	-.396 (1.111)	-.334 (1.080)	-.470 (1.149)
Racial/Ethnic Comp-Logged	.376* (.213)	.322 (.230)	.312 (.217)	.243 (.234)	.458** (.207)	.400* (.239)	.522** (.209)	.365 (.246)
Violent Crime-Logged	-.433 (.669)	-.554 (.708)	-.110 (.706)	-.327 (.741)	.499 (.714)	.240 (.715)	.259 (.762)	.363 (.768)
	R <sup>2</sup> =.105 N=320 F(9,315)=3.94 prob<F.000	R <sup>2</sup> =.123 N=277 F(10,273)=3.55 prob<F.000	R <sup>2</sup> =.111 N=311 F(12,306)= 3.02 prob<F.000	R <sup>2</sup> =.133 N=273 F(13,269)=2.83 prob<F.000	R <sup>2</sup> =.098 N=320 F (9,315)= 3.19 prob<F.001	R <sup>2</sup> =.140 N=278 F (10,274)= 4.59 prob<F.000	R <sup>2</sup> =.106 N=311 F (12, 306)=2.68 prob<F.000	R <sup>2</sup> =.150 N=274 F (13, 270)= 3.73 prob<F.000

\*p>.1; \*\*p<.05; \*\*\*p>.01; \*\*\*\*p<.001

# APPENDIX B

## BIVARIATE CORRELATIONS

	Racial Typification	Ethnic Typification	Racial Resentment	Ethnic Resentment	Black Contact	Work Contact (Black)	Contact (Black)	Contact (Black)	Latino Contact	Work Contact (Latino)	Contact (Latino)	Contact (Latino)	TV	Crime Drama	Internet	Perceived Risk	Age	Race	Ethnicity	Gender	Education	Income	Conservatism	Ethnic Comp	Racial Comp	Violent Crime Rate	Symbolic Racism	Symbolic Ethnicity	
Racial Typification	1.00																												
Ethnic Typification	0.21*****	1.00																											
Racial Resentment	0.09*	0.10*	1.00																										
Ethnic Resentment	0.02	0.09*	0.68*****	1.00																									
Black Contact	0.15*****	0.07	0.02	0.06	1.00																								
Work Contact (Black)	0.17*****	0.04	0.07	0.07	0.72*****	1.00																							
Friend Contact (Black)	0.04	-0.04	0.00	0.03	0.83*****	0.42*****	1.00																						
Community Contact (Black)	0.18*****	0.08*	0.00	0.03	0.77*****	0.32*****	0.46*****	1.00																					
Latino Contact	0.13***	0.23*****	0.03	0.03	0.23*****	0.22*****	0.23*****	0.09*	1.00																				
Work Contact (Latino)	0.09**	0.14****	0.04	0.02	0.15*****	0.25*****	0.08	0.03	0.74*****	1.00																			
Friend Contact (Latino)	0.08*	0.18*****	0.09*	0.11**	0.24*****	0.16*****	0.26*****	0.13****	0.82*****	0.42*****	1.00																		
Community Contact (Latino)	0.12***	-0.18*****	-0.04	0.0308	0.13****	0.09*	0.17*****	0.07*	0.74*****	0.30*****	0.43*****	1.00																	
TV	0.09*	-0.04	0.06	0.02	0.05	0.05	0.01	0.05	-0.03	-0.07	-0.03	0.05	1.00																
Crime Drama	-0.05	0.03	0.00	0.02	0.17*****	0.09*	0.18*****	0.13****	0.13***	0.08*	0.12****	0.10**	0.20*****	1.00															
Internet	-0.02	-0.04	-0.07	0.14***	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.03	0.00	-0.05	0.01	0.04	0.16*****	0.02	1.00														
Perceived Risk	0.16*****	0.15*****	0.05	0.03	0.29*****	0.2182*****	0.19*****	0.30*****	0.06	0.01	0.11**	0.08*	0.11**	0.13****	0.03	1.00													
Age	0.04	-0.05	0.00	-0.02	-0.21*****	-0.10**	0.20*****	-0.15*****	-0.22*****	-0.14*****	-0.20*****	-0.19*****	0.24*****	-0.05	-0.12***	-0.09*	1.00												
Race	0.05	-0.01	-0.18*****	0.08	0.47*****	0.21*****	0.48*****	0.39*****	0.11**	0.02	0.07	0.17*****	0.03	0.16*****	0.02	0.17*****	-0.16*****	1.00											
Ethnicity	0.06	0.08*	0.00	0.02	-0.03	0.02	0.05	0.02	0.29*****	0.22*****	0.32*****	0.14****	-0.03	0.04	-0.02	0.05	-0.26*****	0.00	1.00										
Gender	0.02	0.07	0.01	0.05	-0.01	0.07	0.04	0.04	-0.13***	-0.09*	-0.08*	-0.05	0.03	0.06	-0.16*****	0.20*****	0.09***	0.04	-0.06	1.00									
Education	-0.21*****	-0.05	-0.11**	-0.05	0.05	-0.01	0.03	-0.10**	0.03	0.04	0.00	0.02	-0.16*****	-0.19*****	0.14*****	-0.15*****	-0.05	-0.04	0.05	-0.04	1.00								
Income	-0.15*****	-0.14***	0.02	-0.09	-0.04	0.04	0.01	-0.06	-0.03	0.02	-0.05	-0.07	-0.14***	-0.15*****	0.07	-0.20*****	-0.16*****	-0.02	0.03	-0.0871*	0.47*****	1.00							
Political Conservatism	0.13****	0.11**	0.29*****	-0.28*****	-0.11**	-0.03	0.094**	-0.12***	-0.05	-0.04	-0.07	0.02	0.04	-0.06	-0.03	0.00	0.11**	-0.12***	-0.06	-0.05	-0.07	-0.04	1.00						
Ethnic Comp	0.13****	-0.11**	0.06	0.03	0.06	0.03	0.04	0.06	0.34*****	0.26*****	0.27*****	0.25*****	-0.02	0.04	0.03	-0.03	-0.11***	0.02	0.19*****	0.03	0.18*****	0.11**	-0.03	1.00					
Racial Comp	-0.00	-0.02	0.07	0.01	0.22*****	0.11**	0.14*****	0.24*****	0.18*****	0.15*****	0.13****	0.11**	-0.01	0.083*	0.05	0.08*	-0.13****	0.12****	0.12****	0.02	0.12****	0.06	-0.07	0.80*****	1.00				
Violent Crime Rate	0.01	-0.07	0.03	0.06	0.02	-0.01	0.01	0.07	0.21*****	0.16*****	0.13****	0.14****	0.00	-0.01	-0.13***	-0.03	-0.02	0.02	0.06	-0.0874*	0.09*	-0.02	-0.05	0.40*****	0.37*****	1.00			
Symbolic Racism	0.93*****	0.22*****	0.06	0.01	0.16*****	0.16*****	0.05	0.17*****	-0.10**	-0.06	-0.08*	-0.09**	0.13****	0.06	0.01	0.22*****	0.02	0.07	-0.02	-0.01	-0.26*****	-0.13***	0.12***	-0.08*	0.08*	-0.03	1.00		
Symbolic Ethnicity	0.23*****	0.91*****	0.08	0.10*	0.0887*	0.07	0.06	0.09**	0.21*****	0.12***	0.16*****	0.14*****	0.08*	0.01	0.00	0.22*****	0.01	0.07	0.0917**	0.06	-0.12***	-0.11**	0.09**	0.11**	0.06	0.05	0.46*****	1.00	

## APPENDIX C

### INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD APPROVAL LETTER

Office of the Vice President For Research  
Human Subjects Committee  
Tallahassee, Florida 32306-2742  
(850) 644-8673, FAX (850) 644-4392

#### APPROVAL MEMORANDUM

Date: 8/6/2010

To: Kristin Lavin [kml08j@fsu.edu]

Address: 2626 E Park Ave Apt 3102 Tallahassee FL 32301  
Dept.: CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

From: Thomas L. Jacobson, Chair

Re: Use of Human Subjects in Research  
Public opinion on Crime, Criminals, and Social Policies

The application that you submitted to this office in regard to the use of human subjects in the proposal referenced above have been reviewed by the Secretary, the Chair, and two members of the Human Subjects Committee. Your project is determined to be **Exempt** per 45 CFR Â§ 46.101(b)4 and has been approved by an expedited review process.

The Human Subjects Committee has not evaluated your proposal for scientific merit, except to weigh the risk to the human participants and the aspects of the proposal related to potential risk and benefit. This approval does not replace any departmental or other approvals, which may be required.

If you submitted a proposed consent form with your application, the approved stamped consent form is attached to this approval notice. Only the stamped version of the consent form may be used in recruiting research subjects.

If the project has not been completed by 8/5/2011 you must request a renewal of approval for continuation of the project. As a courtesy, a renewal notice will be sent to you prior to your expiration date; however, it is your responsibility as the Principal Investigator to timely request renewal of your approval from the Committee.

You are advised that any change in protocol for this project must be reviewed and approved by the Committee prior to implementation of the proposed change in the protocol. A protocol



change/amendment form is required to be submitted for approval by the Committee. In addition, federal regulations require that the Principal Investigator promptly report, in writing any unanticipated problems or adverse events involving risks to research subjects or others.

By copy of this memorandum, the Chair of your department and/or your major professor is reminded that he/she is responsible for being informed concerning research projects involving human subjects in the department, and should review protocols as often as needed to insure that the project is being conducted in compliance with our institution and with DHHS regulations.

This institution has an Assurance on file with the Office for Human Research Protection. The Assurance Number is IRB00000446.

Cc: **Ted Chiricos, Advisor** [[tchiricos@fsu.edu](mailto:tchiricos@fsu.edu)]  
HSC No. **2010.3628**

## APPENDIX D

### SURVEY INSTRUMENT

Hello, my name is \_\_\_\_\_ and I am calling on behalf of Florida State University. We are asking people to give us their opinions as part of a research project about issues here in the United States. The survey should take less than ten minutes and I assure you we are not selling anything.

1. For this interview, I would like to talk to the person 18 years or older in your household who had a birthday most recently. Is that you?

1. Yes (Go to second intro)
2. No

1a. Can that person come to the phone now?

1. Yes
2. No (Schedule callback)

(Once correct person is on the phone)

Hello, my name is \_\_\_\_\_ and I am calling on behalf of Florida State University. We are asking people to give us their opinions as part of a research project about issues here in the United States. The survey should take less than ten minutes and I assure you we are not selling anything.

Your participation is voluntary. Any information obtained during the course of this interview will remain confidential to the extent allowed by law. The benefit of your participation will be the potential to influence the understanding of important social issues. If you have any questions about the survey or wish to learn some of the results, I can provide a phone number where you can contact the researchers directly.

2. To begin, what do you think is the most important problem facing our country today?

(RECORD RESPONSE VERBATIM)

3. Next, I am going to read a list of things that have been suggested as ways to deal with juvenile crime in the United States. On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all supportive and 10 is very supportive, please tell me how much you support each of these proposals.

(RECORD NUMBER 0-10)

(REFUSE/DK/NOTSURE = 99)

- a. Trying more juvenile offenders in adult courts\_\_\_\_\_
- b. Locking up more juvenile offenders\_\_\_\_\_
- c. Helping juveniles released from prison find jobs\_\_\_\_\_
- d. Making sentences more severe for juveniles who commit crimes\_\_\_\_\_
- e. Providing job skill training to juveniles in prison\_\_\_\_\_
- f. Expanding educational programs for juveniles in prison\_\_\_\_\_
- g. Making juvenile offenders work hard labor while they are in prison\_\_\_\_\_
- h. Expanding drug treatment services for juveniles in prison\_\_\_\_\_
- i. Making it easier for juvenile inmates to receive family visits\_\_\_\_\_
- j. Sending violent juvenile offenders to adult prisons\_\_\_\_\_
- k. Giving the death penalty to juveniles who commit murder\_\_\_\_\_

4. Because public resources are limited, officials must choose between different policies. I am going to read a list of competing policies for dealing with juvenile crime. For each set of policies please tell me which you would prefer most.

[Would you prefer to...]

- a. Have juveniles who sell drugs serve time in jail.

(MARK "1" IF CHOSEN)

OR

Have juveniles who sell drugs perform community service.

(MARK "0" IF CHOSEN)

[Would you prefer to...]

- b. Pay for more job skill training for youth in high-crime areas.

(MARK "0" IF CHOSEN)

OR

Pay for more police to patrol high-crime areas.

(MARK "1" IF CHOSEN)

[Would you prefer to...]

- c. Use the adult justice system to punish violent juvenile offenders.

(MARK "1" IF CHOSEN)

OR

Use the juvenile justice system to rehabilitate violent juvenile offenders.

(MARK "0" IF CHOSEN)

These next few questions are concerned with crime in general, not just juvenile crime.

5. When you think about people who break into homes and businesses, approximately what percent would you say are White, what percent would you say are Black, and what percent would you say are Latino?

(RECORD NUMBER 0-100)

- a. White \_\_\_\_\_  
b. Black \_\_\_\_\_  
c. Latino \_\_\_\_\_

6. When you think about people who rob other people at gunpoint, approximately what percent would you say are White, what percent would you say are Black, and what percent would you say are Latino?

(RECORD NUMBER 0-100)

- a. White \_\_\_\_\_  
b. Black \_\_\_\_\_  
c. Latino \_\_\_\_\_

7. When you think about people who sell drugs, approximately what percent would you say are White, what percent would you say are Black, and what percent would you say are Latino?

(RECORD NUMBER 0-100)

- a. White \_\_\_\_\_  
b. Black \_\_\_\_\_  
c. Latino \_\_\_\_\_

8. When you think just about juveniles who commit crime, approximately what percent would you say are White, what percent are Black, and what percent are Latino?

(RECORD NUMBER 0-100)

- a. White \_\_\_\_\_
- b. Black \_\_\_\_\_
- c. Latino \_\_\_\_\_

9. On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 means not at all likely and 10 means very likely, how likely is each of the following:

(RECORD RESPONSE 0-10)

- a. A white male committing a violent crime before age 30.
- b. A black male committing a violent crime before age 30.
- c. A Latino male committing a violent crime before age 30.
- d. A white male selling drugs before age 30.
- e. A black male selling drugs before age 30.
- f. A Latino male selling drugs before age 30.

10. On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means not at all likely and 10 means very likely, how likely do you think it is that you or a member of your family will:

(RECORD NUMBER 0-10)

- a. Have your car stolen? \_\_\_\_\_
- b. Have someone break into your house when no one is home? \_\_\_\_\_
- c. Have someone break into your house when someone is home? \_\_\_\_\_
- d. Be robbed or mugged on the street? \_\_\_\_\_
- e. Be raped or sexually assaulted? \_\_\_\_\_
- f. Be murdered? \_\_\_\_\_

11. I am going to ask a series of questions about different racial and ethnic groups. Please tell me if you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with these statements.

- 1. Strongly Agree
- 2. Agree
- 3. (DNR) Neutral/Not Sure/DK/Refused
- 4. Disagree
- 5. Strongly Disagree

- a. There is a lot of discrimination against Blacks in the US today, limiting their chances to get ahead.
- b. There is a lot of discrimination against Latinos in the US today, limiting their chances to get ahead.
- c. Other minorities (such as the Irish, Italians, and Jews) overcame prejudice and worked their way up without special favors, Latinos should do the same.
- d. Other minorities (such as the Irish, Italians, and Jews) overcame prejudice and worked their way up without special favors, Blacks should do the same.
- e. Over the years, Blacks have gotten more than they deserve.
- f. Over the years, Latinos have gotten more than they deserve.
- g. Historical events have made it difficult for Latinos to work their way out of the lower class.
- h. Historical events have made it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class.

12a. Now, I am going to ask you about your personal interaction with other racial and ethnic groups. What percent of your friends are White, what percent are Black, and what percent are Latino? Do not worry about being exact and making the percentages equal 100.

(RECORD NUMBER 0-100)

- 1. White \_\_\_\_\_
- 2. Black \_\_\_\_\_
- 3. Latino \_\_\_\_\_

12b. What percent of people that you talk to at work are White, what percent are Black, and what percent are Latino?

(RECORD NUMBER 0-100)

- 1. White \_\_\_\_\_
- 2. Black \_\_\_\_\_
- 3. Latino \_\_\_\_\_

13. When you think of people living within a mile of your home, what percent would you say are Black, what percentage are White, and what percentage are Latino?

- a. White \_\_\_\_\_
- b. Black \_\_\_\_\_
- c. Latino \_\_\_\_\_

14. When you think of people living within a mile of your home, would you say that the size of following groups has increased, decreased, or stayed the same in the past five years?

- a. Whites \_\_\_\_\_
- b. Blacks \_\_\_\_\_
- c. Latinos \_\_\_\_\_

D2. Okay, we're almost done. Thank you for your patience. I have a few questions to ensure that individuals from all walks of life are represented in our survey.

Do you rent or own the home where you currently live?

- 1. Rent
- 2. Own
- 0. (DNR) DK/Refused

D3. What is your age?

(RECORD AGE IN YEARS 18-100)

D4. Are you currently married, widowed, divorced, separated, or have you never been married?

- 1. Married
- 2. Widowed
- 3. Divorced
- 4. Separated; married but living apart
- 5. Never married
- 0. Refused, no answer

D5. How would you describe yourself politically? Very liberal, liberal, middle of the road, conservative, or very conservative?

1. Very Liberal
2. Liberal
3. Middle of the road
4. Conservative
5. Very conservative
0. (DNR) Refused/DK/No answer

D6. What race do you consider yourself?

[DNR List- just use to classify]

1. White
2. Black
3. Hispanic, Latino, Mexican American, etc.
4. Asian, Pacific Islander
5. American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut
6. Other
0. (DNR) Refused, no answer

D6B. (SKIP IF D6=3) Are you of Latino or Hispanic origin?

1. Yes
2. No
3. (DNR) DK/Refused

D7. Approximately, how many hours a week you spend doing the following?

(RECORD NUMBER 0- 168)

- a. Watching local television news \_\_\_\_\_
- b. Watching crime drama programs (like CSI, NCIS, Bones, Law and Order) \_\_\_\_\_
- c. Looking at news stories on the internet \_\_\_\_\_



D8. What is the highest grade or year of formal education that you have completed?

[DNR List- just use to classify]

1. 1st through 7th grade
2. 8th grade
3. 9th through 11th grade
4. 12th grade (finished high school)
5. Some college, no degree, AA degree
6. Bachelor's degree
7. Master's degree, law or similar graduate degree, not PhD
8. PhD, MD or other degree beyond Master's
9. Other
0. (DNR) Refused, no answer

D9. Could you please tell me your ZIP code?

(RECORD 5 digit number)

D10. Finally, please tell me which category corresponds with your household's total annual income for 2008?

1. Less than \$15,000
2. \$15,000 to less than \$35,000
3. \$35,000 to less than \$50,000
4. \$50,000 to less than \$75,000
5. \$75,000 to less than \$100,000
6. More than \$100,000
0. (DNR) Refused, don't know

D11. Thank you very much for your time. Those are all the questions we have. Have a nice day.

Respondent's sex:

1. Male
2. Female

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## **BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH**

Kristin Golden (nee Lavin) was born in Princeton, NJ and grew up in Edison, NJ. She earned a Bachelor's Degree in Psychology and Sociology and a Master's Degree in Criminal Justice at Villanova University. She attended Florida State University's College of Criminology and Criminal Justice, where she studied race, crime, public opinion, and the formation of stereotypes while earning her doctorate degree. She has published on the relationship between marriage and delinquency (*Justice Quarterly*), minority threat and fear of crime (*Journal of Ethnicity in Criminal Justice*-forthcoming), intergroup contact and perceived risk (*Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*), and perceived racial composition and victimization risk (*Criminology*). Kristin is currently a Special Investigator for the Office of Law Enforcement Professional Standards in New Jersey's Office of the Attorney General.