

# Florida State University Libraries

---

Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations

The Graduate School

---

2007

## Cultures and Conflict: The Waning of the Clash of Civilizations

Glynn Ellis



**THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY**

**COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**

**CULTURES AND CONFLICT:**

**THE WANING OF THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS**

**By**

**GLYNN ELLIS**

A Dissertation submitted to the  
Department of Political Science  
in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Awarded:  
Summer Semester, 2007

Copyright © 2007  
Glynn Ellis  
All Rights Reserved

The members of the committee approve the dissertation of Glynn T. Ellis,  
defended on May 21, 2007.

---

Paul Hensel  
Professor Directing Dissertation

---

Jonathan Grant  
Outside Committee Member

---

Dale Smith  
Committee Member

---

Mark Souva  
Committee Member

---

Tom Carsey  
Committee Member

Approved:

---

Dale Smith, Chair, Department of Political Science

The Office of Graduate Studies has verified and approved the above named committee members.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Tables.....	iv
Abstract.....	v
1: CULTURES AND CONFLICT.....	1
2: CULTURE CLASHES: WHO AND TO WHAT EXTENT? .....	8
3: WHY DO CULTURES CLASH? .....	50
4: SETTLING DIFFERENCES PEACEFULLY.....	74
5: IN CONCLUSION.....	103
APPENDIX A: COUNTRIES BY CIVILIZATION.....	112
APPENDIX B: SERIOUS CONFLICT BY CIVILIZATION.....	114
REFERENCES.....	118
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH.....	125

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.1: Logit Analysis of Post-Cold War Fault-Line Interstate Conflicts .....	42
Tables 2.2a/b: Post-Cold War Predicted Probabilities (1990-2001) .....	43
Tables 2.3a/b/c: Civilizations and Conflicts (Post-Cold War) .....	44
Table 2.4: Logit Analysis of Post-Cold War Religious Conflict .....	45
Tables 2.5a/b: Post-Cold War Religious Conflict Predicted Probabilities (1990-2001)..	46
Table 2.6: Conflict Totals/Percentages by Category and Time Period .....	47
Table 2.7: Logit Analysis of Cold War Fault-Line Interstate Conflicts .....	48
Tables 2.8a/b: Cold War Predicted Probabilities (1946-1989).....	49
Table 3.1: Issue Categories and Frequencies.....	70
Tables 3.2a/b: Issue Frequencies by Dyad Type.....	71
Table 3.3: Escalation after the Onset of MIDs.....	72
Table 3.4: Escalation after the Onset of Different-Civilization MIDs.....	73
Table 4.1: Logit Analysis of Probability of Settlement Attempts .....	97
Table 4.2: Predicted Probabilities (Hypotheses 4.1 & 4.2).....	98
Table 4.3: Logit Analysis for Peaceful Settlements.....	99
Table 4.4: Civilization Membership of Third Party Actors .....	100
Table 4.5: Different-Civilization Probabilities for Reaching Settlements.....	101
Table 4.6: Different-Civilization Peaceful Settlements by Technique.....	102

## ABSTRACT

In this study I investigate an array of aspects concerning cultural conflict. I use Samuel Huntington's civilizations, from his theory of a *Clash of Civilizations* (1993), as a means of identifying different cultures. Taking advantage of an expanded data set that was not available to Huntington and most of his critics, I not only review his theory but advance well beyond it, exploring additional matters such as the distribution of cultural conflict, its intensities, underlying issues, and resolution techniques. I find support for a number of arguments including the following: different-civilization conflicts are more prevalent than those between same-civilization states, even though in general there is a higher likelihood of same-civilization rather than different-civilization conflict; this cross-cultural militarized conflict does not permeate all civilizations at the international level, but rather is principally limited to only a few; the cultures most prone to inter-cultural conflict are Islam and the West, while the Sinics (Chinese) are among the least prone; and while cultural differences play a role in this type of conflict, such issues are not among those that most frequently lead to serious conflict or war. I also find, though contrary to expectations, that cross-cultural dyads seek peaceful solutions to their differences more often than same-culture dyads, they have about the same success rate, and neither third party assistance nor bilateral negotiating techniques present a particular advantage for resolving different-culture conflict.

## CHAPTER 1

### CULTURES AND CONFLICT

In the study of conflict, differences between groups of peoples have long been associated with violence. People of various cultures (i.e., races, ethnic groups, religions, etc.) have attacked each other countless times throughout history. This phenomenon not only continues to be a problem today, but recent conflicts in the Middle East and terrorist attacks such as the 2001 World Trade Center tragedy have generated increased attention to and fear of such conflict.

Samuel Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations* theory tied together various types of cultural differences and predicted that these would be the dominating source of conflict in the post-Cold War world (1993: 207). His categorization of peoples at the macro level (civilizations) essentially equates to a perception that where heterogeneous populations live in close proximity to each other, the probability of armed conflict increases. Put another way, differences in identities are associated with greater occurrences of violent conflict. If true, this has repercussions not only for international relations, but also for subnational heterogeneous communities within reach of one another.

In this study I evaluate and analyze conflict that occurs between people of different cultures. My objectives are to provide researchers and policy makers with a better understanding of conflictual relations between different peoples and to identify effective ways to mitigate those conflicts. Among the areas to be investigated are the extent to which cross-cultural conflict takes place, the intensities at which it occurs, the main participants and issues involved, and what, if anything, can be done to resolve or lessen it. Huntington's (1993; 1996) discussions of the different aspects of his theory on cultural conflict take a broad view of the topic and have generated or influenced much of the associated literature. For that reason I use his theory and his focus on civilizations as the basis, or initial starting point, of this dissertation. More specifically, Huntington's divisions of people into civilizations are used to establish cultural identities for the series of studies I conduct.

In his 1993 *Foreign Affairs* article ("The Clash of Civilizations?") Huntington predicted that future wars would be cultural and that there would be a post-Cold War clash of civilizations. This prediction drew enormous attention. He further explained and expanded his suppositions in a 1996 book, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. This book became a national best seller and was translated into a number of foreign languages. Huntington and his

ideas on this topic are often cited in other works, and at least one book has been written with the aim of preventing the predicted civilization clashes (Herzog, et al. 1999).

What is more, the United Nations has created an organization, the Alliance of Civilizations, dedicated to improving relations between civilizations. Its High Representative, Jorge Sampaio, has demonstrated the need to challenge the idea that civilizations are doomed to confrontation and war, and the organization credits the clash of civilizations theory for creating “anxiety and confusion” and for distorting “the terms of the discourse on the real nature of the predicament the world is facing” (Alliance of Civilizations report 2006: 3).

Civilization is the concept Huntington uses to differentiate between the various macro cultures in the world. He states that both civilization and culture refer to “the overall way of life of a people, and a civilization is a culture writ large” (1996: 41). He includes a number of factors that may be part of the definition of civilization, among them values, norms, institutions, religion, language, and ways of thinking. But he maintains that culture is the common theme in virtually all definitions of civilization.

Huntington believes that people are much more likely to get along with those who are most like themselves, those with whom they share common identities. He further observes that civilizations are the highest level of identities, and they are formed through common cultural characteristics. When people from different civilizations interact with each other on a regular basis, those differences become more important. Huntington suggests these differences in civilizations (or identities or cultures) can lead to divergences and disagreements between neighbors and the development of an “us” versus “them” outlook (1993: 211). The result of such a scenario can lead to a polarizing of the two distinct groups as tensions build upon tensions, often leading to serious conflict. He sees these polarizing effects becoming much more prevalent after the end of the Cold War, developing into large-scale violent conflict.

### **Huntington’s Critics**

However, some subsequent studies<sup>1</sup> have found little support for Huntington’s supposition. Unlike Huntington, scholars involved in those works used systematic empirical analysis rather than what might be described as conjecture and a combination of historical and anecdotal evidence as presented by Huntington. But some of those studies (i.e., Russett et al. 2000; Henderson and Tucker 2001) suffered from important data limitations, being written at a

---

<sup>1</sup> Russett, Oneal and Cox (2000), Henderson and Tucker (2001), and LaSala (2003), among others



time when only three to four years of empirical data on armed conflict was available for the post-Cold War period, which is the time when Huntington's arguments are most relevant. Such limited data does not inspire great confidence in the ensuing results, as the writers themselves noted. Huntington's clash could easily take more than this three to four year period to develop.

More recently, additional data has become available which allows for a more in depth look at Huntington's suppositions. This increase extends the available conflict data from 1992 to 2001, effectively quadrupling the number of post-Cold War years that can be studied and offering a much better chance for a fair test of Huntington's arguments. Taking advantage of this expanded data, LaSala (2003) incorporates as large a post-Cold War data set as is currently available. His overall conclusions mirror those of Russett et al. and Henderson and Tucker, that evidence is insufficient to support Huntington.

But LaSala's study has some issues of its own, the two most notable being its complexity and an unusual time frame. Among its complexities, he uses two data sets containing actual data, and from them constructs two additional sets of proportional data because of the differences in numbers of member states within the different civilizations. He compares results from the actual and proportional sets throughout his study and in several instances gets contradictory results. For example, he finds support for Huntington's primary tenet, increased likelihood of different-civilization conflict, using the actual data but not with the proportional data, and he has more confidence in the latter. While proportional data may be appropriate for comparing conflict propensities among the different civilizations, its suitability for analyzing overall international conflict is questionable, as the world does not operate in proportional sets.

I also find his evaluation period, 1980-2001, to be rather perplexing. LaSala's reasoning is that Huntington (1996: 246) refers to the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as a transitional war that eventually leads to the "clash" after the Cold War ends. LaSala justifies beginning his analysis the following year as including this "transition" period and also because it covers about equal Cold War and post-Cold War years for a better look at the two periods. However, the two periods in reality are not equal. Examination of these years as a single time period fails to analyze the post-Cold War as a period of its own, and also skews whatever results a comparison may provide, since less than one fourth of the Cold War is included. As with the studies of Russett et al. and Henderson and Tucker, weaknesses within LaSala's work make it appropriate to reevaluate Huntington's theory.

## Huntington and Beyond

In the following chapters I evaluate an array of factors to determine the depths of cultural conflict.<sup>2</sup> Specifically, I attempt to answer four research questions related to cultural differences. The first is whether empirical support exists for Huntington's view that in the post-Cold War era the majority of violent clashes will be between civilizations. Huntington did not use systematic empirical analysis to support his claims. Critics have used empirics to test his hypothesis and conclude that support for it does not exist, but weaknesses in those studies should be addressed.

A second and closely related question inquires about who the main participants are in different-civilization clashes. This question is valid whether or not these clashes rise to the level anticipated by Huntington. As discussed earlier, there is considerable concern in the world about violence between cultures, regardless of whether or not this violence "qualifies" as a clash of civilizations. Determining if countries from all civilizations are prone to fight with each other on a frequent basis, or if there are only a few that do so, will add significant knowledge to the conflict literature base.

The next question asks if these clashes are directly related to cultural issues, or whether they are for the most part over other issues that are unrelated to civilization differences. If the former is the case, this phenomenon will present a very serious and disturbing repercussion, that being the possibility that the mere existence of multiple identities and cultures in the world is a major cause of war. If we go to war because one side controls something another side wants (territory or resources, for example) eventually a settlement can be reached, even if it comes about as a result of fighting. But even war will not change who people are. If identities alone lead to conflict, that fact could sentence mankind to eternal violent clashes and the destruction of some civilizations by others.

Conversely, if these different-civilization conflicts are over issues not related to identity and cultural differences, does that relegate civilization clashes to a minor concern in the study of conflict? Of course not, although it would make such clashes less worrisome. If conflict is more prevalent or more escalatory between different civilizations than within civilizations, but the issues are not directly civilization-related, it is still important to determine why these conflicts occur so frequently. Any time there is any common thread, or in some cases a lack of a common

---

<sup>2</sup> Throughout this dissertation the terms different-cultural conflict and different-civilizational conflict are used interchangeably, as are similar terms such as inter-civilization, inter-cultural, cross-cultural, etc.

thread, in a large number of violent conflicts, learning more increases our chances of reducing or resolving them.

The fourth and final research question concerns the most effective methods for different-culture dyads to employ in conflict resolution efforts. Beyond the possible increase in armed conflict that has led to so much debate, Huntington's arguments also suggest that members of different cultures will find it more difficult to settle differences through peaceful means. It is therefore desirable to investigate whether this expectation is supported, as well as determine which techniques for conflict management or resolution have been most effective for settling differences between members of different cultures. It may also be advantageous to learn about both the similarities and differences in patterns of conflict management between and within cultures. Determining factors that play significant roles in the resolution process could be a crucial step in resolving those conflicts.

### **Civilizations in Conflict**

As stated earlier, Huntington's divisions of people into civilizations are used to establish cultural identities for the series of analyses I conduct. Having made that determination, I hasten to add that it is a fact that neither cultures nor civilizations go to war. For the most part, where international conflict is concerned it is states that engage in disputes and fight or "clash" with each other. Civilizations do not have governments, armies, or foreign policies. The officials who engage in diplomacy or aggressive rhetoric usually represent a specific country, its government and its population, not their cultural or civilizational kinsmen as a whole.

This study does not imply that cultures or civilizations control the foreign policies of nations. Rather, my intent is to determine to extent of influence cultural or civilizational factors have on the conflict policies of those states that are members of the various cultures or civilizations. As others before me have done, including Henderson and Tucker (2001: 318), who are among Huntington's biggest critics, I interpret Huntington's theory to mean that states belonging to different civilizations are more likely to come into conflict with each other, and states belonging to the same civilization are less likely to do so. States are therefore appropriate entities for the study of civilizational conflict, and are in fact the only reasonable means that are available at this point.

## Chapter Synopsis

The next three chapters of this dissertation are devoted to three interrelated studies of specific civilization issues. Each chapter contains its own research question or questions, theoretical discussion, research design, results, and conclusions. A synopsis follows.

In Chapter 2 I discuss the conceptualization and measurement of civilizations in the modern world and lay out a theoretical foundation for Huntington's hypothesis that in the post-Cold War era the majority of violent interstate clashes will be between cultures. I then test this argument using updated militarized conflict data that was not available to Huntington's early critics (i.e., Russett, Oneal and Cox 2000; Henderson and Tucker 2001) when they carried out studies that suggested there was no empirical support for his conclusions. Incorporating this data into a research design very similar to those used in the Russett et al. and Henderson and Tucker studies, I reexamine Huntington's argument. I find that while cross-cultural clashes occur more frequently than same-culture conflicts, they have not risen to the frequency and intensity expected by Huntington. Even so, they still constitute a very important phenomenon affecting international relations as a whole and violent conflict in particular. I also establish that some civilizations are more prone to inter-cultural conflict than are others.

Having established in Chapter 2 the extent to which culture clashes occur and who the chief participants are, Chapter 3 investigates whether or not cultural differences are the principal issues at stake in these clashes. An issue-based analysis is used to determine the underlying sources of different-civilization conflict. Militarized disputes occurring after the Cold War ended are evaluated to determine their underlying sources. Results indicate that while a significant amount of different-civilization conflict (or conflict escalation) is associated with cultural concerns (ethnicity, religion, etc.), most of the more serious conflict (higher intensity levels) springs from issues such as territory and national security. My analyses provide evidence that the underlying issues of cross-cultural conflict are not always, and in fact often are not, related to cultural identities. Therefore, while civilization differences are important, they are not as dangerous as Huntington suggests; much of the observed conflict between civilizations invokes the same types of issues that produce conflict within civilizations.

Where serious conflict exists, conflict resolution becomes essential. A few studies have looked into specific details of conflict resolution attempts, but currently this is an area of study in which the surface has barely been scratched. No in-depth look at conflict can be complete

without inquiring into ways to prevent or resolve it. Chapter 4 provides such an effort. In this chapter, data from the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) project (Hensel 2001) are used in seeking to determine the degrees of success achieved and the most effective approaches that should be employed by different-civilization dyads in their attempts to resolve contentious issues.

Contrary to expectations, I discover that different-civilization dyads are just as likely as same-civilization dyads to manage their differences effectively. I also examine peaceful settlement techniques, but unfortunately, I am unable to identify one that provides a particular advantage in successfully resolving different-civilization conflict.

Chapter 5 summarizes conclusions and implications of this study and discusses several suggestions for future research. Of the conclusions, there are two that I consider most important. First, cross-cultural or different-civilization conflict consistently occurs more frequently than does same-civilization conflict at all three levels of examined intensity. This makes cultural conflict a very important phenomenon that requires in-depth study. The second is that, in spite of the first conclusion, different-civilization conflict is not the post-Cold War clash of civilizations envisioned by Huntington. There are three primary reasons for this conclusion: inter-cultural conflict has outnumbered intra-cultural conflict at least since the end of World War II; civilization conflict at the higher intensities is mostly confined to only three civilization groups; and it is not cultural issues that most often lead to serious cross-cultural conflict. Among other findings are that Islam and the West are the most contentious of all civilizations, that states in different-civilization dyads are about as likely as same-civilization dyads to attempt peaceful resolution of their differences, and that when they make these attempts they have about the same success rates.

In this chapter I also highlight the need for additional research and analysis in a number of areas. Of those discussed, there are three that I see as most pressing. The first is to develop other measures of culture, both from a macro view as well as at more local levels. These should be used to continue and expand on the findings presented here. Second, as Islam and the West are found to be the most contentious of civilizations, research is required to determine why. And third, there is a need to expand ICOW so that a more in-depth review of cross-cultural conflict management can be completed.

## CHAPTER 2

### CULTURE CLASHES: WHO AND TO WHAT EXTENT?

While the amount may be in question, it would be difficult to contest the idea that there is conflict in the world between dissimilar groups of people, whether the differences involve ethnicity, religion, values, or other forms of culture. As previously discussed, Huntington viewed these differences and conflicts from the macro or civilizational level, as do I in this study.

This chapter focuses on two specific aspects of Huntington's theory, as well as a third he did not address. First, in his initial article on the topic (1993) he envisions a post-Cold War clash of civilizations, and second, in his follow-up book (1996) he predicts that three of these civilizations (Islam, the West, and Sinics) will be even more contentious than the others. And third, beyond the relative frequency of inter-civilizational conflict (which has received most of the scholarly attention), I examine the intensity of such conflict. In short, this chapter seeks to determine if different-culture conflict approximates Huntington's clash of civilizations, which groups are the main participants, and how intense this conflict becomes.

#### Civilizations

Since, like Huntington, I use civilizations to identify differences in culture, it is necessary to ascertain exactly what a civilization is. *Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language* (Portland House 1989: 270) defines civilization as "the type of culture, society, etc. of a specific place, time or group." There are two parts to this definition. First, it includes cultures and societies, two terms that refer to people and the way they live. From this we should expect that there are aspects, practices, and/or beliefs of one civilization that are different from those of another. Second, the definition isolates civilizations to specific places, times, or groups. Consequently, we see that civilizations change. For example, descendants of the Persian Empire in Iran today bear little resemblance to their ancestors who fought Islamic Arab invaders fourteen hundred years ago. Since then the Persians/Iranians have joined the Arabs to become members of the same religion, and arguably the same civilization.

Huntington attributes a number of additional terms to the above definition of civilization, among them values, beliefs, institutions, and social structures, all of which can fall under the culture/society umbrella. Huntington notes that common language, history and blood lines can also be important. Additionally, he tells us that the world's great civilizations have all been

associated with great religions. He contends that "...people who share ethnicity and language but differ in religion may slaughter each other" (1996: 42).

These identified characteristics constitute *groups* that people tend to identify with. In the Western world an important group for identification is the state. We are Americans, Britons, or Germans first, and other sub-group identities (Floridian, Welsh, Bavarian) come farther down the priority list. In the United States there are Irish Americans, Italian Americans, and African Americans, to name a few, but most consider themselves Americans first.

A great deal of the world, however, does not see identities so tightly tied to the state. In much of Africa international boundaries were drawn through tribal lands separating groups linked through culture, history and blood, while at the same time joining them to others with whom they have no obvious connections. Tribalism and culture still define the differences between self and other more so in these places than does nationality (McCormick 2004). Similar circumstances exist in parts of Asia and South America (Russett et al. 2004; Applebaum 2003). Religions also serve as points of identity. Islam is very influential in how many see themselves in some areas, as is Hinduism in others.

Overall, people tend to identify themselves broadly through one or a combination of the heretofore discussed characteristics. It is the expansive or "mega" identities above nationalism and tribalism that Huntington calls civilizations, and they are so designated for this study. I do not expect that civilizations will routinely transcend the lower level identities. Rather, they are selected because they present a way to distinguish different peoples at the highest level, where the greatest and most violent conflicts have the potential of erupting.

Categorizing civilizations is a rather complex undertaking. Of the nine that Huntington divides the world into (1996: 45-48), he does not use a fixed criterion, as there does not appear to be one that is applicable to all. For example, some of his civilizations appear to follow generally racial lines (African, Sinic, Japanese), while others are clearly based primarily on religion (Islamic, Buddhist, Hindi). The remaining three, Latin American, Orthodox and Western, emerge as a combination of religion, history, and culture.

Although civilizations may be difficult to isolate uniformly, there is an arguable logic behind Huntington's categorizations. These divisions generally identify the largest or macro groups of the world by broad commonalities, perhaps better than any other designation could do. And, while these divisions are certainly vulnerable to criticism as to their make-up, the same

would also be true for any other attempts at separating the peoples of the world. For example, using religions would combine several civilizations and greatly dilute any results (i.e., the Western, Latin American, and Orthodox civilizations and possibly parts of Africa would constitute the Christian religion). Language would generate far too many groups and race would be very controversial, as many countries today are multi-racial and races are not always easy to identify. A case in point, is Russia a Caucasian nation, and if so, does it belong in the same grouping as the United States? While civilizations are not ideal, they are more functional than many other candidates. Rationale for the inclusion of specific civilizations and guidelines for country assignment to each is discussed in the Research Design section of this chapter. A listing of countries by civilization is provided in Appendix 1.

### **The Clash**

Huntington hypothesizes that the fundamental source of conflict in the new world, that is, the post-Cold War era, will be neither ideological nor economic, but rather cultural. Specifically, he argues “The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future,” (1993: 207). These fault lines Huntington refers to are the places on earth where populations of different civilizations live alongside each other. Many of these dividing lines are borders between contiguous states. For example, Pakistan is an Islamic nation and India is Hindu. Their common border is part of the world wide fault line network, and their repeated battles over the province of Kashmir are widely regarded as part of the hypothesized clash. There are also a number of places where fault lines run through countries instead of around them. This happens where a majority of a population in one sector of a state is composed primarily of one civilization, with another sector populated by a different group. Nigeria and Sudan are examples, lying on Huntington’s fault line between Islamic North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa.

During the early history of civilizations, relationships among these groups and their experiences with each other were limited. Prior to 1500 A.D., civilizations were separated in most cases by vast distances and natural obstacles that made interaction difficult. In some instances oceans, continents and/or a lack of knowledge about each other’s existence reduced or eliminated the opportunities for contact. The Mesoamericans and Andeans, for example, had no contact with any other civilizations, or even with each other. The few adventurers who traveled from Europe to the lands of the Mongols, or even beyond to China, took years to return and their



stories were not always believed. Where there was substantial inter-civilization contact it was often of a violent nature, such as the expansion of the Roman Empire into North Africa or the Arab conquest of North Africa and Iberia.

In today's world, Huntington sees civilizations as the highest group levels in which people share identities through common cultural characteristics. When people from different civilizations are exposed to and interact with each other, they become more aware of their differences. Huntington (1993: 211) believes these differences in identities can lead to divergences and disagreements between neighbors and the development of an "us" versus "them" outlook. Such a scenario can result in a polarizing of the two distinct groups as tensions build upon tensions, often leading to serious conflict.

Huntington views civilizations as the ultimate human tribes, with civilizational conflict as tribal warfare at its zenith (1996: 207). At the fault lines, Huntington says the "tribes" are most exposed to each other, and their differences manifest themselves to their greatest and most obvious degrees. This is where differences have the most frequent, actually a continual, opportunity to grow into conflict.

Considerable evidence exists to support Huntington's views about the tensions between civilizations. As noted earlier, cultural/civilizational differences may include such aspects as ethnicity, religion, and language, all of which help to constitute identity. These more narrowly focused differences have been the subject of numerous studies, which together have many implications for civilizational conflict.

Included in this array of literature, Kegley and Wittkopf (1995) conclude that ethnic conflict is among the world's greatest killers. Heraclides (1989) argues that where ethnicities collide, intense feelings can lead to 'denial policies', or situations in which policies are by definition not negotiable. Carment and James (1995) find that ethnic territorial conflicts are more severe than those that are of a non-ethnic nature. They also note that during the recent growth in the number of states in the international system, the new states were often constructed along ethnic lines. As a result, they (Carment and James) contend, conflict management may need to be more proactive than it has been in the past (1995: 105). Smith (1993) deduces that ethnicity can provide leaders with a tool for political mobilization. Even Fearon and Laitin (1996), who are skeptical about the contentiousness of ethnic conflict, acknowledge that where

interrelations exist between different ethnicities, there is always an underlying uneasiness, or constant tension.

Richardson (1960) included language and religion in his works in determining that those who share the Chinese language and its Confucian religion/philosophy are less likely to fight among themselves, while Christians and Muslims are more prone to conflict with each other. Henderson (1997) agrees with Huntington's assessment of religion, finding that its impact exceeds most other influences. And Rothman and Olson (2001) determine that conflict can result from issues of identity. They report that abstract and difficult to define issues that are common to such conflict are often made more complex by opponents' expressions of needs in mutually exclusive ways (2001: 297).

Proximity is another factor in Huntington's argument, as conflict is expected to be most likely along the fault lines between civilizations, and students of conflict are familiar with the roles attributed to contiguity in the outbreak of violence. Among the litany of such findings and suggestions, Diehl (1985) and Vasquez (1993) conclude that the vast majority of wars are started or fought between states with geographically shared borders, Bremer (1992) finds that contiguity has a greater impact on war than do such factors as regime type, alliances or power status, and Starr and Thomas (2002) explain that contiguity increases the opportunity and ability for states to go to war with each other. Even so, Henderson (1997) concludes that cultural variables have greater impact on conflict than does contiguity. In fact, as alluded to previously, he finds that religion has twice the impact (1997: 664). Whether it is cultural variables or contiguity that makes the largest contribution to generating international conflict, it is logical to expect that adding the two together (the fault lines) could only exacerbate whatever tensions may be caused by either of them separately.

Huntington argued that the clash of civilizations would become dominant in world affairs after the end of the Cold War, a time he referred to as the new world order. He believes this clash did not happen earlier because the international environment during the Cold War was dominated and to an extent controlled by the ideological and military rivalries between the United States and the Soviet Union. These rivalries delayed what Huntington (1996: 39) considers to be the natural development of conflict between the civilizations. With the demise of the Soviet Union and a near meltdown of the Russian economy, Soviet/Russian military power after the Cold War was greatly reduced. The U.S. and several of its NATO allies responded to

this reduction by reducing their military budgets. Thus, the superpower standoff that held the world's attention has evaporated and the major power centers are not as strong as they once were. In contrast, Huntington (1996: 89-90) notes that other regions have been increasing their military capabilities at a rapid rate, and simultaneously the diffusion of weapons of mass destruction has taken place around the world. Consequently, states from different civilizations have greater ability to exert their power and influence than was previously the case.

We can see from this that since the end of the Cold War an increased number of power centers have more ability to use military force against people of other cultures, but what would cause them to actually do so? Lester Pearson (1955), a Canadian political leader in the mid 20<sup>th</sup> century, early in the Cold War foresaw the future development of new, non-Western political societies throughout the world. There have been frictions and problems between and among nation-states since their development, and Pearson proffered that the rise of these new societies within various cultures would lead in time to similar frictions and problems between civilizations. From his viewpoint, as the Cold War drew closer to its end these cultures became more organized and assertive.

Buzan (1991) argues that at the end of the Cold War the more developed powers (the North, or center) were more dominant and the less developed states (the South, or periphery) more subordinate than at any time since decolonization began. He sees this as a triumph of Western capitalism. As a result, he expects societal concerns to assume much greater prominence in international dealings, leading to a cold war between the North and South. As we have seen, tensions in a cold war at times run very high. When they do, absent the danger of a world-wide nuclear war, as was the case between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., violence has a high likelihood of erupting.

Vlahos (1991: 62) writes that culture is the actual source of human reality, and that patterns of thought and behavior are shaped by culture. He contends that U.S. attempts to assert a global culture ended in the early 1990s, and that other cultures that had been assisting in that effort began to move in their own directions. These cultures have their own goals and priorities, and Vlahos predicts potential military threats for the West, and the U.S. in particular, from what he calls advanced culture areas. Lind (1991) also expects culture clashes aimed at the West due to, among other things, anti-Western ideology. He sees these conflicts as being made possible by the decline of the West vis-à-vis its neighbors: Africa, Asia, India and the Islamic World. He

describes this decline as going on throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century, culminating in the end of the Cold War, which included the collapse of the Soviet Union and self-imposed reductions of military power by the United States as discussed above. The neighbors, Africa, Asia, India and the Islamic World, according to Lind (1991: 44), are not merely regions or collections of nations, but cultures, and the West will face serious threats from other cultures for the first time since the Ottoman siege of Vienna in 1683.

Returning to Huntington (1993: 209), he says that the world has become a smaller place through globalization. This leads to increased interaction among peoples of different civilizations and therefore more opportunities for them to encounter problems and frictions that result in clashes. Thus evolves Huntington's theory of the clash of civilizations and why he believes it is destined for the post-Cold War period. In order to test his overall view, the following hypothesis is submitted:

*Hypothesis 2.1: During the post-Cold War era, violent conflict will be more likely between neighboring states of different civilizations (those on the fault lines) than between neighbors of the same civilization.*

### **Islam**

Huntington's vision is not so simple as to merely expect that civilizations will fight with each other; he sees more complex divisions among the world's actors complicating matters. One example is that he expects that Islam will be the most contentious of the civilizations (1996: 255). He suggests six reasons why this might be so: proximity, militarism, victim status, indigestibility, demographic bulge, and core state absence (1996: 262-265).

His explanations for the first two are relatively straightforward. For proximity he believes that Islam's imperialist period was dominated by an expansion across the land masses of northern Africa, the Balkans, and central and southern Asia. This left many Islamic states in direct contact with states of other civilizations. Put more succinctly, Islam has greater exposure to the fault lines than does any other civilization. Militarily, Huntington sees Islam as a religion that admires and glorifies military virtues. He states that, unlike in Christianity and Buddhism, the concept of nonviolence is absent from the Islamic doctrine. He also notes that Mohammad is remembered as a "hard fighter and a skillful military commander" (1996: 263) and that this is in sharp contrast to both Christ and Buddha. Further evidence is found in a number of passages from the Koran referring to making war against unbelievers (i.e., 8: 37-41; 9: 122-128).

A third of the six suggested reasons for Islamic contentiousness is victim status. According to Huntington (1996: 264), some Muslims advance the theory that Western subjugation of Islamic states during the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries made Islamic states appear weak and thus attractive targets for others. This supposedly led to an anti-Muslim prejudice similar to anti-Semitism. This theory provides no explanation as to why this situation might be worse for Islam than for the states of sub-Saharan Africa or the former Western colonies in Southeast Asia. Whether there is any merit to this theory is immaterial; a mere belief in it can lead to frustration and anger, both of which are enabling conditions for conflict.

Reason number four is indigestibility. Islam's modern day resurgence has been as a religion that presents a "complete way of life" (Esposito et al. 2004: 370). That is, it provides guiding principles not only for private and public life, but for society and the state as well. Another way of saying it might be that where other religions allow for separation of that which is God's and that which is Caesar's, Islam does not. Whether that is a reasonable analogy is more an issue for religious scholars, but it is a fact that some Islamic leaders give the impression that their religion holds the key to many political decisions, and where God is concerned there can be no compromise. Things must be done God's way, as interpreted by which ever religious leader is involved in a given situation, or often times by Islamic laymen who have strong beliefs and present themselves as Islamic authorities (i.e. Osama bin Laden; Abu Musab al-Zarqawi). Since in many instances there can be no compromise, violence is the only option to achieve an important goal if the other side does not give in completely.

Next, the peoples of most Islamic states are among the world's most prolific. Birth rates over the most recent decades have been high (creating a demographic bulge) while economic conditions have not been particularly good. The result has been large numbers of unemployed males, especially those in their 30s or younger (Moghadam 2004). These young men become highly susceptible to radical fundamentalists looking for followers in their struggles to Islamicize local governments and right perceived wrongs committed by foreign entities. This leads to instability and the potential for increased violence, both internally and with other civilizations.

Finally, there is no core state in Islam to serve as a leader. The more powerful civilizations have such states to follow in times of crisis or when a defensive, moral or economic compass is needed. The West has the United States, the Orthodox has Russia, and the Sinics can look to China. In the Islamic sphere or even in the Middle East, which is the hub of Islam, there

is no state that the others naturally turn to or follow. Nasser tried to position Egypt for the role in the late 1950s and 1960s, but was not strong enough. Saddam Hussein was working on the same quest for himself and Iraq, but obviously fell short. Iran has the potential to become a powerful Islamic state, but it is not Arabic, and while it is Islamic, it is also Shiite. Nearly 90% of Islam is Sunni and the goals and views of the two factions are often not compatible. Thus, Iran's chances of becoming the Islamic core state are remote.

There is one more possible candidate: Saudi Arabia. It is the wealthiest of the large Islamic states and therefore has the resources to provide financial assistance to fellow Muslim countries. It is also home to the Islamic religion and its two holiest cities, Mecca and Medina. Conversely, it is not sufficiently strong militarily to be the natural leader. In fact, several other states, among them Egypt, Turkey, and Iran, appear to be considerably more powerful in this regard. Moreover, Saudi Arabia is perceived in the Middle East to have been too closely aligned with the West and consequently lacks the necessary moral high ground and credibility (Aburish 1994). Like Egypt, Iraq, and Iran, the Saudis have little chance of becoming an Islamic core state anytime in the near future.

Without a leader, Islamic states tend to go their own way. That means there is no common sense of purpose for them on various issues, even when there may be basic agreement on those issues. Huntington calls it "conscience without cohesion" (1996: 177). There is no strong power to assist in looking out for the interests of Islamic states, or to provide carrots and sticks to encourage moderation of behavior. In the absence of such a force Islamic states are free, or perhaps doomed, to become involved in frequent violent conflicts, both of inter- and intra-civilizational natures.

A number of empirical studies support an expectation of higher than average contentiousness for Islamic countries. Among them are Gurr (1994), Sivard (1993), and the *New York Times* (1993). Gurr, for example, reports that during the two year span of his evaluation Muslims participated in 26 of 50 ethno-political conflicts around the world. Not all of those conflicts were inter-civilizational, but in the 20 that were, Muslims represented one side in 15 of them. This lends credence to Huntington's contention that Islam tends toward violence more so than other civilizations.

*Hypothesis 2.2: During the post-Cold War era, violent conflict will be more likely between members of the Islamic civilization and members of other civilizations than between members of non-Islamic civilizations.*

### **The West**

The West as a civilization is basically the countries of Western and Central Europe, the United States and Canada, and Australia and New Zealand. It is mainly composed of industrialized democracies or states recently free of Soviet control that are making significant strides toward strong industrialized democratic status. Huntington excludes Latin America and Mexico from the Western civilization, designating that area as its own civilization, largely because he says they had a different development history than did the rest of the West (1996: 46).

In Huntington's vision, the Western civilization of today started to emerge in the 8<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> centuries, but did not begin to develop modern Western culture until about three centuries later. Like other civilizations, the West has a history of imperialism. But unlike those other civilizations, Western imperialism is a recent phenomenon. Because it happened in more recent times, advances in technology allowed western explorers to travel farther and conquer more lands and peoples in less time than was previously possible. Between Columbus's "discovery" of the Western Hemisphere and the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, Western civilization spread to and conquered all or most of five of the six inhabitable continents. Huntington reports that in 1920 in excess of 84% of the earth's land surface was controlled by the West.<sup>3</sup>

Huntington posits that the West won the world by superiority in applying organized violence, and that this fact is remembered and resented by non-Westerners (1996: 51). This assertion is most likely correct, but also ironic since other civilizations expanded in much the same manner, just at a slower pace and less efficiently. Resentment about the West's imperialism may be less a matter of how it was implemented than the fact that many of the effects still exist today. Though not as strong as previously, the West retains enormous power and influence, much more so than any other single civilization and possibly more than all of the

---

<sup>3</sup> Huntington (1996) discusses the issue of territory controlled by the West in more than one place. On page 51 he specifies western control of in excess of 84% of the earth's land surface, but on page 84 he states that the figure is "close to half", which is more consistent with his map on pages 22-23. Huntington does not explain these inconsistencies, but most likely it is because Central and South America, once a collection of Western colonies, were by 1920 mostly independent. If they are included, the 84% figure is reasonable. (Estimates do not include Antarctica.)

others combined. During the twentieth century the world moved toward global political and economic systems, but usually under the leadership and, to a great extent, control of the West. Along the way, Huntington reminds us that Western states tended to treat each other as equals, but many others as subordinates. And there are still many people alive today in Africa and Asia who remember living under Western colonialism.

Because of the West's power, for years its culture was a center of fascination for other civilizations, but that fascination has been receding. Huntington discusses Dore's "second generation indigenization phenomenon" (1996: 93). These two authors relate that non-Western nations sent many of their first modernized generation of students off to Western universities for modern training. However, those same civilizations have since developed their own universities, and their subsequent generations of students no longer depend on the West for technical expertise or modernization philosophy. Huntington says that many people in the other civilizations are increasingly proud to stand on their own, with feelings of independence and a belief in the superiority of non-Western values, but also with resentment for past feelings of inferiority (1996: 93).

Looking deeper at this resentment, Huntington's theory holds that the West has had a "major and at times devastating impact on every other civilization" (1996: 183). Consequently, he expects the other civilizations to have contentious relations with the West, to the extent that states from the various civilizations will join forces, on a temporary basis for short term objectives, against Western states and interests at various times and under a variety of circumstances.

This concept would remind us that the countries of Central and South America (which Huntington categorizes as the Latin American civilization) may have particularly strong feelings in this regard. For years they exhibited long-held resentments about their former colonizers in Europe, and also about what they perceived as exploitive treatment from the United States. Today the West is clearly more advanced economically and militarily than any of the other civilizations. Following Huntington's logic it may be natural to expect the poorer, less advantaged groups to look for revenge or team up for advantages.

Then again, revenge can be counterproductive. For example, in spite of their differences and tensions, the U.S. and China depend on each other for much of their economic success (Jisi 2005). Actions by one that negatively impact the other may also have negative domestic results.



Eastern European states freshly freed from Soviet control in the early 1990s (including some Orthodox states) quickly jumped at opportunities to join the West through both NATO and the European Union, even though for years these organizations had been among their declared enemies. Also, there is now a Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) designed to bring the smaller Latin American states closer to the U.S. trade wise. Beyond the theoretical, I find little evidence for Huntington's suggestion of the West vs. the rest. Still, the West is often involved in conflict, so this concept bears exploring. The next hypothesis is as follows:

*Hypothesis 2.3: During the post-Cold War era, violent conflict will be more likely between members of the Western civilization and members of other civilizations than between members of two non-Western civilizations.*

Huntington expands his view concerning the West and Islam by forecasting that these two civilizations will have a particularly conflict-prone relationship (1996: 209-218). He argues that history belies the idea espoused by Western leaders that the West does not have issues with Islam, but rather has them only with Islamic extremists. He contends that over the past fourteen hundred years Christianity and Islam have been in serious competition for "power, land, and souls."<sup>4</sup>

Beginning in the seventh century with the Arab conquest of Spain, according to Huntington, the interests and actions of the two civilizations have collided regularly. These collisions run through the European retaking of Southern France and Iberia, the Crusades, and the Ottoman subjugation and rule of the Balkans and its pressure on the rest of Europe. In the 20<sup>th</sup> Century Western nations colonized the Middle East and North Africa and competed among themselves for the region's resources. Friction and fighting have often been a major part of the relationship between Islam and the West.

But the existing contentiousness, as Huntington sees it, is not attributable to the accumulation of ill will due to the historical conflicts, or to "twelfth-century Christian passion or twentieth-century Muslim fundamentalism" (Huntington 1996: 210). Instead, he credits both the historical conflicts and current tensions with the basic nature of the two religions and the civilizations built upon them. As discussed previously, Christianity separates religion from

---

<sup>4</sup> Huntington (1996: 209) quoting from Esposito (1992: 46).

politics, whereas Islam blends them. And, as the Mohammed cartoon fiasco of early 2006 demonstrated,<sup>5</sup> freedoms of one society can and do clash with restrictions/taboo of the other.

In addition to their fundamental differences, there are similarities that also invite conflict. Both claim to be the one true faith, and both sincerely believe they have an obligation to convert the world. To this Huntington adds five fairly recent trends and events that further exacerbate tensions. These include the previously discussed growing Muslim population leaving large numbers of young men jobless, a renewed Muslim confidence in Islamic values compared to those of the West, the West's propensity to intervene in matters Islam sees as its business, the collapse of communism which removed a common enemy, and the increased exposure and interaction of the two worlds to and with each other, making both more aware of their own identities and differences.

Huntington asserts that tolerance between Islam and the West declined in the final decades of the twentieth century. Events of the last few years would seem to support a contention that such a decline, if it happened, continues. Considering the above discussed deep-seated differences between the two peoples and the fundamentalists who continue to add fuel to the fires in their efforts to prevent peace between the sides, Huntington appears to have established a prima-facie case that the Islam-West civilization dyad has endured and will continue to endure stormy relations. Hence, the next hypothesis:

*Hypothesis 2.4: During the post-Cold War era, violent conflict will be more likely between members of the Western and Islamic civilizations than between members of other civilizations.*

### **The Sinics**

And finally, Huntington expresses his belief that the Sinics will be one of the major participants in the clash. The Sinic civilization covers a considerable portion of the East Asia-Pacific region and consists of 1.5 billion people in seven countries. However, over 1.3 billion of them, or about 90%, are in China. Thus, the terms Sinic and Chinese are practically, though not entirely, synonymous.

For several decades and since the Cold War in particular, the United States has been the dominant power in the Asia-Pacific region, but that is changing. As Mahbubani (2005: 49) puts

---

<sup>5</sup> In response to a publication in Denmark in which cartoons depicted Mohammed as a war monger, violent riots broke out in several Islamic countries resulting in dozens of deaths and the ransacking of offices and destruction of property belonging to Western companies – whether they were Danish or not.

it, China is like a dragon “waking up after several centuries.” Thus far it is stretching and getting its bearings. Mahbubani states that the region, and perhaps the world, is waiting to see how China eventually reacts. Huntington reminds us that since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution all major powers that went through rapid industrialization and economic growth either simultaneously or shortly thereafter “engaged in outward expansion, assertion, and imperialism” (1996: 229). China is currently going through rapid industrialization and with it economic growth and military expansion.

Mearsheimer (2002) argues that strong powers, which China is becoming, will seek to dominate their neighbors as regional hegemony. But Rosecrance (2006) disagrees, believing that countries do not always assert their power. He suggests that this may be because they are more interested in growth through trade and do not need additional territory. Among the examples that he cites are modern Japan and the United States in the 1920s and 30s.

As China “stretches,” to use one of Mahbubani’s terms, it is experiencing an enormous need for resources, as it does not have anywhere near a sufficient stock of its own (Bijian 2005; Zweig and Jianhai 2005). It has aggressively entered the world market, striving to lock in for acquisition as much fuel and other important materials as it can. This puts China in direct competition with other civilizations, most notably the West and Japan, for these resources. Since China is so large and its appetite is likely to grow rather than recede, concern naturally arises. There is concern outside China about its drain on the availability of resources for others, and concern inside China about reactions by others to its acquisition of these resources (Zweig and Jianhai 2005). Conflict between China and others over resources is a very real potentiality.

According to Huntington, the material success of increased economic and military power, referred to as hard power, is followed by *cultural* assertion, as hard power generates soft power. Huntington declares that China has set among its national goals to become a champion of Chinese culture and to become the East Asian hegemonic power (1996: 168). An argument can be made that it is making solid progress on both fronts. Therefore, Huntington’s perception of China’s contribution to the clash of civilizations will be tested.

*Hypothesis 2.5: During the post-Cold War era, violent conflict will be more likely between members of the Sinic civilization and members of other civilizations than between members of two non-Sinic civilizations.*

## Critics and Other Problems

As noted in Chapter 1 several studies investigated Huntington's hypothesis and failed to find empirical support for his contentions. Henderson and Tucker (2001) evaluate the occurrences of war (1000 or more deaths in a conflict) and find that different-civilization states are neither more nor less likely to fight one another during the post-Cold War era, and that when such important factors as distance, joint democracy, or power parity are controlled for, effects of civilization membership are not statistically significant. They also discover no significance for different-civilization war during the Cold War. They report not being sure what this means, since they found plenty of wars, both same- and different-civilization, during this time period. They argue that Huntington's work is devoid of controls and places far too much emphasis on intrastate disturbances of the early 1990s, with much less attention paid to interstate conflicts along his own major fault lines. They further suggest that he over relied on "anecdote and selective (in)attention to the historical record" (2001: 332).

Russett, Oneal, and Cox (2000) examine the occurrence of militarized interstate disputes, or MIDs (the threat, demonstration, or actual use of military force). MIDs include all levels of militarized disputes ranging from war all the way down to those in which one state makes an idle threat that is not responded to by the other. Thus, this study takes a very different approach to the definition of a clash from that of Henderson and Tucker. Russett et al. find that disputes across civilizational boundaries are not significantly more common than for other pairs of states. They report that in half of the civilizations fighting is more prominent within than without, and that measures of military, political, and economic interests provide a better account of interstate violence than does Huntington's theory.

Both groups of researchers readily agree that the time factor used in these studies is problematic. Henderson and Tucker acknowledge the weakness of including only the years 1989-1992 for their post-Cold War analysis, but argue that since that was the limit of empirical data available to them in their analysis, it was also the limit of what was available to Huntington in the development of his theory, and therefore should be as appropriate for refuting as constructing his claims. Russett et al. actually used a time frame of 1950-1992, which was much broader than the post-Cold War and makes their results even more problematic. However, they do investigate for trends and conclude that the number of different-civilization conflicts decrease as opposed to increase towards the end of the Cold War.

LaSala's (2003) study had a time issue of a different nature. He has an advantage in that his empirical data runs through 2001, but his period of evaluation, as discussed in Chapter 1, is 1980-2001. He reports that, like the two studies above, he also finds little overall evidence of influence of civilizational membership on international conflict. Yet, within his study there are a number of instances of strong support. For example, using one of his sets of actual data he finds statistical significance for increased likelihood of different-civilization conflict when considering all non-violent and violent conflict. But, he gets contradictory results using his corresponding proportional data. LaSala has more confidence in and relies more upon the proportional rather than the actual data sets. Such contradictions, along with the unusual time frame of analysis, lead to questions about his results.

Other scholars, while not using empirical methods, have nevertheless reviewed Huntington's proposals and found them difficult to accept. Ajami (1993), for example, believes that Huntington does not give enough credit to the influence of states. He accuses Huntington of ignoring furrows that "run across whole civilizations" and of underestimating the "tenacity of modernity and secularism" that has taken place within all or parts of civilizations (1993: 27). Binyan (1993) sees economic issues as exerting more weight than civilizations. He points out that early in the 20<sup>th</sup> century the Chinese people were eager to accept Communism in search of economic development, and more recently have turned to Western values in pursuit of that same materialistic well being. Furthermore, he expresses serious doubt that common Confucian culture can overcome the political differences on opposite sides of the Taiwan Strait. And Kirkpatrick (1993) notes that the most violent war of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, World War II, was to a great extent a same-civilization conflict.

These and other scholars make credible points about weaknesses in Huntington's theories. But many of them, like Huntington, are using history selectively without the more thorough and less partial aspects of rigorous empirical analysis. It is the previous empirical studies that I am more concerned with. These existing attempts to test Huntington's arguments have been weakened by three important research design problems: lack of relevant data; inappropriate populations of cases (or inappropriate measures of fault lines); and inappropriate or incomplete measures of conflict. This study overcomes all three.

First, regarding lack of relevant data, the size of the post Cold War temporal domain used by Russett et al. (2000) and Henderson and Tucker (2001) is, as already noted, insufficient for a

comprehensive test. The three years of post-Cold War conflict data available at the time provide little opportunity for a detailed exploration of the concept in question. Such a short period does not allow for the recognition of trends, and in this instance mostly or completely excludes the actions about two dozen new countries that gained independence in the early 1990s.

Incorporating new data through 2001 overcomes this shortcoming.

Second, the inclusion of all possible worldwide dyads in an analysis without controlling for contiguity fails to place appropriate emphasis upon Huntington's fault lines, where he posited the clash would take place. Henderson and Tucker include distance in their analyses, but they merely reverify that distance plays a role in international conflict, as has been demonstrated in multiple studies before. Russett et al. control for contiguity, but include dyads separated by open water of up to 150 miles distance. Such separations prevent the frequent contact and friction addressed by Huntington when he discussed fault lines. These aforementioned approaches do not adequately differentiate between different-civilization states that share land borders and those that do not. The probability that Saudi Arabia of the Islamic civilization will go to war with Guatemala in the Latin American civilization is extremely low due to the distance between them. A similar assertion could be made about Iran and India, members of different civilizations but located on the same continent separated by only a few hundred miles and one other country. I consistently isolate the fault lines through the use of an interaction term that restricts contiguity to the sharing of land borders.

And third, these two studies use greatly different dependent variables to measure conflict. Henderson and Tucker restrict Huntington's clashes to interstate wars involving at least 1000 battle deaths. On the other hand, Russett et al. include all Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID). MIDs include disputes that escalate to full scale war, but also those that may consist of a mere threat. In addition to this wide gulf, LaSala (2003) uses a series of dependent variables including conflict frequency (with the presence of MIDs as the definition of conflict), conflict intensity, and conflict escalation. LaSala finds the latter two somewhat problematic, as he states that he "will measure it [intensity] as inclusively as possible" (2003: 136), and that he will "operationalize escalation as inclusively as possible" (2003: 138). The obvious conclusion to this discussion of dependent variables is that there is no uniformly acceptable definition of what a clash is, and Huntington does not provide one. Rather than attempting to determine which one might be the best, I utilize three dependent variables in a series of parallel analyses. These

variables measure conflict at levels that equate to low, high, and also an interim point that I argue includes all serious conflicts, many of which are well short of the 1000 deaths of Henderson and Tucker, while excluding the less serious conflicts.

### **Research Design**

At this juncture I wish to reiterate a point made in Chapter 1. That being, there is a recognized difference between civilizations and states; however, Huntington's theory of a clash of civilizations is commonly accepted to mean that states belonging to different civilizations are more likely to come into conflict with each other. Consequently, states are appropriate for use in the study of civilizations, and in fact are the only reasonable method of doing so at this time.

The principal focus of this chapter is on real and predicted events during the post-Cold War period, represented as the years 1990-2001. The Cold War is generally considered to have ended in November 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall (Baker 1995; Halberstam 2001), and 2001 is the most recent year that empirical conflict data is available. Having said that, the overall temporal domain is 1946-2001. The Cold War is included for comparison purposes as Huntington expected that different-civilization conflict, a hypothesized phenomenon, would occur only rarely during the Cold War but would increase dramatically afterwards. He theorized that friction among the civilizations would be suppressed in the context of the ideological conflict taking place between the two Cold War superpowers (1996: 39).

Most of the data for this analysis was collected by the Correlates of War (COW) project (Jones et al. 1996; Ghosn and Palmer 2003), and the assembling of data was enhanced through the use of the Expected Utility Generation and Data Management Program (EUGene) (Bennett and Stam 2000). The basic unit of observation is the dyad year (non-directed dyads).

The dependent variables will be dichotomous; therefore, the method of analysis is the logit variant of maximum likelihood using a series of cross-sectional/time-series models.<sup>6</sup> The need to compensate for errors induced by such models is emphasized by a number of sources, including Beck, Katz and Tucker (1998) and Gujarati (2003). I employ the peace years count and linear spline variables to counteract autocorrelation associated with time-series data. (The

---

<sup>6</sup> Violent conflict occurs rarely when compared with the number of observations of dyadic years included in empirical models. King and Zeng (2001) developed a rare events procedure (relogit) that compensates for problems inherent in such models. Relogit was employed and results were compared with those attained using the basic logit function. There were no instances in which a significance level changed from one type of regression to the other. Since results were the same and relogit does not support the Clarify predicted probabilities functions used in this chapter, the regular logit procedure was retained.

peace years count and spline variable values are not reported in the results.) Standard errors are clustered by dyad. Predicted probabilities are calculated using Clarify software (Tomz et al. 2003).

***Dependent Variable:***

The dependent variable is the occurrence or absence of a “clash.” One of the most difficult aspects of constructing a research design to analyze the ‘clash of civilizations’ lies in the determination of exactly what a clash is. Huntington expends great effort in discussing the nature of civilizations and the conflicting relations and tensions between them, but he apparently assumes that a clash is a universally accepted principle. The term he uses most often to describe a clash is conflict. Like clash, he does not define conflict, but a common definition is a difference in preferred outcomes in a bargaining situation (Goldstein 2004: 183). Consequently, a conflict may be anything from a mild disagreement to a violent and protracted war. Huntington writes of “great divisions among humankind” (1993: 207) and the potential for the use of force, but also of seemingly less serious descriptions such as quasi war, uneasy peace, and troubled relations (1996: 207-208). Surprisingly, the word ‘war’ surfaces only infrequently in his discussions and does not even appear in the index of his book (1996).

Nowhere does Huntington make a specific attempt to define what a clash is. He merely presents us with the term and leaves it to us to determine what level of violence, if any, it includes. This is easy for Huntington because he only discusses a concept; he does not test it in any systematic sense. However, empirical analyses require specific definitions in order to conduct hypothesis testing, especially for the dependent variable.

Previous empirical studies have varied greatly in their definitions of clash. As already discussed, Henderson and Tucker restricted the term to wars including 1000 battle deaths, Russett et al. looked at all MIDs, some of which are as mild as threats conveyed by only one side of a dyad, and LaSala included intensity and escalation. I submit that few nations would deem a mere threat to be a clash of substance; on the other hand, numbers of battle deaths far below 1000 may be considered significant by many countries. Based on one’s point of view, any definition of clash may be construed as arbitrary. Moreover, ignoring either higher or lower intensity conflicts leaves any results open to wide criticism. Accordingly, I conduct three parallel analyses that evaluate conflict at what are essentially low, serious, and high or extreme intensities.



The lowest level is actually all-inclusive, incorporating all militarized interstate disputes (MID). The high level will use the COW threshold for war, 1000 battle deaths. The parameters for serious conflict present a greater challenge. In their *Armed Conflict* data set Strand et al. (2003) define 25 battle deaths as an intermediate level of conflict. However, I prefer a somewhat higher threshold and propose that an occurrence of more than 100 fatalities is reasonable and appropriate for what I term as a serious level. Again, this number might be seen as arbitrary; nevertheless, 100 deaths is significant by most any standard. This minimum number allows the inclusion of conflicts where deaths total in the hundreds, all of which are excluded using war as a dependent variable. On the other hand, this cutoff point excludes those incidents where the amount of lives lost might be considered significant for a single military battle, but perhaps not so for a conflict that extends over more than either a few days or multiple battles. Exceeding one hundred deaths in any encounter or series of encounters should be recognized for what the label implies, serious violent conflict.

The COW MID data set reports dispute-related fatalities in terms of six categories, ranging from zero deaths (level 0), or 1-25 deaths (level 1), to more than 999 deaths (level 6), the latter being its definition of war. My “serious” measure of more than 100 battle deaths corresponds to the COW fatality levels 3 and higher.<sup>7</sup> The designations and coding of the three dependent variables are as follows: *MID* is coded 1 if any MID occurs in a given year and 0 if not; *serious* is 1 if any MID results in more than 100 battle deaths and 0 if not; and *war* is coded 1 if a conflict occurs with at least 1000 battle deaths and 0 if not.

My analysis in this chapter is primarily concerned with the occurrence of violence and the civilizations represented in these occurrences. To that end, joiners are included. Joiners are states that are not the initial belligerents but enter a conflict in support of an ally after it begins. However, even though the unit of observation is the dyad year, where a dispute continues into the following year it is counted as only one dispute.

### ***Civilizations:***

The primary focus of this analysis is cultural conflict, and Huntington’s civilizations are used to differentiate cultures. Therefore, the explanatory variable of key interest is civilizations, or more specifically, dyadic civilizations. Earlier in this chapter civilizations are defined and

---

<sup>7</sup> Even though I chose 100 as opposed to the 25 of Strand et al., analysis reveals almost no statistical difference in results between the two.

discussed. Broadly defined, they are the largest overarching identities shared by groups of people. For an empirical analysis to be conducted all countries must be categorized by civilization and then paired. Huntington does not identify each nation by category, but instead provides a map (1996: 26) that approximates states and their civilizations. I use his map as guidance in assigning each nation-state to a specific category. The map makes the assignments of some states quite clear but others it does not. In those cases the below explained guidelines<sup>8</sup> are used to assist in making appropriate designations. I have coded states into the nine civilizations identified by Huntington or into an ‘other’ category as follows:

(1) *Western*. These states include Canada and the United States, most of Western and Central Europe, and other countries of similar customs, cultures and governments, such as Australia and New Zealand. The great majority of these are either democracies of long standing or are striving to become strong democracies.

(2) *Latin American*. This consists of most countries in Central and South America and a few in the Caribbean. Even though some scholars would put North and South America into the same group, Huntington believes the states of the South have a distinctive identity, having evolved along a different path from Europe than did their northern neighbors.

(3) *African*. This category appears to perplex Huntington. He calls Africa a civilization, “possibly” (1993: 209). The continent is actually split. The northern states are part of the Islamic world and quite distinct from those farther south. While Huntington has trouble making up his mind, he remarks that sub-Saharan Africa could cohere into a distinct civilization. In the final analysis he designates the states of southern Africa as part of their own civilization.

(4) *Sinic*, or what Westerners referred to in the past as Oriental. Sinic includes China and the Chinese related populations and common cultures found in countries such as the Koreas and Vietnam. It specifically excludes Japan.

(5) *Hindu*. In addition to the obvious choice of India, this civilization also includes Nepal.

(6) *Islam*. The Islamic world takes in all Arab countries throughout the Middle East and North Africa as well as other subcultures such as Turkic, Persian and Malay. It is also found in a number of the newly independent countries that split from the Soviet Union in the early 1990s.

---

<sup>8</sup> The guidelines presented here are basically the same as those developed by Huntington (1996: 45-48). In some instances I have expanded on them for clarification purposes.

(7) *Orthodox*. This civilization is centered in Russia and includes much of Eastern Europe. Huntington says it is distinct because of its historical lineage, bureaucratic despotism, and that as a religion it is unique.

(8) *Japanese*. Japan is considered a civilization by itself, having emerged from the Chinese nearly two thousand years ago. Huntington sees this group as the only civilization that has been able to modernize without “westernizing.”

(9) *Buddhism*. Huntington explains that some of the countries where Buddhism is the major religion are not necessarily part of the Buddhist civilization. Examples are China and Japan, where Huntington views the religion as having been adapted into the dominant cultures and suppressed to a certain extent. His outlook on Buddhism is that it is a major religion but not a major civilization (1996: 48). Having said that, he goes on to identify no less than seven Asian countries (plus the Tibet region of China) that are part of a Buddhist civilization. We must therefore conclude that Buddhism is a minor rather than major civilization, but a civilization nonetheless.

(0) *Other*. This category is reserved for countries that either do not really fit into one of the designated civilizations, or fit into more than one to the extent it is difficult to give them an assignment with a reasonable degree of confidence. For example, Guyana and Suriname in South America each consists of several ethnicities, with none constituting more than a third of the citizenry. In Haiti over 90 percent of the population is of African origin, but Haitians are far removed from that part of their history. They share an island with a Latin American country, the Dominican Republic, and have some cultural ties with France, including their language. Most Haitians follow Western religions/denominations, including Catholic and Baptist, though they add their own unique twists like “voodoo.” Overall it could be argued Haitians are “sort of African,” “sort of Western,” and “sort of Latin American,” but not overwhelmingly any of those. Haiti, Guyana, and Suriname are all assigned to the *other* category.

Israel lies in the center of the Middle East but is obviously not an Islamic state. In fact, it is the world’s only Jewish country, but due to its small size it is not a civilization recognized by Huntington, so like the previous three it is categorized as *other*. Consideration was given to classifying Israel as a Western state, due primarily to its close association with the United States and the Western base of much of its population. However, it really is unique as a Jewish state; in the end, there was no noticeable effect on results with it in either category.

There is also a number of small island nations in the Pacific and the Caribbean that, like the states above, do not fall into any particular civilization and all of these are categorized as *other*. While this category is not a separate civilization, it serves to differentiate these states from the nine that have been designated when they appear together in a dyad. Appendix 1 provides a breakdown of countries by civilization.

All states having been classified by civilization, a different-civilization variable is created for all dyads. If the two members of a dyad are from different civilizations the variable is coded 1; if they are members of the same civilization, it is coded 0.

***Other Explanatory Variables:***

Huntington's hypothesis places considerable emphasis on the fault lines, those places where different civilizations are contiguous, or physically located next to each other. These are the places where they have local and frequent interactions, thus generating the greatest opportunities to come into conflict with each other. In order to test this facet, first a dichotomous proximity variable is established that codes dyads with a value of 1 if they are geographically contiguous to each other and 0 if they are not. Many scholars include in their definitions of contiguity as separated by up to 150 miles of open water. I restrict it to the sharing of land borders because the local interaction Huntington specifies for the fault lines is greatly reduced or eliminated by such open bodies of water.

To complete the fault line testing, a variable interacting civilizations with contiguity is created to control for the conditional effects of distance. This is necessary for situations like the example cited previously about Guatemala and Saudi Arabia. That is, they are of different civilizations and in the strictest sense of Huntington's hypothesis they are susceptible to differences and clashes. In reality, however, the distance and obstacles between them make it unlikely that they will have such serious conflicts and attack each other militarily. The contiguity-civilizations interaction term allows focus on a country's immediate neighbors, those states where differences *can* manifest themselves into problems and violent clashes as opposed to those dyads not on the fault lines.

Consideration was given to using relevant dyads as opposed to contiguous dyads for this analysis. The former consists of dyads that include contiguous states, major powers, and states that are "proximate enough in terms of distance and terrain to be potential war fighters" (Lemke 1995: 23). This approach would expand the number of dyads that are likely to fight. However,

the fault lines are defined as contiguous, thus allowing those states to come into regular, direct contact. Many relevant dyads do not allow for this opportunity. Some examples are Russia and Costa Rica, France and Qatar, and China and Botswana. Accordingly, the contiguous interaction term provides a better test of the fault lines.

Dichotomous variables coded 1 and 0 are created for the Islamic, Western, and Sinic civilizations. These are used for calculating predicted probabilities and to test hypotheses 2.2, 2.3, and 2.5, which predict in varying degrees that countries from these civilizations will be involved in high levels of inter-civilizational conflict.

For the comparison of the Cold War and its aftermath two additional variables are created. The first is a post-Cold War time period dummy, coded 1 if the observed year is 1990-2001, and 0 if not. The second interacts this *post-Cold War* dummy with the civilization-contiguity interaction term. Positive statistical significance of this variable will indicate strong performance of different-civilization conflict on the fault lines after the Cold War as compared to during.

***Control Variables:***

Two control variables are used for this analysis. The first is dyadic democracy. As part of the democratic peace theory a number of researchers, including Oneal and Russett (1999), Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999), and Maoz and Russett (1993) find that high joint democracy scores tend to dampen the likelihood of nations going to war. To test for this assertion democracy ratings are included from the Polity IV data (Marshall and Jaggers 2002). In that data set regimes are rated on a scale running 0 to 10, with 0 the least democratic and 10 the most. A dichotomous joint democratic variable is coded 1 if both members of a dyad have polity scores of 7 or above, and 0 if one or both have a score below 7.

The second control variable is power parity, or relative military capabilities, which are considered to be a factor in the decision of states to go to war (Bremer 1992). More to the point, the power transition theory anticipates that equal or nearly equal power between two countries will be associated with conflict (Lemke and Kugler 1996; Geller 1996; Gilpin 1981). A power parity variable is constructed using the Correlates of War's Combined Index of Capabilities (CINC). The CINC score captures each country's global share of demographic (total and urban population), military (spending and personnel), and economic capabilities (iron and steel production, energy consumption). I divide the smaller of the two military capabilities scores by

the sum of the two. A resulting .5 indicates perfect parity, or symmetry, while a 0 assumes total domination by one side. Increases in value move toward power parity, while decreases approach power dominance.

Henderson and Tucker (2001) use a one year lag (t-1) when incorporating power parity into their study. I theorize that in this case the current year variable is more appropriate. If the main actors are people who do not have access to the latest military information, such as citizens considering their nation's military strength when voting, then a lag is appropriate as they will be acting upon information that they have read about or seen in the news in past time periods. However, when a nation is preparing for the possibility of war, its leaders will have access to the latest information about their own armed forces, and the most current facts about the enemy that their intelligence networks can provide. Since leaders should have current information about their own military and information gleaned from intelligence sources about that of the opposition, I choose to use the current power parity variable as opposed to the lag.

### **Findings**

The initial analyses cover the period following the close of the Cold War. If Huntington's claims are correct, we are in the time where the clash of civilizations is taking place. There should be considerably more international different-civilization conflict than same-civilization conflict. This would be indicated in the previously suggested regression models by a positive and statistically significant contiguity-civilizations interaction term, which represents different-civilization dyads along the fault lines, and subsequent confirming predicted probabilities.

Analyses are run using three different models with MID, serious conflict and war as dependent variables, respectively, representing three intensities of conflict. Table 2.1 provides regression results. In all three models the contiguity-civilizations interaction term is positive and statistically significant.<sup>9</sup> This provides an initial impression of support for the hypothesis. However, comparison of combined effects of the key variables indicates a slightly higher rate of

---

<sup>9</sup> Additionally, analyses were run and compared for the years 1989-92, the period used by most of the previous empirical studies on civilization clashes, and 1993-2001. The intent was to ascertain if there was a notable difference in conflict trends in these two periods. There was. For the two more serious levels the fault line variable was statistically significant during the latter period, but not during the former. MIDs were significant in both periods.

conflict between same-civilization dyads as compared with different-civilization states.<sup>10</sup> Additionally, the predicted probabilities in Table 2.2a illustrate that overall there is a higher likelihood of violence between states within civilizations than between those from different civilizations. Probabilities in Table 2.2b show that for specific dyads this is not always the case, but in general, same-civilization states are more likely to clash than are those from different civilizations. These results are not consistent with Huntington's theory that in the post-Cold War a clash of civilizations will exist, as presented in hypothesis 2.1.

Throughout these analyses most, though not all, of the other variables perform as expected. Civilization is negative and statistically significant. As discussed previously, same-civilization states tend to be clustered, so most different-civilization dyads are separated by considerable distance and other countries. They generally have neither reasons nor opportunity to come into violent conflict with each other. Conversely, contiguity is positive and significant. States that share land borders are more likely to have frequent dealings with each other, and are therefore more likely to have disagreements leading to higher levels of conflict than are states that are separated geographically.

Power parity, one of the controls, also performs as expected. In all three models, as the military power of states approach symmetry the likelihood of conflict increases. Joint democracy, the other control, performs as expected in the war model, moving dyads away from violent conflict. In the models where the dependent variable consists of MIDs or serious conflict, joint democracy is negative as anticipated, but is not statistically significant.

While initially surprising, this phenomenon can be explained by the findings of Mitchell and Prins (1999) in a democratic peace study. They conclude that even though democracies seldom, if ever, go to war with each other, they still engage in a substantial number of lower intensity disputes. Mitchell and Prins argue that these MIDs involving states with high democracy scores do not lead to war because they are generally over issues that do not lend themselves to the types of intensity that generate wars. Contests over fishing rights are much less likely to result in an invasion than ownership or control of mainland territory. In other words, democracies are perfectly willing to bicker among themselves, but not over the more serious issues that lead to violence. If joint democracy does not suppress lower level MIDs in

---

<sup>10</sup> Combining the coefficients of the key variables (different civilizations, contiguity, and the interaction term that combines the two) produces a total that is slightly less than the coefficient of the contiguity variable, thus indicating that contiguous same-civilization states (represented by the contiguity variable) are more likely to engage in conflict.

democratic dyads, it is not surprising to find that democracy also does not suppress lower level conflict among different-civilization dyads. This becomes even more understandable considering that a larger proportion of the same-civilization dyad observations share high democracy scores than do different-civilization observations (37% vs. 25%).

Hypotheses 2.2, 2.3 and 2.5 predict higher than average participation in different-civilization conflict for the Islamic, Western and Sinic civilizations. Analysis results are interesting in a number of ways with respect to these hypotheses. For example, Huntington expected Islam to be the most contentious of all civilizations. Yet, in the MID model Islam does not achieve statistical significance and thus does not demonstrate much of a propensity for conflict. Conversely, as the intensity of conflict increases, so does the performance of the Islamic variable in the logit analyses, as it is statistically significant at both of the higher intensities. Islam's predicted probability for conflict is much less than that for Western states at the two lower intensities (when not paired against each other), but where only war is included Islamic states are more likely to be involved than are those from the West.

The West lives up to Huntington's expectations about engaging in a high rate of different-civilizational conflict. It is statistically significant in all three models and at the two lower intensities (MID and serious) it has higher probabilities of conflict than Islam. But Huntington expected the West to have heavy involvement because it would literally be under siege from the rest of the world (the West and the rest); that is, it would have conflicts with most of the other civilizations repeatedly over time. Tables 2.3a, b, and c break down the occurrences of conflict among the civilizations after the end of the Cold War. As can be seen, all of the West's cross-cultural serious conflicts except one were confined to only two civilizations, Islam and the Orthodox. The lone exception was the U.S. invasion of Panama in December 1989.<sup>11</sup> And at the highest intensity, Western states went to war only against Islamic states. The West has a strong propensity for conflict, but there is no indication that there is systematic fighting between "the West and the rest."

Even so, what is it about the West that leads to involvement in so many dyadic conflicts? As can be seen in Appendix 2, which provides a list of all serious conflicts by civilization, the West has a propensity to band together. Driving Iraq out of Kuwait in 1991 and the invasion of

---

<sup>11</sup> The evaluated time period begins in January 1990, but since the Cold War is assumed to have ended in November 1989, the U.S.-Panama conflict is included.



Afghanistan in pursuit of Al Qaeda after the 9-11 of 2001 attacks account for all of the Western wars. In each case a coalition of Western states joined forces against a single foe, but the pairing of each Western state with its opponent is a dyadic conflict. While these are genuine wars, elimination of these two conflicts would also eliminate all 19 of the wars the West was involved in and over half of those involving Islam. Similarly, if the breakup of Yugoslavia is eliminated, all of the serious Western-Orthodox disputes also disappear. This does not lessen the contentiousness of the West, but demonstrates that this contentiousness stems from cooperation within rather than attacks from without.

The same comment about “the rest” cannot be said of Islam. Table 2.3b illustrates that Islamic states had serious clashes with six of the other eight civilizations and with four of them multiple times. In fact, the only civilizations it has not clashed violently with are the two that avoided all conflict at the upper levels (Sinic and Buddhist). Additionally, there were 35 different-civilization dyadic pairings involving 1000 or more deaths during the evaluated time frame, and Islam was represented in all of them. These 35 pairings occurred in only eight actual wars, but just two wars accounted for all of the 19 pairings with the West. At the highest intensity there appears little doubt as to which of the civilizations is the most contentious.

We have thus found support for hypotheses 2.2 and 2.3 (high contentiousness for Islam and the West). Hypothesis 2.5 expects a similar finding for the Sinics, but the Sinic variable performs very differently. Where MID is the dependent variable it does not achieve statistical significance as expected. And, during the post-Cold War the Sinic civilization does not engage in any serious different-civilization conflicts. The Sinic civilization is absolutely not a major participant where different-civilization conflict is concerned. This is not consistent with and does not support hypothesis 2.5.

Hypothesis 2.4 anticipates that the most contentious dyad will be Islam and the West. The dyad’s probability of conflict is higher than any of the other pairings at the two upper intensities. Western and Orthodox states actually engaged in more serious conflicts than did Western and Islamic states (see Table 2.3b). Yet, none of those conflicts escalated to war (Table 2.3c). As indicated above, Islam was represented in all 35 of the war pairings, and Western states were their opponents in 19 of them. This dyadic match-up accounts for well over half of the conflicts reaching the war category. Considering the predicted probabilities, and assuming

that war is the pinnacle of conflict and accounts for the most death and destruction, the West and Islam as a dyad are unrivaled in their contentiousness. Hypothesis 2.4 is supported.

Huntington (1996: 42) suggests that religions are among the most, if not *the* most, divisive of all cultural factors, and Henderson (1997: 664) declares that religion exerts twice the impact on conflict that contiguity does. This brings to mind the question of what might the results be if the above analyses had been conducted using religion rather than civilizations as the identifying entities. To find out, supplementary analyses were estimated. The Western, Latin American and Orthodox civilizations were combined into a Christian group; the Sinic, Japanese and Buddhists were similarly combined to form a Buddhist religion; and the Hindi and Islamic civilizations were counted as individual religions. Sub-Saharan African countries are often a mixture of Christian and traditional religions. For that reason the African civilization was also put into a religious group of its own.<sup>12</sup> A different-religion variable was constructed (coded 1 if a dyad had different religions; 0 if the same) and a contiguity-religion interaction term was generated.

Logit regressions were run at the three intensities, and the Christian, Islamic, and Buddhist religions were included as separate variables, as they include the three civilizations Huntington hypothesized about. Results are provided in Table 2.4 and provide some surprising differences. To begin with, the interaction term (different religions and contiguity) is positive and statistically significant in the first two models, but not where war is the dependent variable ( $p > .570$ ). Conversely, the different *civilizations* and contiguity variable is statistically significant for war (Table 2.1). The Islamic civilization is not significant in the MID model, but is in the more serious conflict models. The Islamic religion is strongly significant in all three models. Christianity is positive and statistically significant in the MID model, but not in the serious and war models (though it is marginally significant in the serious model at  $p > .062$ ). The Buddhist religion is significant only in the MID model.

Predicted probabilities in Table 2.5a reveal that, much like in the civilizations models, same-religion dyads are more likely to engage in conflict than are different-religion dyads. As with the civilizations, when specific different-religion dyads are examined (Table 2.5b) their

---

<sup>12</sup> A separate series of analyses were run with the African civilization included in the Christian religion. The only change in statistical significance between the two series was that Christianity was significant in the war model when Africans were included, but not when they were in their own grouping. In addition, Israel was coded as a separate religion (Jewish), but had no effect on results.

probability of conflict is sometimes higher than that of the general trend. More interesting is a comparison of civilization and religious probabilities. At the MID level religious probabilities are considerably higher than are those for civilizations; in some cases they are dramatically higher. Also, different-religion dyads, both contiguous and non-contiguous, have a higher likelihood of war than do different-civilization dyads. For most other serious conflict, including other scenarios of war, civilization pairings are more likely to fight. While religion appears to be at the root of much lower level conflict, civilization differences surface more often than do religions for more of the serious conflict.

### **Cold War Comparison**

Part of Huntington's theory was that different-civilization conflict would be rare during the Cold War, and then would dramatically increase over the years following. Table 2.6 provides a breakdown of the numbers and percentages of conflicts, by category, which occurred in each of the two time periods. The figures contained therein do not conform to Huntington's view. At all three intensities different-civilization conflict outnumbered same-civilization conflict during the Cold War, a clear indication that different-civilization conflict was not rare. In addition, percentages of conflict that was between different civilizations were actually higher during the Cold War than afterwards. For example, 65 percent of the conflict that rose to the serious level during the Cold War was between states from different civilizations. That share was 60 percent after the Cold War. Cross-cultural wars were even more notable, falling from 73 percent to less than half (48.5%).

For a more in-depth analysis of this trend a series of logit analyses were run that encompassed the years 1946-2001. This period included both the Cold War and its aftermath. Results are provided in Table 2.7. Contrary to Huntington's expectations, but more in line with information found in Table 2.6, results in all three models for the entire period are positive and statistically significant for the fault line interaction variable, and all three of the civilizations that have theoretical expectations are significant, including the Sinics. Different-civilization conflict, whether or not it is a clash of civilizations, has been with us for some time; it is not new to the post-Cold War world.

Cold War predicted probabilities (Table 2.8a) indicate that, like in the post-Cold War period, same-civilization states were more likely to have conflict than were members of different-civilizations. They also illustrate that the most contentious Cold War civilization dyad,

West-Sinic, has a higher likelihood of conflict than does the post-Cold War's most contentious dyad (West-Islam) in five of the six predicted situations (Table 2.8b). Whether Cold War different-civilization conflict was more or less likely than same-civilization conflict is actually irrelevant. What is important is that different-civilization conflict was an important factor during the Cold War, which is contrary to Huntington's theory.

Another interesting point is that a three-way variable that interacted the post-Cold War period with different-civilizations and contiguity (the fault lines) is not statistically significant at any of the intensities. Thus, cross cultural conflict after the Cold War does not stand out statistically when viewed as a part of the entire time frame. This is evidence that at worst, the different-civilization conflict that is experienced after the Cold War is business as usual, and at best it has actually moderated.

### **Discussion**

Hypothesis 2.1 expects to find support for Huntington's theory of the development of a 'clash of civilizations' in the aftermath of the Cold War. Huntington is correct in that the extent of international cross-cultural conflict in the post-Cold War era is an important and threatening phenomenon throughout the conflict intensity spectrum. However, analysis reveals that same-civilization states have a higher likelihood of clashing than do different-civilization states. Within the confines of different-civilization conflict, most of it is restricted to states from only three civilizations: Islam, the West, and the Orthodox. Of the 61 serious cross-cultural conflicts during the evaluated time period, states from these civilizations were pitted against each other in 50 of them, and represented one side in the other 11. All 61 were a product of these three civilizations in one way or another. Huntington saw the world exploding with conflict across the board, but led by some civilizations more than others. He did not discuss an expectation that this conflict would be so completely dominated by so few.

Furthermore, a major surprise is the results of the comparison of the above findings with what transpired during the Cold War. Huntington's emphasis was on the time afterwards, as he believed that the Cold War's ideological conflict between the two superpowers would suppress animosities between other groups. That is not the case. Fault line different-civilizational conflict is significant at all three intensity levels during the Cold War. In fact, when war is the dependent variable, fault line different-civilizational conflict performs even stronger during the Cold War than afterwards. And, the post-Cold War – contiguity – different-civilization triple interaction

variable that compares fault line conflict between the two eras indicates that different-civilization conflict after the Cold War does not stand out from the different-civilization conflict during the Cold War. In other words, the world's current level of civilization conflict is not new; it was with us throughout the Cold War, if not before.

In addition, Table 2.6 illustrates an actual decline in the percentage of overall conflict that is inter-civilizational after the Cold War, and it reaches across all three levels of intensity. An example is that cross-cultural war falls from nearly three fourths of all wars during the Cold War to less than half afterwards. Also, predicted probabilities demonstrate a higher likelihood of different-civilization conflict between the most contentious civilizations during the Cold War compared with after it. Otherwise, the likelihood of conflict is very similar in the two periods.

There is an abundance of cultural conflict. Overall it greatly outnumbered incidences of same-civilizational conflict. Whether one chooses to call this a 'clash of civilizations' is basically a matter of preference. But in his theory Huntington described a world of serious clashes between members of the different civilizations at increasing rates much greater than what had been seen previously. That does not match the evidence found in this analysis.

The anticipation of hypothesis 2.2 is that Islam will be a very contentious civilization after the Cold War. More to the point, Huntington expected Islam to be the most contentious of all. In line with his expectations, if not exceeding them, Islam is part of 39 of the era's 61 serious cross-cultural conflicts, and represents one side in all of the 35 wars. By far, it appears to be the most contentious.

But those facts do not provide a complete picture. Surprisingly, where all MID's are included (in the post-Cold War) Islam does not achieve statistical significance. This is not what would be expected of the most contentious grouping. But as the conflict intensity level rises, so does the degree of significance of Islamic participation. Islam's apparent domination of the war category may be misleading, as 24 of the 35 war pairings happened in just two disputes: the Gulf War of 1991 with Iraq and the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. In each case there was a large coalition, comprised largely of Western states, fighting against a lone Islamic member. (See Appendix 2 for specifics.)

These examples demonstrate two things. The first is a willingness within the West to assist each other in serious conflicts, especially if the cause is relatively popular and the opponent is weak. The second is that this Western willingness has created distorted statistics of

Islamic contentiousness. It is not that Islam is a victim of a Western conspiracy to create such an impression. Rather, from the civilizational conflict aspect, Islam as a group is a victim of choices of and actions by a few of its members. Still, those choices result in a higher number of serious conflicts that were participated in by Islamic states and for that reason Islam is, at the very least, one of the most contentious civilizations.

But the West is another, as predicted by hypothesis 2.3. Huntington viewed this as an eventuality because of the West's imperialistic past and massive resentment among the rest of the nations of the world. He posited that the West would be besieged by members of the other civilizations, at times in temporary coalitions. Huntington was on target about the West being heavily engaged in civilizational conflict, but not the reason behind it. With only one exception, all of the West's serious inter-civilizational conflict has been limited to the two other civilizations previously identified: Islam and the Orthodox.

Hypothesis 2.4, that the West and Islam are the most contentious dyad, is supported. Well over half of the different-civilization dyadic wars were fought between states from these two cultures. But as explained previously, the numbers do not tell the whole story. The West fought only two Islamic countries in two actual wars. Even so, for the time frame involved, that was by far the most fighting with the most deadly results of the period.

Hypothesis 2.5 was well off the mark. It expected the Sinics, led by the Chinese, to join the West and Islam as major actors in civilizational clashes in the post-Cold War. And while they were key participants during the Cold War, afterwards the Sinics avoided inter-cultural disputes that reached the serious level.

An argument could be made that this was greatly affected by the fact that there are only eight Sinic states, compared to 31 Western and 45 Islamic. Even so, the Orthodox civilization was represented in 31 serious conflicts yet has only 11 states, the two-state Hindu civilization was in three serious conflicts, and even the single state Japanese were in one. The smaller number of Sinic states may provide fewer opportunities to experience serious friction with others compared to some, but does not explain the total abstinence of serious civilizational conflict between 1990-2001.

### **Conclusions**

In this chapter empirical evidence is presented that there is very high frequency of violent conflict between different cultural groups at the highest levels. That these conflicts outnumber

same-civilization conflicts attests to the degree of threat they pose for populations of the world. This high frequency of conflict is a serious matter requiring study and increased effort to reduce or resolve it, even if it does not support Huntington's theory statistically.

While the quantity and intensity of this conflict is important, it is not the post-Cold War clash of civilizations envisioned by Huntington. It has a narrow focus, primarily within three civilizations. Most of the serious hostilities came about as a result of only three conflicts: the Gulf War, the post 9-11 invasion of Afghanistan, and the breakup of Yugoslavia. And, inter-cultural conflict was as prevalent during the Cold War as it is in its aftermath. Thus, these cross-cultural conflicts, though very serious, are a continuation of a pattern of international clashes primarily by a few groups, and may be moderating as time goes by. There is no indication that it is expanding in scope.

Islam and the West are the most contentious civilizations and together they form the most contentious dyad. But sorting which of these two is more conflict prone is difficult. Islamic states engage in all of the war pairings; whereas, the West is represented in a little more than half of them. Conversely, where all serious conflicts (more than 100 deaths) are included, the West is involved in considerably more than Islam. Furthermore, the West has more countries involved in these conflicts even though Islam has half again as many states. The most contentious of the two is in the eye of the beholder. Suffice it to say they are both conflict prone. And the Sinics, hypothesized to be contentious in the post-Cold War, are not. As of the end of 2001 no Sinic state had been involved in a serious inter-cultural conflict since the end of the Cold War.

The only other civilization that participated in a significant number of serious conflicts is the Orthodox. Even so, all but four of those were part of the Yugoslavian breakup. The West, Islam and the Orthodox all engaged in 31 or more serious civilizational conflicts. The Africans are fourth in line with only five, so there is a very wide gap between the three major actors and the others. All of the serious civilizational conflicts participated in by members of these remaining civilizations were with the three major actor states; none were among themselves. Inter-cultural conflict is driven primarily by the West, Islam, and the Orthodox, with the others at times being drawn in as peripheral actors.

**Table 2.1: Logit Analysis of Post-Cold War Fault-Line Interstate Conflicts**

	<i>MID</i>	<i>Serious</i>	<i>War</i>
Different Civilizations	-1.32*** (.289)	-1.90*** (.448)	-3.08*** (.327)
Contiguity	3.07*** (.225)	2.01*** (.419)	2.00*** (.448)
Contiguity-Different Civilizations	1.08*** (.314)	1.57** (.571)	1.58** (.620)
Joint Democracy	-.091 (.165)	-.031 (.265)	-2.33*** (.757)
Power Parity	1.91*** (.414)	2.86*** (.624)	1.62* (.772)
Islam	.198 (.198)	.889*** (.248)	1.96*** (.276)
West	1.07*** (.220)	1.47*** (.307)	1.39*** (.372)
Sinic	.389 (.321)		
Constant	-5.60*** (.252)	-7.16*** (.374)	-6.94*** (.439)
$\chi^2$	1043.77	318.55	567.28
Prob > $\chi^2$	0.000	0.000	0.000
N (Dyad years)	203,782	202,131	202,131

\*\*\*Significant at .001 level (two tail); \*\*Significant at .01 level (two tail); \*Significant at .05 level (two tail); Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by dyad. Main data sources are Correlates of War and Polity IV.



**Table 2.2a: Post-Cold War Predicted Probabilities (1990-2001)**

	<i>MID</i>	<i>Serious</i>	<i>War</i>
Different-Civilizations: Shared Borders	.0146	.0024	.0009
No Shared Borders	.0016	.0001	.00002
Same-Civilizations: Shared Borders	.0162	.0033	.0039
No Shared Borders	.0039	.0004	.0005

**Table 2.2b: Specific Dyad Post-Cold War Predicted Probabilities (1990-2001)**

	<i>MID</i>	<i>Serious</i>	<i>War</i>
West-Islam: Shared Borders	.0243	.0255	.0264
No Shared Borders	.0044	.0007	.0007
West-Sinic: Shared Borders	.0251	N/A	N/A
No Shared Borders	.0044	N/A	N/A
Islam-Sinic: Shared Borders	.0189	N/A	N/A
No Shared Borders	.0026	N/A	N/A
West-Other: Shared Borders	.0249	.0103	.0037
No Shared Borders	.0035	.0003	.0001
Islam-Other: Shared Borders	.0166	.0059	.0065
No Shared Borders	.0020	.0002	.0002
Sinic-Other: Shared Borders	.0176	N/A	N/A
No Shared Borders	.0021	N/A	N/A

**Table 2.3a: Civilizations and Dyadic MIDs (Post-Cold War)**

<i>Civilizations*</i>	African	Buddhist	Hindu	Islam	Japanese	Lat Am	Ortho	Sinic	West
African (27)	54	0	0	19	0	0	0	0	5
Buddhist (6)	0	8	2	0	0	0	0	3	0
Hindu (2)	0	2	0	6	0	0	0	0	1
Islam (45)	19	0	6	87	1	1	50	2	46
Japanese (1)	0	0	0	1	0	0	4	10	0
Latin Am (21)	0	0	0	1	0	24	1	0	5
Orthodox (11)	0	0	0	50	4	1	20	2	92
Sinic (8)	0	3	0	2	10	0	2	29	7
West (31)	5	0	1	46	0	5	92	7	10
Total same civ	54	8	0	87	0	24	20	29	10
Total different civ	24	5	9	125	15	7	149	24	156

\* The number of states that are members of the civilizations are in parentheses.

**Table 2.3b: Civilizations and Dyadic Serious Clashes (Post-Cold War)**

<i>Civilizations*</i>	African	Buddhist	Hindu	Islam	Japanese	Lat Am	Ortho	Sinic	West
African (27)	13	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0
Buddhist (6)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hindu (2)	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0
Islam (45)	5	0	3	18	1	1	9	0	19
Japanese (1)	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Latin Am (21)	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1
Orthodox (11)	0	0	0	9	0	0	3	0	22
Sinic (8)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
West (31)	0	0	0	19	0	1	22	0	0
Total same civ	13	0	0	18	0	1	3	0	0
Total different civ	5	0	3	39	1	2	31	0	42

\* The number of states that are members of the civilizations are in parentheses. See Appendix 2 for a listing of these conflicts.

**Table 2.3c: Civilizations and Dyadic Wars (Post-Cold War)**

<i>Civilizations*</i>	African	Buddhist	Hindu	Islam	Japanese	Lat Am	Ortho	Sinic	West
African (27)	12	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0
Buddhist (6)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hindu (2)	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0
Islam (45)	4	0	3	18	1	1	7	0	19
Japanese (1)	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Latin Am (21)	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Orthodox (11)	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	0	0
Sinic (8)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
West (31)	0	0	0	19	0	0	0	0	0
Total same civ	12	0	0	18	0	0	0	0	0
Total different civ	5	0	3	35	1	1	7	0	19

\* The number of states that are members of the civilizations are in parentheses. See Appendix 2 for a listing of these conflicts.

**Table 2.4: Logit Analysis of Post-Cold War Religious Conflict**

	<i>MID</i>	<i>Serious</i>	<i>War</i>
Different Religions	-2.06*** (.214)	-1.73*** (.266)	-1.05*** (.288)
Contiguity	2.76*** (.162)	1.84*** (.293)	2.24*** (.372)
Contiguity-Different Religions	1.57*** (.327)	1.74*** (.540)	.416 (.733)
Joint Democracy	-.198 (.174)	-.072 (.288)	-1.93* (.828)
Power Parity	1.60*** (.413)	2.34*** (.638)	1.49 (.807)
Christian	.689*** (.195)	.647 (.347)	.030 (.377)
Islam	.636*** (.198)	1.25*** (.373)	1.56*** (.528)
Buddhist	1.15*** (.269)	-1.60 (1.05)	-1.53 (1.04)
Constant	-5.73*** (.229)	-7.59*** (.453)	-7.93*** (.668)
$\chi^2$	1037.90	291.92	298.20
Prob > $\chi^2$	0.000	0.000	0.000
N (Dyad years)	203,782	202,131	202,131

\*\*\*Significant at .001 level (two tail); \*\*Significant at .01 level (two tail); \*Significant at .05 level (two tail); Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by dyad. Main data sources are Correlates of War and Polity IV.

**Table 2.5a: Post-Cold Religious Conflict Predicted Probabilities (1990-2001)**

	<i>MID</i>	<i>Serious</i>	<i>War</i>
Different-Religions: Shared Borders	.0738	.0023	.0014
No Shared Borders	.001	.0001	.0001
Same-Religions : Shared Borders	.1076	.0019	.002
No Shared Borders	.0081	.0003	.0002

**Table 2.5b: Specific Religious Conflict Post-Cold War Predicted Probabilities (1990-2001)**

	<i>MID</i>	<i>Serious</i>	<i>War</i>
Christian-Islam: Shared Borders	.2145	.0130	.0054
No Shared Borders	.0039	.0003	.0003
Christian-Buddhist: Shared Borders	.3052	.0012	.0004
No Shared Borders	.0066	.00003	.00004
Islam-Buddhist: Shared Borders	.2950	.0022	.0018
No Shared Borders	.0062	.0001	.0001
Christian-Other: Shared Borders	.131	.0039	.0012
No Shared Borders	.0021	.0001	.0001
Islam-Other: Shared Borders	.1252	.0069	.0053
No Shared Borders	.0019	.0002	.0003
Buddhist-Other: Shared Borders	.1901	.0007	.0004
No Shared Borders	.0033	.00002	.00002

**Table 2.6: Conflict Totals/Percentages by Category and Time Period**

	<u>Cold War (1946-89)</u>		<u>Post-Cold War (1990-01)</u>	
	Same-Civ	Different-Civ	Same-Civ	Different-Civ
MID	616 (37.1)	1043 (62.9)	244 (47.7)	268 (52.3)
Serious	256 (34.8)	480 (65.2)	40 (40.0)	60 (60.0)
War	83 (27.0)	224 (73.0)	34 (51.5)	32 (48.5)

Numbers of same- and different-civilization conflict by category and time period. Percentages are in parentheses.

**Table 2.7: Logit Analysis of Cold War Fault-Line Interstate Conflicts**

	<i>MID</i>	<i>Serious</i>	<i>War</i>
Different Civilizations	-1.32*** (.283)	-1.82*** (.405)	-2.66*** (.518)
Contiguity	2.78*** (.235)	2.13*** (.335)	1.07 (.609)
Contiguity-Different Civilizations	1.11*** (.319)	1.40*** (.429)	1.79** (.739)
Joint Democracy	-.078 (.174)	-.763*** (.222)	-1.24** (.484)
Power Parity	1.24*** (.383)	1.17* (.555)	1.85* (.784)
Post-Cold War (PCW)	-.307 (.208)	-.804* (.374)	-.194 (.477)
PCW- Different Civilizations	-.140 (.244)	-.090 (.424)	-.464 (.522)
PCW- Contiguity	.235 (.249)	-.521 (.512)	.220 (.723)
PCW-Contiguity- Different Civilizations	-.305 (.378)	-.157 (.652)	-.518 (.896)
Islam	.276 (.150)	.254 (.211)	.507* (.214)
West	1.12*** (.182)	1.26*** (.269)	1.74*** (.318)
Sinic	1.42*** (.197)	2.10*** (.245)	3.03*** (.261)
Constant	-4.73*** (.255)	-4.77*** (.356)	-5.46*** (.537)
$\chi^2$	1760.85	724.11	467.87
Prob > $\chi^2$	0.000	0.000	0.000
N (Dyad years)	555,778	551,407	551,407

\*\*\*Significant at .001 level (two tail); \*\*Significant at .01 level (two tail); \*Significant at .05 level (two tail); Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by dyad. Main data sources are Correlates of War and Polity IV.

**Table 2.8a: Cold War Predicted Probabilities (1990-2001)**

	<i>MID</i>	<i>Serious</i>	<i>War</i>
Different-Civilizations: Shared Borders	.0239	.0022	.0002
No Shared Borders	.0005	.0001	.00001
Same-Civilizations: Shared Borders	.0287	.0032	.0005
No Shared Borders	.0019	.0004	.0002

**Table 2.8b: Specific Dyad Cold War Predicted Probabilities (1990-2001)**

	<i>MID</i>	<i>Serious</i>	<i>War</i>
West-Islam: Shared Borders	.0905	.0101	.0021
No Shared Borders	.002	.0003	.0001
West-Sinic: Shared Borders	.2349	.0581	.0228
No Shared Borders	.0062	.0018	.0012
Islam-Sinic: Shared Borders	.1185	.0221	.0071
No Shared Borders	.0027	.0006	.0004
West-Other: Shared Borders	.069	.0076	.0012
No Shared Borders	.0015	.0002	.0001
Islam-Other: Shared Borders	.0316	.0029	.0004
No Shared Borders	.0006	.0001	.00002
Sinic-Other: Shared Borders	.0915	.017	.0041
No Shared Borders	.002	.0005	.0002

## CHAPTER 3

### WHY DO CULTURES CLASH?

International conflict can and often has produced destructive and terrifying results. The more that can be learned and understood about this phenomenon, the better our chances should be in attempts to reduce and manage it. Recognizing that different-culture dyads produce more than their share of violent clashes is an important step in the study of conflict; however, it is only a step. Expanding our understanding of cultural disputes is essential, and part of that understanding is to identify causes of these clashes. In this chapter I ask what the reasons are for inter-culture conflict. In particular, I seek to determine to what extent the violence is directly related to cultural/civilization differences.

The first obstacle in this quest is deciding which research approach offers the best chance for success. Conflict occurs because of an underlying reason, or something that the adversaries want to accomplish or change. Such reasons have been defined as “the stakes over which two parties contend” (Holsti 1991: 18). These *issues* are the catalysts that lead to an initial disagreement or incident that can, in turn, set in motion higher levels of conflict and even war. Without first identifying these issues, I contend that we cannot effectively understand and therefore address the prevention or termination of potential or resultant conflicts. Consequently, my efforts will follow what Hensel (2001), Diehl (1992), and Mansbach and Vasquez (1981) refer to as an issue-based approach.

In order to identify issues, a host of potential categories must be considered, since conflict can and has developed from many sources. Examples range from tangibles like territory, to rights such as air and water navigation, to emotional matters that include ethnicity and religion, to security concerns and national liberation. And not all issues are equal. In an early look at them Hensel (1996) demonstrates that territorial disputes produce different forms of conflict behavior than do less salient issues. An implication is that some issues are more likely to lead to conflict or its escalation, so an examination of issues is appropriate.

In evaluating issues as they relate to civilizational disputes, we again begin with Huntington’s views. However, while he discusses historical aspects of civilization clashes in great detail, his attention to issues is much less thorough. One of his most detailed discussions suggests that *core state conflicts* occur for the six following reasons (1996: 208-209):



1. relative influence in shaping global developments and the actions of global international organizations such as the UN, IMF, and World Bank;
2. relative military power, which manifests itself in controversies over non-proliferation and arms control and in arms races;
3. economic power and welfare, manifested in disputes over trade, investment and other issues;
4. people, involving efforts by a state from one civilization to protect kinsmen in another civilization, or to exclude from its territory people from another civilization;
5. values and culture, conflicts over which arise when a state attempts to promote or impose its values on the people of another civilization;
6. occasionally, territory, in which core states become front line participants in fault line conflicts.

Because core states are those that are the most powerful (Russia, the United States, China, India), Huntington suggests that violent conflict between them is rare. They are much more likely to be searching for ways to avoid fighting with each other than to engage in it. Furthermore, as Huntington himself points out, most of these issues are classic to all international disputes, so this discussion alone does not provide as much of a basis for additional understanding of different-civilization clashes as might be hoped.

For example, relative influence in shaping global developments and relative power, the first two of these issues, may be more useful for studying hegemonic war than civilizational conflict. After all, for centuries the major European powers (largely Western states) fought among themselves in an effort to become the leading world power for the purpose of shaping or controlling global developments. Though more for regional than global influence, Iraq's 1980 attack on Iran was for arguably the same reason, and both states were Islamic.

On the other hand, reasons 4 (people) and 5 (values and culture) arise from cultural differences and in some cases number 6 (territory) may be tied to culture also. The ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict is a prime example of both people and territory issues, where Arab states have fought wars for the interests of Arab Palestinians, including territory. And during the period of Western colonization there are abundant

examples of values and culture issues, as colonizer and colony were almost always from different civilizations and the former imposed its values on the latter.

Huntington identifies three issues that he sees as being influential in different-civilization fighting that do not necessarily involve core states: history, demographics, and politics. But as with most of the six issues above, these can apply to any conflict. Even where applied specifically to violence between civilizations, because of their general nature they provide little information regarding the eruption of a specific dispute. Take history, for example. Even Huntington (1996: 259) concedes that while a history of past violence can generate fears and insecurities on both sides, it does not explain the breakdown of years of peace into new violence. Similar points may be made about demographics and politics. Numerical increases of one group may put pressures on other groups and induce countervailing responses, but why sometimes a violent response and sometimes not is not immediately clear without a closer look. And his assertion that politics causes conflict is quite incomplete, since politics is also responsible for preventing, diffusing or ending military tensions or crises in many instances.

Huntington takes particular interest in issues that lead to disputes with Islamic states. He identifies six that he believes causes Muslims to be more contentious than other civilizations. As discussed in Chapter 2, these include proximity, militarism, victim status, indigestibility, demographic bulge, and core state absence (1996: 262-265). But while these, like the three in the previous paragraph, are important in the study of conflict, they are better classified as enabling conditions rather than the issues that actually cause the onset of violence. After all, many states that are in proximity to each other do not go to war. Where two do so it is because something very specific happens to change their relationship to the extent that war is perceived as a better option than peace, or perhaps the only option. In places Huntington provides in-depth discussions of some of these enabling conditions. But it is the issues, those specific disagreements that generate friction and sometimes the onset of violence between states, that this chapter examines.

As noted previously, Holsti (1991: 18) describes issues as “the stakes over which two or more parties contend.” In his study of issues and armed conflict covering the period 1648-1989 he identified more than two dozen issues that led to war. A number of these were present in both same- and different-civilization clashes over an extended time. For example, included in the conflicts in which he classified territory as a concern were wars between same-civilization

Turkey and Egypt in 1839 and different-civilization India and China in 1962. Protecting nationals was an issue in both the 1932 war between Peru and Colombia (same-civilization) and the 1982 Falklands conflict between Great Britain and Argentina (different-civilization). Holsti also recognized that it is often impossible to determine a single cause for war, as he identified from two to five issues that were at stake in each of the 177 wars and major armed interventions he analyzed.

Even though Huntington does not conduct an in-depth issue analysis similar to Holsti, his discussions provide a look at the nature of issues and he suggests that reactions to them can be affected by culture. As discussed in the first two chapters, he surmises that as people define their identities in ethnic and religious terms they are likely to see an “us” vs. “them” relationship with others (1993: 211). Henderson and Tucker (2001: 320) summarize Huntington’s theory as arguing that “one’s identity in a dispute is more important than one’s position.” Put another way, states from different civilizations are likely to be involved in more conflict for either or both of two reasons. The first is that they may react differently to issues, resorting to violence quicker than with a state from their own civilization because of the added tensions that result from the “us” vs. “them” relationship. The second is that they may engage in conflict because of the cultural differences; i.e., they may fight over issues directly related to cultural factors such as religion, ethnicity, or race, differences that are either non-existent or much less pronounced between states from the same civilization.

Considering the first reason, reacting differently, a border dispute between same-civilization states might only require discussions and a formalized agreement to prevent future occurrences. Conversely, a similar event between different-civilization states may be complicated by tensions due to cultural differences and lead to violence quicker, or at a higher rate. Examples include the 1995 border incursions between same-civilization Colombia and Venezuela that resulted in a negotiated agreement without their military forces confronting each other, and the 1994 border incursions between different-civilization Ethiopia and Sudan that led to the killings of dozens of people in repeated clashes. If the suggestion that different-civilization states react differently is valid, analysis should provide evidence that they resort to violence over several issues more often than do same-civilization states.

An example of the second reason, cultural differences, would be where a minority ethnic group in one country is being governed by a different majority ethnic group, with that minority

group being a majority in a second, nearby state. Relations between the minority group and its government in the first state could become a sensitive issue in the second state and lead to violence between the two. Such is the case of Kashmir, a primarily Muslim province under Indian (Hindi) rule. Movements in both Islamic Pakistan and within Kashmir attempting to shift the governance to Pakistan have resulted in three wars and a seemingly endless series of terrorist attacks. If the suggestion that culture plays a direct role in conflict between different-civilization states is valid, analysis should reveal significant instances of fighting over cultural differences between different-civilization states, yet few between same-civilization states. These cultural factors, among them religion, ethnicity, race, and/or values, I combine into one general category which I subsequently identify as *cultural issues*.

It is not always easy to determine if culture plays a direct role in conflict. Two examples which appear to be cultural conflicts are the 1977 war between Somalia and Ethiopia and Russia's entry into Yugoslavia in 1999 amidst the Kosovo crisis. In the former, Islamic Somalia invaded and attempted to annex African Ethiopia's Ogaden province, whose inhabitants are largely Muslims and ethnic Somalis. This may be seen as an effort to rejoin ethnic and religious kin with their own. In the latter, as NATO forces were preparing to move into the area of Kosovo after halting their bombing campaign, Russian troops beat them to the punch. Russia had been trying to lessen the impact of military operations against their former ally and fellow member of the Orthodox civilization (the Serbian part of Yugoslavia). The Russians made what some considered a calculated risk, placing themselves in an influential position to lessen the punishment for the Serbs, their ethnic cousins. In these instances cultural issues could be argued to be the impetus leading to tensions or armed conflict. Acceptance of this viewpoint fits with Huntington's theory about identities in conjunction with "us" vs. "them" relationships.

But there are those who do not agree that cultural differences play a significant or large-scale role, even where different-civilization violence occurs. Weeks (1993) proffers that Huntington's civilizations have been chopped into pieces by states and that as a result culture and religion provide less cohesion than do the states themselves. Ajami (1993) contends that it is the states that control civilizations and not the other way around. He asserts that the power of civilizational traditionalists who make threats and demands should not be exaggerated, as they are often most insistent when they are losing their influence. He singles out Islamic fundamentalism as a sign of panic more than resurgence (1993: 28). And Kirkpatrick (1993: 52)

points out that Islam, shown in Chapter 2 to be one of the most contentious civilizations, has more issues and explosive differences within than without.

Following the logic of these scholars, a look at the two conflicts above from a different perspective can yield other conclusions about their sources. For years Somalia had visions of a Greater Somalia. This vision included lands in several neighboring states that Somalia felt they had claims to based on history and common ethnicity with some of the inhabitants. Given the internal chaos present at the time in Ethiopia and the belief by the Somalis that the balance of power had shifted in their favor, Somalia may very well have launched their invasion as much for reasons of empire and geopolitics as for cultural issues. In the example of the Russians, they had lost much international prestige and influence after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and here was yet another instance where they were being marginalized in their own back yard. Russian concerns over geopolitics most likely played a greater role in their movements than did civilizational kinship.

In these particular cases cultural differences may or may not be important. Often when conflict involves different-civilization dyads the issue does not have to be, and I contend that often it is not, due to cultural differences. Two high profile examples presented by Huntington (1996: 247) as civilizational conflicts are the Gulf War and the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Gulf War with its many cross-pairings of different-civilization states, but also with a number of Islamic countries opposing Iraq, is more likely to have had to do with resources and economics (keeping oil flowing and out of the hands of an unmanageable dictator), and the war in Afghanistan was certainly largely a geopolitical decision by the USSR (national security: controlling one's sphere of influence). I submit that this invasion likely would have happened even if Afghanistan had been an Orthodox state.

What's more, identity differences can also contribute to same-culture clashes just as they do in different-culture disputes, depending on a given definition of culture. Such an example is the Hutu-Tutsi conflict in Central Africa. The two groups are of the same civilization (African) and same race (black), but are members of different tribes. At two levels they share cultures, but do not at a third. These tribal differences have led to attempts at political domination and the killing of hundreds of thousands of people on both sides across several countries. Such differences can reach even lower into societies. Consider competing street gangs in American cities. Sometimes these gangs are of the same ethnic backgrounds (i.e., Hispanic or Asian), but

their identities are based on specific countries or groups of countries that their roots are tied to (i.e., Colombia vs. Mexico; Vietnam vs. China).

Moreover, sharing cultural membership does not necessarily dampen strife where there are other issues underlying contention. In what appeared to be an attempt at consolidating regional power, Iraq attacked Iran and engaged in an eight year war that claimed over a million lives. Being brothers in Islam did not provide an avenue to end the war; rather, it added fuel to the fire in that the two governments were members of different sects of Islam (Sunni and Shiite). This could be akin to Catholics and Protestants killing each other, which was common in Northern Ireland for many years. Huntington's concern about differences and conflict in relation to peoples' concept of "us" vs. "them" seems well founded, but these identities are not unique to civilizations or even lower level cultures. Referring back to street gangs, there are conflicts where white gangs fight each other and where black gangs fight each other for a variety of reasons. North Korea invaded South Korea in 1950 for largely nationalistic purposes and China attacked Vietnam in 1979 over issues involving a neighbor (Cambodia). All are examples of same culture groups fighting among themselves. While group identity may very well be an important inclination for conflict (McCormick 2004: 408), this identity does not necessarily translate into culture or civilization identity.

Throughout the course of the above discussion several tendencies emerge. First, as in Kashmir, the source of different-civilization conflict may be ethnic or religious (cultural) in nature. Next, in other cases such as the Somalia-Ethiopia war or the Russian dash into Yugoslavia, civilization differences may not be the main source, but may be a contributing or secondary factor. Third, there are instances of different-civilization conflict where issues appear unrelated to civilizations, the India-China border war of 1962 and the Gulf War of 1991 being examples. And finally, even though different identities can lead to increased tensions and violent clashes, identity differences are not unique to culture. With this in mind, I offer the following proposals:

*Proposition 3.1: Culture-unique issues will not significantly increase the likelihood of overall conflict in the post-Cold War era.*

*Proposition 3.2: Culture-unique issues will not be the only source that significantly increases the likelihood of different-culture conflict in the post-Cold War era, but will be one among others.*

Unfortunately, it would be very difficult to test these propositions. Such testing requires not only identifying where issues are present that lead to conflict, but also where they are present but *do not* lead to conflict. At present there is no satisfactory way to do this. The Issue Correlates of War project (Hensel 2001) will eventually provide such an opportunity, but data is still being collected and as of yet neither the ICOW geographical coverage nor its array of included issues (limited to three) are broad enough for a satisfactory test. And, collecting such a large amount of data is well beyond the scope of this dissertation.

While it is impractical to study the impact of issues on militarized dispute onset, we can still study the impact of issues on the escalation of conflicts once they begin. International disagreements are considered to be militarized once one state threatens, displays, or uses force against another. From these sometimes low levels, conflicts can escalate in intensities to serious or even extreme violence. Previous literature suggests that analysis of escalation can offer important evidence as to the effects of different types of issues on conflict.

For example, Gochman and Leng (1983: 100) ask “why do statesmen escalate – or choose not to escalate – the level of hostility...?” They suggest two answers, one of those being the issue in contention.<sup>13</sup> Hensel (1996) argues that militarized disputes involving territory typically reach higher severity levels than disputes over other types of issues. This argument indicates that the degree of escalation may be tied to the specific issue involved and its level of salience, and supports Leng (2000) who finds evidence that where issues are vital for both sides, disputes are more likely to escalate. Huth (1988) uses escalation to determine the success or failure of extended immediate deterrence (the protection of allies) and Senese and Vasquez (2003) use it to detect whether the presence of territorial claims in the onset phase of a dispute affects the relationship between territorial militarized disputes and war (i.e., whether this particular issue is associated with disputes that evolve into wars).

Where escalation occurs in disputes, the above studies by Gochman and Leng (1983) and Hensel (1996) indicate that the same issues that lead to the initial disputes are also associated with the subsequent escalations. Huth (1988) and Senese and Vasquez (2003) successfully employ escalation to explore other factors (deterrence and relationships between territorial disputes and war, respectively). Based on these studies that demonstrate the effective use of

---

<sup>13</sup> Their other suggestion is the nature of threats employed; the two are not mutually exclusive.

escalation in conflict studies, I use it to test propositions 3.1 and 3.2, presented here as hypotheses:

*Hypothesis 3.1: Culture-unique issues will not significantly increase the likelihood of overall conflict escalation in the post-Cold War era.*

*Hypothesis 3.2: Culture-unique issues will not be the only source that significantly increases the likelihood of different-culture conflict escalation in the post-Cold War era, but will be one among others.*

### **Research Design**

In order to test Hypotheses 3.1 and 3.2, we must be able to identify the contentious issues involved in cases of armed conflict. Following the analysis in Chapter 2, armed conflict is measured by militarized interstate disputes (MIDs). While the needed issue data is not embedded in the original issue data, collecting it for the purposes of this study is a reasonable task.

A fairly large number of potential issues may be at stake in any given dispute. Holsti (1991) identified over two dozen that have been at stake in previous conflicts and additional issues have been recognized by others. Among these additional ones are resources (Klare 2001), river and maritime issues (Hensel and Mitchell 2005), and humanitarian concerns (Regan 2000). It is also important to note that both the outbreak and escalation of conflict can be and usually are caused by more than one issue, as Holsti found up to five at stake in the conflicts he analyzed.

To conduct a meaningful analysis of escalation, it is necessary to develop an appropriate conceptualization of the types of issues to be compared. I meet this need with issue *categories*, because Holsti's conceptualization of dozen's of issue types is neither practical nor useful for my purposes. The objective of this chapter is not to identify every single issue that has been involved in disputes, or to compare the relative frequency of each issue. Rather, it is to determine the role, if any, of *culture-specific* issues in different-civilization conflict escalation, as compared with the roles of other types of issues.<sup>14</sup>

The issue categories I utilize incorporate similar and associated issues into distinct groups. This allows for differentiation between issues *types* while keeping the number small

---

<sup>14</sup> Previously I noted that all cultural issues (ethnic, religious, etc.) would be conflated into one category, to be designated *cultural issues*. It is beyond the scope of this study as to which or how many cultural issues may be involved or which are more prevalent. At this point the concern is that either cultural issues as a group are an important source of inter-state conflict escalation or they are not.



enough for an effective analysis. Failure to make a distinction between types would offer an unfair test, because such conflictual issues as territory would be combined with most other issues in a general category that would likely magnify any conflictual effect of cultural issues. I establish five groups of issues in addition to culture. An example of a category is territory, which includes three of Holsti's issues: territory, strategic territory, and border demarcation disputes. All three involve questions of sovereignty over territory and can be assigned to a single category without any deterioration in this analysis. The key concern here is not which type of territorial issue influenced a given conflict, but whether the conflict, or in this case the escalation of that conflict, was significantly influenced by contention between two states over a territorial concern as opposed to cultural and/or other differences.

The conflicts included in this analysis are from the COW MID data set (Jones et al. 1996; Ghosn and Palmer 2003) during the post-Cold War period (1990-2001), i.e., the same data set that was the primary focus in Chapter 2. In order to code the issues involved I examined descriptions of each dispute, gleaning as much information about them as possible. Most of the descriptions came from the dispute narratives of the MID data set. While this was an excellent source of information, it was not all-inclusive. Additional information was located in various news sources through on-line data bases and search software such as Lexus-Nexus and Google.

From these descriptions I listed every issue that appeared to be involved in each conflict. A review of these issues revealed that most fell into five broad categories: cultural issues, territory, resources, national security matters and humanitarian concerns. The remainder constituted a diverse group of low frequency and/or low salience concerns and were placed into a category designated *other*. Thus, the six categories referred to previously were established.

#### ***Issue Categories:***

Cultural issues involve conflicts at least partially influenced by concerns over differences involving religion, ethnicities, race, tribal affiliation, or basic values of the population of one group or state vis-à-vis those of another. An example is the 1994 attack by Greek nationalists on a part of Albania because they claimed that ethnic Greeks in the area were being mistreated by the Albanian government. Others incidences include the recurring conflicts between Pakistan and India over the disputed province of Kashmir and the majority Muslim population within. (Kashmir has both territorial and cultural issues at stake.)

The territorial category includes all incidents where one of the underlying issues entails overlapping claims to a geographical (land) area, ranging from large expanses to small discrepancies in border demarcations. In most cases this contention will be directly between the two initial participants in a dispute. However, there are times that a state joins a conflict to protect the territory of a friend or ally. In these instances the joining state does not have a claim to the territory; its objective is support of an ally. But, there would be no need for support and the joiner would not be involved if territory was not at stake. Consequently, in these situations territory will be included as an issue for the joining state.

The resources category encompasses issues that incorporate contested claims of ownership over or access to certain minerals and other natural resources. Oil is one of the more obvious, as ownership and security of the Rumaila oil field in southern Iraq was one of Saddam Hussein's declared reasons for invading Kuwait in 1990. Tensions flared between Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago in 1997 over both maritime fishing and oil exploration rights in the Gulf of Paria. In that same year one of the sources of a dispute between Syria and Turkey was the former's concern about its dependence for water from the Euphrates River, which originates in Turkey. In order to have access to resources states must also control the area in which they are located. Therefore, as might be expected, resource issues often accompany other types, most often territory or maritime, and in some cases river issues.

Of the various issue categories, national security casts the largest net. Threats to the security of a state and its regime are the main concerns, but definitions of such can be far ranging. Included are violations of a nation's borders and threats to its government, people, assets or interests. A border intrusion by an outside army is a clear example, and such incidents are not particularly unusual in Central and South America where borders are often not marked or monitored very well. But national security threats are not restricted to a nation's home territory. U.S. missile strikes on Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998 in response to bombings of American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya are examples of incidents resulting from national security concerns.

Humanitarian issues are incidences of military intervention for peace keeping operations to prevent additional outbreaks of violence. American forces have been stationed in the Sinai for over 20 years to keep the Egyptians and Israelis separated. Other humanitarian missions can be to relieve suffering or prevent the deaths of large numbers of local inhabitants in an area. The

U.S. foray into Somalia in 1992 to feed people who were starving because of a massive draught and the NATO incursion into Kosovo later in the decade to prevent mass killings and torture are examples.

The remaining issues found in this study's collection of disputes are a diverse group that do not fall into any of the other categories and are not related to each other. Among these are primarily protests and threats or displays of force for the following reasons: support of allies, to protest or enforce embargoes, concerns about weapons of mass destruction control and proliferation, to prevent threatening or violent actions between other countries, and in one instance each an accusation of war crimes, a response to a grant of asylum, and Estonia's reaction to what it felt was Russia's being too slow to remove its troops from Estonian territory after Estonia achieved independence. All of these unrelated issues are designated as part of the *other* grouping.

As we have seen, conflicts often involve more than one issue; Holsti (1991) found up to five. In this study, because of using broad issues instead of individual issues, there were no cases in which there was a need for more than three. Consider, for example, the U.S. invasion of Grenada in 1983, which was included in Holsti's study. If that conflict was part of this analysis at least three and possibly all four of the issues identified by Holsti would fit into the national security category.<sup>15</sup> Consequently, where I list a single category for a conflict, there could be several related issues involved. Of the 446 MIDs used in this chapter's analysis, 26 involved issues from three categories, 113 from two, and 307 from one.

Table 3.1 provides a breakdown of the issue categories and their frequencies. Table 3.2a compares cultural and non-cultural issues within same- and different-civilization dyads, while Table 3.2b contrasts the frequency that the cultural issue category accounts for all of the issues in a MID with the MIDs where other issues are also at stake. Two things are evident from these tables. The first is rather obvious, that cultural issues are not very common within same-civilization dyads where MIDs arise, as there are only four identified instances during the evaluated time period. Two resulted from Sudanese support for Muslim rebels/terrorists trying to replace the Eritrean government with an Islamic religious regime, and the other two involved Turkish troops crossing into Iraq over concerns about Kurdish activities. compare

---

<sup>15</sup> These four issues were government composition, protection of nationals, regime survival, and maintaining regional dominance (Holsti 1991: 278).

The second notable item from the two tables is that cultural related issues are involved in relatively few of the conflicts that occur in different-civilization dyads. Nearly 90 percent of issue categories involved in these conflicts are non-cultural in nature. The largest share involves national security issues, which is also the largest share for same-civilization dyads. National security concerns constitute about half of the same-civilization issues, and are actually more numerous between different-civilization states, though they make up a smaller share, 42.1 percent. Issues pertaining to territory and resources also play roles in a substantial amount of conflict for both types of dyads, although territorial conflict occurrences are about half again more prominent between states from the same civilization. In addition to cultural issues appearing much more frequently within different-civilization dyads, so too do humanitarian issues and those from the *other* category. While determining the reasons for this difference is beyond the scope of this study, it is a suitable topic for future research.

There is an additional interesting aspect of the issue categories that is not evident from the tables. While these categories join with each other in varying combinations within various conflicts, five of the six may be found alone in a conflict or with another category.<sup>16</sup> But the cultural issues category stands alone very seldom; other categories are regularly part of conflicts where this one is involved. Cultural issues stand alone only seven times out of 43 conflicts they are a factor in. These issues are most often accompanied by territorial or national security issues, or both. (Also of interest, territory is frequently included where resources are at stake in addition to being involved in conflicts with culture and national security.)

***Methodology:***

The temporal domain for the following analysis covers the post-Cold War years, 1990-2001. The primary data set is the same as that used in Chapter 2, taken from the MID collection of the Correlates of War (Jones et al. 1996; Ghosn and Palmer 2003) and assembled through the use of EUGene (Bennett and Stam 2000). Standard errors are clustered by dyad.<sup>17</sup>

The method of analysis is censored probit, often referred to as the Heckman selection model. The objective of this chapter is to determine, where MIDs occur, which issue categories are associated with those that escalate. This type of analysis limits the use of available data and thus gives rise to concerns about selection effects. The Heckman selection model is designed to

---

<sup>16</sup> In single-issue category conflicts all of the issues are related and therefore part of the same category.

<sup>17</sup> Analyses were also run with standard errors were clustered by MID, but differences in results were minor.

compensate for such effects through the use of two stages (Lemke and Reed 2001). The first stage (the selection stage) evaluates all data to determine if a required condition has occurred. In this case that condition is the outbreak of a MID. The second stage (the outcome stage) conducts the desired analysis using only those observations where the specified condition, i.e., MID, has occurred.

The Heckman selection model is used to avoid the loss of a large amount of data. Specifically, the data set employed in this study contains more than 200,000 observations of dyad years, yet MIDs occur in only a small percentage of them. Excluding all of the observations where conflict does not erupt and concentrating just on those where it does would ignore much valuable data. The Heckman model considers all of it in the first stage.

***Dependent Variables:***

These analyses evaluate the escalation of MIDs to determine if cultural differences exert more influence than other categories of issues on those escalations. As in Chapter 2, I conduct three parallel analyses. The dependent variable for the first stage of the analyses is the occurrence of a MID, coded 1 if a MID occurs and 0 if it does not. The second stage dependent variables are the occurrence or nonoccurrence of escalation when a MID has arisen. In order to differentiate between the intensity levels of violence, three dependent variables are used. They are *escalate1*, *escalate101*, and *escalate-war*. *Escalate1* is coded 1 for disputes that escalate to at least one death, and 0 where no such escalation occurs. *Escalate101* denotes escalation to a clash of more than 100 deaths, and *escalate-war* denotes escalation to at least 1000 deaths, both coded 1 and 0 as with *escalate1*.

***Explanatory Variables:***

Because the Heckman model uses two stages, two sets of independent variables are required. In the analyses for both hypotheses the first stage predicts the occurrence of MIDs and the independent variables are contiguity, dyadic democracy and power parity. All three of these variables and their association with the outbreak of MIDs are explained in the research design section of Chapter 2.

The second stage of the Heckman model is the main focus, analyzing the significance of issue categories on escalation. The categories *territory*, *cultural issues*, *resources*, *national security*, and *humanitarian*, all explained above, are incorporated as explanatory variables. The *other* category is omitted as the referent group. Where an issue from a particular category is at

stake in a dispute the category is coded 1, otherwise 0. Dyadic democracy and power parity, both used in the first stage as control variables, are again included in this stage for the same purpose.

The possibility exists of an additive effect, that is, that disputes may be more contentious if there are multiple issues involved. Since this study uses issue categories rather than individual issues, a count variable would not be appropriate. This could result in the number of issues in a conflict being masked, i.e., only one issue in a category in one conflict, but several issues in a category in another. In this case they would receive the same count number. This difficulty is overcome by the use of a dichotomous multi-count variable, which eliminates the masking problem and still provides a test of possible additive effects. This variable, designated *multiple issue categories*, is coded 1 if there is more than one issue category involved in a conflict, and 0 if there is only one issue category.

In this chapter the focus is on issue types that lead to escalation. Once an issue arises and an escalation takes place, the length of the dispute is inconsequential to the study. Therefore, where disputes carry over into subsequent years, those subsequent years are excluded.

### **Overall Conflict Results**

In the first set of analyses conflict escalation among all dyads is assessed regardless of state civilization ties. These analyses are conducted to test hypothesis 3.1, which expects that cultural issues will not be a significant source of escalation in overall international conflict. The cultural issues category is positive and statistically significant for MIDs, but not at the two upper intensities. This indicates that cultural issues do not significantly increase the likelihood of conflict escalation in overall conflict except at the lowest level, and is consistent with the hypothesis so far as serious conflict is concerned. Results are provided in Table 3.3.

Analysis results in regards to this variable at the MID level could be misleading, giving the impression that cultural issues are significantly involved in low-level conflict between same-civilization states as well as different. But referring back to Table 3.1, there are only four conflicts in which cultural issues were present in same-civilization dyads. The strong performance of the variable at the lower level is primarily due to the number of different-civilization MIDs that cultural issues influence, with lesser influence from the few cases in same-civilization conflict.

Beyond the primary issue category of interest in this study, cultural issues, results for other categories are also noteworthy. Territory and national security are both statistically significant at all levels. Results for these two provide evidence that issues of territory and national integrity, including physical threats to citizens and property, are much more escalatory than most other issue types. This is consistent with findings by Hensel (1996) and Senese and Vasquez (2003) about the salience of territorial disputes, and suggests that issues involving national security may deserve similar scrutiny.

Humanitarian issues are statistically significant at the MID and serious level. They play an important role in modern conflict, and that role is growing. Of the 55 instances in which humanitarian concerns influenced conflict participation during the 1990-2001 period, 38 of those occurred in the last four years. There were no occurrences of humanitarian issue involvement where conflicts escalated to war. Resource issues were not statistically significant at any level.

As for the control variables, joint democracy suppresses escalation at all levels. Power parity is positive and statistically significant at the serious intensity, but not for escalations to the lower and upper levels. This is perplexing and, though not a focus of this study, may have implications for the power transition theory, which expects that power parity will be associated with an increased probability of war. Multiple issue categories, the issue count variable, is not significant in any of the models.

### **Different-Civilization Conflict Results**

Hypothesis 3.2 predicts that cultural differences will not be the main source of violent conflict escalations between states that are members of different civilizations, but will be one of several that do so. Testing this hypothesis requires a focus on different-civilization conflict alone, allowing us to concentrate on these cases without any risk that the results will be distorted by the presence of same-civilization conflicts. In the models used to test this prediction, as presented in Table 3.4, cultural issues are positive and statistically significant at both the low and high intensities, but not in between. This significance translates to culture playing an important role in different-civilization conflict escalation as was anticipated by the hypothesis.

As with the previous analyses, territory and national security are consistently positive and statistically significant. Issues of these types remain extremely escalatory for different-civilization conflicts just as they were for the larger population of all disputants in Table 3.3. Overall these two categories perform stronger than the culture variable. Cultural differences are

therefore not the only significant influence on different-civilization conflict, but are among three, with the other two actually exerting more influence. These results support hypothesis 3.4.

A further examination reveals that there are 39 instances of cultural issues being present in 241 different-civilization MIDs included in the analysis, a total that is very close to the 41 of territory. However, as escalations rise to the war intensity, the difference in influence of these two issue types becomes much greater, with cultural issues affecting only four wars compared with 13 for territorial issues. The national security category, which admittedly contains a higher number of issues than the other two categories, is a factor in 22 wars. All three of these issue types are important factors in different-civilization conflict, but territory and national security are more so than culture.

There is another interesting aspect about the roles played by these three types of issues. Cultural issues, to a large extent, appear to be dependent on the other two for escalation to the higher levels of conflict. In the confines of this study, where national security was at stake, this category accounted for all of the issues in a mid 72 percent of the time. The territory category accounted for all issues 26 percent of the time, but when paired with resources, which provide a reason for wanting territory, the share climbs to 53 percent. The cultural category accounts for all issues in a mid only six times out of a total of 43 instances where they are at stake, for a share of just 14 percent. Additionally, in each of the remaining 37 MIDs involving cultural issues, either territory, national security, or both were also at stake. This raises the possibility that it is not cultural differences per se that directly lead to conflict or its escalation, but that these differences add to the contentiousness of an already serious disagreement, making the situation worse. This is evidence that in most instances cultural issues may be more of an enabling condition than a contentious issue.

Similar to the analysis reported in Table 3.3 for all conflict, resources are not statistically significant at any intensity. But unlike in Table 3.3, where humanitarian issues are significant at the two lower levels, they are not significant at any level where only different-civilization dyads are included. None of the three control variables, joint democracy, power parity, or multiple issue categories, are statistically significant. Results for joint democracy are particularly interesting. A recurring and consistent finding in conflict literature is that joint democracy has a tempering effect on conflict. However, its failure to achieve significance in any of the different-civilization models indicates that this tempering effect is largely absent when states are from



different cultural groups. Power parity is usually associated with conflict, but is not where different-civilization dyads are involved. Results for both joint democracy and power parity are in contrast to those of most previous conflict studies. Where disputants are from different civilizations the “rules” that researchers have come to expect do not seem to apply nearly as often. In the case of joint democracy a likely source of this is the disproportionate number of different-civilization dyads with low scores as was revealed in Chapter 2 (only 25% have high joint democracy scores compared with 37% of same-civilization dyads).

An item of interest in the first stage of the analysis model, which determines whether or not a different-civilization MID has occurred, is that joint democracy is *positive* and statistically significant, suggesting an influence toward violence. This also contradicts a long list of studies over a period of years and begs the question “why?” A possibility is that 79 percent of all democratic dyads are within civilizations, leaving only 21 percent that cross cultural boundaries. Even so, this result does not happen in the second stages, as joint democracy there is negative as expected in both models, though it does not reach statistical significance. These surprising results warrant additional research in the future.

### **Conclusions**

Analyses in this chapter provide strong evidence that cultural issues are not alone as the sources of different-civilization conflict escalation, but instead are one of three issue types that influence these escalations. However, the influence exerted by the other two, territory and national security, is more consistent and more frequent. Additionally, cultural issues are seldom the only issue type involved in a conflict. Much more often these issues are accompanied by issues from either or both of the other two groups. This suggests that instead of being the primary source of conflict, cultural issues may often generate added friction that leads to conflict and its escalation where other serious issues are at stake. This ties in with the suggestion earlier in this chapter that different-civilization dyads may react differently to issues than same-civilization dyads. This added dimension (civilization difference) likely increases tension and leads to a quicker resort to violence. Consequently, it may be more appropriate in many cases to think of cultural issues as ‘helpers’ or enabling conditions rather than issues. Still, they play a significant role in conflict escalation and their influence should not be minimized.

On the other hand, it shouldn’t be overemphasized, either. Cultural issues make up only 11 percent of all issues involved in different-civilization MIDs, and only 8 percent of those that

evolve into wars, compared with 27 and 45 percent of the war issues for territory and national security, respectively. Both of these latter two are also highly influential in same-civilization conflict. Thus, most of the more serious different-civilization violent escalations are a result of the same issues that cause international violence within civilizations. Territory and national security are the most contentious issues, regardless of who the opposing sides consist of.

Huntington was concerned about a clash of civilizations because he believed that differences in cultural identities (“us” versus “them”) would inherently lead to violence. Chapter 2 demonstrates that this conflict is not so wide spread as he feared, and not so new as he anticipated. This chapter reveals that little of this conflict is primarily inspired by differences, but rather by the same grievances that lead to other conflict. Where differences play a role, they are usually in conjunction with two more common, and more serious, issues.

### **Issues and the Clash of Civilizations**

Chapter 2 revealed a number of things about cross-cultural or different-civilizational conflict. Among them were that its likelihood is usually less than that of same-civilization conflict; it outnumbers same-civilization conflict, but is declining in that regard; and that most of the serious different-civilizational conflict is confined to three civilizations. Consequently, the clash of civilizations does not rise to the intensities expected by Huntington.

Chapter 3 now adds to the lessons of Chapter 2. We observe that while cultural or civilization differences are important and contribute to conflict, for the most part it is neither in the way nor at the intensities Huntington predicted. In most instances different-civilization dyads engage in serious conflict over the same issues as same-civilizational dyads, those being territory and national security. Cultural differences are an issue in a much smaller percent of the different-civilizational wars. Where they are an issue, regardless of the intensity level, they are regularly accompanied by issues from one or both of the other two types.

We therefore observe that the clash of civilizations is not only relegated primarily to just three civilizations, but that in most cases the issues involved are not culture related. Where they are culture related, they are accompanied by more contentious issues, indicating that cultural differences may be stronger as enabling conditions than issues. Either way, cultural issues up to this point have shown no propensity for being the main catalysts that will drive different-civilizational conflict in the current time period.

Let me add a final thought for this chapter. The preceding pages have been concerned with groups of issues that lead to the escalation of conflict. Early in the chapter I argued that escalation could be used to help identify issues that impact the onset of conflict, citing such works as those of Hensel (1996), Huth (1988), and Senese and Vasquez (2003) to strengthen my point. The original intent of this chapter was to determine whether cross-cultural conflict is a product of cultural issues. Having demonstrated the role that these issues play in escalation for different-civilization conflict, I submit that these conclusions also have strong implications for conflict onset. I infer that the role played by the issue categories in escalation is similar for conflict onset.

**Table 3.1: Issue Categories and Frequencies\***

<i>Category</i>	<i>Types of issues included</i>	<i>Frequency</i>		<i>MIDs involving issues**</i>
		<i>Same-Civilization</i>	<i>Different-Civilization</i>	
Cultural Issues	Ethnic/race/religious/values differences and concerns	4 (1.5%)	39 (11.4%)	43 (9.2%)
Territory	Territorial issues	63 (24.0)	41 (12.0)	104 (22.3)
Resources	Natural resources, river & maritime issues, navigation rights	49 (18.6)	43 (12.6)	92 (19.7)
National Security	Threats to national or regime integrity and power or to citizens and property	137 (52.1)	144 (42.1)	281 (60.2)
Humanitarian	Military interventions to keep peace or relieve suffering of populations	5 (1.9)	50 (14.6)	55 (11.8)
Other Issues	Generally unrelated issues with low frequencies or few incidents of escalation	5 (1.9)	25 (7.3)	30 (6.4)
Total		263 (100)	342 (100)	

\*Issue categories are not all-inclusive. They incorporate only those issues involved in the MIDs examined in this study. \*\* This column reports the number and percentage of all disputes in which an issue category is at stake.

**Table 3.2a: Issue Frequency by Dyad Type\***

	Same-civilization dyads	Different-civilization dyads
Cultural issues	4 (1.5%)	39 (11.4%)
Non-cultural issues	259 (98.5)	303 (88.6)
Total	263 (100)	342 (100)

\* Issue categories are not all-inclusive. They incorporate only those issues involved in the MIDs examined in this study.

**Table 3.2b: Cultural Issue Frequency by Dyad Type\***

	Same-civilization dyads	Different-civilization dyads
Cultural issues only	0 (0%)	6 (15.4%)
Cultural and other issues	4 (100)	33 (84.6)
Total	4 (100)	39 (100)

\* Row 1 provides the number of observations where the cultural category accounts for all issues in a MID. Row 2 provides the number of observations where other issue categories in addition to cultural issues are at stake in a MID.

**Table 3.3: Escalation after the Onset of MIDs**

<i>Level of Escalation (number of deaths)</i>	Model 1 <i>At least 1 death</i>	Model 2 <i>More than 100</i>	Model 3 <i>1000 or more</i>
<b>Y2: Escalation</b>			
Cultural Issues	1.15*** (.385)	.727 (.439)	.652 (.450)
Territory	.654** (.261)	.716** (.285)	1.07*** (.260)
Resources	.494 (.298)	.125 (.298)	.486 (.325)
National Security	1.13*** (.259)	.880** (.320)	1.12*** (.344)
Humanitarian	1.28*** (.326)	1.13*** (.364)	
Joint Democracy	-.593*** (.179)	-.457** (.180)	-1.05** (.304)
Power Parity	.628 (.492)	1.01* (.520)	.833 (.673)
Multiple Issue Categories	-.097 (.324)	.080 (.352)	-.520 (.359)
Constant	-2.19*** (.421)	-3.46*** (.416)	-3.97*** (.389)
<b>Y1: Onset of MID</b>			
Contiguity	1.53*** (.063)	1.53*** (.063)	1.53*** (.063)
Joint Democracy	.092 (.059)	.092 (.059)	.092 (.059)
Power Parity	.633*** (.159)	.633*** (.159)	.632*** (.159)
Constant	-3.21*** (.052)	-3.21*** (.052)	-3.21*** (.052)
$\chi^2$	76.97	55.62	70.39
Prob > $\chi^2$	0.000	0.000	0.000
N (Censored)	203,270	203,270	203,270
N (Uncensored)	446	446	446
rho	.125	.495***	.628***

\*\*\*Significant at .001 level (two tail); \*\*Significant at .01 level (two tail); \*Significant at .05 level (two tail); standard errors in parentheses clustered by dyad. Main data sources are Correlates of War and Polity IV.

**Table 3.4: Escalation after the Onset of Different-Civilization MIDs**

<i>Level of Escalation (number of deaths)</i>	Model 1 <i>At least 1 death</i>	Model 2 <i>More than 100</i>	Model 3 <i>1000 or more</i>
<b>Y2: Escalation</b>			
Cultural Issues	1.03* (.542)	.418 (.601)	.831* (.379)
Territory	.701* (.358)	.966* (.420)	1.12*** (.269)
Resources	.354 (.389)	-.197 (.378)	.149 (.414)
National Security	1.17*** (.358)	.895* (.428)	.979*** (.337)
Humanitarian	.778 (.424)	.804 (.474)	
Joint Democracy	-.283 (.209)	-.199 (.199)	-.300 (.207)
Power Parity	.802 (.604)	.757 (.658)	.305 (1.26)
Multiple Issue Categories	.414 (.424)	.441 (.492)	-.321 (.330)
Constant	-2.76*** (.505)	-3.51*** (.523)	-4.63*** (.409)
<b>Y1: Diff-civ MID</b>			
Contiguity	1.75*** (.103)	1.75*** (.104)	1.74*** (.108)
Joint Democracy	.314*** (.073)	.315*** (.073)	.312*** (.073)
Power Parity	.805*** (.198)	.806*** (.198)	.801*** (.197)
Constant	-3.36*** (.073)	-3.36*** (.073)	-3.36*** (.073)
$\chi^2$	71.16	47.18	78.92
Prob > $\chi^2$	0.000	0.000	0.000
N (Censored)	171,959	171,959	171,959
N (Uncensored)	241	241	241
rho	.271*	.512***	.953***

\*\*\*Significant at .001 level (two tail); \*\*Significant at .01 level (two tail); \*Significant at .05 level (two tail); standard errors in parentheses clustered by dyad. Main data sources are Correlates of War and Polity IV.

## CHAPTER 4

### SETTLING DIFFERENCES PEACEFULLY

Over the course of time states come into conflict with each other at varying levels. Some of these conflicts remain minor, and are often peacefully negotiated without threats of hostility. Others quickly become militarized and approach or enter into violence. These more serious disputes may be negotiated during initial periods of increased tensions, or after military combat has been initiated and both sides are looking for a way to end the death and destruction that usually accompanies fighting. In all cases, peaceful settlement methods are very important to conflict management.

The ultimate objective in any complete study of conflict is to identify ways to prevent or end it. In this chapter I examine conflict resolution where states from different cultures are involved, inquire as to how effective different-civilization dyads are at settling their disagreements, and search for the most efficient means for them to do so.

Prior to proceeding, please take note of the term ‘dispute.’ This word is widely recognized in the conflict literature and is usually synonymous with militarized conflict. Additionally, it is closely associated with the COW MID data set. But as noted above, not all international disagreements over contentious issues become militarized. In this chapter I use data from the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) project (Hensel 2001).<sup>18</sup> This data collection introduces the term ‘claim’ to refer to international disagreements over contentious issues whether or not there is a presence or threat of military force. A claim occurs when an official of one state makes an unambiguous assertion of ownership or control over a territory, area or resource presently controlled, administered or claimed by another state. Throughout the remainder of this study ‘claim’ refers to all contentious issue disagreements, while ‘dispute’ refers solely to militarized confrontations arising out of these disagreements.

#### **Settlement Techniques**

How do claims get settled? There are two obvious answers; if they are settled it is done either peacefully or militarily. Where the latter technique is employed the use of threats and/or violence is the norm. In the two preceding chapters considerable attention was paid to militarized engagements, evaluating the actors, intensities, and issues involved. In this chapter we examine peaceful settlement techniques. A variety of techniques may be used to try to

---

<sup>18</sup> The ICOW data is available at <http://www.icow.org>.



manage or settle contentious issues. The subsequent discussion identifies and explains the types of techniques, and then reviews literature associated with peaceful settlement attempts. The specific focus here is seeking to determine if one or more of these methods would be likely to increase the chances for cross-cultural dyads to successfully resolve their claims without resorting to military means.

First, what types of peaceful settlement techniques are available? There are two broad categories: bilateral efforts, where the two claimants deal directly and solely with each other; and efforts of third party assistance, which involves the participation of other actors besides the states or governments that are the principal claimants. The role of third parties is to help the two primary actors reach a successful conclusion to their talks. Third party assistance can take several different forms which may be classified into two subgroups: binding and non-binding (Hensel 2002). Binding forms include arbitration, which has the claimants submitting to a third party's binding decision, and adjudication, where the two sides make their cases before a legal institution such as the World Court or European Court of Justice.

In non-binding proceedings the third parties attempt to facilitate, encourage or assist in settlement resolution in a number of ways. Among these are good offices, inquiry or conciliation, mediation, and multilateral negotiations. When a nation uses its good offices it is trying to facilitate communications between the claimants, perhaps by passing information between them or providing a secure, neutral site for meetings. Inquiry or conciliation is fact-finding by the third party, and in mediation the third party enters into the discussions and makes suggestions. Multilateral negotiations occur when the third party is included as an equal participant with self-interests as opposed to being a neutral actor attempting to assist others. For example, during preparations for the reunification of East and West Germany, many of the negotiations included the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, and both Germanies, all of which had an interest in the reunification.

Third parties may be sovereign states, institutions such as intergovernmental or non-governmental organizations, and even individuals who are not officially representing a government. Internationally known and respected people such as Jimmy Carter and Nelson Mandela are occasionally invited by quarreling nations to fulfill such a role.

## **Different Cultures and Conflict Resolution**

How can these peaceful techniques best fit into the conflict resolution process between states from different cultures? The remainder of this chapter examines why these techniques are needed and which ones may be most effective.

As to why they are needed, members of dyads that cross cultural lines have different ethnicities, histories, races and/or religions. Huntington (1993) sees these differences (aggregated broadly in the concept of civilizations) as important but polarizing forms of identity. He states that relations among these civilizations will be “almost never close, usually cool, and often hostile” (1996: 207). He continues that trust and friendship will be rare, and uses terms like quasi war, uneasy peace, and intense rivalry to describe the “troubled relations” among civilizations (1996: 207). Because of these deep-seated differences, different-civilization dyads may find it very difficult to set aside suspicions and successfully work out disagreements, especially those that are considered serious.

The degree to which Huntington is correct in his expectations about the difficulties of cultures getting along is not an issue at this point. An abundance of different-civilization conflict is an empirical fact, as Chapter 2 established that the sheer quantity of different-civilization conflict exceeds that of same-civilization conflict at all three intensities. Therefore, the objective here is to identify and understand, to the greatest extent possible, ways to prevent, mitigate, or terminate this conflict. Chapter 3 provided a start by allowing us to recognize that the most serious issues are largely the same for both inter- and intra-cultural disputes. But we also concluded that the existence of cultural issues increases the likelihood of conflict where other serious issues are present, those primarily being territory and national security. In this section I scrutinize other conditions that may decrease the likelihood of peaceful settlement of conflict.

A number of researchers have noted added obstacles that must be overcome by those from different cultures that same-cultural members do not have to deal with. Heraclides (1989) argues that in ethnic conflict the opposing sides can have such intense feelings about each other that each follows ‘denial policies’ that are, by definition, not negotiable; in such cases no settlement can be reached. Rothman and Olson (2001) argue that conflicts between actors of different identities are complex in that the underlying stakes over which the opposing parties contend are often abstract and difficult to define. Additionally, the desired outcomes are intangible and difficult to identify, and the needs of rival groups can be framed in ways that are

mutually exclusive (2001: 297). If culturally diverse groups accept that there is no chance of a peaceful settlement because of emotional (or cultural) attitudes or because of misunderstandings about what the issues and desired outcomes really are, then there will be no peaceful settlements.

Fearon and Laitin (1996), who believe that large-scale inter-ethnic violence is rare, nevertheless agree that there is a tension underlying inter-ethnic relations that is relatively absent in dealings between intra-ethnic groups. They suggest that it is easier to have access to information about “coethnics” because of better developed social networks, and that due to cultural familiarity people are better able to identify opportunists among coethnics (1996: 730). They see this as facilitating peaceful interactions within ethnicities, and hampering it across ethnic group lines.

Druckman and Broome (1991) find that familiarity, or its absence, between groups affects flexibility and the willingness to compromise. They argue that any reduction in either familiarity or liking reduces the willingness, and therefore the ability, to make compromise agreements. Davis and Moore (1997) suggest that elites of an ethnic group are likely to accept that their ethnic kin will have similar policy preferences about a given set of issues. Furthermore, they (Davis and Moore) believe that members of an ethnic group will monitor the status and behavior of fellow ethnic members across borders. This monitoring increases the familiarity Druckman and Broome identify as enhancing the ability of negotiators to reach settlements. Reaching peaceful settlements should therefore be more difficult for different ethnic groups, including different-civilization states, because of a lack of familiarity and understanding between the two sides.

Huntington includes religions in his series of discussions on contentiousness; Henderson (1997) expands on the possibility that religions are more problematic than ethnicities. He points out that people can learn new languages or be divided in their ethnicities, such as being half Ukrainian or half Indian. However, he declares that it is not so easy to change religions or to be half Christian and half Muslim. He finds that the religion variable consistently has twice the impact of contiguity when it comes to interstate war (1997: 664). In Chapter 2 religious differences were shown to be associated with militarized conflict less than overall cultural differences; however, where they present problems they appear to be even more formidable obstacles to reaching peaceful settlements than are ethnicities.

Factors such as ethnicities and religions are important elements of culture, along with common histories, languages and race. Few people would disagree that those who share such backgrounds should, *ceteris paribus*, have better understandings of each other when compared with groups or states who do not share these similarities. Research from scholars discussed thus far illustrates an array of increased difficulties that dissimilar peoples must overcome in order to settle their varying levels of claims and prevent or end violence. Chapter 2 demonstrated an abundance of violence among dissimilar peoples. Since dissimilar peoples, whether they are from different tribes, religions, or races, share both increased conflict and additional obstacles to peaceful settlements, I proffer the following hypotheses:

*Hypothesis 4.1: Different-civilization dyads will be less likely to attempt to settle claims peacefully than will same-civilization dyads.*

*Hypothesis 4.2: Where peaceful resolution approaches are employed, different-civilization dyads will be less likely to reach settlements than will same-civilization dyads.*

### **Which Techniques?**

Inter-cultural conflict is viewed by many scholars as being different from intra-cultural conflict, though to varying degrees, especially where the issues are directly related to cultural differences (Carment 1993; Davis and Moore 1997; Henderson 1997; Pearson 2001). A number even consider these conflicts to be among the more contentious, dangerous, and/or prolific engagements (Burton 1987; Carment and James 1995; Kegley and Wittkopf 1995). Dixon (1996) believes the introduction of ethnic or religious issues into a disagreement greatly reduces the prospects of a peaceful settlement, and Maynes (1993) even suggests that ethnic conflict is so dangerous as to rival the spread of nuclear weapons.

With these increased obstacles for different-civilization dyads, identifying an effective way of settling their contentious disagreements becomes very important. Nader (1972: 54) identifies what she believes are three critical aspects of conflict resolution, two of which are civilization related: the type of relationship between the two claimants, and the “cultural load” affecting the conflict.<sup>19</sup> On the basis of these features, she suggests that it should be up to a third party to decide how to proceed with negotiations.

---

<sup>19</sup> The third aspect according to Nader is the variation in the type of dispute.

Rothman (1997) and Rothman and Olson (2001) discuss what they call the ARIA framework<sup>20</sup> for identity based conflict resolution. They argue that different ethnic groups engaged in conflict can benefit greatly from joint workshops about each other and their conflict, provided these are guided by third party panels. Kelman (1995) believes that such efforts were significant in moving Israelis and Palestinians towards the signing of the Oslo accords. He says that negotiators had come to know each other's points of view and their political and identity needs. Not only were most of these learning sessions led by third parties, but so were the Oslo accords themselves.

Hensel (2001: 26) finds that third parties are "much more likely to be involved in territorial claims that appear to be more dangerous...." Having seen earlier that conflicts involving ethnic differences are also considered by many scholars to be very dangerous, Hensel's revelation about third parties and territorial claims may carry over to negotiations involving cultural issues.

Druckman and Broome (1991) proffer that familiarization among different groups increases their willingness to negotiate and compromise. Where familiarization is not present to a desired extent, neutral third parties may be used to facilitate and enhance familiarization between different cultural or civilization groupings. In addition to Druckman and Broome's familiarity, there is also the issue of trust. Maoz and Russett (1993) study regimes and reveal that it is easier for democratic dyads than non-democratic dyads to develop trust due to the transparency associated with the former's type of governments. One side can watch much of the decision processes of the other because of the public nature of democracies. Conversely, in non-democratic dyads this openness is absent. The lack of transparency in non-democratic governments increases uncertainty and impedes the development of trust. Maoz and Russett therefore believe that non-democratic regimes, at least one of which is present in non-democratic dyads, are more likely to see disagreements as zero-sum games with regards to winning and losing. In conflicts they may be more amenable to a winner-take-all approach or more likely to try to conduct and resolve differences through coercion and violence.

An implication here is that if both states in a dyad are democratic, the significance of their civilization differences may be greatly reduced. However, the proportion of democratic dyads in the settlement data used for this chapter's analysis is considerably smaller among

---

<sup>20</sup> This model/framework is named for the ARIA Group, an association that provides support for conflict studies.

different-civilization match-ups than same-civilization dyads (22% vs. 48%).<sup>21</sup> Thus, the potential for positive effects from joint democracy for different-civilization pairings are substantially reduced. In the absence of democracy, states from the same civilization, due to their increased familiarity with each other as explained by Druckman and Broome above, may find trust easier to develop. Conversely, cross-cultural dyads may find this development more difficult because of a lack of familiarity and understanding about decision making processes and customs in the other state, especially when coupled with lower frequencies of joint democracy which, in turn, results in reduced transparency. In instances of different-civilization dyads, third party involvement may help level the playing field by first decreasing the costs of attaining information, next by encouraging conditions and solutions favorable to both sides, and finally by raising the costs of defection. Accordingly, different-civilization dyads may see third party assistance as desirable.

The common thread in all of these discussions about settlement attempts and different-civilizations or dangerous groupings is the need for commonality and understanding enhanced through the assistance of third parties. With this in mind, the next hypothesis is submitted:

*Hypothesis 4.3: Where different-civilization dyads attempt to settle claims peacefully, they are more likely to reach settlements through the use of third party assistance techniques than through bilateral negotiations.*

Having hypothesized an increased efficiency of third party assistance techniques, it is logical to anticipate where different-civilization dyads should turn to for this assistance. The discussion over the previous pages highlights concerns about increased difficulties when states from different cultures deal with each other over disagreements. Huntington (1996) expects these difficulties because of what he calls troubled relations between civilizations, Fearon and Laitin (1996) recognize underlying tensions not present in same-civilization dyads, and Druckman and Broome (1991) and Rothman and Olson (2001) emphasize the need for familiarity and understanding between the two sides. Based on these concerns and suppositions we should expect that when states look for assistance in settling claims they would naturally turn to where the least tensions and greatest familiarity and understanding exists, that being members of their own civilization. This is obviously easier for states that are from the same culture than

---

<sup>21</sup> This gap between the two is much greater here in claim match-ups than in the broader interstate system. Polity 4 data for 2001 reveal that across the entire system 41.8 percent of same-civilization dyads shared joint democratic status compared with 29.3 percent of those from different civilizations.

for those who are not. In ideal circumstances we might expect different-civilization pairings to seek multiple third party actors, at least one from each civilization. Since circumstances are seldom ideal, it may be more reasonable to expect them to at least attempt to use a member of one of the represented civilizations. Therefore, to complete Hypothesis 4.3, two sub-hypotheses are submitted:

*Hypothesis 4.3a: Where same-civilization dyads employ third party assistance techniques while attempting to settle claims, they are more likely to accept assistance from members of their own civilization than from members of a different civilization.*

*Hypothesis 4.3b: Where different-civilization dyads employ third party assistance techniques while attempting to settle claims, they are more likely to accept assistance from members of at least one of their two civilizations than from a third.*

### **Third Parties**

Where tensions are greatest between two sides and trust and understanding are in low supply, such as between different-civilization states, having a neutral party available to objectively look at details and provide guidance should enhance the search for peaceful resolution. There are two broad categories of settlement attempts when claimants receive assistance from a third party: binding and non-binding. Which of these two categories might be best suited to improve chances for success where different-civilization claimants attempt to settle a claim peacefully? The logical, simple and peaceful way to deal with all international disputes involving third party assistance is through the World Court, thus employing a binding approach. The World Court is a worldwide tribunal that was created specifically for this purpose. States can present their sides of a claim to a panel of international jurists who are trained and highly experienced in matters of justice. The result is fair and impartial justice based on what is right to the greatest extent that humans can provide. At least, that is the theory.

Unfortunately, use of this court carries several disadvantages. First and foremost, to submit to such jurisdiction nations must voluntarily sacrifice some of their sovereignty; this is always a touchy issue for states, both internationally and domestically. In most cases, those states that do volunteer to submit to World Court decisions do so conditionally, stipulating the degree to which the court can infringe on their national sovereignty (Powell and Mitchell 2007; Goldstein 2004).

Additionally, neutrality of the adjudicators and their abilities to understand points of view of different cultures is never fully assured, especially for states who see themselves as outsiders (non-Western states) compared to those who originally established the court (the West). Many such states are those that Visscher (1956: 467) refers to as having entered international relations with “civilizations obviously foreign to that which was at the basis of traditional international law and its procedures.” Considering both the sovereignty issue and concerns about neutrality and cross-civilizational understanding, the World Court has been relegated to chiefly secondary issues among nations that generally have good relations with each other (Goldstein 2004). The same problems that plague this court are inherent with other such bodies. The European Court of Justice is somewhat of an exception in that it has “real” jurisdiction, but it applies to a primarily single-civilization constituency and thus is little help in managing different-civilization claims.

With the reality that adjudication has not been as successful at resolving international claims as might be desired, attention must turn to other areas of third party assistance. It is also important to realize that while one or the other (binding or non-binding) technique may be more advantageous for different-civilization dyads as a general rule, there will always be exceptions. Simkin (1971) and Kolb (1983) proffer that negotiation processes are complicated by situation-specific features and must be dealt with as they arise. This correlates with Nader (1972) who asserted that third parties must tailor settlement methods to the features of the issue at hand.

Having discussed adjudication and found critical problems with it, there are other binding settlement procedures available that are not part of any court system. If those on opposing sides of an issue are willing to submit to binding arbitration, settlement attempts become much simpler than otherwise. Under this binding approach, much like in court, each side presents their arguments and an arbitrator upon whom both sides have agreed makes a ruling. At this point the issue has been resolved. But there are two significant drawbacks here. The first is that, like in the courts, states must voluntarily give up the right to defend their interests after the ruling. Convincing adversaries to do that, especially where understanding and trust are both in short supply as may be the case where different-civilizations are involved, can be problematic. The second disadvantage is that when arbitration is used, one or even both sides may feel that an unacceptable solution has been imposed on them. In such a case animosity may remain, the underlying issue of the claim could continue to simmer, and the imposed settlement may be short-lived.



Precedent can also be an impediment to arbitration. A similar issue or situation faced by two states may have been previously arbitrated. If so, the results of that arbitration may be a hint to adversaries as to how their quarrel is likely to be decided. According to Schotter (1978), the nature of the previous decision may lead the side not favored by precedent to avoid this process.

And finally, the history of arbitration can be a stumbling block. Islam, identified in Chapter 2 as one of the world's most contentious civilizations, has not fared well under these procedures in modern times and does not necessarily view this approach with high regard (Brower and Sharpe 2003). Though Brower and Sharpe are of the opinion that this attitude may be shifting, such changes are often slow to become prevalent, if they ever do. If the civilization that is involved in the highest number of different-civilization wars (Islam) shies away from a particular technique, that approach's chances of being effective on a large scale become more limited.

Binding third party assistance, whether adjudication or arbitration, has worked to some extent within associations dealing with matters that do not lend themselves to war. Trade associations are an example. The European Union (EU) is perhaps the most comprehensive association to successfully employ binding procedures. However, within this organization serious international violence ceased to be a significant issue before regimes were established to implement binding settlement procedures. And, the EU is primarily a single-culture organization, though it is slowly branching out. When it comes to cross-cultural peaceful settlement attempts for relatively serious issues, most states may find that the disadvantages of binding procedures as discussed above generally outweigh the advantages.

Under non-binding procedures, on the other hand, the third party is not in a position to impose a settlement on the two sides, but rather may be charged with developing proposals that provide for finding common ground and producing joint benefits. The strength of a mediator or other non-binding facilitator is that he/she assists disputants "in resolving their own differences" (Kaufman and Duncan 1992 quoting Cormick 1980). Under this scenario the two sides are more likely to arrive at decisions that both can live with, assuming a settlement is reached. They are also more likely to "own" the settlement, whatever it is, and therefore more likely to abide by it.

Mandell and Tomlin (1991) believe that mediation provides long-term dividends in that it can bring about normative changes in states' behavior. They argue that new kinds of behavior may result that may not be realized for years, but whose importance at restraining conflict could

last well into the future. They cite U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's role in ending the 1974 Egypt-Israeli conflict as an example. They say that his shuttle diplomacy resulted in each side understanding the other's concerns and political limitations, and that this led not only to the end of that war, but was also influential in leading to the eventual Camp David accords signed by Egypt and Israel with the help of President Carter.

And while a mediator cannot impose a settlement on the disputants if they become intractable, as can be done under arbitration, he/she is not without power to influence the situation, provided the right mediator is selected. Where progress is stymied, the mediator can press the sides to reevaluate their inflexible positions (Fisher and Keashly 1991). This can be done by inducing additional costs, providing positive incentives, or offering guarantees to break a stalemate. In other words, mediators possessing enough power can use carrots and sticks.

Third party assistance can be an effective way to settle a claim between different-civilization dyads, whether an international crisis or merely a low level discord. The chances of a settlement being complied with by both sides and lasting an extended period of time increase if both sides feel ownership of the settlement and believe that, given all of the circumstances, they got the best arrangement possible. This is more likely to happen through non-binding techniques than those that are binding. And, considering that different-civilization states are more likely than same-civilization states to enter into bargaining situations with less trust and understanding between the two sides, they are more likely to accept solutions that are mutually agreed upon in non-binding attempts than they would be if the solutions were forced upon them in binding settlements. Thus, the resulting hypothesis is submitted.

*Hypothesis 4.4: When different-civilization dyads use third party techniques in peaceful settlement attempts, they are more likely to reach settlements through non-binding rather than through binding techniques.*

### **Research Design**

The primary data for this analysis comes from the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) project (Hensel 2001). This data collection is tailored for the evaluation of international claims involving three types of contentious issues: territory, river, and maritime. The data set is a work in progress and will eventually cover claims for the three issues worldwide. As of this date, and within the confines of this study, it includes all three issues for the entire Western Hemisphere,

including North, Central and South America and the Caribbean, and also for Western Europe. In addition, it contains maritime issues for Eastern Europe and river claims for the Middle East.

Unlike in the two previous chapters, the desired data is not available for the entire world, and only four of the nine civilizations are included in the claims analyses (West, Latin America, Orthodox, and Islam). Accordingly, the extent to which the results from these analyses apply to the rest of the world is to a degree unknown. However, due to the large quantity of claims analyzed, the extensive number of countries involved, and the fact that nearly half of the civilizations are incorporated (4 of 9), results may be reasonably inferred to be at least somewhat representative of the international system, pending the availability of additional data. The topic of this chapter is obviously a candidate for additional research and analysis when that additional data becomes available.

Results found in Chapter 2 indicate that cultural conflict was as or more prolific during the Cold War as after. Thus, this chapter's temporal domain includes both time periods and is 1946-2001.

***Dependent variables and methods of analyses:***

Analysis of hypothesis 4.1 utilizes the ICOW dyad year data set, and the unit of observation is the claim dyad year. This analysis seeks to determine the propensity of dyads to search for resolutions to contentious claims through peaceful means. A dichotomous dependent variable is employed coded 1 if a peaceful settlement attempt is made to resolve a given claim in a dyadic year and 0 if the claim remains without a peaceful settlement attempt being made. Since the dependent variable is dichotomous, logit regression is employed as the method of analysis.

For hypotheses 4.2-4.4 the ICOW settlements data is used and the unit of observation is the individual claim settlement attempt. The dependent variable is *settlement*. Settlement is dichotomous and coded 1 if during a settlement attempt a claim is completely or partially settled and 0 if it is not. A settlement of procedural matters is not considered a partial settlement, since this applies only to the process of negotiations, not to the underlying issue. (Settlement attempts that apply only to procedural matters are omitted from the analyses.) Functional settlement attempts are included. These attempts do not cover ownership in a disputed claim, such as ownership of a territory, but would cover usage of the territory. While a functional settlement does not permanently settle a claim, it may eliminate some of the tension and subsequent danger

that accompanies contentious claims, and I therefore consider it a success, however limited, in conflict management. Because these evaluations incorporate a dichotomous dependent variable, the method of analysis is a series of logit regressions. Robust standard errors are employed in all cases to reduce possible effects of heteroscedasticity.

***Explanatory variables:***

There are three explanatory variables of primary interest. The first, used in the two previous chapters, is *different civilizations*. When a challenger and target (the two countries contesting a claim) are members of different civilizations, the variable is coded 1, and 0 if they are from the same civilization. Negative statistical significance of this variable will support hypotheses 4.1 (different-civilization states are less likely than same-civilization dyads to attempt peaceful resolutions) and 4.2 (different-civilization states are less likely than same-civilization dyads to reach settlements when peaceful resolutions are attempted).

Hypothesis 4.3 focuses on whether or not third party assistance techniques increase the likelihood of success in resolving different-civilization conflict when compared with bilateral negotiations. To test this expectation a variable designated *third party* is created, coded 1 where a settlement attempt employs third party assistance and 0 where it does not. The hypothesis will be supported if the variable is positive and statistically significant.

Hypothesis 4.4 anticipates that when different-civilization dyads employ assistance from third parties, they will have better settlement success using non-binding assistance methods rather than if they use binding techniques. The variable *non-binding* is coded 1 if a settlement attempt is made using non-binding third party assistance and 0 if a binding technique is employed. The hypothesis will be supported if the variable is positive and statistically significant.

Hypotheses 4.3 and 4.4 both proffer expectations about settlement attempts where only different-civilization states contest issues. Thus, the data included in these analyses are restricted to observations involving only different-civilization dyads. Hypothesis 4.4 proffers expectations about settlement attempts where only third party techniques are utilized. As a result, only observations of third party settlement attempts are included in this analysis.

There are five control variables. The first two are the same joint democracy and power parity (relative military capabilities) measures used in previous chapters. Joint democracy is expected to be associated with increased peaceful settlement attempts and increased likelihood of

reaching settlements. Because power parity is associated with the outbreak of war, it is expected to increase tensions and hinder reaching peaceful settlements.

The third control is issue salience, the importance attributed to a particular claim by the claimants. This level of importance may affect the emphasis placed upon, and the technique used for, the settlement attempt. ICOW's salience index scores the importance of each claim for each claimant on a 0-12 scale. For territory it takes into consideration whether homeland territory is involved, whether or not the territory in question is part of the mainland, known or potential resources the disputed area may contain, the existence and size of a population in the area, and ethnic or religious bases for the claim. For rivers, salience indicators include the volume of water discharged and the need for that particular source of water for a variety of reasons, among them drinking, fishing, irrigation, resource extraction, and other economic requirements. Maritime considerations are resources like fish and offshore oil and minerals, and their degree of importance to the national economy. Another maritime consideration is strategic military significance, such as naval choke points. The three claim types are evaluated on different criteria, but all use the same twelve point scale for ease of comparison. The variable employed in this analysis is the combined salience scores of the two claimants.

Territory is the fourth control variable. It is included because in Chapter 3 it was shown to be one of the most contentious of all issues. The other such issue type, national security, is not yet included in the ICOW data set, and collecting data on settlement attempts pertaining to these types of issues is well beyond the scope of this study.

The last of the five control variables is a count of pacific settlement commitments the dyadic members are signatories to. These commitments are actually memberships in multilateral organizations with a requirement for peaceful resolutions of differences as part of their charters. Examples of such organizations are the United Nations, the European Union, and the World Trade Organization. Data for this variable comes from the Multilateral Treaties of Pacific Settlement (MTOPS) data set (Hensel 2001). In some cases regional organizations may play a more prominent role for non-major powers. On the other hand, focusing entirely on regional institutions would eliminate the United Nations and a number of world bodies like the WTO that are important to both large and small nations. Therefore, this variable includes both global and regional organizations that require peaceful resolution to claims. This measure is employed to

determine if those commitments, as a group, are influential in encouraging peaceful conflict resolution.

Finally, an additional variable is included. It is a dichotomous time measure, coded 1 for observations after the Cold War ended. Findings in Chapter 2 indicate that cultural conflict has actually abated somewhat since the end of the Cold War. This variable is included to ascertain if attempts for and/or success at peaceful resolutions are more prevalent in the more recent time period.

### **Findings**

Hypothesis 4.1 predicts that different-civilization dyads will be less likely to attempt to settle claims peacefully than will same-civilization dyads. In a test of this hypothesis the principal variable of interest, different civilizations, is positive and statistically significant (see Table 4.1 for complete results). This is an indication that where different-civilization states are contesting contentious issues, they are very likely to engage in efforts to resolve these issues peacefully. In fact, predicted probabilities reported in column 1 of Table 4.2 illustrate that they are actually more likely to do so than are states from the same civilizations. This is true for both the Cold War and its aftermath. These results do not support Hypothesis 4.1.

All of the control variables in this analysis are statistically significant, one negatively and the remainder positively. The lone negative coefficient belonged to *pacsett*, the number of pacific settlement commitments dyads are signatories to. Contrary to expectations, as the number of these commitments increase, the less likely claimants are to seek peaceful settlements. Joint democratic democracy, power parity, higher issue salience and the presence of a territorial issue are all associated with increased likelihood that contending states will attempt to settle claims peacefully. These results conform to expectations. Joint democracies seldom fight with each other, and increased salience or the presence of either power parity or a territorial issue increase tensions, thus emphasizing a greater need to attempt a peaceful settlement. In addition to the control variables, the post-Cold War variable is also statistically significant and positive, indicating that overall, states are more likely to attempt to settle contentious issues peacefully after the Cold War than during.

The expectation for Hypothesis 4.2 is that where claims cross cultural boundaries, those dyads will be less likely to reach peaceful settlements than will states from the same civilizations. The different-civilizations variable in model 2 (Table 4.3) is negative as expected

indicating movement away from successful settlements, but it is not statistically significant. The probabilities in column 2 of Table 4.2 demonstrate that there is little difference in the likelihoods of success for peaceful settlement attempts between same- and different-civilization dyads. This is not consistent with and does not support the hypothesis.

In the test for Hypothesis 4.1 all of the control variables were statistically significant. Only two are here. First is democracy, which has a positive sign. As expected, high dyadic democracy scores are associated with an increased rate of success where peaceful settlement attempts are employed. Second, territorial issues are negative as anticipated, so they are associated with a decrease in reaching settlements during peaceful attempts. Saliency does not achieve statistical significance as defined by the study ( $p > .05$ ); however, it is negative and has a  $p$  value of .081, so it is marginally significant or close to significance. There is therefore *some* indication that greater issue saliency impedes success where peaceful settlements are attempted.

Prior to examining the results of Hypothesis 4.3 it is appropriate to first discuss the findings of Hypotheses 4.3a and 4.3b, which expect that same-civilization states will be more likely to employ third party assistance from members of their own civilization, and that different-civilization dyads will more likely accept assistance from actors who match the civilization of at least one of the two members. Table 4.4 provides statistics about the civilization origins of third party actors for settlement attempts examined in this study. Many of the actors are not countries but organizations, most of those being intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). Organizations are considered to be from the same civilization as the dyad if memberships match, i.e., if two Western states use the EU for their assistance, the organization would be coded as the same civilization, since the EU is a primarily Western organization. On the other hand, if two Western states accept assistance from the United Nations, the organization would be coded as a different civilization because the UN make-up is neither completely nor primarily of Western nations.

As indicated in Table 4.4, states that are members of the same civilization are twice as likely to employ third party actors from their own civilization. In this study they chose actors exclusively from their civilization 63.1 percent of the time, and in another 5.7 percent of the cases they chose a mix of actors, with members from their civilization and at least one other. In only 31.2 percent of the time did they not use same-civilization members. Hypothesis 4.3a is supported.

Table 4.4 illustrates that different-civilization dyads accepted their third party assistance from actors who matched one of their civilizations on 44.3 percent of the occasions, and employed multiple actors who represented both civilizations another 14.7 percent of the time. In all, states from different civilizations received their assistance from actors matching at least one of their civilizations 59 percent of the time. Hypothesis 4.3b is supported.<sup>22</sup>

Hypothesis 4.3 foresees that different-civilization dyads are more likely to be successful when attempting to settle claims peacefully with the aid of third parties as opposed to bilateral negotiations. In model 3 (Table 4.3) only different-civilization dyads are included in the analysis. The third party variable is employed to test the effects of third party assistance on the success rate when different-civilization states bargain over contested claims. The variable is not statistically significant. Predicted probabilities reported Table 4.5 indicate almost identical likelihood for reaching settlements using third party assistance and for those using bilateral methods in both periods (Cold War and post-Cold War). Hypothesis 4.3 is not supported.

Two of the control variables are statistically significant: salience and pacific settlement commitments, as is the post-Cold War. Salience is negative and so is associated with a decreased success rate when different-civilization dyads use third party assistance during settlement attempts. Pacific settlement commitments are positive; this is evidence that higher numbers of these commitments by different-civilization claimants contribute to higher success rates in achieving peaceful settlements. The post-Cold War variable is also positive, an indication that peaceful settlement success rates between states from different cultures improved after the Cold War. This is consistent with conclusions from Chapter 2 that different-civilization conflict is moving more towards moderation than increasing in intensity.

The last hypothesis (4.4) predicts that when different-civilization dyads use third party assistance in peaceful settlement attempts, they will have an increased likelihood of success using non-binding rather than binding techniques. That Hypothesis 4.3 was not supported tends to overshadow whatever the results for 4.4 might be. Indeed, the non-binding variable is not statistically significant (model 4 of Table 4.3). Probabilities in Table 4.5 show a definitive

---

<sup>22</sup> While I had no theoretical expectations about the effects of the civilization that third party actors are members of, I was curious. I created a dichotomous variable to account for whether or not third party actors in settlement attempts matched the civilizations of the claimants, and another variable for different-civilization dyads to account for matching one or both dyad members' civilizations. I then reran the regressions with these variables included, separately and together. The civilization memberships of third party actors had no noticeable influence on the success of reaching a settlement.



higher prediction for successful *binding* third party settlement attempts during the Cold War, but afterwards predictions for non-binding attempts are about the same. Hypothesis 4.4 is not supported, but there appears to be a shift in the direction of the hypothesis results after the Cold War.

The only variable that is statistically significant in this model is the post-Cold War. As with the previous hypothesis results, this is an indication that among states from different cultures, peaceful settlements were more likely to be reached after the Cold War ended rather than while it was in progress, though in this case the results refer only to attempts employing third party techniques. It should also be noted that during the period after the Cold War, *all* cross-cultural third party settlement attempts were made using non-binding techniques. This indicates a definite movement toward the use of non-binding procedures where third party settlement approaches are applied. (A breakdown of attempts and settlements by technique is found in Table 4.6.)

In summary, four of the six hypotheses in this chapter are not supported by the results. Evidence indicates that cross-cultural dyads are more likely than same-culture states to seek peaceful solutions to contentious claims, and their success rates are similar to those of the same-culture states when they engage in peaceful resolution attempts. Additionally, different-civilization dyads have about the same likelihood of settling claims peacefully whether they use third party assistance or bilateral negotiations. And, when being assisted by third parties, chances of different-civilization dyads reaching a settlement were initially better using binding techniques. On the other hand, after the Cold War ended binding techniques were not used, and all peaceful settlements were then reached through non-binding procedures. This factor provides some support for Hypothesis 4.4, but the lack of use of binding techniques makes a comparison for the post-Cold War era impossible.

### **Discussion**

How could so many of the hypotheses have been incorrect? A number of potentialities that were not considered come to mind. The first is that contesting actors as well as third parties might focus on and place most of their emphasis on the most dangerous cases. Cases in which MIDs, and especially wars, occurred in the recent past involving a given issue would certainly qualify as dangerous. Analyses were rerun controlling for past MIDs, MIDs involving fatalities, and wars (individually in separate models) at five, ten, and fifteen year intervals. These three

variables exert influence on the likelihood of reaching peaceful settlements, but only if the analyses are restricted to different-civilization dyads. As the total number of previous MIDs over an issue increase, the likelihood of reaching a settlement decreases. Conversely, as the number of previous wars and MIDs that include fatalities increase, the chances of reaching a peaceful settlement increase. For war this influence is more pronounced if third party assistance is employed; for MIDs with fatalities the effect is not present without third party assistance employment. While each of these phenomena impacts cross-culture conflict resolution results and adds to our knowledge of the subject, including them in the analyses, either individually or as a group, does not change or explain the lack of support for the hypotheses.

A second possibility not considered in the original analyses is the effect of another type of previous activity, that dyads with a history of settling differences peacefully may find it easier to repeat those successes in subsequent claims, or those with a history of failure to settle them might find those difficulties magnified with future claims. Controlling for prior peaceful settlements of claims between states does not affect results. On the other hand, previous unsuccessful attempts to resolve conflict decrease the likelihood that a settlement will be reached in the future. The scope of this finding is opposite of those in the preceding paragraph; it applies to overall settlement attempts including all dyads, but the effect is not present when restricted to different-civilization states. And as with the preceding paragraph, these results provide no explanation as to the lack of support for the hypotheses.

Another potential reason for unexpected results is the distribution of cases. For example, the distribution could be extremely one-sided in favor of either same-civilization or different-civilization dyads. Such a lack of adequate data in one of the categories could prevent a proper test of the hypotheses. Even so, in reality the split in cases between the two types of dyads in this analysis is almost even (474 same-civilization dyads and 448 different). Results are not affected by an inadequate distribution of data favoring either same- or different-civilization dyads.

A further example of a distribution problem could be that most of the different-civilization dyad pairings are either particularly contentious or especially peaceful. In this case the latter is a distinct possibility. Nearly 42 percent of the pairings are West-Latin American claims. This match-up produced only one serious dispute during the entire evaluation period in Chapter 2 (see Table 2.3), and that one fell short of war. Conversely, the most conflictual dyad,

West-Islam, represents only two percent of the pairings. Still, the Orthodox was also a contentious civilization, though primarily below the war level. Pairings that include two of these three contentious civilizations account for 29 percent of the match-ups. As a result, while more cases involving the West and Islam would be desirable, the number where contentious civilizations deal with each other appears adequate for testing.

A final and much stronger potential consideration is that the ICOW data is currently limited in its geographical coverage. Consequently, as discussed in the research design section of this chapter, there are only four civilizations represented in the data. Claims involve all of Latin America, most of the West, and a smaller number of Islamic and Orthodox states. Western states are engaged in 552 different settlement attempts, followed by Latin America, which participates in 418. Islamic and Orthodox states participate in only 121 and 140, respectively. This is because while all three ICOW issues (territory, maritime and river) are covered for all of the Western Hemisphere and Western Europe, only maritime issues are included for Eastern Europe and just river claims for the Middle East. That translates to two civilizations covered thoroughly, two partially, and five civilizations that are not represented at all. Even though there are a significant number of cases to be analyzed, an even larger number, and a large portion of the world, are excluded. As ICOW expands its global coverage to other civilizations, the results of these analyses could change.

Hypotheses 4.3a and 4.3b about the civilization memberships of third party actors was supported. Though the hypotheses about the effectiveness of third party assistance techniques for cross-cultural states were not supported, there were two additional interesting and potentially important revelations about third parties that surfaced. First, during the time period covered by this examination (1946-2001) different-civilization dyads turned to third parties for assistance better than a fourth again more often than did their same-civilization counterparts. Inter-cultural claimants utilized outside assistance in 35 percent of their peaceful settlement attempts, compared with 25 percent for those of intra-cultural claimants.<sup>23</sup>

The other item of interest is the composition of these parties. Table 4.4 provides statistics of broad categories. Looking further, we find that an important source of this assistance during the analysis period was intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). The frequency of use for these

---

<sup>23</sup> While this discrepancy between dyad types is notable from the mid 20<sup>th</sup> century to the present, when the entire period covered by the ICOW data is included (1816-2001) the difference is negligible, 26 percent for same-civilization states and 27 percent for different-civilization members.

organizations was similar, 40 percent of the time for same civilizations and 37 percent for civilizations that were different. Within that group, states from the same cultures were more likely to use regional IGOs, over two thirds of the time (28 of their 40%). Cross-cultural states also used them more often than global IGOs, but only slightly more than half of the time (20 of their 37%).

More germane to this study, when using IGOs or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), same-civilization dyads split such organizations almost equally between those that were completely or primarily composed of members of their civilization and those that were not (51.7% same; 48.3% different). Finding a same-civilization organization is obviously much more difficult for different-civilization dyads, so it should not be surprising that in most cases the third party organizations did not match the civilizational compositions of the dyad (84.8%).

While not so much the mystery presented by the main hypotheses, the control variables in this chapter also perform interestingly. All but one exert a positive influence on states to try to solve their claims through peaceful means. The lone exception is that increased numbers of dyadic pacific settlement commitments are associated with the opposite effect, which is not at all intuitive. Additionally, joint democracy plays a role in reaching settlements (model 2), but not when only different-civilization states are involved (models 3 and 4). This is most likely because only about one fourth of different-civilization dyads share high democracy scores. The power parity variable has no noticeable effect on reaching settlements in any of the models. It was expected to be a hindrance since power parity is often associated with the outbreak of war. The presence of territorial issues impedes success in settlement attempts, except where only different-civilization states are involved. High salience does the same (though only marginally in model 2), except where different-civilization states employ third party assistance techniques. As previously stated, memberships in multiple pacific settlement treaties is associated with decreased likelihood of attempting to reach settlements peacefully. Yet, these memberships produce positive effects in *reaching* settlements, but these effects are evident only when attempts are restricted to different civilizations.

An unreported comparison of this chapter's results was made with other time periods to determine if state actions have been consistent over time. Results indicate that

that they have not, and the end of World War II appears to be the turning point.<sup>24</sup> Testing the hypotheses over a variety of time periods indicates that had my temporal domain been 1816-1945, three of my four unsupported hypotheses would have been supported. During this time, where peaceful resolution approaches were employed, different-civilization dyads were less likely to reach settlements than same-civilization dyads (hypothesis 4.2); states from different civilizations were more likely to reach settlements through the use of third party assistance than through bilateral negotiations (4.3); and when using third party techniques, different-civilization dyads were more likely to be successful at settling claims peacefully through the use of non-binding rather than through binding techniques (4.4). Only results for hypothesis 4.1, which showed that different-civilization dyads are more likely to attempt to settle claims peacefully than are same-civilization dyads, were consistent throughout the 1816-2001 time period.

The world has changed in some respect, but what that change may be is far from clear. One change that may possibly have an affect, in particular on hypothesis 4.2 (different-civilization dyads were less likely to reach peaceful settlements prior to 1945), is that the post-World War II era saw an increase in the number of democracies in the world. As discussed in Chapter 3, 79 percent of all democratic dyads are within civilizations. Mitchell and Prins (1999: 178) find that while democratic dyads seldom go to war with each other, in the post war era they are also very poor at permanently settling disputes. More democratic dyads could translate to more same-civilization disputes that do not get settled, which could lead to different-civilization dyads becoming more likely to reach peaceful settlements than same-civiizations. Another reason for the shift in results could be in the data; that is, the claims that have been identified could be more or less complete in some time periods than in others, thus affecting outcomes.

### **Conclusions**

For the most part, the results for this chapter are not what were expected. Evidence does support the expectation that civilization membership of third party actors is important for claimants when receiving assistance. Even though the other hypotheses were not supported,

---

<sup>24</sup> Logit regressions were conducted for all four hypotheses using the same models found in Tables 4.1 and 4.3, except that the post-Cold War variable was excluded where that time period did not apply. The four additional temporal domains examined were the 19<sup>th</sup> century (1816-1900), the 20<sup>th</sup> century (1900-2001), the period prior to the Cold War (1816-1945), and the entire period for which data was available (1816-2001).

their results allow for some rather useful conclusions. To begin with, different-civilization dyads attempt to resolve problems peacefully more so than same-civilization dyads, and they have about the same degree of success in those efforts as do the same-civilization states. Next, using third party assistance as a bargaining technique for different-civilization dyads presents no particular advantages over bilateral techniques so far as the ability to produce a settlement goes. And finally, where third parties provide assistance to cross-cultural dyads, non-binding techniques present no particular advantage over binding techniques, though in recent years binding techniques appear to have fallen out of favor.

Chapters 2 and 3 concluded that cross-cultural conflict is not as serious as envisioned by Huntington. The conclusions reached in testing the first two hypotheses in this chapter are that different-civilization dyads are more likely to attempt to settle claims peacefully than are same-civilization dyads, and that where peaceful resolution approaches are employed, different-civilization dyads are not less successful than their same-civilization counterparts. These results are consistent with the conclusions of the two previous chapters.

**Table 4.1: Logit Analysis of Probability of Peaceful Settlement Attempts**

<i>Peaceful Attempts</i>	Model 1
Different Civilizations	.400*** (.098)
Joint Democracy	.306*** (.092)
Power Parity	2.12*** (.291)
Saliency	.135*** (.021)
Territory	.703*** (.098)
Pacific Settlement Treaties	-.089*** (.016)
Post- Cold War	.249** (.094)
Constant	-3.22*** (.222)
$\chi^2$	144.73
Prob > $\chi^2$	0.000
N (Dyad years)	4535

\*\*\* Significant at .001 level (two tail) \*\* Significant at .01 level (two tail) \* Significant at .05 level (two tail). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Main data source is Issue Correlates of War (Dyad years).

**Table 4.2: Predicted Probabilities (Hypotheses 4.1 & 4.2)**

	Peaceful Settlement Attempts <sup>1</sup>	Peaceful Settlements <sup>2</sup>
Different Civilizations:		
Cold War	.119	.359
Post-Cold War	.148	.365
Same Civilizations:		
Cold War	.083	.354
Post-Cold War	.104	.370

1. Probabilities that claimants will attempt to settle claims peacefully. 2. Where peaceful settlement techniques are employed, the probabilities that settlements will be reached.



**Table 4.3: Logit Analysis of Peaceful Settlements**

<i>Settlement</i>	Model 2 All attempts/ All dyads	Model 3 All attempts <sup>1/</sup> Different- Civilization dyads	Model 4 Third party attempts <sup>2/</sup> /Different- Civilization dyads
Different Civilizations	-.018 (.162)		
Third Party		-.011 (.228)	
Non-Binding			-.044 (1.05)
Joint Democracy	.374* (.160)	.341 (.296)	-.114 (.539)
Power Parity	.261 (.487)	1.10 (.843)	.667 (1.84)
Saliency	-.063 (.036)	-.101* (.051)	.038 (.093)
Territory	-.315* (.156)	-.109 (.247)	-.164 (.461)
Pacific Settlement Treaties	.027 (.028)	.098* (.042)	-.013 (.092)
Post- Cold War	.072 (.156)	.819*** (.251)	1.34*** (.417)
Constant	-.357 (.350)	-.780 (.514)	-1.34 (1.54)
$\chi^2$	15.39	23.21	11.62
Prob > $\chi^2$	0.031	0.002	0.114
N (Dyad years)	902	431	143

\*\*\* Significant at .001 level (two tail) \*\* Significant at .01 level (two tail) \* Significant at .05 level (two tail). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Main data source is Issue Correlates of War (Settlements). 1. Third party assistance compared with bilateral techniques. 2. Non-binding third party assistance compared with binding third party assistance techniques.

**Table 4.4: Civilization Membership of Third Party Actors**

Dyad Type	Same*	Different*	Mixed*	Partial*	Total
Same-Civilization	99 (63.1%)	49 (31.2%)	9 (5.7%)		157 (100%)
Different-Civilization	18 (14.7)	50 (41.0)		54 (44.3)	122 (100)

\* Same – Third party actor is from the same civilization as the dyad members. For Different-civilization dyads, at least one actor is from each civilization. Different - Third party actor is not from the same civilization as the dyad members. For Different-civilization dyads, the actor is not the same as either member. Mixed - Third party actors are from the same civilization and other civilizations. Partial – Third party actor is from the same civilization as one claimant, but not the other. In 45 cases the third party matches the target and in nine it matches the challenger.

**Table 4.5: Different-Civilization Probabilities for Reaching Settlements**

	Cold War	Post-Cold War
Third Party Assistance	.308	.504
Bilateral Techniques	.309	.505
Non-Binding 3d Party	.258	.560
Binding 3d Party	.297	.559

The first two rows compare predicted probabilities for third party assistance with predicted probabilities for bilateral negotiations. Probability values are based on model 3 in Table 4.3. The last two rows compare predicted probabilities for third party non-binding techniques with predicted probabilities for third party binding techniques. Probability values are based on model 4 in Table 4.3.

**Table 4.6: Different-Civilization Peaceful Settlements by Technique**

	Cold War Attempts	Cold War Settlements	Post-Cold War Attempts	Post-Cold War Settlements
3d Party Non-Binding	113 (36.0%)	30 (31.3%)	34 (25.4%)	18 (30.5%)
3d Party Binding	10 (3.2)	5 (5.2)	0 (0)	0 (0)
Bilateral	191 (60.8)	61 (63.5)	100 (74.6)	41 (69.5)
Total	314 (100%)	96 (100%)	134 (100%)	59 (100%)

This table provides numbers and percentages of peaceful attempts and settlements (each are separated into the Cold War and the post-Cold War periods) categorized by technique (third party non-binding technique, third party binding, and bilateral negotiations).

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **IN CONCLUSION**

As discussed in Chapter 1, differences between groups of peoples have long been associated with violence. Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations* theory increased concern about cultural conflict, and subsequent events, especially the attack that destroyed the World Trade Center in New York, carried those concerns to new and terrifying heights.

Such international cultural conflict is the topic of this study. The study's purpose is generally threefold. The first is to determine if the 'clash of civilizations' is real, as previous studies on the topic suffered from various weaknesses. Included in this part of the analysis is an attempt to discover the extent to which cross-cultural conflict takes place, the intensities at which it occurs, and who the main participants are. The second purpose is to ascertain if cultural conflict is a unique phenomenon with its own causes, or if it is a product of the same conditions and issues that lead to intra-cultural conflict. And third, a search is conducted for techniques that may be better suited than others for successful peaceful settlement attempts of cross-cultural contentious claims.

#### **Theoretical Contributions**

Though there are exceptions, the theories for the first part of this work generally mirror those of Huntington. This is because the first empirical chapter (Chapter 2) is primarily an evaluation of his suppositions. This evaluation is appropriate and necessary because previous reviews of Huntington have suffered from a variety of shortcomings, from lack of sufficient data to inadequate measures of variables to inconsistencies in the definition of what constitutes a 'clash.'

This examination includes explaining his concepts, sometimes supporting them and sometimes criticizing them. For example, I diverge from his view that much of the hypothesized 'clash' will be between the West and the rest, that is, that the other civilizations of the world will form coalitions to battle Western states due to long held resentments over the colonization practices of the past. In such instances I show why I think he is in error, in this particular case because I anticipate other civilizations will place more emphasis on trading with and emulating the economic successes of Western nations. Even so, it is the major aspects of his theory that I test in this section.

After this analysis I move into two other areas, the first being issues. In recent years issues have become a key focus in conflict research. Two obstacles are often encountered in such research, and in this study I employ methods of dealing with each. First, there are such a large number of potential issues in conflict, often dozens, that it is difficult to include all of them in a single analysis. By combining similar issues into groups, I reduce them to six categories, a number that can be effectively included in regressions.

Second, determining whether a given issue is a significant cause of conflict is difficult. To do so, one must not only identify where issues are present that lead to conflict, but must also be able to differentiate from where they are present but *do not* lead to conflict. There is as of yet no way to consistently identify the presence of an issue between two states where peace remains in effect. Thus, an accurate determination as to a given issue's influence, or lack thereof, in the outbreak of conflict is problematic. Previous research such as that of Gochman and Leng (1983) suggests that escalation of hostility occurs because of the issue or issues in contention that lead to the outbreak of hostility. By examining the issues of MID's and those that lead to escalation I am able to reveal information about issues in overall versus different-civilization conflict.

And finally, I combine cultural information with a new data set, the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW). By doing this, I am able to analyze peaceful settlement attempts between different-civilization states, and the settlement techniques they employ.

### **Key Conclusions**

Among a number of important lessons learned throughout this study, I see two as being the most significant. The first is that militarized interstate disputes occur much more frequently between countries of different cultures than between those of the same and therefore account for the majority of international violence. This makes cross-cultural conflict a very serious issue. The second lesson is that the tensions, threats and even destruction caused by these cultural conflicts are not nearly as great (compared with same-civilization conflict) as the first lesson might suggest.

How is this apparent paradox explained? As has already been stated, conflict between cultures accounts for most wars and cannot be taken lightly. Misunderstandings and the friction of directly opposed deeply held convictions can lead to violence, as the Mohammed cartoon episode discussed in Chapter 2 clearly illustrates. Even so, the post-Cold War clash of civilizations as predicted by Huntington has not come to pass. Among the primary reasons for

this conclusion is that different-civilization conflict is much more narrowly focused than Huntington expected, and it has moderated since the end of the Cold War rather than intensified.

This study contains three analytical chapters (Chapters 2-4). A summary of the specific findings of each follows.

## **Chapter 2**

Chapter 2 examined three aspects of cultural conflict. These were whether empirical support exists for Huntington's post-Cold War 'clash of civilizations' theory, how prevalent cross cultural conflict is (is it pervasive across all or most civilizations?), and does this conflict reach across the intensity spectrum to become as violent as Huntington expected.

The hypotheses in this chapter were designed to test the various aspects of Huntington's theory. The first anticipated that during the post-Cold War era, which is the time Huntington predicted the clash would occur, that violent conflict would be more likely between neighboring states of different civilizations (those on the fault lines) than between neighbors of the same civilization. This anticipation is tested at three intensity levels: MID, which includes all militarized interstate disputes, most of which are minor and do not result in fatalities; an intermediate level termed *serious*, defined as conflict in which there are more than 100 battle related fatalities; and war, which uses the COW definition of at least 1000 battle deaths.

The results of the analyses support the hypothesis at all three levels of intensity. Predicted probabilities of a number of specific scenarios also support the hypothesis in most incidences at the two lower intensities; however, when conflict reaches the war level, except for where Western and Islamic states are the actors, contiguous same-civilization states are more likely to fight than are different-civilization states. Thus, while the post-Cold War 'clash of civilizations' theory is supported statistically, probabilities that it will develop on a large scale is true only at the lesser intensity levels. Huntington's declaration that future conflict would be dominated by cultural differences (1993: 207) turns out to be not so much inaccurate as overstated, i.e., technically it exists but does not dominate at the most violent intensity.

Additionally, comparison with conflict during the Cold War provides strong evidence that if anything, cross-cultural conflict moderated after the Cold War. In an analysis of the years 1946-2001, the variable interacting contiguity with different-

civilization status (the fault line variable) was statistically significant and positive, indicating that different-civilization states on the fault lines were more likely to engage in conflict than were same-civilization states throughout the entire period. This was the case at all three intensities. Conversely, the variable that interacted the post-Cold War period with contiguous different-civilization status (the fault line – post-Cold War interaction term) was not significant at *any* of the levels. Furthermore, calculated probabilities for 42 diverse scenarios produce more predictions for higher probabilities of different-civilization conflict during the Cold War than afterwards. These regression and predicted probability results illustrating stronger different-civilization fault line conflict during the Cold War provide the moderating evidence noted above.

Expectations by Huntington that Islam and the West would be among the most contentious civilizations in the post-Cold War period are supported, but a similar expectation about the Sinics is not. In fact, the Sinics were among the least contentious; they did not participate in any conflicts at the two upper levels with other civilizations. There was a third contentious civilization, but it was the Orthodox. And, while Western states have been engaged in much of the conflict at the two upper intensities, with only one exception it has been restricted to the other two contentious civilizations. This is important because Huntington predicted that the rest of the world would turn against the West, i.e, the West and the rest, and this has not happened.

More importantly, this ‘conflict of civilizations’ was confined to a large extent to the three civilizations identified above as contentious. Most of the conflict at the serious and war intensities were engaged in by two member states of these three civilizations. Those upper level conflicts that were not exclusive to these three civilizations were always between one of these and one of the remaining six civilizations. In other words, all of the serious cross-cultural conflict was in some fashion a product of Islam, the West, or the Orthodox.

Huntington’s prediction that the West and Islam would constitute the most contentious dyad is supported. Over half of the war pairings after the Cold War were between Islamic and Western states, and the dyad’s probability of conflict is higher than any of the other pairings at the two upper intensities.

In summary, while Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ theory is empirically supported, it is not the clash he expected. It is greatly restricted to only three civilizations, has moderated



rather than intensified since the end of the Cold War, and same-civilization states actually have a higher probability of going to war in the current era than do most different-civilization matchups. Plus, the rest of the world has shown no signs of turning on the West.

An additional analysis not part of the hypotheses or the original study was added to compare the effects of religion with civilizations/cultures. This analysis was of a preliminary nature; even so, it indicated that while religion can lead to international conflict, it is not as contentious as civilization differences, especially at the war level.

There is a finding from this chapter that is an excellent candidate for additional research. Islam is represented in every dyadic pairing in which a conflict reaches war status. Even though the West is involved in more than half of those, the remaining wars are between Islam and other civilizations. What is it about Islam that leads to such widespread violence? Examining this question is certain to be a complex undertaking, but one that may pay large dividends if a solid answer can be found.

### **Chapter 3**

In Chapter 3 the focus is on determining if there are particular, unique issues that lead to cross-cultural conflict, or put another way, the extent to which this violence is directly related to cultural or civilizational differences. The expectation is that the greater degree to which its causes can be isolated, the better the chances are of reducing or resolving cross-cultural conflict. Thus, in this chapter hypothesis testing is designed to identify the underlying issues and compare those that are the most contentious in overall conflict with those that are contested in different-civilization conflict. This is done at the three intensities used in Chapter 2.

As previously discussed, two challenges inherent in evaluating the roles of issues were met by grouping issues by similarity and analyzing conflict escalation rather than outbreak. A third challenge was that while a data set containing an extremely large number of dyad-year observations was available, MIDs only occurred in a small percentage of those observations. In order to avoid the loss of so much useful data, a censored probit, or Heckman selection model, was used for analysis. This permitted the evaluation of all observations to determine the outbreak of a MID, while restricting analysis to the MIDs when evaluating escalation.

The first hypothesis predicted that culture-unique issues would not be a significant source of overall conflict escalation in the post-Cold War era. However, the hypothesis was not supported. Cultural issues were significant at all three of the intensities. But they were not

alone; there were three other issue categories that were also associated with escalation. These were territory, national security issues, and, at the two lower intensities, humanitarian concerns.

The prediction of the second hypothesis was that cultural issues would not be the only significant source of different-civilization conflict escalation in the post-Cold War era, but would be one among others. The results were consistent with this hypothesis. Along with cultural issues, two other issue groups were important sources of escalation. As with the previous hypothesis, these were territory and national security. In fact, these two variables performed stronger than did the culture variable.

As it turns out, the issues associated with different-civilization conflict are pretty much the same as those that lead to same-civilization conflict. This is both good and bad. It is good because this constitutes evidence that identity differences do not lead to conflict as much as Huntington believed, which translates to a lessening of the seriousness of a ‘clash of civilizations.’ It is bad in that it does not provide a strong clue as to a single source of different-civilization conflict. If there was a single source, it might be easier to deal with for prevention or resolution purposes.

Another finding from Chapter 3 is that where cultural issues are at stake in conflict, they are seldom the only type of issue involved. In most cases they are accompanied by either territorial issues, national security issues, or both. Conversely, it is not unusual for all issues of a conflict to be restricted to either of the latter two categories. That this is the case is an indication that cultural issues may often be more of an enabling condition that aggravates a situation when other issues are present rather than the primary issue of a conflict.

Turning to appropriate areas for additional research, there are three that surface from this chapter. The first has to do with the national security issues category. Territory has for some time been recognized as one of the international system’s most contentious issues. Results of this chapter’s analyses indicate that national security may share that characteristic. Additional research may well provide information to expand the literature in that regard.

Another area where additional attention could add to the literature base is the extension of this issues analysis. An extended effort could take either or both of two directions. The first is to pursue underlying issues leading to conflict or its escalation between minorities and majorities in individual countries or geographical regions. A second direction might follow the lead of Davis and Moore (1997) who studied conflict outbreak between dyads where an advantaged

minority in one state has an ethnic tie to a disadvantaged minority in another state. Analysis of the issues bearing on either of these conflict situations would increase our understanding of cultural clashes.

Finally, humanitarian issues were found to be statistically significant at the lower intensities in one of the models tested. These issues are growing in their influence on international relations and they surface much more frequently in conflictual situations involving different-civilization dyads than in same-civilization dyads. Research into this area might produce interesting results.

#### **Chapter 4**

The main objective of Chapter 4 is to determine the most effective techniques for different-civilization states to employ in attempting to resolve claims peacefully, and also to identify added difficulties encountered by these states in reaching peaceful settlements over contentious claims.

Hypotheses expect that different-civilization dyads will be less likely to attempt to settle claims peacefully than will same-civilization dyads, and when they do, they will be less likely to reach settlements. However, according to regression analysis and predicted probabilities, states from different civilizations are *more* likely than those from the same civilization to attempt to settle claims peacefully, and when they do, they have about the same success rate in reaching settlements as the same-civilization states.

Additional hypotheses anticipate that where different-civilization dyads attempt to settle claims peacefully, they are more likely to reach settlements through the employment of third party assistance techniques than through bilateral negotiations; and when using third party techniques, they are more likely to reach settlements through non-binding rather than binding third party techniques. As before, the analyses do not support the expectations. Results indicate that for states from different civilizations there is no noticeable advantage to the employment of third parties over bilateral negotiations in peaceful settlement procedures. Also, where third party assistance is used, over time binding procedures have been more likely to result in settlements, though that trend has changed completely since the end of the Cold War, i.e., all different-civilization third party settlement attempts have employed non-binding techniques. In a nutshell, I was unable to identify a settlement technique that, *ceteris paribus*, offers advantages over others.

In considering future research, the entire analysis of this chapter is a candidate. The ICOW data covers much of the world and is an excellent tool for analysis. But as discussed previously, there are still major regions it does not include. As it expands its coverage, analyses similar to those in Chapter 4 should be repeated to ascertain whether the current findings still hold. And, I obviously need to reevaluate my theories to determine why none of my four primary hypotheses were supported.

### **The Civilization Approach**

Cultural conflict is the overall focus of this study. The approach taken was to use Huntington's civilizations as the definition of culture. Narrowing culture to a measurable entity is very difficult; no matter what definition is used, there are and will be major flaws, as there is not yet an ideal measure. Nevertheless, an arguable logic, presented in Chapters 1 and 2, supports civilizations as a reasonable set of categories when analyzing the entire world. Still, the conclusions reached as a result of this approach may have been different had another definition been employed. If an additional suitable measure or method of analysis can be identified, a reanalysis may yield additional information.

Religion was substituted for civilizations in Chapter 2 and indicated that religion, though potentially contentious, is less so than civilization differences. In future studies that are more localized, religion or ethnicities might be used. This could reveal similarities and differences from a micro viewpoint as compared with the macro level evaluation contained herein. But if ethnicity is used, a definition will have to be developed, overcoming obstacles similar to those of culture. Tribes, such as the Massai and Hutus, might be appropriate for Africa, but what about South America where tribes are not such a major part of society, or Southeast Asia where they do not exist? And how would ethnicities be identified in Europe where there are ethnic Greeks and Turks, ethnic Russians, Albanians, Serbs, and others? More than one definition may be required, as is the case with civilizations. Also, as is the case with civilizations, there will be a need to recognize exceptions in places, like which nationalities get to be ethnicities and which do not. Otherwise, nationalities become the focus rather than ethnicities. The point is that other measures for differences among peoples can be utilized, but each carries its own disadvantages.

While this is so, it should not prevent the search for a broader body of knowledge. Potentially, different results from different measures would add to the knowledge base of the

conflict literature. On the other hand, these new results would not necessarily negate the conclusions derived from the present analyses.

### **Summary**

Throughout this dissertation, hypotheses have been presented and tested concerning conflict between states of different cultures. Evidence collected verifies that cross-cultural conflict outnumbers same-culture or same-civilization conflict, and has for at least half a century. This conflict is not getting worse, but rather has diminished since the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, at the higher intensities it is mostly limited to three civilization groups (the West, Islam, and Orthodox), and more often than not the underlying issues have more to do with territory and national security matters than with cultural differences. And finally, different-civilization dyads are more likely to try to settle differences peacefully, are as successful as same-civilization states in reaching peaceful settlements, and, taken as a whole, the use of third party assistance techniques do not provide a higher likelihood of reaching settlements than do bilateral negotiations.

In short, cross-cultural conflict does not present a new and more deadly threat to the world as Huntington foresaw. Rather, it is one of a number of important aspects of international conflict that requires attention and solutions. This latter fact is underscored by the United Nations' creation or an organization, the Alliance of Civilizations, specifically to deal with and improve relations between civilizations.

## APPENDIX A

### COUNTRIES BY CIVILIZATION

#### African

Angola	Equat. Guinea	Liberia	South Africa
Benin	Etiopía	Madagascar	Swaziland
Botswana	Gabon	Malawi	Tanzania
Cameroon	Ghana	Mozambique	Togo
Central African Republic	Ivory Coast	Namibia	Uganda
Congo	Kenya	Nigeria	Zambia
Dem. Rep. of Congo	Lesotho	Sierra Leone	

#### Buddhist

Bhutan	Cambodia	Mongolia	Sri Lanka
Burma	Laos	Singapore	Thailand

#### Hindi

India	Nepal
-------	-------

#### Islamic

Afghanistan	Eritrea	Libya	Somalia
Albania	Gambia	Malaysia	South Yemen
Algeria	Guinea Bissau	Mali	Sudan
Azerbaijan	Guinea	Mauritania	Syria
Bahrain	Indonesia	Morocco	Tajikistan
Bangladesh	Iran	Niger	Tunisia
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Iraq	North Yemen	Turkey
Burkina Faso	Jordan	Oman	Turkmenistan
Chad	Kuwait	Pakistan	United Arab Rep.
Cyprus	Kyrgyzstan	Qatar	Uzbekistan
Egypt	Lebanon	Saudi Arabia	Yemen

#### Japanese

Japan

### **Latin American**

Argentina	Costa Rica	French Guiana	Panama
Belize	Cuba	Guatemala	Paraguay
Bolivia	Dominican Republic	Honduras	Peru
Brazil	Ecuador	Mexico	Uruguay
Chile	El Salvador	Nicaragua	Venezuela
Colombia			

### **Orthodox**

Armenia	Georiga	Moldova	Serbia
Belarus	Greece	Romania	Ukrain
Bulgaria	Kazakhstan	Russia	Yugoslavia

### **Sinic**

China	Philippines	South Korea	Taiwan
North Korea	Singapore	South Vietnam	Vietnam

### **Western**

Australia	Finland	Lithuania	Slovakia
Austria	France	Luxembourg	Spain
Belgium	Germany	Netherlands	Sweden
Canada	Hungary	New Zealand	Switzerland
Croatia	Iceland	Norway	United
Czech Republic	Ireland	Poland	Kingdom
Denmark	Italy	Portugal	United States
Estonia	Latvia	Slovenia	

### **Other**

Cape Verde	Haiti	Malta	Papua New
Fiji	Israel	Marshall Islands	Guinea
Guyana	Jamaica	Micronesia	Suriname

## APPENDIX B

### SERIOUS CONFLICT BY CIVILIZATION

(\* indicates wars)

#### Single Civilization Serious Conflict<sup>25</sup>

##### African

Year	Country 1	Country 2
1996	Democratic Republic of Congo	Rwanda

##### **(The below were part of the Second Congo War)**

1998	* Democratic Republic of Congo	Uganda
1998	* Democratic Republic of Congo	Rwanda
1998	* Democratic Republic of Congo	Angola
1998	* Democratic Republic of Congo	Zimbabwe
1998	* Democratic Republic of Congo	Namibia
1998	* Uganda	Zimbabwe
1998	* Rwanda	Zimbabwe
1998	* Rwanda	Namibia
1998	* Angola	Zimbabwe
1998	* Angola	Namibia
1998	* Zimbabwe	Namibia
2001	* Angola	Zimbabwe

##### Latin American

1995	Ecuador	Peru
------	---------	------

#### Two-Civilization Serious Conflict

##### African-Islamic

1998	* Ethiopia	Eritrea
------	------------	---------

##### **(Part of the Second Congo War)**

1998	* Chad	Uganda
1998	* Chad	Rwanda

---

<sup>25</sup> Civilizations experiencing same-civilization serious conflict included the African, Islamic, Latin American, and Orthodox civilizations. Same-civilization pairings that are part of conflicts that also include different-civilization pairings (for example, the Gulf War) are listed later in the appendix with those larger conflicts. Such conflicts included all of the Islamic and Orthodox same-civilization pairings.



### **Hindi-Islamic**

1993	* India	Pakistan
1999	* India	Pakistan
2001	India	Pakistan

### **Islamic-Orthodox**

1992	* Armenia	Azerbaijan
1992	Yugoslavia	Bosnia-Herzegovina

#### ***(Caucasus War)***

1993	* Armenia	Iran
1993	* Armenia	Turkey
1993	* Russia	Azerbaijan
1993	* Russia	Turkey

### **Orthodox-Western**

1992	Croatia	Yugoslavia
------	---------	------------

### **Islamic-Western**

1992	Bosnia-Herzegovina	Croatia
1993	Bosnia-Herzegovina	Croatia

### **Multi-Civilization Serious Conflict**

#### **Gulf War**

##### **African-Islamic**

1991	* Sierra Leone	Iraq
------	----------------	------

##### **Islamic-Japanese**

1991	* Japan	Iraq
------	---------	------

##### **Islamic-Latin American**

1991	* Argentina	Iraq
------	-------------	------

##### **Islamic-Western**

1991	* United States	Iraq
1991	* Canada	Iraq
1991	* United Kingdom	Iraq
1991	* Netherlands	Iraq
1991	* Belgium	Iraq
1991	* France	Iraq
1991	* Spain	Iraq

1991	* Germany	Iraq
1991	* Italy	Iraq
1991	* Australia	Iraq

**Islamic**

1990	* Kuwait	Iraq
1991	* Senegal	Iraq
1991	* Niger	Iraq
1991	* Morocco	Iraq
1991	* Turkey	Iraq
1991	* Egypt	Iraq
1991	* Syria	Iraq
1991	* Saudi Arabia	Iraq
1991	* Bahrain	Iraq
1991	* Qatar	Iraq
1991	* United Arab Emirates	Iraq
1991	* Oman	Iraq
1991	* Pakistan	Iraq
1991	* Bangladesh	Iraq

**Kosovo Conflict**

**Islamic-Orthodox**

1998	Albania	Yugoslavia
1998	Turkey	Yugoslavia

**Orthodox-Western**

1998	United States	Yugoslavia
1998	Canada	Yugoslavia
1998	United Kingdom	Yugoslavia
1998	Netherlands	Yugoslavia
1998	Belgium	Yugoslavia
1998	Luxemburg	Yugoslavia
1998	France	Yugoslavia
1998	Spain	Yugoslavia
1998	Portugal	Yugoslavia
1998	Germany	Yugoslavia
1998	Italy	Yugoslavia
1998	Lithuania	Yugoslavia
1998	Norway	Yugoslavia
1998	Denmark	Yugoslavia
1998	Iceland	Yugoslavia
1999	Poland	Yugoslavia
1999	Hungary	Yugoslavia
1999	Czech Republic	Yugoslavia
1999	Italy	Yugoslavia
1999	Denmark	Yugoslavia

**Orthodox**

1998	Macedonia	Yugoslavia
1998	Greece	Yugoslavia
1998	Russia	Yugoslavia

**Post 9-11 invasion****Islamic-Orthodox**

2001	* Greece	Afghanistan
2001	* Russia	Afghanistan

**Islamic-Western**

2001	* United States	Afghanistan
2001	* Canada	Afghanistan
2001	* United Kingdom	Afghanistan
2001	* Netherlands	Afghanistan
2001	* France	Afghanistan
2001	* Spain	Afghanistan
2001	* Portugal	Afghanistan
2001	* Germany	Afghanistan
2001	* Australia	Afghanistan

**Islamic**

2001	* Tajikistan	Afghanistan
2001	* Uzbekistan	Afghanistan
2001	* Pakistan	Afghanistan
2001	* Turkey	Afghanistan

## REFERENCES:

- Aburish, Said K. 1994. *The Rise, Corruption, and Coming Fall of the House of Saud*. New York: St. Martin's Griffin
- Ajami, Fouad. 1993. "The Summoning." In *The Clash of the Civilizations? The Debate*, pp. 26-35. New York: W.W. Norton
- Applebaum, Nancy. 2003. *Muddie Waters: Race, Religion and Local History in Colombia, 1846-1948*. Durham: Duke University Press
- Baker, James A. III. 1995. *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War & Peace, 1989-1992*. New York: Putnam
- Beck, Nathaniel, Jonathan N. Katz and Richard Tucker. 1998. "Taking Time Seriously: Time-Series-Cross-Section Analysis with a Binary Variable." *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 42, No. 4, pp. 1260-1288.
- Bennett, D. Scott and Allen Stam. 2000. "EUGene: A Conceptual Manual." *International Action* 26: 179-204. Version 3.02
- Bijian, Zheng. 2005. "Peacefully Rising to Great Power Status." *Foreign Affairs*. Vol. 84, No. 5, pp. 18-24.
- Binyan, Liu. 1993. "Civilization Grafting." In *The Clash of the Civilizations? The Debate*, pp. 46-449. New York: W.W. Norton
- Bliss, Harry and Bruce Russett. 1998. "Democratic Trading Partners: The Liberal Connection, 1962-1989." *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 60, No. 4., pp. 1126-1147.
- Bremer, Stuart A. 1992. "Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816-1965." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 36, 2 (June): 309-341.
- Brower, Charles N. and Jeremy K Sharpe. 2003. "International Arbitration and the Islamic World: The Third Phase." *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 97, No. 3. pp. 643-656.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alistair Smith. 1999. "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace." *American Political Science Review*. 93 (4): 791-807.
- Burton, John. 1987. "The International Conflict Resolution Priorities." *Forum Peace Institute Reporter*. June, pp. 5-12.
- Buzan, Barry. 1991. "New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-first Century." *International Affairs*. Vol. 67, No. 3, pp. 431-451.

- Carment, David. 1993. "The International Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict: Concepts, Indicators and Theory." *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 137-150.
- Carment, David and P. James. 1995. "International Constraints and Interstate Ethnic Conflict: Toward a Crisis-Based Assessment of Irredentism." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 39: 82-109
- Cormick, G.W. 1980. "The Theory and Practice of Environmental Mediation." *Environmental Professional* (2) 1: 24-33.
- Davis, David R. and Will H. Moore. 1997. "Ethnicity Matters: Transnational Ethnic Alliances and Foreign Policy Behavior." *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 41, No. 1, pp. 171-184.
- Diehl, Paul F. 1985. "Contiguity and Military Escalation in Major Power Rivalries, 1816-1980." *Journal of Politics*. Vol. 47, No. 4, 1203-1211.
- Diehl, Paul F. 1992. "What Are They Fighting for? The Importance of Issues in International Conflict Research." *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 29, No. 3. pp. 333-344.
- Dixon, William J. 1996. "Third Party Techniques for Preventing Conflict Escalation and Promoting Peaceful Settlement." *International Organization*, Vol. 50, No. 4, pp. 653-681.
- Druckman, Daniel and Benjamin J. Broome. 1991. "Value Differences and Conflict Resolution: Familiarity of Liking?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 35, No. 4, pp. 571-593.
- Esposito, John L. 1992. *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality*. New York: Oxford University Press
- Esposito, John L., Mohammed Khan, and Jillian Schwedler. 2005. "Religion and Politics in the Middle East." In *Understanding the Contemporary Middle East*, edited by Deborah Gerner and Jillian Schwedler. Boulder: Reinner
- Fearon, James D. and David Laitin. 1996. "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation." *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 90, No. 4, 715-735.
- Fisher, Ronald J. and Loreleigh Keashly. 1991. "The Potential Complementarity of Mediation and Consultation within a Contingency Model of Third Party Intervention." *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 29-42.
- Geller, Daniel S. 1996. "Relative Power, Rationality, and International Conflict." In Douglas Lemke and Jacek Kugler (eds.), *Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of The War Ledger*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press
- Ghosn, Faten, and Glenn Palmer. 2003. "Codebook for the Militarized Interstate Dispute Data, Version 3.0." Online: <http://cow2.la.psu.edu>

- Gilpin, Robert. 1981. *War and Change in World Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Gochman, Charles S. and Russell J. Leng 1983. "Realpolitik and the Road to War: An Analysis of Attributes and Behavior." *International Studies Quarterly* 27, 1 (March): 97-120.
- Goldstein, Joshua S. 2004. *International Relations*. New York: Longman
- Gujarati, Damodar N. 2003. *Basic Econometrics*. New York: McGraw-Hill
- Gurr, Ted Robert. 1994. "Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System." *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 38, pp. 347-378
- Halberstam, David. 2001. *War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals*. New York: Scribner
- Henderson, Errol and Richard Tucker. 2001. "Clear and Present Strangers: The Clash of Civilizations and International Conflict." *International Studies Quarterly* 45: 317-338.
- Henderson, Errol A. 1997. "Culture or Contiguity: Ethnic Conflict, the Similarity of States, and the Onset of War, 1820-1989." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 41, No. 5, 649-668.
- Hensel, Paul R. 1996. "Charting a Course to Conflict: Territorial Issues and Interstate Conflict, 1816-1992." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 15, 1 (Fall 1996): 43-73.
- Hensel, Paul R. 2001. "Contentious Issues and World Politics: The Management of Territorial Claims in the Americas, 1816-1992." *International Studies Quarterly* 45, 1: 81-109.
- Hensel, Paul R. 2002. General Codebook: Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) Project: <http://www.icow.org>
- Hensel, Paul R and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell. 2005. Issue Correlates of War Project Codebook for ICOW Data, version 1.0: <http://www.icow.org>
- Heraclides, Alexis. 1989. "Conflict Resolution, Ethnonationalism and the Middle East Impasse." *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 197-212.
- Herzog, Roman and Amitai Etzioni, Henrik Schmiegelow. (1999). *Preventing the Clash of Civilizations: A Peace Strategy for the Twenty-First Century*. Palgrave MacMillan.
- Holsti, Kalevi J. 1991. *Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648-1989*. New York: Cambridge University Press
- Huntington, Samuel P. 1996. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Touchstone

- Huntington, Samuel P. 1993. "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72, 3 (Summer): 22-49.
- Huth, Paul K. 1988. "Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War." *American Political Science Review* 82, 2: 423-443.
- Jisi, Wang. 2005. "Searching for Stability With America." *Foreign Affairs*. Vol. 84, No. 5, pp. 39-48.
- Jones, Daniel M., Stuart A. Bremer and J. David Singer. 1996. "Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 15(2); 163:213.
- Kaufman, Sanda and George T. Duncan. 1992. "A Formal Framework for Mediator Mechanisms and Motivations." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 36, No. 4. pp. 688-708.
- Kegley, Charles and Eugene Wittkopf. 1995. *World Politics: Trends and Transformation*. New York: St. Martin's
- Kelman, Herbert C. 1995. "Contributions of an Unofficial Conflict Resolution Effort to the Israeli-Palestinian Breakthrough." *Negotiation Journal*, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 19-27.
- King, Gary and Langche Zeng. 2001. "Explaining Rare Events in International Relations." *International Organization*. Vol. 55, No. 3, pp. 693-715.
- Kirkpatrick, Jeane J. 1993. "The Modernizing Imperative." In *The Clash of the Civilizations? The Debate*, pp. 50-52. New York: W.W. Norton
- Klare, Michael T. 2001. *Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict*. New York: Owl
- Kolb, D.M. 1983. *The Mediators*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- LaSala, Phillip J. 2003. Dissertation: Clash of Civilizations: An Empirical Examination. University of Nebraska
- Lemke, Douglas. 1995. "The Tyranny of Distance: Redefining Relevant Dyads." *International Interactions*, Vol. 21, No. 1, PP. 23-38.
- Lemke, Douglas and Jacek Kugler. 1996. "The Evolution of the Power Transition Perspective." In Douglas Lemke and Jacek Kugler (eds.), *Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of The War Ledger*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
- Lemke, Douglas and William Reed. 2001. "War and Rivalry Among Great Powers." *American Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 45, No. 2, pp. 457-469.

- Leng, Russell J. 2000. "Escalation: Crisis Behavior and War." In *What Do We Know About War?* Edited by John Vasquez. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Lind, William S. 1991. "Defending Western Culture." *Foreign Policy*. No. 84, pp. 40-50.
- Mahbubani, Kishore. 2005. "Understanding China." *Foreign Affairs*. Vol. 84, No. 5, pp. 49-60.
- Mandell, Brian S. and Brian W. Tomlin. 1991. "Mediation in the Development of Norms to Manage Conflict: Kissinger in the Middle East." *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 43-55.
- Mansbach, R. and J.A. Vasquez. 1981. *In Search of Theory: A New Paradigm for Global Politics*. New York: Columbia Press.
- Maoz, Zeev and Bruce Russett. 1993. "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986." *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 87, No. 3. (Sep., 1993), pp. 624-638.
- Marshall, Monty G. and Keith Jagers. 2002. Polity IV Dataset. [Computer file; version p4v2002] College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland.
- Maynes, Charles W. 1993. "Containing Ethnic Conflict." *Foreign Policy*, Spring, No. 90.
- McCormick, John. 2004. *Comparative Politics in Transition*. Belmont: Thomson-Wadsworth
- Mearsheimer, John. 2002. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: Norton
- Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin and Brandon C. Prins. 1999. "Beyond Territorial Contiguity: Issues at Stake in Democratic Militarized Interstate Disputes." *International Studies Quarterly* 43:169-183.
- Moghadam, Valentine M. 2004. "Population Growth, Urbanization, and the Challenges of Unemployment." In *Understanding the Contemporary Middle East*, edited by Deborah Gerner and Jillian Schwedler. Boulder: Reinner
- Nader, Laura. 1972. "Some Notes on John Burton's Papers on 'Resolution of Conflict'." *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 53-58.
- New York Times*, Feb. 7, 1993, pp. 1, 14
- Oneal, John R. and Bruce Russett. 1999. "The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885-1992." *World Politics*, 52 (1): 1-37.
- Pearson, Frederick S. 2001. "Dimensions of Conflict Resolution in Ethnopolitical Disputes." *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 275-287.



- Pearson, Lester B. 1955. *Democracy in World Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Powell, Emilia Justyna and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell. 2007. "The International Court of Justice and the World's Three Legal Systems." *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 69, No. 2, pp. 397-415.
- Regan, Patrick M. 2000. *Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in Intrastate Conflict*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press
- Richardson, L.F. 1960. *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels*. Pacific Grove, CA: Boxwood Press
- Rosecrance, Richard. 2006. "Power and International Relations: The Rise of China and its Effects." *International Studies Perspectives*. Vol. 7, Issue 1, pp. 31-35.
- Rothman, Jay. 1997. *Resolving Identity-Based Conflict in Nations, Organizations and Communities*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Rothman, Jay and Marie L. Olson. 2001. "From Interests to Identities: Towards a New Emphasis in Interactive Conflict Resolution." *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 289-305.
- Russett, Bruce M., John R. Oneal, and Michaelene Cox. 2000. "Clash of Civilizations, or Realism and Liberalism Déjà vu? Some Evidence." *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 37, No. 5, p. 583-608.
- Russett, Bruce M., Harvey Starr, and David Kinsella. 2004. *World Politics: The Menu for Choice*. Belmont: Thomson-Wadsworth
- Schotter, Andrew. 1978. "The Effects of Precedent on Arbitration." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 659-678.
- Senese, Paul D. and John A. Vasquez. 2003. "A Unified Explanation of Territorial Conflict: Testing the Impact of Sampling Bias, 1919-1992." *International Studies Quarterly* 47, 2: 275-298
- Simkin, W.E. 1971. *Mediation and the Dynamics of Collective Bargaining*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Sivard, Ruth Leger. 1993. *World Military and Social Expenditures*. Washington: World Priorities, Inc.
- Starr, Harvey and G. Dale Thomas. 2002. "The 'Nature' of Contiguous Borders: Ease of Interaction, Salience, and the Analysis of Crisis." *International Actions* 28:213-235.

Strand, Havard, Lars Wilhelmsen, Nils Petter Gleditsch, Peter Wallensteen, Margareta Sollenberg and Mikael Eriksson. 2003. *Armed Conflict Data Set Codebook*, version 1.2. International Peace Research Institute, Oslo and Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University.

Tomz, Michael, Jason Wittenberg, and Gary King. 2003. "Clarify," version 2.1, available at <http://gking.harvard.edu/clarify>

United Nations Alliance of Civilizations report. 2006. On line at the Alliance of Civilizations web site: [http://www.unaoc.org/repository/HLG\\_Report.pdf](http://www.unaoc.org/repository/HLG_Report.pdf)

Vasquez, John A. 1993. *The War Puzzle*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Visscher, Charles De. 1956. "Reflections on the Present Prospects of International Adjudication." *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 50, No. 3, pp. 467-474.

Vlahos, Michael. 1991. "Culture and Foreign Policy." *Foreign Policy*. No. 82, pp. 59-78.

Weeks, Albert L. 1993. "Do Civilizations Hold?" In *The Clash of the Civilizations? The Debate*, pp. 53-54. New York: W.W. Norton

Zweig, David and Bi Jianhai. 2005. "China's Global Hunt for Energy." *Foreign Affairs*. Vol. 84, No. 5, pp. 25-38.

## **BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH**

Glynn Ellis spent his early years in several small towns in South Georgia, most notably Valdosta and Bainbridge. He received a B.A. in Political Science from North Georgia College in 1970 and served for 23 years in the United States Army. He spent almost half of those years in foreign countries and served in two wars: Vietnam and the Gulf War. He retired from the military in 1993 as a Lieutenant Colonel. Subsequently, he returned to school, became a certified teacher, and taught in the Valdosta, Georgia public school system for seven years. In 2002 he entered Florida State University in pursuit of a Ph.D. in Political Science.

In addition to a B.A. and a teaching certification, Glynn also holds Masters Degrees in Management and Political Science. He is a certified SCUBA diver, has a commercial pilot's license for both airplanes and helicopters, and enjoys skiing and travel. He and his bride of 30 years, Dyana, have two children and two grandchildren.