

Florida State University Libraries

Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations

The Graduate School

2009

Iraqi Insurgents' Use of Youtube as a Strategic Communication Tool: An Exploratory Content Analysis

Rheanna Rutledge



FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF COMMUNICATION

IRAQI INSURGENTS USE OF YOUTUBE AS A STRATEGIC
COMMUNICATION TOOL: AN EXPLORATORY CONTENT ANALYSIS

By

RHEANNA R. RUTLEDGE

A Dissertation submitted to the
Department of Communication
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Awarded:
Summer Semester 2009

Copyright 2009
Rheanna R. Rutledge
All Rights Reserved

The members of the committee approved the dissertation of Rheanna R. Rutledge defended on June 8, 2009

Steven McClung
Professor, Department of Communication
Director, Dissertation

Peter Garretson
Outside Committee Member

Ulla Bunz
Committee Member

Julia Cortese
Committee Member

Jay Rayburn
Committee Member

Approved:

Stephen McDowell, Chair, Department of Communication

Gary Heath, Dean, College of Communication

The Graduate School has verified and approved the above named committee members.

This dissertation is dedicated to the men and women who have served in the United States Armed forces.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Thinking about the path that has led me to this place in life, I know I have had many Blessings have come in the form of adventures, and plenty of opportunity. I have been surrounded by family, friends, and colleagues who have taught, and inspired me. While there are no words that can completely express my gratitude, I will do so briefly here.

First, to my family, thank you for the constant reminders of your love and support throughout this process. From sending little cards for motivation and inspiration to staying up late at night to check for spelling errors, you have been there every step of the way. This dissertation could hardly have been completed without your support.

My dissertation committee forever has my thanks for their support and helpful advice throughout this process. This was no short dissertation and they have read a page! Dr. M, I thank you for being my chair and especially leading me through those stages of bringing the study's approach from mass to more individual and practical. I relax and that the dissertation writing process does not have to take years. You are the most humble genius I have ever come across and I am grateful for all of the knowledge you have shared globally and about the Middle East, thank you for your supportive and practical side of demonstrating how to go about Krippendorff's alpha. You have a keen editing eye, a knack for theory, and new media studies. I am grateful along the way for the push to make theoretical connections. Dr. Rayburn, I am grateful not only for your advice but for agreeing to be added to the committee in such a short time. Your experience and expertise in the field of Strategic Communication have provided that you were able to share.

Gratitude also goes to some others who were equally important to my growth and educational process. Dr. Mayo, Dr. Schlenoff, Dr. Arpan, and Dr. Raney have each provided a great deal to my understanding of various aspects of my studies.

I am eternally grateful to my friend Melissa for listening to my hopes, dreams, and fears in the rear when needed, and supportive, celebratory nature when accomplishments were reached. My department's peers have also been helpful throughout this process. Peter, Bruce, and Michele, I thank you for helping me consider all of my career options. You have been great mentors. I will never forget you.

To all of those who have been there for me, thank you.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|--|------|
| List of Tables..... | viii |
| List of Figures..... | ix |
| Abstract..... | x |
| | |
| I. INTRODUCTION..... | 1 |
| Problem Statement / Purpose..... | 1 |
| Background / Context..... | 2 |
| Iraq..... | 7 |
| YouTube..... | 9 |
| | |
| II. LITERATURE REVIEW..... | 11 |
| Overview..... | 11 |
| Operationalization of Terms..... | 11 |
| Insurgent Groups in Iraq..... | 12 |
| Islam..... | 14 |
| Five Pillars of Islam..... | 15 |
| Sunni and Shi. a..... | 16 |
| Jihad..... | 16 |
| Middle Eastern Media..... | 17 |
| Insurgent Internet Media..... | 18 |
| Propaganda..... | 21 |
| Iraqi Insurgent Strategic Communication..... | 29 |
| U.S. Strategic Communication Comparison..... | 32 |
| Credibility..... | 33 |
| Media Effects..... | 35 |
| Agenda Setting and Framing..... | 36 |
| Cultivation..... | 41 |
| Violence..... | 45 |
| Reality of Violence in Iraq..... | 49 |
| The Social Identity Theory..... | 50 |
| Diffusion of Innovation Theory..... | 52 |
| Diffusion of the Internet Innovation..... | 55 |
| Diffusion of the YouTube Innovation..... | 57 |
| Diffusion of Social Movements..... | 62 |
| Connecting the Literature..... | 62 |
| Research Questions..... | 64 |
| | |
| III. METHODOLOGY..... | 67 |
| Overview..... | 67 |
| Units of Analysis..... | 67 |
| Population / Sample..... | 67 |
| Downloading video clips..... | 69 |
| Criteria..... | 69 |
| Coding..... | 70 |

| | |
|--|-----|
| Coding Scheme Reliability..... | 71 |
| Coding guidelines..... | 72 |
| Clarification of terms..... | 75 |
| Adaptations / Reasoning..... | 76 |
| Issues..... | 77 |
| IV. RESULTS& ANALYSIS..... | 79 |
| Introduction..... | 79 |
| Interpreting Data sources..... | 79 |
| Intercoder Reliability..... | 79 |
| Overall Video Collection..... | 80 |
| Insurgent Groups..... | 81 |
| Production features..... | 82 |
| Production Quality..... | 84 |
| Video Types..... | 85 |
| Research Question. #1..... | 87 |
| Recruiting Theme Function..... | 87 |
| Acclaims..... | 87 |
| Efficacy..... | 88 |
| Nonverbal Display..... | 88 |
| Religious Appeals..... | 89 |
| Nationalistic Appeals..... | 90 |
| Anti-U.S..... | 92 |
| Intimidation..... | 93 |
| Defenses..... | 93 |
| Research Question. #2..... | 94 |
| Anti-U.S..... | 94 |
| Victim Frames..... | 94 |
| Attacks..... | 96 |
| Defenses..... | 99 |
| Research Question. #3..... | 99 |
| Acclaims..... | 100 |
| Attacks..... | 100 |
| Defenses..... | 101 |
| Emotional / Affect Appeals..... | 102 |
| Martyrdom..... | 103 |
| Women Warriors of Jihad..... | 105 |
| Weapons / Tactics..... | 106 |
| ...Remarks..... | 107 |
| V. DISCUSSION / CONCLUSION..... | 108 |
| General Discussion Overview..... | 108 |
| Importance / Reasons for the Study..... | 108 |
| Conclusions Related To Infringement on the | 109 |
| Conclusions about Acclaims..... | 109 |
| Conclusions about Nationalistic Appeals..... | 109 |

| | |
|--|-----|
| Conclusions about Religious Appeals: Jus | |
|Islam..... | 110 |
| the Martyrdom Frame / Role of Imam. | 110 |
| Conclusions about Recruiting Efforts Pres | 111 |
| Conclusions a Frame Anti..... | 111 |
| Conclusions about the U.S. as Immoral Fra | 112 |
| Displacement of Responsibility..... | |
| Conclusions a Frame Insas..... | 113 |
| Conclusions about Search Term Used..... | 113 |
| Conclusions about Video Types..... | 113 |
| Conclusions about Production / Editing... | 114 |
| Conclusions about Clarity of Messages.... | 114 |
| Future Research..... | 114 |
| Larger Sample / Reduce Variables..... | 115 |
| Individual Count vs. Presence..... | 115 |
| Arabic Inclusion..... | 115 |
| Media Effects..... | 115 |
| Persuasion / Behavior..... | 116 |
| Cultivation Theory..... | 117 |
| ..Elections..... | 117 |
| Victim Frames..... | 118 |
| Chain of Command..... | 118 |
| Media Arm / No Media Arm..... | 118 |
| Issues Related to the Topic..... | 118 |
| Implications..... | 119 |
| APPENDICES..... | 122 |
| APPENDIX A: IRB APPROVAL..... | 122 |
| APPENDIX B: LETTER OF CONSENT..... | 124 |
| APPENDIX C: CODE BOOK..... | 126 |
| APPENDIX D: URLS FOR TRAINING VIDEOS..... | 132 |
| APPENDIX E: SUBJECTIVE CODE SHEET..... | 133 |
| APPENDIX F: OBJECTIVE CODE SHEET..... | 134 |
| APPENDIX G: SALEM ET AL. (2008) CODE SCHEME..... | 136 |
| APPENDIX H: SET OF VIDEOS IN SAMPLE..... | 138 |
| APPENDIX I: INSURGENT GROUPS..... | 140 |
| APPENDIX J: APPEALS..... | 142 |
| REFERENCES..... | 143 |
| BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH..... | 157 |

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 YouTube Iraqi Resistance Video Content Coding Adapted from Salem (2008)..... 72

Table 2: Top Iraqi Insurgent Groups With and Without a Media Arm 82

Table 3: Overall Video Frequencies for Language and Media 83

Table 4: Overall Production Quality of Videos for Sample 84

Table 5: Video Types 85

Table 6: Top 4 Groups Type of Videos 86

Table 7: Appeals Used by Top 4 Iraqi Insurgent Groups. 90

Table 8: Crosstabulation of Nationalistic Appeals and Resistance 91

Table 9: Top 4 Iraqi Insurgent Groups Use of Iraqis and Minorities as Victims 96

Table 10: Crosstabulation of Emotional / Affective Appeals Used by Groups Without a Media Arm 103

Table 11: Weapons Present In Iraqi Insurgent Videos... 106

Table 12: Tactics Used In Iraqi Videos 107

Table 13: List of Videos in Sample 138

Table 14: List of Iraqi Insurgent Groups 140

Table 15: Appeals Used by Iraqi Insurgents 142

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Animated Logo For Mujahideen (Video 1)..... 82

Figure 2: Insurgents Plan a Parade (Video 19)..... 86

Figure 3: Insurgent Celebration (Video 16)..... 88

Figure 4: U.S. Soldier Weeping (Video 16)..... 89

Figure 5: Saddam Hussein in Parade (Video 30)..... 91

Figure 6: Iraqi Insurgent Holds Severed Arm (Video 9)..... 93

Figure 7: U.S. Soldiers Burning after Attack (Video 28)..... 95

Figure 8: Insurgent Shows off Helmet of Dead US Soldier..... 95

Figure 9: US Soldier Shown Threatening (Video 4)..... 96

Figure 10: President George Bush Depicted Negatively (Video 28)..... 98

Figure 11: Old Picture of President Barack Obama (Video 6)..... 99

Figure 12: Weapons Used by Insurgents (Video 18) 100

Figure 13: Insurgent Speaking to U.S. Soldiers (Video 25)..... 101

Figure 14: Insurgent Showing Picture of His Family (Video 5)..... 102

Figure 15: Iraqi Describing Role of Imam (Video 34)..... 104

Figure 16: Iraqi Child Holding Weapon (Video 33)..... 105

Figure 17: Iraqi Women Holding Weapons (Video 6) 106

ABSTRACT

This dissertation study is a baseline investigation into Iraqi insurgent communication as a strategic communication. The study conducted a content analysis of frames from October 28, 2008 to December 1, 2008 for the search term YouTube. The study examined criteria for all framing devices and themes. The function of videos were examined. While not a random sample, the selection of videos was selected as a representation of the overall population of Iraqi insurgent videos for the study. The study examined open interpretation of frames, the study examined those which may be used to influence U.S. sentiment. It builds upon previous research in related areas and approaches focus on Social Identity, Diffusion of Innovation, and Framing in attempt to explore the phenomenon. The methodological design establishes a discipline for the study since the topic of Iraqi insurgent YouTube has yet to be examined extensively in the academic arena. Overall, there were 54 videos that met set criteria examined. Of these, most were documentaries. While there were 28 Iraqi insurgent groups represented in the videos, only 4 Iraqis were identified in more videos. These were Islamic State of Iraq (25.9%, n=14), Iraqi Resistance (24.2%, n=13), and Jaish al-Mujahideen (13%, n=7). Two of these four groups have a media arm devoted to creating their video content and acting as a media representative for members of the group. There was not a large difference in the number of videos between groups with and without a media arm. Analysis of the data suggested Iraqi insurgents using YouTube to recruit and influence sentiment. There was a presence of several framing devices some of which included religious, nationalistic, institutional, and defenses. Overall, videos in the sample had a large presence of military members.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

This study is an exploratory content analysis of YouTube insurgent videos from November 1, 2008 to December 1, 2008 found under the search term Iraqi resistance. The purpose of the study is to explore how Iraqi insurgents are using YouTube as a communication tool by attempting to identify overall themes found in these videos. In particular, the study examines frames which may be used to recruit U.S. sentiment. However, the process also includes an open interpretation found in the content. This chapter presents the problem statement, the purpose for the study, some background information on the topic, and the theoretical applications which will be expanded on in the literature review. While the study examines content by the Muslim population, this in no way purports to be reflective upon the larger population as a whole. Iraqi insurgents tend to have a radicalized view of Islam and ideology. The terms strategic communication and propaganda are used interchangeably.

Problem Statement Purpose

The United States government has attempted to win the hearts and minds of the Middle East, but as a result has had many failed attempts. In order to combat insurgent messages, it is imperative to understand the complexity of messaging from a culture that is not Western. According to the Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication (2004), in order to be effective, strategic communicators must understand attitudes and cultures, respect the importance of ideas, adopt advanced information technologies, and employ sophisticated communication skills and strategies. Further, in order to be persuasive, messages must be seen as credible.

Messages disseminated by insurgent groups must be examined with the purpose of understanding what has worked and why, overestimating the grievances of the insurgents and those who potentially sympathize with them is a common mistake. From this perspective, a present day study is needed, a clearer, more comprehensive understanding of strategic communication tactics employed by groups such as

The purpose of the proposed study is to explore current strategic communication tactics employed by Iraqi insurgents. The study examines insurgent YouTube videos for frames and devices and particularly themes with a focus on how the Iraqis use YouTube

as a tool for both recruiting and US messages. While insurgents potentially messaging to many groups, this study focuses on videos with English or mu videos with English. English is one of the few global diplomatic languages a United States is one of the top countries regarding Internet penetration and mostly the English speaking Western world that dominates the Internet (Statista, 2008).

Iraqi insurgent YouTube messages may be targeting United States / Western individuals, especially Muslims or minorities, and reach disenfranchised or sympathetic American and other Westerners along with populations. While it is impossible to determine exact insurgent targeting intent regarding audience, these messages are reaching potential audiences.

The scope of this study has a narrowed focus on Iraq since the United States has a strong and somewhat controversial military presence there since 2003. This research sheds light on an Iraqi insurgent strategic communication widely discussed yet limited knowledge exists on its effects and particular messaging tactics. Audience research outside of the scope of this present study participant exposure to potentially harmful messages could have been a consequence. Content analysis is determined to be the most practical and ethical means of collecting data and exploring this phenomenon given the limited knowledge known on the topic.

In order to provide the most accurate picture, the researcher has made every effort to be as objective as possible. While contributing to new knowledge in social sciences, this study may also provide insight valuable for counterterrorism efforts.

Background Context

The United States has been fighting the Global War on Terror in the Middle East since 2001. In particular, the United States has engaged in regime change activities in Iraq since 2003, which at times been met with great resistance. While Iraqi insurgents are known for violent attacks, they also fight with strategic messaging tactics known as strategic communication (also known historically as propaganda (Doty, 2005)). Insurgent messaging on YouTube uses strategic communication / propaganda strategies in an attempt to influence audience and viewer behavior. Propaganda is the attempt to influence the opinions of an audience through the transmission of ideas, and values (Taylor, 2005).

Viewers, especially Westerners, are not likely to have otherwise had exposure to insurgent ideas and values. Thus, YouTube messaging is a tool with great potential for communication / propaganda purposes.

Insurgent strategic communications can take on many forms, such as word-of-mouth, flyers, newsletters, e-mails, courses by religious and community leaders, messages, news coverage such as Jazeemah Web pages, and video footage (Weimann, 2006). The widespread and common use of the Internet by insurgent groups has been noted since it allows members to communicate rapidly, at low cost, and has the potential for anonymity.

Weimann's (2006) research found there were more than 4,300 websites serving terrorists and their supporters on the Internet, many of which were dedicated to insurgent groups. YouTube also receives high monthly volume. The number of video streams (the way usage is measured) from April 2008 to November 2008, was more than 4 billion. These streams were viewed by viewers 73.5 million (Weimann News Release, 2008). While YouTube is somewhat guarded about the total number of users, a 2006 article reported that YouTube had 100 million (Hofstadter, 2006).

Efforts such as the Dark Web Terrorism Research project have used computer science to access terrorist related websites and content. The Dark Web collection is the largest open source collection in the academic world of extremist and terrorist websites. Its collection is 2 TBs in size, 500,000,000 pages / files / postings from more than 10,000 sites (Artificial Intelligence Lab, n.d.).

Chen, Chung, Qin, Reid, Sageman, and Weimann (2008) developed a methodology using Dark Web data collection techniques to incorporate content visualization and analysis techniques to exploit web information sources. They applied this methodology to analyze information from 39 Jihadi websites. Along with additional expert input, their methodology to be promising.

Artificial Intelligence Lab researchers Salem (2008) as part of their Dark Web Terrorism research, conducted a content coding analysis of Jihadi videos. Their research identified types of videos, groups, usage patterns, ideological content, and video production features. While Salem et al.'s (2008) study

insurgent videos on YouTube, their research greatly informed the present study as part of the coding scheme.

Another study, titled *Intelligence Savvy U.S. and Middle Eastern Extremist Groups* by Reid and Chen (2007), provided a hyperlink and content analysis of 44 U.S. and Middle Eastern extremist groups' websites to analyze their use of computer communication to support collective identity and mobilization. The results of the identification and analysis of the groups' web communities and their CMC use are detailed in (Reid and Chen, 2007: 181).

Weimann (2006) focused on terrorist groups' use of weblogs to communicate with cell members and for strategic communications. While such as those conducted as part of the Dark Web Project provided academic knowledge on overall web usage by Iraqi insurgents, little to no empirical research has yet been done on using the popular video sharing website YouTube.

YouTube, founded in February of 2005, is an Internet website that provides free video streaming. Users of YouTube are able to share multimedia clips (Pavri-Garcia & Tomlinson, 2007). YouTube in particular is becoming popular because its viewership is constantly increasing across the West. Although some alternative media sources have existed, Web 2.0 has become a stronghold with a limited perspective (Herman, 1992). YouTube, for alternative content, such as Iraqi insurgent messages, to be shared through streaming video that has been made available on the site.

YouTube allows for clips to be viewed continuously or even long after the speaker has died and can be filmed and/or uploaded from anywhere in the world requiring only a computer and Internet access. The receiver can also be anywhere with a computer and Internet access. It is also possible for people / users to download videos from YouTube, save them to their hard drive, and show the content to people who are without such access.

YouTube is a relatively recent innovation with its potential usages and impacts on insurgents yet to be explored. The numbers of YouTube users (both uploaders and viewers) are growing exponentially, the impacts of Iraqi insurgent messaging through YouTube are still being explored, and the potential to be quite substantial. Considering a select few Western media sources, the dominant exposure for both the West and the Arab world (Zeitoun, 2009), the Internet

and resources on it such as YouTube, provide insurgents with the opportunity globally in a way not possible before. They can now provide a different perspective to counter Western media, and show content to individuals who would otherwise not see it (Garfield, 2007). The present study applies the Diffusion of Innovations theory (Rogers, 2003) to examine how the innovations of the Internet and video sites, such as YouTube in particular, have diffused across society making global messaging possible.

Insurgent groups are capable of framing their communications in an attempt to deliver their intended message and shape perceptions based on the content presented. Frames are likely to be different depending on the intended audience. Iraqi insurgents have chosen a media frame, often presented toward a Western audience, but do so through the lens of how they (Westerners) see the other. Iraqi cultural norms and ideals along with stereotypical notions of the West inform the frames produced. If this is the case, an explanatory factor may be Benford and Snow's (2000) theory that a frame is an interpretive schema that simplifies and condenses the world out there by selectively encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions or past environments. As Entman (1993) states, "to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in sum to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, treatment recommendation" (p. 52).

Along with message frames, portrayals of particular groups and individuals can influence identity formation and encourage social comparison. This notion is central to Social Identity Theory (Albert & Turner, 1979). Social identity is commonly defined as a person's sense of self derived from membership in social groups (Chen & Li, 2006, p. 2). Individuals tend to base their identity partially on the groups to which they belong, which was first developed in 1979 by Turner in an attempt to understand intergroup discrimination.

Utilizing the conceptual framework of Social Identity Theory may explain why individuals who feel they belong to a particular insurgent group may derive their sense of self in part, from that group (Turner, 1979). Insurgents may attempt to draw upon commonalities in their videos to potential viewers such as through ties of common ideology, or the like. Other appeals could attempt to reach individuals

potential identification as a disenfranchised person, someone who feels they have been excluded by the United States or western world, appeals to someone who has lost family and friends because of war, etc. Insurgents likely use media messages to create a collective identity and for the purpose of reaching potential recruits. Further, White Supremacists literature, interpretative frameworks are likely to simulate threatening social issues, provide corresponding recommendations for social action (Adams & Roscigno, 2005)

Nisan (2002) discusses a separation between Muslims and other people of the book, Christians and Jews, are still considered outsiders to the group.

Insurgents may call upon utilizing principles of the Social Identity Theory. Media viewers feel they are part of a larger group and that including Israeli's and the western world, a group that should increase the barrier between them and the United States would then become us against them approach. Once strong attitudes are built and reinforced by insurgency media, it may then become increasingly difficult to counteract these messages and persuade viewers in a different direction.

As Lippman (1997) asserts, our opinions and behavior are responses not to the world itself but to our perception of that world. It is the picture that we see and our feelings and actions, and these only imperfectly reflect the world that surrounds us. Our experience of the world is largely indirect (Lippman, 1997, p. 130). Lippman's reference to a largely indirect experience refers to how the public often experiences and forms perceptions through media consumption. Cultivation theory (Gerbner, 1969) exposure to cultural imagery will shape viewers' concept of reality (Freed, 2000). The theory suggests that heavy viewers exposed to mass media will have attitudes that are consistent with those displayed in the media they consume rather than is in actual reality. Propaganda is a tool for altering perceptions of reality. These perceptions of reality are shaped by particular messaging frames. Insurgents have the capability to perhaps influence opinions, behavior, and even perception of the world by exposing individuals to media and by their choice of framing device. Heavy exposure to such videos (cultural propaganda) especially have an impact on these perceptions.

Iraq

Iraq is located in the Middle East, partially bordered by the Persian Gulf. Bordering countries include Iran to the east, Kuwait to the south, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria to the west, and Turkey to the north. It has an area of 437,072 square kilometers (168,753 square miles), which is slightly more than twice the size of Idaho. The majority of Iraqis live in Baghdad, Iraq's capital city, and is centrally located. Some other major cities, including Ar Ramadi and Karbala in the middle, and Mosul in the north. Iraq has the fourth largest population in the Middle East and North Africa with an estimated total of 28,221,000 in 2008. Islam is the predominant religion, comprising 97 percent of the population. While the majority are Shi'ite (Shia) Muslims, 65 percent, Sunni Muslims make up an estimated 32 percent. There is a small minority of Christians and other religions comprising the other estimated 3 percent. The majority of Muslims and Iraqis are not members of insurgent groups. More than thirty percent of Iraq's population was under 15 years of age with a median age of 20.2 years as of July 2008. Iraq has the second largest oil reserves in the world. Oil mining accounts for 60 percent of the country's GDP (Central Intelligence Agency, 2009).

Oil production is concentrated in the north in Kirkuk, Jambur, Bai Hassam, Butman, and Baiji. Oil fields include the Rumaila and Zubeir, and until the Gulf War oil was exported via the Gulf Arab Pipeline. In addition, smaller fields can be found in the south, including Luhais, Nahr Umr, Buzurgan, Abu Ghuraib, and Jabal Fauqi. Oil production was interrupted as a result of armed conflict initially with Iran and later by allied forces during the Gulf War. Production before the war at its highest was 3.5 million barrels per day in 1979, declining to 700,000 barrels a day in 1980 with the start of the Gulf War and UN sanctions imposed. Sanctions reduced production and output capacity and until 1996, oil exports were forbidden under the terms of the UN sanctions. The only exception was made by the United Nations in 1996, as part of a humanitarian program designed to provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. Under the program 1.76 million b/d of oil were exported (Encyclopedia of the Nations).

The Gulf War in 1991 was said to be a result of the invasion of Kuwait on July 17, 1990. Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein threatened them of waging Economic War on

Iraq by flooding the world's oil market and reserving that oil for under both countries. American involvement was swift as government officials from Kuwait met and then President George H. Bush condemned the actions of Saddam Hussein. A resolution was passed by the United Nations requiring Iraq to remove all forces from Kuwait by January 15, 1991. During the months between the invasion and the resolution deadline, including the U.S. military, began preparing for offensive operations. Hussein's resolution deadline on January 17, 1991 coalition forces began Operation Desert Storm, which started with an air war against Iraq. After five weeks of air strikes, ground troops began their operations. The ground war lasted 100 hours before the Iraqis agreed to a ceasefire agreement. The Liberation of Kuwait was announced on March 6, 1991 (War: A line in the sand, n.d.).

Attacks, carried out by terrorist organizations and individuals, have occurred around the world. On September 11, 2001, the World Trade Center (Twin Towers), in New York, and the Pentagon, in Washington DC, were attacked by terrorists killing about 3,000 people. Four hijacked jetliners to have them fly directly into symbolic U.S. landmarks. One, on September 11, 2001, crashed instead in the Pennsylvania countryside because unarmed passengers revolted against the hijackers. This may have prevented the death of many individuals who would have been killed had the plane reached its intended target (9/11 Commission Report, 2004).

Al-Qaeda, a known terrorist organization, claimed responsibility for the September 11 attacks. George W. Bush condemned the attacks and gathered an international coalition to fight against all of the perpetrators. This international campaign led by the U.S. became known as the Global War on Terrorism. Coalition troops began Operation Enduring Freedom, entering Afghanistan in 2001, after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, to drive out the Taliban oppressive ruling group which supported Al-Qaeda.

Coalition forces, composed mainly of U.S. and British troops, invaded Iraq in 2003. This action began in order to overthrow the government of Saddam Hussein, who was believed to be in possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), a severe threat to coalition troops around the world. Saddam Hussein was also supporting terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda and violating the human rights of the Iraqi people. The Iraqi military was quickly defeated and Saddam Hussein was eventually captured.

convicted of human rights violations, and executed. A new democratic government established. However, 5 years later, the US position continues to fight the insurgency (Iraq War Timeline, n.d.; Gulf War to Iraq War 2003 Aug. 1990 Timeline of Operation Iraqi Freedom, n.d.).

YouTube

During the time period data from which the present study was drawn, YouTube was an active player in major political events taking place in the United States and throughout the world. O Leary (2008) suggests that YouTube was a crucial election in recent memory. YouTube has a video recorded of the campaign (2008).

Bellamy (2008) points out that YouTube became a political player in the 2008 presidential campaigns. For example, Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton candidacies in Web videos, Senator and Presidential candidate McCain was caught on video singing Bomb Iran to the tune of the Beach Boys song Surfer Girl. A former pastor, Rev. Jeremiah Wright was shown shouting God damn, America! were circulated on YouTube (Bellamy, 2008).

Learnmonth (2008) discusses video postings on YouTube preceding the 2008 presidential campaigns. He found Obama's campaign posted five times as many videos as McCain's, although McCain had a high number of Obama campaign videos from appearances around the country while the McCain campaign posted mostly ads. Some of these ads even ended up on national TV providing free television. Obama campaign was also dominant on social networking sites MySpace. Learnmonth reports September 2008, the Obama campaign had 12.9 million views compared with McCain's 5.8 million with and that they posted 206 videos compared with McCain's 40 posts, six of which had sound but no video content (2008). from the web analytics firm TubeMogul, in September 2008, McCain's average were 150,948 compared with Obama's 59,253. Learnmonth reports July web hits margin with McCain at 3 million YouTube views Obama's 3.2 million. Consider the narrow win for the Obama campaign (9.3 million) in comparison to McCain (Learnmonth, 2008), the issue of media presence, including usage of resources should be considered as a influential factor of win/loss ratios.

YouTube has had such a powerful impact that it was credited as having
cause of Virginia Sen. George Allen's destroyed campaign. YouTube posting of
Macaca video, which sets forth a downward spiral, was viewed 360,000 times (O'Leary
2008). While literature is increasingly being published about the president
(Bellamy, 2008; Leary, 2008; Leary, 2008; Walsh, 2008) there is nothing as of yet
examining Iraqis' use of YouTube during the same period.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

Overview

This literature review attempts to operationalize terms, inform the re-insurgent groups and discuss typical loyalties, Islam, Strategic Communication (propaganda), Middle Eastern and Insurgent produced media. Further, an overview of credibility literature, media effects, Agenda Setting, Framing, Cultivation influence of violence, Social Identity Theory, and Diffusion of Innovation. While this study does not test the related theories except for framing devices, the theories explain possible relationships between the sample content and media effects. This chapter connects the theories which may in part explain the phenomena examined in the present study, followed by the research questions used to explore the content.

Operationalization of Terms

Often terms such as insurgency used without a concrete understanding of their meaning. In order to conduct dialogue on the topic of insurgency, a standard term must be found. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency defines insurgency as an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict (Headquarters, Department of the Army, Agency Operations Manual, 08.22, 2004). Bard O'Neil (2001) book *Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare* defines insurgency as a struggle between a ruling group and the ruling authorities in which the group consciously uses political resources (e.g., organizational expertise, propaganda, and demonstrations) and violence to destroy or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more political aspects of

For the purpose of operationalizing the term insurgency, the definition provided by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) will be used. The CIA defines insurgence

Insurgency is a protracted political activity directed toward completely or partially controlling the resources of a country through the use of irregular and illegal political organizations. Insurgent activities may include terrorism, and political mobilization, for example, propaganda, recruitment, covert party organization, and internal subversion to weaken government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent CIA, *Guidelines for the Analysis of Insurgency*, quoted in Daniel Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce William Rosenau and David Brando, *Outside Support for Insurgent Movements*, Santa Monica: RAND, 2001, p.4)

The CIA's definition includes terrorism, widely known insurgents terrorist acts as a tactic (Byman, Chalk, Hoffman, 2006). Ahmed, Has Brannan (2006) points out in *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq* that whether an organization is considered an organization depends on your standpoint. The U.S. Department defines terrorism as premeditated, politically motivated violence against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience (Rex Hudson, 1999). There is further distinction between terrorism tactics. Terrorists differentiate between combatants and guerrilla tactics are generally attacks on military or government (Alexander, et al., 2003).

Insurgent Groups in Iraq

There are three broad categories of insurgents associated with Iraq: secular tribal, and Islamist. According to a United States Institute of Peace Special Report (2005), many insurgents across these three classifications share common interests solely within any one particular grouping or category.

There is a difference between the Shiite militias and insurgency, which are Sunni groups. Shiite militias are generally directed toward Sunnis and less towards the United States. Sunni insurgency groups take issue with the U.S., the Iraqis, and the militias (Berger, 2007).

According to Baram (2005), insurgents generally claim one of three identities based on their motivation for their American and government violence: / secular ideological, tribal, or Islamist. Islamists either the moderates and radicals who might one day reach an accord with and the Iraqi government, fall under the radical Salafi and Wahhabi Islamist movement, which will never occur. Baram states that, identity and motivations of most insurgents are elastic and multifaceted (Baram, 2005, p.1).

Most Iraqi insurgents can also be categorized as Sunni nationalists, moderate Sunni Islamists, and Salafists. Sunni nationalists focus on nationalistic goals, focus on promoting an Islamic form of government under Sharia law, and the group Al Qaeda in Iraq, move to build a Muslim empire (Berger, 2007).

Estimates of the number of insurgents can be difficult because of the transient nature and degree of secrecy among members. U.S. military estimates range from 8,000 in 2006 to 20,000. Iraqi Intelligence officials issued figures upward of 40,000 fighters and 160,000 supporters (BBC News, 2006). While it would be near impossible to count insurgent groups in Iraq, the following provide an overview of some of the key groups.

Salem, Reid, and Chen (2008) found videos from the following names of insurgency groups:

- Al-Jabha Islamiya-Muqawama al-Iraqiya (Islamic Front of the Iraqi Resistance)
- Al-Jaysh Islami al-Iraq (Islamic Army in Iraq)
- Al-Qiyada Muwahada L-Mujahidin (Mujahidin Central Command)
- Harakat-Muqawama al-Islamiya al-Iraq (Islamic Resistance s Movement in Iraq)
- Jaysh al-Iraq Islami (Iraq Islamic Army)
- Jaysh al-Ihad Islami (Islamic Army)
- Jaysh al-Mujahidin (Mujahidin s Army)
- Jaysh al-Talif al-Mahsoura (Victorious Group s Army)
- Jaysh Ansaar al-Sunna (Partisans of the Sunna Army)
- Tandhim al-Ihda fi Bilad al-Rafidayn-Qaada s Organization in Mesopotamia)

Controlling force differs spelling, in addition to BBC 2006 News, a article, Guide: Armed groups includes Mujahideen Shura Council they say an umbrella organization including five insurgent groups. Kimmage and Ridolfo (2007) s group is also part of Al-Qaeda in Iraq.

Both the BBC 2006 article and Kimmage and Ridolfo s (2007) study include Sunni Nationalists, Shia Militia, Mehdi Army, and the Badr Brigade largest Shia party in Iraq, the Supreme of the Islamic Revolution). Kimmage and Ridolfo (2007) also provide a list of some Iraqi insurgent media producers: Media Production, Global Islamic Media Center, Fard al-Intitute for Media Production.

As Alexander, Kyle, and McQuinn point out in their article The Iraqi Insurgent Movement the tribal ethos is the basis for most security, economic, and political Iraq They explain that culture is made up of a long history continuum

going from the strongest to the weakest immediate family, then extended family
tribe/ clan region, Muslim Arab/Muslim Arabs, all. National ties come before the
separation between Shia and Sunnis. Alexander, Kyle, and McCallister's example
Iraqi will side with Sunni Iraq in a conflict with Persian Shia. While part
are indeed important divisions and are most often divided by Sunni and Shia
influence must not be disregarded. Iraq is based on a tribal society where
thousands of years. At least 75% of the population of Iraq belong to hundred and
fifty of the nation's tribes (Alexander, Kyle, and McCallister Arab parts of
Iraq there are ten large tribal federations and hundreds of tribes and sub
tribal units (Goodall, & McDermid, 2006).

Islam

Islam is believed by Muslims to be the only (Allah) religion of God
word Islam literally means the submission or surrender of one's will to Allah
a word meaning peace. Its adherents are called Muslims. The religion is
related to Judaism and Christianity, Islam is said to have been revealed in
its final form by Prophet Muhammad in the seventh century (Philips, 1995).

Islam is considered a religion and way of life for Muslims and promotes
and forgiveness (The Islamic Affairs Dept 1989). Islam places a strong emphasis
moral responsibility and accountability and the majority of Muslims are pious
women and men, family and community oriented, and wish to live in peace and
than in warfare (Esposito, 2005). Islam is the second largest religion in the world
Christianity and the population is steadily increasing. There are around 900 million
according to Esposito. Islam is spreading throughout Europe, Asia, Africa,
most notably in the Soviet Union, China, India, England, and the United States
and cities which include large numbers of Muslims Paris, Marseilles, London,
Manchester, New York, Boston, Chicago, Houston, Dallas, and Los Angeles
quickly becoming less associated with Western people and increasingly applies to
West as well (Esposito, 2005).

Globally, the majority of Muslims strictly follow rules concerning modern
divorce, inheritance, intoxicants, gambling, diet, theft, murder, fornication
Some Muslims living and traveling to the United States and other Western countries

Western customs including clothing styles yet many adhere to strict customs (Esposito, 2005).

Muslims believe that God revealed the Qur'an to Muhammad through the angel Gabriel. They regard the Qur'an and the Sunna (words and deeds of Prophet Muhammad) as the foundation of Islam. For Muslims, Muhammad was the final prophet to receive revelations from Allah over the course of two decades which make up the Qur'an in its entirety (Al-Haram, 1995).

Muslims do not believe in the divinity of prophets and see them as human beings. At times have been used to work miracles. Other prophets recognized by Islam include Adam, Noah, Abraham and Jesus (The Islamic Affairs Department, 1989).

The Qur'an is compiled of 114 soorahs (suras), each with its own meaning. The soorahs cover spiritual, social and moral issues and provide guidance for Muslims to follow. Muslims follow the hadith, writings about Muhammad's life and practices, especially when the Qur'an does not specifically address an issue. Muslims believe the Qur'an is perfect in its Arabic form and translations are only to be considered interpretations. All Muslims are expected to pray in Arabic and most learn Arabic at a young age even if it is not their language (Maududi, 2002).

Five Pillars of Islam

Followers of Islam have duties known as the Five Pillars of Islam.

1.) The first pillar is a declaration of one's faith called Shahadah which is recited as "There is no God except God and Muhammad is His messenger." The second part of the Shahada is Muhammadun rasulullah (Muhammad is the messenger of Allah) (Islamic Affairs Department, 1989).

2.) The second pillar is called Salat which are obligatory prayers performed five times a day at dawn, noon, afternoon, sunset and nightfall. These prayers are considered a direct link to Allah. In Muslim countries there is a call to prayer broadcasted by mosques for each prayer. These prayers are done facing toward Mecca (Islamic Affairs Department, 1989).

3.) The third pillar is an obligatory charity called Zakat. This charity is used toward the spread of Islam. Muslims give Zakat individually which is about 2.5 percent of their capital if they can afford it (Islamic Affairs Department, 1989).

4.) The fourth pillar is a month long fasting ritual. Each year during the month of Ramadan Muslims fast from dawn until sundown abstaining from food, drink, and sexual intercourse. Those who are exempt include the sick, elderly, young children, and women who are pregnant (Islamic Affairs Department, 1989).

or nursing. Women do not fast while menstruating but make up the days missed the fasting ritual during puberty. ~~by gender (Islamic Affairs Department, 1989).~~

5.) The fifth and final pillar is a pilgrimage called Hajj. Those who are able to perform the Hajj do so annually. This pilgrimage is to Makkah and around two miles ~~each~~ ^{per} year. Adherents attempt to make this pilgrimage at their lifetime. Some of the rituals for Hajj include walking around the Kaaba, touching of the Black Stone, and running seven times between Mount Safa and ~~Mount Arafat~~ (Islamic Affairs Department, 1989).

Sunni and Shi a

There has been one major historic division of Islam which is between Sunni and Shi a. The Sunnis make up 85 percent and Shi a 15 percent of the world's Islamic population. The separation occurred in the 7th century following disagreements over the religious and political leadership of the Muslim community. Muslims were divisive over who should be the Prophet Muhammad's successor (Esposito, 2005; Philips, 1995).

Sunnis believe that the ~~caliphs were~~ ^{caliphs were} the rightful successors to Muhammad since Allah (God) did not specify any particular leaders to succeed Prophet Muhammad. Leaders had to be elected. The Shi a make up the ~~second~~ ^{largest} branch of Islam. They believe that the cousin and ~~son~~ ^{uncle} of Muhammad, Ali, was Prophet Muhammad's rightful successor. The Shi a reject the legitimacy of the Muslim caliphate. There are other differences between Shi a and Sunnis, however, both are adherents of Islam (Esposito, 2005).

Jihad

Jihad means "to strive or struggle" and has two different forms for Muslims. The greater jihad is the ~~individual's~~ ^{individual's} striving to live a good Muslim life and follow the will of Allah. This form of jihad includes adherence to Islamic law (Esposito, 2004). The lesser jihad, according to ~~author~~ ^{author}, is a violent struggle for Islam. This jihad is also subdivided into two forms, the ~~land jihad~~ ^{land jihad} and the ~~land jihad~~ ^{land jihad} the land of conflict.

There is a distinction between defensive and offensive jihad. When the existence of an Islamic State is threatened by some form of invasion there is an individual obligation (for Muslims) to be part of a defensive jihad either by direct fighting, financial support, or prayer. If an Islamic State is ~~not~~ ^{not} attacked and the attacked country does not have the strength to fight alone, neighboring Muslim countries have a duty to assist. There is also global Muslim responsibility if ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~land~~ ^{land} is ~~not~~ ^{not} ~~enough~~ ^{enough} (Mahdavi, 2002).

Offensive jihad is an attack on ~~un~~ ~~the~~ ~~Islamic~~ ~~law~~ ~~to~~ Sharia (Quranic law). The offensive jihad is a collective not individual obligation. The Muslim umma, was required to engage in a jihad ~~to~~ ~~expand~~ ~~Islam~~ ~~into~~ ~~the~~ ~~world~~ so that all humankind could benefit from living within a just political social order. Based on a sincere belief is the will of Allah ~~is~~ ~~the~~ ~~same~~ ~~Muslim~~ ~~will~~ ~~to~~ ~~wage~~ ~~jihad~~. Some of the more ~~of~~ ~~these~~ ~~people~~ ~~forming~~ ~~insurgent~~ ~~groups~~.

The Pew Research Center ~~estimated~~ ~~the~~ ~~total~~ ~~population~~ ~~of~~ ~~Muslims~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~United~~ ~~States~~ ~~at~~ ~~2.35~~ ~~million~~. The Pew ~~Research~~ ~~Center~~ ~~study~~ ~~of~~ ~~Muslim~~ ~~Americans~~: ~~Middle~~ ~~Class~~ ~~and~~ ~~Mostly~~ ~~Mainstream~~ ~~(2007)~~ ~~suggested~~ ~~overall~~ ~~support~~ ~~for~~ ~~Islamic~~ ~~extremism~~ ~~was~~ ~~lower~~ ~~for~~ ~~Muslim~~ ~~Americans~~ ~~compared~~ ~~with~~ ~~the~~ ~~global~~ ~~population~~ ~~of~~ ~~Muslims~~. However, Muslim Americans are more likely than other Western European Muslims to reject Islamic extremism. Among Muslims in the U.S., the Pew study ~~found~~ ~~more~~ ~~acceptance~~ ~~of~~ ~~Islamic~~ ~~extremism~~ ~~among~~ ~~African~~ ~~American~~ ~~Muslims~~. Further, younger Muslim Americans were much more likely than older Muslim Americans to say there is sometimes a justification for suicide bombing in the name of Islam. Most Muslim Americans believed the U.S. led War on Terror was a sincere effort to combat terrorism and only 40% of Muslim Americans believed Arabs carried out the 9/11 attacks. (Pew Research Center 2007).

Middle Eastern Media

Middle Eastern media until as late as the 1990s have been tightly controlled by their affiliated governments. (Gallagher, 2005) Jazeera, network launched in Qatar in 1996 has become the best known satellite television network with considerably limited competition. That limited competition includes Saudi MBC, Bayhaq, Abu Dhabi TV, Dubai based Al Arabiya and a few others. (Jazeera, 2005) Jazeera has been noted for being fast moving, has video heavy newscasts, and has political shows which discuss social, and religious issues previously untouched by Arab media. (Smith, 2005, p.7). They have had guests on their programming such as Donald Rumsfeld, Colin Powell and the Ambassador to Lebanon. (Gallagher, 2005) Jazeera has expanded its programming to be offered in the West, offering a perspective not found in traditional syndicates such as Fox News, CNN, NBC etc.

The programs on Jazeera are said to be relatively free of censorship. There may be at least somewhat truth to this. (2005) Jazeera states, On 10 October the White

House announced it had asked the U.S. television networks, ABC, CBS, CNN, Fox and NBC to censor Al Qaeda footage and that minutes later National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice urged all the American network chiefs not to broadcast any footage from Al Qaeda. Miles (2005, 116) All five networks followed the request and did not broadcast any footage from Al Qaeda. Miles (2005, 116) The U.S. First Amendment cannot technically be violated since Rice had phrased it as a request. The U.S. also attempted to have Arab and British news channels censor their material but were refused since both felt it would be wrong to censor speech (Miles, 2005, 116). However, Al Jazeera, according to Campagna in his 2001 article, Foreign Policy, has been notably soft on its coverage of Qatari affairs and of the family in particular (Campagna, 2001).

In general Arab media refer to wars which they report differently than most Western media outlets. Ralph (2004), in a Middle East perspective, during the 2003 Gulf War Arab broadcasters mostly framed it negatively. They sometimes used the term 'Invasion of Iraq' but frequently called it 'U.S. Attack on Iraq', 'U.S. Invasion of Iraq' and on occasion called it 'U.S. Terrorist War on Iraq'. The West called it the 'War of Liberation' and most commonly 'Iraq Operation'. Negative frames of the second Gulf War were broadcasts in Arab media, Al Jazeera, Al Dhabi TV, and Al Arabiya.

Other forms of media available in the Middle East include Radio Sawa, a 24 hour, 7 day a week American Arabic language radio station that began broadcasting in March 2001 in Amman, Kuwait, Dubai, Abu Dhabi among other places. American funded is Alhurra TV, launched February 2004 (Congressional Broadcasting Board of Governors, 2005). Although not by itself, the world were considered for research purposes in this dissertation. In addition, many magazines, newspapers and the like also publicly available in the Middle East. Insurgent Internet Media

The pen is said to be mightier than the sword. Insurgents use this to their advantage. Their weaponry includes computers and the Internet—where they use e-mail, instant messaging, chat rooms, blogs, discussion forums, Voice over IP (Ford, 2007), online guides, magazines, and streaming video (Weimann, 2006). Insurgent use of new media provides an edge they would not have had once. They are breaking through the media monopoly long dominated by the West and have

over the communication process. No longer does the United States have complete control of the discourse taking place, especially on the World Wide Web (Heller, 2005; Halloran, 2007; Gallagher & Smith, 2005; Whine, 1999). There has been concern by the originators of the Internet about the potential for misuse of the network, particularly in the context of the Cold War (Douglas, 2006). This tool created to protect the ability of individuals to communicate has become a double-edged sword.

The Internet provides a global community where individuals can share ideas and conduct dialogue. The exchange of ideas can unify individuals and nations, whether it is for peaceful reasons or insubordinate ones. It can be used for providing information or strategic communication and psychological warfare.

Insurgent groups exploit the Internet since it is easy to access, has a wide reach, and is suggested to be influential on public opinions, and they have not yet been able to develop effective media strategies (Goodall & McDonnell, 2006). They create graphically appealing web pages with imagery, multimedia, and selected content (Kimmage & Ridolfo, 2007). Weimann suggests from his extensive research on insurgent media on the Internet, terrorist or insurgent groups tend to avoid drawing attention to either the violence or the death and destruction that they are causing. He says they routinely change web site names and URLs to avoid getting hit by service providers (Weimann, 2006a).

Web pages, blogs, and video uploads allow for a selective presentation of information and are a useful, effective messaging tool. The Internet is being used to present information in multiple languages in several different forms with several target audiences in mind. To incite fear in the enemy or recruit new members, messages can be strategically disseminated across quickly and at minimal costs. As Weimann (2006) notes, the Internet allows easy access, little to no regulation, censorship, or government control. For huge audiences throughout the world, is virtually anonymous, inexpensive, and maintenance, is an interactive medium that has the ability to surpass traditional mass media coverage in the traditional mass media.

As Paul Eed (2002), expert on the Middle East suggests about Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda strategy: The Web site is central to al Qaeda's strategy to ensure that its war effort can continue even if many of its cells across the world are broken up and its members are killed or captured. The site's function is to deepen and broaden its support, allowing al Qaeda or successor organizations to reach and recruit for recruitment.

political backing. The whole thrust of the site, from videos glorifying Islamic legal arguments justifying the killing of civilians, and even radical Muslims that, for decades, the U.S. has destroyed Iraq, and that they might back.. (¶ 3)

Al Qaeda has published several online magazines, Jihad, The Voice of Jihad, Al Qaeda Battar Training Camp bimonthly online magazine that contains detailed intelligence organization and management, weapons training, physical fitness, and even wilderness survival training. Some issues focus on how to conduct operations, negotiate release of hostages, and collect information on target sites provide information on how to build explosive and chemical weapons, photographs, directions, codes, and technical explosives (Newman, 2006).

Messages are strong and often highly influential. One example from the online January 2004 issue of Al-Jaahid Magazine (2006b) which included the following statements:

My Muslim mujahid brother, can you not see Muslims killed in Afghanistan Iraq Can you not see the faces of these children completely torn, their skulls scattered all over the television screens? Can you not see the Muslims in a condition of shame, humiliation, pain, harm, and injury? Can you not see the headquarters of the war in Arabian Peninsula and that the center of all logistical support was this land, which the Prophet, may peace be upon him, be purified from the polytheist?

You have seen the war on Iraq, and you have seen how all the military bases, and even the civilian Arar airport has been changed to a military base because of its strategic location, which was indisputable in attacking

According to Whine (1999), several Islamist web sites are providing passworded communications to members and sympathizers. For example, The United Islamic Association in Europe provides for members only, and subjects, this may have been a haven for instructions for militant student activity. Strategic communication members may make use of passworded sites such as this allowing free exchange of information without safeguards to prevent harmful content. Miller getting a article published on pbs.org (2007), stated that a U.S. think tank had published a report on its armored vehicle being used by U.S. forces in Iraq. Miller reported that with had been linked via a reported Qaida website.

Propaganda

Strategic communication is the more politically correct term for what known as propaganda. Adolf Hitler, in his imprisonment in 1921, wrote Mein Kampf in which he said, "The functions of propaganda lie in the scientific training of the individual, but in calling the masses attention to certain facts, processes of significance is thus for the first time placed within their field of vision, doing this so skillfully that everyone will be convinced that the fact is really the necessity correct." (Hitler, et al., 1926/1969), p. 1164. Hitler's broad defining points resonated with that of scholars who have long studied the art of propaganda.

Propaganda was neutral in its origins, having been coined by the Roman Catholic Church in 1622 by Pope Gregory XV. The Pope encouraged Catholics to propagate the faith. Propaganda as we know it derived from the Latin *propagare* to spread (Halloran, 2007).

The term propaganda has taken on a negative connotation over time as people became increasingly aware of its powerful usage, and especially as it became associated with the Nazis during WWII. Strategic communication, a term, is commonly used at present to describe propaganda (Halloran, 2007). Throughout this paper the terms strategic communication and propaganda are used interchangeably.

The goal of strategic communication / propaganda is to create attitudes and influence the behavior of a given population. Propaganda is the attempt to influence the population through the transmission of ideas and values (Taylor, 2006, p.15). Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (2004) effective, strategic communicators must understand attitudes and cultures, methods of ideas, adopt new information technologies, and employ sophisticated communication skills and strategies. Further, in order for it to be persuasive, messages

Social psychologist Harold Lasswell described 6 factors of marketing propaganda in his text, Propaganda Technique in the World War (1938). These recurring themes were as follows:

1. Fasten the war guilt on the enemy.
2. Claim unity and victory, in the names of history and deity.
3. State war aims.

4. Strengthen the belief of the people that the enemy is responsible for the war by giving examples of the enemy's depravity.
5. Make the public believe that unfavorable news is really enemy lies. This creates disunity and defeatism.
6. Follow this with horror stories of the Turk who sits before a tubful of his captives' eyes was first told during the Crusades. Horror stories should be authoritative.

George C. Bruntz's book, *Allied Propaganda and the Collapse of the German Empire, 1918*, set specific types of propaganda. Bruntz (1938) suggested the following types:

1. Propaganda of enlightenment: Get true facts to the people and army in their own country, negating the false information they are fed by their own country.
2. Propaganda of despair: To break down the morale of the enemy by showing that death, disaster and defeat face him.
3. Propaganda of hope: Present to the enemy civilians and army a picture of a better land, if they will only lay down their arms. President Wilson gave the American war aims.
4. Particularist propaganda: This is aimed at factions in the opposing country. It seeks to divide them into antagonistic groups. Catholic against Protestant, the people of Alsace-Lorraine against the French in the last war.
5. Revolutionary propaganda: This is aimed at breaking down the government of the enemy from within. The propaganda by the Allies in the last war aimed at the German people against the Hohenzollerns.

John Corner (2007), in his article "Mediated politics, promotional culture and propaganda" described practices often used in propaganda. A condensed version of these practices is as follows:

1. Lying. Deliberate construction and circulation of false information.
2. The withholding of information. Censorship, overlaps with lying where denial is involved.
3. Strategic selectivity. Omission of disadvantageous information or inclusion of questionable material to gain support.
4. Exaggeration. Distortion and overstatement of positive or negative information.
5. Explicit or covert affective appeals to desire or to fear, persuasive argument (ex. audio-visual materials).
6. Use of a rhetoric of visual display and/or linguistic structure. Organization and of value in ways outside of the rational content of the communication.

One additional caveat, as asserted by Lumley, is that propaganda is perceived in one way or another as to (1) its origin or sources, (2) the intentions and methods employed, (3) the content spread, and (4) the benefits accruing to the sender. A combination of these (Lumley, cited in Taylor, 1979).

Historical and current examples of propaganda are abundant. Included are examples to illuminate how strategic communications / propaganda have been used.

Around 500 BC, Sun Tzu, The Art of War capture the enemy's entire army better than to destroy it; to take intact a regiment, a company, or a squad of them. For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the ac the enemy without fight the supreme excellence. Sun (Tsu's quote makes use of Bruntz's (1938) notion of propaganda denigrating the enemy. His use of psychological manipulation is among the first reported.

Alexander the Great in 334 B.C. instructed his armorers to create oversized armor breastplates and helmets that would fit giants. The armor was 7 to 8 feet tall. In battle, the oversized armor was placed out on the fields in order to induce withdrawal of adversaries, who had Alexander's troops outnumbered. This creation was successful. (Rouse, n.d.)

Alexander's exaggeration of the truth can also fall into a similar category. Stories of the giants must have spread quickly, brought down morale, and made their enemy feel less self-assured.

The Reign of Terror, during the French Revolution, was a campaign in which seventy thousand people were executed publicly. The large numbers were highly publicized and used as propaganda in order to display power and among the people. (Weimann, 2006a)

World War I saw heavy usage of propaganda by several nations including the United States. For example, President Woodrow Wilson established the Committee on Public Information (CPI), also known as the Creel Commission, in order to manipulate popular opinion into favoring the war in support of the United Kingdom. This encouraged press censorship and wrote themed speeches. (Creel, 1918)

The CPI succeeded within six months, in turning a pacifist population into a hysterical population which wanted to destroy everything German, tear the Germans limb from limb, and save the world. It should certainly be noted that Walter Lippman and Bernays were part of Wilson's Creel Commission. Among the top cited authors in the propaganda / persuasion field even today. Among other works,

known for writing *Public Opinion* (1922), while Bernays wrote *The Art and Science of Propaganda* (1928).

Much of the wartime propaganda was invented by the British Ministry of Information, which had a significant influence on global communication (Bernays, 1942). The British used the Atlantic to their advantage in distributing propaganda against Germany. They also dropped propaganda leaflets, and such, into enemy countries from airplanes, a large population with their message. After the war, Germany admitted the propaganda was very effective and in 1933, Edward Bernays, a pioneer in Public Relations, gave a lecture at Brunswick Technical College that the English campaign of lies was one of the most effectual weapons used against us, conducted on thoroughly sound psychological principles. English propaganda was run entirely by the German by so (Bernays, 1942, p. 238).

During WWI, the German use of propaganda / psychological warfare was ineffective. They did not concern themselves with the morale of the German home. They utilized sabotage and censorship, as well as making the effort in foreign countries, distributing unexciting leaflets and mailing thick academic journals. At the conclusion of the war, they realized their use of propaganda in the foreign countries was not as effective as they had hoped. They were too enthusiastic and inflammatory in their propaganda, as well as being too tactless, too open, and too obvious (Bernays, 1942).

Vladimir Lenin, Marxist revolutionary and leader of the Bolshevik Party, used the slogan, "Power to the Soviets" to emphasize strength and gain support. Lenin wanted to increase revolution where a power shift would go from the bourgeoisie (upper classes) and given to the proletariat (working class) and peasants. Lenin's Bolsheviks in November of 1917, rallied up these classes and spoke directly toward the empowerment of the proletariat. Lenin stated, "Which class holds power decides everything, and the revolution is based, obviously and unconditionally, on a majority of the population carrying out a popular revolution." He went on in great length about the meaning of "Power to the Soviets" and referred to the middle class as "petty bourgeoisie" who make only promises and search for all (Storin, 1977, p. 63).

Lenin used propaganda techniques such as film to influence public perception. He believed the majority of films should be entertaining, thus draw in the

then create revenue to assist in the reorganization of the Soviet film industry. The rest of the film could contain propaganda content. He understood that film was a propaganda weapon, especially in the rural areas where they [films] are not available. Therefore propaganda will be particularly successful. (Baird, 1979, p. 52) After the reorganization of the film industry, the Lenin regime also attempted to control film production. Films were only made if they projected the particular image of Soviet Russia. These authorities controlling the propaganda believed that it was most effective when it showed tension between good and evil and them, opposing forces. This allows for the audience to then see themselves in the forces of good and evil, opposing the forces of evil. (Baird, 1979) This good versus evil dichotomy parallels the American stance on terrorist activity.

A year after Hitler's rise in power in 1932, as Ewald Banse pointed out in Germany Prepared for War (1934) the Nazis were effectively manipulating and using symbols such as the Heil salute, the swastika flag, and most importantly Hitler himself. Attention to using propaganda on the home front, sending pamphlets to every household, insistence that the swastika be displayed at every household in Germany. The swastika was considered very inflammatory and it is illegal to display the swastika flag in Germany (Bernays, 1942)

During World War II, Hitler used the themes of traditional German patriotism and Nazi ideology. With the intentions of brainwashing the German people to support the war in the dangers posed by Jews, the Nazis produced documentaries such as the Eternal Jew. It suggested that the Jewish people were motivated solely by lust for power and that they were a race entirely differing from Aryan in body, but the soul, for they had no soul (Baird, 1974, p.6).

Hitler's propaganda campaign also consisted of indoctrinating audiences where he rallied nationalistic pride. The perceived mass support also had a quiet effect on the people. There was a large bandwagon effect where the people bonded together and perceived as the greater good.

Hitler, in his Berlin September 26, 1933 speech, talked about having always worked toward and pursued a peace policy and used the line, 'I only wish and I don't know how grave a thing Hitler, 1938) He then went forth several times to

Poland and, referring to the Polish leader Mr. Benes, stated, The decision peace or war (p. 81). Hitler displaced the word on Benes not to imply. The following year, in his (Hitler, 1939) Reichstag in Berlin, September 1939, Hitler referred to himself from then on as just [the] first soldier of the German emphasized, My whole life has been nothing but one long struggle for my people restoration, and for Germany. There was only one watchword for that struggle: faith with his people and duty. One word I have learned: that is, (Hitler) Hitler wanted to appear one with his people and duty. The greater good, he made sure to use a mixture of shame and fear tactic to avoid being opposed. He stated, Whoever, however, oppose this national command, whether directly or indirectly, shall fail. With traitors (Frisler, 1989).

Also during World War II, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) used a very inventive form of psychological manipulation. With the threat of German invasion the summer of 1940, the BBC began broadcasting a radio show, listened to by millions of Englishmen to the potential German invasion. The lines were given in German and English as a lesson. According to Major Ed Rouse (Rouse, n.d.):

and so it will be best if you learn a few useful phrases in English before your first lesson. DIE KANALFAHRT . The Channel Crossing. Now, just repeat after me: DAS BOOT SINKT. The boat is sinking. The boat is sinking. DAS WASSER IST KALT. The water is cold. KALTSE Very cold Now I will give you a verb that should be useful. Again, please repeat. ICH BRENNE. I am burning. DU BRENNST. You are burning. ER BRENNT. He is burning. WIR BRENNE N. We are burning. IHR BRENNT. You are burning. SIE BRENNE N. They are burning. (Rouse, n.d.),

These statements were effectively played into the existing rumor spread by British intelligence that the British had a device that could set fires in the Channel whenever they wished (Rouse, n.d.).

Tokyo Roses is the name given by Allied forces referring to several English female broadcasters of Japanese propaganda during World War II. The most notable was Iva Toguri d Aquino. Directed at American GI s, the broadcasts attempted to boost morale using a mixture of American music, and popular songs and sacrifices (Federal Bureau of Investigation). Former servicemen report tales of unfaithful wives and draft dodgers (Fau, 2008). Army analysis did not support any negative effects on troops.

caused by the Tokyo Raiders but did find reason for concern over the appearance of intelligence regarding U.S. ship and Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Political Warfare Executive (PWE) was Britain's propaganda agency responsible for developing and disseminating propaganda. Part of their propaganda campaign included faking German documents. Some of these documents were directed to the Arab world to decrease the support and popularity of British forces in the Arab world. Historical Review Included in the propaganda aimed at the Arab world were stories of German soldiers turning Mosques in Tripoli into brothels. Other false documents were sent to the German public including a report that the Germans were using gas to kill their own soldiers who had been wounded. This was meant to demoralize the people of Germany and cause dissension. (Institute for Historical) Review, n.d.

By 1941, the British government believed much of their information was a result of the careless release of sensitive information by British troops and propaganda during World War I. To combat this, they developed a propaganda campaign directed toward their own soldiers reminding them of the consequences of leaks. Part of this campaign included posters showing people in everyday situations, such as sitting at a table, discussing military secrets and not seeing Goebbels sitting behind them. Propaganda campaigns were used to remind soldiers that talking to the press was a serious offense during World War II.

Moving ahead, the U.S. during the First Gulf War, used psychological operations to attempt to get many of the enemy soldiers to desert. Approximately 20 million leaflets were distributed and reached about 98% of the 300,000 Iraqi troops. For example, leaflets were dropped on a specific unit letting them know they had four hours to surrender or they would be attacked. Loudspeakers were used to broadcast surrender appeals, harassment, and deception tapes (Rouse, n.d.).

According to Rouse (n.d.), Psychological Operations (PSYOP) are those operations that employ the planned use of communication to influence human attitudes and behavior in target groups behavior, emotions, and attitudes that support the attainment of objectives. (4). PSYOPs are intended to induce responses required for a shorter time period during the duration of a bombing campaign.

The Voice of the Gulf radio network broadcasting in January of 1991 and continued through April of that year. During this time there were a total of 2072 news items, 210 hours of live broadcasting, and 330 hours of prerecorded program PSYOP messages disseminated with (Rouse, n.d.)

President Bush's 2001 congressional address on Thursday, September 20, 2001 days after the 9/11 attacks, included some very strategic words. In response to the attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, the Global War on Terrorism, President Bush (2001) stated on September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed these attacks against our country. Here President Bush (2001) asserts the enemy must have committed these attacks because they do not value freedom. A heartfelt connection between the enemy with anti freedom, was an attempt at repelling any thought people might have regarding the attack. Further, the connection attempted to unify the people who value freedom. In the same address President Bush said,

In Afghanistan we see a vision for the world. Afghanistan's people have been brutalized, many are starving and many have fled. Women are not allowed to go to school. You are not allowed to own a television. Religion can be practiced as you wish. Leaders dictate. A man can be jailed in Afghanistan if his beard is not properly trimmed. The United States respects the people of Afghanistan, we are currently providing humanitarian aid to the people of Afghanistan. We condemn the Taliban regime.

Here President Bush (2001) attempts to show how backwards the Afghani system is and to frame them as against their own people, especially women. Then he emphasizes the humanitarian aid to the U.S. into a more favorable light to the Afghanis and presents a veiled threat, you support the Taliban regime, the U.S. takes away aid.

President Bush (2001) also addressed Muslims directly in attempt to suggest a fight against them. He said,

I also want to speak tonight directly to Muslims throughout the world. Islam is a faith. It's practiced freely by many millions of Americans and by millions of people in countries that America counts as friends. Its teachings are those of peace and justice. Those who commit evil in the name of Allah blaspheme the name of Allah.

These comments connect the U.S. with the Islamic world and having a large Muslim population. In some of the final lines of his speech, Bush attempts to call for a fight against terrorism civilization's fight

Psychological warfare and propaganda have been used heavily in Afghanistan. The U.S. has dropped leaflet bombs depicting a Taliban member beating women, with the fo

Is this the future you want for your women? House, n.d., photo 13
leaflets with information about the attacks on the World Trade Center and
also dropped, as well as frequency radios set to a frequency that broadcast mess
the U.S. military to the people of Afghanistan (Leonard, 2002)

The U.S. government's choice to embed media reporters within the troops
was also a strategic move and is, in a sense, propaganda. By embedding jour
the U.S. was able to provide (and abroad) a glimpse of war from the American pe
The images captured are carefully controlled by the choice of where the
embedded journalists are taken and by what is considered to be or not to be
Security. A report found on the Inter Press Service News Agency website
Jamail, provided an account of journalist Zorah Miller who claims he was cen
military in Iraq. However, the article provided a tiny glimpse of wh
Miller from to include over 20 Marine's burned remains, a visual of skull c
shards, and body parts being picked up with buckets and bags (Jamail, 2008)
images and scenes may be justifiably censored

The Broadcasting Board of Governors in their 2005 Annual Report discuss
America (VOA), a strategic tool used to enhance the U.S. interests
overseas. The report stated the VOA broadcasts more than 1,000 radio
and an estimated 50 hours in 23 languages on television with a weekly audie
100 million. The VOA is perceived as highly credible since it seemingly pro
objective International news accounts. However, scrutiny on media
selection and framing for all media stories covered. The VOA appears to be
example, the report states 77 percent of Alhurra's <VOA television> viewers
Radio Sawa's <VOA radio> listeners consider their news to be credible (U.S. Congress
Broadcasting Board of Governors, 2005).

Iraqi Insurgent Strategic Communication

Strategic communication by Iraqi insurgent groups has utilized many of
covered in previous examples. Insurgents employ disengagement practices including
displacement of responsibility, diffusion of responsibility, dehumanization
euphemistic language, advantageous comparisons, distortion of sequence of e
attribution of blame. Of these, the displacement of responsibility is widely used

insurgents as victims who have been forced by their oppressors to defend their enemies are framed as a merciless enemy, made up of those who have no moral restraints (Weimann, 2006). Insurgents' violent acts are framed as the weak man's only way against their oppressors and the Jihad frame is used to raise it to the status of a sacred duty. Bin Laden displaced responsibility and spoke through Al Jazeera, October 29, 2004 by saying:

I say to you, Allah knows that it had never occurred to us to strike them until it became unbearable and we witnessed the oppression and tyranny of the American coalition against our people and Lebanon. In it came to my mind. And as I looked at those demolished towers in Lebanon, it entered my mind that the oppressor in kind and that we should destroy towers in America in taste some of what we tasted. They do not deterred from killing our women and children. (Aljazeera)Net, 2004

While bin Laden admitted to revenge, his message asserted he had to do so to save their women and children.

Bin Laden's attempt at getting a message out made Lasswell's suggestions and was highly effective. Bin Laden contacted Al Jazeera and either arranged or sent pre-recorded videotapes of interviews or statements of him speaking. The nature of the video allows him to be anywhere the footage is aired, to say what he wants, and to shape the environment as he desires. This tight control over the media frame resembles the journalist embedment with deployed troops.

Bin Laden's strong sentiment and statements brought about the fear in the Western world and a sense of calling and duty to many Taliban and other extremists. The videotaped statement causing fear was, "I swear to God that America will not live in peace until it is destroyed." The repetition of footage only reinforced the fear (Mintz, 2005).

Graphic, violent images have been used by insurgents with the intent of demoralizing their perceived Western world. For example, one video in 2006 showed the bodies of two soldiers Pfc. Kristian Menchaca and Pfc. Thomas Tucker. Their uniforms were covered in blood and one soldier's decapitated head had been placed on his body. The soldier's chest had also been cut open. The video, shown by the Council on Foreign Relations, played an audio message of Osama bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zuhayr (Mintz, 2006). While violent acts such as those described have not been

overwhelmingly common, the message intent, causing fear and demoralizing the common. These tactics are similar to the Reign of Terror during the French Revolution earlier in this paper and Hitler's suppression against non

Weimann (2006) states, Terrorist rhetoric on the Internet tries to present images and arguments in which the terrorists appear as victims forced to turn to violence to achieve their just goals in the face of a brutal, merciless enemy devoid of mercy. Demonizing the enemy, playing down the issue of individual responsibility, and proclaiming innocent messages are all used on most terrorist sites (p. 8).

Roderick Jones, in his counterterrorism book *Who Learn: Virtual worlds and Strategic Communications*, states, It is not to be seen whether any government can fight an effective information war within virtual communities, given the freedom of the individual user as opposed to the constrictions government employees would face. Jones refers to the red tape and bureaucracy the United States and others go through to develop propaganda. Especially when it comes to response, a quick turn around the U.S. is caught up trying to get message approval, insurgents are often posting YouTube and other websites within hours of an event.

The Internet empowers insurgents. They can find information such as how to make explosives, chemical weapons, providing maps, photographs, directions, code books, and details of how to use explosives (Weimann, 2006). This information may increase self-efficacy which according to the persuasion literature should have a higher impact on behavior (Perloff, 2003). The increase in extremist individualism may cause some

Al Qaeda has only publications to issue, *Salaf al-Jihad* and *The Voice of Jihad*. These serve as ideological indoctrination (Weimann, 2006). Regarding the Internet propaganda tool from insurgents, terrorists, or perceived groups is not a simple task. Weimann points out, Al Qaeda for example, is quick to change names and URLs every few days to avoid being hacked or taken down.

Corman and Schiefelbein (2006) provide the media / communication goals used in jihadi operations. They attempt to legitimate their movement through various frameworks, propagate their movement by spreading messages to sympathetic a

attempting to increase their media and public base of operation, and intimidate their opponents through fear tactics.

U.S. Strategic Communication Comparison

The United States spends millions of dollars in creating messages in order to counter the highly influential messages are producing. The real problem is that the individuals creating the messages are mostly of American origin then. While they certainly try, it is difficult for a Westerner to fully understand viewpoints on messages. There is a cultural component that impacts perceptions consumed. Images and words have different meaning across cultures and time. The U.S. attempt to compare Saddam Hussein as being just Adolph Hitler was known for his hatred and extermination of Jews. Iraqi people have long been fond of this comparison. (Rouse, p. d.) Another example where the U.S. did not understand the need for a Western perspective of materials used was the Deserted leaflets on cooperative EPWs (enemy prisoners of war). Some of their suggestions remove any trace of the color red since it signifies danger to Iraqis, show beards instead of the clean shaven face of Americans, and to add bananas to a basket of fruit being offered to surrendering Iraqis since bananas are a delicacy in Iraq. The advice was to remove thought bubbles as these are not known or used by Iraqis common in the United States (Rouse, p. n).

The U.S. created Radio Sawa, an American-funded Arabic language radio that began broadcasting in March 2001. The target audience is people under 25 years old. It is broadcast on FM in Amman, Kuwait, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and is available in digital satellite format 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. It airs popular music interspersed with news programming. Alhurra TV was launched February 4, 2004 and has also been a success. Independent studies have shown Radio Sawa and Alhurra TV to be perceived by Middle Eastern listeners as reliable sources of information and to show respect for intelligence and United States Broadcasting Board of Governors (2005).

While these were a success, the Shared Values Initiative, a series of television commercials was not as successful. This initiative was intended to convey positive messages about Muslim life in America, but failed to take into account the perceived unimportance of such messages by the Islamic world. Muslim life in

little bearing on the larger issues they were representing. The use of leaflets over the country of Iraq and has had relative success.

Regardless of American success stories with strategic communication efforts, expenditures have been costly and there have been many instances that have damaged American credibility (Goldman, 2007; the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 2004; Gallagher & Smith, 2005). Insurgents often make use of virtually free mass media and have a thorough understanding of the culture they operate in (Goldman, 2007). Utilizing Tarner's (1979) Social Identity Theory, insurgents may better understand the implications of imagery pertaining to their culture and mass media may automatically be seen as more credible. Another barrier for the Americans is the slow pace of getting approval through military channels. Iraq has no red tape and can quickly disseminate messages without these channels (Goldman, 2007). Insurgents are using strategic communication such as YouTube and MySpace which are usually anonymous, inexpensive, and uncensored (Weimann, 2006; Corum, 2006). The SU in comparison spends millions to create commercials and leaflets that are clearly from a Western perspective which has led many to believe the U.S. has the upper hand in winning hearts and minds of the Iraqi people (Corum, 2004).

Credibility

Messages must be perceived as credible in order for people to more readily accept a recommended idea or behavior suggested. Research suggests higher perceived message source credibility is related to higher persuasive capability (Fahoum & Width, 2006). Source credibility is known to be a problem for communications directed toward Iraq since messaging so often comes from a Western perspective. However, Iraqi messages appear to be more readily accepted. The credibility issue is a problem for U.S. efforts in Iraq (Gallagher & Smith, 2002) asserts fifty years ago political struggles were more about the ability to control information while today they are about the creation and destruction of credibility.

Credibility, as a field of study, dates to the time of Aristotle who wrote about the art of persuasion (Perloff, 2003:159). It is defined by a McCroskey as a "disposition toward a source of communication held at a given time by a receiver" (McCroskey, 1997, p.87) and is not a thing. It is not some sort of overcoat that we put on and take off at

perception of us that lies people do of whom we (Hark, Friedrich, & Brummett 1983 cited Perloff 2003 p.159)

Credibility is multidimensional in that there are several components to a communicator's credibility. The most important of these dimensions affect perceptions of a source's credibility are perceived trustworthiness, expertise (Perloff 2003). Trustworthiness is derived from a person's perceived honesty, safety (61). Expertise is defined as the knowledge (the communicator possesses). Goodwill is the perceived concern the communicator has for the audience. A communicator must have at least one of these components in order to be deemed credible in a context with which the communication complicates credibility. Examples of situational factors are the size of the audience, the role the communicator plays, and the communicator / audience relationship. A communicator's approach to credibility should be flexible and change depending on the situation (Perloff, 2003)

Credibility is diminished when words and actions do not match, when sources directed to multiple audiences are inconsistent, when overt and covert actions are co-funded and co-coated (Gregory, 2006). One example of diminishing credibility for the U.S. stemmed from the discovery and publicity coverage of images of detainees at Guantanamo Bay prison (Amr & Singer, 2006; Trent & Doty, 2005). These images did not convey positive messages. Strategic communications were attempting to send a negative message regarding the consequences regarding credibility (Jones, 2005). An example of credibility reduction was the CIA's two decades of covert funding for Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty which were disclosed by the press. Once the funding source was leaked to the public the government lost some of its credibility both (Gregory, 2006 and at home (2005).

Social scientists and other researchers have employed a variety of methods related to credibility. Credibility issues span across fields and appear to be constant throughout time. Perceptions of credibility may influence prospective buyers of a brand, vote for a politician, and persuade a positive attitude toward quitting smoking and the like.

Studies on credibility have included nonverbal behavior (Mehrabian, 2006; Garrido, & Herrero, 2003; Pogue & AhYun, 2006; Rockwell & Hubbard, 1999) such as

appearance, facial expressions and general body language, and employment. nonverbal cues related to credibility. Education literature (Paul, 1988; Pogue AhYun, 2006). Pogue and AhYun suggested an increased level of instructor behaviors such as smiles, head nods, eye contact toward students etc. were increase in perceived credibility, motivation, and learning. Paul's (1988) students perceive males as generally more credible. However, impressive introduction of credentials this gender difference diminishes.

Still other research has been conducted to investigate whether opinion and low credibility sources are maintained over time (Hovland et al., 1952) and what role communication apprehension plays on interpersonal perceptions communicating (McCroskey & Richmond, 1976). Hovland and Weiss (1952) hypothesized participants who originally found a source to have low credibility forget the source, but remember the message. Thus, over a period of time, participants chances of taking on the position advocated by the source. The sleeper effect particular interest because initial evaluations of credibility may become blurred over time. The takeaway from this study is that perceived credibility of a message over time as memory of specific details (Hovland & Weiss, 1952). The result of the study conducted by McCroskey and Richmond (1976) showed that people who are apprehensive about communicating are viewed more positively, more socially possibly more academically successful (depending on the area of study), and opinion leader. Those with less apprehension about communicating are more likely to be highly credible.

Media Effects

In 1944, Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet (1968) investigated the effects of mass communication. Their research examined the 1940 Presidential election campaign. The results of The People's Choice published in 1948 provided a new perspective for understanding media effects. The prevalent concept at the time was based on the hypodermic model where it was believed media had a significant, powerful, direct effect on audiences. However, their study results suggested media effects were minimal. The direct, powerful effects of a mass media on the audience that was misperceived and social factors that influence information. Lazarsfeld, Berelson (1968) and Gaudet

many voters regard family members and close personal friends, not the mass influences in the decision-making process (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudin, 1948, p. iv). Resulting data demonstrated only 5% of people had changed their voting behavior based on media messages. Contrary to Lazarsfeld et al.'s expectations, exposures to media were a rather poor predictor of voting behavior. The influential individuals who pass information to others were labeled opinion leaders.

Stemming from these findings, the flow process of mass media came about in which the role of opinion leaders was added (Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1950). Lazarsfeld (2006), further built on this notion. Through their research study in Illinois, they found not all viewers take the same active role in their media consumption; individuals may act as opinion leaders, sharing their thoughts and opinions with others who may not have the same consumption. These opinion leaders, generally more informed, may consume more media than the average person, and tend to be more active than the average person. Therefore, even if an individual does not receive a message directly from the media, they may still receive the message through opinion leaders in a social network. This concept of opinion leaders is also a key concept in Innovation research by Everett Rogers (2003).

Agenda Setting and Framing

Bernard Cohen observed, the press may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about. The world will look different to different people, depending on the information for them by writers, editors, and publishers of the papers they read (his statement to a function of Agenda Setting: Agenda process through which the media communicate the importance of various issues to the public (Cohen, 1963 cited in Rogers & Deegan, 1988, p. 558).

Current understanding of Agenda Setting takes into account the relative power of the press, while also taking into account choice by media consumers. Agenda setting is a three part process where there is a media agenda, public agenda; all three agendas are interrelated (Rogers & Deegan, 1988).

There are various levels of Agenda Setting that should be noted. The first level is what the media use objects or issues to influence the public. The public should

think about. The second level asserts media focuses first of the objects or issues. The media suggests people should think about the issues. The third level is in which the media asserts there is a salience transfer (McCombs & Reynolds, 2002).

Key concepts within Agenda Setting are gatekeeping, priming, and framing. Gatekeepers are those who have control over the selection of media content (McCombs, 2006). Priming occurs when the media puts emphasis on certain issues that are perceived important to these issues. McCombs and Reynolds (2002) assert, media salience primes the creation and expression of public opinion and Agar and Kinder state priming a possibility at once more salient and than agenda (cited in Rogers & Dearing, 1988, p.568). Framing, as will be discussed in much greater detail, selects and depicts only some aspects of reality while ignoring others.

Agenda Setting helps explain why people tend to prioritize the same issues and suggests if individuals are exposed to the same or similar media they will do so in the same way.

Walter Lippmann, was the first to note Agenda Setting in the 1920 s. As a publicist, he was a Harvard graduate that transferred from Belgium to the United States serving on the Creel Commission (propaganda campaign aimed at changing American opinion about entering World War I), then served as an advisor to President Wilson at the Versailles conference. One of Lippmann's greatest contributions was his book *Public Opinion* (1997). He is well known for his catch phrase, the "Man of Straw" where he asserts the modern world is too complex for the general public to grasp. While not words, the average viewer would not be able to see past media Agenda Setting.

Lippmann (1997) writes:

The lesson is, I think, a fairly clear one. In the absence of institutions which the environment is so successfully the realities of public life stand sharply against stereotyped opinion, the common interests very largely elude public opinion entirely, and can be managed only by a specialized class whose reach beyond the local class is irresponsible. This reflects upon information that is not common property, in situations that the public at large does not control and can be held to account only on the account of the fact, (1997, p. 195)

One key study, done by Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw (1972) on Agenda Setting examined voters in the 1968 Presidential election. The authors hypothesized the mass media

set the agenda for each political campaign and influence attitudes toward political issues. Their study conducted interviews with 100 voters who were not voting for a particular candidate. Participant's perception of the key campaign compared to a content analysis of the mass media occurring at the time of the data suggested a significant relationship between the emphasis placed on different issues by the media and the judgments of the voters as to the salience and campaign topics. Participant's judgments about mass media coverage suggested an agenda setting of mass media (McCombs & Shaw, 1972).

Frames are, constructs used to assign meaning to events, occurrences, and cultural artifacts, thus functioning to facilitate participation (Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986). Only make use of the Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1972), creating frames that suggest viewers who are part of a group. Building on unifying issues such as commonality of religion (Islam, Nationalism, community etc. (Alexander et al., 2003), insurgent groups use pre-insurgency mindsets, recruit and/or create supporters (Fahoum & Width, 2007) frame themselves as believers, on a path to salvation, and who are being oppressed by occupying force. They often appeal to codes of honor suggest individuals for their families and often promote revenge for group members (Mutter, 2007) Regardless of the particular insurgent group, the commonality is an attempt to unify members (Fahoum & Width, 2007). The sentiments used include (allegiance to the clan or tribe), (allegiance to the state, Nationalism), calls to defend Islam and to protect the innocent believers from the oppressor. This sentiment is not necessarily used exclusively. Most often insurgent groups are different with similar organization (Alexander et al., 2003).

Framing, an important aspect of Agenda Setting, refers to including or excluding information from a message that may alter the way a message is perceived. Topics presented include certain information of view and exclude others. It is up to the viewer of the message to interpret what he or she thinks about the subject, but framing impact the judgments and attitudes (Dittman, 1999) states, to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a

in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation (p. 52).

Frames guide an individual's perception by their particular representation of reality on a particular topic. They help determine which parts of reality become salient (Berenger, 2008).

While we do not remember or are not able to recall exact messages, frames can make a message more memorable and comprehensible. Framing can apply to anything from an entire story to the practices of naming. For example, as Rasmussen points out in his article *Gulf War Framing in the News*, the second Gulf War was named in various ways: Operation Iraqi Freedom, the War in Iraq, Iraq war or Gulf War. In a slightly positive way, the news organizations framed the conflict by choosing Operation Iraqi Freedom. Berenger (2004) also points out that Arab broadcasters mostly framed the war in a negative light. They sometimes used the U.S. War on Iraq, but frequently used the U.S. Aggression on Iraq, the U.S. Attack on Iraq, the U.S. Invasion of Iraq, or called it U.S. Terrorism on Iraq. Negative frames of the second Gulf War were used by Arab media on Jazeera, Dubai TV, and Al-Biyya. The particular naming frame chosen may impact the overall perceptions viewers take away (Berenger, 2004).

Osama Bin Laden is notorious for using creative and powerful framing in his speeches. In one instance, in many of his interviews he referred to Coalition forces as the Crusaders fighting a war against Islam. Bin Laden has also contacted Al Jazeera and either arranged recorded videotapes of interviews and / or statements of him speaking. The recorded footage allows him to be anywhere at the time the footage is shown, and to set up the environment as he desires. He is able to use the particular message which typically use strong sentiment and statements bringing about fear, and a sense of calling and duty to many Taliban and other extremists. An example of one taped statement caused Bin Laden to swear to God that America will not live in peace before peace reigns in Palestine. The repetition of footage only reinforced the message (Ed, 2003).

Bush's words also use framing devices in order to bring about a particular reference to his audience abroad and in the United States. Referencing Bin Laden as the Evil Doer, the Evildoer, and making statements like we'll smoke him out of his

indicative of a clear hatred and implied ~~racism~~ ~~inability~~ ~~where~~ ~~the~~ ~~U.S.~~ and the U.S. and the U.S. of course would be opposite to that.

Often television and other media programming is riddled with stereotypical representations that frame characters in a particular way. Andre (2007) states a stereotypical, conventional, formulaic, and usually oversimplified conception, opinion or group, event or issue considered to typify or conform to a particular, unvarying pattern. He states stereotypes prevent us from seeing clearly, not only in the sense that they obscure conflicting information, but also in the sense that they keep us from understanding what is really going on. This is even true of positive stereotypes about the U.S. (p. 50).

Walter Lippman (1997) states that the subtlest and most pervasive of those which create and maintain the repertory of stereotypes. We are told a certain way to see it. We imagine most things before we experience them. And those perceptions govern deeply the whole process of perception (p. 59).

Media sources must select only certain aspects of reality to depict, and this selection may at times be stereotypical. The same holds true for television news, entertainment programming, and even YouTube video content.

One assumption of this theory is the audience may be swayed to feel a certain salience of the topics to which they are exposed by the manner in which they are presented. However one should not be in the assumption, individuals are not able to see past the frames, which may actually be the case.

Agenda Setting may influence what people think and Framing, an aspect of Agenda Setting, influences how people think about the media. If seen as credible by Western viewers, should be able to influence what issues viewers think are most important to be discussed and the way in which they are framed may influence the viewers' overall thoughts, opinions, and even behavior. Frames of Americans or Arabs as stereotypes may reinforce such stereotypes.

Those who have researched portrayals of Arabs and Muslims in the entertainment media have repeatedly found negative stereotypes. A study by (1989) found that Americans have a general picture of Arabs which, though often incorrect and almost invariably, negative at times bordering on racist. Islam have often presented Islam and Muslims in a most unfavorable light.

not distinguish between Arabs and Muslims and think the two terms are synonymous. Reporting about Islam and Muslims automatically garnishes a ready-made perception of the world based on the Western media, viewing Iraq insurgent YouTube clips should reinforce stereotypes of Arabs and Muslims. In the Western world, Muslims are not Arab, this assumption will not likely be separated from YouTube. Arabs and Muslims are seen as terrorists.

A Pew survey conducted September 2003 finds that 74 percent of those surveyed were very closely paying attention to the news and 90 percent chose television as their source of news (Huddy, Khatik & Capelo, 2002). Internet streaming video is becoming increasingly used and could eventually be in competition with television. The September 11th attack received major global attention. The Pew survey was conducted days after 9/11, which viewers sought information about. As Weimann's book discusses, a group has received major attention for an action such as an attack that is placed online, then other groups are more likely to follow (Weimann, 2003). Although news coverage, are likely to draw viewer attention and reinforce stereotypes of Arabs and Muslims as terrorist while also creating increased fear and perception of danger.

Cultivation

The Cultivation theory, developed by George Gerbner, how heavy exposure to cultural images shape a viewer's perception of reality (Pieper, 2006). Explored the effects of television programming on the attitudes and behaviors of the American public (p.281). While Gerbner's studies in there is no obvious reason it would not apply outside of the U.S. This theory focuses on heavy viewing over long periods of time focusing on singular events. Heavy viewers, according to Gerbner, are those who watch more hours a day of television. Light viewers watch less than four hours a day. Zillmann (2002) state, in the typical U.S. home, the television set is in use for about 4 hours a day.

In the 1950s, Gerbner began to study the television of viewers' ideas of what the world around them was like and called his series of studies the Cultivation Research Project.

The Cultivation theory states that heavy viewers exposed to mass media attitudes more consistent with what is displayed in the media they consume rather than actual reality. It asserts heavy viewers' attitudes are affected by what they see on television. Heavy viewers make assumptions about events they have not actually experienced based on the depiction on television (Gerbner, Gross, & Signoriello, 1980). For example, they form assumptions about prevalence of drug usage, crime, and weapons of mass destruction.

Television socializes people that teaches them a reality different from actual one. The more exposure individuals have the more they believe this reality may still be influenced by the media, but are less likely to form this alternative view and look toward other sources as well in order to develop their perceptions.

The Mean World Syndrome is one possible effect of Cultivation. It occurs when television viewers believe the world is a much worse place than what is in reality. For example, if viewers watch a large amount of programming showing violence and wrongdoing. They may feel the world is a violent place to be in. It may also lead to fear. Individuals affected by Mean World Syndrome may believe they will be a victim to crimes related to terrorism, hijacking, etc. One example of this is the Hawkins and Pingree (1981) study in which their study suggested that viewing violent programs was the strongest individual social reality beliefs about a mean and violent world.

Mainstreaming means that television viewing may absorb or override diverse perspectives and behavior that stem from other social, cultural, and demographic influences. It represents the homogenization of divergent views and a convergence of disparate viewpoints (Miller, 2005, p.286). Individuals who get their perspective mainly from the media theory have a homogenization of views. For instance, the slant in the media on terrorism or war should be seen in the biased nature of these individuals' viewpoints. However, they also have other social, cultural, and demographic influences that shape their perspective and make it more representative as a whole.

Resonance is another concept proposed to explain differential cultivation effects on different groups of viewers. The concept suggests that the effects of television viewing are more pronounced for individuals who have had related experience in real life (Miller, 2005, p.286).

Individuals who had more direct contact with the bombing of The World Trade Center, for example, may have resonance. Thus, the television portrayal may be particularly

Gerbner, Gross, Mordant, and Signorielli (1980) explored resonance relationships between amount of viewing and participant responses that fear a serious problem. The researchers drew on results from a recent sample collected by the Opinion Research Corporation in March 1979. The main issue examined in this study showed that the relationship between the amount viewed and the fear of crime was shown in some categories, but not in other categories. For example, the heavy, medium and high income groups were likely to give the fear of crime response and the mainstream. The subjects in the low income group, both heavy and light viewers, were apt to give the fear response. The results for resonance suggested the association among females and among those who live in cities and urban areas and environmental factors may resonate with television's messages and may even be amplified (Gerbner et al., 1980).

Cavender and Bond-Maupin (1999) conducted a content analysis of Most Wanted and Unsolved Mysteries. The particular programs depict actual crimes and reenactments of the crime. The shows are audience interactive in that they allow viewers to call in to the show if they have any information presented. This form of television has become a part of the viewer's reality since by participating in reality shows, the audience is part of that reality. Bond-Maupin suggests this makes the television reality almost indistinguishable from any other aspects of life.

The Cultivation effect has been further studied (Shrum, 1995). First-order cultivation effects refer to the effects of television on statistical beliefs about the world (Miller, p.287). For example, first-order effect would suggest that heavy viewers would overestimate the likelihood of being the victim of a crime (Miller, 2005). These individuals may estimate the likelihood of a terrorist attack or fall victim to one carried out by an Arab at a much higher statistical rate than is actually the case.

Second-order cultivation effects refer to effects on beliefs about the world. For example, a second-order effect would suggest that heavy viewers are more likely to view the world as a mean or scary place (Miller, 2005, p.287). A news media coverage of any war, such as The War on Terror, individuals are

general nature of the world as negative. They only see the Middle East or U.S. etc. as a bad place deriving from the specific news content consumed.

Cultivation theory is based on several assumptions. One assumption is that there is a relationship between heavy and light viewers in their perceptions. Studies establishing a causal relationship between heavy media consumption and perception of reality are based on the assumption that there is an objective reality. Whether or not there is an objective state of speculation and reality is debatable. Lastly to be mentioned here is the assumption that cultivation can be observed or measured. There may be other elements or factors also influencing individual's perceptions, which are overlooked in the Cultivation framework.

One shortcoming of cultivation theory (Gerbner, 1969) is that not all research has yielded evidence supporting the assumptions of the theory. Gerbner and others have found evidence of Cultivation through small, but significant effects over time; however, other researchers have not found the same evidence. For example, a study by Chadee, Farrall, Gilchrist, (2004) found no relationship between fear of crime and quantitatively assessed consumption of various types of media, and that this is true for most attempts to discover such a relationship.

Stemming from the Cultivation Theory, Westerners with heavy exposure to news messaging may have a sense of reality that coincides with the reality depicted in the programming. As suggested by Mean World Syndrome, if the particular Arab news program viewed has a large degree of violence depicted or images inducing fear, as in the case of Iraqi insurgent videos produced, viewers may see the world as a more violent place and may feel it is a world in which to fear.

Most Americans receive their information from news media and there has been an increase in the perception that all Arabs and Muslims are terrorists for national security. A major majority of Americans now say that Muslims are disproportionately responsible for violence (Deane & Fears, 2006). Slone (2000) found that media portrayals of violence, and threats to national security provoke anxiety in individual viewers.

Conservative and liberal experts say that American attitudes about Islam are fueled in part by political statements and media reports that focus almost exclusively on Muslim extremists (Deane & Fears, 2006). If this is the case, however, Arab extremist video content such as those posted on YouTube, especially those

attacks against Americans, should fuel Americans negative attitudes about Iraq further.

For heavy viewers, whose resonance resembles what they've seen in the media, resonance, as suggested previously, may occur. For heavy viewers of most live news which has likely influenced a stereotypical view of Arabs and Muslims already, resonance potentially occurs if life appears to resemble this cultivated view. If Iraqi live news videos of actual documented beheadings, attacks etc. which are real live acts against people, resonance may occur albeit through the secondary source is a link between reality and reality as depicted through a live or real video image. Bandura, Ross, and Sproull (1963) found that children exposed to aggressive content via television mediated exposure were not affected the same, this link should be further pondered and examined by researchers. If resonance does occur, this should reinforce attitudes and perceptions of Arab insurgents and/or terrorists.

Violence

Societal concern over the potential harmful effects to viewers of violence have spurred an abundance of research. While potential negative impacts of the Internet are still in infancy, studies have examined effects of exposure to television violence. According to Bryant and Zillmann (2002), scientific research on violence of media violence extends back nearly 75 years.

Gerbner (1972) defined violence as the overt expression of physical force without a weapon against another, compelling of action against one's will on pain of hurt or death, or actually hurting (Gerbner, Gross, Morgan & Signorielli, 1980).

Research examining whether viewing violent media causes aggressive behavior has been a focal point in countless prominent research studies. Berkowitz (1984) defines aggression as any form of behavior that is intended to injure someone physically or psychologically. (Potter, Vaughan, Mirsma, Howley (1995), similarly define aggression as, any action that serves to diminish in some physical, psychological, or emotional manner (p. 497).

The Pain Fund Studies were the first major scholarly examination of pain effects and were conducted in the 1930s. One of these studies, conducted by Dal

content analysis of 1,500 movies. Dale's results revealed a heavy amount of violent content. Blumer (1933), also conducted a study which revealed many individuals were consciously aware they had directly imitated acts of violence they had previously seen in violent movies (Bryant & Zillman, 2002).

The 1982 National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) suggested there is a causal effect relationship between viewing of media violence and real life aggression. NIMH's conclusion based on laboratory experiments and field studies. There was no evidence that viewers become more aggressive. The studies suggest a positive correlation between exposure to media violence and aggression (Bryant & Zillman, 2002).

Hennigan, Heath, Wharton, Del Rosario, Cook, and Calder (1982) compared violent crime rates of American cities with and without television access. In direct contrast to previous studies, their results showed no significant difference of violent crime rates when examined.

In 1980, Williams (cited by Bryant & Zillman, 2002) examined changes in a Canadian town before and after implementation of national television. Her study suggested an increase in exposure to media violence lead to increased aggression.

Paik and Comstock (1994) performed a meta-analysis examining 217 studies conducted between 1957 and 1990 related to television violence and aggression. Their results also suggested a causal relationship between violent media exposure and natural aggression.

A National Television Violence Study conducted in 1995 analyzed the amount and context of televised violence between 1994 and 1995. The study examined 2,693 video programs ranging from cable, premium cable, and broadcast, and did so for five days a day and a range of program types. Findings suggest most television programs depict violence, perpetrators go unpunished in 73% of all violent scenes, and violence is almost as often as it is punished. Singer, Slovak, Frierson, and York's study found that television exposure is related to a more positive attitude toward violence (Singer, Slovak, Frierson, & York, 1998).

Research sheds light on the impacts of violent media content on aggression. Feshbach's (1972) study suggested that when media violence is perceived as realistic, it elicits more aggression than media perceived as unrealistic. Media portrayals of violence

framed as morally justified tends to elicit more aggressive behavior than morally unjustified (Berkowitz & Leinhardt, 1966). When viewers identify with the aggressor of an act of observed violence, their aggression against a victim is enhanced (Berkowitz, 1972). Further, when violence is described as motivated by desire, aggression is elicited from the viewer than the same violence (attributed to revenge) (Stonner, 1973). And Stonner (1973) also found violence regarded as being motivated by revenge is associated with lower subject ratings of inhibitions against a nonvengeful aggression.

Gunter's research (1985), suggested television aggression based on contextual cues of the (Bryant & Zillman, 2002) factors appeared to explain the seriousness of ratings of violence for research participants rating violent scenes. These factors were legitimacy, type of act, and consequences. Feshbach's study (1972), Gunter's research suggested increased realism was serious.

Particular characteristics of violent portrayals most likely to elicit aggression (Comstock (1977) were presented as (1) rewarded, (2) exciting, (3) real, and (4) the perpetrator of the violence is (5) not criticized for his behavior and intending to injure his victim (Phillips, 1983)

One possible effect related to heavy consumption of violent programming is an increase in violent behavior for individuals with borderline tendencies. Some individuals are just over the edge just enough to react by enacting violence. Because the media audience number in the millions, even very small statistical effects can translate into serious problems. If just one person in several hundred thousand is influenced by a violent act, several million viewers watching that movie might be influenced (Bryant & Zillman, 2002).

The Social Learning Theory, deriving from Albert Bandura (1984), suggests media characters serve as models for aggressive behavior. Whether violent behavior is rewarded or punished would either discourage or encourage imitation of the behavior (Bryant & Zillman, 2002). Key experimental studies conducted by Bandura and his colleagues in 1961, 1963, and 1965 provide a base for understanding Social Learning and potential media effects stemming from violent programming. Since

experiments today are unlikely to pass the required internal review board (previous studies such as ~~these~~ still pivotal to our understanding.

Bandura et al. s first key study examined results from an experiment in which subjects were exposed to aggressive ~~aggressive~~ ~~aggressive~~ more adult models [in person] and were then tested on the amount of imitating ~~imitating~~ ~~imitating~~ in a new situation in the absence of the model (Bandura, 1961). The results of the study showed those subjects exposed to the aggressive models reproduced significantly more of the aggressive behavior than that of subjects in nonaggressive groups. It was also shown that aggressive ~~aggressive~~ ~~aggressive~~ ~~aggressive~~ expressed less aggression than subjects in the control group. These results provide evidence of learning by imitation (Bandura et al., 1961).

Bandura et al. further explored the same phenomenon using a similar experimental design, but through film mediated aggressive models versus models in person. Bandura took a step further and demonstrated potential media effects ~~effects~~ ~~effects~~ in viewing aggressive programming. Today, more so than in Bandura s time, there is an abundance of aggressive programming on television ~~media~~ ~~media~~ (Bandura, 1963).

The results of Bandura et al. s study suggest importance of the proposed study of analyzing ~~insurgents~~ ~~insurgents~~ messaging on YouTube, since many of these violent acts committed ~~by~~ ~~by~~ aggressive models. Bandura et al. s findings indicate that exposure of subjects to aggressive models increases the probability that subjects will behave aggressively when instigated on later occasions and subjects who viewed television mediated models do not differ from each other in total aggressiveness. In the experimental groups expressed significantly ~~less~~ ~~less~~ behavior than the control subjects (p.7). There ~~was~~ ~~was~~ also significant gender effects found in the Bandura et al. study (Bandura, 1963).

Another possible media effect is Catharsis. Feshbach (1955) suggested that Catharsis ~~is~~ ~~is~~ that viewers of violent media who are angry or frustrated by viewing fantasy aggression then purging their negative emotions by viewing the content will behave less aggressively (Bryant and Zillman 2002). Some ~~research~~ ~~research~~ studies have suggested Catharsis (Berkowitz, 1965; Feshbach, 1961; Feshbach, 1971), however, the majority of studies have suggested instead a causal relationship between viewing violent

an increase in aggressive behavior (Smith 198; Donner & Deimer, 1998; Comstock & Scharrer, 2003; Paik & Comstock, 1994; Singer & Singer, 1981).

Repeated exposure to violent media content may cause a psychological and emotional adjustment to occur. Bryant and Zillman (2002) sensitization may occur where initial levels of tension, anxiety, or disgust may diminish or levels of negative emotion associated with exposure to media violence may rise to respond to violence in (Pearl 2007) life. Bryant and Zillman state, As people's sensitivity to violence become increasingly dull, violent behavior may increase, in part not recognized any longer as behavior that should be c

Reality of Violence in Iraq

The reality of violent acts in Iraq are rarely discussed likely due to the nature of these acts. However, there is potential for the reality to be in video. Dawn Perlmutter (2007) paints a picture of violence. Perlmutter states, suicide bombings, beheadings, mutilation, cutting out tongues, cutting off ears, amputating eyes, genital mutilation, and dismembering dead bodies are common and widespread.

Perlmutter (2007) suggests, the campaign promotes victimhood as a recruitment technique with the goal of indoctrinating moderate Muslims into racist and extremist ideology and to elicit global sympathy as an oppressed population. The campaign justifies violent acts to its own enemies.

Fedayeen Saddam and Republican Guard troops were known to torture and have included violent acts such as beatings, breaking bones, gouging out eyes, falling off of high buildings, chopping off fingers, cutting ears and tongues, piercing hearts with electric drills, ritualized mutilations, and beheadings (Perlmutter, 2007, p).

In Iraq under Saddam's regime, widespread and systematic government sanctioned torture, rape, and mass murder. In May of 1994, Saddam Hussein ordered surgeons to remove the ears of army defectors and those who refused to report for military of judicial punishment. No. 10 were administered. During the course of three months, 17-19, 1994, an estimated 3,500 men lost their ears.

Beheadings are also common. For example, the Mujahideen often decapitate perceived enemies of Islam. Similarly, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was known to videotape beheadings of hostages during the War on terrorism thus far hundreds of civilian soldiers have been decapitated as the direct result of Islamic ideology. and Afghanistan dismembered corpses are regularly found in mass graves and are frequently found by soldiers. The practice of beheading captives is often justified since it dates back to the Prophet Muhammad 768 C.E. (Perlmutter,

Violent acts are often videotaped such as the videotaped public beheading of Nicolas Berg, Kim Suda, Jack Hensley, Eugene Armstrong, Kenneth Bigley, and numerous other victims by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's group al Qaeda in Iraq (Perlmutter, 2007).

Insurgents posted an Internet video on June 20, 2006 of what had been abducted, brutally mutilated, and murdered. Pfc. Kristian Menchaca, 23 L. Tucker, 25, were members of the 101st Airborne division (Perlmutter, 2006).

The video shows two white bodies with taunt words written in blood. One of the soldiers has been decapitated, and the head sits next to the body, with an open explosive device lined the leading to the victims. Their eyes were reportedly gouged out and their bodies defiled (Wong, 2006). On July 10, 2006 the first video of a mutilated American soldier was issued on the Internet by the Mujahideen Council (Perlmutter, 2007; Wong, 2006).

The Social Identity Theory

Social identity is defined as a person's self-concept derived from perceived membership in social groups (Chen & Lytle, 2006). In other words, individuals tend to base their identity partially on groups to which they belong.

This theory was first developed in 1979 by Tajfel and Turner in an attempt to explain intergroup discrimination. This theory contains three main components; categorization, comparison, and identification. Categorization is defined as placing ourselves and others into social categories, such as Christian, Hispanic, or male. Identification is the way individuals associate themselves with specific groups. The group, or groups, an individual identifies with is compared to those groups that he / she does not identify with. The last component is comparison; individuals compare their groups with other groups.

groups. In this comparison a favorable bias is formed toward the individual is a member (Tajfel & Turner, 1979 & Li, 2006).

A definition of oneself is derived from the characteristics of the group one belongs to. This definition is a part of the self-concept (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Individuals base how they should feel, think, and act based on the memberships in their social groups. An individual's perceived norms and behavior and perception of self are stereotypical and normative, which then influence group behavior and group stereotypicality. This stereotyping leads to competitive and discriminatory intergroup conduct. The degree to which this occurs is based on the nature of the relationship between the groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

Social identities are evaluative as well, in that an evaluation or comparison of one's group relative to other groups (Hogg, Terry, & White, 1995). It is suggested this evaluative property of social identity provides the motivation in a way as to gain or prevent the comparison of one's group to other groups. This in turn favors oneself as well (Hogg et al., 1995).

Regarding the proposed dissertation study, Social Identity Theory explains why those who feel they belong to the insurgent group may derive their sense of identity from that group. Insurgents may draw upon nationalism, religion etc.

Research on White Supremacist groups' use of the Internet suggests that nationalism, religion and definitions of responsible citizenship are interwoven with racial and collective identity for [their] groups, their members and potential recruits (Adams & Roscigno, 2005). An assertion could be made the same, excluding the use of the Internet, YouTube etc.

White Supremacists use media messages that appeal to nationalism, religion and responsible citizenship to create a sense of collective identity and for their potential recruits (Adams & Roscigno, 2005). Further, as was found in the White Supremacist literature, interpretative frameworks simultaneously identify threatening social events and corresponding interpretation, and make recommendations for action.

Trepte and Kramer (2006) conducted a study utilizing social identity theory to examine potential gender and national identity effects on selective exposure to entertainment. The study found that participants in the series that portrayed feminists with their own sex higher than

protagonists of the opposite sex. Contrary to their hypothesis, participant countries sampled gave similar ratings to series produced and distributed in their home countries. Therefore, this study did not support a strong bias toward viewers' identity.

Insurgents may call upon related tactics to make media viewers feel they are a larger group and the believers including Israelis and Muslims in the West, are the group. This may increase the barrier between them and the United States. Once strong attitudes are built against them, it would then likely become difficult to counteract these messages and persuade message receivers in a different direction. As Perloff (1995) states, the strength of attitudes may influence message evaluations and judgments of communication. Further, Maureen Warner and her colleagues (1995) state that strong attitudes are probably anchored by other beliefs and values, making them resistant to change (Warner, Hodges, & Wilson, 1995, p.56).

Diffusion of Innovation Theory

In his book Diffusion of Innovation (1962), Everett Rogers defines diffusion as the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among members of a social system.

Research in the area of diffusion began in the early 1900s with Gabriel Tarde, a judge and lawyer. He was the first to note that new ideas follow as they are adopted by individuals over time (Rogers, 2003). His curve is still relevant today. As stated by Rogers (2003) when the rate of adoption of an innovation is slow, the curve will have a steeper slope. If an innovation diffuses through the social system, which diffusion will have a flatter slope.

There are four elements in the Diffusion of Innovation process. The first is Innovation, which is anything (practice, idea, product) that has been new. Next, Communication channels that are the mode by which messages concerning the innovation are exchanged between individuals. The third element is Time and it contains the innovation decision process, which is the individual's decision to adopt or reject

innovation from the initial knowledge of its existence; (b) the time in which it is adopted by an individual or group relative to other individuals or groups; (c) the adoption during a specific period of time the number of individuals that have adopted the innovation. The final element is Social system which is a set of interrelated individuals engaged in joint problem solving to accomplish a common goal (Rogers 2003, 114).

Individuals are associated with one of five Adopter Categories, as defined by Rogers (2003), based on their innovativeness, the degree to which an individual is more likely to adopt new ideas than other members of a social system (p. 280). Social innovators (2.5%) adopt the innovation first and are considered Venturesome. A few preconditions must be met for an individual to be an innovator, substantial financial resources are helpful, high level of education and the ability to deal with a degree of uncertainty about an innovation (p. 280). Early Adopters (13.5%) will adopt the innovation shortly after the innovators and are considered opinion leaders of any category. To many individuals they are the individuals who look to when adopting an innovation. Because they are respected, their adoption of an innovation triggers the critical mass to begin adoption (p. 283). The Early Majority (34%) adopts an innovation after the Early Adopters and they have a very deliberate decision process (p. 283-284). The Late Majority (34%) is skeptical and the adoption of an innovation (after the Early Majority) may arise from peer pressure or the availability of relatively scarce resources means that uncertainty about a new idea must be removed before the late majority feel to adopt (p. 284). Laggards (16%) are the last group to complete the innovation process. The individuals in this group look to the individuals who have already made decisions about the future and are very careful in when dealing with innovation. Due to their limited resources, before adopting an innovation, they must be convinced that it will succeed (p. 284-285). The percents for each category are estimates and may contain higher or lower percentages for each category.

A limitation with this categorization system occurs when the adoption of an innovation is incomplete or the innovation is not being used by 100 percent of the social system (Rogers 2003).

The innovation decision process is part of the Time element of diffusion of innovation, which consists of five distinct steps as conceptualized by Rogers. Knowledge is the first step in the process where an individual is first made aware of the innovative information about what the

innovation is and how/why it works. The second step is Persuasion, which has a favorable or unfavorable attitude is formed regarding the innovation by an individual. The third step is Adoption, which is the next step and the choice to adopt (or reject) the innovation. The fourth step is Implementation, in which an individual begins to use the innovation. The fifth step is Confirmation where an individual tries to get support for the decision that was made and may change that decision for the innovation is (Rogers, 2003).

There is no set time table for diffusion to occur. Dekimpe, Parker, and Verbeke studied the global diffusion of technological innovations. They focused on 160 countries and differences in timing of a country's implementation stage (Rogers, 1983) and confirmation stage or a country's full adoption of an innovation. Results showed a contagion effect where the more countries that have adopted the international experience with an innovation, the chances other countries will also implement increase. Countries with homogeneous social systems reached full confirmation faster than laggard countries exhibited faster diffusion rates (Dekimpe, Parker, and Verbeke, 2000). Countries trying the innovation later may reach full confirmation sooner because they benefit from previous adopters' experiences with the innovation (Dekimpe et al., 2000), p. 47.

One potential shortcoming of the original Rogers concept is the assumption that all individuals will go through each step of the process. However, this is not always the case. For example, the government of a small country or decision maker, decides to replace an old technology with a new one. In this case it is impossible to differentiate between implementation and confirmation steps (Dekimpe et al., 2000).

The main context in which Diffusion of Innovation is applied today is through the diffusion of technological advancements. Television, the Internet, and cell phone technologies have diffused quickly and are largely enjoyed by populations around the world. Western dominance over media is starting to be challenged by the expanding technology by the Western world.

Conceptually, any message, including Arab messages can be diffused if the right circumstance. However, it is through innovations such as satellite television and streaming video such as YouTube, Arab messages are being diffused. Mainstream Western media has long dominated the air waves in the United States. Through the introduction of satellite television, those possessing this technology in the West are now

channel with Arab media they would never have been exposed to on the mainstream the innovation of the Internet, allows for Arab messaging to be almost immediate inexpensive channel of communication, and can be received by mass audiences (2006a).

Diffusion of the Internet Innovation

Every innovation has a starting point. The Internet can be seen as a theoretical construct J.C.R. Licklider at MIT in 1962 envisioned a globally interconnected set of computers through which everyone could access data and programs from any site (2000, p. 2). Much research into this concept was done in parallel during the RAND group, and in the United Kingdom. By 1969, the initial ARPANET, the precursor of the Internet, was running with four host computers connected into it. After this, it quickly added to the ARPANET. Work continued on completing network software, and the first host protocol, the Network Control Protocol (NCP), was completed. This device protocol, would eventually be replaced by Transmission Control Protocol (TCP/IP) which is more of a communications protocol. However, the introduction of NCP into ARPANET allowed users to develop applications. The first applications designed was electronic mail (email). For more than a decade, the network application has been a (2000).

ARPANET, which grew into the Internet, was based on the concept that many independent networks would all be connected together and that these networks would have random designs. This is known as a decentralized architecture. The owner of the independent network had the choice of network architecture. This provided the opportunity for innovation in accordance with the specific environmental requirements of that network (Licklider et al 2000 p.3)

In the beginning, with a limited number of networks connected to ARPANET, it was fairly easy to maintain the hostnames and their addresses. As more and more computers / networks were connecting to the Internet, a change in the management of the Internet was required. The Domain Name System (DNS), developed by Paul Mockapetris, was able to convert hostnames, such as www.us.ibm.com, into Internet addresses (2000)

The Internet was first designed to support resource sharing, remote login, and has since grown to support hundreds of thousands of applications, including email, so

videostreaming, over the Internet telephone (Voice Over IP), etc., and is accessible to people worldwide.

The Internet has changed drastically over the last 10 to 15 years. At its inception, those who knew about the World Wide Web had only a vague idea of the effect it would have on the future and the way society would use it to conduct day to day life. Today, Internet usage in the western world has now reached critical mass. Communicating with friends, shopping, networking, researching, the plethora of information, conducting business, etc. can all be done online. According to the Internet Usage Statistics from Internet World Stats, as of June 30, 2008, 248 million people in North America are using the Internet. This is an increase of 129% from 108 million in 2001. There has been an enormous increase in Internet users over the past years. The same study from Internetworldstat.com also found that the world population of 6.6 billion on Earth, 1.4 billion of these people are online, an increase of 305.5% from 361 million in 2001. The largest percentage increases were in Africa and the Middle East, which increased their number of Internet users by over 1000%. North America has the highest percentage of the population online with 73% (2005) as he stated in his article "Who uses the Internet, what they do, and what that means" the 248 million users in North America, 136 million are Americans, 67% of which are older than age 18. How do these people first get online? A Portrait of Early Internet Adopters: Why People Get Online and Why they stayed, an article by Peter D. Weerts results from a survey showing that 50% of the people surveyed first got online because of a personal work reason, 31% and school with 19%. A survey was conducted by Stanford University, asking respondents to select from a list of 17 common Internet activities they conducted. An overwhelming majority of 90% selected email as the activity they do in just about any survey conducted, email is typically the most common activity. Forty percent of respondents use the Internet for Consumer to Business transactional activity (online purchases, etc.) Approximately 25% of respondents use the Internet for entertainment utility and about 25% selected chat as their primary activity. The use of chat rooms declines after the age of 25.

Rogers (2003) states when studies examine the education level of those who adopt new technologies the results show that more educated people tend to adopt the innovations more quickly than those with relatively less education. Along the same lines Harter et al. (2003) in the case of the Internet's global spread, this suggests that countries

populations will be more likely to show higher rates of Internet diffusion than educated citizens (p. 704). Hargittai (1999) also found evidence that suggested economic and telecommunications policy were among the most salient predictors of Internet connectivity. Beilock and Dimitrova (2003) examined Internet usage rates across nations and found per capita income was the single most important determinant of Internet use across the nations studied. Other important determinants were openness of a society and infrastructure, and using telephone and personal computers.

Cultural differences may also have an impact on the diffusion of innovation. Straub and Kamel (2003) examined Arab culture and technological innovation and the process of culturalization regarding acceptance of the Internet. Their study was a mixed approach in part a quantitative field study and also a qualitative analysis in a focus group format. Straub and Kamel's findings suggest Arab culture can both inhibit and encourage technological innovation and how Arab cultures can move their economies quickly into the digital age.

Diffusion of the YouTube Innovation

Jawed Karim founded payment processor PayPal, which in 2002 acquired for \$1.5 billion and a mere four years later, received \$65 million in Google stock when Google bought YouTube from him for \$1.65 billion (Lange, Pavr-Garcia, & Tomlinson, 2007). YouTube, founded in February of 2005, is an Internet website that provides free video streaming. Users of YouTube are able to share multimedia clips (Keelan, Garcia, & Tomlinson, 2007). YouTube was purchased by Google in November 2006 and has struck partnerships with major media companies such as CBS, BBC, Universal Music Group, Sony Music Group, Warner Music Group, NBA, The Sundance Channel (YouTube Company History, n.d.).

YouTube is a video sharing platform and also offers a personal profile page and channel page and enables friending (Lange, 2007a). The process of producing and uploading them and sharing them on YouTube can be done with relative ease (Haridakis, 2008). The website allows individuals to limit physical access to technical features such as only Strategic tagging can also be used where the video uploader uses keywords known as tags to describe or identify that video. Such as cryptic references or tags, however, may prevent the general

population from knowing how to find that video. Individuals may also use search terms that are readily understood by members outside of a group (Lange, 2007a).

Video makers can have one or more YouTube accounts. By this means, that while one video may be flagged and taken down for a reported violation, another video may go up under a different account and/or video name.

YouTube is essentially a database with a complex record structure, organization, and good search features. All videos include descriptive data, detailed usage statistics, provider profile, viewer rankings, viewer comments and a Related Videos section where thumbnails of related videos are displayed that may be of interest to the viewer. Users may search the 15 broad subjects such as music or comedy and have options for advanced searches to include Boolean search, language, length, relevance, number of views, count, or particular tags. Content that is objectionable may be flagged by users, resulting in YouTube staff examining the video and either keeping it up or removing the video for violation (O Leary, 2008).

YouTube does collect data on the IP addresses or personally identifiable information that they use to track personal information and behavior (O Leary, 2008).

While YouTube attempts to protect freedom of speech, it has rules and guidelines in place. Some of these include content such as bomb making, graphic or gratuitous violence, someone being physically hurt, attacked, or discriminated against, dead bodies or similar things with intent to shock or disgust, hate speech, intimidation, inciting others to commit violent acts, etc. Postings such as these are subject to removal of these videos. Infractions may result in the uploader being banned from YouTube accounts. YouTube staff review videos that have been flagged by users 24 hours a day, seven days a week in attempt to determine whether they violate the guidelines. Videos that are deemed a violation are removed. Repeated violations can lead to account termination without being allowed to create a new account. Flagged videos that are considered inappropriate for all viewers but without violation may be set as only viewable for users who claim they are age 18 by Google (Google, 2008, n.d.).

YouTube defines hate speech , shocking and disgusting , and dangerous as:

Hate Speech

"Hate speech" refers to content that promotes hatred against members of a group. For instance, racist or sexist content may be considered hate speech. There is a fine line between what is and what is not considered hate speech. It is generally okay to criticize a nation, but not okay to make insults about people of a particular nationality.

Shocking and Disgusting

The world is a dangerous place. Sometimes people do get hurt and it is sad. These events may be documented on YouTube. However, it is not okay to post graphic content primarily intended to be shocking, sensational or disrespectful. If a video is particularly graphic or disturbing, it should be balanced with context and information. For instance, including a clip from a slaughterhouse or a factory may be appropriate. However, stringing together unrelated clips of animals being slaughtered in a video may be considered gratuitous. It is to shock rather than illustrate.

Dangerous Illegal Acts

While it might not seem fair, you can't show something because of what viewers theoretically might do in response, we draw the line at content that shows or encourages violence or dangerous, illegal activities that have an inherent physical harm. This means not posting videos on things like instructional making, ninja assassin training, sniper attacks, videos that train teenagers in illegal street racing. Any depictions like these should be educational and should not be designed to help or encourage others to imitate them. (YouTube Community Guidelines, n.d.).

Lange (2007a) conducted a year long ethnographic project analyzing how participants developed and maintained social networks. Lange's findings suggest that sharing of videos is reflective of different social relationships. Some studies on YouTube publicly private where video makers' identities were revealed and some relatively private since it was not widely demonstrated. It is a mix of public and private behavior where their videos were widely accessible but the video producers were not public. Due to the nature of insurgent video content and legal issues regarding copyright content, it is possible that clips for the present study would mostly fall under public and private.

YouTube offers an immediate connection to people who share a history, common interests, opinions, and the same creative interests. (Donohue, 2009) YouTube is considered a vlog which according to Lange (2007) is text and often photographs, features

a central mode of communication, and may be viewable to the general public select group. Vloggers can use the Internet <and YouTube> and discuss to e difficult issues and thereby achieve greater understanding of themselves and o creating a discourse transcending social hierarchies and norms to be questioned and refashioned (1).

Innovations such as YouTube sometimes run into problems. Viacom, in March 200 took legal action against Google in a \$1 billion lawsuit, claiming YouTube from artists who were not being compensated for their work. Viacom ordered removal of over 10,000 clips of copyrighted material (Patterson, 2007). lawsuit does not appear to have slowed its users down.

The numbers of YouTube users (both uploaders and viewers) is growing e every day. A 2006 article reported YouTube had reached 10 million to the website (Hof, 2006). YouTube also receives high monthly volume. The number streams, the way usage is measured, from April 2008, as collected by Nielsen was more than 4 billion. These streams were viewed by 75 million viewers (Nielsen Ne Release, 2008). During the time period examined for the present study, bet December 2008, ComScore determined YouTube reached a full 25 percent of all queries in the United States. More were conducted on YouTube (an estimated 2 billion searches) than through Yahoo which had 2.7 billion searches between December 2008.

YouTube has made its place in some classrooms. Muller (2008) and Wedwick use of YouTube, digital stories, and blogs as a tool in their language arts mi curriculum (Mullen & Wedwick, 2008). Agazio and Buckley (2009) explore how be used to illustrate theoretical content, involve students, and inspire in methods for use in Nursing education. Juhasz (2009) too has incorporated Yo classroom. A professor of media studies focused on activist media of noncom a course, Learning from YouTube , where all course videos were posted and open to the public.

One potential problem with YouTube, according to Techcrunch blogger Er is that large portions of YouTube videos are watched on other sites in embe viewers anywhere other than from YouTube do not count towards the total views

video. According to Schonfeld, YouTube spokespersons responded to this issue by stating that autoplaybacks are not counted toward the number displayed on the YouTube site, because autoplaybacks are not viewer initiated. The spokesperson also suggested that videos are not affected by this (Schonfeld, 2008).

Another issue for YouTube that is often a concern for most any technology is other competitors. Thus far, as suggested, YouTube has not been met with enough competition to deter viewers from using the site.

NBC Universal and News Corp. launched a video site called Hulu, offering TV shows and movies. Hulu has met with great success of attracting and selling advertising such as Bank of America, Best Buy, and Nissan. Hulu has legally obtained content and contains full versions of many popular television shows such as movies such as Jerry Maguire. Unlike Hulu, YouTube videos clips rarely more than five minutes long. One potential downside to Hulu for viewers is the obligation to watch 30 second commercials. Considering the number of viewers and presence of content in the televised medium, this is certainly a major detractor (Lowry, 2008). Frustrated with losing 20 percent of the advertising revenues with Hulu, CBS plans to showcase many of its shows on YouTube instead utilizing a new YouTube Feature View format which Hulu has (Sullivan, 2008).

Technology is appreciated by some and feared by others. Kidder (2008) expressed concern for the proliferation of YouTube stating, "The grandly democratic power of and its that they allow everyone's work to be posted and subsequently buried each individual work under gigabytes of competing data, stifling the identity yearning for amplification, recognition, and response" (p. 53).

YouTube, commonly used by insurgents to disseminate messages, also allows for the diffusion of ideas and messages across a global population including the West. Increased exposure to Arab media and Iraqi insurgency messages, such as those discussed in the dissertation study, are capable of reaching the masses. This is a new ability to cultivate perceptions of reality which used to be limited mostly to western media and agendas.

Diffusion of Social Movements

While most Diffusion of Innovation research has focused primarily on technological advancements, Kern and Nam (2008) examined a social movement utilizing collective emergence of citizen journalism in South Korea. While the authors did not mention differing cultural visions, ideas of its purpose, and structural interests, they were successful at realizing their goal. Kern and Nam do not mention Rogers (1983) or Schumpeter's Theory of Innovation. Schumpeter (1928) defined innovation as a new combination of means of production (cited in Kern & Nam, 2008, p. 74). Kern and Nam state that Schumpeter's concept of innovation (creative destruction) and that this disrupting force in the economic system is required for economic growth and development (Kern and Nam, 2008).

Army Captain Stephen Ford (2007) appears to be suggesting a similar diffusion occurs with insurgencies. He states:

An insurgency must maintain popular support throughout its course, and increase it during its later stages. At the outset, the insurgents need a radical idea, discussion, or plan from something conceptual to something physical (usually military) manifestation of the movement. The movements require support as the government mobilizes to defend its position of monopoly on the use of force within the country. As the insurgency makes progress from guerilla to conventional warfare as it seeks to destroy or injure the national power and establish its own bases of operation. As this occurs, violence increases, and the insurgency must justify the violence. To attain objectives the people will support: more security, more prosperity, national power, and so forth. (p. 86)

Ford's explanation suggests several stages to obtain popular support and to sustain it. Connecting the Literature

Social Identity Theory and Credibility can be intimately tied together. This is shown in the United States government's outreach to the hearts and minds of the Muslim world (Christie et al., 2006). Their approaches included leaflets, commercials, and a radio station. In this case, the people from the Muslim world themselves thought of the United States as the group. The reverse is true for people from the United States. The messages sent by the US government to the Muslim world were seen by them as messages from the group, and thus had low credibility. This lack of credibility would make it very difficult for those in the Muslim world to change

study was conducted by Christie et al. (2006) to determine whether people with a heritage from a predominantly Muslim country will find U.S. public relations more credible than will people without such a heritage (Christie et al., 2006). This study was used to determine credibility survival messages, countering disinformation, and communication. The Muslims found the messages credible in all categories. This study has revealed key intergroup differences in the credibility of messages to the Muslim world (Christie et al., 2006).

Agenda Setting / Framing and Diffusion of Innovation also connect. The process by which an innovation diffuses, if it diffuses at all, starts with gaining knowledge about the innovation. Individuals can learn about an innovation through the mass media. The media have most likely framed this information in a specific manner that will lead individuals to think about the innovation in a certain way. A study conducted by McLeod and Rogers & Dearing, (1988), found that mass media content has a greater effect on individual agendas in individuals who participate in conversations about the topics on the media agenda (p568). Rogers and Dearing (1988) state This finding [by McLeod et al. (1974)] is consistent with the conclusions from research on the Diffusion of Innovation. Individual exposure to mass media channels often creates awareness of new ideas, but interpersonal channels are necessary to persuade the individual to adopt the innovation. This indicates that for an innovation to diffuse an individual must converse with others after first gaining knowledge and these discussions increase the influence of the innovation.

According to Rogers and Dearing (1988), not all researchers in the field of Agenda Setting / Framing believe that the agenda of mass media affects individuals, that there are some circumstances in which an individual is not influenced by the media agenda. One such circumstance arises when the media, as a medium, is considered by the individual to be a low credibility source. The example given by Rogers (1989) is that a Wall Street Journal may feel that the National Enquirer is less credible than the New York Times. If a story comes from the less credible source and it is rejected by the individual, then the media has failed to sway the individual with its agenda.

Cultivation effects, as suggested by Gerbner et al.'s studies, shape the perceptions of viewers of television, and arguably YouTube among other programming. These perceptions of reality that come from media are made up of the reality presented in media frames.

then may have an impact on viewers' perception of the world and also help f which they live.

Social Identity Theory may help explain how viewers YouTube video content. How they feel about the particular source being presented, via per membership, should impact their overall acceptance or rejection of the mess Arab culture, there are social groups ranging from religion, tribe, nation, insurgency group. This should be a potential explanatory factor even if not directly.

Individuals are more likely to accept a message if they deem that mess and from a credible source. Drawing from previous credibility studies, several connections to the dissertation topic can be made. Regarding Iraqi insurgen YouTube, if viewers see the message coming from a credible source (i.e. a r they should be more likely to accept the message. The reverse should also b seen as not being from a credible source (i.e., an out group member), the m likely to be rejected. While the particular source will not be examined viewer effect such as perceptions of credibility, the potential impacts of these percepti should be acknowledged.

Agenda Setting suggests viewers are made aware of only particular issu (through framing) and these particular issues and concerns then become salient viewers. Framing, a subset of Agenda Setting, was chosen as a theoretical f must be specific framing devices used in the production of YouTube media. In or specific tactics and appeals being used by Iraqi insurgents, their particul to be examined. This framing examination should paint a picture of how Iraq using YouTube as a strategic communication tool

Research Questions

This dissertation is an exploratory content analysis of Iraqi insurgen YouTube. A combination of theoretical perspectives and quantitative analysis examine the following research questions:

RQ1: How have strategic framing devices been used by insurgents using YouTube recruiting?

Corman and Schiefelbein (2006) provide an analysis of three strategic communication and media used in Jihadi operations of the global Jih movement through social and Islamic religious programming, the message linking it to a wider Muslim struggle and utilizing political communication to bases of operations globally in addition, put them on notice, and cause fear in their opponents, in particular the leaders and people in the United States.

Research question one has a focus on the possibility of intimidation of Corman and Schiefelbein's statement. In particular, research question examines framing devices Iraqi insurgents are using with regard to their YouTube messaging a function of intimidation occurs as a means of recruiting, this may too be a motivation used. Intimidation is behavior to compel or deter an action by coercion, extortion, duress or threat (United States Department of Justice, 2002).

Fahoum and Width (2006) state framing is a vital component of the recruiting equation. It allows them to use culturally familiar words, symbols or narratives (stories) targeting the potential recruit which resonates and incites an emotion subsequently opens the door for a future relationship based on common opinion eventually trust. Frames, similar to metaphors delineate different ways of issues (p. 6). Benford and Snow (2000) assert three types of framing are most successful recruitment: diagnostic, prognostic and motivational. Diagnostic to persuade potential recruits that a problem exists and need to be addressed presents strategies, tactics and targets, and motivational framing convinces action (p. 8).

RQ2: How have strategic framing devices been used by insurgents as a tool for spreading anti-U.S. sentiment?

Weimann (2006) states, Terrorist rhetoric on the Internet tries to present images and arguments in which the terrorists appear as victims forced to achieve their just goals in the face of a brutal, merciless enemy devoid of Demonizing the enemy, playing down the issue of terror victims, shifting blame to violence, and proclaiming grievances are all strategies used on most terror sites (Weimann, 2006 p.8) While there is an assumption insurgents are using YouTube to spread anti-U.S. sentiment such as has been the case often with their web pages,

frames by which they are doing this and if it even appears to be the case needs to be examined. Will they demonize their perceived enemy? This question also addresses Cormier and Schiefelbein's (2006) intimidation factor as mentioned in research question two. Research question two addresses the frames by which Iraqi insurgent videos may or may not be using anti-U.S. messages including intimidating content for individuals not supporting the insurgency. RQ3: What major themes (assertions, statements, arguments, and claims) are used by insurgents using YouTube?

Holsti (1969) defines a theme as a single assertion about some subject (Holsti, 1969, p.116). Iraqi insurgent themes are examined using a quantitative analysis of YouTube video content. Research question two is an exploratory question. It examines the major themes in Iraqi insurgent YouTube videos. The study examines themes using the categories of (videos portraying the insurgency group in a positive or favorable light), (videos portraying the United States / Western world in a negative or unfavorable light), and defense of the insurgency in response to a prior perceived or real attack on the insurgency. These categories were adapted from Keelan, Wilton, Garcia, and Tomlinson's (2007) research.

The first two research questions examine specific frames related to RQ1 spreading anti-U.S. messages, and frames related to intimidation for individuals not supporting the insurgency. The third research question interprets the findings and makes no assumptions as to the themes / frames that will be found in the videos.

CHAPTER 3 : METHODOLOGY

Overview

This study employed content analysis procedures to systematically code, observe, and quantify the representations within the population of video clip criteria. Berelson (1952) defined content analysis as a research technique systematic, and quantitative description of content (p. 8). Similarly, Krippendorff (2004) building upon Berelson's previous definition analysis as, a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences meaningful matter to the contexts of their use

Units of Analysis

The goal of this dissertation was to representatively describe the population of Iraqi insurgent video on YouTube. General descriptive statistics for comparison among videos posted in specific groups and shed light on the type of video content. The unit of analysis examined was the individual video. Unit elements of the content which the frequencies represent (Berelson, 1952, provided an analysis of the entire collection meeting criteria.

Population Sample

While the overall population of Iraqi insurgent videos posted on YouTube every effort was made to obtain a sample of videos that would be representative of the population. A purposive sample of videos was selected. Sampling of all YouTube videos was unlikely to yield practical and applicable results. The volume of and length of videos within a reasonable amount to examine. The collection of videos meeting the criteria was used for this study.

The video collection for this study was made up of all videos on YouTube yielded from the search term "Iraqi resistance" initiated on the date of October 2, 2008 to December 1, 2008. The time period examined for the present study the end of October and December 2008, ComScore determined YouTube reached a full percent of all Google search queries in the United States 8 billion searches.

The broadest term would ideally be "Iraqi insurgent." However, due to the connotations very few videos from initial test searches yielded anything of

insurgency ~~U.S.~~ videos. Changing the term to ~~insurgency~~ instead gave a more positive identity frame and in initial analysis ~~it is the videos that~~ Iraqi resistance applied across ~~groups within~~ Iraq, this term was deemed broad enough and applicable. ~~if the type of~~ Iraqi eliminates insurgent activities in areas such as Afghanistan. The ~~results includes~~ such as Al Qaeda that may exist or have members in other countries.

The time period was noteworthy as it ~~is just prior to~~ the United States presidential election, the actual presidential elections on November 4, 2008, one month of data after elections.

All videos for the search ~~initially were downloaded~~ on October 28, 2008. Daily searches for the same search term were conducted to obtain any ~~videos~~ the studies end date December 1, 2008. ~~Information such as~~ title of video, length of video, number of views, and star rating ~~was recorded~~ as they were downloaded. Some videos could not be ~~downloaded~~ because they had been flagged as having objectionable content. In this case the URL was logged along with the standard information to online for analysis. For all ~~videos viewed online~~, those meeting the preestablished ~~criteria~~ were used for analysis.

If videos are found to contain violent, graphic, or terrorist related content ~~and~~ removed by YouTube moderators. ~~YouTube~~ user who uploaded the video content has the ability to remove their videos. For any given day, ~~new~~ videos be added, other users will delete their content ~~available~~ as it is a dynamic environment not remain constant. However, ~~videos added to YouTube were collected~~ daily each term providing the most complete ~~feasible~~ collection.

The date of Thursday, October 9, 2008 can be used as an example to provide an idea of ~~the~~ under consideration. ~~A YouTube~~ search for Iraqi resistance on this date yielded 247 video results. This is the raw number without filtering criteria. YouTube provided was a search ~~if anything~~ uploaded today, this week, month, or year. For ~~the~~ date, videos were uploaded that day. However, it should be noted, it was possible the same video may be uploaded by different uploaders may have different names for the same video. Also, there was a ~~possibility~~ researched ~~recorders~~ not noticing duplication, resulting in some duplicates.

used for analysis. Furthermore, relatively little identifying information is provided on YouTube about those who have uploaded the information, therefore it is not possible to state with any certainty when the insurgent posted the video. Given the criteria of the presence of an insurgent group logo or mention of belonging to a particular group, the assumption is that some if not most of the videos have been created by insurgents in their efforts

Downloading video clips

Each video was downloaded using the free download site, Tech Crunch (<http://www.techcrunch.com/get>). Videos were saved using the following naming scheme: title used for the video on YouTube, date uploaded onto YouTube, and these titling conventions was separated by an _ (underscore). For longer YouTube titles more than five words were used. This naming scheme was used in order to sort the videos for duplications. Every effort was made to remove duplicated videos before they were logged and tracked using an Excel spreadsheet and later imported into the database. Criteria

Four sets of criteria were used to assess a YouTube clip as being an insurgent video. (1) Clips must have an insurgency icon or explicitly state the group they represent. (2) There has to be reference to the insurgency in the video and be a prominent feature. (3) Only content used primarily English speaking, had English subtitles, and were used with the exception of simple references to Allah (God), and (4) The clip must appear to be realistic in nature, and not a spoof which could be of a comedic, serious, or satirical nature of the speaker(s) and/or graphics (this criterion is somewhat subjective).

The first criterion was chosen in an attempt to select videos with the presence of being Iraqi insurgent video. The presence, statement of specific group representation and/or flag depicting a particular group, allows for analysis to be conducted. The second criterion was chosen as a safeguard attempting to select only original video footage is often taken from one video and put together in another video. This criterion should eliminate videos where individuals have borrowed footage and reframed it for their own purposes. Because the researcher has limited Arabic language ability and coders for the subjectivity

knowledge of Arabic. In order to accurately assess the frames present it was only select videos when information was presented in a comprehensive format. However, all videos including those in Arabic were downloaded and/or URLs logged. These inclusion in future analysis. The fourth criterion was chosen in order to avoid that were not representative of actual Iraqi insurgent video. YouTube has a mixture present including satirical videos for the search term that joke about insurgents not represent Iraqi insurgent groups and were not analyzed as part of the study.

Coding

After the video content was obtained, researcher coded objective data such as rating system, number of views, Appendix IV) graduate students from the Florida State University, Department of Communication, were reemployed in order to prevent researcher coding bias. More subjective markers were trained by the researcher on the use of content analysis methods, guidelines and operationalization of terms and criteria. Practice coding exercises were able to ask questions and get clarification during training in order that was clear and consistently coded.

Viewing and coding of video took place during 2009 using personal laptop computers equipped with the Media Player were asked to conduct analysis in a quiet environment free from distractions. Videos provided to coders on a jump drive (storage device) and could be viewed as many times as needed in order to produce accurate each video. Coders viewed videos while coding their findings on paper coding provide (see Appendix E) paper forms were input directly into SPSS software analysis.

Coders were each provided with a printout of the coding scheme, a review of all instructions and training materials / review, along with reference copies of video content. The researcher remained in close contact with coders asking they had any questions or concerns.

After obtaining a sufficient inter-rater alpha on the reliability test, the researcher and coders viewed approximately one of the objective video material each. The researcher input all objective coding data into the rating system.

Coding Scheme Reliability

Researchers need to consider consistency in their analysis of the content of communications (Berelson, 1971). This includes consistency between analysts where different coders produce the same results when they apply the same categories to the same content (Berelson, 1971). Consistency was measured in order to address Berelson's point

Inter-coder reliability was measured in order to determine agreement between coders. This is an informative measure to determine the reliability of a coding scheme (Mayest, 2005). One way of defining the correctness of subjective categorization of content corresponds to the decisions made by other people who approach the content with the same set of instructions for making the decisions (Mayes also notes, "If subjective categorization decisions turn out to be inaccurate (i.e., unreliable), the study are primarily determined by subjective decisions rather than the facts being analyzed" (p. 19)). These points emphasize the importance of obtaining a high inter-coder reliability measure.

Preliminary inter-coder reliability tests were conducted in a pre-session for the coders. Any discrepancies or ambiguity among the coders and the categories were resolved before the study. After a sufficient training session, the researcher and coders conducted inter-coder reliability checks on three video coding just over 15 percent of the video content meeting criteria (The video resulting Krippendorff displays a sufficient agreement between the researcher and each coder.

Riffe, Lacy, and Figue (1998) suggest that the same content should not be used for training purposes. Videos used for the training session were from the search term "mujahideen" and did not include any videos used for the studies search term "combatants on behalf of a jihad movement". The term jihad is often used to refer to the religious duty of holy war against the infidels, to extend the non-Islamic territories; it is derived from the word jahada, which means to struggle (Alexander et al, 2003). The researcher asserted the term mujahideen yields similar results to the study's search term without having the same exact videos. Mujahideen is not specific, but sufficed for training purposes.

All content categories and functions coded were analyzed for the purpose of handling multiple responses possible for one content category function, each possible response was entered as a separate variable.

Coding guidelines

An initial review of all videos downloaded determined if criteria were met and each coder coded subjective material for one-third of the videos that met criteria. Objective material downloaded and title of video, were only recorded by the researcher. Specific coding guidelines were provided to the researcher and coders in order to obtain specific data for analysis. The coding guidelines included operationalization of standards for coding and a description of each variable being measured.

Adapting Salem, Reid, and Chen's (2008) coding scheme for high school classes were used, and divided into twenty-five (25) content categories. The researcher coded every class while coders coded only subjective classes in Table 1 to include expression of emotion, target, and function. See Appendix E to view the separate subjective code sheet and Appendix F to view the objective code sheet.

| Class | Content category | Content feature |
|---------------------|--------------------|---|
| General information | Title | Specify the reported title of the video |
| | Type of video | Documentary attack (including suicide attack, Hostage taking etc.), Social Documentary (people affected etc.), Tribute, Message, Training |
| | Length of clip | Specify the clip length minutes and seconds |
| | Duplicate | Specify if the video appears to be a duplicate already coded (yes, no), clarify in written notes used for same video etc. |
| User interaction | # of times viewed | Specify the # of viewers for date of acquisition |
| | Star rating system | poor to 5 (awesome). |

Table 1 Continued

| Class | Content category | feature |
|-----------------|--------------------|--|
| Date | Reported Date | video was uploaded to YouTube |
| | Acquisition Date | video was obtained by the researcher |
| Production | Language | Specify language (English only, Arabic w/ sub-English subtitles & music, music only, English other |
| | Special effects | Logo(s), English subtitles, Animations, Music |
| | Accompanying music | Secular music, Hymn music, Symphonic, Non-music N/A |
| | Production quality | 1 (poor quality) to 5 (high quality) |
| Extremist group | Extremist group | Specify the reported group name |
| Expressions | Non-verbal | Kissing, Hugging, Celebrating, Weeping/crying, Angry, Neutral/ambiguous, Serious |
| | Reference to media | Arab Media, Western Media, None, Other/un |
| | Appeals | Religious, Nationalist, E/ affected, U.S. Anti-Israeli, Western World |
| Event | Tactic | Suicide Bomb, Bombing (suicide bomber), Grenade Attack, Shooting, Bladed Attack, Hijacking, Vandalism, Ground Vehicle Attack, Aircraft Attack, (verbal or written), Motivational speech, Religious speech, Paramilitary, Hostage taking, Kidnapping, Artillery / Mortar / Rocket / Missile Attack, CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological Nuclear) Attack, Unclear/unknown |
| | Weapon | Bomb / Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), Mortar / Rocket / Missile, Grenade Launch weapon, Poison/biological agent, Automobile, Assault rifles / guns, Unclear/Unknown |

Table 1 Continued

| Class | Content category | feature |
|--------|--------------------------|--|
| Target | Victim type | Humanitarian/Government Organization (NGO), Government Official and/or Person, Iraqi / Middle Eastern, Military Personnel, Religious Figure, Health Care, Western Civil Journalist / on business, Other, Unknown |
| | Victim Gender | Male, Female, Unspecified/ unknown, N/A |
| | Victim characteristics | Victims are specified as being from: U.S. Israeli, Iraqi / Middle Eastern, Unknown |
| | Facility type | Specify attack on: Military Base, Military Airports & Airlines, Business, Government Political Party, Paramilitary, Transportation Energy Infrastructure, Police Facility, Non Religious Institution, Vehicle, Ship, Home, Unknown, N/A |
| | Facility characteristics | Facility type was specified as being used NATO / UN, Iraqi, Unknown, N/A |
| Theme | Function categorization | <p>Acclaims (portray the insurgency group or favorable light.)</p> <p>Attacks portray the U.S. in a negative or intimidation, an act or behavior to compel action by coercion, extortion, duress or</p> <p>Defenses respond to a prior perceived threat of the insurgent group by the Western world. Attacks are considered as sentiment</p> <p>Clips would be categorized as having a relief if</p> <p>They portray the insurgency group favorably. They provide a solution including a support role</p> <p>Clips would be categorized as having effective suggested individuals are able and can be task suggested</p> |

Table 1 Continued

| Class | Content category feature |
|-------|--|
| | Clips would be categorized as ambivalent neutral or ambiguous. |
| | Coders also make note of possible other the video. |

Clarification of terms

For the content category accompanying music, a hymn is further defined. For the purposes of this study, a hymn is a type of Islamic (God) whereas secular music is popular songs such as pop/rock music.

For the content category Extremist group, this refers only to Iraqi groups other than Iraqi insurgencies are outside of the scope for the present study.

Nonverbal communication, according to Guerrero (2008) and Hecht (2008) includes messages that people exchange in interaction with the exception of Guerrero and Floyd's (2006) defined in Guerrero & Hecht (2008) perspective includes all of the forms of <nonverbal> communication except for unattended behavior. The nonverbal frames examined for this study include positive, negative, and neutral. While this list is not inclusive of verbal cues, it should allow for a general list of types of nonverbal cues. Rejoicing or celebration would be synonymous with celebrating. A neutral / ambiguous person would be one void of showing particular emotion.

Regarding reference to media, Arab Media refers to media that clearly comes from the Middle East / Arab and has an Arabic logo such as Al Jazeera (Arabic version only), Western Media is news media originating from the Western World such as CNN, FOX or MSNBC.

None refers to there being no reference to news media in any way. Other refers to there is reference to news media, but it is unclear or the coder does not know.

The content category appeals provided several options for a short list. Religious appeal would try to motivate or influence individuals based on religious statements related to Islamic (Muslim) Religion and/or Arab / Iraqi nationalism. Nationalistic ideology appealing to being to the Arab world and/or Iraq. The appeal is based on a common heritage and culture. Emotional / affect appeal

pleas with high emotional intensity or those tugging recruitment words be an appeal for others in the insurgency's cause. While an Israeli, and Western World appeals all use a negative portrayal or calling regions rally against these Adaptations / Reasoning

Salem, Reid, Chen (2008) coding scheme included in Appendix A was adapted for this study and the differences are as follows:

Under General Information al(2008) listed items of which Source and Batch # were deleted for this study as the source of all video clips will be the researcher will not be downloading them in batches. Length of Clip was added in order to make statistical connections for analysis in this study.

In Type of video Documentary was subdivided into documentary attack social documentary because there is a difference between the two which was also under Type of video was removed as all the video clips in this considered a form of propaganda. User interaction was added as a class to of times a video was viewed as of the acquisition date and the rating the video from viewers. These were collected using the same measurement method as Ke Pavn-Garcia, and Tomlinson (2007) used in their study YouTube Information on Immunization: A Content Analysis, to determine the level of user interaction clip. The Date class remains unchanged.

In Production #, Multiclip was removed as there was no connection to the research questions being explored. It now asks the coder to specify which language three choices (English only, Arabic w/ subtitles, Subtitles & music, music music, other) instead of just specify language for simplification of coding.

An Appeals category was added Expressions class to obtain the type of appeal made in the video clip including religious, nationalistic, etc. in this analysis.

Group Media agency and Sub group were removed from Extremist group class because this would unnecessarily complicate scheme. The Verbal content category was removed Celebrating / Rejoicing, /crying, Angry,

Neutral/ambiguous, and other were added to the Verbal category Expressions because these have often been noted by the researcher in preliminary analyses.

Several items were altered in the category in the class. Simple clarifications such as out Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear attack CBRN was done as well as other changes such as Arts, Bomb, Mortar, Missile, and Grenade Launcher one content feature (which was Weapon in the category). This was done in order to simplify coding.

Several of the content features for the Victim Type category combined into one Government Official and/or Personnel, and Diplomat was added to the category. A Gender category was added to obtain the proportion of each gender affected by insurgent activity shown.

The Victim characteristics and Facility characteristics were changed to determine if the victim or facility was from or being American, NATO / UN, Iraq, or unknown. Salient specified several countries under each category. Except for the UN Iraq, these countries were deleted as it may be difficult for the encoders to distinguish between American versus Allied for each country. NATO / UN was added to distinguish between American versus Allied traits.

Another class theme was added to the coding scheme to address Research Questions referring to themes found in the content studied. Clips were organized into assertions, statements, arguments, or claims. Hainsi defines a theme as a single assertion on some subject (Holspiller, 16). For example, an insurgent clip may be documenting an insurgent attack on U.S. military vehicle or the like. The theme would be U.S. military vehicle. The classes, event, target and themes, were used in analyzing overall themes. Each theme was categorized by function. Keeping a modification Wilson, Patricia and Tomlinson's (2007) operational framework was adapted from referring to immunization to being Iraqi insurgent oriented.

Issues

Coders viewed potentially violent content that could be disturbing to large quantities. In order to prevent unnecessary withdrawal their participation was voluntary and that they may choose not to watch a video or quit any time. A list of University courses were provided to both an understanding / consent form was designed by each coder. This letter and the

study were approved by the institutional review board (IRB) in order to be
harm was being caused to the coder. Each coder was given an incentive of \$100.00 in
to encourage quality, focused on Appendix B.

CHAPTER 4: RESULTS & ANALYSIS

Introduction

This study is a baseline investigation of how Iraqi insurgent groups use a means of strategic communication. The resulting data provides a general overview of videos these insurgent groups are using and sheds light on areas that may be a research focus. While the data provides a general overview of Iraqi insurgent video content, it is only a small glimpse into the communication strategies being used by the groups. The resulting sample size should be taken into account when interpreting the data as there are several significant findings that provide a foundation for the research questions. All percentages are rounded to the nearest whole percent and anything below this rounded down.

Interpretation of Chi-Square

The data obtained from video coding were input into SPSS for analysis of frequencies, and to examine the potential relationship between variables. Chi-square and the Pearson's correlation coefficient was examined to determine significance.

Because the sample size is small, the expected cell count for many of the related variables are also small. (2010) states a conservative rule of thumb is to include no expected frequencies smaller than 5 for analysis. However, a more liberal approach is also acceptable, stipulating a somewhat expected frequency of less than 5 should be used. This study is exploratory in nature and attempts to form a baseline for future studies. A more liberal rule of thumb of cell count below 3 being applied.

Intercoder Reliability

Two independent coders were trained by the researcher on applying specific codes to videos as operationalized in the codebook. After initial training, each coder independently coded a sample of approximately fifteen percent of the videos. Krippendorff's alpha was used to evaluate intercoder reliability. A Krippendorff's alpha was conducted for each subjective variable for each coder individually against the percentage of agreement with the researcher. The values ranged from 0.72 to 0.91. Because of the small overall sample size acquired after initial review for content, it was determined

appropriate for evaluation of Krippendorff's alpha between coders. The majority of variables had a value of 1.00 for coder agreement. Falling below 1.00 indicated

The following had a 1.00 for primary researcher and the lower value specified for secondary researcher as follows: Serious (0.72), Nationalist (0.76), Resisting (0.72), Efficacy (0.72) and Ambivalent Theme Function (0.72).

Both secondary coders had a value of less than the primary researcher for the following variables (0.76), Emotional (0.76), Acclaims (0.72) Attacks (0.72). Video coding was determined to be reliable due to the Krippendorff's alpha scores.

After initial coding was completed, statistical analysis of the additional variable quality of production was deemed an appropriate exploratory variable for analysis of correlations between the top insurgent groups with arm and quality of production. The researcher trained a second coder on proper production quality resulting in a Krippendorff's alpha of 0.90. This variable was completed by both coders and differences were through discussion between the coders.

Overall Video Collection

Video collection began on 02/28, 2008. On that date 240 videos were present on YouTube for the search term Iraq Resistance. 44 videos could not be downloaded so URLs and identifying information for these were logged so they could be viewed directly on YouTube for application of criteria. These 44 videos were unable to be downloaded because of flagged content which was deemed inappropriate by one or more YouTube users. Videos for the search term were then collected daily until 12/08/08 with any identifying information for video unable to be downloaded also logged.

Criteria, as stated, were applied to each video to determine fit for the study. Videos were eliminated for analysis because they duplicated, did not have English or English subtitles or only in Arabic and instead relied primarily or heavily on Arabic. Arabic phrases such as "In the name of Allah (God)", as is common in Islam, were acceptable. Videos were eliminated because they did not include an insurgent group logo or make specific reference to their group, were not insurgent videos, and/or were silly in nature and appeared

individuals mocking insurgents have been trained to apply the coding sheet appropriately and a high enough Krippendorff's alpha was acquired, several ones available online had been deleted by either the user or YouTube moderators. Fifty unsuitable videos that met criteria were analyzed which were examined online due to the downloading issue.

The length of videos ranged from 13 seconds to 10 minutes 50 seconds with minutes 39 seconds. Most of the videos included upload dates in 2008 while some had an upload date as far back as 2006. Videos, such as those that remained posted on YouTube represent only a subset of those that would have been posted during earlier time periods.

The majority of upload dates for qualifying videos had only one new video individual date had more than 3 videos. The term "new video" is used here loosely. Many insurgent videos are repeats of the video content. unclear. Also, many videos are a compilation of other insurgent video clips there are sometimes more than one insurgent group icon used in a single insurgent video.

Twenty-eight insurgent groups were identified in the videos. Many very little representation in the videos, and while they were included in our analysis (Appendix B), only insurgent groups with 5 or more videos for a particular group were of an independent focus. Many group logos made reference to a particular group that had joined another group or changed their name. These were combined for analysis using the most recent updated listing of groups, the connections, and group names as documented by the IntelCenter (2008) in their Jihadi Logo ID and Iraqi Resistance. After combining group names as appropriate, there were only 4 groups referred to in the videos. These were Al-Islam (19%, n=10), Islamic State of Iraq (26%, n=14), Iraqi Resistance (24%, n=13), and Al-Mujahideen (13%, n=7). Analysis conducted included each of these individual top four insurgent groups the highest presence over time and should be most representative of what viewers are likely to have exposure to.

Two of these four groups have attempted to create their own video content and acting as a media representative to the public and members of the

provides a valuable opportunity to examine top insurgent media groups both with and without a media arm laying the groundwork for future study.

| |
|--|
| Table 2: Top Iraqi Insurgent Groups With and Without Media Arm |
| Top Insurgent Groups With Media Arm |
| Ansar al-Islam |
| Islamic State of Iraq |
| Top Insurgent Groups Without Media Arm |
| Iraqi Resistance |
| Jaish al-Mujahideen |

Production features

Production features were examined to include presence of one or more of the following: animations, subtitles, and music (secular or non-secular), and production quality.

Almost 93% of videos had an insurgent logo present (n=50). Videos that did not have a logo present were required to mention the insurgent group in order to meet the criteria for inclusion. Videos that showed insurgents with a group flag so this was considered the insurgent group represented. The presence of a logo (insurgent icon) allows viewers knowledgeable about the insurgent group represented to associate the particular video content with the group. Videos that were a compilation of frequency footage and displayed multiple logos.

Most videos used animations (n=33) such as animated logos. Creating videos with animations potentially require increased software expense. However, the animated videos did not exhibit significantly higher video production quality.

Figure 1: Animated Logo For Mujahideen (Video)

The frequency of English speaking and use of English subtitles suggest creators of videos in the sample made an active attempt to engage English speaking members of their audience. Many videos also used the universal language of music without any subtitled speaking in the videos.

| Category | Frequency | Percent |
|-----------------------------|-----------|---------|
| English Only | 2 | 4 |
| Subtitles and Music | 7 | 13 |
| English w/ Music | 6 | 11 |
| Arabic w/ Subtitles (music) | 8 | 15 |
| Music only | 20 | 37 |
| Other | 11 | 20 |
| Total | 54 | 100 |

There was a mixture of music types, (both secular and non secular music) found in the video collection. Music ranged from upbeat to depressing mourning in tone. Choice of music could be representative of the audience they are attempting to target. Videos with music may be attempting to draw in a more global audience. Hymns (Nasheeds) are predominately associated with the Middle East and appeal to fewer individuals on a global scale. However, Nasheeds are generally music that appeal to the global population. Also of note, that prevalent were videos that fell into the category of other, 20% (n=11). Videos that fell into this category did not fit into any one single category. For example, English subtitles were present along with insurgents speaking in which case subtitles in English appeared. Light music in the background.

Top groups examined with a media arm had only 3 videos with secular music present compared to 8 videos for top insurgent groups without a media arm. This could suggest groups with a media arm are attempting to reach a more global audience.

Eighty-four percent (16) of videos representing the top groups without a media arm had presence of hymned music. Top groups with a media arm 63% had hymned music in their videos (n=12). This may suggest both groups (i.e., with and without a media arm) are attempting to appeal to a Middle Eastern / Muslim audience with the top group with a media arm giving this population greater focus. Given the substantial presence of

secular music and hymns, it appears groups have both a Middle Eastern / Muslim audiences in mind.

Production Quality

The variable Production Quality, the overall quality of production for each video. A Likert scale was used ranging from 1 (lowest production quality) to 5 (highest production quality). The criteria for evaluating production quality was an adaptation of the iVIE (Innovative Video In Education) rubric for judging video production. Low production quality was associated with unclear scenes, such as night attacks, where the viewer was unable to see much of what was going on, the camera was shaky or out of focus/shadegrainy or faded, and/or inappropriate use or lack of transitions between scenes. Medium quality was associated with overall good production with nothing exceptionally outstanding. Some videos have been slightly grainy but overall camera work is strong. High production quality was associated with well put together transitions where elements such as clear images without grainy or shaky footage, include impressive animations and/or graphics, clear audio, camerawork, editing, transitions, and graphics used. Table 4 provides an overall frequency count of videos with varying degrees of production quality described.

| Category | Frequency | Percent |
|---------------------|-----------|---------|
| Low quality | 4 | 7 |
| Low-medium quality | 4 | 7 |
| Medium quality | 10 | 19 |
| High-medium quality | 16 | 30 |
| High quality | 20 | 37 |
| Total | 54 | 100 |

The production quality variable was collapsed to examine potential relationships between videos associated with having the highest production quality and Medium quality. The high quality categories were combined to high quality. Out of all videos coded 67 (n=36) had high quality video. The data suggests more than half of the videos collected fell into this category.

The study analyzed the relationship between top insurgent groups (both without media arms) and high quality content (n=15) videos for top insurgent groups without a media arm had high quality 53% (n=10) of videos from top groups with a media arm.

Iraq Resistance had high quality production (n=12) of their videos. Ansar al Islam had 70% (n=7). of these groups had a higher percentage of high quality their videos than was present in sample collected from the Islamic State of Iraq had a lower presence of high quality 50% production and Aljazeera had high quality production (n=3) of their videos.

Video Types

Videos fell into four video types (see Table 5). Documentary attacks were the most common video type with 76% (n=41). The high percentage of documenting insurgent attacks demonstrates the large amount of violence being depicted. live footage of their attacks and posting them online to sites such as their (Weimann, 2006) or YouTube. Many documentary videos depicted a range of activity including the preparation of an attack, a real attack, and a signature (see Table 2).

| Type of Video | Percentage Present | Number of Videos |
|------------------------|--------------------|------------------|
| Documentary attack | 76% | 41 |
| Messaggs | 28% | 15 |
| Social Documentary | 15% | 8 |
| Tributes | 11% | 6 |
| Instruction / Training | 4% | 2 |

Figure 2: Insurgents Plan an Attack (n=9)

Often, footage provides close-up of the weapons being used which may have been attempted to demonstrate the groups' fire power. The documentary attacks appear to be the insurgency effort through demonstration of strength and successful attacks.

Similar to the frequencies for type of video, the top four insurgent groups are predominantly documentary attacks. Table 6: Ansar al-Islam has documented attacks in the majority of videos. Closer examination of the data reveals a high presence of particular weapons and targets. Eighty percent (n=8) of videos have presence of one or more items in the category mortar, rocket, missile, grenade, assault rifles and/or guns present, 90% (n=9) have presence of a pipe bomb/IED, and 100% of videos show military personnel.

| Insurgent Group | Documentary Attack | Social Documentary | Tribute | Message | Instructional Training |
|---------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|----------|----------|------------------------|
| Ansar al-Islam | 90% 9 | 10% 1 | 0% | 10% 1 | 0% |
| Jaish al-Mujahideen | 86% 6 | 0% | 0% | 0% | 14% 1 |
| Iraq Resistance | 77% 10 | 31% 4 | 31% 4 | 23% 3 | 0% |
| Islamic State of Iraq and Syria | 93% 13 | 0% | 7% 1 | 7% 1 | 0% |

% Of videos within the insurgent group specified, # of videos

RQ1 - How have strategic framing devices been used by insurgents using YouTube for recruiting?

Several elements examined in this study provide evidence of some of them being used by Iraqi insurgent groups using YouTube with regard to recruiting. Corman and Schiefelbein's (2006) findings, Iraqis have attempted to legitimize their movement within their existing social and religious frameworks, effective at gaining support and/or recruit members for the insurgency effort. They need to feel the insurgent effort is for the benefit of the system and/or based on religious, social, or other concerns that are important to the viewer. Portraying the United States as an immoral, cruel enemy aids in creating a sense that makes it easier emotionally for individuals to support or join the insurgent effort. A sense of value, belonging to a community, and promoting a successful insurgency are in the video collection and appear to be part of the recruiting process.

Video 6, for example, consists of frames that tie training exercises to a community to which members belong. They depict insurgents in several physical scenarios such as marching and shooting practice. Following prayer, then all of the insurgents sit in a large circle with a lead individual in the middle, presumably instruction. The camera then zooms in to a Quran where the video attempts to create a sense of belonging, with religious overtones that suggest positive group interests.

Recruiting Theme Function

Recruiting as a theme function was examined as a separate variable. Large as the recruiting variable does not necessarily leave the group open for recruitment. In cases where the recruiting variable is not present, their recruitment is disguised. Most videos (87%) demonstrate a recruiting effort as one of their theme functions. For each of the top groups, recruiting was reported in 100% of the videos. Therefore, recruiting is suggested to play a key role for the top insurgent groups (with and without a media arm)

Acclaims

Framing the insurgency in a positive light is important to recruit individuals likely to support and/or join the efforts of an insurgent group that they trust.

the purpose of this study, Acclaims are defined as positive portrayals of the insurgency. In 91% of the 54 videos, the insurgency was clearly portrayed in a positive manner. The remaining 3% of videos were ambiguous such as night attacks where very little could be made out.

Efficacy

Most videos portrayed insurgents as typical people who may be similar to the viewer and capable of taking part in and being successful in the insurgency. The variable efficacy examined videos for successful acts such as attacks and exercises where the viewer should feel capable of doing so. Efficacy was clearly present in 87% (47 of 54) of videos. The remaining videos were too ambiguous to warrant having efficacy.

Nonverbal Displays

Analysis of nonverbal displays was conducted to provide an overview of the nonverbal actions represented. Most videos contained more than one type of nonverbal action category. Celebrating / rejoicing was present in 46% (26 of 54) which demonstrated a sense of pride and excitement by insurgents over their successful attacks and the belonging to the group. Throwing the arms up in the air cheering (see Figure 3)

Figure: 3 Insurgent Celebrating (n=26)

Also common was the gesture similar in appearance to the V sign, presented with the back side of the hand. This with was fingers raised and the others kept together and stand for a V for Victory. Very emotionally connective to the viewer was the presence of weeping and crying, 28 (52%) of 54. These images depicted weeping because of

their deceased and relatives or American soldiers crying apparently in defiance (see Figure 4).

Figure 4: U.S. Soldiers Weeping (Video 16)

Never did a video depict an insurgent weeping or crying, rather it was the American soldiers who were showing this. The frame appeared to demonize and shame the American West who were framed as having been the cause of such grief which legitimized the insurgency. Anger was only found in the absence of apparent extreme anger of interest. Instead, the presence of a strong and successful insurgency was demonstrated via nonverbals.

Religious Appeals

Insurgent group portrayals commonly used religious appeals. For a frequency count of religious appeals, see Appendix C. Before, during, and after insurgent attacks, insurgent members were most often heard honoring and praying to Allah. While religious reference is extremely common in Middle Eastern culture, it may also connect Islam and an insurgent mindset in viewers. Many videos, as counted in the religious appeal variable, cite the Qu ran either verbally and/or by written verses are clearly chosen to promote the insurgency efforts. Some verses may be taken from the Qu ran. Some verses cited in the video collection made reference to the rewards for martyrdom and present in a most honorable manner. The verses often paint an image of virgins to await them as reward for their martyrdom. Some verses appear to be for the purpose of recruiting via making Muslim viewers feel obligated to take part in the insurgency. The present also included some which suggested they insurgents were the only path

and that they would win against the unbelievers. For example, one video stated the following quote from the Qu ran in English, "And (the unbelievers) plotted and planned and planned, and the best of the planners is in our side" (Qur'an 54:19-20). This frame supports the Social Identity Theory in that they are creating a group identity. There was a difference in the presence of religious appeal between the top groups with a media arm. Only 42% (8 of 19) of videos for top insurgent groups saw with a media presence of this variable compared to 63% (68 of 109) videos for the top groups without a media arm. Out of the top insurgent groups, Jaish al-Mujahideen had the highest percentage of religious appeals at 86% (see Table 7). Presence of the religious variable is only one potential factor for recruiting therefore absence of the variable does not imply lack of recruitment.

| Insurgent Group | Religion | Nationalist | Anti-US | Intimidation | Defenses |
|---------------------|----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|----------------|
| Ansar al-Islam | 40% (n=4) | 20% (n=2) | 100% (n=10) | 100% (n=10) | 30% (n=3) |
| Jaish al-Mujahideen | 85.7% (n=6) | 14.3% (n=1) | 71.4% (n=5) | 57.1% (n=4) | 14.3% (n=1) |
| Iraq Resistance | 61.5% (n=8) | 76.9% (n=10) | 100% (n=13) | 100% (n=13) | 53.8% (n=7) |
| Islamic State Iraq | 35.7% (n=5) | 14.3% (n=2) | 85.7% (n=12) | 78.6% (n=11) | 14.3% (n=1) |

Nationalistic Appeals

Some videos display an attempt to attract nationalistic appeals (42 of 54). Nationalistic appeals work to mobilize the insurgent effort through the protection of the Iraqi homeland and its people. Video 46, for example, demonstrates a nationalist frame and appeal by depicting a silhouette of Iraqi families walking together under a colorful sun in the background and various Iraqi flags displayed in the background. Places of cultural significance and Iraqi iconography such as the Martyrs Monument in central Baghdad are shown in some videos for the apparent purpose of depicting the positive qualities of Saddam Hussein were somewhat common. Video 28, 30, and 46, for example, depicted Saddam Hussein in a glorified manner. They also depicted suffering of Iraqi people, especially children.

children. Presence of Nationalistic appeals creating a sense of duty or obligation and its people indicate use of a Nationalism which are likely to be intended to and gain support

Figure 5: Saddam Hussein Parade Video 30

Top groups without a media arm had a higher percentage of their videos Nationalistic appeal (63.19) than groups with a media arm (21.9). Out of the top four insurgent groups, (Iraq Resistance) had a much higher presence Nationalistic appeal (61.0 to 77.3). The relationship between the insurgent group Resistance and Nationalistic appeals was statistically significant (p = .05) through a one cell count (see Table 8). This suggests that for the insurgent group Iraq Resistance larger than expected presence of Nationalistic appeals.

| Table 8: Comparison of Nationalistic Appeals and Insurgent Group | | | | | |
|--|--------------------------|--------------------------|---------|-------|-----|
| Crosstab | | | | | |
| | | Iraq Resistance | | | |
| | | Not Present | Present | Total | |
| Nationalist | Not Present | Count | 27 | 3 | 30 |
| | | Expected Count | 23 | 7 | 30 |
| | | % within Iraq resistance | 66% | 23% | 56% |
| | | Residual | 4.2 | -4.2 | |
| | | Std. Residual | .9 | -1.6 | |
| Present | Count | 14 | 10 | 24 | |
| | Expected Count | 18 | 6 | 24 | |
| | % within Iraq resistance | 34% | 77% | 44% | |
| | | | | | |

| Table 8Continued | | | | | |
|--|----------------|------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| | Residual | -4.2 | 4.2 | | |
| | Std. Residual | -1.0 | 1.8 | | |
| Total | Count | 41 | 13 | 54 | |
| | Expected Count | 41 | 13 | 54 | |
| | % within Iraq | 100% | 100% | 100% | |
| | resistance | | | | |
| | Residual | | | | |
| | Std. Residual | | | | |
| Chi-Square Tests | | | | | |
| | Value | df | Asymp. Sig (2sided) | Exact. Sig (2sided) | Exact. Sig (1sided) |
| Pearson Chi-Square | 7.315 | 1 | .007 | | |
| Continuity Correction ^a | 5.685 | 1 | .017 | | |
| Likelihood Ratio | 7.502 | 1 | .006 | | |
| Fisher's Exact Test | | | | .010 | .008 |
| Linear-by-Linear Association | 7.179 | 1 | .007 | | |
| N of Valid Cases | 54 | | | | |
| a. Computed only for 2x2 table | | | | | |
| b. 0 cells (0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected cell count is .78. | | | | | |

Anti-U.S.

Another apparent recruiting effort is reflected in the many videos that depict the United States and/or West as being immoral occupiers that are causing harm to an innocent Iraq. Most videos were deemed Anti-U.S. (89.48% of 54). These videos specifically stated the wrong doing of or hatred / dislike for American people and/or American government. U.S. apparel was either verbal and/or was depicted in images showing the killing and/or destruction of American property. For people insurgent groups with and without arm, videos were considered Anti-U.S. (90.17% of 19) of videos. Extremist al-Islam and Iraq Resistance appeared in 100% of their videos (See Table depicting their perceived enemy as being cruel and devoid of positive human characteristics). Insurgents create a sense of hatred or contempt toward their enemy. It is easier to support and/or take part in insurgent activity when the enemy is viewed with negative positive characteristics.

Intimidation

Intimidation may also have been used as a recruiting tool. Intimidation was present in 61% (741 of 54) of all videos examined. For example, present in the videos were gruesome depictions of charred bodies being poked at and beaten with sticks, mutilated bodies, and soldiers burning alive (see Figure 6). While some of the bodies or victims were clearly U.S. soldiers, several others were too mutilated to determine their origin. This type of depiction may have been strategically used to intimidate Iraqis from leaving Iraq and/or supporting the insurgency. This intimidation may have been directed toward those who would otherwise dare to question or act against the insurgent group. For both top insurgent groups with and without arms, 84% (16 of 19) of videos had the presence of intimidation. In both Anbar and Iraq, Resistance had intimidation in 100% of their videos (see Table 1).

Figure 6: Iraqi Insurgent Holders (Video 19)

Defenses

Defenses, for the purposes of this study, are portrayals of the insurgent defense of the United States occupation. This appeal creates a legitimate point of view on their perceived enemy. Insurgents used defenses (22% of 54) of videos to place blame on the United States (government, U.S. citizens, or otherwise). This U.S. frame depicting the insurgents causing the U.S. presence in Iraq, for example, video 2 provides one example. It shows the U.S. as occupier frame and Iraqi victim frame. In the point of view of a young boy named Maza whose mother had been killed in the

U.S. is blamed for the death and destruction of Iraq and Maza is depicted a force to fight against the U.S. occupation.

Defenses attempt to provide a reason to support insurgent efforts and/ an active member. Forty-two percent (18 of 19) of top insurgent groups without a media defenses compared to (4 of 11) defenses for top groups with a media arm.

Many videos in the collection depict ideologies that are common global protecting yourself and those you care about from harm, honoring your religious appeals. Insurgent may be pulling from these common ideologies to recruit and support for their cause. Because of the potential global span of audiences, insurgents and recruit from a range of countries to include the United States. This study answer the question of how effective the recruiting efforts are or what messages would lead viewers to become actively engaged in the effort.

RQ2 - How have strategic framing devices been used by insurgents as a tool for spreading Anti sentiment?

Iraqi insurgent content contains an abundance of U.S. footage which depicts an array of images and arguments to support insurgent grievances against the U.S. There was a clear intent by insurgent groups to spread Anti-U.S. sentiment.

Videos that the various Anti-U.S. specifically stated they were wrong doing the American people and/or American government and a hatred or dislike for them. U.S. appeared either verbal and/or was depicted in images showing the killing and/or destruction of American property. Most videos deemed Anti-U.S. (89%, n=48) For both top insurgent groups with and without a media arm, video considered Anti in 86% (17) of videos examined. Ansar-Illam and Iraq Resistance appeared in 100% of their videos (previously). The referred to in killing of Americans and/or destruction of American property abundant in documentary attack videos.

Victim Frames

U.S. military personnel were depicted as the recent attacks (39) 72% of all videos collected. However, this victim depiction was not likely intended to have emotional attachment. Many videos showed attacks on military

vehicle (63%, n=34), and most often did not show the face of the victims. The researchers frequently analyzed shootings of American soldiers (37%, n=20), where an animated circle followed the soldier until the shooting occurred. Other videos provided footage of U.S. soldiers (for example, but), never focused in on the face during attacks. The researchers suggest that the purpose of the U.S. soldiers in the videos may be an attempt to remove emotional connections and remorse for the American victims. The researchers suggest that the purpose of the U.S. soldiers in the videos may be an attempt to remove emotional connections and remorse for the American victims. The researchers suggest that the purpose of the U.S. soldiers in the videos may be an attempt to remove emotional connections and remorse for the American victims. The researchers suggest that the purpose of the U.S. soldiers in the videos may be an attempt to remove emotional connections and remorse for the American victims.

Figure 7: U.S. Soldiers Burning Attack Video 28

Figure 8: Insurgent Shows off Helmut Soldier Video 16

Similar to Weimann's (2006) study, videos depicted the Iraqis as a victim forced to violence because of the U.S. occupation and destruction of their homeland. The victim frame was present in 21% of the videos (see figure 9).

Figure 9: US Soldier Shown Threatening Civilians (Media)

For top Iraqi insurgent groups with this frame was present 42% of the time (8 of 19). Top insurgent groups with a media arm had only 10 videos with the frame. While the group Iraq Resistance had a higher percentage of the Iraqi victim frame at 54% of 13, the remaining groups used the frame much lower than expected based on the overall percentage found in videos (see Table 9). The correlation of the frame as an intentional emotional connection made to the suffering of the victims. These images commonly focused in on the pain, anguish, and death of the victim. The Iraqi victim frame is an attempt to spread anti-American sentiment and create a supportive environment for the insurgency.

| Group | Percentage (n) |
|-----------------------|----------------|
| Ansar al-Islam | 20% (n=2) |
| Jaish al-Mujahideen | 14% (n=1) |
| Iraq Resistance | 54% (n=7) |
| Islamic State of Iraq | 14% (n=2) |

Attacks

The variable attacks examined the presence of negative portrayals of the presence of such attacks occurred in 23% of all videos in the dataset. These videos made statements or showed images directly related to the United States. United States soldiers were commonly depicted in the videos, sometimes as images of Abu Ghraib and to surface in the video content. Other examples include U.S. beating Iraqi children, appearing to have been detained, invading an Iraqi home in

the night terrifying women and children, and shooting at and then running off in a Humvee. These images are repeated toward Americans. Very common were images of U.S. soldiers, often with the intent of depicting them as weak and ineffective. 48% of Iraqi insurgent videos contained an anti-American frame.

The following statement given by a woman labeled 'Wife' demonstrates how she feels about the U.S. and how much she cares about her country. She desires to become a martyr. This statement was spoken in Arabic and subtitled in English.

It is considered martyrdom whether I am killed or doing what I am doing now. And I yearn to be martyred. My country is precious. The home is precious. An American has invaded my country and occupied me. Maybe he will even rape me. Even if he arrests me, martyrdom is my wish and I hope to be martyred to serve God, serve my homeland and satisfy my conscience. The country is precious. My children are not more precious. My soul is not more precious.

While some videos target their negative depiction at U.S. soldiers, others depict members of the U.S. government. This is mostly included in Bush administration. Figure 10 shows that, toward the end of the video, the focus shifts to Barack Obama, the topic of a few videos (see Figure 1). This shift in focus coincided with Barack Obama's presidency and the departure of the Bush administration.

Video 37 provides an example of how President George Bush was depicted. This video dates to the election of Barack Obama and thus provides an understanding of how the media framed videos toward the administration. The video started with footage from a live MSNBC broadcast where Bush stated, 'At this hour, American and coalition forces are in the early stages of military operations to disarm Iraq, and to free the world from grave danger. This statement was followed by many images of successful ongoing attacks intermixed with Bush being confused, shaking his head, and making awkward, unintelligent gestures. Also shown are images of U.S. troops wounded, bleeding, and lying over their peers' dead bodies. The video concludes with insurgents holding weapons demonstrating their perceived victory over the U.S. occupation.

Several videos depict President Bush and his administration in awkward moments. These are negative portrayals (see Figure 10).

Figure 10: President George Bush Depicted Negatively

Video provided a lengthy message directed mostly at Barack Obama. A separate video stated it had a message for Obama which was:

Itell him: you have reached the position of president, and a heavy load of crimes awaits you. A failure in Iraq to which you have admitted, and a failure in Afghanistan to which commanders of your army have admitted. The other thing which I want to bring your attention is that what you've announced about going to reach an understanding with Iran and pull your troops out of Afghanistan is a lie which was destined for failure before it was born. I don't know anything about the Muslim Ummah and its history, and the traitors who cooperated with the invaders against it, and don't know the history of Afghanistan and its free and defiant Muslim people. And if you're stubborn about America's failure in Afghanistan, then remember the fate of Pervez Musharraf, and the fate of the Soviets and British before them. The dogs of Afghanistan have found the flesh of your soldiers to be delicious. Thousands after thousands to them. As for the crimes of America which appear to the world and towards the Muslims. The Muslim Ummah received with extreme bitterness your hypocritical statements and stances towards Israel, the Ummah that you have chosen a stance of hostility to Islam and Muslims. You represent the exact opposite of honorable black Americans like Malcolm X (may Allah have mercy on him). You were born to a Muslim father who chose to stand in the ranks of the enemies of the Muslims, and pray that you would become Jews, although you claim to be Christian, in order to climb the rungs of leadership in America. And so you promised to back Israel, and you threatened to strengthen regions in Pakistan, and send thousands more troops to Afghanistan, in the name of the American Crusade in it to continue

The nature of the video message directed at Obama is anti-U.S. and makes clear the negative insurgent stance on the new administration. The message frames Obama as an outsider who comes from a Muslim father chosen to side with the Islamic world. This attempt

to discount Obama as Muslim may be addressing the Islamic justification for jihad. Obama was seen as Muslim and the U.S. as a Muslim land, jihad would no longer be an obligation for defensive jihad if the existence of Islam is threatened by some form of invasion such as an occupation, is an individual obligation (fard ayn) for all Muslims as part of a defensive jihad either by direct fighting or financial contribution. However, it only holds true that Muslims must not attack a state if it is attacked by non-Muslim power and the attacked country does not have the capability to defend itself (Mawardi, 2002).

Figure 1: Old Picture of President Barack Obama (Video)

Defenses

Defenses (portrayals of the insurgent groups in the United States occupation) were used in 21% of videos. These videos attempted to increase anti-U.S. sentiment by placing blame on the United States (government, U.S. citizens, or other entities). Further, the defenses created what may be perceived as a legitimate excuse for violence on the part of the U.S. 42% of 19 of top insurgent groups without media defenses compared to 24% of 19 defenses for top groups with a media arm.

RQ3- What major themes (assertions, statements, arguments, and claims) are insurgents using YouTube?

This research question attempted to determine what other themes may be present in insurgent YouTube videos. The exploratory variables directly measure acclaims, attacks, and defenses. All coding schemes included a section in addition to the predefined themes that appeared to be present in the video.

Acclaims

Presence of acclaims, an exploratory variable, was found to be helpful in addressing RQ-1 which examined recruiting frames. Acclaims were present in 93% (n=50) of Iraqi insurgent videos used for the research study. Videos of the insurgent group in a favorable light. In general, all videos portrayed groups in a favorable light with the only exception being somewhat ambiguous or hard to make out. The words favorable light caused the video depicted being used by the insurgency groups is often quite extreme. However, the favorable because it does not present this violence negatively and instead most through celebration after successful attacks. Many videos depict large stashes of weapons such as rockets and grenades, and document successful attacks (see Figure 2). These videos appear to be demonstrating abundance of strength of the insurgent group. Another common aspect of acclaims was the group identity of the insurgents. Videos depicted several insurgents working together to plan, and/or attend to attacks. Their camaraderie and celebratory nature together, after groups, framed their effort as being the will, of Allah, or Iraqis would be considered a favorable characteristic.

Figure 2: Weapons Used by Insurgents

Attacks

Attacks portray the U.S. in a negative and unfavorable light. In 43% (n=23) of videos examined, this variable also aided in answering RQ-2. The negative portrayal of U.S. soldiers and U.S. command, however, also notable was the absence of blame on ordinary U.S. citizens. For example, in more than

one message the insurgents directly confronted U.S. citizens asking them to
 insurgency, and discussing the wrongs of the American government. This additional
 aspect of the frame suggests that citizens were not solely at fault for their
 government actions, the citizen has an obligation to confront the U.S. govern-
 ment and demand change.

Figure :13 Insurgent Speaking to U.S. Civilians

Defenses

Defenses respond to a prior perceived on the insurgent group by the U.S.
 Western world. Most defenses in the video collection suggest the U.S. occupying Iraq
 against the Iraqi people's welfare. Other defenses included the claim that the U.S.
 stealing Iraq and killing innocent women and children. Forty percent (n=22) of the Iraqi
 insurgent videos contained defenses as a theme. These defenses build up a seemingly
 logical and emotional argument through a series of framing moves. These
 insurgent tactics against the U.S. forces in order to defend the Iraqi people
 storyline of innocent Iraqis being impacted by destructive U.S. occupiers
 successful insurgent attack in defense. For example, the music in 4 English
 singing about the impacts of war and depicts images of wounded, crying, or
 and civilians. The scenes include images of U.S. soldiers holding Iraqi people
 Iraqi civilians, some even, with children in U.S. led detention camps. After
 developing a frame of Iraqis as victims of the U.S. occupation the video pace
 quickens and the music gets more intense. There is a shift from still shots
 insurgent attacks on the U.S. forces in Iraq. The shift in frame changes from Iraq

Iraqi insurgents fighting back with successful attacks. This video creates an enemy occupying Iraq and destroying innocent Iraqis. The message creates a perceived justification and need for insurgent attacks. Further, recruiting, the video depicts the insurgents can be successful at protecting suggesting the viewer too can join and aid in the successful efforts.

Emotional / Affect Appeals

Another noticeable presence in many videos was the use of emotional appeal. Thirty-nine percent (n=21) of the insurgent videos contained an emotional or appeal.

Insurgents include a mixture of such appeals in their videos. For example, some videos discussed the hardship of the American occupation and war on their lives and the death of members and/or friends. Sometimes insurgents show a quick glimpse of a loved one (often a child) for whom they are fighting. These appeals attempted to affect the emotions of viewers.

Figure 4: Insurgent Showing Pictures of Family Members in Video (n=16)

Top insurgent groups without a noticeable presence of emotional affect appeals in 33% (12 of 19) of their videos. This presence is higher than that for the overall sample, statistically significant at a significance level of $p < .05$ (see Table 11 for comparison). 5 of 19 for top groups with a noticeable emotional / affect appeals present: 85% (11 of 13) for Iraq Resistance, 100% (3 of 3) for Ansar al-Islam, 21% (3 of 14) for the Islamic State of Iraq, and 11% (1 of 17) of videos for al-Mujahideen.

| Table 10: Comparison of Emotional Appeal/Affect of Top Insurgent Groups Without a Media Arm | | | | | | | |
|---|-------------|--|---------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--|
| Crosstab | | Top Insurgent Groups Without a Media Arm | | | | | |
| | | Not Present | Present | Total | | | |
| Emotional Affect | Not Present | Count | 26 | 7 | 33 | | |
| | | Expected Count | 21 | 12 | 33 | | |
| | | % within Iraq resistance | 74% | 37% | 61% | | |
| | | Residual | 4.6 | -4.6 | | | |
| | | Std. Residual | 1.0 | -1.4 | | | |
| | | Present | Count | 9 | 12 | 21 | |
| | Present | Expected Count | 14 | 7 | 21 | | |
| | | % within Iraq resistance | 26% | 63% | 39% | | |
| | | Residual | -4.6 | 4.6 | | | |
| | | Std. Residual | -1.2 | 1.7 | | | |
| | | Total | Count | 35 | 19 | 54 | |
| | | Expected Count | 35 | 19 | 54 | | |
| % within Iraq resistance | 100% | 100% | 100% | | | | |
| Residual | | | | | | | |
| Std. Residual | | | | | | | |
| Chi-Square Tests | | | | | | | |
| | | Value | df | Asymp. Sig. (2sided) | Exact. Sig. (2sided) | Exact. Sig. (1sided) | |
| Pearson Chi-Square | | 7.265 ^a | 1 | .007 | | | |
| Continuity Correction | | 5.775 | 1 | .016 | | | |
| Likelihood Ratio | | 7.259 | 1 | .007 | | | |
| Fisher's Exact Test | | | | | .010 | .008 | |
| Linear-by-Linear Association | | 7.130 | 1 | .008 | | | |
| N of Valid Cases | | 54 | | | | | |
| a. Computed only for 2x2 table | | | | | | | |
| b. 0 cells (0%) have expected count less than or equal to the minimum is 7.39. | | | | | | | |

Martyrdom

Video 34 is one example that illustrates the theme of promoting martyrdom. The presence of which is depicted almost universally. The video describes the role of the Imam in recruiting and encouraging martyrdom (see Figure 15) (see

Figure 5: Iraqi Describing Role (Video 1)

This video is in Arabic with English subtitles. Example 34). The Imam reveals his stance on martyrdom clearly. He promotes Jihad and for followers of Islam in his congregation to become a martyr

The first drop of blood that the martyr sheds washes away all of his sins. This is why his body should not be washed or put in a shroud. He should be covered in his own blood that was shed for the sake of God Almighty. A martyr's status at judgment day will be very high. He will intercede on behalf of his family and wed 72 virgins. And a crown of gems and pearls will be placed on his head. He won't feel the pain of death like a mosquito. This is the martyr. And he will be spared the questions posed by the Angel of Death at the grave. This is the highest status a Muslim can reach while alive to God. It is the status we have encouraged people to aspire to.

A character in the same video, called The Warrior, states about martyrdom and life after

Just like them, we lose people. We can't win every day. We can't prevail every day. Loss is inevitable and we accept that, even though it's not really a loss. Because the ones who fall on our side leave this place and go to a better place. They leave this world to the hereafter, which is reserved for us, not for them.

Young children appear in some of the videos in the sample collection. Some were shown as victims and others were depicted with weapons, pretend or real. The garb associated with insurgent group members. They appear to be on a path of Jihad, some looking as young as 5 years old (see Figure 6).

Figure 6: Iraqi Child Holding Weapon

In this video, the young recruits state:

When they began calling for Jihad at the mosques we told the Imam we would do Jihad. The Imams and the clerics delivered us to Jihad. In the beginning he won't reveal what he really wants from you. He will say, "God bless you so young, return to your own life. Jihad for the sake of God is a very hard thing. There are people older than you who are doing it for Jihad. But the more you insist to the Sheikh or the Imam, they will grant you your request. Through the clerics and the mosques, they delivered us to Jihad in Iraq."

Also, the Imam speaks about the proper way to take part in Jihad. His statement suggests following a careful path to avoid innocent people. The particular statement, while supporting Jihad and martyrdom, informs viewers there is a right and wrong way to take part in Jihad.

On many occasions we've seen the people not to be reckless. If you tell someone, "Yea, go be with Jihad," and he doesn't know how to do it properly, he'll go and he will only do harm to himself, his family and his own neighborhood. This has happened to lots of people in Al-Qadisiyah and other neighborhoods. The guy fires on a tank from the middle of the market, and the tank will start firing on the people, and many innocent people get killed. This isn't the way to do Jihad.

Women Warriors of Jihad

Women take a role in Jihad and they are depicted in the video collection. They are shown with weapons (see Figure 7) and as supportive wives to their insurgent husbands. This is not used as a variable in the present study but is suggested for future research.

Figure 17. Iraqi Women Holding Weapons Video 16

Weapons / Tactics

This study collected data on the presence of weapons and/or tactics in (see Table 11 and 2). The abundant use of real life acts of violence may impact the effect of this particular armed the viewer.

| Table 11 Weapons Present In Iraqi Insurg | |
|--|------------------------------------|
| Weapon | Percentage Pres Number of Video |
| Mortar/rocket/missile/gun | 74% 40 |
| Assault rifles/guns | 72% 39 |
| Bomb/IEDs | 50% 27 |
| Unclear/unknown weapon | 6% 3 |
| Bladed weapon | 4% 2 |
| Automobile/other vehicle weapon | 2% 1 |
| No weapons present | 11% 6 |

| Table 12 Tactics Used In Iraqi Insurgent | |
|--|-----------------|
| Tactic | Percentage Pres |
| | Number of Video |
| Mortar/rocket/missile/air attack | 67% |
| | 36 |
| Ground vehicle attack | 63% |
| | 34 |
| Bombings (non-suicide) | 46% |
| | 25 |
| Shootings | 37% |
| | 20 |
| Motivational speech | 22% |
| | 12 |
| Threats (verbal or written) | 20% |
| | 11 |
| Recruiting speech | 17% |
| | 9 |
| Religious speech | 11% |
| | 6 |
| Aircraft attack | 9% |
| | 5 |
| Tactic unclear | 7% |
| | 4 |
| Paramilitary training | 6% |
| | 3 |
| Hostage / kidnap | 4% |
| | 2 |
| Hijacking | 4% |
| | 2 |
| Suicide bombing | 2% |
| | 1 |

Remarks

The present study's data suggests Iraqi insurgent groups are exploiting simultaneously traditional communication strategies to achieve desired goals. The research questions appear to have appropriately directed some focus into spreading anti sentiment and recruiting efforts. The study does not present an array of strategies Iraqi insurgent groups, and groups appear frequently to employ each of the strategies insurgent communication strategies suggested by this study. Researchers with new areas in which to focus.

CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION / CONCLUSION

General Discussion Overview

The purpose of the study was to baseline investigate current strategic communication employed by Iraqi insurgents. The study examined YouTube videos for framing devices and particular themes. This theme presents reasons for the research, study research findings, and to draw conclusions based on evidence suggested from the findings. The research focuses on framing devices to determine how Iraqi insurgent groups were or were not attempting members, a supportive environment, and spread sentiment. The research also gained insight into other framing devices, themes, and appeals. This chapter presents suggestions for future research and concluding remarks.

Importance Reasons for Study

There were several important reasons for conducting the study. The constant new technology and innovations like video sharing on YouTube, creates a constantly updated research in the communication field. For example, Gerber's Cultivation Theory was originally directed toward media effects on television. Today, with other innovations are becoming prevalent and these theoretical approaches may need their modification. Certainly, computer mediated communication (CMC) such as YouTube addition to the communication literature base and repertoire. The prevalence of YouTube in particular, suggests an abundance of global exposure to different content never before dealt with. While researchers are steadily gathering knowledge on Internet use as a whole, few studies have been conducted on the use of YouTube. This study is not aware of any study that had been conducted on YouTube before the present study.

Another important reason for the study is (2007) research by Gabriel et al. found there were more than 4,300 websites serving terrorists and their supporters on any given day; many of which were tied to insurgent groups. Attacks, carried out by organizations and individuals, have occurred all over the world. The global Internet and YouTube use along with the nature of violent insurgent attacks carried out

groups, creates a need to understand the ways in which insurgent groups are each other, recruiting, and promoting attacks such as on the U.S.

Conclusions Related to Insurgent Recruiting Via YouTube

The study findings suggest that recruiting is a major purpose of Iraqi insurgent via YouTube. Tajfel & Turner (1979) developed the Social Identity Theory which individuals may derive their sense of identity, at least in part from that appear to be drawing upon commonalities to their viewers of various group membership. Nationalistic ties, religion (Islam), familial ties, and common ideology. However, the groups represented in the videos were Sunni except for one video which was a Naqshbandi Order. This may suggest it is the Sunni group identity (with Nationalistic and ideological ties) represented possible, for the purposes of uniting under a common cause (anti-U.S. and occupation) the Sunni group appealing to the whole Muslim community and a wider global community of viewers.

Another apparent recruiting tool is the identification of threatening situations with providing corresponding interpretation and recommendation. This is similar to Adams & Roscigno's (2005) findings regarding White Supremacist frameworks.

Conclusions about Acclaims

Acclaims are present in 50% of videos in the collection. These acclaims clearly portray insurgency in a positive light. In conjunction with this positive frame, the perceived efficacy frames (n=47) suggest the apparent ability for the average individual assigned to a video. Another positive portrayal is an depicting group unity and/or celebration which takes place. Researcher and authority figure on persuasion, Perloff (2003), suggests that efficacy should have a higher likelihood of effecting behavior. The researcher suggests that the combination of acclaims, sense of community and belonging, along with perceived efficacy, may result in persuasive insurgency.

Conclusions about Nationalistic Appeals

Nationalistic appeals (n=24) were used to promote group membership as an appeal to their fellow community. This often depicted the Iraq flag, iconic structures present in Iraq, and images of Saddam Hussein. These appeals often create an obligation to support Iraq by fighting. Many of the images

and sentiments depicting Iraq President Saddam Hussein. Insurgent groups depicting Hussein appeared to have a sense of loyalty and affection toward him. The researcher suggests that this loyalty may be lessened by increased negative yet truthful depictions of Saddam's leadership and extreme monetary waste. Insurgent groups have the potential to use Iraq Nationalistic appeals as well. The researcher also suggests that through promoting Iraq and supporting Nationalistic pride, the insurgent groups may lose this effective recruiting tactic.

Conclusions about Religious Justification of Attacks Through Islam

Religious appeals were commonly present in videos examined, making reference to the Qu'ran and/or Islam to promote the insurgent effort of jihad. The insurgent groups present in the sample frequently portrayed taking religious obligation of all Muslims. The researcher notes that the use of Islam was used to create a justification for acts of terror by insurgents. Morally justifying an environment where individuals are no longer constrained by societal moral codes and legitimization of violence through religion is not a new concept however; it is one that has major societal repercussions. When individuals feel their violent acts are morally justified, there may be less hesitation to kill and little moral restraint.

Counteracting this abuse of principles, the researcher suggests U.S. counterterrorism experts reframe the insurgent efforts utilizing text from the Qu'ran to condemn such acts of violence. Further, the U.S. media must be wary of framing the situation in Iraq as a war against Islam even in a subtle way since this would be justified according to Islam for a Holy War.

Conclusions about Martyrdom Frame / Role of Imam

The issue of martyrdom and the role of jihad as part of a religious duty were analyzed. Martyrs were described as having reached the highest honor through martyrdom was presented as being a sure path to a better life. The researcher notes that the negative aspect presented for insurgent death rather it was glorified and encouraged.

The Imam was presented as having a strategic role in promoting jihad and serving as a meeting place for insurgents in their mosques. The researcher concludes that the recruiting and supportive role of the Imam for at least some mosques and that they appear to be a place where a great deal of communication among group members

The Imam is generally a well respected member of Iraqi society as a lead re likely to be viewed as a credible authority figure and a well individual highly for insurgent recruiting efforts (2003) discusses the role of opinion leaders as pla in the diffusion of information. The Imam as a respected individual may act as an opini who triggers individuals to adopt recommended action of group membership and/or ji

Conclusions about Recruiting Efforts Present

Recruiting is present in 87% (n=47) of videos in the collection analyzed groups are attempting to appeal to potential recruits through these appeals have included religious, Nationalistic, intimidation, and emotional frames among other Recruiting frames in the sample collection presented apparent global a and potential supporters worldwide. This was evidenced by the use of multiple variations of language and music choices, the message frames, and scenes de recruiting new members, the group messages could be used to encourage reinforce members and supporters. The researcher concludes the recruiting efforts several seemingly effective persuasive appeals.

Conclusions about Anti-U.S. Frames

Iraqi insurgent groups also depicted the U.S. as threatening the wellb communities for which most of the appeals were directed toward such as the nat religion of Islam, and other innocents. A dual purpose of also providing a justification for insurgent action and legitimization of the gr U.S. frame the insurgent recruiting device would be without reason for the of fighting U.S. and occupying forces.

Supporting Garfield's (2007) Middle East Quarterly findings from the present study suggest insurgents are adept at timely dissemination of negative that exploit U.S. failures, defend the actions of the insurgents own potency, and suggest positive change only occurred as a result of their violence. against evil dictators. The video content suggests insurgent groups are promoting those who are doing the will of Allah and framing the U.S., especially the occupying forces, as an inferior enemy to insurgents appear to have gone through great efforts to create video content with a negative U.S. frame as communication strategy.

Findings suggest these insurgent groups have made use of social psychology and the concept of marketing propaganda as discussed in Propaganda Technique in War (1938). For example, video content evidenced insurgents fastened the war to a claimed victory in the name of Allah, have stated war against the U.S. is a religious duty, and a belief that the U.S. is responsible for the war by providing graphic examples. Video content sampled also presented frames that undermined U.S. credibility, intimidated and scare their perceived enemy. As the overarching purpose of the videos appeared to be to spread sentiment and to intimidate.

Several anti-U.S. frames were present in the study. The U.S. is weak, a presence overall of 89% (n=48) for images included. Anti-U.S. frames include intimidation, which often portrayed U.S. soldiers being blown up, shot, burned, etc. U.S. soldiers are often depicted as being weak and intimidated, consistent with Bruntz's (1938) notion of propaganda of desecration. This suggests intimidation is used as an attempt to break down the morale of the enemy, that death, disaster, and defeat face him.

Defenses which portray the Iraqis as reacting to a perceived threat from the U.S. are common as attacks which are defined for the study as negative portrayals of the U.S. Such negative portrayals include images of Abu Ghraib, soldiers beating Iraqi children who had been detained, etc. These images are a strong visual attack against the U.S. The researcher concludes the U.S. must be increasingly vigilant in keeping with the threat. Each U.S. soldier needs to be aware that these may have major repercussions and could result in increasing leverage for the insurgents. The largest group of frames reflects the image of the U.S.

Conclusions about the U.S. as Immoral, Incompetent, and Displacement of Responsibility

Many insurgent videos framed the U.S. and U.S. soldiers as being void of morality. This framing device is consistent with Weimann's (2006a) findings that the Internet were framing the U.S. as a senseless enemy devoid of all moral restraints. The representation of soldiers and U.S. government officials as immoral suggests that insurgents are attacking the U.S. and attempting to blame their violent attacks. The

researcher concludes Iraqi insurgents use of YouTube utilizes similar tactics Weimann used to displace responsibility.

The U.S. government is commonly framed in such a way as to degrade the its leaders, and make viewers skeptical of the military's presence in Iraq. Research suggests higher credibility of a message source is related to higher persuasive capability (Fahoum & Wyder, 2006). The U.S. government and soldiers a negative way insurgents are able to counter the potential persuasive impact. Conclusion about Insurgents' Grievances

Examination of video content provided an understanding of Iraqi insurgents and how the messages are framed to state these grievances. The research finds evidence of a common U.S. as occupier perspective. There is a unified agreement, among the insurgents, that the U.S. is occupying Iraq, and they want the U.S. to exit. Many videos focused their frame around how the U.S. occupation is killing innocent Iraqis. The research concludes the U.S. produced frame of War on Terror is not the one being used by Iraqi insurgents. Instead the U.S. as occupier produced a frame where the U.S. is causing the terror.

Conclusion about Search Terms Used

This research was conducted using the search term Iraq Resistance during the time frame and successfully shed light on the types of frames that are used by Iraqi insurgents across related search terms. The research provides a representative data sample that enabled us to look at the accounts and framing devices used by Iraqi insurgents. The research results yielded an abundance of information that concluded the search term was effective.

Conclusion about Video Types

The results showed presence of several video types. The most common video type was documentary. Many videos frame their content around documenting their successful attacks and promote Jihad as a religious duty. A large number of videos are devoted to documenting attacks on U.S. troops and their vehicles. Video footage appears to be taken from the battlefield to the Internet (2006). The presence of information on terrorist web pages such as how to build explosives, weapons, providing maps, photographs, directions, codes, and technical details of how these explosives are constructed (p. 9) /

training videos used for coding purposes for the present study pertained on physical training exercise such as shooting practice. Weimann's statement suggests terrorist web pages use training with exercises as the only training present in the video collection for the present study has a high presence of exercises. The high presence of document, but not a high presence such as the above suggests a difference in some of the types of information presented on YouTube web pages. Video types appear to be selected for providing technical information. The researcher suggests this may be because of a diverse audience supportive of insurgency efforts. Technical information is reserved for more private Internet spaces.

Conclusions about Production

Some videos have very little editing and few advanced graphics, while intricate layout with animation, impressive logos, and transitions. Surprisingly, the quality of the top Iraqi insurgent groups was higher than those with a media arm. The researcher concludes there may be a potential difference between groups with and without a media group overall although this has not been confirmed. Further, creating quality video is not limited to groups with a large media presence.

Conclusions about Clarity of Messages

All English verbal statements and English subtitled elements were clear and free of ambiguity as to what was meant. Messages were not overly complex which aids comprehension and possibly retention of information encountered. The researcher concludes video creators were either very well versed in English themselves or selected translators were capable of expressing the group's message in a comprehensible manner. The comprehensive understanding demonstrated of the English language suggests a large number of U.S. and/or Western educated video producers. Further, the clarity and inclusion of English messages suggests a large impetus to promoting insurgent viewpoints toward an English speaking / Western world.

Future Research

The following are examples of future research areas to be explored. The questions stemmed from issues, findings, and the broader implications of the research study.

Larger Sample / Reduce Variables

Statistical analysis and results may be stronger if a larger sample size is used. A method of obtaining additional data in a future study is to consider a long-term collection. This study examined videos for the search term Iraq Resistance, one may also seek to determine other relevant search terms to be considered within a larger sample pool. Decreasing the number of variables to code is a smarter, more manageable coding process for large sample sizes.

Individual Count vs. Presence

The study results provided an exploratory analysis of variables present in the sample collection. The next step required for a better understanding of the video and achieve potentially significant results is to conduct an analysis of the presence of each variable in each video. For example, the present study determined the presence of several variables, tactics used, and victims. Future studies could use individual count of each. Based on frequency counts of the presence of weapons, viewers are exposed to a great deal of violence. Mere counts of the presence of tactics, however, does not give justice to the often grotesque images portrayed. U.S. soldiers burning alive, or their bodies being thrown from a tank that Arabic Inclusion

It is suggested that all videos meeting a specific criteria be included with the addition of Arabic speaking (with or without English subtitles) content. Comparing and contrasting media frames between primarily Arabic videos with videos that do not have Arabic could provide some insight into the intended audience. Videos that rely only on Arabic content may be geared toward a more Islamic and/or Middle Eastern audience. Arabic may or may not have a more extremist view than those with English present. A comparison between only Arabic and those with English present or music only may yield differences in media frames.

Media Effects

Because this research utilizes an exploratory content analysis, media effects were not examined. The impact of violent content on viewers is a focus although there are ethical concerns and restraints for this type of study. Questions exist about the effect on individuals exposed to lengthy periods of violent stimulus encounters.

videos? Feshbach's (1972) suggested when media violence is perceived as more realistic, it elicits more aggression than media perceived as being fictitious. Does viewing violence create a bridge between what is acceptable in the televised reality? Comstock (1977) suggested particular characteristics of violent portrayals that elicit aggression. These were portrayals presented as 1) rewarded, 2) exciting, 3) justified; when the perpetrator of the violence defines his behavior and is presented as 4) intending to injure his victim. Considering much of the violent sample videos fit one or more of the above, how likely are the videos to elicit aggression? might exposure to insurgent messages cause a viewer to cross over from being an Intentional to an active insurgent? These are only a few media effects out of many that have been studied out of the present study.

Persuasion / Behavior

Even if a message is received, it may not have been successfully persuasive and may or may not cause individuals to act. One aspect for future research is to determine which viewers find the insurgent videos credible. Fahoum & Width's (2006) research showed that higher perceived credibility of a message source was related to higher persuasive effectiveness. A study examining the perceived credibility of message sources, such as an Imam or a military figure, may provide a better understanding of the potential stages of persuasiveness.

Nye (2002) asserted the destruction of the opposition's credibility is one of the most important ways to win. Video frames present in the study such as those depicting Abu Ghraib, may have negatively impacted U.S. credibility. The effect of negative frames on perceptions of credibility for viewers who previously held positive views of the U.S. could yield new insight into impacts of negative frames.

Qualities of the speaker, the message itself, or even the production quality of the video may have an impact on perceptions of credibility regarding the message. The variable production quality was added in the present study, and appeared to be an additional variable determining level of sophistication the groups had regarding video production.

Research in the area of appeal effectiveness of insurgent messages is limited. The research focus raises questions of credibility, and especially message appeal, and behavioral change such as whether messages have a strong enough persuasive

move viewers from having a positive attitude toward the insurgent group and member face versus only a member of the community.

Cultivation Theory

Cultivation Theory (Gerbner, 1969) suggests individuals (particularly heavy viewers) will in part create their sense of reality based on what they see represented in media, etc. Their view of reality is even stronger when what they see resonates with real life. Iraqi insurgent videos are most commonly documentary attacks on people, most often U.S. soldiers. The violent, graphic nature of these attacks provide a scary, traumatic view of the world for some. Further, the consistent negative depictions of the U.S. government may have an emotional and/or personal impact on U.S. persons and for the global community who may incorporate this into their view of the world depicted by insurgent groups. Future research could hypothetically test the Cultivation Theory by examining the reality presented in U.S. mainstream media, the reality presented in videos such as that on YouTube, and against world statistics. From a logistical standpoint, this type of study could prove difficult.

Elections

The study took place prior to the 2008 Presidential elections, during the time period shortly afterward which allowed the researcher to gather a representative sample of each time period. There were not a large number of videos uploaded to YouTube for the second time period examined after the election. However, the data set does provide a comparison study of pre and post Election frames. A study was suggested for 2009 during the same time period for comparison.

Because many of the videos are compilations of other videos, it would be difficult to conduct an analysis on how long it takes for the Bush administration to turn to addressing the Obama administration. This shift in framing devices is suggested.

There was a large presence of unfavorable stories presented about the government and especially the Bush administration. Future studies may consider conducting similar analysis to determine if the Obama administration is also given a negative frame or if it is given a more positive frame. While there appeared to be a negative frame on the Obama administration, a larger sample would be needed to determine if this

Victim Frames

Another element from the present study suggested for future study is the use of victim frames. Iraqi insurgents frame the Iraqi people as victims of Iraq much differently than they frame the U.S. victim. Further qualitative analysis is needed to explore the differences and nuances of these framing devices. While the present study examines these frames in the current sample, a larger sample may enable the researcher to explore victim frames used commonly by each insurgent group and to determine if a particular frame is consistent over time.

Chain of Command

Future studies may consider the flow of message framing production decisions in the Iraqi insurgent group's chain of command. In particular, researchers should examine decisions as to the frame that should be presented, when to film, what is the overall goal the videos are attempting to achieve. Analysis is whether groups are being proactive (addressing issues ahead of time) or reactive (responding to events).
Media Arm / No Media Arm

Some insurgent groups have media arms devoted to dealing with the media and the media such as videos, etc. The media arms are most often attached directly to the insurgent groups. A suggestion for future research is to conduct analysis on groups with and without a media production arm. The differences in framing, persuasiveness, and their content present in the study along with having a media arm versus without a media production arm. The differences in framing, persuasiveness, etc. are potential elements for future study.

While insurgent groups, especially those with a media arm, may attempt to maintain a high amount of control of frames representing that group, the ability of users to share and view it via their own chosen frames may take some of this control away from the leadership. The manipulation of frames may also be of interest.

Issues Related to the Topic

Video sharing sites such as YouTube have reached critical mass in that the presence of this technological tool. The spread of the Internet and its related technologies has made communication possible between individuals and groups that may not have previously been able to spread their ideas and messages. Individuals that were previously alone in their ideological viewpoints can now connect with others with similar

connectedness is positive overall and may promote a sense of belonging for negative drawbacks since individuals may also connect in their similar interests and/or oppression of others. Once the flood gates opened for the Internet, there is little that can be done to police the information made available in the

While YouTube makes attempts to moderate and take down inappropriate content, the sheer mass of videos available and constant uploading and deleting videos makes it nearly impossible to prevent insurgent and other content that violates their policies from being posted.

The extensive global use of the Internet and increasing availability of content creates several issues that require careful consideration. Many people understand that the Internet is not a free-for-all and that governments, especially the US, may want the Internet more tightly controlled and monitored for violent content. However, there are equally valid arguments that the Internet would infringe on the human right to freedom of speech. There is ongoing debate over the limitations for free speech.

Implications

The researcher sought to contribute to a large body of knowledge in the field. No academic research had previously been conducted on Iraqi insurgents' use of YouTube. The present study provides new information on one use of YouTube, a computer-mediated communication (CMC) that is widespread in use (though few studies have been conducted that relate to it). While several previous studies on Iraqi insurgents, this study provides evidence of a strategic communication that may be quite persuasive and reach a wide audience. Further, there is no evidence YouTube is archiving videos. Had this study not been conducted, many videos from 2008-2009 would no longer be available and a comparison study could not be performed.

The present research focus was on Iraqi insurgent groups. There is an ongoing debate over whether insurgent groups present globally and group leadership and structure tends to be localized. This research opens doors to a comparison with other groups and provides a framework for future research on insurgent group strategic communication.

While primarily conducted as a study to provide valuable information about the field of communication, this study has wider implications for counterterrorism, counter-messaging implications, strategic communication, marketing product or in

this case an idea or group, inevitably has the potential of being influential and successful in this type of market (Frenn and Burke, 2005). Successful marketing campaigns draw on emotions, and strong brands tell stories. Finding the right story and the right people to deliver it to is crucial. Insurgents appear to know their market and use likely persuasive appeals that influence viewers. They also commonly make use of emotionally connective stories depicting wounded and dead Iraqi children and a civilian framed as caused by the occupation. The U.S., in order to be successful in countering will need equally if not more persuasive appeals and must find a way to get perceived as trustworthy and credible, message campaign.

Related to counter-messaging, is the potential need for a shift in policy. The US Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 also known as the Smith-Mundt Act of 1949 prohibits domestic distribution for propaganda (Dillon, 2003). Therefore, the U.S. cannot legally create strategic counter-messaging for domestic use to counter insurgent messages. This provides a prime opportunity for continued messaging without much of a fallback.

Evidenced by the violent acts depicted in the majority of videos in the insurgent arsenal as a strategic communication tool. Viewer exposure to this content may have wider societal implications such as the negative word of mouth, violent acts, intimidation, mimicry and/or justification. Increased violent acts depicted on various media channels such as the Internet are a reason for societal concern.

Understanding the frames, themes, and messages used in Iraqi insurgent videos provide an opportunity for communication experts to find methods of countering these messages and doors to understanding strategic communication impacts the hearts and minds of message receivers. The present study provided insight regarding the strategic communication strategies used by Iraq's insurgents. Insurgent strategies are in many ways similar to strategic communication techniques historically across the globe, the innovation of the Internet and YouTube creates a method for rapid dissemination of messages to a potential

In some ways this technological advancement parallels Guttenburg s creation
pres. Doors leading to mass exposure of ideas are limitless and with unfort

APPENDIX A

IRB APPROVAL LETTER

Office of the Vice President For Research
Human Subject Committee
Tallahassee, Florida 32306
(850) 644-7313 • FAX (850) 439-1414

APPROVAL MEMORANDUM

Date: 10/10/2008

To: Rheanna Rutledge [rrr05@fsu.edu]

Address: 3700 Capital Cr S.E. #116, Tallahassee, FL 32311
Dept.: COMMUNICATION

From: Thomas Jacobson, Chair

Re: Use of Human Subjects in Research
Exploratory Study of Iraqi Insurgents Use of YouTube to Recruit and Produce
Sentiment

The application that you submitted to this office in regard to the use of human research proposal referenced above has been reviewed by the Human Subjects Committee meeting on 10/08/2008. Your project was approved by the Committee.

The Human Subjects Committee has not evaluated your proposal for scientific merit, weigh the risks to the human participants and the aspects of the proposal related to safety and benefit. This approval does not replace any departmental or other approvals required.

If you submitted a proposed consent form with the approved stamped consent form is attached to this approval notice. Only the stamped version of the consent form is used in recruiting research subjects.

If the project has not been completed by 10/7/2009 you must request a renewal of the project. As a courtesy, a renewal notice will be sent to you at the expiration date; however, it is your responsibility as the Principal Investigator to request renewal of your approval from the Committee.

You are advised that any change in protocol for this project must be reviewed and approved by the Committee prior to implementation of the proposed change in the protocol. A change/amendment form is required to be submitted for approval by the Committee.

federal regulations require that the Principal Investigator promptly report unanticipated problems or adverse events involving risks to research subjects.

By copy of this memorandum, the Chair of your department is reminded that he/she is responsible for being informed concerning research involving human subjects in the department, and should review protocols as often as necessary while the project is being conducted in compliance with DHHS regulations.

This institution has an Assurance on file with the Office for Human Research Protections. Assurance Number is IRB00000446.

Cc: Steven McClung, Advisor [Steven.McClung@comm.fsu.edu]
HSC No. 2008.1098

APPENDIX B

IRB LETTER OF CONSENT

Researcher: Rheanna R. Rutledge
Office: UCC 3rd floor, C3137
Phone: 85063393
E-mail: rrr05@fsu.edu

Dissertation Committee Chairperson: Dr. Steven McClung
Office: UCC 3rd floor, C3131
Phone: 8506449125
E-mail: Steven.McClung@comm.fsu.edu

Thank you for agreeing to participate as a rater in this dissertation study on the Use of YouTube. A training session where we will review how to rate video content and discuss content ~~issues~~ will take place on (date) from (time).

This form outlines the purposes of the study and provides a description of the study and rights as a rater.

The purpose of this project is to explore how Iraqi Insurgents are using YouTube for both recruiting and ~~use~~ **use of sentiment**

Your part in this project is incredibly important! Research has inherent bias and cannot be avoided. When only one individual is reviewing data, analysis becomes more susceptible to bias. In order to avoid this, individuals in the Department of Communication and Journalism and one outside member in the sciences will be used to examine videos for 1) meeting themes used. Two raters will review each video. If the reviews are dissimilar, a third member will review the video.

The method being used is content analysis. I will first download all of the videos for the research that meet the following criteria:

- 1.) Clips have to have an insurgency icon or explicitly state the group they represent.
- 2.) There has to be reference to the insurgency-insurgency group and be produced by the group.
- 3.) Only content using music only or English speaking or having English subtitles used.
- 4.) The last criterion is somewhat subjective; the clip must be serious in nature and not a spoof which could be delineated by a serious tone of the speaker(s) and/or graphics.

Please Note: Some of the content you view may show violent activity. Any rater who is uncomfortable with the content of videos is free to eliminate him/herself from watching that video or from participating as a rater in the study. If at any time you feel mentally harmed by what you are viewing I strongly urge you to seek counseling or discuss the issue with a friend, myself or the dissertation chair, Dr. McClung.

FSU Human Subjects Committee Approved on 10/9/2008 Void After 10/7/2009
HSC#2008.1098

One counseling resource is offered ~~Monday-Friday~~ here at the university. Their contact information is:

The University Counseling Center
Student Life Building
113 S. Wildwood Dr. Rm. 201 / Tallahassee, FL 32306
Phone 850/62403
fax 850/64450

I encourage you to ask any questions at any time about the nature of the study methods that I am using. Your suggestions and concerns are important to me; please contact me at any time ~~at the~~ phone number listed above.

I will use the information from this study to write my dissertation. The final report will happily be provided via electronic file if you wish to read it.

By signing this form you acknowledge that you understand the nature of this participation as a rater is voluntary; you have the right to withdraw as a participant from the study, any reason, and without any prejudice, and that you have available resources if needed.

I agree to the terms

Respondent _____ Date _____

I agree to the terms:

Researcher _____ Date _____

APPENDIX C

CODE BOOK

STUDY DESCRIPTION

This dissertation study is a baseline investigation into Iraqi insurgents strategic communication tool. The study utilized a content analysis of video overall framing and themes found in the population of videos from November 1, 2007 to December 1, 2008 for the search term Iraqi resistance. Along with a more of frames, the study examined which may be used to recruit US soldiers and anti. It builds upon previous research in related areas and applies theory with a Identity, Diffusion of Innovation, and Framing in attempt to explore the ph content analysis was conducted using the sample of YouTube videos search term Iraqi Resistance that met stated criteria. The methodological design est future comparison and study since the topic of Iraqi insurgent use of YouTube examined extensively in the academic ar

CRITERIA USED FOR VIDEO SELECTION

Four sets of criteria were used to assess a YouTube clip as being an insurg (1) Clips must have an insurgency icon or explicitly state the group they r (2) There has to be reference to the content and source by group. (3) Only content that used primarily English speaking, had English subtitle only were used with the exception of simple references to Allah (God), and (4) The clip must appear realistic in nature, and not a spoof which could be d comedic, serious, or satirical nature of the speaker(s) and/or graphics (th somewhat subjective).

Overall terminology

CONTENT ANALYSIS

Berelson (1952) defined content analysis as a research technique for the objectiv and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication. (p. Krippendorff (2004) building upon Berelson's previous definitions, defined c a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts matte) to the contexts of (p. 8). This study employed content analysis proce systematically code, characterize, observe, and quantify with the it re of video clips meeting set criteria.

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION

Strategic communication is the more politically correct term for what has l propagand. The term propaganda has taken on a negative over time as the publi became increasingly aware of its powerful usage, and especially as it becam Nazis during WWII. Strategic communication, as a term, is commonly used at propagand (Alloran, 2007). end goal of strategic communication / propaganda s to influence attitudes and behavior of a given populous. Propaganda is the the public opinions of an audience though the transmission of ideas and val

Throughout this dissertation the terms strategic communication and propaganda are interchangeable.

FRAMES

Frames are, constructs used to assign meaning to events, occurrences, social and cultural artifacts, thus organizing information and facilitate participation (Scherer, 1986). Rochford, Worden, & Benford (1996) states, to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and treatment recommendation (Entman, 1993, p.52). Frames guide an individual in their particular representation of a particular reality and determine which parts of reality become noticed (K nig, 2008).

INSURGENT

For the purposes of operationalizing the term insurgency, the definition of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) will be used. The CIA defines insurgency

Insurgency is a protracted political activity directed toward completely or partially controlling the resources of a country through the use of irregular military forces and political organizations. Insurgency includes terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and political mobilization, for example, propaganda, recruitment, front and covert party organization, international activities designed to weaken government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control and influence (CIA, 2001). The Analysis of Insurgency, quoted in Daniel Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, and David Brantley, Support for Insurgent Movements: RAND, 2001, p.4

The CIA's definition includes terrorism, and insurgents are known for committing terrorist acts (Byman, Rosenau, 2001). Author Ahmed Hashim (2006) points out in his book, Countering Insurgency In Iraq whether an organization is a terrorist organization, depends on your standpoint. The US State Department defines terrorism as premeditated, politically motivated, perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine individuals intended to influence an audience (Rex Hudson, 1999).

INSURGENT GROUPS

While you will not be responsible to log the names of each insurgent group, it is useful to have some idea of the groups represented.

Salem, Reid, and Chen (July 2008) found the following names:

Al-Jabha Islamiya al-Iraqiya (Islamic Front of the Iraqi Resistance)
Al-Jaysh Islami-fir'iq (Islamic Army in Iraq)
Al-Qiyada al-Muwahada al-Mujahidin (Mujahidin Central Command)
Harakat al-Qawama al-Islamiya fir'iq (Islamic Resistance s Movement in Iraq)
Jaysh al-Iraq al-Islami (Iraq Islamic Army)
Jaysh al-Jihad al-Islami (Islamic Jihad Army)
Jaysh al-Mujahidin (Mujahidin s Army)

Jaysh al-Fatah (Victorious Group's Army)
Jaysh Ansar al-Sunna (Partis of the Sunna Army)
Tandhim al-Bayda fi Bilad al-Rafidain (Qaeda's Organization in Mesopotamia)

Coding specific terminology and guidelines

In order to have a full understanding of what belongs in each category for the following, you should be used to make such decisions in the most objective way possible. Please refer back to these guidelines as often as needed in order to maintain consistent coding responses. Please contact me if anything is unclear or if issues arise.

On your coding form you will find the following:

Type of video (check all that apply)

- Documentary attack (including suicide bombings, hostage taking, etc.)
- Social Documentary (eg. lives affected, people.)
- Tribute
- Message
- Instruction / Training

A documentary attack, it states, is any video that shows or implies an actual kind such as bombings, shooting, etc. Implied here means actual image material, an animated explosion but suggests the presence of individuals with weapons.

A social documentary depicts the social situation of individuals and the surrounding environment. For example, images of the destruction of buildings in the aftermath of a bombing, such as grieving people, interviews with people count in this category. Training videos included as social documentaries unless they are designed to show the insurgents discuss what the insurgency is like or some other type of social commentary.

A tribute is a video type that demonstrates a particular paying of homage / respect to an individual. Often these individuals are leaders and/or deceased members of the group. Sometimes this is denoted by particular graphics such as a shadow or light effect around a picture of the individual or elaborate border elements.

A message video type provides a specific message to the people. They will often say something like, "The American people need to know..." or "The American people..." The message can be targeted at any potential viewer including foreigners. It may either be read or spoken directly to the audience.

An instruction / training type shows insurgent group training exercises in a specific scenario. There is no actual fighting depicted with the perceived enemy. They include physical and/or endurance exercises, shooting practice, etc.

Non-verbal (check all that apply)

| | | | |
|------------------|---------|-------------|-----------|
| Kissing | Hugging | Celebrating | Rejoicing |
| Weeping / crying | Anger | Serious | |

Nonverbal communication, according to Guer (2008) and others, includes messages that people exchange in interactive contexts with the exception of physical expressions and behaviors of individuals emotions. For the purpose of this study, refers only to physical and vocal expressions people display, physical signs anger, such as yelling and tearing up, and down with anger on their faces, it is considered. Individuals have their face masked and you are unable to determine whether their arms flailing about are in anger or celebration, do not mark these categories you mark these categories if they are clearly present. Serious or serious tone of voice or serious facial expressions.

Appeals (check all that apply)

| | | |
|-----------|---------------|--------------------|
| Religious | Nationalistic | Emotional / affect |
| Anti-US | Anti-Israeli | Anti-Western World |

Appeal to religion refers to an appeal to religion specifically. This type of appeal may, for example, reference to the Islamic text, the Qu ran or the Prophet Muhammad. Any reference to Allah (God), the Qu ran (Holy Book), or the Prophet Muhammad etc. count. You may hear Allahu Akbar and other prayerful calls as attacks are being conducted. All of these count as religious.

Islam Muslims believe that God revealed the Muhammad through the angel Gabriel. They regard the Sunna (words and deeds of Prophet Muhammad) as their guide to Islam. For Muslims, Muhammad was the final prophet who received revelations from Allah over the course of two decades which make up the Qur'an in its entirety.

Nationalistic appeals make reference to Iraq and the need to defend the Iraqi people and/or land. Reference to defending Islam and Muslims in general does not qualify as Nationalistic. There must be direct reference to Iraq and/or Iraqi people and Nationalistic ideology appeals attempt to appeal to individuals based on a shared identity and culture.

Emotional / affect appeals heartwarming and/or heartbreaking stories or depict scenes that have an emotional impact. This type of appeal (1) people grieving, (2) suffering, (3) depict families or family life, (4) show images of destruction or infrastructure not to include Westerners and American grief can also count for Emotional/affect. It isn't limited to Israel and may be verbal or visual.

Anti-US appeals specifically state the wrong /dislike for American people and American government. This appeal may be verbal or may include images of Americans and/or destruction of American property. You know who is being fought you can't assume -US, etc. For example, attacks are often difficult to tell who the target is.

is. However, especially for day after tomorrow, able to make out that the tanks are American tanks thus it is fair to say Anti

Anti-Israeli appeals specifically state being wrong /dislike for Israeli people the Israeli government and/or Israeli military. This appeal may also be images showing the killing of Israeli s and/or destruction of Israeli property. Gen Palestine do not count in this category.

Anti-Western World appeals specifically state being wrong /dislike to West . This type of appeal can only be selected if there is meets criteria for Anti-Western World. Even though the U.S. is part of the West, this appeal West .

Your coding sheet will show:

Theme Functions (check all that apply)

- Acclaims (portray the insurgency group in a positive or favorable light.)
- Attack (portray the US in a negative or unfavorable light)
- Intimidation (compel behavior by or as if by threats inducing a sense of inferiority)
- Defense (respond to a prior perceived or real attack on the insurgent group world.)
- Recruiting function
 - portray the insurgency group favorably
 - provide a tactic including that of a supportive role
- Efficacy (suggested individuals are able and can be effective at the task suggested)
- Ambivalent (neutral or ambiguous) function

Theme Functions

Acclaims function portray the insurgency group in a positive or favorable light. This includes successful attacks and/or discussion of how great the insurgent effort. For night attacks it is often unclear if an attack such as a bombing hit it not considered an acclaim unless the video depicts the attack. For day attacks, generally, the viewer is more clearly able to make out if an attack was successful resulting tanks blowing up, etc. Acclaims may be based on images and/or verbal.

Attack function portray the US in a negative or unfavorable light. This may be written, verbal or images negatively portraying or attacking U.S. credibility, U.S. policy, etc.

Intimidation functions attempt to compel behavior by or as if by threats inducing fear or a sense of inferiority. Intimidation may include showing wounded and/or dead American or Western bodies, etc.

Defense responses verbally, written, and/or images perceived or real attack on insurgent group by the U.S. Defense function must clearly demonstrate how they are as a result of a prior perceived or real attack on them by the U.S.

Recruiting function portrays insurgent group favorably a call to action including that of a supportive appeal includes any discussion of how great the insurgency and their efforts are. For example, successful attacks count portraying the group as favorable. Recruiting videos will have a verbal or a call to action.

Efficacy functions imply and/or suggest individuals are able and can be effective at the task suggested by or for the insurgent effort.

Ambivalent functions are general or ambiguous themes / functions. A message can only be ambivalent if it does not fit any of the other theme functions. However, if video does not fit the other functions provided here but fits some other function not ambivalent. If this is the case please take it out of your coding sheet.

You will also see a place for you to note overall themes.

Overall theme(s) found: notes as a coder)

This is where you the coder can make note of possible other themes you found there was something that struck you as different or interesting please share it

Contact information: Feel free to contact me any time with questions or concerns.
Rheanna Rutledge
Cell phone - 850 3393
E-mail rrr05@fsu.edu

APPENDIX D

URLS FOR TRAINING VIDEOS

Examples of what not to include on Ede

Hamas Execution Training <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y588SvTPEPY>

Examples to code for training

Jihad and Liberation Command Training for Combat

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1DvH7D5>

6:23 seconds

What is the least we can do for the (Mujahideen)?

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9duORYJJ0vM>

5:19

Warriors of Allah

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1N3Mg>

2:50

Mujahideen in Afghanistan singing nasheed

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1W5CycqRHNg>

2:37

An English muslims message to the enemies of Islam

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F_xDGqA0d7M

1:06

Iraqis Celebrate Attack on http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s0Igj_d8rnw

2:41 no group specified

Mujahideens Open Declaration on Kufr Forces

3:32

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=70J0uHMxwDU>

Mujahideen of Islam

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GgxJqM0usZM>

5:31

Example of Nasheed (Islamic song)

Qom 1

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bfpk0L_GPhY

2:58

APPENDIX E

SUBJECTIVE CODE SHEET

VIDEO TITLE: _____ DUPLICATE Y E S N O N o t

Type of video (check all that apply)

- Documentary attack (including suicide attack, Beheading, Hostage taking etc.)
- Social Documentary (eg. lives of people)
- Tribute
- Message
- Instruction / Training

Non-verbal (check all that apply)

- Kissing Hugging Celebrating / Rejoicing
- Weeping / crying Anger Serious

Appeals (check all that apply)

- Religious Nationalistic Emotional / affect
- Anti-US Anti-Israeli Anti-Western World

Theme Function (check all that apply)

Acclaims (portray the insurgency group in a positive or favorable light.)

Attacks (portray the US in a negative or unfavorable light)

Intimidation (attempt to compel or deter by or as if by threats, inducing fear or a sense of inferiority into another)

Defense (respond to a prior perceived or real attack on the group by the Western world.)

Recruiting function

- portray the insurgency group favorably
- provide a tradition including that of a supportive role

Efficacy (suggested individuals are able and can be effective at the task)

Ambivalent (neutral or ambiguous) function

Overall theme(s) found: notes a coder

APPENDIX F

OBJECTIVE CODE SHEET

Title of video: _____

Length of clip (minutes and seconds): _____

Duplicate Y E S N O N o t e s :

User interaction# of times viewed _____

Star rating system: _____

Date Reported date: _____

Acquisition date: _____

Production Specify language (check one)

- English only Arabic w/ subtitles (can have music too)
- Subtitles & music music only
- English w/ music other

Special effects (check all that apply)

- Logo(s) English subtitles
- Animations None

Accompanying music (check all that apply)

- Secular music Hymn music
- Hymn + secular music None

Expressions Reference to media (check all that apply)

- Arab Media Western Media
- None Other/unknown

Extremist group Extremist group name posted:

Tactics (check all that apply)

- Suicide Bomb Bombing (non-suicide bomber)
- Artillery/Mortar Attack/ Shooting
- Rocket/Missile/Grenade Attack
- Bladed Attack (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear)
- Hijacking Hostage taking / Kidnapping
- Ground Vehicle Attack Vandalism
- Threat (verbal or written) Aircraft attack
- paramilitary training Unclear/unknown

Weapon (check all that apply)

| | |
|---|-----------------|
| Bomb /Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) | |
| Mortar rocket missile/ grenade launcher | |
| Poison/biological agent | Assault rifles |
| Bladed weapon | Unclear/unknown |
| Automobile/ other vehicle | None |

Victim type (check all that apply)

- Humanitarian/Non-Government Organization (NGO)
- Military Personnel
- Religious Figure
- Government Official/Personnel/Diplomatic
- Health Care
- US / Western Civilian
- Iraqi / Middle Eastern
- Journalist / on business
- Other
- Unknown
- None

Victim gender M a l e F e m a l e U n s p e c i f i e d / ~~N~~ / ~~A~~ u n k n o w n

Victims are specified as being from (check all that apply)

- United States
- NATO / UN
- Iraqi / Middle Eastern
- I s r a e l i
- Unknown
- N/A

Facility type Specify attack (check all that apply)

| | | |
|------------------------|---------------------|------------------------|
| Military Base | Military Vehicle | Airports & Airlines |
| Business | Government Building | Political Party |
| Paramilitary | Hotel | Religious Institutions |
| Energy Infrastructure | Police Facility | Transportation |
| | | Infrastructure |
| NGO / Aid Organization | Convoy | Civilian Vehicle |
| Ship | Unknown | N/A |

Facility use characteristics (check all that apply)

American NATO / UN Iraqi Unknown N / A

Overall theme(s) found as a coder

APPENDIX G

SALEM ET AL.(2008)CODING SCHEME

APPENDIX H

LIST OF VIDEOS IN SAMPLE

| Table 13: List of Videos in Sample | | | |
|------------------------------------|--|------------|---------------|
| Video | Name of Video | Time (m:s) | Date Uploaded |
| 1 | Sniper Attack US Soldiers Oct/24/2008 | 3:59 | 29Oct08 |
| 2 | A 15 Year old Insurgent (Iraq War) | 4:21 | 29Oct08 |
| 3 | Suicide Bomber Blows up US Checkpoint | 1:04 | 29Oct08 |
| 4 | Iraqi resistance | 3:30 | 2Nov-08 |
| 5 | Barack Obama (The Victory OF Islam) | 3:39 | 5Nov-08 |
| 6 | Training the Iraqi Resistance | 2:26 | 8Nov-08 |
| 7 | IED Attack US Humvee + Full Aftermath | 2:10 | 9Nov-08 |
| 8 | Al Qaeda Hates Obama 9/20/08 | 10:50 | 20Nov-08 |
| 9 | Iraqi resistance video | 4:22 | 25Nov-08 |
| 10 | Iraqi Resistance Victory Great background | 7:33 | 26Nov-08 |
| 11 | A warm welcome from Iraqi resistance | 0:53 | 28Nov-08 |
| 12 | Resistance Night Attack | 0:44 | 14Nov-08 |
| 13 | / H 1 ' , β a ~ a | 5:32 | 14Nov-08 |
| 14 | Another Message from Iraqi Resistance | 4:30 | 28Oct08 |
| 15 | Iraqi Resistance | 4:36 | 28Oct08 |
| 16 | Iraqi Resistance | 4:16 | 28Oct08 |
| 17 | Iraqi resistance | 2:34 | 28Oct08 |
| 18 | Message of the Iraqi Resistance to the A | 9:10 | 28Oct08 |
| 19 | true iraqi resistance 1 | 4:59 | 28Oct08 |
| 20 | Iraqi Resistance Part 3 | 0:58 | 28Oct08 |
| 21 | Iraqi Resistance Part 4 | 0:58 | 28Oct08 |
| 22 | Iraqi Resistance | 3:36 | 28Oct08 |
| 23 | [Speech]Sayed Nasrallah on Iraqi Resista | 1:39 | 28Oct08 |
| 24 | Samra' Resistance in Iraq | 0:54 | 28Oct08 |
| 25 | The History of Liberty is a History of Res | 2:37 | 28Oct08 |
| 26 | the real Iraqi Resistance / jeish al ma | 10:03 | 28Oct08 |
| 27 | Traitor for americans_ | 3:44 | 28Oct08 |
| 28 | Iraqi resistance ' fi ' a H | 3:32 | 28Oct08 |
| 29 | Iraqi resistance ' fi ' a H | 1:32 | 28Oct08 |
| 30 | the iraqi resistance β ' fi ' | 7:27 | 28Oct08 |
| 31 | Iraqi resistance i c | 6:57 | 28Oct08 |
| 32 | General John Batiste recognizes the Iraq | 0:13 | 28Oct08 |
| 33 | IRAQI RESISTANCE / ¥ f ¥ S | 3:02 | 28Oct08 |
| 34 | Meeting Resistance [6/9] | 10:00 | 28Oct08 |
| 35 | american forces in iraq | 3:42 | 28Oct08 |
| 36 | Iraqi Resistance / α α¢ αfαα ¢α | 3:40 | 28Oct08 |
| 37 | War on Iraq In 5 Secs | 1:23 | 28Oct08 |
| 38 | IED Attack US Humvee Sept-2008 | 1:28 | 28Oct08 |
| 39 | US Chinook Helicopter Shot Down 18/2008 | 2:32 | 28Oct08 |
| 40 | Jihad in Iraq 1 | 4:04 | 28Oct08 |
| 41 | Iraq Sniper Attack USS Sept 13/2008 | 0:21 | 28Oct08 |

| | | | |
|----|--|-------|---------|
| 42 | Support Our Troops | 1:47 | 28Oct08 |
| 43 | IRAQ | 1:40 | 28Oct08 |
| 44 | General Jack Keane recognizes US failure | 0:14 | 28Oct08 |
| 45 | Iraqi song nashedi ' , β« | 5:18 | 28Oct08 |
| 46 | Sba3 al Fallujah!!!!! « | 6:52 | 28Oct08 |
| 47 | Iraqi resistance shelling US base | 0:53 | 28Oct08 |
| 48 | Iraqi resistance attack flight with SAM | 1:49 | 28Oct08 |
| 49 | Iraqi Resistance f ☼ | 7:15 | 28Oct08 |
| 50 | Iraqiresistance | 5:30 | 28Oct08 |
| 51 | IRAQI RESISTANCE β«β ' fi ' β« a | 4:09 | 28Oct09 |
| 52 | Iraq lions < ' f ☼ | 3:03 | 28Oct08 |
| 53 | Iraq: The Hidden Facts Part 1/2 | 8:01 | 28Oct08 |
| 54 | irak resistance | 10:26 | 28Oct08 |

APPENDIX I

INSURGENT GROUPS

| Table 14: List of Iraqi Insurgent Groups | | |
|--|---|--------------------|
| Group Name | Group Information | Percentage Present |
| | | Number of Videos |
| Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant | Al-Qaeda affiliated umbrella group operating in Iraq, also includes Furkan Media (media arm of the State of Iraq) | 26% |
| | | 14 |
| Iraq Resistance | | 24% |
| | | 13 |
| Ansar al-Islam | Formally known as Ansar al Sunna (2007), (2003) operates in Iraq, also includes Sudanese And splinter group Sharia Commission Ansaruna | 19% |
| | | 10 |
| Jaish al-Mujahideen | Operates in Iraq | 13% |
| | | 7 |
| Islamic Army in Iraq | Operates in Iraq, separate group | 7% |
| | | 4 |
| Jaish al-Jihad | Member of Jihad and change front, member identity | 7% |
| | | 4 |
| As-Sahab | Al-Qaeda s media arm | 6% |
| | | 3 |
| Asai b Ahl al-Haqq Army | Leagues of the Righteous People (Shi it in Iraq) | 6% |
| | | 3 |
| 1920 Revolution Brigades | Part of Jihad and Change Front, operate | 4% |
| | | 2 |
| Al Karama | | 4% |
| | | 2 |
| Islamic Front for Iraqi Resistance | Armed wing of the Salim al-Muhyabi Brigades, member of the political council for Iraq umbrella group that maintains own identity Islamic Action Front | 4% |
| | | 2 |
| Jaish al-Islami al Iraq | | 4% |
| | | 2 |
| Jihad Media Battalion | Jihad media distribution organization (no splinter insurgent group affiliation) | 4% |
| | | 2 |
| Hezbollah Brigades in Iraq | Operates in Iraq, independent Shi a group | 4% |
| | | 2 |
| HAMAS Iraq | Operates in Iraq, member of political council Resistance, maintains own identity | 4% |
| | | 2 |
| Al-Mujahideen al Iraq | Includes al-Mujahideen al Ramadii | 2% |
| | | 1 |

| | | |
|---|---|----|
| Jaish-Iraqi | | 2% |
| | | 1 |
| Jaish-Mahdi | Suspended, part formed into Mumahidun, Shi a | 2% |
| | | 1 |
| Iraqi Islamic Resistance | | 2% |
| | | 1 |
| Iraq Taliban | | 2% |
| | | 1 |
| Islamicahadi Resistance | | 2% |
| | | 1 |
| Army of the men Naqshabandi Ord | Own group, member of the Supreme, CSuffin Order | 2% |
| | | 1 |
| Fedayeen | | 2% |
| | | 1 |
| Iraq s Jihadist Leagues | Maintains own group identity | 2% |
| | | 1 |
| Jaish-Falstheen | Splinter group from JRhadrmFront, sub umbrella group for the political council Resistance | 2% |
| | | 1 |
| Jaish-Falshideen | Member of Jihad Change Front, maintains | 2% |
| | | 1 |
| Qaeda-Jihad Organization in Land of Two Riv | Member of Mujahideen Shuralwhich is AK Islamic State of Iraq | 2% |
| | | 1 |
| Mujahideen Resistance in I | | 2% |
| | | 1 |

APPENDIX J

APPEALS

| Table 15 Appeals Used by Iraqi Insu | |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------|
| Appeal | Percentage Pres |
| | Number of Video |
| Anti-US | 89% |
| | 48 |
| Religious | 52% |
| | 28 |
| Nationalistic | 44% |
| | 24 |
| Emotional / Affec | 39% |
| | 21 |
| Anti-Western | 11% |
| | 6 |
| Anti-Israeli | 2% |
| | 1 |

REFERENCES

- 9/11 Commission Report. (2004). Retrieved December 12, 2008 from <http://www.11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf>.
- Adams, J., & Roscigno, V. J. (2005). White supremacists, oppositional culture, and the wide web. *Social Forces International Journal of Social Research*, 84(1), 175-198.
- Agazio, J., & Buckley, K.M. (2009). An untapped resource in nursing education. *Nurse Educator*, 34(1), 28-33.
- Alexander, C., Kyle, C., & McCallister, W. (2003). *The Iraqi Insurgency*. Naval Postgraduate School. Retrieved October 11, 2008 from <http://library.nps.navy.mil.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/home/Iraqi%20Insurgency%20.pdf>.
- Aljazeera.Net (2004). Full transcript of Bin Laden's speech, 2008 from <http://www.lib.umich.edu/govdocs/text/bin1004.txt>
- Al-Lahim, S. (1995). *Principles of Islam and commentary* by Mahmoud Ridha Murad. Manila: Islamic Studies, Philippines.
- Amr, H., & Singer, P.W. (2006). *Restoring America's good name: Improving strategic communications with the Islamic world*. National Defense University, Washington, D.C.
- Andre, J. (2007). *Mural film, an anthology fall 2006*. In M. Martinez, J. LoRutledge, & R. Cocciolone (Eds.), *Conceptual and Normative Considerations* (pp. 47-51). Boston, MA: Pearson.
- Artificial Intelligence Lab. (2008). Retrieved August 18, 2008 from <http://ai.arizona.edu/research/terror/index.html> APA Help.
- Baird, J. W. (1974). *Mythical world of Nazir propaganda, 1939*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Bandura, A., Ross, D., & Ross, S. A. (1961). Transmission of aggression: imitation of aggressive models. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 58, 63-71.
- Bandura, A., Ross, D., & Ross, S. A. (1963). *Mediated aggression models*. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 66, 1-10.
- Banase, E. (1934). *Raum und volk im weltkrieg*. Habyis, A. Germany, prepare for war. London: L. Dickson.
- Baram, A. (2005). *Are the insurgents?* United States Institute of Peace, Special Report. Retrieved January 17, 2009 from <http://www.usip.org/specialreports/sr134.html>.

- BBC News. (2006). Guide: Armed groups in Iraq. Retrieved November 12, 2008
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4268904.stm).
- Beilock, R., & Dimitrova, D.V. (2003). Laboratory model of community Internet diffusion. *Telecommunications Policy*, 27, 232.
- Bellamy, R. (2008). The election year that was do as you would be Cable, *138*(43), 6.
- Bender, S. (2005). Walter Lippmann and the phantom retrieved. on October 12, 2008 from www.LewRockwell.com.
- Benford, R. D., & D. A. Snow. (2000). Framing processes and social movement and assessment. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 26, 611.
- Berelson, B.R. (1952). Content analysis as a tool of communication research. New York: Free Press.
- Berenger, R.D. (2004). Gulf War fallout: A theoretical approach to improve media coverage of the Middle East. *Media Journal*, Retrieved January 14, 2009 from <http://lass.calumet.purdue.edu/fac4/emrj/fall04/mj>
- Berger, K. (2007). Iraq insurgency for Beginners. Retrieved October 30, 2008. from <http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2007/03/02/insurgency/index.html>.
- Berkowitz, L. (1965). Some aspects of observation of personality and Social Psychology, 2, 359.
- Berkowitz, L. (1993). Aggression: Its causes, consequences, and control. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Berkowitz, L., & Geen, R.G. (1966). Film violence and the cue properties of Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 5, 30.
- Bernays, E. L. (1942). The marketing of national policies: Journal of war psychology and marketing, 3, 244.
- British propaganda during World War I. Retrieved March 10, 2009 from http://www.ourastronomy.com/topics/British_propaganda_during_World_War_II.
- Bruntz, G. G. (1934). Propaganda and the collapse of the German empire in 1918. Stanford University Press; London, H. Milford, University Press.

- Bryant, J., & Zillmann, (2002) Media effects: Advances in theory and research. (2nd ed.). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Bush, G.W. (2001) Presidential congressional address September 20, 2001. Retrieved October 1, 2008 from <http://www.historyplace.com/speeches/bush.htm>.
- Byman, D.L., Chalk, P., Hoffman, B., Rosenau, W., & Bradshaw, D. (2001). Outside support for insurgents in Santa Monica, California: RAND Cooperation.
- Campagna, J. (2001) TVAs an mixed signal. Foreign Policy, 27, 88.
- Cavender, G., & Bondin, L. (1993). Fear and loathing on reality television: America's Most Wanted and Unsolved Mysteries. In *Journal of Psychological Inquiry*, 6(3), 305-317.
- Central Intelligence Agency. (2009). CIA world factbook, Iraq. Retrieved January 20, 2009 from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theprint/iz.html>.
- Chen, H., Chung, W., Qin, J., Reid, E., Sageman, M., & Weimann, G. (2008). The dark web: A study of Jihad on the web of the American Society for Information Science And Technology, 1359.
- Chen, Y., & Li, X.G. (2006) Identity and social preferences. Retrieved August 22, 2008 from www.si.umich.edu/~yanchen/papers/20061030.pdf.
- Chomsky, N. (2002). Media control: The spectacular achievements of propaganda. Seven Stories Press.
- Christie, T., Clark, A., & Zwarun, L. (2006). Finding a credible message to the Muslim world. *Global Media Journal*, 5(8). Retrieved May 13, 2006 from <http://lass.calumet.purdue.edu/ceap/0607/sip06/ClarkZwarun.htm>.
- ComScore. (2009) ComScore releases December 2008 U.S. search engine rankings. Retrieved January 16, 2009 from <http://www.comscore.com/press/release.asp?press=2687>.
- Comstock, G., & Scharrer, E. (2003) Zapping the controversy over television violence and aggression. In D.A. Gentile (Ed.), *Violence and children* (pp. 12-26). Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Corman, S.R., Schiefelbein, J. (2006) Report #0601 Communication and media strategy in the Jihadi world. Report from the Consortium on Strategic Communication, Arizona State University. Retrieved November 4, 2008 from http://comops.org/publications/report_CS0601had_comm_media.pdf.
- Corner, J. (2007). Mediated politics, promotional culture and the idea of 'Culture Society'. *Journal of Cultural Studies*, 6(2), 29.

- Corum, J. (2014). *Winning insurgents: New shortcuts to success*. Army War College, Carlisle, PA.
- Dale, E. (1985). *The content of motion pictures*. New York: The Macmillan Company.
- Deane, C., & Fears, D. (2006). Negative perception of Islam increasing: Poll higher than in 2001. *Washington Post*.
- Dekimpe, M.G., Parker, S., & Sarvary, M. (2000). Global diffusion of technological innovations: A coupled approach. *Journal of Marketing Research*, 37, 597.
- Diatram, A.S. (1999). Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. *Journal of Communication*, 29, 103.
- Ditton, J., Chadee, D., Farrall, S., Gilchrist, E., & Bannister, J. (2004). Intimidation: A note on the curious and changing relationship between the and fear of British Journal of Criminology, 44(4), 650-655.
- DoD Information Operations Roadmap. (2003). Retrieved May 31, 2009 from <http://www.au.af.mils/ihfo.htm>
- Doherty, S. (2009). *Social media*. *Artist*, 7(97), 4.
- Douglas, S. (2006). The turn within: The irony of technological globalization. *American Quarterly*, 58(3), 638-659.
- Eedle, P. (2002). *Terrorism.com*. Retrieved January 5, 2009 from <http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,13858,044028721>
- ElNawawy, M., & Iskandar, A.A. (2003). *Al-Qaeda: The story of the network that is rattling governments and redefining modern geopolitics*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Encyclopedia of the Nations. (n.d.). Retrieved January 5, 2009 from <http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/>.
- Entman, R.M. (1993). Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. *Journal of Communication*, 43(4), 851.
- Esposito, J.L. (2005). *The straight New York*. Oxford University Press.
- Fahoum, K., & Width, J. (2006). Marketing messages: Insights of anti-recruitment. *Strategic Insights*, 9(3), 1-5.
- Federal Bureau of Investigation. *Historical Famous cases, Iva Toguri d Aquino and Tokyo Rose*. Retrieved March 10, 2009 from <http://www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/famcases/rose/rose.htm>.

- Feshbach, S. (1955). The conditioning function of behavior. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 50, 1-13.
- Feshbach, S. (1961). The stimulating versus cathartic effects of a vicarious experience. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 63, 381-385.
- Feshbach, S. (1972). Reality and fantasy in filmed violence. In J.P. Murray, E.A. Rubenstein, & G.A. Comstock (Eds.), *Television and social behavior: Vol.2. Television and social learning* (pp.31-45). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- Feshbach, S., & Singer, J. (1971). *Television and aggression*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Ford, C. (2007). Of shoes and sites: Globalization, military development, and the future of war. Retrieved November 13, 2008 from <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/MayJun07/Ford.pdf>
- Gallagher, P., & Smith, D. (2005). USAWC strategy research project: Strategic communication for the war on terrorism, countering anti-American bias. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College.
- Garfield, A. (2007). The US propaganda failure in Iraq. *Middle East Quarterly*. Retrieved November 13, 2008 from <http://www.meforum.org/article/1753>.
- Geen, R. G., & Donnerstein, E. (1988). *Human aggression: Theories, research, and implications for social policy*. San Diego: Academic Press.
- Geen, R. G., & Stonner, D. (1973). Context effects on aggression. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 25, 145-150.
- Gerbner, G. (1969). Toward cultural indicators: The analysis of mass media systems. *AV Communication Review*, 17, 1-178.
- Gerbner, G., Gross, L., Morgan, M., & Signorielli, N. (1980). The main stream of American television news from 1964 to 1976: Violence profiles. *Journal of Communication*, 30, 10-29.
- Goldman, E. (2007). Strategic communication: A tool for asymmetric warfare. *Small Wars Journal*. Retrieved November 13, 2008 from www.smallwarsjournal.com.
- Goodall, B., Trethewey, A., & McDonald, K. (2006). *CSA Report #0604: Strategic communication, and public diplomacy in an uncertain world: Principles and Recommendations*. Consortium for Strategic Communications. Retrieved September 5, 2008 from http://comops.org/publications/CSA_report_0604_strategic_communication.pdf.
- Gregory, B. (2005). Public diplomacy and strategic communication: Cultures and imported norms. Presentation at American Political Science Association Conference on International Communication and Globalization. Retrieved March 3, 2009 from <http://www8.georgetown.edu/cct/apsa/papers/gregory.pdf>.

- Gregory, B. (2006). Discourse Norms in Public Diplomacy: *From Early a Line Presented at Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication 2006 Convention*. Retrieved March 3, 2009 from https://www.gwu.edu/~smpa/facdocuments/AEJMC_001.pdf.
- Guerrero, L.K., & Hecht, M. (2008). *The (2008) Global communication (3rd ed.)*. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, Inc.
- The Gulf War: A line in the sand. Retrieved January 5, 2009 from http://www.military.com/Resources/HistorySubmittedFileView?file=history_gulfwar.htm
- Gulf War to Iraq War Aug 1990 Mar 2003 (n.d.). Retrieved January 5, 2009 http://warchronicle.com/iraq/news/timeline_two_wars.htm
- Halloran, R. (2007). *Strategic communication parameters* 44.
- Hansen, G., & Haridakis, P. (2008). You're watching and listening: A uses and gratifications approach. *The Journal of Electronic Publishing*: <http://dx.doi.org/10.3998/3336451.0011.305>.
- Hargittai, E. (1999). Weaving the western web: Explaining differences in internet use among OECD countries. *Telecommunications Policy* 23, 177-188.
- Hashim, A. (2006). *Insurgency and insurgency in Iraq*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Hawkins, R.P., & Pingree, S. (1981). Uniform messages and habitual viewing: assumptions in a reality. *Human Communication Research*, 7, 291.
- Hayes, A.F. (2005). *Statistical methods for communication sciences*. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., Publishers.
- Headquarters, Department of the Army (2004). *Emergency operations* FM 308.22. Retrieved September 13, 2008 from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/policy/army/07/22/ch1.htm>.
- Hennigan, K.M., Heath, L., Wharton, J.D., Del Rosario, M.L., Cook, T.D. & C. (2006). Impact of the introduction of television on crime in the United States: Empirical and theoretical implications. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 91, 457-466.
- Herman, E. (1992). *Beyond hypocrisy: Decoding the news in an age of propaganda*. Boston: South Press.
- Hiltner, E. (2005). *Insurgent media*. *History Review* 106.
- Hitler, A. (1936). *Mein Kampf*. London: Quercus Publishing Ltd.

Hitler, A. (1930) from now on just first soldier of the German Reich. In
 (Ed.) Speeches that changed the world (pp. 82-84). London: Quercus Publishing Ltd.

Hitler, A. (1926) Mein Kampf (Manheim, R., Trans.) London: Hutchinson Publishing
 work published in 1926).

Hof, R. (2006). YouTube: 100 million BusinessWeek.com The Tech Beat
 Retrieved October 11, 2008 from http://www.businessweek.com/the_thread/techbeat/2006/07/youtube_100_mil.html.

Hogg, M., Terry, D., & White (1995). A tale of two theories: A critical comparison
 identity theory with social identity theory. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 68(4), 269-285.

Holsti, O. (1969) Content analysis for the social sciences. Massachusetts
 Addison-Wesley.

Hovland, C., & Weiss, W. (1951) The influence of source credibility on communication
 effectiveness. *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, 15(4), 634-654.

Huck, S.W. (2003) Reading statistics and research (4th Edition) (Ham Heights, MA: Allyn &
 Bacon.

Huddy, L., Khatib, N., & Capelos, T. (2002). The public's reaction to the terrorist attacks
 of September 11, 2001, study from the Public Opinion Quarterly, 66(4),
 418-450.

Hudson, R. (1999). The sociology and psychology of terrorism: Who becomes a terrorist and
 why? Report prepared by the Federal Research Division, Library of Congress
 Washington, DC: Library of Congress. Retrieved November 14, 2008 from
http://www.loc.gov/rfdiv/soc_Psych_of_Terrorism.pdf.

Institute for Historical Review (IHR) British wartime propaganda. Retrieved
 March 10, 2009 from http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v18/v18n5p15_propaganda.htm

Internet usage statistics. (June 30, 2008). Retrieved September 29, 2008 from
<http://www.internetworldstats.com/istat.htm>.

Iraq War Timeline. (n.d.). Retrieved January 5, 2009 from http://warchronicle.com/iraq/news/timeline_iraq_war.htm.

Iraqi rebel groups breakout wall chattered in Alexandria, (2008) Intel Center.

iVIE Rubric for Video Production (2009) Retrieved May 15, 2009 from
<http://www.ivieawards.org/welcome.asp>.

- Jamail, D. (2008). Journalist charges censorship by U.S. Postal Service Falluja News Agency. Retrieved November 14, 2008 from <http://foxnews.net/news.asp?idnews=43066>
- IntelCenter. (2008). i logo identification w/alexcharney1VA: Intel Center.
- Jones, J. (2005). Strategic communication: A mandate for the United States. *Quarterly*, 39, 108.
- Jones, R. (2007). Look: Virtual worlds and strategic communication. Retrieved November 20, 2008 from http://counterterrorismblog.org/2007/11/look_an_virtual_worlds.php.
- Juhasz, A. (2009). Learning the five lessons of YouTube: After trying to te don't be the hype. *Journal of Mass Media Studies*, 48(2), 150.
- Katz, E., & Lazarsfeld, P. (2006, original publication 1955). The part played by people in the flow of mass communication. Transaction Publishers.
- Keelan, J., Wilcox, Garcia, V., & Tomlinson, G. (2007). YouTube as a source information on immunization: A content analysis of the American Medical Association. *Journal of Health Communication*, 298(21), 2484.
- Kern, T., & Nam, S. (2008). Social movements as a citizen journalism in South Korea. GIGA Working Paper Series 73, GIGA German Institute of Global Area Studies. Retrieved November 20, 2008 from <http://www.giga-repec.org/04-29.html>.
- Kidder, R.M. (2008). YouTube and the silent Canadian. *Journal of Mass Media Studies*, 48(4), 53.
- Kimmage, D., & Ridolfo, K. (2007). Iraqi insurgent media: The war of images. A radio free Europe Liberty RFE/RL Special Report. Retrieved December 8, 2008 from <http://realaudio.rferl.org/online/OLPDFfiles/insurg>
- Krippner, T. (2008). Frame analysis: Theoretical perspectives. Retrieved on October 11, 2000 from http://www.ccsr.ac.uk/methods/publications/frameanalysis/#snow_19
- Krippendorff, K. (2004). Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology. (2nd ed.) Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Lange, P.G. (2007a). Publicly private and privately public: Social network YouTube. *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication*, 13(1). doi: <http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol13/issue1/lange.html>.

- Lange, P.G. (2007). vulnerable video blogger: Promoting social change through intimacy. *The Scholar and Feminist Online*, 5(2), 1-11. http://www.barnard.edu/online/blogs/lange_01.htm.
- Lasswell, H. D. (1938). *Propaganda technique in the world*. New York, P: Smith.
- Lazarsfeld, P.F., Berelson, B., & Gaudin (1968). *The people's choice: How the voter makes up his mind in a presidential campaign*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Learmonth, M. (2003). *Gain makes big strides on advertising*, *Age* 79(37), 9.
- Leiner, B., Cerf, V., Clark, D., Kahn, R., Kleinrock, L., Lynch, D., Postel, Wolff, S. (2000). *Brief history of the Internet*. February 5, 2009 from <http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief.shtml>.
- Lenin, V.I. (1919). *Power to the Soviets*. In *Lenin's speeches that changed the world* (pp. 65). London: Quercus Publishing Ltd.
- Leonard, M. L. (2002). *Diplomacy by Foreign Policy*, 32 (Sept), 48.
- Lippmann, W. (1997, originally published 1922). *Public opinion*. New York: Macmillan.
- Loch, K.D., Straub, D.W., & Kamel, S. (2003). *Diffusing the internet in the role of social norms and technologies*. *IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management*, 50(1), 63-74.
- Lowry, T. (2008). *The Tube is starting Business*, *Week*, 4102, 52.
- Marchak, F. (2006). *Eye movement assessment of concealed knowledge*. *Journal of Credibility Assessment and Witness Psychology*, 7(2), 14-28.
- Masip, J., Garrido & Herrero, C. (2003). *When did you conclude she was lying: impact of the moment the decision about the sender's veracity is made sender's facial appearance on police officers' credibility judgments*. *Credibility Assessment and Witness Psychology*, 4(1), 61.
- Maududi, S. (2002). *Towards Understanding Islam*. International Islamic Publishing House.
- McCombs, M., & Reynolds, A. (2002). *Influence on our pictures of the world: effects: Advances in theory and research* (Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
- McCombs, M.E., & Shaw, D.L. (1972). *The image formation of mass media*. *Opinion Quarterly*, 36, 177.

- McCroskey, J.C. (1997). Introduction to rhetorical communication (5th ed.). Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
- McCroskey, J.C., & Richmond, V. (1976). The effects of communication apprehension on the perception of Western Speech Communication, 41, 214.
- Miles, H. (2005). *Al Qaeda: The inside story of the Arab that is challenging the West* (American ed.). New York: Grove Press.
- Miller, K. (2005). *Communications theories: Perspectives, processes, and contexts*. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
- Miller, T. (2007). *In transition: Iraqis in Iraq attempt to spread message, influence media*. Retrieved December 5 2008 from http://www.pbs.org/newshour/indepthcoverage/middle_east/dec07july
- Mullen, R., & Wedwick, L. (2008). *Avoiding the digital abyss: Getting started in the classroom with YouTube, digital stories, and e-learning* (2nd ed.). Hoboken, NJ: Pearson Education, Inc.
- Nielsen News Release (2008). *Nielsen's Video Consumption Report*. Retrieved August 30, 2008 from <http://www.nielsen.com>.
- Nielsen News Release (2008). *The video generation: Kids and teens consume more video content than adults at home, according to Nielsen*. Retrieved October 10, 2008 from http://www.nielsen.com/media/2008/pr_080609_down
- Nisan, M. (2002). *Cities in the middle east: A history of oppression* (2nd ed.). Jefferson, NC and London: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers.
- Nye, J. (2002). *The paradox of American power*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Office of the Under Secretary of Defense For Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (2004). *Report of the defense task force on strategic communication*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense.
- O Leary, M. (2008). *I love information technology*, 25(11), 3933.
- O'Neill, B. (2001). *Urgency and terrorism: Inside modern revolutionary warfare*. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, Inc.
- Paik, H., & Comstock, G. (1994). *The effects of television violence on anti-social behavior: A meta-analysis*. *Communication Research*, 21(5), 515-546.
- Paul, M. (1988). *Gender and the perceived expertness of the speaker as a function of recall*. *Mesol Quarterly*, 22(3), 409.

- Perez, J.C. (2007). *Islam slaps Google with \$1b YouTube/a giant alleges copyright infringement, requests Google News Service*. Retrieved March 13, 2007 from http://www.infod.com/article/07/03/13/HNviacomgoogleupdate_1.htm
- Perlmutter, D. (2007). *Mujahideen desecration: Beheadings, mutilation & Murder*. *Anthropoetics*, 2(2). Retrieved March 15, 2009 from <http://www.anthropoetics.ucla.edu/ap1202/muja07.pdf>.
- Perloff, R.M. (2003). *Dynamics of persuasion: Communication and attitudes in the 21st century* (2nd ed.). New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
- Pew Research Center (2007). *Muslim Americans: Middle class and mostly mainstream*. Retrieved March 3, 2009 from <http://pewforum.org/surveys/american/>.
- Pfau, A.E. (2008). *Your lovin': GIs, gender, and domesticity during World War I*. Retrieved March 10, 2009 from <http://www.gis.com/chapter5.html>.
- Pierce, T. (November 2000). *The cultivation theory message*. Retrieved September 2, 2009 from <http://www.colostate.edu/Depts/Speech/rccs/theory06.htm>.
- Philips, A. (1995). *The true religion*. Sharjah, UAE: Project of Islamic Progress Towards God (Al).
- Phillips, D.P. (1983). *The impact of mass media violence on U.S. homicides*. *Sociological Review*, 45(4), 560. Retrieved September 2, 2009 from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2117722>.
- Pogue, L., & AhYun, K. (2006). *The effect of verbal immediacy and credibility on student motivation and affective learning*. *Communication Education*, 11(3), 331-341.
- Potter, W.J., Vaughan, M.W., Warren, R., & Howley, K. (1995). *How real is television aggression in television entertainment*. *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media*, 49(6), 496.
- Rainie, L. (2005). *Uses the internet, what they do, and where it spans*. Retrieved September 29, 2008 from <http://www.pewinternet.org/ppt/Freedom%20to%20Connect%20Conference%10Speech.ppt>
- Reid, E., & Chen, H. (2007). *Internet and middle eastern extremist groups, mobilization*. *International Quarterly*, 12 (Review), 172.
- Riffe, D., Lacy, S., & Fickel, J. (1998). *Media messages: Using quantitative content analysis in research*. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., Publishers.

- Rockwell, P., & Hubbard, A. (1999). The effect of attorneys' nonverbal communication on perceived credibility. *Journal of Credibility Assessment and Witness Psychology*, 1, 2-13.
- Rogers, E.M. (2003). *Diffusion of innovation* (5th ed). New York: Free Press
- Rogers, E., & Dearing, J. (1988). *Agenda research: Where has it been, where is it going?* In J. A. Anderson (Ed.), *Communication yearbook* (pp. 55-82). New York: Sage Publishing.
- Rouse, E. (Psywarrior). *psychological operations*. Retrieved September 28, 2008, from www.psywarrior.com.
- Rouse, E. (n.d.). *The Gulf War*. Retrieved September 28, 2008, from <http://www.psywarrior.com/gulfwar.html>
- Sageman, M. (2004). *Understanding terror networks*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Salem, A., Reid, E., & Chen, H. (2008). Multimedia content coding and analysis of content of Jihadi extremist groups. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 31(7), 605-626.
- Schonfeld, E. (2008). *Google know how to count? Some YouTube views don't seem to register*. Retrieved February 5, 2009 from <http://www.techcrunch.com/2008/07/18/Does-google-know-how-to-count-some-youtube-views-dont-seem-to-register/>
- Shrum, L.J. (1995). Assessing the social influence of television: A social cognitive theory approach. *Communication Research*, 22, 402-429.
- Singer, J. L., & Singer, D. (1981). *Television, imagination, and aggression: A study of preschoolers*. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
- Singer, M.I., Slovak, K., Frierson, T., & York, P. (1998). Viewing preferences, psychological trauma, and violent behaviors among children who watch television. *Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry*, 37, 1011-1019.
- Slone, M. (2000). Responses to media coverage of the 1998-1999 conflict in Kosovo. *Journal of Peace Research*, 44(4), 502-512.
- Smith, S. L., & Donnerstein, E. (1998). *Effects of exposure to media violence: Learning of aggression, emotional desensitization, and fear*. In R. G. Green & E. Donnerstein (Eds.), *Human aggression: Theories, research, and implications for social policy* (pp. 168-202). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.

- Snow, D.A., Rochford, E.B., Worden, S.K., & Benford, R. (1986). Processes, micromobilization, and movement patterns. *Sociological Review* 51, 404.
- Suleiman, M. (1989). America and the Arabs: Negative images and the Arab Americans: Continuity and change. *Journal of Arab American University Graduates* 1, 251.
- Sullivan, M. (2008). *Suburban*, will put shows. *PC World* 26(12), 20.
- Tajfel, H. (1972). Experiments in a vacuum. In T. Turner & H. Tajfel (eds). *The Context of Social Psychology: A critical assessment*. London: Academic Press.
- Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. (1978). A cognitive theory of intergroup conflict. In W. Turner & S. Worchel (Eds.), *Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.
- Taylor, R. (1979). *Film propaganda: Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany*. London; Croom Helm; Barnes & Noble Books.
- Taylor, R. (2006). *Film propaganda: Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany*, 2nd Edition. New York : I.B. Tauris.
- Timeline of Operation Iraqi Freedom. (n.d.). Retrieved January 5, 2009 from <http://usiraq.procon.org/viewresource.asp?resourceID=670#war2003>.
- Trent, S., & Doty, M. (2005). An overlooked aspect of information operations. *Military Review*, 85(4), -74.
- Trepte, S., & Krueger, R. (2003). Expanding social identity theory for research in media effects: Two international studies and their presentation at the annual meeting of the International Communication Association, Dresden International Congress Centre, Dresden, Germany. Retrieved February 20, 2009 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p90475_index.html.
- Tsu, S. (6th cent. B.C.). & Rudnik, S. (1986). *The Stars of Hollywood*. CA: The Stars of Hollywood.
- Turner, C., & Berkowitz, L. (1972). Identification with film aggressor and violence. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 21, 256.
- The Islamic Affairs Department. (1989). *Understanding Islam and the Muslims*. Washington D.C.: The Embassy of Saudi Arabia.
- United States Congress Broadcasting Board of Governors. (2005). *Annual Report*. September 2, 2008 from www.bbg.gov/reports/annualreports/05anrprt.pdf.

- United States Department of Agriculture (2002). Reporting default, threats, intimidation, interference, FSIS Directive 4735. Retrieved January 5, 2009 from <http://www.fsis.usda.gov/FOIA/cv12/4735>
- Walsh, K. (2008, December). For Obama, governing YouTube. U.S. News World Report 145(12), 32.
- Weimann, G. (2006a). Terror on the internet: The new arena, the new challenges. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace Press.
- Weimann, G. (2006b). Virtual disputes: The use of the internet for terrorism. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 29, 623.
- Wells, A.T. (February 6, 2008). A portrait of early Internet adopters: Why online and why they stayed. Retrieved September 30, 2008 from www.pewinternet.org.
- Whine, M. (1999). Cyber space: A new medium for communication, command, and control extremists. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 22, 235.
- Wong, E., Hussein, H., & Mahmoud, M. (2006). Insurgent group post video of soldier. *The New York Times* (41), 10.
- YouTube community guidelines (mes.). Retrieved March 10, 2009 from http://www.youtube.com/t/community_guidelines.
- YouTube company history (oryd.). Retrieved March 10, 2009 from <http://www.youtube.com/t/about>.
- Zeitlin, M. (1989). The large corporation and the downs America? The same old game (pp. 142). Oxford: Polity.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Rheanna Rutledge graduated from Florida State University Summer 1999 with a Bachelors of Science and obtained a Master of Arts from the University of Central Florida the Summer of 2003. She has had a range of career opportunities from teaching inner-city schools, teaching college, and government positions.