Florida State University Libraries

Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations

The Graduate School

2010

The Ethnic Typification of Crime and Support for Punitive Attitudes: An Exploratory Analysis of Arabs in Israel

Lindsey N. Devers

THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

THE ETHNIC TYPIIFICATION OF CRIME AND SUPPORT FOR PUNITIVE ATTITUDES:
AN EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS OF ARABS IN ISRAEL

By
LINDSEY N. DEVERS

A Dissertation submitted to the
College of Criminology and Criminal Justice in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Awarded:
Fall Semester, 2010

The members of the committee approve the dissertation of Lindsey Devers defended on October 25, 2010.

Dr. Marc Gertz
Professor Directing the Dissertation

Dr. Joyce Carbonell
University Representative

Dr. Nicole Piquero
Committee Chair

Approved:

Dr. Thomas Bloomberg
Dean of College of Criminology and Criminal Justice

The Graduate School has verified and approved the above-named committee members.

I dedicate this to my mother.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

While the following dissertation is an individual work, I could never have reached the heights or explored the depths without the support, guidance and efforts of many people. First, I would like to thank my major professor Dr. Marc Gertz for instilling in me the qualities of being a committed criminologist. His dedication and enthusiasm have been apparent through my graduate career at the Florida State University. Second, I would like to thank my committee members Dr. Nicole Piquero and Dr. Joyce Carbonell for their time and guidance.

I would also like to take this opportunity to thank those who contributed greatly to success of this unique research endeavor, specifically, Principle Baruch Kraus and those at NFTY-EIE high school. Baruch went out of his way to solicit informants in order to gain access to the participants in the Arab villages. In addition, a special thanks need to be given to those who helped us solicit participants within these villages including Issa Jaber, Marc Rosenstein, Mahmoud Omar and Amira Asadi. Several informal researchers also dedicated their time and resources to the dissertation. Thank you to Gretchen Devers, Sally and Aaron Gertz. Without all of these individuals, the research would not have been a success.

My very special thanks to the one person whom I owe everything I am today, my father, William Devers Senior. His unwavering confidence and determinism in my abilities is what has shaped me to be the person I am. Thank you for everything.

Finally, I would like to take the opportunity to thank my professors and colleagues at Florida State University and my coworkers at the Justice Research Center. Their dedication to quality and excellence in research and analyses will continue to influence my standards of performance throughout my career.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES	vi
ABSTRACT.....	vii
1. INTRODUCTION	1
The Typification of Crime and Deviance	2
Ethnic Typification of Crime	4
2. THEORY	7
Aggregate Threat and Social Control Theory	7
The Transformation of Blalock's Concepts	12
Individual Threat and Social Control Theory	17
Race, Ethnicity and Social Control.....	19
Summary	22
3. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE	24
Prior Research on Race, Ethnicity and Social Control	24
Fear of Crime and Punitiveness.....	25
Race and Punitiveness	29
Racial Attitudes and Punitiveness	31
Intraracial Threat and Punitiveness	35
Race, Ethnicity and Social Control Theory in Israel	37
Summary	41
4. RESEARCH DESIGN	43
Research Questions	45
Data and Sample	45
Variables and Measures	49
5. RESEARCH FINDINGS	59
6. DISCUSSION.....	79
Theoretical Relevance	79
Limitations	80
Future Research	83
APPENDIX A.....	86
APPENDIX B.....	95
REFERENCES	96
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH	108

LIST OF TABLES

Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Means Test	57
Table 4.2 Difference of Means Test by Village for Significant Variables	58
Table 5.1. Correlations Matrix.....	59
Table 5.2 Regression of Punitive Attitudes on the Arab Typification of Crime	60
Table 5.3 Effects of the Arab Typification and Punitive Attitudes by Village.....	62
Table 5.4 Effects of the Arab Typification and Punitive Attitudes by Sex	63
Table 5.5 Effects of the Arab Typification and Punitive Attitudes by Student Status	64
Table 5.6 Effects of the Arab Typification and Punitive Attitudes by Concern	65
Table 5.7 Effects of the Arab Typification and Punitive Attitudes by Ethnic Prejudice	66
Table 5.8 Effects of the Arab Typification and Punitive Attitudes by Percent Violent Crime	67
Table 5.9 Effects of the Arab Typification and Punitive Attitudes by Retributiveness	68

ABSTRACT

According to social threat theorists, it is the mere presence of blacks that induces a fear of crime which increases punitive attitudes and leads to the mobilization of social control. Blalock (1967) argued that social control is exerted upon minority populations that are deemed threatening. Recent work on the percent black and fear of crime has transformed this aggregate-level relationship into an individual-level measure of the presences of blacks, specifically, the racial typification of crime. The present study extends Chiricos and colleagues (2004) work on the racial typification of crime by conducting such analyses in Israel where there have historically been high ethnic tensions. The dissertation explores the relationship between the ethnic typification of crime and punitive attitudes by utilizing an Arab sample of respondents from Israel. Results indicate that the main hypothesis under examination was not supported by the regression analyses. The analyses demonstrated that concern for crime was the strongest predictor of punitive attitudes net of other control and demographic variables.

CHAPTER ONE

1. INTRODUCTION

Social control has a long history in Sociology as a tool for explaining crime (Liska, 1992). Social threat and social control theory argues that the perceived danger presented by certain groups or individuals, triggers mechanisms of social control by dominant group members. Social threat theory has developed substantial empirical support. Despite this support, major gaps in the empirical literature remain. The purpose of this dissertation will be to broaden and generalize the foundation of social threat theory to include other ethnic minorities. More specifically, the dissertation will expand social threat and social control theory by examining ethnic threat, rather than racial, in Israel. For simplicity purposes, race is defined by the color of one's skin, or biologically with similar traits like skin color, eye color and hair color as common traits. Conversely, ethnicity is defined as sharing such cultural factors such as nationality, beliefs, customs and culture. While there can be some overlapping qualities between race and ethnicity, according to theory all minority populations can be deemed as threatening because of their racial or ethnic status.

To date, the majority of research on social threat theory has been conducted in the United States where the focus of the literature has been almost exclusively on social controls geared towards the black population. Thus, research on individual level threat excludes analyses comprised of other majority and minority groups. This limits support for social threat theory considering the results and the theory may not be generalizable to areas outside of the United States. In order to assess the theory more globally, researchers need to conduct empirical assessments that focus on minority group status. Most support for the theory has been found for

studies that investigate black white relations. The relationship between ethnic rather than racial threat and social control theory has been given little attention in the field.

Original threat theorists conceptualized power threat in terms of minorities and majorities (See Blalock, 1967; Liska, 1992; Rubenstein, 1983). Only recently has this framework been empirically expanded to include other ethnic populations such as Hispanics (Chiricos et al., 2001). A major gap exists within the research, specifically concerning minority groups outside of the United States. How much explanatory power does social threat theory have globally?

The following dissertation will demonstrate that social threat theory encompasses not only racial threat but also ethnic and intra-ethnic threat. This study represents the first attempt to integrate social threat theory by utilizing international data on a different minority population. To do this, data are gathered in two Arab villages in Israel that investigate the relationship between the ethnic typification of crime and punitive attitudes. Before the results are presented, it is first critical to outline how the typification of crime fits into social threat theory. Additionally, the racial and ethnic typification of crime are discussed. Chapter 2 will examine the origins of the power threat hypothesis. Chapter 3 will present the empirical literature on these issues. Chapter 4 will outline the research design. Chapter 5 will discuss the results of the study. Last, Chapter 6 will discuss the summary findings, limitations and offer suggestions for future research.

The Typification of Crime and Deviance

American criminal justice researchers and theologians have historically been engrossed in explaining blacks' overrepresentation in the American criminal justice system. Various theoretical frameworks have been used to assess the relationship between race and imprisonment, and overtime, these frameworks have developed into the threat hypothesis. The

threat hypothesis argues that aggregate levels of threat increases aggregate levels of controls due to an increase in the minority percentage variable. At the individual level, the main hypothesis argues that the fear of crime increases punitive attitudes towards criminals, which in turn imposes social control on threatening populations.

The support for an increasing punitive response to crime is grounded in the belief system, ~~that~~ constructs crime in terms of race and race in terms of crime” (Roberts, 1993:1947). Chiricos and colleagues (2004) were the first researchers to directly assess the crime threat relationship. They tested whether support for harsh punitive attitudes towards crime is linked to the association of crime with race. In other words, how likely one is to typify crime as a racial phenomenon, or what can be termed, the racial typification of crime. This dissertation will present evidence that argues that the cultural construction of criminals is not just specific to a racial identity but it also can be defined as an ethnic phenomenon.

Blalock (1967) originally conceptualized threat in terms of racial majorities and minorities. The hypothesis states that as the percent minority increases, the majority will be more likely to impose formal social controls upon minority populations. Blalock (1967) argued that there are other sources of threat besides power or status threat; minorities can also be deemed economically and/or politically threatening. He hypothesized that as the minority population increases, they will be more likely to take majority jobs because minorities pose an economic threat to the majority. Thus, minority populations are more likely to be subject to social control. Additionally, the political threat hypothesis argues that as the percent of minorities increase, minorities will pose a political threat due to their sheer numbers. These groups will be more likely to be subject to formal social controls. While Blalock conceptualized

economic and political threat in terms of discrimination, recent literature now recognizes that these are two mediating sources of threat (Stults and Baumer, 2007).

In addition to various sources of threat, Blalock (1967) argued that these relationships are nonlinear. Because he conceptualized threat in terms of numbers, he hypothesized that once the minority population infiltrates the majority, they will be fully integrated within society and will be rooted in the economic and political sphere. In consequence, the minority population will become the majority population and will no longer be threatening.

Ethnic Typification of Crime

Drawing heavily on Blalock (1967), those who developed the threat perspective argued that aggregate measures of punitiveness would vary with aggregate measures of racial composition because the presence of minorities creates a fear of crime that mobilizes punitive responses. A core assumption is that fear of crime drives punitive attitudes. These attitudes help organize support to impose social controls upon minority populations (Chiricos et al, 1997, 2001, 2004; Langworthy and Whitehead, 1986).

While this postulation is a key component of social threat theory, extant research on fear of crime and punitive attitudes has been inconsistent (Chiricos et al., 2004). What questions this underlying assumption is the possibility that people can have punitive attitudes and have little or no crime threat. In certain contexts, fear of crime is not associated with punitive attitudes (Applegate et al, 2002; Barkan and Cohen, 1994, 2005; Baron and Hartnagel, 1996; Chiricos et al., 2004; Costello et al., 2002; Delisi, 2001; Sandys and McGarrell, 1995; Secret and Johnson, 1989; Sims, 2003; Sims and Johnson, 2004; Sprott, 1999; Stack 2000, 2003; White, 2009; Wu, 2000) and other variables can better predict this relationship.

While many studies have examined the relationship between fear of crime and punitive attitudes, Chiricos and colleagues (2004) is the only study to directly assess the crime threat relationship. They found that the racial typification of crime is a significant predictor of punitive attitudes, independent of the effects of the fear of crime, Southernness, racial prejudice, percent violent crime, being conservative, crime salience and other demographic controls. In this study, the racial typification of crime was more strongly associated with punitive attitudes than fear of crime (Chiricos et al., 2004:378). Consequently, present research indicates that the racial typification of crime may better predict this relationship at the individual level.

To date, studies on the fear of crime and punitive attitudes have been inconsistent. Robust analyses that rely on precise measures are more likely to find support for this association. However, in certain contexts, fear of crime remains an insignificant predictor of punitiveness. Some researchers argue that this discrepancy is attributable to the micro processes in individuals and the fact that studies do not account for the racialized nature of fear. Furthermore, race has also been an insignificant predictor of punitiveness. The most robust support found for this association has been for measures of racial attitudes and punitiveness. No one has yet to explore this relationship as an ethnic phenomenon.

If the relationship between the ethnic typification of crime and punitive attitudes can hold true in other contexts, it could strengthen the core assumption of social threat theory. This supposition entails that ethnic relations are an important variable concerning attitudes towards the punitiveness of punishment. Using Chiricos and colleagues (2004) as a framework for the analysis, the dissertation explores the relationship between ethnicity, the fear of crime, racial attitudes, the ethnic typification of crime and punitiveness. Additionally, the focus of this dissertation is extend the work of Chiricos and colleagues (2004) to explore the relationship

between intra-ethnic threat and punitive attitudes. In other words, are Arabs more likely to perceive other Arabs as committing crime, and if so, under what conditions?

CHAPTER TWO

2. THEORY

Theorists have developed many intricate explanations for describing the social construction of control throughout time including biological examinations, spatial relations, learned behaviors, normative consensus theories, economic status, and through the perpetuation of class lines. The major limitation of these arguments is the lack of emphasis concerning power relations, resources and the mobilizations of these resources as a tool for explaining control mechanisms. Social threat, the perceived danger presented by certain groups or individuals, triggers mechanisms of social control by dominant group members. The relationship between social threat and social control is complex and multidimensional. In order to understand how social threat effects social control on minority groups, an in depth analysis of Blalock's *Toward a Theory of Minority Group Relations* is essential.

Blalock's (1967) seminal threat hypothesis argued that social control is a result of threat presented by minority group members. Blalock conceptualized threat in terms of racial minorities and majorities, in addition to other relations such as: ethnic, religious, cultural, gender and ideological. Specific types of threat can be conceptualized at multiple levels of analysis such as individual, situational and aggregate level threats. This chapter will explore aggregate level threat and social control theory, the transformation of Blalock's concepts, followed by individual threat and social control theory.

Aggregate Threat and Social Control Theory

Blalock's (1967) threat hypothesis argued that aggregate levels of threat would increase aggregate levels of controls due to an increase in the minority percentage variable.

Discrimination, the successful attempt of social control mechanisms, occurs when the dominant group members mobilize resources in order to repress the threat of the minority group. The minority percentage variable is conceptualized in terms of sheer numbers. Thus, the perceived growth of a racial minority is threatening because an increase in the minority group presents a threat to the dominant majority. Blalock argued that there are different types of threats that can be perceived as dangers. First, minorities can present a status threat or a danger to the social position or rank of the dominant majority members. Second, minority groups can present an economic threat to the elite. This specific type of threat emerges from intergroup conflict over the competition for resources. Third, minority groups can present a power threat, which threatens the political power of the superordinate group. Thus, Blalock defined threat in terms of status, economic competition and political power.

Blalock's influential "Power Threat Hypothesis" takes into account both macro and micro levels of analysis. While he argued that motivation is a factor at the individual level, at the macro level, there may be no conscious effort on the part of the elite to promote situations of inequality. Blalock (1967:109) disagreed with Marxian theorists, who believed that there is a conscious, rational effort to discriminate on the part of the elites to subordinate minorities against their own best interests. Thus, group level variables are often influenced by individual motivation variables; however, at the aggregate level this does not mean that there is conscious effort to subordinate minority groups.

Blalock (1967: 28) summarized the theory by arguing four main propositions. First, that an exposure to a large number of minority members is an influential variable that threatens individual members of the majority group. Second, these threats combined with personality variables, produce motivations to discriminate at the individual level. Third, similarly motivated

individuals interact with each other in such ways that bring about concentrated efforts that lead to discrimination. Last, the aggregation of discriminatory behavior leads to lowered or controlled minority levels. Overall, Blalock argued that the percent nonwhite is an influential variable in explaining inequality and discriminatory behavior. The type of discriminatory behavior utilized as a control mechanism is dependent upon the type of threat presented.

Status threat and discrimination result when there is an increase in the percentage of nonwhites. Here, majority group members sense a danger to their social status, rank or relative position in society. Blalock stated that minorities pose a threat to elite status because they are in direct opposition with at least some common means and goals of the dominant group. Because goals and means are also valued by large portions of the dominant group, competition results among rivalry over the various resources to achieve status and prestige (Blalock, 1967: 41).

The competition over shared goals and means is linked to minority status in five ways. First, simply being a competitor with the dominant group is more likely to cause discrimination. Thus, social control serves to eliminate one's opponent. Second, in some cases, it is necessary to avoid minorities in order to achieve social status, or to reduce the likelihood of losing status. Third, status objectives may be obtained through the exploitation of minority groups. In other words, status is gained by mistreating the rivalry group. Fourth, political power may be obtained by manipulating those through prejudice. Last, aggression may be directed toward minorities to satisfy the psychological need produced by frustration over intergroup conflict.

Displaced aggression and avoidance are also common techniques of social control (Blalock, 1967:42-44). Here, aggression can be displaced from the source of initial frustration and the dominant group member selects a target that is similar to the target source. The minority may be perceived as the actual source of frustration especially when they make themselves more

visible by crossing cultural norms or boundaries. Using violence or aggression successfully oppresses the competition by directly harming the opponent. Minorities make excellent targets when they are visible, available, and vulnerable. These types of controls are used as a deterrent to regulate the behavior of the minority group and to achieve status over the subordinate group. Often, the more horrifying the form of aggression, the greater the deterrent effect on the potential deviant. At the aggregate level, the higher levels of frustrations produced by strains in the social system, the greater the level of intensity of aggression (Blalock, 1967:44).

It is important to note that there is a chance of deviation in the positive relationship between status threat and discrimination. As Blalock hypothesized, an increase in the minority percentage variable leads to an increase in discrimination. Blalock also argued that when the status of the minority is so low a reverse effect might occur. The need for discrimination will increase because interacting with a low status minority causes a significant loss of social standing for dominant group members (Blalock, 1967:70). Only in certain circumstances will discrimination be negative.

Blalock also conceptualized other sources of threat besides status. He stated that economic self-interest is a major cause of discrimination (Blalock, 1967:73-74). Competition results when two or more individuals are striving for the same limited objective. Concerning intergroup conflict, the success of one's group implies a reduced probability that others will also achieve their objective. He argued that competition is most intense when resources are distributed equally and when skill level is evaluated fairly. Conversely, intergroup competition is high when the overall competition is high and existing abilities are not determined by skill level per se but by coalition forming. In other words, competitors act as if a coalition has been formed resulting in a winning and losing group. The relationship between competition and

discrimination is nonlinear (Blalock, 1967:147-150). There is a nonlinear relationship with a decreasing slope between minority percentage and economically motivating discrimination based on the threat of competition. In other words, as the minority percentage variable increases, the amount of discriminatory behavior will be amplified at an increasing rate. At a certain point, when the minority group becomes so large, it is included within the majority. Here, the minority group will no longer be perceived as threatening. According to intergroup conflict theories, a different minority group will replace the threat of the prior group.

Blalock (1967:110) defines the last form of threat, political threat, in terms of power or the actual overcoming of resistance in a standard period. Power is the successful repression of the opposing group. He argued that those who dominate the resources (material, legislative and policing power) are more likely to utilize those resources when a threat presents itself to the existing authority. Power is a multiplicative function of two general types of variables, total resources and the degree to which these resources are mobilized in service of those persons or groups exercising the power. Power must be conceptualized as the potential or ability to influence others or to get them to do what they would not otherwise do. Power threat and discrimination is also a nonlinear relationship, with an increasing rather than decreasing slope. Because the value of discrimination depends on the right to vote as a resource, the actual exercise of this right represents mobilization. Thus, whites remain dominant to the degree of mobilization relative to that of blacks (Blalock, 1967:150-154). Consequently, the degree of discrimination must not only increase with percent black, it must also rise at an increasing rate.

Blalock's aggregate level theory integrates both individual and group level variables to form a distinct threat hypothesis. Blalock was the first to theoretically examine minority relations as it relates to discrimination by outlining several propositions within the framework.

Since the publication, many theorists have altered Blalock's original concepts. Overtime, Blalock's innovative threat hypothesis has developed into the groundbreaking social threat and social control theory. Next, the transformation of Blalock's concepts is discussed.

The Transformation of Blalock's Concepts

Liska (1992) brought the foundations of social threat and social control theory into the area of criminal threat and crime control. Liska focused on specific groups that are perceived as threatening and various types of control mechanisms. Liska argued that the greater number of acts and people threatening to the interests of the powerful, the greater the level of deviance and amount of crime control (1992:18). Liska outlined specific types of criminal threat and different types of social controls such as fatal controls, coercive controls and beneficial controls.

Fatal or lethal controls are those forms of social control where the threatening population is killed such as in lynchings and police homicide of citizens (Liska, 1992:19). Tolnay and Beck (1992) focused on how lynchings were used to control the black population pre and post Emancipation. Lynchings were used primarily between 1882 and 1933 as a technique of the white population to control the black population. Southern whites considered themselves a population under attack after emancipation. Black lynchings were a social control, not a crime control, mechanism. Black males were portrayed as "sexually driven brutes" with a special affinity for white women (Williamson, 1984). Courts treated black criminals harshly. Vigilante justice was common where whites would remove the victim from jail after the case had been judicially processed. Thus, victims would be killed for committing trivial offenses, which they were awaiting trial.

Tolnay and Beck (1992) discussed fatal forms of social control, specifically, when lynchings were more likely to be utilized. They argued that lynchings represented a different

type of threat post Reconstruction Era. These types of threat are difficult to isolate because, in the case of lynchings, it is not clear whether the threat was predominantly class based, economic or political. The type of threat, in this context, was often overlapping.

During the pre Reconstruction Era, minorities represented a status threat because the sanctity of the caste line was essential in guaranteeing that at least some groups, blacks, were of a lower status in southern society. Anything that threatens the caste line is certain to be vigorously and potentially violently opposed (Tolnay and Beck, 1992:43). Certain common behaviors would constitute threatening behavior such as speaking disrespectfully to whites, acting like a white man, or not knowing ~~your~~ "place" in society. Crossing these boundaries would constitute a threat, not necessarily to the elite, but to poor white southerners who had specific interests in maintaining the caste system (Tolnay and Beck, 1992:44).

Tolnay and Beck argued that after the Reconstruction Era, blacks posed an economic threat. Before the emancipation, blacks were essentially free labor. After emancipation, the primary concern for white farmers and planters was to hire workers as cheaply as possible to guarantee larger profits. The goal of the white worker was to secure the highest wage possible for labor (Tolnay and Beck, 1992:38). An abundant supply of black laborers served the interest of the white elite but caused a direct threat to those whites who directly competed with those offering cheap labor. Thus, whites attacked when they perceived blacks as threatening to their access to resources.

Blacks were perceived as politically threatening when they pursued greater access to political power, economic status, and enhanced social status. Disenfranchisement of the black population in the 1900s often led to violent intimidation when blacks did not ~~know~~ "their place" in society and when they began to utilize their political right to vote (Kousser, 1974; Woodard,

1966). The black population in the South represented a potential numerical threat to the dominant white majority when they were granted the right to vote and when they began to utilize this right. In sum, lynchings in the South were due to blacks posing overlapping forms of threat to the majority group throughout the Eras of emancipation.

Police use of deadly force, another measure of lethal control, was investigated by Liska and Yu (1992). Their examination showed that an increase in the percentage of nonwhites increased the overall police homicide rate controlling for crime rates, population size, police size, segregation, and income inequality (Liska and Yu, 1992:63). Additionally, they disaggregated the effects of race on crime reporting. They found that the racial composition of place mediated the relationship between percent nonwhite and police homicide. This analysis strongly supported the contextual threat hypothesis.

Focusing on coercive controls, Warner (1992) criticized conflict theories for neglecting the micro processes that underlie the macro level. She argued that prior theory has neglected to focus on why the elites perceive these processes to be threatening and how these threats translate into criminal justice policy, practice and activities. She examined the effects of crime reporting to police and found that the racial composition of place is detrimental as to why citizens report crime, controlling for crime seriousness and crime rate. This study highlighted the importance of the individual level processes by which crimes are reported to the police. More specifically, elites are not directly threatened by crime. Poor minorities are the most threatened group and they are the most sensitive to the signs and symbols of crime. Additionally, she found that intraracial crimes are less likely to be reported to the police (Warner, 1992:78-85).

Jackson (1992) also examined coercive controls. She argued that blacks are not perceived to be threatening until they reach a certain percentage of the population. From that

point, the perceived threat increases until blacks become the majority and assume political power. Here, blacks are no longer perceived as threatening but as a resource to local black authorities (Jackson, 1992:81-101).

Chamblin and Liska (1992) extended the work on police force size and arrest rates. They used 1972 and 1982 data and reported that an increase in the percentage of nonwhites dramatically decreases the arrest rates of nonwhites, but it did not affect white arrests (Chamblin and Liska, 1992:109). They had two findings, which supported the benign neglect hypothesis. First, they found that intraracial crime among nonwhites fails to mobilize police. Second, they found that nonwhite victimization also fails to mobilize police, independent of the race of the offender.

Inverarity (1992) also contributed to the literature on coercive controls. He examined social control in terms of imprisonment. Inverarity criticized three types of action theories. Rational choice theory states that an increase in crime causes an increase in prison rates. According to conflict theory, the elites are the driving force behind the criminal justice process and they are thought to be a major influence in prison policy. Managerial theory argues that the managers of the criminal justice policy maximize their own interests (1992:126). While Inverarity criticized these theories, he argued for structural theories and suggested that imprisonment rates vary in terms of the contraction or expansion of the labor market. Thus, when the labor market is deteriorating, there will be an increase in the imprisonment rate due to the need to control the increase in the surplus population. Conversely, in times of economic prosperity, there is a contraction in prison system because of the need for cheap labor.

The use of beneficial controls was also integrated within the social threat literature. Specifically, Arvanites (1992) theoretical discussion on mental asylums argued that two control

bureaucracies, mental asylums and prison systems, function together to control threatening populations (1992:133). A decline in one form of social control leads to an increase in the other form of social control. Thus, the deinstitutionalization of asylums led to an overflow or expansion of the prison and the criminal justice system (1992:139).

Another beneficial control, the welfare system, is frequently conceptualized within conflict and social threat theory. Chamblin argued that welfare expansion in the 1960's was not necessary due to a response in social need, but a reaction to appease the threatening population during times of instability, public protest, and rioting (1992:152). Chamblin criticized other studies due to their overreliance on cross-sectional data. These analyses are problematic because they disregard the simultaneous effects of the imprisonment process. His analysis revealed that percent black positively affects welfare recipient rates (1992:161).

Liska's examination of fatal, coercive and beneficial controls are in line with the Blalock tradition of utilizing the percent black measure to examine the effects of social control, and how controls can lead to a lowered minority status (Blalock, 1967:28). Liska adds to Blalock's contribution by synthesizing substantive forms of controls and highlighting the fact that these studies are theoretically similar works. What is critical to the focus of this paper is how Liska illustrates these substantive forms of control and aggregate level threats. Liska (1992:175) summarizes the threat perspective as follows:

Theorists have assumed various lines of economic, political, social, and racial conflict, which crosscut each other. Those threatened include political elites, economic elites, bureaucratic managers, ethnic majorities, and the middle class. They are assumed to fear a loss of economic resources, political position, social status, and physical safety both from specific classes of people (the lower class, ethnic and racial minorities) and from specific actions (crime, unemployment urban riots, political movements) associated with them.

Liska's (1992) work on social threat and social control theory contributes significantly to the literature. The focus of the dissertation is on individual level threat and social control theory. This is discussed next.

Individual Threat and Social Control Theory

While Blalock (1967) and Liska (1992) primarily focused on aggregate levels of threat and social control, recent work has emphasized the importance of understanding this process at the micro level. As theorized, it is the micro level process that, when aggregated, leads to an increase in social control. Blalock was the first to raise this issue. He states,

In order to shed light on the macro-level theory, one might then shift down to the micro level and set forth the following line of reasoning: (1) exposure to a large number of minority members is a forcing variable that threatens *individual* members of the dominant group; (2) these threats combined with personality variables produce motivation to discriminate; (3) similarly motivated individuals interact with each other in such a way to bring about concerted action leading to actual discrimination; and (4) the discriminatory behavior, when aggregated in some way, leads to lowered (aggravated) minority levels (1967:28).

Blalock (1967) acknowledges the importance of motivation as a tool in the mobilization of control. While motivation is not important at the aggregate level, it is critical at the micro level. Intergroup conflict arises because individuals have limited resources to achieve the same success goals. One goal is to gain approval by adhering to group norms that define legitimacy (1967:116). When success goals are generally encouraged for all participants, there will be strains within the system that create pressures to change the norms defining the range of behaviors considered legitimate. Where majority-group individuals are blocked from upward mobility, norms will be restructured in such a way that minority discrimination becomes defined

as legitimate. Thus, the more difficult it becomes to obtain success goals, the more discrimination. This is the focus of the micro level research.

Within criminological literature, the individual level analyses examines how various crime control activities are affected by the legal psychological and social characteristics of people (Liska, 1992:7). Many empirical examinations have focused on sentencing research, specifically the linkage between nonwhite and the attribution of negative qualities and sentencing outcomes. The theory of “bounded rationality” states that judges base their sentencing decisions on, “past experience, stereotypes, prejudices, and highly particularized views,” (Clegg and Dunkerley, 1980:265). Other works on judicial sentencing disparities have highlighted the importance of race and sentencing. “Focal concerns” theory examines the circumstances by which judges’ use “perceptual shorthand that allows for extra legal characteristics to influence the decision-making process” (Steffensmeier, Ulmer and Kramer, 1998).

Overtime, theorists have extended Blalock’s work on discrimination to examine the relationship between the racial composition of place and punitive attitudes towards crime mediated by the fear of crime. A core assumption of this postulate is whether crime threat or fear increases punitive attitudes towards criminals. These underlying motivations, concerning the fear of competition and the fear of crime are ultimately confounded at the individual level. Theoretically, fear of crime is an essential intervening mechanism between ethnic threat, and racial attitudes, which in theory, is used to fuel punitive policies of control. When analyses yielded inconsistent results concerning fear and race, theorists redefined these concepts to encompass a more concise measure of racial stereotyping, the racial typification of crime. These issues will be discussed further in the next chapter.

Race, Ethnicity and Social Control

According to social threat theorists, the mere presence of blacks induces a fear of crime that increases punitive attitudes, and leads to the mobilization of social control. The percent black is the underlying mechanism in the social threat process. Recent work on the percent black and fear of crime has transformed this aggregate level relationship into an individual level measure of the presence of blacks as a crime threat, specifically, the racial typification of crime. Consequently, the fear of crime is the underlying mechanism that bolsters support for institutions of social control. This relationship has always been merely assumed. Until recently, there has been no direct test, which links race to punitive responses to crime.

In American culture, the link between crime and black men has been well-established (Hawkins, 1995; Russell, 1998). Since the civil rights movements, the connection has become less prominent even though there remains a clear association between race and incarceration rates (Szykowny, 1994). Some argue that much of the punitive response to crime in America is grounded in the belief system that crime is associated with race and that race is associated with crime (Becket and Sasson, 2000; Roberts, 1993). The associations between the media, the fear of crime and punitive responses have also been documented in the literature.

Becket and Sasson (2000:136) found that observing television crime news associates race and crime in such a way that it persuades those watching that punitive responses are the best way to prevent crime. Not only is race an influential component of crime news, but the media reinforces the idea that criminals are fundamentally different from non-criminals by consistently reporting on incidents of violent crime. This reinforces the stereotype that violent crime is the most prominent form of crime when violent crime represents about 6 percent of the annual

crimes known to the police (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2006). Thus, violence becomes the essence of crime to the public and reinforces the notion of punitive punishment.

Crime-related images and messages that saturate the mass media play a vital role in actualizing these stereotypes. While blacks are accurately represented on television, they are represented as criminals more often than any other occupation (Chiricos et. al., 2000). Thus, the media not only misinforms and misleads the public about what types of crimes are committed; they also misrepresent blacks' involvement in violent crime. These erroneous beliefs have been found to fuel support for punitive anticrime measures (Beckett and Sasson, 2004). Moreover, one study found that local and national news are related to the fear of crime independent of the effects of the crime rates and other controls (Chiricos et. al., 2000).

Thus, the racial typification of crime has become a phenomenon, which some argue is a form of modern racism (McConahay, 1986; Sears, 1988; Sniderman and Harvey, 1998). Modern racism includes feelings of anxiety, hostility and negativity towards blacks instead of a direct expression of racial superiority. Modern racism is transformed through selective misleading and misinforming information that fuels support for punitive measures (Garland, 2001; Beckon and Sasson, 2004). Race and fear are a fundamental part of this process.

To date, preliminary evidence suggests that this form of modern racisms holds true in Israel. Researchers have documented the overrepresentation of Arabs in official crime statistics (Cohen and Palmor, 1985; Hassin, 1986; Hassin and Kremnitzer, 1988; Sherer, 1991). Moreover, minority status plays a crucial role in probation and sentencing outcomes for Arabs (Cohen and Palmor, 1985; Fishman and Rattner, 1997; Sherer, 1991). Conversely, only one study suggests that sentencing bias does not exist (Cohen, Fishman and Soroka, 1985). Despite this, the majority of evidence, which will be outlined in Chapter 3, demonstrates a

disproportionate number of Arabs are processed through the Israeli criminal justice system. The overrepresentation begs the question as to whether Arabs actually commit more crime than Jews do or whether there is inherent bias against them. Theoretically, literature concerning discrimination based on ethnic status in Israel is limited and an understanding of the history of ethnic relations within Israel may help explain why this association can be extended to include Arabs as a criminally threatening minority group.

Jews comprise approximately 80 percent of the population, while Arabs make up 20 percent. Consequently, Jews are the dominant majority and Arabs are the minority population in Israel. Neither groups should be perceived as a monolith, just as the Caucasian or black population should not be portrayed as one ethnic group in the United States. Conflict exists within groups and between groups. In regards to intergroup conflict, Jews and Arabs have a history rooted in strife and rivalry. Consequently, Arabs are often alienated in terms of economic and residential resources and they live in deprived isolated areas of the country.

Racial discrimination penetrates throughout all areas of life. Arabs have a civil status in Israel, which is defined as “ghetto citizenship” or more broadly as, “situated within a stratified system of creeping apartheid” (Yiftachel, 2009:56). Historically, Arabs have been regulated through the military. They control only 3.5 percent of the state area, they have an average income that is 68 percent of their Jewish counterparts, and their mean level of higher education reached one-third of that of the Jewish rate (Yiftachel, 2009:57-58). Ethnic status dictates certain rights and privileges of Israeli citizenship and ultimately lessens the status of the Arab minority. Thus, most citizens perceive Arabs as not having full membership status in society. Ethnic stereotyping of criminals has resulted from the cultural circumstances whereby Arabs are

perceived as the disadvantaged and subordinate ethnic group. Because of their disadvantaged civil status, they are perceived as criminals (Fishman et al., 1987).

Research on race, ethnicity and social control is theoretically limited when analyses are uniformly applied to the same black-white populations. Original threat theorists have articulated the theory in such a way to include all majority and minority groups. Specifically, minority groups are threatening purely by their presence and their potential to mobilize. Blalock argued that to obtain significant support for a theory of intergroup competition, studies should be replicated on a number of different populations in a number of different regions. Additionally, Blalock argued that research should be conducted internationally to have confidence in any theoretical propositions (1967:195). To date, the theory has typically been tested within the United States where the minority population is defined as nonwhite or black, and the majority is defined as white. Only recently have these studies begun to include other ethnic origins such as Hispanics (Chiricos et al., 2001; Tanton and Lutton, 1993). The present study will lay the foundation for future research in Israel by conducting such analyses where there have historically been high racial tensions between Arabs and Israelis.

Summary

Chapter 2 has outlined social threat theory at the aggregate level and the individual level. At the aggregate, Blalock (1967) argued that an increase in the minority percentage variable leads to increase in social control. Liska (1992) transformed some of Blalock's concepts and provided specific details concerning threatening populations and various sources of controls. Next, individual level theories were examined by incorporating the works of Blalock, Liska and others who argued the importance of individual motivations as influential in the mobilization of social control. More specifically, researchers have noted the importance of fear of crime, race

and racial attitudes as predictors of punitiveness. Ethnic threat in Israel was also discussed in terms of minority and majority relations. Chapter 3 will empirically outline research concerning these theoretical arguments.

CHAPTER THREE

3. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

There is a substantial body of literature, which investigates the relationship between minority threat and social control. The majority of these studies are conducted at the aggregate level. There is also a growing body of research concerning the individual level process specifically in regards to fear, race, racial attitudes and social control. The focus of this chapter will be to outline the various studies that have empirically assessed these relationships. This is done by outlining research on the fear of crime, race, and racial attitudes and the relationship to punitiveness. Recall that one of the main postulates of this dissertation assumes that social threat theory can be extended outside of the United States to examine other minority and majority populations in Israel. This chapter will also demonstrate that Arab-Israelis are a threatening minority group. Additionally, the few studies that have investigated intraracial threat will be discussed. Finally, a general summary of the empirical findings will be given.

Prior Research on Race, Ethnicity and Social Control

Empirical research on racial threat and social control theory examines the relationship between the presence of blacks and the impact of various crime control efforts. Most research on racial threat has been conducted at the macro level including the demographic composition of place and various measures of social control. Social threat is usually measured by percent black or percent nonwhite (Liska et al., 1989; Parker and Stults, 2005) and social control has been measured in various ways including lynchings (Tolnay and Beck 1992) and executions (Tolnay et al., 1992), police force size (Chamblin, 1989; Greenberg et. al., 1985; Jacobs, 1975; Parker and Stults, 2005; Stults and Baumer, 2007) and by incarceration and arrest rates (Liska et al.,

1989; Padgett, 2002). While most of these studies find that an increase in the black population is associated with greater social controls geared towards blacks, the question remains as to whether such findings can be interpreted as unwavering support for the racial threat hypothesis (Eitle et al., 2002; Jacobs and Helms, 1999; Liska, 1992; Stults and Baumer, 2007). For these reasons, researchers have begun to address the empirical deficits by examining the individual level processes that influences the motivation to discriminate.

The threat hypothesis argues that aggregate measures of punitiveness will vary with aggregate measures of racial composition because the presence of minorities creates a fear of crime that mobilizes punitive responses (Chiricos et al., 2001: 323). As illustrated in Chapter 2, these underlying motivations concerning the fear of competition and the fear of threat are ultimately confounded at the individual level.

A core assumption of this postulate is whether crime threat increases punitive attitudes towards criminals. These attitudes help organize support to impose social controls upon minority populations. Thus, the main hypothesis argues that the fear of crime increases punitive attitudes towards criminals. There are several categories of research, which indirectly relates to the hypothesis under examination: fear of crime and punitiveness, race and punitiveness, racial attitudes and punitiveness, and intraracial threat. Last, research relating to race, ethnicity and social control theory in Israel are discussed.

Fear of Crime and Punitiveness

Results on the association between fear of crime and punitive attitudes are inconsistent. In certain contexts, fear of crime is not related to punitiveness (Applegate, 2002; Barkan and Cohen, 1994, 2005; Baron and Hartnagel, 1996; Chiricos et al., 2004; Costello et al., 2002; Delisi, 2001; Sandys and McGarrell, 1995; Secret and Johnson, 1989; Sims, 2003; Sims and

Johnson, 2004; Sprott, 1999; Stack 2000, 2003; White, 2009; Wu, 2000). However, some studies yield support for this association (Costello et al., 2009; Cochran and Chamblin, 2006; Dowler, 2003; Hogan et al., 2005; Holbert et al., 2004; Hurwitz and Smithey, 1998; Johnson, 2009, 2007; Langworthy and Whitehead, 1986). The inconsistency in the findings is due to the number of ways by which both punitive attitudes and fear of crime are measured. The most robust measure of punitive attitudes should be more likely to find an association with fear of crime if the relationship exists.

Researchers have utilized various measures of punitiveness. In most cases, researchers have been limited to an estimate of punitive attitudes by asking a straightforward question, whether one supports the death penalty (Barkan and Cohn, 1994; Borg, 1997; Britt, 1998; Delisi, 2001; Kelley and Braithwaite, 1990). Conceptually, support for the death penalty is not an ideal measure because it does not capture the complexity of issues concerning those who are punitive. Stack (2003:343) argued that punitiveness is fundamentally different from support for the death penalty because people with relatively high amounts of punitiveness may fall short of support for the death penalty. Thus, the death penalty measure will only assess those who are in favor of capital punishment. This could misclassify all those who are punitive, but who do not support the death penalty. Furthermore, some states and countries do not impose the death penalty. Therefore, this measure can be problematic for many reasons.

A better indicator of punitiveness is “stiffer sentences” or severe sanctions. Researchers who utilize this measure ask questions pertaining to whether respondents favor specific punishments in certain situations (Barkan and Cohn, 1994; Callanan, 2001; Sprott, 1999; Kelley and Braithwaite, 1990). For example, Sprott (1999) measured punitive attitudes by assessing what sentence (fine, community service, prison) the respondent would give a first-time and

second-time offender (juvenile or adult) when breaking into a home and stealing things that are worth \$250 or more. While severe sentences is a better estimate of punitive attitudes than support for the death penalty, it is not the best measure. The measure of severe sentences is problematic because it relies on hypothetical situations that cannot capture the varying attitudes towards a range of policies (Applegate et al., 2000; Bowers, 1990; Hogan et al., 2005; Grasmick et al., 1993).

So far, the most robust measure of punitive attitudes has been an index, which asks questions pertaining to support for a range of punitive policies (Applegate et al., 2000; Applegate et al., 2002; Chiricos et al., 2004; Hogan et al., 2005; Costelloe et al., 2002, 2009; Dowler, 2003; Keil and Vito, 1991). A good example is Hogan and colleagues (2005) punitive index:

On a scale of one to ten, with one being the least support and ten being the most support, please tell me how much you would support each of the following proposals: eliminate parole and require all convicted criminals to serve at least 85% percent of their sentences; making sentences more severe for all crimes; putting more police on the streets, even if it means paying higher taxes; limited appeals to death sentence; use chemical castration for sex offenders; prosecute juvenile offenders as adults; make prisoners work on chain gangs; and take away television and recreational privileges from prisoners.

Hogan and colleagues' (2005) measure of punitiveness is a robust index because it includes many items and the items cover a diverse array of punitive policies.

There are also various indicators of fear of crime including: being afraid to walk alone at night, feeling safe, perceived victimization risk, worrying and being fearful of crime. The most common indicator of fear is a dichotomous measure taken from the General Social Survey (GSS). A number of researchers have relied on GSS data because of convenience and the reliability of the data (Barkan and Cohn, 1994; Cohn et al., 1991; Delisi, 2001; Kelly and Braithwaite, 1990; Stack, 2003). This measure asks a single question, —Are you afraid to walk

alone at night in your neighborhood.” Another common indicator of fear, safety, also relies on a single question, which asks, “thinking of your neighborhood, how safe do you feel when you walk alone outside after dark” (Baron and Hartnagel, 1996; Callanan, 2001; McCorkle, 1993). Both safety and being afraid are cognitive indicators of fear, which does not assess fear in certain contexts (Ferrero and LeGrange, 1987).

These measures are hypothetical indicators of fear because it poses an imaginary situation, which respondents would not necessarily encounter in life (Chiricos et al., 2001; Ferraro, 1995). Someone who does not feel safe would probably not walk alone at night in his or her neighborhood. For this reason, the perceived risk of victimization has been assessed and compared to fear (Chiricos et al., 2001). While fear and victimization risk are distinct concepts, the latter is a more robust measure in relation to punitive policies. Some researchers utilize victimization risk while others continue to inquire about fear.

Despite known accurate measures, research continues to be inconsistent. For example, a recent study by Sims and Johnson (2004) utilized a random sample Pennsylvanians (N=849) to examine their perceptions of various crime and justice issues. They measured fear of crime by asking respondents how often they worry about the crimes of murder, robbery, assault, sexual assault and burglary. They found that their fear of crime index was not significantly associated with support for capital punishment for adults, the mentally retarded or for juvenile offenders.

On the other hand, Costelloe and colleagues (2009) utilized both robust measures of fear and punitiveness. They conducted a statewide survey of 2,250 randomly selected Florida residents. They measured fear of crime as an index consisting of six items. Respondents were asked, “How much would you say you fear: having your car stolen; having someone break into your home while you are away; having someone break in to your home while you are there;

being robbed or mugged on the street; being raped or sexually assaulted; and being murdered.” They found that fear of crime was significantly related to the level of support for seven punitive policies used to deal with crime.

Moreover, Johnson (2009) utilized data from the 2001 Race, Crime and Public Opinion Study. They assessed a random, national sample (N=1,508) to examine the relationship between anger, fear of crime and punitive policies towards criminals. Johnson (2009) found that anger about crime is a significant predictor of punitive attitudes controlling for racial prejudice, fear of crime, political ideology, and other measures. More importantly, the fear index, comprised of two items, was significantly and positively associated with his measure of four punitive policies (Johnson, 2009:62). In summary, there appears to be support for the fear of crime as a significant predictor of punitiveness in studies that utilized robust measures of both fear and punitiveness. However, more research is necessary in order to come to a definitive conclusion about fear.

Race and Punitiveness

While the relationship between fear of crime and punitiveness has been inconsistent the evidence for the relevance of race has been found to be an insignificant predictor (Applegate et al., 1996, 2000, 2002; Bobo and Johnson, 2004; Buckler et al., 2008; Grasmick et al., 1992; Harris, 1986; Johnson, 2008, 2009; King and Wheellock, 2007; Langworthy and Whitehead, 1986; McCorkle, 1993; Payne et al., 2004; Sandys and McGarrell, 1995; Schwartz et al., 1993; Skovron et al., 1988; Snortum and Victor, 1972; Timberlake et al., 2001; Tyler and Weber, 1982; Unnever and Cullen, 2010). Conversely, some studies have found support for the association (Arthur, 1993; Baker et al, 2005; Borg, 1998; Cochran and Chamlin, 2006; Cohen et al, 1991;

Costelloe et al., 2009; Delisi, 2001; Dowler, 2003; Hurst and Nation, 2009; Shaheen and Stiles, 2001; Unnever and Cullen, 2007, 2010; Wison and Dunhum, 2001; Young, 1991). Most studies that find support for race and punitive attitudes are more likely to find an association when death penalty support is used as an indicator of punitiveness. More specifically, research finds that whites are more likely to support the death penalty than blacks (Borg, 1997; Britt, 1998; Cochran and Chamlin, 2006; Cohen et al., 1991; Delisi, 2001; Shaheen and Stiles, 2001; Unnever and Cullen, 2007, 2010; Wison and Dunhum, 2001; Young, 1991).

For example, Delisi (2001) utilized data from the GSS survey to assess various attitudes concerning race, punitiveness and police use of force. He measured punitiveness as support for capital punishment and approval of three indicators of police use of force. The sample included 18,540 respondents. Delisi (2001) found that whites were more punitive than blacks controlling for demographic characteristics, fear of crime, region and political views.

Cochran and Chamblin (2006) conducted the most robust test of race and death penalty support. They utilized data available through the NORC General Social Surveys for the years 1973 to 1996. They had several findings from this analysis. First, they found that there were significant differences between white and blacks, and support for capital punishment. Second, these differences were consistent throughout the sample period. Third, trends in death penalty support were consistent across race and time. Lastly, the significant direct effect of race on death penalty support was stable independent of eleven explanations of racial divide, socioeconomic status, religiosity, political ideology, fear of crime, victimization experience, and attribution styles.

As illustrated above, studies are more inclined to find an association between race and punitiveness when utilizing a measure of death penalty support, rather than a more precise

measure of a number of varying punitive policies. The relationship between race, support for the death penalty, and punitiveness is clearly demonstrated in a recent study by Unnever and Cullen (2010). They utilized a random sample (N=1,217) from the 2000 National Election Study and conducted a regression analysis in order to assess a number of social sources of punitiveness. Unnever and Cullen (2010) measured punitiveness as both an index consisting of four punitive policies, and the degree to which respondents favored the death penalty. They found that race was not related to punitiveness; however, it was related to support for capital punishment controlling for racial resentment, racial stereotype, religiosity, being conservative, authoritarianism, age, gender, education and region (Unnever and Cullen, 2010:116).

In summary, literature on race and punitiveness shows how the relationship can vary upon the operationalization of the dependent variable. The majority of studies that do find an association between race and punitiveness use a measure of death penalty support. The research on race and death penalty support shows that when there is an association, whites are more likely than blacks to support capital punishment. Conversely, race and multiple indicators of punitive policies have been shown not to have an association. This issue again highlights the importance of utilizing precise measures of punitiveness that consists of multiple items for the dependent variable.

Racial Attitudes and Punitiveness

The results for racial attitudes and punitiveness have been consistent. Some studies have utilized a racial prejudice or a racism measure and found support for the association (Aguirre and Baker, 1993; Barkan and Cohen, 1994; Bobo and Johnson, 2004; Buckler et al., 2008, 2009; Chiricos et al., 2004; Johnson, 2008, 2009; Lee and Rasinski, 2006; Matsueda and Drakulich,

2009; Peffley and Hurwitz, 2002; Soss et al., 2003; Unnever and Cullen, 2007; Young, 2004). Others have employed a measure of racial animus, racial antipathy, or a measure of negative stereotyping and have found support (Barkan and Cohen, 1994; 2005; Borg, 1997; Green et al., 2006; Hurwitz and Peffley, 1997; Johnson, 2008, 2009; King and Wheelock, 2007; Unnever et al., 2007). These studies are also more likely to find that whites are generally more punitive than blacks (Borg, 1997; Barkan and Cohen, 1994; Bobo and Johnson, 2004; Chiricos et al., 2004; Cochran and Chamlin, 2006; Cohen et al., 1991; Dowler, 2003; Hurst and Nation, 2009; Shaheen and Stiles, 2001; Unnever and Cullen, 2007), and that Southerners are more punitive than those in other regions of the US (Borg, 1997; Chiricos et al., 2004; Cochran and Sanders, 2009; Shaheen and Stiles, 2001).

For example, Johnson (2008) used a national random sample of respondents (N=1,195) and analyzed data from the 2001 Race, Crime and Public Opinion Study. He assessed the effects of two measures of racial attitudes, a racial stereotype index and a racial resentment scale, and the effect on punitiveness. They measured punitiveness as support for four items of harsh policies. The racial stereotype index was measured by asking respondents three questions: (1) how much confidence do you have in the police in terms of treating blacks and whites equally; (2) how much confidence do you have in prosecutors in terms of treating blacks and whites equally; and (3) how much confidence do you have in judges in terms of treating blacks and whites equally.

Racial resentment was measured as a scale, which included how much respondents agree with six items: (1) Irish, Italian, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up, blacks should do the same without any special favors; (2) over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve; (3) government officials usually pay less

attention to a request or complaint from a black person than from a white person; (4) most blacks who receive money from welfare programs could get along without it if they tried; (5) it's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder, they could be just as well off as whites; and (6) generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class. Johnson (2008) found support for the racial resentment index but not for the measure of racial stereotype.

Johnson's (2008) measure of racial resentment is a modified version of Henry and Sears' (2002) symbolic racism index. Other studies have also found support for the association between symbolic racism and punitiveness (Bobo and Johnson, 2004; Buckler et al., 2009; Johnson, 2009; Matsueda and Drakulich, 2009; Unnever and Cullen, 2010). For example, Matsueda and Drakulich (2009) used data from the 2000 American National Election Studies and they found that their measure of symbolic racism was significantly more likely to find support for the death penalty and increased crime spending.

Barkan and Cohen (1994) used two measures of racial attitudes, antipathy towards blacks and racial stereotyping, to analyze a national random sample of respondents using data from the General Social Survey. They used two items to measure racial antipathy including the degree to which respondents favored or opposed, "living in a neighborhood where more than half your neighbors were blacks" and, "having a close family member or relative marry a black person." They used a six-item scale to measure racial stereotyping by asking respondents how much they thought blacks were lazy, unintelligent, unpatriotic, violent, poor, and desirous to live off welfare. They found that antipathy towards blacks and racial prejudice were significant positive predictors of death penalty support (Barkan and Cohen, 1994:205).

While there has been support for the association between racial attitudes and punitiveness, some argue that the operationalization of fear of crime and race does not take into account the racialized context of Blalock's original theory (Chiricos et al., 2004). Moreover, there are a number of measures, which assess racial attitudes; however, these measures only indirectly test the association. Most people do not directly relate blackness to punitiveness per se, but individuals may be more likely to typify crime as a predominantly black phenomenon. In consequence, essentialism, or the belief that "others" are fundamentally different from oneself or one's group, allows individuals to demonize the other group as criminal (Young, 1999:379). Thus, the typification of the "other race" as criminal contributes to racial prejudice, antipathy, negative stereotyping and racial animus. These are distinct concepts when assessing punitiveness and they should be measured as such. To date, only one study has examined the relationship between the racial typification of crime and punitiveness.

Chiricos and colleagues (2004) conducted a national random sample (N=885) of adults, in households accessed by random digit dialing, in 2002. They measured punitiveness by using a seven-item scale. The racial typification of crime was measured by asking respondents three questions that evaluated the extent that respondents typify crime as something "the other" race commits: (1) what percent of people who commit violent crime are black; (2) what percent of people who break into homes are black (3) what percent of people who rob someone at gunpoint are black. Results from the OLS regression found that the racial typification of crime is a significant predictor of punitiveness independent of crime salience, racial prejudice, conservatism, and other demographic and control measures. This relationship was stronger among white respondents who were less prejudiced, not southern, conservative, and for those who have low crime salience (2004:378).

As previously noted, the aim of this dissertation is to replicate Chiricos and colleagues' (2004) research for an Arab sample of Israelis. Furthermore, because this dissertation will focus on intraracial or intra-ethnic threat, evidence will be presented concerning whether minority populations view themselves and other minorities as threatening. This section will be discussed next.

Intraracial Threat and Punitiveness

When assessing the relationship between threat and punitiveness, very few studies have examined intraracial threat. In other words, do minority populations find their own race threatening and does this influence punitiveness. As noted above, it has been found that whites are usually more punitive than blacks (Borg, 1997; Barkan and Cohen, 1994; Bobo and Johnson, 2004; Chiricos et al., 2004; Cochran and Chamlin, 2006; Cohen et al., 1991; Dowler, 2003; Hurst and Nation, 2009; Shaheen and Stiles, 2001; Unnever and Cullen, 2007). In certain contexts, blacks have been found to be more punitive than non-blacks (Buckler et al., 2009). Moreover, minorities may also be likely to typify, have racial antipathy, racial animus, or some form of negative connotation towards their own race (Buckler et al., 2009).

Buckler and colleagues (2009) utilized a probability sample from the 2000 American National Election Study to explore the impact of race-specific attitudes (symbolic racism and negative black stereotype) and support for punitive and progressive criminal justice policies. Controlling for political ideology, race-neutral sociopolitical attitudes and demographic characteristics they found that the effects of symbolic racism affects whites, blacks and other races. Specifically, the odds of blacks having symbolic racist attitudes were 4 percent greater than whites and other ethnicities.

In addition, Chiricos and colleagues (2001) examined the relationship between the perceived racial and ethnic composition of neighborhood and the perceived risk of criminal victimization with a sample of Floridians (N=1,769). While this study did not assess either the racial typification of crime or punitiveness, the results are indirectly relevant nonetheless. They found that Hispanic and whites but not blacks, who had a high perception of proximity to blacks and Hispanics, were more likely to have a higher perception of crime risk. In this case, whites and Hispanics perceived Hispanics and blacks as criminally threatening, whereas blacks did not perceive their own race as threatening.

Williams and Davison (2009) utilized a sample of 7- and 9-year old first and third grade African American children (N=80) in disadvantaged neighborhoods in Chicago to assess inter- and intraracial stereotypes. They found that black children were more likely to hold negative attitudes towards other blacks and darker complexioned children, compared to whites. In addition, they found that black children were likely to internalize these negative connotations about their own race.

Herzog (2003) conducted the most relevant research concerning intra-ethnic threat in Israel. He found that there were only certain types of crimes (illegal abortion and tax evasion) that Arabs perceived other Arabs to commit more often than they perceived Jews. More generally, each ethnicity perceived the other as the criminal offender (Herzog, 2003). This study will be discussed in more detail in the next section.

Overall, the few studies that have indirectly assessed intraracial, intra-ethnic threat and punitiveness have been inconsistent. A fundamental postulation of the dissertation assumes that the minority threat relationship can be extended to other populations outside of black and white

relations. The next section will show that research on minority relations in Israel is a logical extension of social threat theory.

Race, Ethnicity and Social Control Theory in Israel

According to the United Nations Development Programme, Israel is ranked 42 among the countries with the highest prison population. In the 1970s, the incarceration rate for Israelis ranged from 65 to 85; in the 1980s it ranged from 80 to 110, and in the 1990s the rate ranged from 110 to 120 prisoners per 100,000 (Korn, 2003). In 2007, approximately 13,909 people were incarcerated with 209 prisoners per 100,000 people (Statistical Abstract of Israel, 2009). In 1970s, the Arab incarceration rate was 158.41 per 100,000 and it rose to 198.83 in 2001. This rate is twice as high as the Jewish rate, which was 86.44 in 2001 (Korn, 2003:46).

Comparatively, the United States incarcerates the largest number of people in the world (Hartney, 2006). The incarceration rate in the US is 4 times the world's average and it is 4 to 7 times higher than other western nations such as the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Germany (Harteny, 2006:2). In the 1980s, the incarceration rate in the US was 139 per 100,000; by 2000, there were 470 per 100,000; and, in 2008, there were 504 per 100,000 prisoners under State and Federal jurisdiction. More specifically, in 2008, over 7.3 million people were on probation, in jail or prison, or on parole at the yearend. This represents 3.2 percent of all U.S. adults or 1 in every 31 adults (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2008). In 2005, the incarceration rate for whites was 412 per 100,000 residents, compared to 2,290 for African Americans and 742 for Hispanics (Harrison and Beck, 2006). Moreover, while blacks represent about 13 percent of the population, they are incarcerated at 5.6 times the rate of whites compared to 1.8 for Hispanics (Mauer and King, 2007).

While sentencing disparities have been well documented in the United States, there has been little research conducted in Israel. The 2009 Central Bureau Statistics (CBS) report, Statistical Abstract of Israel, has the most up to date statistics for information regarding public order, crime, and imprisonment rates. Since the 1980s, the number of files opened by the police continues to grow. In 1980, there were 247,084 crimes reported to the police; by 2000, there were 379,546, and in 2008, there were 419,837 crimes reported to the police. Arabs represent approximately 20 percent of the population, 33 percent were serving a prison sentence in 2007, 31 percent in 2006, and 32 percent in 2005. Conversely, Jews represent about 80 percent of the population and 27 percent of Jews were serving a prison sentence in 2007, 28 percent in 2006, and 29 percent were serving a sentence in 2005. Arab adults were also more likely to receive a suspended sentence, a fine, and to recidivate (Statistical Abstract of Israel, 2009).

Other researchers have also documented the overrepresentation of Arabs in official crime statistics (Cohen and Palmor, 1985; Hassin, 1986; Hassin and Kremnitzer, 1988; Sherer, 1991). Moreover, minority status plays a crucial role in probation and sentencing outcomes for Arabs (Cohen and Palmor, 1985; Fishman and Rattner, 1997; Sherer, 1991). Conversely, only one study suggests that sentencing bias does not exist (Cohen et al., 1985). Despite this, the majority of evidence demonstrates a disproportionate number of Arabs are processed through the criminal justice system.

Few studies have been conducted which investigate the underlying mechanisms of the Israeli criminal justice system as a tool for controlling threatening populations. Zureik (1988) argued that Arab crime should be understood as a product of conflict over land and the competition for resources. Cohen (1989) suggested that Arab criminality should be linked to the broader concepts of social control theory and discrimination. Last, Shavitt (1998) argued that the

increase in the rate of imprisonment is due to an increasingly punitive policy geared toward violent and drug crimes. These offenses are more likely to receive the most attention from the media and are likely to stigmatize Arabs and create a sense of fear and panic.

Korn (2003) completed the most robust assessment of the overrepresentation of Arabs in prisons. She examines trends in imprisonment rates since the country's inception in 1948. She found that the criminal justice system serves as an important mechanism of control to regulate the Arab minority (Korn, 2003:33). More specifically, she found that the gap between the Jewish and Arab rate of incarceration has narrowed since the 1970s. Despite this, Arabs are still more likely to be imprisoned than Jews. Arabs are perceived as a hostile minority population because they historically have been convicted of "security" offenses and they are less likely than Jews to be excused from their term for "good behavior" (Korn, 2003:48-49). Thus, minority threat in Israel is fundamentally different from the threat posed by blacks in the United States. In some instances, it is similar to the threat posed by Hispanics in the US (Dixon and Rosenbaum, 2004). Specifically, Arabs pose not only a status threat but also a power and security threat to the dominant majority.

Sela-Shayovitz (2009) directly assessed the crime threat relationship in Israel. She utilized an interrupted time-series analysis, of the years 1995 to 2005, in order to examine pre-trial detention rates after the outbreak of the Second Intifada. The Intifada is a violent Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupations of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. She argued that during the Second Intifada in 2000, Arab-Israelis supported the Palestinian movement and they initiated violent riots throughout Israel to demonstrate their loyalty. These riots strengthen the public's perceptions and reinforced the Jews perception of Arabs as a threat to the security of the nation and as an enemy of the State (Sela-Shayovitz, 2009; Shamir and Sagiv-Schifter, 2006;

Yiftachel, 2009). More specifically, she found that Arabs pre-trial detention rates (aggravated assault, rape, public order, robbery manslaughter and murder) dramatically increased after the outbreak of the Second Intifada. She also found that ethnic status was a strong predictor of pre-trial detention rates controlling for terrorist attacks, unemployment rates, crime rates and law reform. Moreover, a multiplicative effect was found for the status of the Second Intifada and Arab ethnicity on pre-trial detention rates.

So far, evidence has been provided that supports the assumption that the crime threat relationship exists in Israel. What has yet to be explored is whether specific race related attitudes towards Arabs exist. To date, few studies have been conducted which assess this relationship. First, Fishman and colleagues (1987) investigated the impact of ethnic origin on the attribution of criminal offenses. They used a sample of randomly selected college students (N=513) and had subjects attribute five offenses to a sequence of nine photographs which varied by ethnicity. They found that Arabs had the greatest probability of being identified as committing rape (49%), homicide (40%) and burglary (40%) compared to Jews. Overall, the study found that ethnicity affects how people attribute particular offenses to portraits.

Second, Dambrun (2007) assessed the role of racial prejudice towards Arabs, the attribution of criminal traits and the support for the death penalty by using a convenience sample of mostly female college students (N=105-256) in France. He had three major findings. First, he found that prejudice against Arabs remains a significant predictor of death penalty support controlling for conservative authoritarianism. Second, he found that the attribution of criminal traits to Arabs mediates the relationship between ethnic prejudice and death penalty support. Third, Dambrun (2007) conducted a path analysis and found that prejudice towards Arabs,

criminal stereotyping, and death penalty support for Arabs play an important role in predicting overall support for the death penalty.

Finally, Herzog (2003) utilized a random sample of Israelis (N= 868-870) to assess whether offender's ethnicity influenced the seriousness rating of eighteen randomly selected criminal offenses. He found that Arabs were more likely to be perceived as committing less serious crimes (tax evasion and illegal abortion) compared to Jews (2003:767). More specifically, Arabs respondents typified Arab offenders as significantly more likely to commit illegal abortion compared to Jewish offenders (2003:768-771). In addition, Arab respondents were also significantly more likely to perceive Jewish offenders as committing offenses such as ideological murder, street murder, concealing evidence, shop arson and bribing a clerk (2003:771). Conversely, Jewish respondents were more likely to perceive Arab offenders as committing street murder, ideological murder, concealing evidence, shop arson, and false tax declaration (2003:770). Overall, both ethnicities perceived the other as more likely to commit the same crimes except for tax evasion and illegal abortion.

Summary

Studies on the fear of crime and punitive attitudes have been inconsistent. Robust analyses that rely on precise measures are more likely to find support for this association. However, in certain contexts, fear of crime remains an insignificant predictor of punitiveness. Some researchers argue that this discrepancy is attributable to the micro processes in individuals and the fact that studies do not account for the racialized nature of fear. Furthermore, evidence presented in this chapter suggests that race has been an insignificant predictor of punitiveness, and that there has been support for measures of racial attitudes and punitiveness. It was shown that the few studies that exist for intraracial threat have had inconsistent findings. In addition,

evidence was presented which illustrates that the criminal justice system in Israel processes Arabs at a disproportionate rate to their population. Moreover, proof was provided which supports the assumption that the crime threat relationship exists in Israel. Some evidence was provided concerning support for racial attitudes towards Arabs and punitiveness. The next chapter will discuss the research design and the research findings.

CHAPTER FOUR

4. RESEARCH DESIGN

Empirical investigations begin with theory. As outlined in the previous chapters, Blalock (1967) provides the theoretical framework for this examination. A fundamental assumption of the theory is that minority populations, including but not limited to blacks, can present a status, economic, or political threat to the majority population. This threat is then translated into mechanisms of social control. The current examination will investigate one potentially threatening population in Israel, Arabs. The dissertation will investigate the ethnic typification of crime and how other factors such as ethnic prejudice, concern for crime, crime salience, the perceived risk of crime, perceived safety, retributive attitudes, and other control and demographic variables are associated with punitive attitudes.

Recall that those who developed the threat perspective argued that aggregate measures of punitiveness would vary with aggregate measures of racial composition because the presence of minorities creates a fear of crime that helps mobilize punitive responses. Blalock (1967) assumed that as the relative size of the minority group increases, members of the majority group would perceive a growing threat to their positions and would take steps to reduce competition. The threat of competition, real or imaginary, inherently leads to conflict between racial groups. At the micro level, threat theorists have empirically examined how the percent black is related to the fear of crime and how fear affects punitive attitudes towards specific crime policies in the United States. In 2004, Chiricos and colleagues demonstrated that the racial typification of crime better predicted this relationship.

In Chapter 3, it was found that studies on the fear of crime and punitive attitudes have been inconsistent. Robust analyses that rely on precise measures of punitiveness are more likely to find support for the association. However, in certain contexts, fear of crime remains an insignificant predictor of punitiveness. Some researchers argued that this discrepancy is attributable to the micro processes in individuals and the fact that most studies do not account for the racialized nature of fear. Furthermore, the evidence presented here suggests that race has been an insignificant predictor of punitiveness. However, in certain contexts, whites have been found to support one indicator of punitiveness, the death penalty. Conversely, research has documented a link between a number of indicators of racial attitudes and punitiveness. Chapter 3 also outlined the limited number of studies that exist concerning intraracial and intraethnic threat. The findings of these few studies have been inconsistent. Lastly, evidence was presented that showed that the criminal justice system in Israel processes Arabs at a disproportionate rate to their population. Moreover, evidence was provided which supported the assumption that the crime threat relationship exists in Israel.

Using data gathered in two Arab villages in Israel, this study attempts to explore whether Arabs typify other Arabs as criminally threatening and whether this is more likely to increase support for punitive attitudes. It has been documented in the literature that crime threat varies by race and ethnicity and by the geographical context of where one lives (Blalock 1967, Liska, 1982, Chiricos et al. 2001: 335). Replicating Chiricos and colleagues (2004), this dissertation will lay the foundation for assessing the crime threat relationship in Israel.

There are several ways this research will strengthen the existing literature. First, the study is the first to examine attitudes of a different minority population outside of the United States. The importance of this dissertation is to serve as an example of how social threat theory

can be applied to other majority and minority populations throughout the world. Second, the dissertation is also one of the first studies to investigate intraracial threat and the effect on punitive attitudes. Third, the investigation will define and clarify predictors of threat in Israel and their affect on punitiveness. Fourth, the examination is the first to test the underlying micro processes as they pertain to punitive attitudes in Israel. Last, the dataset includes a unique sample of Arab respondents. Very few researchers have attempted to gather data concerning Arab attitudes towards threat and punishment.

Research Questions

The following research questions guide this study in assessing the relationship between the ethnic typification of crime and punitive attitudes towards punishment.

1. What is the relationship between the ethnic typification of crime and punitive attitudes towards crime?
2. What is the relationship between ethnic prejudice and punitive attitudes towards crime?
3. What is the relationship between concern for crime and punitive attitudes towards crime?
4. What is the relationship between the perceived risk of crime and punitive attitudes towards crime?
5. What is the relationship between perceived safety and punitive attitudes towards crime?
6. What is the relationship between retributiveness and punitive attitudes towards crime?

Data and Sample

There have been no studies on punitiveness and few studies of crime seriousness conducted in Israel (Herzog, 2006; Herzog, 2003a, 2003b). Moreover, there has yet to be a study that specifically assesses Arabs' opinions, attitudes and perceptions directly, rather than utilizing crime scenarios and vignettes. Of those studies that have solicited the attitudes of Arab-Israelis, only one investigation reported the frequency of Arab respondents in their sample (Herzog, 2006). For these reasons, a convenience sample was gathered of Arabs who agreed to participate in the study.

The present study collected a nonrandom sample of older, Arab high school students from two villages in the Northern and Central regions of Israel (N= 491). Approximately 80 percent of the sample were students. Adults were also solicited; however, few adults participated. Adults were sampled by having students take the survey home to their parents to complete. Additionally, adults who worked at the high schools had the option to participate in the study. The Israeli population consists of about 1.2 million Arab-Israelis. Due to a recent increase in the Arab birth rate, 51 percent are zero to 19 years old and only 3 percent of the population is 65 and older (Central of Bureau Statistics, 2002). As well as surveying Arab respondents, focus groups were conducted with students between May 2008-09.

Each survey took approximately 15 minutes to complete and each focus group took approximately 45 minutes to conduct. Surveys were translated from English to Hebrew to Arabic and were back translated into English. A comparison of the original questionnaire with the back-translation revealed similar versions. In total, seven focus groups were conducted in the two villages. Focus groups were divided by sex and a maximum of ten participants were included in each group. A translator was also provided. The translator was necessary only to clarify specific words and questions. Most respondents spoke some English.

Due to the methods utilized and the nature of the research being conducted, the study is supplemented by a qualitative analysis and a brief description of each village is warranted. As noted above, two villages were used in the sample: Abu Gosh and Shaghur. Both are Arab villages located in Israel and all of the respondents are Muslims. It is important to note that there are 116 Arab localities in Israel and 33 of them are rural villages (Israel Central of Bureau Statistics, 2002).

Abu Gosh is located 6 miles west of Jerusalem. According to the Israel Central of Bureau Statistics (2009), Abu Gosh had a population of 6,200 in 2005. During the Israeli-Arab war in 1948, Abu Gosh remained neutral and did not participate in the conflict. Today, Abu Gosh is famous for being one of the friendliest Arab villages in Israel. Abu Gosh is also renowned for their hummus and for hosting musical festivals twice a year for the Jewish holidays of Shavuot and Sukkot. Abu Gosh is considered an ideal Arab village because they have close ties to the Israeli government.

One of the primary research informants was the deputy mayor of the village. An informal interview took place with him and he discussed how Abu Gosh compares to other Arab villages in Israel. The following information was gathered from that interview. The deputy mayor stated that Abu Gosh is considered more liberal than other Arab villages. Nevertheless, Arabs in Abu Gosh still holds conservative and traditional values. Abu Gosh is comprised of three families and the mayor reported that everyone living in Abu Gosh was related to him, at least as distant cousins. The deputy mayor also stated, “Abu Gosh pays 80 percent of their taxes [owed] to the state and this is why we have a better educational system than other Arab villages. Most others only pay about 35 percent of their taxes.”

In Israel, the state will match the amount of taxes paid by the villagers. While everyone in the village should pay their taxes, traditionally, the clan that has political power is more likely to do so. The clan in power also solicits tax money from other individuals from other clans. In most cases, those individuals who are not in the clan with political power do not pay their taxes. Consequently, Arab villages are generally poor and most mayors are perceived as corrupt by society.

Given that the mayor of Abu Gosh has surpassed this problem within his community, he is considered a good mayor and he has been reelected several times. Moreover, the mayor stated that he is not afraid to hire Jewish or other civilians from different ethnicities to work in the village. According to the mayor, “Other Arab mayors [typically] do not hire ethnically diverse staff because it is considered too risky for reelection purposes.” It should be noted that there is empirical support for this theoretical argument regarding tax evasion. One study that was conducted in Israel found that the rate of tax collection was associated with distrust of the government and that the rate of collection was much lower for Arab localities after accounting for other measures of socio-economic disadvantage (Brender, 2005).

The second village, Shaghur, is located in the Northern region of Israel near Haifa. According to the Israel Central of Bureau Statistics (2010), the population of Shaghur was 30,500 in 2009. In 2005, there were approximately 14,600 males and 13,900 females. About 49 percent of the population is 19 years of age or younger, 17 percent are between the ages of 20 and 29; 20 percent are between the ages of 30 and 44, 11 percent are between the ages of 45 and 64, and 3 percent of the population are 65 and older (Israel Central of Bureau Statistics, 2007).

Shaghur recently went through some structural changes. In 2005, Shaghur was created by merging three distinct Arab localities: Majd al-Krum population of 13,800; Deir al-Asad population of 8,400; and Bi'ina population of 5,600 (Israel Central of Bureau Statistics, 2003). Each locality had three separate mayors. In an effort to collect taxes, the Israeli government took control of the villages. As a result, the government merged the three villages into one community. Only one of the three mayors could be elected to lead the new village. This ultimately led to political conflict and violence. A murder took place between the clan members and the offender's family was exiled from the village. During the focus groups, it was apparent

that car bombings occurred daily because of this civil unrest. One respondent reported, “So now this makes everyone angry. Now, those whose village is not a part of the town do not pay taxes and they have guns and they make most of the violence in the last three years.” While Shaghur is much larger than Abu Gosh is, it should be noted that the sample and focus groups participants were solicited from a high school in the Deir al-Asad locality, which is located in the eastern portion of Shaghur. In total, there are six high schools located in Shaghur (Israel Central of Bureau Statistics, 2003).

Variables and Measures

In this section, the variables used in the outcome analysis will be outlined. The description will include all indicators used in each additive index and the corresponding alpha coefficients. Then, the descriptive statistics are presented. The descriptive statistics table includes the minimum and maximum values, the means and standard deviations, and it includes the significant values for the means difference test between subsamples.

Dependent Variable

Punitive Attitudes Towards Crime

Methodologies have varied in how punitive attitudes have been measured. Some studies have used crime vignettes and have asked respondents to assign the correct punishment to the crime or it has been measured by asking respondents to assess the appropriateness of punishment in certain circumstances (Blumstein and Cohen, 1980; Durham et al., 1996; Herzog, 2006; Miller et al., 1986, 1991; Rossi and Berk, 1997; Thomas et al., 1976). Others researchers have measured punitiveness by asking respondents whether they support the death penalty or about their opinions regarding the correctness of the certain sentencing policies (Borg, 1997; Britt,

1998; Cohen et al., 1991; Secret and Johnson, 1989; Sprott, 1999). In order to engage the respondents with specific punitive policies towards punishment, a measure was taken from Chiricos and colleagues (2004:369). This index was created by adding the values of the indicators and dividing by six. The reported standardized Cronbach alpha was significant at .75. The values range from zero to 10. Thus, higher values indicate harsher attitudes towards punitive policies. The question asks,

We are asking about things that have been suggested as ways of dealing with crime in the Israel. On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is being not at all supportive and 10 is being very supportive; tell me how much you support each of these proposals.

- Making sentences more severe for all crimes
- Putting more police on the streets, even it means paying more taxes
- Taking away recreational privileges from prisoners
- Having harsh penalties for criminals who consistently break laws
- Locking up more juvenile offenders
- Sending repeat juvenile offenders to adult court

Independent Variables

Arab Typification of Crime

Using previous a measure from Chiricos and colleagues (2004:369), the main independent variable is composed of responses to three questions that evaluate the extent that respondents typify crime as something the other ethnicity commits. A baseline percentage was used so that predictions could be made more accurately. For each ethnicity (Jews and Arabs) the question asks,

The following set of statements is about your opinion on crime. The population of Israel contains approximately 80 percent Jews and 20 percent Arabs. Please estimate:

- What percent of people who commit violent crime are (Jews/Arabs)?
- What percent of people who break into homes are (Jews/Arabs)?
- What percent of people who rob someone at gunpoint are (Jews/Arabs)?

Unfortunately, there was a substantial amount of missing data for these indicators. Mean substitution was utilized as a method to overcome this issue and the limitations of this method will be discussed in Chapter 6. Consequently, only 44 percent of the respondents answered these questions for the measure of Arab typification. For the indicator of Jewish typification, 45 percent of the sample answered the three questions. In order to have complete data, the main independent variable was dichotomized. The variable was dictomized manually for each of the three items. Thus, if the respondent felt that Arabs committed more crime (45 percent verse 35 percent) they were coded as a one. If they perceived Jews to commit more crime, they were coded as a zero. If the respondent felt that each ethnicity commits the same percentage of crime, they were also coded as a zero. Once each indicator was dichotomized, the measure was computed into an index and data are valid for 51 percent of the sample. Values range from zero to 1. While it is not standard to report a Cronbach alpha for dichotomized items, the reported alpha for the additive index is significant at .71.

Ethnic Prejudice

The next independent variable, ethnic prejudice, is measured by an index that contained five questions pertaining to the acceptability of someone from a different ethnic background and varying contexts of social proximity. This measure was adapted from Chiricos and colleagues (2004:371) and was modified to inquire about ethnic relations rather than racial. The index was created by adding the values of the indicators and dividing by five. The reported standardized Cronbach alpha was significant at .60. Values range from one to four. Thus, higher values indicate a greater level of prejudiced. The questions asks,

The next questions concerns how acceptable you are towards someone of a different ethnic background. Please tell me if you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements:

- It is acceptable for someone from a different ethnic background to live nearby.
- It is acceptable for someone of a different ethnic background to marry into my family.
- It is acceptable for someone of a different ethnic background to join a club or organization of which I was a member.
- It is acceptable for someone of a different ethnic background to come home with me for dinner.
- It is acceptable for me to have a job in which my supervisor or boss was of a different ethnic background.

Retributive Attitudes Towards Crime

Another independent variable that was used in the analysis is having a retributive philosophy for punishment. This measure is utilized in order to isolate the affects of retributive attitudes from punitive attitudes towards punishment and to incorporate the role of religion as a justification for punishment. Grasmick and colleagues (1992) argued that fundamentalism is associated with a retributive doctrine of punishment. In religious or close-knit societies, it may be the case that retribution is related to punitiveness. While punitive attitudes and retributive attitudes are similar concepts, it is necessary to assess whether these concepts are unique and whether they are associated. In this dissertation, the measure of retributive attitudes takes into account an overall purpose or philosophy for punishment, whereas the measure of punitiveness accounts for specific attitudes regarding the severity of punishment for a number of different crime policies. Retributive attitudes are measured by asking the respondents how much they agree with the following statements. The question reads,

The next questions concerns why someone should be punished. Please tell me if you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements.

- The primary purpose of punishment should be to pay those back for the crimes they have committed.
- We should use the old saying ~~an~~ “an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth” as guidelines when deciding punishment.
- Punishment of criminals is necessary to preserve a sense of justice in our society.

Grasmick and colleagues (1992:29) utilized the first three items and the last was included in order to construct a more robust index. Grasmick and colleagues (1992) constructed this index from other studies on retributiveness. The first indicator was used in Warr and Stafford’s (1984) measure of retributive attitudes. The second indicator has been used in several public opinion polls of attitudes towards the death penalty and it has been used as a measure of retributiveness in Vidmar and Ellsworth’s (1974) study. The third measure was adapted from a statement in Justice Stewart’s Opinion in *Furman V. George* when he discussed the ~~instinct~~ “instinct for retribution” (Finckenauer, 1988:92). The Cronbach alpha is not significant at the .27 level. Values range from one to four. Thus, higher values indicate a higher level of having a retributive philosophy for punishment. Because this study is exploratory in nature, the index is used in the analysis.

Victimization Risk

The next set of questions concerned the risk of crime. As noted in the literature review, one problem in studying crime threat is the way in which studies have operationalized fear (Ferraro, 1995). Some studies have used ~~fear,~~ “~~perceived safety~~” and ~~perceived risk.~~” Chiricos and colleagues (2001:324) argued that perceived risk is a less ambiguous and more accessible measure of crime threat than fear because some populations may be less willing to admit that they are fearful. For this study, a previous measure taken from Chiricos and colleagues (2001) was used. This index was created by adding the values of the indicators and dividing by seven. The reported standardized Cronbach alpha is significant at .85. Values range from zero to 10.

Thus, higher values mean that the respondents are more likely to perceive themselves as being a victim of crime. These questions ask,

Now I want you to rate the chance that a specific crime will happen to you during the coming year. On a scale from 0-10, where 0 means not at all likely and 10 means very likely, how likely do you think it is that you will,

- Have personal property stolen from you
- Have someone break into your home while you are there
- Be robbed or mugged on the street
- Be raped or sexually assaulted by someone you know
- Be beaten up or assaulted by strangers
- Be murdered by a stranger or strangers
- Be murdered by someone who is close to you

Perceived Safety

As noted in the literature review, many studies on the fear of crime have utilized the perceived safety of one's neighborhood as an indicator of fear. Because perceived safety is a conceptually different indicator than risk, respondents were also asked how safe they felt being alone in their neighborhood at night. Values ranges from one to four, thus higher values indicate feeling unsafe. The question asks, "How safe would you say you feel being out alone in your neighborhood at night, very safe, somewhat safe, not very safe, or not safe at all?"

Perception of Crime in Israel

This measure was included in order to gauge whether respondents thought that crime has remained relatively stable since the last year. The question asked respondents, "Compared to last year, would you say that crime in Israel is much higher, higher, about the same, lower, or much lower?" Values ranged from one to five. The values were reversed coded so that higher values

indicated that more crime was committed this year compared to last year (henceforth, crime stability). The measure was included in the analysis to control for the perceived rate of crime overtime.

Concern for Crime

In order to control for how salient crime is, a measure was used to control for respondents' overall concern for crime. The measure was included in the analysis because it has been shown that despite the fear or risk of crime, concern for crime is a different cognitive response. For example, one can think that they are not likely to be a victim of a crime, but one still may have an overall concern for crime. If one is concerned with crime, it also may positively influence their level of punitiveness. This variable was measured by asking respondents two questions regarding whether one is concerned for crime in their neighborhood and in Israel. This index was created by adding the values of the indicators and dividing by two. The reported standardized Cronbach alpha was significant at .62. Values ranged from zero to 10 with higher values indicating a higher level of concern. Two questions were asked and they read, "On a scale from zero to 10 where zero is being not at all concerned and 10 is being very concerned, how concerned are you with crime in Israel and crime in your neighborhood?"

Perception of Violent Crime in Israel

This measure was another crime salience measure that asked respondents to indicate the percentage of violent crime that occurred in the last year. The measure was included in the investigation to see whether violent crime is exaggerated in Israel. In the United States, the perception of violent crime is often inflated and it has been shown to be related to punitiveness

(Chiricos et al., 2004; Surrette, 1992). Respondents were asked, “Please estimate the percent of crimes in Israel that are violent.” Values ranged from three to 100 percent. Higher values indicate a higher perception of violent crime.

Other Control Variables

Five other demographic variables were included in the analysis. First, the village in which the respondent lived was included because there could be significant variation in the level of punitiveness across region. Shaghur was coded as a one and Abu Gosh was coded as a zero. Twenty-five respondents that were included in the sample were not a part of either village. The respondents were part of a high school class, which was located in Jerusalem. These respondents were used in the main analysis but are not a part of the subsample comparisons between villages. Second, the level of education was included in the analysis because it has been shown that the level education can affect punitiveness. This measure was coded on a scale ranging from zero to three (some high school, completed high school and more than a high school education). As noted, most respondents were in high school. Third, student status was included in the sample because the majority of the sample was in high school. If the youth were students they were coded a one, all others were coded a zero. Fourth, age was included in the sample because some studies have found that older respondents are more likely to be punitive. The age of respondents ranged from 16 to 67. Last, sex was used as a control variable. Female was coded as a one and male was coded a zero. The table on the next page illustrates the descriptive statistics of the sample. In addition to the descriptive statistics, a mean difference test was conducted between the Arab samples in order to gauge whether the villages and samples are quantitatively different on key variables.

As noted below Table 4.1 describes the minimum and maximum values of each variables used in the analysis as well as the mean and standard deviations. As the table indicates, 61 percent of the respondents are women, the average age is 19 years of age, and the majority of the sample are students (80%). Moreover, the sample is split by village equally, the perception of violent crime is at 62 percent and concern for crime is relatively high (6.34). Most respondents perceive crime in Israel as being higher this year compared to last (4.34) and the risk of victimization is low (2.34). In addition, the mean level of retributive attitudes (2.96) towards crime and ethnic prejudice (2.37) are moderate to high respectively. Lastly, approximately 44 percent of the sample typifies Arabs as committing more crime compared to Jews.

Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics & Means Test

<u>Variable Name</u>	<u>Minimum</u>	<u>Maximum</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>P</u>
Punitive Attitudes	0	10	5.10	
Female	0	1	.61	
Age	16	67	19.38	*
Student	0	1	.80	***
Education	0	2	1.11	***
Village	0	1	.51	
Percent Violent Crime	3	100	62.10	
Concern	0	10	6.34	**
Crime in Israel	1	5	4.34	
Safe	1	4	2.09	
Victimization Risk	1	10	2.35	
Retributive Attitudes	1	4	2.96	
Ethnic Prejudice	1	4	2.37	
Arab Typification	0	1	.44	**
N				491

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

The subsamples have a significantly different mean for the following measures age, student, education, concern for crime, crime in Israel and the Arab typification of crime. In order

to understand the variation across villages, a closer look at the differences for the means for each subsample is warranted. Table 4.2 below illustrates the differences of means by village only for the significant variables.

Table 4.2 Difference of Means by Village for Significant Variables

<u>Variable Name</u>	Mean	N	SD	SE
Age				
Shaghur	18.61	226	7.22	.48
Abu Gosh	20.48	168	9.24	.71
Student				
Shaghur	.84	236	.36	.02
Abu Gosh	.76	230	.43	.03
Education				
Shaghur	1.10	231	.33	.02
Abu Gosh	1.14	199	.54	.04
Concern				
Shaghur	6.54	192	3.04	.22
Abu Gosh	6.29	164	3.57	.28
Crime in Israel				
Shaghur	4.15	230	.67	.04
Abu Gosh	4.63	163	.99	.08
Arab Typification				
Shaghur	.50	129	.41	.04
Abu Gosh	.40	112	.36	.03

Table 4.2 shows that the average age for youth in Shaghur is about 19 years old while the average age for youth in Abu Gosh is about 20. Eighty-four percent of the sample in Shaghur are students compared to 76 percent in Abu Gosh. Additionally, those in Abu Gosh reported a slightly higher educational level, concern for crime was greater in Shaghur and respondents in Abu Gosh were more likely to report that crime was higher in Israel compared to last year. Lastly, respondents in Shaghur were 10 percent more likely to typify Arabs as committing more crime compared to respondents from Abu Gosh. Overall, the difference of means test showed that there were modest differences in the two subsamples. Because this study is exploratory in nature, the investigation will continue.

CHAPTER FIVE

5. RESEARCH FINDINGS

In this section, the research findings will be discussed. First, the quantitative findings will be presented followed by the contextual analyses. Then, the findings from each research question posed will be answered and they will be supplemented by the qualitative findings. The qualitative results were compiled by synthesizing general themes and patterns from the field notes. The quantitative analyses begin with a correlations table, presented below, which assesses whether there are problems of collinearity.

Table 5.1 Correlations Matrix

	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>14</u>
1. Punitive Attitudes	-	.07	.13	-.02	.10	.02	.01	.36	.15	-.11	.12	.13	-.13	-.07
2. Female	.07	-	-.05	.18	.02	-.02	.13	.12	.00	-.22	.07	.03	-.21	-.06
3. Age	.13	-.05	-	-.49	.22	-.11	-.17	-.03	.05	.15	-.13	-.03	-.03	-.18
4. Student	-.02	.18	-.49	-	-.12	.10	.10	.07	-.06	-.10	-.02	-.08	.02	-.02
5. Education	.10	.02	.22	-.12	-	-.04	-.08	.01	-.06	.05	-.05	-.02	-.01	-.14
6. Village	.02	-.02	-.11	.10	-.04	-	-.13	.04	-.28	-.15	-.17	-.20	-.04	.13
7. Percent Violent Crime	.01	.13	-.17	.10	-.08	-.13	-	.37	.25	-.14	.23	.12	.03	.13
8. Concern	.36	.12	-.03	.07	.01	.04	.37	-	.12	-.22	.25	.11	-.01	.04
9. Crime in Israel	.15	.00	.05	-.06	-.06	-.28	.25	.12	-	-.10	.20	.03	.06	.01
10. Safe	-.11	-.22	.15	-.10	.05	-.15	-.14	-.22	-.10	-	-.30	.02	-.10	-.12
11. Victimization Risk	.12	.07	-.13	-.02	-.05	-.17	.23	.25	.20	-.30	-	.11	.00	.00
12. Retributive Attitudes	.13	.03	-.03	-.08	-.02	-.20	.12	.11	.03	.02	.11	-	-.01	.09
13. Ethnic Prejudice	-.13	-.21	-.03	.02	-.01	-.04	.03	-.01	.06	-.10	.00	-.01	-	.18
14. Arab Typification	-.07	-.06	-.18	-.02	-.14	.13	.13	.04	.01	-.12	.00	.09	.18	-

As noted by Table 5.1, there are no apparent problems of multicollinearity with tolerance levels consistently above .74 and no bivariate correlations between independent variables in excess of .49 (student and age). There is also a modest correlation between percent violent crime and concern for crime at .37. The strongest correlation for punitive attitudes is concern for crime

(.36) and crime in Israel (.15). In addition, the strongest correlations between the main independent variable, the Arab typification of crime, are age (-.18) and ethnic prejudice (.18).

Table 5.2 below reports the results of regressing punitive attitudes on the full set of independent variables. Quantitative data are analyzed by using Ordinary Least Squares Regression. Breusch-Pagan tests indicate that the assumption of homoskedasticity is not violated. Because the analyses include subsample comparisons, both unstandardized (*b*) and standardized (*Beta*) coefficients are reported.

**Table 5.2 Regression of Punitive Attitudes
on the Arab Typification of Crime**

<u>Variable Name</u>	<u>Punitive Attitudes</u>		
	<i>b</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>p</i>
Female	.00	.00	
Age	.03	.10	
Student	.16	.03	
Education	.27	.06	
Village	.14	.03	
Percent Violent Crime	-.01	-.09	*
Concern	.19	.28	***
Crime in Israel	.24	.09	*
Safe	.10	.04	
Victimization Risk	.03	.02	
Retributive Attitudes	.28	.09	*
Ethnic Prejudice	-.37	-.09	*
Arab Typification	-.20	-.03	
N			491
Constant			2.22
R-squared			.12
Adjusted R-squared			.10
* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$			

Table 5.2 shows that the strongest predictor of punitive attitudes is concern for crime (.28), followed by age (.10), percent violent crime (-.09), crime in Israel (.09), retributive attitudes (.09) and ethnic prejudiced (-.09). The adjusted r-squared (.10) is relatively common

for research involving race and punitiveness. Chiricos and colleagues (2004: 373) reported the strongest adjusted r-squared values for their full model (.27), while Rossi and Berk (1997:201) and Applegate and colleagues (2000:734) reported lower adjusted r-squared values (.03 through .19).

Significant variables in the model include percent violent crime, concern for crime, retributive attitudes, and ethnic prejudice. Support for punitive attitudes is greater for those who are concerned with crime and for those who perceive crime to be higher than in the previous year. Moreover, those who hold retributive attitudes are also significantly more likely to hold punitive attitudes towards criminals. Interestingly, both the percent violent crime and ethnic prejudice are significant and in the unexpected direction. Thus, Arabs who are less prejudiced are more likely to have punitive attitudes. One possible explanation for this finding is that the majority of the respondents were female (61%) and Table 5.1 illustrates that ethnic prejudice and female were negatively correlated (-.21). The negative association between ethnic prejudice and punitive attitudes is discussed in more detail in the contextual analyses and in the qualitative findings.

As noted by Table 5.2, the main independent variable, the Arab typification of crime, is not significantly associated with punitive attitudes in the full model. Thus, Arabs are less likely to typify Arabs as committing more crime. While not significant, this relationship demonstrates that Arabs are more likely to typify Jews as committing more crime. Overall, Table 5.2 illustrates that many of the variables associated with punitiveness in the literature are also significant in this context. Additionally, some of the variables in the analyses are in the opposite direction than would be predicted. For these reasons, it is essential to investigate further.

The next three tables present the contextual differences between the village where the sample was gathered, sex and student status. It has been noted in the literature that racial threat varies by region (Corzine et al., 1983; Emerson, 1994; Jackson, 1989). Moreover, while the relationship between sex and punitive attitudes has been inconsistent in prior research, it has yet to be examined in regards to Arab-Israelis. Results are also disaggregated by student status because the majority of the sample were students and there were too few adults to split the sample by age.

Table 5.3 below illustrates the effects of the Arab typification of crime by village. As noted, age and retributive attitudes are significant in Shaghur but not in Abu Gosh. Thus, older respondents and more retributive respondents are more likely to have punitive attitudes in Shaghur. As illustrated, concern for crime is significant in both villages.

Table 5.3 Effects of the Arab Typification and Punitive Attitudes by Village

<u>Variable Name</u>	<u>Abu Gosh</u>			<u>Shaghur</u>		
	<i>b</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>p</i>
Female	.24	.05		-.06	-.02	
Age	.01	.03		.06	.25	**
Student	.35	.07		-.03	-.01	
Education	.18	.04		.11	.02	
Percent Violent Crime	-.01	-.12		.00	-.00	
Concern	.20	.28	***	.20	.31	***
Crime in Israel	.33	.13		.09	.03	
Safe	-.04	-.01		.21	.09	
Victimization Risk	.07	.06		-.06	-.05	
Retributive Attitudes	.05	.24		.75	.24	***
Ethnic Prejudice	-.50	-.11		-.33	-.08	
Arab Typification	-.18	-.02		-.14	-.02	
N			230			236
Constant			3.25*			.62
R-squared			.12			.21
Adjusted R-squared			.07			.17

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 5.4 disaggregates the effects of punitiveness by sex. As noted, those who are concerned with crime are more likely to have punitive sentiments regardless of their sex. Additionally, females are significantly more likely to have retributive attitudes towards criminals, while males are more likely to define crime in Israel as salient. In addition, men who are less prejudiced are also more likely to have punitive attitudes towards crime. These findings may be because men are more likely to be exposed to other ethnicities outside the village, while women predominately remain in the village. Substantively, it also should be noted that ethnic prejudice has a positive but not significant effect for females.

Table 5.4 Effects of the Arab Typification and Punitive Attitudes by Sex

<u>Variable Name</u>	<u>Female</u>			<u>Male</u>		
	<i>b</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>p</i>
Age	.01	.05		.01	.06	
Student	-.18	-.04		.05	.01	
Education	.19	.04		.55	.12	
Village	.12	.03		.31	.07	
Percent Violent Crime	.00	-.03		-.02	-.20	*
Concern	.16	.23	***	.15	.21	*
Crime in Israel	.15	.06		.54	.19	*
Safe	-.01	-.01		.24	.08	
Victimization Risk	-.02	-.02		.05	.04	
Retributive Attitudes	.59	.22	***	-.25	-.07	
Ethnic Prejudice	.08	.02		-1.13	-.23	**
Arab Typification	-.05	-.01		-.46	-.06	
N			263			171
Constant			1.57			4.90**
R-squared			.13			.16
Adjusted R-squared			.09			.10

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 5.5 analyzes the effects of punitiveness by student status. As noted, concern for crime is significant for both students and non-students. Another difference across student status concerns the percent violent crime and retributive attitudes. Non-students who have a low perception of violent crime are more likely to have punitive attitudes. Additionally, nonstudents who have retributive attitudes are also significantly more likely to be punitive.

Table 5.5 Effects of the Arab Typification and Punitive Attitudes by Student Status

<u>Variable Name</u>	<u>Student</u>			<u>Non-Student</u>		
	<i>b</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>p</i>
Female	-.01	-.00		.01	.00	
Age	.08	.12		.01	.07	
Education	-.03	-.01		.49	.12	
Village	-.02	-.01		.30	.06	
Percent Violent Crime	.00	.01		-.03	-.37	***
Concern	.15	.23	***	.36	.49	***
Crime in Israel	.15	.06		.48	.17	
Safe	.07	.03		.25	.10	
Victimization Risk	-.03	-.03		.15	.12	
Retributive Attitudes	.30	.11		.01	.00	*
Ethnic Prejudice	-.37	-.09		-.51	-.10	
Arab Typification	-.28	-.04		-.06	-.01	
N			394			97
Constant			1.98			2.12
R-squared			.10			.36
Adjusted R-squared			.07			.27

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

The next sets of tables disaggregates the estimates of punitiveness by low or high median values of concern for crime (median= 6.5), ethnic prejudice (median= 2.8), percent violent crime (median= 65%) and retributive attitudes (median= 3). The analyses are disaggregated by these measures because they are the strongest predictors of punitiveness. These three tables are presented next.

Table 5.6 disaggregates estimates of punitiveness by low and high median values for concern for crime. The table shows that respondents with a low concern for crime are significantly more likely to be punitive when they are students, older, less educated, have a low perception of violent crime, have an increased risk of crime and when they are less prejudiced. The adjusted r-squared indicates that the model accounts for 15 percent of the variation in punitiveness.

Table 5.6 Effects of the Arab Typification and Punitive Attitudes by Concern

<u>Variable Name</u>	<u>Low</u>			<u>High</u>		
	<i>b</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>p</i>
Female	-.53	-.12		.13	.03	
Age	.08	.28	*	.02	.07	
Student	1.50	.31	**	-.22	-.04	
Education	-.42	-.09	*	.58	.10	
Village	-.03	-.01		.07	.02	
Percent Violent Crime	-.02	-.26	*	.00	.00	
Crime in Israel	.00	-.00		.26	.09	
Safe	.19	.07		.23	.09	
Victimization Risk	.31	.20	*	-.01	-.01	
Retributive Attitudes	.10	.03		.36	.03	
Ethnic Prejudice	-1.22	-.28	**	-.20	-.05	
Arab Typification	.29	.04		-.05	-.01	
N			105			271
Constant			4.94*			2.32
R-squared			.24			.05
Adjusted R-squared			.15			.01

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 5.7 disaggregates estimates of punitiveness by low and high median values for ethnic prejudice. As noted below, concern for crime is significant for those with low and high levels of ethnic prejudiced. Respondents with low levels of prejudice and those who are more educated are more likely to have punitive sentiments. It should be noted, while not significant that there is a positive correlation between Arab typification of crime and punitive attitudes for those with low median levels of prejudice.

Table 5.7 Effects of the Arab Typification and Punitive Attitudes by Ethnic Prejudice

<u>Variable Name</u>	<u>Low</u>			<u>High</u>		
	<i>b</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>p</i>
Female	-.19	-.04		1.05	.21	
Age	.02	.08		.03	.07	
Student	.24	.05		-.28	-.05	
Education	.71	.15	*	-.70	-.13	
Village	-.11	-.03		.15	.03	
Percent Violent Crime	-.01	-.12		-.03	-.28	
Concern	.20	.30	***	.27	.39	***
Crime in Israel	-.09	-.04		.39	.11	
Safe	.05	.02		-.08	-.03	
Victimization Risk	.04	.04		-.09	-.07	
Retributive Attitudes	.25	.08		.09	.03	
Arab Typification	.11	.02		-1.16	-.15	
N			273			84
Constant			2.97*			4.40
R-squared			.13			.28
Adjusted R-squared			.09			.16

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 5.8 disaggregates estimates of punitiveness by low and high median values of percent violent crime. As noted below, concern for crime is significant for those with low and high median levels of violent crime perceptions. Furthermore, respondents who have a low perception of violent crime and who have a higher risk of crime are significantly more likely to have punitive attitudes towards criminals. Additionally, respondents who have a high perception of violent crime, who are retributive and less prejudiced are more likely to have punitive sentiments.

**Table 5.8 Effects of the Arab Typification
and Punitive Attitudes by
Percent Violent Crime**

<u>Variable Name</u>	<u>Low</u>			<u>High</u>		
	<i>b</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>p</i>
Female	-.24	-.06		.23	.05	
Age	.03	.14		.03	.09	
Student	-.11	-.02		.37	.07	
Education	.18	.04		.13	.03	
Village	.10	.02		.26	.06	
Concern	.11	.17	*	.23	.29	***
Crime in Israel	.31	.13		.12	.04	
Safe	.30	.12		-.05	-.02	
Victimization Risk	.20	.16	*	-.07	-.01	
Retributive Attitudes	.13	.04		.54	.17	*
Ethnic Prejudice	.30	.06		-.54	-.14	*
Arab Typification	-.52	-.07		.28	.04	
N			199			225
Constant			.53			1.74
R-squared			.14			.17
Adjusted R-squared			.09			.12
* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$						

Table 5.9 disaggregates estimates of punitiveness by low and high median values of retributiveness. As noted below, concern for crime is significant regardless of the level of retributiveness. Additionally, respondents are more likely to be punitive when they are older, have low median levels of retributive sentiments, low violent crime perceptions and when they have high perceptions of crime stability.

Table 5.9 Effects of the Arab Typification and Punitive Attitudes by Retributiveness

<u>Variable Name</u>	<u>Low</u>			<u>High</u>		
	<i>b</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>p</i>
Female	-.25	-.07		.29	.06	
Age	.04	.22	*	.01	.02	
Student	.17	.04		-.04	-.01	
Education	-.26	-.06		.43	.08	
Village	-.07	-.02		.32	.07	
Percent Violent Crime	-.01	-.20	**	.00	-.04	
Concern	.14	.24	**	.22	.30	***
Crime in Israel	.42	.19	*	.10	.04	
Safe	.06	.03		.06	.02	
Victimization Risk	.17	.15		-.03	-.03	
Ethnic Prejudice	-.30	-.08		-.37	-.08	
Arab Typification	-.36	-.06		-.37	-.05	
N			191			270
Constant		2.85**			3.75**	
R-squared			.18			.12
Adjusted R-squared			.13			.08

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

In summary, the analyses showed that the most consistent predictor of punitiveness is concern for crime. Specifically, the contextual analyses demonstrates that regardless of the effects of village, sex, student status and low or high median levels of ethnic prejudice, percent violent crime and retributiveness, concern for crime has a significant positive effect on punitive attitudes towards crime policies. The next section will discuss the answers to each of the

research questions posed in detail. This discussion will be supplemented by the qualitative analysis.

1. What is the relationship between the ethnic typification of crime and punitive attitudes towards criminals?

No relationship was found between the Arab typification of crime and punitive attitudes. Moreover, the analyses indicated, while not significant, a negative correlation between the ethnic typification of crime and punitiveness. This finding could be due to several reasons. First, as the literature review showed, past research has been inconsistent concerning intraracial threat. Thus, it may be that minority populations do not find their own ethnic group threatening; therefore, it does not increase punitive attitudes. This relationship may be more likely to hold true in certain contexts. For example, the villages under examination are close-knit societies. While crime happens, it is much different from crime that occurs in American inner cities. Thus, Arabs in these communities may be shielded from crime to a certain extent. For example, when asked about community values one respondent who lived in Abu Gosh stated,

We help each other when there are crises. People love each other in Abu Gosh. We all are from one family so our relationship is strong. We have positive things for that and negative things for that. We share the same traditions. Because we all are from the same family, we are very close to each other. In general, it is a good thing that we are close because we have the same mental state. We are close to each other and we share the same mental values.

Moreover, many respondents from Abu Gosh said that they wanted to continue to live in Abu Gosh and that they could not imagine a life outside the village.

When asked about which ethnicity commits more crime, respondents gave a variety of answers. Some respondents felt that Arabs commit more crime, while some felt that Jews do, or

they felt that each ethnicity commits equal amounts of crime. Overall, it seemed that participants had mixed attitudes concerning which ethnicity was more likely to commit crime. Specific comments included:

Jews commit more crime and they get off, but Arabs they commit more simple crimes and go to jail.

Almost all crime is committed by Arabs and almost all crime by Arabs is committed by men and barely any other crime is committed by others.

Jews commits much less crimes than their population. Arabs commit more crimes because there is a lot of drugs, it makes them not care about their children.

Jews commit more crime because Arabs have more family values. Jews have more freedom because it's their country.

Jews commit more crime because they want Arabs to leave Israel.

Jews suffered in the past and Arabs are now suffering. I think that in Arab community we have more values that control us like Islamic religion. Arabs are more controlled by values, so Jews commit more crime.

Arabs commit more because they want to stay more in the country.

Jews commit more because they try everyday to kill us.

Muslims commit more because we see Jews make crimes so we make crimes too.

We are living in the village and around us is Arabian and we hear about Arabian crimes but we are not in a Jewish town or village so we don't hear about those crimes.

Jews, those who have more freedom commit more crime.

2. What is the relationship between ethnic prejudice and punitive attitudes towards criminals?

In Table 5.2 it was shown that ethnic prejudice was significant and in the opposite direction than would be predicted. This finding is in contrast to Chiricos and colleagues (2004:375) finding on racial prejudice. They found that racial prejudice was positive and significant across race. For comparison purposes, the average level of punitiveness for this

sample was 5.1 and it was 6.3 for Chiricos and colleagues (2004:372). Thus, this sample is less punitive. Moreover, this sample is also less prejudice (.24 compared to .49).

Interestingly, the negative correlation between ethnic prejudice and punitive attitudes may be due to the differences in gender roles. In this research study, females made up 61 percent of the sample. In addition, the bivariate correlation between females and ethnic prejudice was negative. However, the analyses showed (Table 5.4) that males were significantly more likely to be less prejudice and this was correlated with punitiveness. In addition, ethnic prejudice has a positive but not significant effect for females. Moreover, females were also more likely to have a retributive philosophy for punishment and this was correlated with punitive sentiments towards crime. One viable explanation is that females are isolated from other ethnic groups more so than males. This may be attributed to the fact that females leave the village less often than males. Men are more likely to work outside of the village while women are likely to stay home to care for the children. While some women leave the village to work, it is less likely for women to leave than men leading to social isolation especially from ethnic others. This finding alludes to the importance of gender roles and ethnic prejudice when examining threat and the social proximity of ethnic groups.

There was some evidence found for this explanation in the qualitative analysis. When asked if someone of a different religion could move next door, male respondents indicated,

*There is no discrimination whatsoever. I play for soccer team in Jerusalem.
There is good relationship with them with sports.*

This village is all Muslim- it is okay, but I don't understand why a Jew would feel comfortable being here.

In addition, when female respondents were asked if it were okay for you or your sister to marry someone of a different religion respondents stated,

If I would marry someone of a different religion, my family would have a big problem with that. My village would be very very mad. If he is not planning on being a Muslim than it is a big problem. They will stop talking to you. They would want you to move out of the village.

No, only if he converts to Muslim because it is against my religion. If it was my brother, than we would punish someone if they married someone of a different a religion. If someone wants to enter our religion, it is a good thing.

Any person can be a Muslim but no Muslim can change religions.

While male respondents stated,

No, it wouldn't happen. They are not allowed to marry other religion. Only few girls marry Muslims outside of Abu Gosh and have left. May be 10 percent [of girls]. It's common for boys to bring Muslim girls to Abu Gosh, maybe 50 percent.

If he is not a Muslim, neither he nor her would want to live here because they would be threatened by crime, to be killed or cajoled by the whole community and especially by her family.

Jews can't marry Arabs and Arabs can't marry Jews. There are very few Muslim girls that marry a Jewish boy. The law wouldn't allow it. Now they live in Haifa but no one from the village talks to them. The Muslim law says that they [women] must convert.

In most cases, the idea of marrying someone from a different ethnicity or even having someone of a different ethnic background move into the village rarely occurs, if it does at all. Thus, prejudice may be low because of the informal rules and codes of the village. Specific rules and regulations concerning gender roles could influence the level of ethnic prejudice and the subsequent impact on punitiveness. Overall, having someone of a different ethnicity living in the village or marrying into the family was impractical for most participants to imagine.

3. *What is the relationship between concern for crime and punitive attitudes towards criminals?*

Recall that in the quantitative analysis concern for crime was significant in the full model and throughout the contextual analyses. Concern for crime was the most consistent indicator of punitive attitudes. While the findings from the qualitative analysis did not specifically ask about crime concern, the results illustrated that little crime happens in at least one of the villages. In Abu Gosh, there seemed no apparent concern for crime in their neighborhood. The majority of respondents indicated that murder or rape was the first crime that they thought of. When probed about the type of crimes that happen inside Abu Gosh one respondent stated, “Inside Abu Gosh there are few robberies and they might come into your house and steal something. [Is a gun ever used?] Not sure about gun, more likely to enter home when no one is there.” Another respondent stated that there is, “Violence and fights in school but we love each other in Abu Gosh.” Moreover, one respondent who lived in Abu Gosh stated, “In general, we have no obvious crimes.” Overall, most respondents in Abu Gosh felt that less serious crimes occurred there and they felt that the majority of crimes took place outside of the village.

When asked about the type of crimes that happen in Shaghur, the overwhelming majority indicated that car bombings occurred a lot. One respondent indicated,

There is no security. There is a lot of crime, robbery and bombs. Bombing of cars [happens] almost once a day. For the last two years, there was bombings four times a week. We are not scared of the bombs, we are in Israel. We are used to it. It just happens and there is no protection. Happens because they are angry at someone but not always. There are family problems or something, especially in the last two years. There was a guy killed in our village. Since that time there has been throwing of the bombs. The guy who killed someone was exiled and him and his family can never come back.

Most respondents in Shaghur felt the same way. When asked about the types of crimes that take place respondents reported,

Bombings of the cars. Someone threw a bomb on someone's car because of family problems.

My cell phone was robbed.

Killings, blood, and murder. In our village there was someone killed by someone else a year ago. The reason for killing was so silly.

Bombing the cars, burning cars and houses is normal. Every night we have bombs of cars. The citizens are the victims. You will be sitting at home and your cousin will call for you that your car is burning. Just random violence, no real reason for it. It happens because they there is no education.

The qualitative analyses illustrated that concern for crime was more likely in Shaghur than in Abu Gosh because serious and violent crimes seemed to be more frequent there. The quantitative analysis demonstrated that Shaghur has a higher concern for crime; however, concern for crime had a strong significant effect on punitive attitudes towards criminals despite the village in which one lived.

4. What is the relationship between the perceived risk of crime and punitive attitudes toward criminals?

The risk of being a victim of crime was not significant in the full model. In the contextual analysis, the risk of crime increased punitive sentiments for those respondents who had below median levels of concern and for those who had low violent crime perceptions. In the qualitative analysis, it was found that the measure of the victimization risk was missing an important indicator of risk, the likelihood of being a victim of a car bombing. This could be one possible explanation as to why victimization risk was not significant in the full model or in more of the contextual analyses.

5. *What is the relationship between perceived safety and punitive attitudes toward criminals?*

As noted in the analyses, perceived safety was not significantly associated with punitive attitudes in the full model or in the contextual analyses. For the qualitative analysis, respondents were asked if they felt safe to walk alone at night. This question spurred different reactions based on one's sex. Overall, the question was perceived as hypothetical for both sexes for different reasons. First, most males respondents said that it was okay for men to walk alone at night. Thus, the question seemed to apply to whether women could walk alone at night when asked to men. The findings showed that women are not allowed to walk alone or be out of the house at night without specific reason for doing so. While this seemed to be true for both sexes, it was truer for women. On the other hand, women thought that neither men nor women should be allowed out alone at night because that meant that they would be involved in suspicious or risky behaviors. Women were highly concerned with damaging their reputation, if they did not abide by certain rules. Some specific comments included,

Some families do allow this and others do not. It depends where she is going.

No, this is not allowed in our society. We [men] will just stop them by telling their parents.

It depends what time and where. If it is a holiday and there is a feast, it would be ok.

I have to be home by 8pm. Some parents allow for 9pm maybe 10pm because they do not want anyone to talk about their daughters because it effects their reputation, oh and because of safety.

Yes, I would be scared of men. Some say that you might be out alone and you see someone doing some crime and you will get in trouble for seeing them do something bad.

Yes, I will feel safe. I'm not afraid near my neighborhood. But in the village center, I would be afraid. I'm afraid that I might be killed or raped. If someone sees me they would say "oh it's a girl" and a guy would talk with me and then I will scream and try to defend myself.

It really depends on where we [girls] are going, the store is ok.

People would gossip about incorrect behavior. It's dangerous sexually speaking.

Girls should not be allowed late at night, boys okay. In Islam, men are different from women.

Neither men nor women should be allowed out late, they are the same.

In Abu Gosh, I would not be scared. I would only be fearful outside of Abu Gosh of being sexually and physically assaulted.

The whole day I can go if I have a purpose, but never if I don't have a purpose.

In sum, men did not admit to being afraid to walk alone at night in their neighborhood. Conversely, women would not be allowed out of their house without permission or without reason because it could damage their reputation. Moreover, this question was imaginary at best because most men and women would not be out alone at night without reason.

6. *What is the relationship between retributiveness and punitive attitudes towards criminals?*

In the quantitative analysis, it was found that those who held retributive attitudes were significantly more likely to hold punitive attitudes towards criminals. Moreover, the contextual analysis revealed that those who had low median levels of retributive sentiments and those who were more punitive, were more likely to have low perceptions of violent crime and higher perceptions of crime stability.

When discussing the appropriate punishment for murder, most respondents felt that if someone were killed, the offender should lose their life for taking another's. One respondent indicated, "He should be executed. In our religion, whoever kills should be killed." Some respondents thought that this punishment might be too harsh. Some thought that those who

commit murder should be banished from the community. Furthermore, the type of punishment one received was dependent on what type of law was being applied. Retributive sentiments were justified through tradition, and tradition was formulated through the practice of the community's interpretation of religious law over time. For Arabs, there are three types of law: traditional, religious, and Israeli law. One respondent explains:

According to Islamic law a killer should be killed, you know an eye for an eye. When there was a murder and according to local Arab traditions, the murdered family should have some kind of compensation. First, they [the killer's family and relatives] should be expelled outside of the village and many other procedures should be taken against them. The killer should be sent to jail. This is not the religious law because according to Islamic religion a killer should be killed. [Who should do the killing?] Not by the family but by the judge in Islamic law. But what happens in the time being, in the Arab and Islamic communities, there is the issue of the suha. This means the reconciliation. The reconciliation issue put some rules, in a case of killing somebody, that the killer's family should pay a sum of money as compensation to the very close relatives like the brothers and fathers but especially the males. The killer's side [family] should be expelled 20 or 30 or 50 meters from the killed man's family. You should separate between the traditional law and the religious law. Sometimes they are not the same.

Thus, there are two types of law at play in Arab villages: traditional and religious law. In Arab villages within Israel, traditional law trumps religious law. This is because Israel is not a Muslim country. Arabs have some discretion when applying laws in their own communities. In Arab villages, a combination of religious and traditional law is exercised. While religious law lays the foundation for traditional law, traditional law is rooted in the practice of religion over time. One respondent explained,

In the village, we have traditional law. The family of the one that killed is thrown out of the village. Here, religious law is only secondary because it does not exist because we are not in a Muslim country.

In summary, the results presented showed that the strongest correlation with punitive attitudes for the sample was being concerned with crime. Concern for crime was also the strongest predictor throughout the contextual analyses. Moreover, respondents with a low

concern for crime were more likely to have punitive attitudes when they were students, older, had less than a high school degree, had a low perception of violent crime, had an increased risk of crime, and when they were less prejudice. The qualitative analysis supported many of the findings from the quantitative analysis. The last chapter will discuss the theoretical relevance of the research findings, the limitations of the study, and it will suggest areas for future research.

CHAPTER SIX

6. DISCUSSION

In this dissertation, several theoretical relationships were tested concerning the ethnic typification of crime and punitive attitudes in two Arab villages. The main hypothesis analyzed the relationship between the Arab typification of crime and punitive attitudes towards criminals. Beyond the direct effects of typification, contextual analyses were utilized in order to investigate the conditions in which Arabs hold punitive sentiments. As the results show, the main hypothesis under examination was not supported by the regression analyses. The analyses demonstrated that concern for crime was the strongest predictor of punitive attitudes net of other control and demographic variables. The following discussion will begin with the theoretical relevance of the research. It will be followed by an outline of the limitations of the study and it will suggest areas for future research.

Theoretical Relevance

The importance of this dissertation is to serve as an example of how social threat theory can be applied to other minority and majority populations globally. This research examined how Arabs' punitive sentiments towards criminals are shaped. More specifically, the dissertation was the first to assess the attitudes of a minority population outside of the United States and it was the first study that investigated the relationship between intra-ethnic threat and punitive attitudes. The main finding of this dissertation was that some of same indicators shape punitive attitudes across the world, specifically in regards to concern for crime, crime stability, ethnic prejudice, perceptions of violent crime and retributive attitudes. In this study, punitive sentiments were not

associated with typifying Arabs as criminal. However, this relationship may hold true in other contexts specifically in regards to Jews. In addition, another relevant finding of this study is that this sample was less punitive and less prejudice than those sampled in the United States (Chiricos et al., 2004). Replicating studies such as these across the globe would contribute substantially to the literature and it would increase the understanding about how punitive sentiments are shaped. Despite these significant contributions, the results of this study are hindered by some limitations. The limitations of the study are discussed next.

Limitations

There are several limitations of this research. First, a nonprobability sample was used. Thus, the sample was not representative of the larger population of Arabs-Israelis. While the sample was not representative, it was large enough to represent a good portion of Arab high school students within each village. As the qualitative analysis illustrated, these villages may not be typical Arab villages because they were more liberal than others may be. This was demonstrated by the fact that they participated in such a study. Moreover, villages that were known to be more conservative (Ultra Orthodox areas) were solicited to participant but they did not agree to take part in such research endeavors. While the study utilized a nonprobability sample, as Chang and Krosnick (2009) demonstrated, nonprobability samples provide results that are more accurate when respondents choose to participate in such research endeavors. Nevertheless, probability samples more accurately represented national distributions (Chang and Krosnick, 2009: 674). Accordingly, the results of this study are more generalizable to older Arab high school students than to the larger population of Arab-Israelis.

The second limitation was the difficulty in obtaining cooperation from a large number of Arab respondents. It was difficult to obtain full cooperation from those who agreed to participate

in the study. It seemed that respondents were likely to refuse sensitive questions about ethnic relations due to their religious beliefs. Many respondents did not want to disclose answers for particular questions. As noted, the main independent variable was dichotomized in order to have data that was more complete. Even then, only 55 percent of the sample answered questions pertaining to ethnic relations. For less sensitive questions, such as concern for crime, there was a much greater ease in reporting (77%).

Consequently, missing data is another limitation of this study. In order to correct for missing data, mean substitution was used. While the advantages of using mean substitution were evident, increasing the sample size to conduct the contextual analyses, there were also major disadvantages in utilizing this method. The first is that mean substitution decreased the variation of the scores, which may make the data less reliable. Second, mean substitution may change the true values of the correlations because the method substitutes missing data with artificial averages. Moreover, because the key independent and dependent variables had the greatest amount of missing data, some of the relationships and findings among the variables may be due to the use of this method. Specifically, the estimates may be underestimated because the dependent variable had the most amount of missing data. Despite these deficits, one researcher argued that this method is superior when estimating parameters (Dodeen, 2003). It should also be noted that regressions were run for the full model by using other methods to correct for missing data (listwise and casewise) and the findings remained relatively unchanged.

Another limitation of this research concerns the difficulties associated with conducting cross-national research. There were three concerns that should be noted which may influence the results of the analyses. First, one of the indicators for retributiveness was lost in translation for half of the surveys that were disseminated. This error occurred after it was apparent that

obtaining cooperation from adult Arabs would be a more complex process than soliciting young adults from high schools. When the survey was modified to be tailored towards younger adults, one question was left out of the second version of the survey. Because of the low alpha in Grasmick and colleagues' (1992:37) index, a fourth indicator was added relating to sinfulness and punishment.

The fourth indicator regarding sinfulness was added to the index because of the idea of religious retribution, in contrast to the doctrines of rehabilitation and deterrence. Those who believe in retribution and believe in what Wald and colleagues (1990) term ~~“moral~~ conservatism,” are more likely to equate both secular and non-secular laws with criminality and sinfulness. According to this idea, sinfulness cannot be corrected through rehabilitative means. Instead, crime is a reflection of weak character and deserves punishment for that reason (Grasmick et al., 1992:28). Thus, if one is more criminal, one is more sinful and they are liable for punishment. The fourth indicator increased the alpha coefficient from .27 to .55. While this lowered the alpha level, the measure still had a positive significant effect on punitiveness.

Second, the measure of victimization risk and the Arab typification of crime did not account for all victimizations and crimes that are common in these villages such as car bombings and other acts of terror. Previous measures were utilized; thus, these types of victimizations and crimes were not included in the measures because they rarely occur in the United States. Consequently, future studies which take place in Israel, should assess whether the risk of crime and the Arab typification of crime is more influential than the analyses suggest. Lastly, when the back translation was conducted, it was noticed that while the questions held the same meaning, they were not as precise as the original English version had been. Next, areas of future research are discussed.

Future Research

There are several areas for future research. First, intra-ethnic threat is an important aspect of social threat theory and very little research has been dedicated to examining these relationships. Future research should examine whether intra-ethnic threat mobilizes punitive responses in other regions and with other minority groups. In addition, ethnic threat more generally should also be examined in regards to punitive attitudes, in Israel and in other parts of the world utilizing various minority and majority group relations.

The next area of research concerns investigating not only Arabs' attitudes, but also assessing whether Jews typify Arabs as criminally threatening and whether the ethnic typification of crime by Jews increases punitive attitudes towards specific crime policies. According to theory, this association could hold true. Future research should investigate the relationship between Jews and Arabs in order to assess the threat hypothesis at the macro and micro levels. Recall, that this dissertation alluded to the fact that the social proximity of ethnic others could affect punitive attitudes and it could affect how ethnic prejudices are formed.

One of the major findings of this study was that the sample was less punitive and less prejudice than the participants in Chiricos and colleagues' study (2004). More specifically, the relationship between ethnic prejudice and punitiveness was significant and it was in the opposite direction than would have been predicted. The contextual analyses and qualitative analysis also demonstrated that males were significantly more likely to be less prejudice and this increased punitive sentiments. One possible explanation for this is that males are more likely to travel outside of the village and they may be more likely to be integrated more so with other ethnicities than women. Future research should explore the possibility of gender differences in various levels of ethnic prejudiced and the subsequent effect on punitiveness.

In addition to the finding concerning ethnic prejudice, future research should also assess the relationship between the risk of crime and punitive attitudes in Israel. This study found that the risk of crime was only significant when crime perceptions were low. As noted in the limitation section, the measure of victimization risk and Arab typification does not include car bombings and other acts of terror as indicators in those measures. These were relevant concerns for those who lived in at least one of the villages and futures measures of victimization risk and the ethnic typification of crime should include such indicators to capture such risks and crimes in Israel.

Finally, gathering an Arab sample of Israeli respondents was difficult and complex. The observations gathered from this study were from Arabs who come from conservative, religious backgrounds. It is put forth that these respondents were less likely to participate in research endeavors for several reasons. First, the sample lived in isolated areas of the country. Furthermore, Arabs are known to have a high-level of distrust of the government because of their cultural and traditional values, in addition to having a long history of conflict between ethnicities (Brender, 2005). Likewise, this sample was likely to refuse participation in such endeavors when the research topic area concerned culturally sensitive issues such as crime and ethnic relations. Only one study was found which indirectly supports this observation. Bernson and colleagues (2010:59) studied the refusal rates for obtaining informed consent with Orthodox Reformed (Protestants) and obtaining blood tests. They found that refusing consent to be tested was related to less openness and cooperativeness because vaccinations were perceived as taboo in this religious group. Despite these observations, there is no empirical evidence that suggests that Arabs are less likely to participate in research studies. This should be an important area for future research.

In summary, this chapter discussed the theoretical relevance, the limitations of this study, and it outlined some areas for future research. Overall, while there were some limitations noted, the theoretical relevance and importance of investigating social threat and social control theory cross-culturally outweighs these limitations. Future research should address the gaps that were out of the scope of this study to do such as investigating other minority and majority group relations, examining intraracial threat among minority populations, and future research should continue to explore the relationship between majority and minority group threat in Israel.

APPENDIX A

ENGLISH SURVEY

We are conducting a survey about issues facing citizens like you. The purpose of this survey is to collect public opinion on social issues such as crime in your neighborhood, as well as demographic information like age and sex. Your opinions are important to us. Your responses are completely confidential and no one will know how you answered these questions.

1. Compared to last year, would you say that crime in Israel is much higher, higher, about the same, lower, or much lower?
 1. Much higher
 2. Higher
 3. About the same
 4. Lower
 5. Much lower
 6. Don't know
 7. Refuse
2. What about crime in your neighborhood? Compared to last year, do you think that crime in your neighborhood is much higher, higher, about the same, lower, or much lower?
 1. Much higher
 2. Higher
 3. About the same
 4. Lower
 5. Much lower
 6. Don't know
 7. Refuse
3. Estimate the percent of crimes in Israel that are violent. _____

The following statements are about your neighborhood. Please tell me if you **STRONGLY AGREE, AGREE, DISAGREE, or STRONGLY DISAGREE** with the following statements:

4. People around your neighborhood are willing to help their neighbors.
 1. Strongly Agree
 2. Agree
 3. Strongly Disagree
 4. Disagree
 5. Refuse

5. This is a close-knit neighborhood.
 1. Strongly Agree
 2. Agree
 3. Strongly Disagree
 4. Disagree
 5. Refuse
6. This village is spiritually tied to one another.
 1. Strongly Agree
 2. Agree
 3. Strongly Disagree
 4. Disagree
 5. Refuse
7. People in this neighborhood can be trusted.
 1. Strongly Agree
 2. Agree
 3. Strongly Disagree
 4. Disagree
 5. Refuse
8. People in this neighborhood generally do **NOT** get along with each other.
 1. Strongly Agree
 2. Agree
 3. Strongly Disagree
 4. Disagree
 5. Refuse
9. People in this neighborhood do **NOT** share the same values.
 1. Strongly Agree
 2. Agree
 3. Strongly Disagree
 4. Disagree
 5. Refuse
10. My family is very close to one another.
 1. Strongly Agree
 2. Agree
 3. Strongly Disagree
 4. Disagree
 5. Refuse

11. How safe would you say you feel being out alone in your neighborhood at night **VERY SAFE, SOMEWHAT SAFE, NOT VERY SAFE, or NOT SAFE AT ALL?**

1. Very Safe
2. Somewhat Safe
3. Not Very Safe
4. Not safe at all
5. Refuse

12. How safe would you say you feel being home alone at night **SAFE, SOMEWHAT SAFE, NOT VERY SAFE, or NOT SAFE AT ALL?**

1. Very Safe
2. Somewhat Safe
3. Not Very Safe
4. Not safe at all
5. Refuse

The following set of statements is about your opinion on crime. The population of Israel contains approximately 80% Jews, 18% Arabs and 2% Druze. Please estimate the following:

13. What percent of people who commit violent crime are

- a. Jews? _____
- b. Arabs? _____
- c. Refuse

14. What percent of people who break into homes are

1. Jews? _____
2. Arabs? _____
3. Refuse

15. What percent of people who rob someone at gunpoint are

- a. Jews? _____
- b. Arabs? _____
- c. Refuse

16. What percent of people who commit sexual acts against God are

- a. Men? _____
- b. Women? _____
- c. Refuse

17. When you think about people who provoke illicit sexual behavior, approximately what percent are

- a. Men? _____
- b. Female? _____
- c. Refuse

18. When you think about people who provoke adultery, approximately what percent are

- a. Men? _____
- b. Female? _____
- c. Refuse

The next questions concerns how acceptable you are towards someone of a different ethnic background or gender. Please tell me if you **STRONGLY AGREE**, **AGREE**, **DISAGREE**, or **STRONGLY DISAGREE** with the following statements:

19. It is acceptable for someone from a different ethnic background to live nearby.

- a. Strongly Agree
- b. Agree
- c. Strongly Disagree
- d. Disagree
- e. Refuse

20. It is acceptable for someone who is not chaste to live near by.

- a. Strongly Agree
- b. Agree
- c. Strongly Disagree
- d. Disagree
- e. Refuse

21. It is acceptable for someone of a different ethnic background to marry into my family.

- a. Strongly Agree
- b. Agree
- c. Strongly Disagree
- d. Disagree
- e. Refuse

22. It is acceptable for someone to marry into my family without giving dowry.

- a. Strongly Agree
- b. Agree
- c. Strongly Disagree
- d. Disagree
- e. Refuse

23. It is acceptable for someone of a different ethnic background to join a club or organization of which I was a member.

- a. Strongly Agree
- b. Agree
- c. Strongly Disagree
- d. Disagree
- e. Refuse

24. It is acceptable for someone of a different gender to join a club or organization of which I was a member.

- a. Strongly Agree
- b. Agree
- c. Strongly Disagree
- d. Disagree
- e. Refuse

25. It is acceptable for someone of a different ethnic background to come home with me for dinner.

- a. Strongly Agree
- b. Agree
- c. Strongly Disagree
- d. Disagree
- e. Refuse

26. It is acceptable for someone of a different gender to come home with me for dinner.

- a. Strongly Agree
- b. Agree
- c. Strongly Disagree
- d. Disagree
- e. Refuse

27. It is acceptable for me to have a job in which my supervisor or boss was of a different ethnic background.

- a. Strongly Agree
- b. Agree
- c. Strongly Disagree
- d. Disagree
- e. Refuse

28. It is acceptable for me to have a job in which my supervisor or boss is a different gender.

- a. Strongly Agree
- b. Agree
- c. Strongly Disagree
- d. Disagree
- e. Refuse

Now I want you to rate the chance that a specific crime will happen to you during the coming year. On a scale from 0-10, where **0** means **NOT AT ALL LIKELY** and **10** means **VERY LIKELY**, how likely do you think it is that you will

29. Have personal property stolen from you?

- 1. 0-10 _____ (Enter number here)
- 2. Refuse

30. Have someone break into your home while you are there?

- 1. 0-10 _____ (Enter number here)

2. Refuse
31. Be robbed or mugged on the street?
1. 0-10 _____ (Enter number here)
 2. Refuse
32. Be raped or sexually assaulted by someone you know?
1. 0-10 _____ (Enter number here)
 2. Refuse
33. Be beaten up or assaulted by strangers?
1. 0-10 _____ (Enter number here)
 2. Refuse
34. Be assaulted by someone who is close to you?
1. 0-10 _____ (Enter number here)
 2. Refuse
35. Be murdered by a stranger or strangers?
1. 0-10 _____ (Enter number here)
 2. Refuse
36. Be murdered by someone who is close to you?
1. 0-10 _____ (Enter number here)
 2. Refuse

On a scale from 0 to 10, when **0** is being **NOT AT ALL CONCERNED** and **10** is being **VERY CONCERNED**; how much are you concerned about the following activities:

37. Crime in Israel.
1. 0-10 _____ (Enter number here)
 2. Refuse
38. Crime in your neighborhood.
1. 0-10 _____ (Enter number here)
 2. Refuse

Next, we are asking about things that have been suggested as ways of dealing with crime in the Israel. On a scale from 0 to 10, where **0** is being **NOT AT ALL SUPPORTIVE** and **10** is being **VERY SUPPORTIVE**; tell me how much you support each of these proposals.

39. Making sentences **more severe** for all crimes.
1. 0-10 _____ (Enter number here)
 2. Refuse

40. Putting more police on the streets, even it means paying more taxes.
1. 0-10 _____ (Enter number here)
2. Refuse
41. Taking away recreational privileges from prisoners.
1. 0-10 _____ (Enter number here)
2. Refuse
42. Having harsh penalties for criminals who consistently break laws.
1. 0-10 _____ (Enter number here)
2. Refuse
43. Locking up more juvenile offenders.
1. 0-10 _____ (Enter number here)
2. Refuse
44. Sending repeat juvenile offenders to adult court.
1. 0-10 _____ (Enter number here)
2. Refuse
45. Making sentences **more severe** for men who kill female members of their household.
1. 0-10 _____ (Enter number here)
2. Refuse
46. Making sentences **more severe** for men who rape women.
1. 0-10 _____ (Enter number here)
2. Refuse
47. Making sentences **more severe** for those who commit crimes against God.
1. 0-10 _____ (Enter number here)
2. Refuse
48. Creating **more laws** to regulate or punish the sexual promiscuity of women.
1. 0-10 _____ (Enter number here)
2. Refuse
49. Punishing those **more severely** who have been involved in premarital sex.
1. 0-10 _____ (Enter number here)
2. Refuse

The next questions concerns why someone should be punished. Please tell me if you **STRONGLY AGREE**, **AGREE**, **DISAGREE**, or **STRONGLY DISAGREE** with the following statements

50. The primary purpose of punishment should be to pay those back for the crimes they have committed.

1. Strongly Agree
2. Agree
3. Strongly Disagree
4. Disagree
5. Refuse

51. We should use the old saying “an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth” as guidelines when deciding punishment.

1. Strongly Agree
2. Agree
3. Strongly Disagree
4. Disagree
5. Refuse

52. Severe punishment of criminals is necessary to preserve a sense of justice in our society.

1. Strongly Agree
2. Agree
3. Strongly Disagree
4. Disagree
5. Refuse

53. Sinfulness is a reflection of weak character and deserves punishment for that reason alone.

1. Strongly Agree
2. Agree
3. Strongly Disagree
4. Disagree
5. Refuse

Next, we are going to ask you a few demographic questions

54. Which of the following best describes the highest level of education that you have completed?

1. No high school
2. Some high school
3. High school graduate
4. Vocational or trade school graduate
5. Some college
6. College graduate
7. Post graduate work or degree

55. In what year were you born? _____

56. What is your sex?

1. Male
2. Female
3. Refuse

57. Which category best describes your identity?

1. Jewish
2. Arabic
3. Druze
4. Other (PLEASE SPECIFY)_____

58. What is your religion? _____

59. Which political party do you consider yourself a member of? _____

60. Are you currently employed?

1. Full time
2. Part time
3. Not employed, seeking work
4. Not employed, not seeking work
5. Not employed, due to other reasons (please specify) _____
6. Refuse

APPENDIX B

HUMAN SUBJECTS APPROVAL LETTER

Office of the Vice President For Research
Human Subjects Committee
Tallahassee, Florida 32306-2742
(850) 644-8673 Fax (850) 644-4392

APPROVAL MEMORANDUM

Date: 2/18/2009

To: Lindsey Devers

Dept.: CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

From: Thomas L. Jacobson, Chair

Re: Use of Human Subjects in Research Typification of Crime

The application that you submitted to this office in regard to the use of human subjects in the proposal referenced above have been reviewed by the Secretary, the Chair, and two members of the Human Subjects Committee. Your project is determined to be Expedited per 45 CFR Â§ 46.110(7) and has been approved by an expedited review process.

The Human Subjects Committee has not evaluated your proposal for scientific merit, except to weigh the risk to the human participants and the aspects of the proposal related to potential risk and benefit. This approval does not replace any departmental or other approvals, which may be required.

If you submitted a proposed consent form with your application, the approved stamped consent form is attached to this approval notice. Only the stamped version of the consent form may be used in recruiting research subjects.

If the project has not been completed by 2/16/2010 you must request a renewal of approval for continuation of the project. As a courtesy, a renewal notice will be sent to you prior to your expiration date; however, it is your responsibility as the Principal Investigator to timely request renewal of your approval from the Committee.

You are advised that any change in protocol for this project must be reviewed and approved by the Committee prior to implementation of the proposed change in the protocol. A protocol change/amendment form is required to be submitted for approval by the Committee. In addition, federal regulations require that the Principal Investigator promptly report, in writing any unanticipated problems or adverse events involving risks to research subjects or others.

By copy of this memorandum, the Chair of your department and/or your major professor is reminded that he/she is responsible for being informed concerning research projects involving human subjects in the department, and should review protocols as often as needed to insure that the project is being conducted in compliance with our institution and with DHHS regulations.

This institution has an Assurance on file with the Office for Human Research Protection. The Assurance Number is IRB00000446.

Cc: Marc Gertz, Advisor HSC No. 2008.1636

REFERENCES

- Aguirre, A., and Baker, D., (1993). Racial prejudice and the death penalty: a research note. *Social Justice*, 20:1-7.
- Allport, G. W., (1954). *The nature of prejudice*. Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Applegate, B., Cullen, F., Link, B., Richards, P., and Lanza-Kaduce, L., (1996). Determinants of public punitiveness toward drunk driving: A factorial survey approach. *Justice Quarterly*, 13:57-79.
- Applegate, B., Cullen, F., Fisher, B., and Ven, T., (2000). Forgiveness and fundamentalism: Reconsidering the relationship between correctional attitudes and religion. *Criminology*, 38:719-753.
- Applegate, B., Cullen, F., and Fisher, B., (2002). Public views toward crime and correctional policies: Is there a gender gap? *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 30:89-100.
- Arthur, J., (1993). Assessing the effects of race on attitudes toward the courts. *Free Inquiry In Creative Sociology*, 21:127-134.
- Arvanites, T., (1992). The mental health and criminal justice systems: Complementary forms of coercive controls. Pp. 131-150 in Allen E. Liska (ed.) *Social Threat and Social Control*, Albany: SUNY Press.
- Baker, D., Lambert, E., and Jenkins, M., (2005). Racial differences in death penalty support and opposition: A preliminary study of white and black college students. *Journal of Black Studies*, 35: 201-224.
- Barkan, S., and Cohn, S., (1994). Racial prejudice and support for the death penalty by whites. *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, 31:202-9.
- Barkan, S., and Cohn, S., (2005). Why whites favor spending more money to fight crime: The role of racial prejudice. *Social Problems*, 52: 300-314.
- Barak, G., (1994). Between the waves: Mass-mediated themes of crime and justice. *Social Justice*, 21:133-147.
- Baron, S., and Hartnagel, T., (1996) Lock 'em up: Attitudes toward punishing young offenders. *Canadian Journal of Criminology* 38:199-212.
- Beckett, K., and Sasson, T., (2000). *The politics of injustice: Crime and punishment in America*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press.

- Beckett, K., and Sasson, T., (2004). *The politics of injustice: Crime and punishment in America*. Pine Forge Press. Revised and updated second edition, Sage Publications.
- Becker, H., (1968). Crime and punishment: An economic approach. *Journal of Political Economy*, 76:169-217.
- Blalock., H. (1967). *Toward a theory of minority group relations*. New York: John Wiley and Sons Publishers.
- Blumstein, A., and Cohen, J., (1980). Sentencing of convicted offenders: An analysis of the public's view. *Law and Society Review*, 14:223-261.
- Brender, A., (2005). *Ethnic segregation and the quality of local government in the minority's localities: Local tax collection in the Israeli-Arab municipalities as a case-study*. Bank of Israel Discussion Paper No. 2005.01. Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=806904>.
- Brown, R., (2000). *Group Processes: Dynamics Within and Between Groups* (2nd ed.). Oxford: Blackwell.
- Bobo, L., and Johnson, D., (2004). A taste for punishment: Black and white Americans' views on the death penalty and the war on drugs. *Du Bois Review*, 1:151-80.
- Borg, M., (1997). The southern subculture of punitiveness: Regional variation in support for capital punishment. *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, 34:25-45.
- Borg, M., (1998). Vicarious homicide victimization and support for capital punishment: A test of Black's theory of law. *Criminology*, 36: 537-567.
- Bowers, W., (1990). *The death penalty's shaky support*. The New York Times, p.A21.
- Britt, C., (1998). Race, religion and support for the death penalty: A research note. *Justice Quarterly*, 15:175-191.
- Buckler, K., Davila, M., and Salinas, P., (2008). Racial differences in public support for the death penalty: Can racist sentiment and core values explain the racial divide? *American Journal of Criminal Justice*, 33:151-165.
- Buckler, K., Davila, M., and Salinas, P., (2009). Public support for punishment and progressive criminal justice policy preferences: The role of symbolic racism and negative racial stereotype. *American Journal of Criminal Justice*, 34:238-252.
- Bureau of Justice Statistics, (2008). Retrieved from the World Wide Web on March 27, 2010 at <http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=11>.
- Callanan, V., (2001). *The effects of crime-related media on Californians' opinions about crime and three strikes sentencing*. Dissertation- Department of Sociology, University of California, Riverside.

- Chamlin, M., (1989). A macro social analysis of change in police force size, 1972-1982: Controlling for static and dynamic influences. *The Sociological Quarterly*, 30: 615-624.
- Chamlin, M., (1992). Intergroup threat and social control: Welfare expansion among states during the 1960s and 1970s. Pp. 151-164 in Allen E. Liska (ed.) *Social Threat and Social Control*, Albany: SUNY Press.
- Chamlin, M., and Liska, A., (1992). Social structure and crime control revisited: The declining significance of intergroup threat. Pp. 103-112 in Allen E. Liska (ed.) *Social Threat and Social Control*, Albany: SUNY Press.
- Chang, L., and Krosnick, J., (2009) National surveys via RDD telephone interviewing versus the internet comparing sample representativeness and response quality. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 73: 641-678.
- Chiricos, T., Hogan, M., and Gertz, M., (1997). Racial composition of neighborhood and fear of crime. *Criminology*, 35, 1:107-129.
- Chiricos, T., McEntire, R., and Gertz, M., (2001). Perceived racial and ethnic composition of neighborhood and perceived risk of crime. *Social Problems*, 48, 3:322-340.
- Chiricos, T., Padgett, K., Gertz, M., (2000). Fear, TV news and the reality of crime. *Criminology*, 38:755-785.
- Chiricos, T., Welch, K., and Gertz, M., (2004). Racial typification of crime and support for punitive measures. *Criminology*, 42, 2:359-389.
- Clegg, S., and Dunkerley, D., (1980). *Organization, class and control*. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
- Cochran, J., and Chamblin, M., (2006). The enduring racial divide in death penalty support. *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 34: 85-99.
- Cochran, J., and Sanders, B., (2009). The gender gap in death penalty support: An exploratory study. *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 37: 525-533.
- Cohen, R., (1993). *Common ground on crime*. Washington Post, December 21 :A2.
- Cohen, B., and Palmor, S., (1985). The Impact of ethnicity on probation recommendation and dispositions in Israel. *Justice Quarterly*, 2: 197-212.
- Cohen, S., (1989). *Crime, justice and social control in the Israeli Arab population*. Tel Aviv: International Centre for Peace in the Middle East.
- Corzine, J., Creech, J., Corzine, L., (1983). Black concentration and lynchings in the South: Testing Blalock's power-threat hypothesis. *Social Forces*, 61: 774-796.

- Cohn, S., Barkan, S., and Halteman, W., (1991). Punitive attitudes toward criminals: Racial consensus or racial conflict? *Social Problems*, 38:287-296.
- Costelloe, M., Chiricos, T., and Gertz, M., (2009). Punitive attitudes toward criminals: Exploring the relevance of crime salience and economic insecurity. *Punishment and Society*, 11: 25–49.
- Costelloe, M., Chiricos, T., Gertz, M., Burianek, J., and Maier-Katkin, D., (2002). The social correlates of punitiveness: Comparing an established and an emerging democracy. *The Justice System Journal*, 23:191-220.
- Dambrun, M., (2007). Understanding the relationship between racial prejudice and support for the death penalty: The racist punitive bias hypothesis. *Social Justice Research*, 20:228-229.
- Delisi, M., (2001). The affordable hypothesis: Punitive beliefs, violent beliefs, and race. *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 29: 101–106.
- Dixon, J., and Rosenbaum, M., (2004). Nice to know you: Testing contact, cultural, and group threat theories of anti-black and anti-Hispanic stereotypes. *Social Science Quarterly*, 85: 257-280.
- Durham, A., Preston E., and Kinkade, P., (1996). Public support for the death penalty: Beyond Gallup. *Justice Quarterly*, 13:705-730.
- Durkheim, E., (1983). *The division of labor in society*. New York: Free Press.
- Dodeen, G., (2003). Effectiveness of valid mean substitution in treating missing data in attitude assessment. *Assessment and Evaluation in Higher Education*, 28: 505-513.
- Dowler, K., (2003) Media consumption and public attitudes toward crime and justice: the relationship between fear of crime, punitive attitudes, and perceived police effectiveness. *Journal of Criminal Justice and Popular Culture*, 10: 109-126.
- Eitle, D., D'Alessio, S., and Stolzenberg, L., (2002). Racial threat and social control: A test of the political, economic, and threat of black crime hypotheses. *Social Forces*, 81:557-576.
- Emerson, M., (1994) Is it different in dixie? Percent black and residential segregation in the South and nonsouth. *The Sociological Quarterly*, 35: 571–580.
- Ferraro, K., (1995) *Fear of crime: Interpreting victimization risk*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Ferraro, K., and LaGrange, R., (1987). The measurement of fear of crime. *Sociological Inquiry*, 57:70-101.

- Finckenauer, J., (1988). Public support for the death penalty: Retribution as just desserts or retribution as revenge? *Justice Quarterly*, 5:81-100.
- Fishman, G., and Rattner, A., (1997). The Israeli criminal justice system in action—Is justice administered differentially? *Journal of Quantitative Criminology*, 13:7-28.
- Fishman, G., Cohen, B., and Soroka, J.,(1985). Judicial discretion and sentencing disparity in adult felony courts in Israel. *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 13:99-115.
- Fishman, G., Rattner, A., and Weimann, G., (1987). The effect of ethnicity on crime attribution. *Criminology*, 25: 507-523.
- Garland, D., (2001). *The culture of control*. Chicago : University of Chicago Press.
- Grasmick, H., Davenport, E., Chamlin, M., and Bursik, R., (1992). Protestant fundamentalism and the retributive doctrine of punishment. *Criminology*, 30:21-45.
- Grasmick, H., Cochran, J., Bursik, R., and Kimpel, M., (1993). Religion, punitive justice and support for the death penalty. *Justice Quarterly*, 10:289-314.
- Green, E., Staerkle, C., Sears, D., (2006). *Symbolic racism and whites' attitudes towards punitive and preventive crime policies*. *Law and Human Behavior*, 30, 435–454.
- Greenberg, D., Kessler, R., and Loftin, C., (1985). Social inequality and crime control. *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, 76: 684-704.
- Hartney, C., (2006). *US rates of incarceration: A global perspective*. Fact sheet: Research from the National Council on Crime and Delinquency. Retrieved from the World Wide Web on March 27, 2010 at http://www.nccdcrc.org/nccd/pubs/2006nov_factsheet_incarceration.pdf
- Harrison, P., and Beck, A., (2006). Prison and jail inmates at midyear 2005. *Bureau of Justice Statistics*.
- Harris, P., (1986). Over-simplification and error in public opinion surveys on capital punishment. *Justice Quarterly*, 3:429-455.
- Hassin, Y., (1986). Juvenile delinquency in Israel. Jerusalem: Henrietta Szold Institute.
- Hassin, Y., and Kremnitzer, M., (1988). Uniformity and sentencing in traffic offenses. *Mishpatim*, 18:1.
- Hawkins, F., (1995). *Ethnicity, race and crime: A review of selected studies*. In Darnell Hawkins (ed.) *Ethnicity, Race and Crime: Perspectives Across Time and Place*. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.

- Herzog, S., (2003). Does the ethnicity of offenders in crime scenarios affect public perceptions of crime seriousness? A randomized survey experiment in Israel. *Social Forces*: 82:757-781.
- Herzog, S., (2006a). Battered women who kill: An empirical analysis of public perceptions of seriousness in Israel from a consensus theoretical perspective. *Homicide Studies*, 10: 293-319.
- Herzog, S., (2006b). Public perceptions of crime seriousness: A comparison of social divisions in Israel. *Israel Law Review*, 39: 57-80.
- Hogan, M., Chiricos, T., and Gertz, M., (2005) Economic insecurity, blame and punitive attitudes, *Justice Quarterly*, 22: 392–412.
- Holbert, L., Shah, D., and Kwak, N., (2004). Fear, authority, and justice: Crime-related TV viewing and endorsements of capital punishment and gun ownership. *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly*, 81:343-363.
- Hurst, Y., and Nation, D., (2009). The impact of race on criminal justice ideology: An examination of high school students. *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 37: 534–541.
- Hurwitz, J., and Peffley, S., (1997). Symbolic racism and whites' attitudes towards punitive and preventive crime policies. *Law and Human Behavior*, 30: 435–454.
- Hurwitz, J., and Smithey, S., (1998). Gender differences on crime and punishment. *Political Research Quarterly*, 51: 89-115.
- Inverarity, J., (1992). Extralegal influences on imprisonment: Explaining the direct effects of socioeconomic variables. Pp. 112-128 in Allen E. Liska (ed.) *Social Threat and Social Control*, Albany: SUNY Press.
- Israel Central of Bureau Statistics, (2002). Retrieved from the World Wide Web on April 1, 2010 at <http://www.cbs.gov.il/statistical/arabju.pdf>.
- Israel Central of Bureau Statistics, (2003). Retrieved from the World Wide Web on April 1, 2010 at http://www.cbs.gov.il/publications/local_authorities2003/pdf/t01.pdf.
- Israel Central of Bureau Statistics, (2007). Retrieved from the World Wide Web on April 1, 2010 at http://www.cbs.gov.il/population/new_2007/table3.pdf.
- Israel Central of Bureau Statistics, (2009). Retrieved from the World Wide Web on April 1, 2010 at http://www.cbs.gov.il/population/new_2009/table3.pdf.
- Israel Central of Bureau Statistics, (2010). Retrieved from the World Wide Web on April 1, 2010 at http://www1.cbs.gov.il/population/new_2010/table3.pdf.

- Jackson, P., (1992). Minority group threat, social context and police force size. Pp. 89-102 in Allen E. Liska (ed.) *Social Threat and Social Control*, Albany: SUNY Press.
- Jacobs, D., (1979). Inequality and police strength: conflict theory and coercive control in metropolitan areas. *American Sociological Review*, 44:913-925.
- Jacobs, D., and Helms, R., (1999). Collective outbursts, politics, and punitive resources: Toward a political sociology of spending on social control. *Social Forces*, 77:1497-1524.
- Johnson, D., (2007). Crime salience, perceived racial bias and blacks punitive attitudes. *Journal of Ethnicity in Criminal Justice*, 4: 1-18.
- Johnson, D., (2008). Racial prejudice, perceived injustice, and the black-white gap in punitive attitudes. *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 36: 198-206.
- Johnson, D., (2009). Anger about crime and support for punitive criminal justice policies. *Punishment and Society*, 11: 51-66.
- King, R., and Wheelock, D., (2006). Group threat and social control: Race, perceptions of minorities and the desire to punish. *Social Forces*, 85:198-206.
- Keil, T., and Vito, G., (1991). Fear of crime and attitudes toward capital punishment: A structural equations model. *Justice Quarterly*, 8:447-464.
- Kelley, J., and Braithwaite, J. (1990). Public opinion and the death penalty in Australia. *Justice Quarterly*, 7: 529-563.
- Korn, A., (2003) Rates of incarceration and main trends in Israeli prisons. *Criminal Justice*, 3: 29-55.
- Kousser, M., (1974). *The shaping of southern politics: Suffrage restriction and the establishment of the one-party South*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Langworthy, R., and Whitehead, J., (1986). Liberalism and fear as explanations of punitiveness. *Criminology*, 24:575-591.
- Lee, L., and Rasinski, K., (2006). Five grams of coke: Racism, moralism, and white public opinion on sanctions for first time possession. *International Journal of Drug Policy*, 17: 183-191.
- Lemert, E., (1951). *Social pathology*. New York: McGraw Hill.
- Liska, A. (1992). *Social threat and social control*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Liska, A., Krohn, M., and Messner, S., (1989). Strategies and requisites for theoretical integration in the study of crime and deviance. In S. Messner, M. Krohn, and A. Liska (Eds.),

- Theoretical integration in the study of deviance and crime: Problems and prospects* (pp. 1-19). Buffalo: State University of New York Press.
- Liska, A., and Yu, J., (1992). Specifying and testing the threat hypothesis. Pp. 53-68 in Allen E. Liska (ed.) *Social Threat and Social Control*, Albany: SUNY Press.
- Matsueda, R., and Drakulich, K., (2009). Perceptions of criminal injustice, symbolic racism, and racial politics. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*; 623: 163-178.
- McConahay, J., (1986). Modern racism, ambivalence and the modern racism scale. In John, Dovidio Samuel, Gaertner. *Prejudice, Discrimination and Racism: Theory and Research*. New York : Academic Press.
- McCorkle, C., (1993). Research note: Punish and rehabilitate? Public attitudes toward six common crimes. *Crime and Delinquency*, 39:240-252.
- Miller, L., Rossi, P., and Simpson, J., (1986). Perceptions of justice: Race and gender differences in judgments of appropriate prison sentences. *Law Society Review*, 20:313-334.
- Moeller, G., (1989). Fear of criminal victimization: The effect of neighborhood racial composition. *Sociological Inquiry*, 59:208-221.
- Mauer, M., and King, R., (2007). Uneven justice: State rates of incarceration rates by race and Ethnicity. *The Sentencing Project*.
- Padgett, K., (2002). *Racial threat and social control: An examination of the racial/ethnic composition-incarceration linkage in Florida*. Doctoral Dissertation, Florida State University.
- Parker, K., Stults, B., and Rice, S., (2005). Racial threat, concentrated disadvantage and black arrests in 2000: Exploring the direct and indirect linkages. *Criminology*, 43: 1111-1134.
- Payne, B., Gainey, R., Triplett, R., and Danner, M., (2004). What drives punitive beliefs: Demographic characteristics and justifications for sentencing. *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 32: 195-206.
- Peffley, M., Hurwitz, J., and Sniderman, P., (2002). The racial components of 'race-neutral' crime policy attitudes. *Political Psychology*, 23: 59-75.
- Roberts, D., (1993). Crime, race and reproduction. *Tuland Law Review*, 67:1945-1977.
- Rossi, P., and Berk R., (1997). *Just punishments: Federal guidelines and public views compared*. New York: Aldine De Gruyter.
- Rubenstein, R., (1983). *The age of triage*. Boston: Beacon Press.

- Russell, K. (1998). *The color of crime*. New York: New York University Press.
- Sandys, M., and McGarrell, E., (1995). Attitudes toward capital punishment: Preference for the penalty or mere acceptance? *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, 32:191-213.
- Schwartz, I., Guo, S., and Kerbs, J., (1993). The impact of demographic variables on public opinion regarding juvenile delinquency: Implications for public policy. *Crime and Delinquency*, 39:5-28.
- Shaheen, H., and Stiles, B., (2001). Differential support for police use of force, the death penalty, and perceived harshness of the courts. *Criminal Justice and Behavior*, 28: 3-23.
- Shamir, M., and Sagiv-Schifter, T., (2006). Conflict, identity and tolerance: Israel in the Al-Aqsa Intifada. *Political Psychology*, 4:477-493.
- Shavitt, G., (1998). *The Israeli prison system* in R. Friedmann's Crime in the Criminal Justice in Israel, 271-313. New York: State University of New York Press.
- Scheff, T., (1966). *Being mentally ill*. Chicago: Aldine.
- Sears, D., (1988). *Symbolic racism*. In Phyllis, Katz Dalmas, Taylor's, Eliminating Racism: Profiles in Controversy. New York : Plenum.
- Secret, P., and Johnson, J., (1989). Racial differences in attitudes toward crime control. *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 17:361-375.
- Sela-Shayovitz, R., (2009). Social control in the face of security and minority threats. *British Journal of Criminology*, 49:772-787.
- Sherer, M., (1991). Peer group norms of Jewish and Arab juveniles in Israel. *Criminal Justice and Behavior*, 18: 267-286.
- Sims, B., (2003). The impact of causal attribution on correctional ideology: A national study. *Criminal Justice Review*, 28: 1-25.
- Sims, B., and Johnson, E., (2004) Examining public opinion about crime and justice: A statewide study. *Criminal Justice Policy Review*, 15: 270-293.
- Skovron, S., Scott, J and Cullen, F., (1988). The death penalty for juveniles: An assessment of public support crime delinquency. *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, 25: 150-169.
- Sniderman, P., and Harvey, T., (1998). *Prejudice and politics: An intellectual biography of a research project*. In Jon, Hurwitz and Mark, Peffley's Perception and Prejudice. New Haven : Yale University Press.

- Snortum, J., Ashear, V., (1972). Prejudice, punitiveness, and. personality. *Journal of Personality Assessment*, 36: 291-296.
- Soss, J., Langbein, L., and Metelko, A., (2003). Why do white Americans support the death penalty? *The Journal of Politics*, 65:397-421.
- Sprott, J., (1999). Are members of the public tough on crime: The dimensions of public "punitiveness?" *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 27:467-474.
- Stack, S., (2003). Authoritarianism and support for the death penalty: A multivariate analysis. *Sociological Focus*, 36:333-352.
- Stults, B., and Baumer, E., (2007). Racial threat and police force size: Evaluating the empirical validity of the minority threat perspective. *American Journal of Sociology*, 113:507-546.
- Steffensmeier, D., Ulmer, J., and Kramer., J., (1998). The interaction of race, gender, and age in criminal sentencing: The punishment costs of being young, black, and male. *Criminology*, 36:763-797.
- Stults, B., and Baumer, E., (2007). Racial threat and police force size: Evaluating the empirical validity of the minority threat perspective. *American Journal of Sociology*, 113:507-546.
- Statistical Abstracts of Israel (2009). Retrieved from the World Wide Web on March 27, 2010 at <http://www.cbs.gov.il/reader/>.
- Stack, S., (2000). Support for the death penalty: A gender specific model. *Sex Roles*, 43: 163-179.
- Stack, S., (2003). Authoritarianism and support for the death penalty: A multivariate analysis. *Sociological Focus*, 36:333-352.
- Surrette, R., (1992). *Media, crime and criminal justice*. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company.
- Szykowny, R., (1994). *No justice, no peace: An interview with Jerome Miller*. The Humanist January/February: 9-19.
- Tanton, J., and Lutton, W., (1993). Immigration and criminality. *Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies*, 18: 217-234.
- Thomas, C., Cage, R., and Foster, S., (1976). Public opinion on criminal law and legal sanctions: An examination of two conceptual models. *The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, 67:110-116.
- Timberlake, J., Rasinski, K., and Lock, E., (2001). Effects of conservative sociopolitical attitudes on public support for drug rehabilitation spending. *Social Science Quarterly*, 82: 184-196.

- Tolnay, S., and Beck, E., (1992). Toward a threat model of southern black lynchings.” Pp. 33-52 in Allen E. Liska (ed.) *Social Threat and Social Control*, Albany: SUNY Press.
- Tolnay, S., Beck, E., and Massey, J., (1992). Black competition and white vengeance: Legal execution of blacks as social control in the cotton south, 1890 to 1929. *Social Science Quarterly*, 73: 627–644
- Tyler, T., and Weber, R., (1982). Support for the death penalty: Instrumental response to crime or symbolic attitude? *Law and Society Review*, 17:21-44.
- Unnever, J., and Cullen, F., (2010). The social sources of Americans’ punitiveness: A test of three competing models. *Criminology*, 48:98-129.
- Unnever, J., and Cullen, F., (2007a). The racial divide in support for the death penalty: Does white racism matter? *Social Forces*, 85: 1281–301.
- Unnever, J., and Cullen, F., (2007b) Reassessing the racial divide in support for capital punishment. *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, 44: 124–58.
- U.S. Department of the State (2003). *Country reports on human rights practices*. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, February 25, 2004. Retrieved of the World Wide Web on March 30, 2010 at <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27929.htm>.
- Vidmar, N., and Ellsworth, P., (1974). Public opinion and the death penalty. *Stanford Law Review*, 26:1245-1270.
- Wald, K., Owen, D., and Hill, S., (1990). Political cohesion in churches. *Journal of Politics*, 52:197-215.
- Warr, M., and Stafford, M., (1984). Public goals of punishment and support for the death penalty. *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, 21:95-111.
- Warner, B., (1992). The reporting of crime: A missing link in conflict theory. Pp. 71-89 in Allen E. Liska (ed.) *Social Threat and Social Control*, Albany: SUNY Press.
- White, D., (2009). *The impact of demographic characteristics, personality variables, beliefs about the causes of crime and fear of crime on attitudes toward sentencing goals*. Australasian Digital Theses Collection.
- Williamson, J., (1984) *The crucible of race: Black-white relations in the American South since emancipation*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Williamson, D., and Davidson, D., (2009). Interracial and intra-racial stereotypes and constructive memory in 7- and 9-year-old African-American children. *Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology*, 30: 366–377. .

- Wilson, G., and Dunham, R., (2001). Race, class, and attitudes toward crime control: The views of the African American middle class. *Criminal Justice and Behavior*, 28: 259-278.
- Woodward, V., (1966). *The strange career of Jim Crow*. Revised Edition, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Wu, B., (2000). Determinants of public opinion toward juvenile waiver decisions. *Juvenile and Family Court Journal*, 51:9-20.
- Yiftachel, O., (2009). Ghetto citizenship: Palestinian Arabs in Israel, in Rouhana, N. and Sabagh, A. (2009, eds). *The Palestinians in Israel: A Guide to History, Politics, and Society*. Haifa: Mada al-Carmel - Arab Center for Applied Social Research.
- Young, R., (2004). Guilty until proven innocent: Conviction orientation, racial attitudes, and support for capital punishment. *Deviant Behavior*, 25:151-167.
- Young, R., (1991). Race, conceptions of crime and justice, support for the death penalty. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 54: 67--75.
- Young, R., and Thompson, C., (1995). Religious fundamentalism, punitiveness and firearms ownership. *Journal of Crime and Justice*, 18:81-98.
- Zuriek, E., (1988). Crime, justice and underdevelopment: The Palestinians under Israeli control. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 20: 411-442.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lindsey N. Devers

Ms. Lindsey Devers, Ph. D. Candidate, has been working for the Justice Research Center since the summer of 2007. She is currently working as the Project Manager running three research projects for the Connecticut Judicial Branch. The main objective of these projects is to evaluate various evidence-based initiatives including probation verse residential services, gender responsive services, and motivational interviewing and strength-based approaches to probation. Her role in these projects includes working closely with the Connecticut Courts Support Services Division (CSSD) to gather reliable data in order to conduct recidivism outcome evaluations. All projects include both quantitative and qualitative analyses. She also conducted research for the National Council on Crime and Delinquency for the Avon Park Evaluation project. Her primary responsibilities included interviewing subjects, investigating, case tracking, data input and data verification. Lindsey received her Bachelor's of Science in 2004, from the Florida State University and subsequently went on to get her Master's of Science in Criminology in 2006. She was an instructor for the College of Criminology and Criminal Justice from the spring of 2006 to the fall of 2009. Lindsey hopes to complete her Doctorate in Criminology in December of 2010.