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From State Foreign Policy to Strategic Interaction

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FROM STATE FOREIGN POLICY
TO STRATEGIC INTERACTION

By

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To put one brick upon another,
Add a third and then a forth,
Leaves no time to wonder whether
What you do has any worth.

But to sit with bricks around you
While the winds of heaven bawl
Weighing what you should or can do
Leaves no doubt of it at all.

-Philip Larkin, *Collected Poems* 1988
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ABSTRACT

For more than two generations, studies linking domestic political unrest with foreign policy behavior have been beset by inconsistent findings and consistent revision. In this project, I ask the following questions: Is there a politics of opposites, where hawks are better at selling cooperation to their publics, and doves are better at selling conflict? If so, do domestic opposition parties and/or rival states respond to the domestic political environment that confronts a leader at home?

To address these questions I develop a theory in which foreign policy is the product of strategic interactions between competing states and political parties. To do this, I draw on a nascent but related body of work that suggests leaders have either hawkish or dovish preferences which shape their interactions with competitors at home and abroad. First, I argue that a hardline foreign policy helps doves obtain the electoral benefit of a politics of opposites because it proves their moderate credentials in foreign policy. As a result, I expect doves will be more likely than hawks to pursue a hardline in foreign policy as their electoral support diminishes. I then consider the counter-intuitive proposition that domestic opposition parties and rival states avoid more dovish leaders who are experiencing domestic political unrest. Specifically, I argue rival states are more likely to avoid doves and exploit hawks in periods where their counterpart is experiencing electoral distress. At the same time, domestic opposition parties are more likely to throw their support behind more dovish leaders and oppose more hawkish ones. Empirical analyses support these propositions in the context of U.S. foreign policy for the final 25 years of the Cold War from 1966 to 1991. This proposition is further supported in a detailed analysis of U.S.-China rapprochement under Richard M. Nixon.
CHAPTER 1
THE POLITICS OF OPPOSITES

The relationship between internal and external factors in the explanation of international politics and foreign policy may be seen as the academic equivalent to the quest for the Holy Grail – many have searched for it; the search has taken place over long periods of time and in diverse research areas; its location has been the subject of many theories; and its existence has been the source of continual debate. Many signs point to the reality of such internal-external linkages, but a systematic, empirical connection has been hard to demonstrate consistently

– Siverson and Starr (1992)¹

1.1 Introduction

For more than two generations the field of international relations has trended toward studying the potential linkages between domestic and international politics. This movement has given birth to literatures like the Democratic Peace research program, which has helped to clarify the role of domestic institutions, audience costs, and democratic norms in accounting for variation in the conflict propensities of across pairs of states. Prominent debates therein focus on whether democracies are more peaceful in general or purely in their relations toward other democracies. Although debate continues over the full extent to which there is a democratic peace, there has been a broad acceptance on one point: the “absence of war between democracies comes as close as anything we have to empirical law in the study of international relations” (Levy 1988, 662).

¹Quoted in Starr (1994, 481).
This movement is joined by a second branch in the literature that draws attention to the role of partisan politics in accounting for fluctuations over time in the interactions of states. The dissertation explores this temporal variation in the interactions between countries by highlighting two related currents within this second branch. One current argues that leaders confronting domestic political unrest have incentives to instigate hostilities abroad as a way to gamble for a policy success or benefit from a “rally ‘round-the-flag effect.” The second current debates the influence of partisanship in executive-legislative relations on matters of “high politics” in foreign policy. Despite the myriad of studies that comprise this second branch, it has struggled to generate accumulated knowledge and stylized facts about international relations. As the epigraph which begins this chapter suggests, the most remarkable feature about this second branch has been the lack of consistent empirical support for many of its propositions.

This second branch of literature developed behind two broad theoretical claims. The first is that leaders make foreign policy decisions in their own interests in order to secure their place in office. More recently, it has been claimed that competing actors in the international and domestic arenas may anticipate the electoral pressures facing a leader and take steps that will gain them an advantage in response to what their competitor will likely do in the future. For example, Smith (1996) and others argue that competing states may avoid the aggressions of a foreign leader exactly when that leader is most likely to target them. Likewise, studies of executive-legislative relations, such as Lindsay (1992-1993), posit that leaders may anticipate the legislative reactions to their foreign policies and avoid taking certain policy positions when Congressional opposition is expected. If states avoid foreign leaders who are likely to target them, or if those leaders respond differently when they anticipate opposition in the legislature, then this claim may help explain inconsistent empirical corroboration for theories linking domestic and international politics.

---

2 See also Leeds and Davis (1997); Clark (2003); Chiozza and Goemans (2004); Mitchell and Prins (2004); Fordham (2005); DeRouen and Sprecher (2006).

3 See also Schultz (1998); Lindsay (2003); Howell and Pevehouse (2005).
Although these studies have borrowed from the strategic choice tradition in international relations, I contend that they have not yet found a home there. Even while this research appeals to strategic interaction to explain cases where interstate conflict or congressional opposition has been avoided, it does not address the more interesting question of when, if ever, one should expect to observe these outcomes. This study builds on these recent accounts of strategic interaction to address questions concerning domestic political influences on foreign policy by arguing that they have only considered part of the story.

To provide a more complete theoretical story, I appeal to the fact that these literatures have developed in the shadow of a burgeoning line of research on two-level games and yet they have not fully incorporated the relevant insights of this research program. The advent of two-level games has provided an important model that places the decision maker in the precarious position of trying to balance pressures arising from domestic and international competitors.\(^4\) This literature helps address the issues raised above in two important ways. First, it points to the common thread in both literatures of placing a leader in one state at the center of the analysis. Despite this commonality, current research has been content with a simplified process in which the strategic interaction is one-sided, either between competing states or between the executive and legislative branches. Meanwhile, one-sided strategic interaction does not fully capture the constraints imposed at another level by other actors making choices. In the chapters that follow, I offer a theoretical and empirical account that suggests studies of one-sided strategic interaction have limited our ability to explain both the presence and the absence of interstate conflict and Congressional opposition.

Second, I develop the theoretical framework within the context of interstate rivalry by observing that two-party electoral competition and interstate rivalry exemplify a situation where the participants view their relationship as zero-sum; that is, governed by strict competition over private goods. The notion that electoral competition is a zero-sum game is very standard in a vast literature on spatial vote choice (e.g., Ordehoff\(^4\) Cox and Milner\(^4\)).
McCubbins (1988). The property of zero-sum competition is a feature of all spatial models and this has helped unify a literature on electoral competition with a burgeoning line of research on interstate crisis bargaining.\(^5\) In addition to this, the most common definitions of interstate rivalry highlight competition over scarce resources, which lead states to view each other as potentially hostile adversaries (Goertz and Diehl 1993 154). Levy (1992) goes even further, noting that rival states may perceive themselves to be in a zero-sum relationship with their adversary even if the underlying issues at stake between them are not strictly zero-sum.\(^6\)

Conceptualizing foreign policy as a two-level process involving strict competition and rivalry provides a useful platform for building stronger micro-foundations that generate additional testable hypotheses. For example, a sizable literature on the relationship between domestic unrest and the use of force abroad has relied on a strong structural argument that assumes all leaders respond in the same way to increasing domestic unrest. However, the theory developed here identifies specific actor-level attributes that generate incentives for leaders to adopt dovish versus hawkish foreign policies in response to domestic political pressures. This highlights the fact that current studies have not carefully delineated between the preferences of actors and the environment in which their interactions unfold. I argue that separating a leader’s preferences (i.e., hawkish or dovish) from his strategic environment (i.e., domestic/international competition and electoral threat) helps to explain the ebb and flow of interactions between the leader and his competitors at home and abroad.

The next section establishes a definition of foreign policy preferences that I use to develop the theoretical framework of this chapter. In brief, the theoretical framework suggests that opposition parties and rivals states respond to information about a leader’s hawkish or dovish preferences and their electoral support. In Chapters 2 and 3, I develop empirical tests of the

\(^5\) Morgan (1984 424) notes that, while spatial models of crisis bargaining contain “the most important (and interesting) aspects of zero-sumness,” they are not purely zero-sum since fighting a war is assumed to involve a loss of utility to both sides. Nevertheless, he notes that competition over the division of the values under contention is strictly zero-sum.

\(^6\) See also Thompson (2001).
expectations generated from this framework for interstate and inter-government relations respectively. In Chapter 4, I consider the implications of the theory and analysis for the case of U.S.-China rapprochement in the early 1970s. Chapter 5 concludes by discussing the theory in light of the evidence accumulated throughout the dissertation.

1.2 Reciprocity and Foreign Policy Preferences

Having long debated the impact that domestic politics have on a nation’s foreign policy, scholars are gaining a new appreciation for how a leader’s reputation for having either hawkish or dovish foreign policy preferences can act as an important mediating variable. This approach has grown out of a venerable line of research that views interstate competition as a process of action-reaction and reciprocity. Action-reaction is understood to be the sequential exchange of roughly equivalent levels of hostility and cooperation; such that “the actions of each party are contingent on the prior actions of the others in such a way that good is returned for good and bad is returned for bad” (Keohane, 1986, 8).

Employed widely during the 1980s and early 1990s to the study arms races (e.g., Ward, 1982; Dixon, 1986) and interstate competition and rivalry (e.g., Freeman, 1990; Dixon, 1986), this body of research developed a useful typology of foreign policy behavior in which states pursue either a bullying or reciprocating strategy in their external relations. A bullying strategy exploits cooperation by responding with relatively greater hostility, while a reciprocating strategy responds in-kind to either cooperative or hostile behavior.

Recent advances build implicitly upon this typology. In particular, Schultz (2005) constructs a more exhaustive typology that includes both extreme and moderate type doves and hawks, as well as a neutral or moderate type (See also, Kydd, 2000; Colaresi, 2004). Formally, Schultz defines each type according to the leader’s preference ordering over the four possible outcomes of a two-player game in which each player simultaneously chooses to

\[\text{This highlights the fact that a bullying versus reciprocating typology omits strategies that might be pursued if states avoid conflict or evoke dovish preferences.}\]
cooperate or defect. In this way, each leader’s preference ordering reflects his willingness to cooperate given their belief about whether cooperation will be reciprocated. Schultz (2005, 8) argues that “More extreme types tend to prefer one strategy or the other regardless of the other states expected response,” while “The best indicator of moderation. . . is a willingness to revise policy preferences in either a cooperative or conflictual direction in response to changing beliefs about the adversary.” For instance, an extreme type dove prefers to cooperate regardless of how the other state responds, while a moderate type dove does not always prefer cooperation, but would rather have unreciprocated cooperation than experience mutual conflict. An inverse preference ordering exemplifies extreme and moderate type hawks, while moderates prefer to match the behavior of others.

I build on the insights of Schultz (2005) to define a dovish leader as more likely to offer unreciprocated cooperation, while a hawk will not cooperate in the absence of cooperation by a competitor. However, unlike Schultz, who constructs his definition in terms of the rivalry that he seeks to explain, I argue that outside actors (e.g. voters, the opposition party, or a rival country) develop their perceptions about a leader’s foreign policy preferences in terms of how that leader interacts with non-rival countries. The argument that leaders are constrained in their choice of policy when confronting a rival state is well established. Given a leader’s electoral goals, and the political risks involved with offering cooperation that goes unreciprocated by a rival, a leader’s interactions with a rival state are better thought of as a mixture of the strategic environment and his preferences. By extension, I contend that the actions leaders take towards non-rivals states is more informative about their hawkish/dovish preferences. With this in mind, I define a leader’s foreign policy preferences across a continuum of leader preference, such that:

8 See, also Colaresi (2004).

9 In addition to the strategic avoidance arguments enumerated here, the Democratic Peace research program specifies the domestic constraints surrounding interstate rivalry as well as foreign policy more generally. See Mor (1997) and Reed and Clark (2002) for an examples which relates specifically to interstate rivalry. Additionally, Chiozza and Goemans (2004b) present compelling evidence that democratic leaders are motivated to select into conflicts which entail minimal risks of electoral punishment.
• Doves: *Have a tendency to over-reciprocate in response to cooperation and under-reciprocate in response to hostility coming from non-rival countries.*

• Moderates: *Reciprocate both cooperation and hostility from non-rival countries equally.*

• Hawks: *Have a tendency to under-reciprocate in response to cooperation and over-reciprocate in response to hostility coming from non-rival countries.*

For clarity, consider how this conceptualization of foreign policy preferences is captured in the empirical analyses that follow. In Chapters 2 and 3, I investigate U.S. foreign policy behavior during the Cold War. To measure each president’s tendency to reciprocate hostility and cooperation received from non-rival countries, I estimate the following two equations for the response of country $Y_i$ to either cooperative or hostile behavior sent from all non-rival countries $X_n$ at time $t$, where $X_{nt} > 0$ indicates cooperative behavior is received from non-rival countries, and $X_{nt} < 0$ indicates hostility:

$$y_{it} = \alpha_1 + \beta_{11}X_{nt} + \delta_{12}Y_{ti}, \iff X_{nt} > 0$$

$$y_{it} = \alpha_2 + \beta_{22}X_{nt} + \delta_{12}Y_{ti}, \iff X_{nt} < 0$$

(1.1)

The $\beta$ parameter captures the part of country $Y_i$’s current behavior that is a function of the actions towards it by non-rival states (i.e., reciprocity), while the $\delta$ parameter captures the portion of $Y_i$’s behavior that is explained by its own bureaucratic routine or policy inertia. Additionally, $\alpha$ establishes an intercept or baseline response for country $Y_i$’s behavior and $\epsilon$ captures the residual error in the model. Importantly, the $\beta$ parameter provides an indicator of reciprocity that I employ to measure foreign policy preferences. When $\beta > 0$ in Equation 1.1, then country $Y_i$ increases its cooperation or hostility on average in response to greater cooperation or hostility from $X_n$. When $\beta < 0$, then country $Y_i$ decreases its cooperation in response to greater cooperation or hostility received from $X_n$. The larger $\beta$ is in either a positive or negative direction, the more responsive country $Y_i$ is to a change in the behavior of $X_n$. 

7
I estimate both equations in (1.1) for every month a president is in office using data from the World Events Interaction Survey (WEIS). WEIS is an events dataset that captures the actor, target, and the action taken from Reuters News-Wire Service for all countries from 1966 to 1992. To obtain an estimate foreign policy preferences for each president, I extract only information about the U.S. interactions with non-rival states and exclude the interactions or events that unfolded between the U.S. and its rivals. A number of studies explore the concept of interstate rivalry for use in empirical research. While a variety on conceptual definitions exist, there is broad agreement that China, Cuba, and the Soviet Union are the principle rivals of the United States during the Cold War.\footnote{The principle difference among the most common conceptual definitions of Interstate Rivalry focus on whether rivalry is conflict-based (i.e., rivalry is present when there is a history of repeated militarized conflict and the expectation that these conflicts will continue into the future) or perception-based (i.e. that the condition of rivalry is met when states themselves to be in a competitive relationship independent of their conflict histories.) See Thompson (2001) for a comparison of rivalry dyads across various datasets.}

In addition to China, Cuba, and the Soviet Union, I also exclude those interactions between the U.S. and the eight Warsaw Pact countries as well as North Korea and Vietnam. Recall the conceptualization of foreign policy preferences offered here is based on a leader’s choice of foreign policy being unconstrained. The Warsaw Pact countries, however, hold a formal defense treaty with the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, North Korea and Vietnam were provided with substantial military assistance throughout the Cold War. These ties with the Soviet Union were based on a shared political orientation – single-party or dominant-party communist rule characterized each country – and their strategic importance which resulted from their location between U.S. and Soviet allies. This meant that U.S. foreign policy toward North Korea, Vietnam and any of the Warsaw Pact countries was dominated by of its relationship with its principle Cold War rivals.

Consider the 42,021 separate events between the U.S. and the rest of the world captured by WEIS for the period 1966-1992. Only 380 of those events involved North Korea, and 11 events involved the Warsaw Pact countries. In that same time-span, however, there were 4,384 events that took place between the U.S. and Vietnam. The vast majority of
Table 1.1: U.S. Reciprocation of Non-Rival Cooperation & Hostility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administration</th>
<th>Reciprocate Cooperation</th>
<th>Reciprocate Hostility</th>
<th>Approx. Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democrats</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson*</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>Hawk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carter</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>Moderate Dove</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Republicans</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nixon</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>Dove</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ford</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reagan</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bush</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Johnson’s administration is not observed before 1966.

These foreign policy events (i.e., approximately 78%) occurred during Richard Nixon’s administration. The most active and volitive period in U.S.-Vietnamese relations took place in the eight months leading up to the 1972 election where nearly a third of all U.S.-Vietnamese interactions occurred. The increased activity during the presidential campaign, and the fact that survey data shows nearly one-third of the public felt Vietnam was the single most important issue in the election, is a strong indication that Richards Nixon’s foreign policy towards Vietnam was constrained by the response of outside actors.\(^{11}\)

Table 1.1 summarizes this information and compares each president’s rate of reciprocation for cooperation versus hostility received from non-rival countries.\(^{12}\)

An alternative and common measurement strategy uses an indicator of partisanship as a proxy for foreign policy preferences. Focusing on the U.S. case, Foster and Palmer (2006) and Foster (2008) each contend that Republican presidents appeal to more hawkish constituencies and thus should be more likely to benefit from initiating hostilities abroad. Important here is

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\(^{11}\)See Aldrich and Borgida (1989) for a review of the public opinion on the Vietnam War.

\(^{12}\)The steps taken in this process are described in further detail in Section 2.3.1 on page 28.
the notion that the categories for hawk or dove are a function of the party of the president.\footnote{See also \textit{Palmer and Regan} \citeyear{Palmer_and_Regan_2004}, who argue that more conservative party leaders are more likely to go to war in general.} Although this simplifies the conceptual and empirical framework by confining preferences to vary only by party affiliation, it also has the effect of omitting moderate types from the analysis. This may be a strong assumption in the U.S. case, in which the two-party winner-take-all electoral system gives leaders a strong incentive to capture the support of a broad coalition of voters in order to gain access to political office.

Table 1.1 underscores the limitations of using partisanship to measure a leader’s preferences. It highlights significant variation across administrations that is not captured by the president’s party affiliation. In fact, the responses of each president to hostility varied widely across party affiliation. For example, the Democratic administrations of Lyndon Johnson and Jimmy Carter reciprocated cooperation 22\% and 58\% of the time respectively, while the Republican administrations of Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, Ronald Reagan, and George H.W. Bush reciprocated cooperation from non-rival states more than 90\% of the time they were in office. However, Richard Nixon is the only Republican president in the sample that did not reciprocate hostility, while Lyndon Johnson’s Democratic administration reciprocated hostility far more often than Jimmy Carter (or even Republicans Nixon and Ford).

The next section proposes a theory of state foreign policy. The theory considers the role of foreign policy preferences in structuring the day-to-day interactions of a leader in one state and an opposition party at home or a rival state abroad.

\section*{1.3 The Politics of Opposites}

Is there a politics of opposites, where hawks are better at selling cooperation to their publics, and doves are better at selling conflict? Nincic \citeyear{Nincic_1988} was among the first to observe a politics of opposites in the U.S. case, where public opinion about U.S. foreign policy toward the Soviet Union varied inversely with the president’s hawkish or dovish agenda. Since then
several studies have argued that hawks are more credible in dealing with rival states and that they face fewer political risks in doing so. Cowen and Sutter (1998), for example, develop a theoretical model to show that “only Nixon can go to China” because his reputation as a hawk was a credible signal to the electorate that the policy was not ideological, but rather it was an issue they would support provided that they had all the available information. Colaresi (2004) claims that international rivalries often become entrenched because anytime a dovish leader attempts to cooperate with a rival state, he is taking the risk that his cooperative gesture will go unreciprocated, and this has the effect of giving the political opposition an issue with which to rally the public around to their side on foreign policy.

Schultz (2005) addresses this debate by noting that previous research on the topic is incomplete, because even if there is a “politics of opposites,” and only Nixon can go to China, it still remains to be answered: “When do they have an incentive to even try?” For Schultz the answer depends on the likely response of the rival state. For example, Nixon’s success in rapprochement with China resulted both from his foreign policy credibility with his domestic audience and from his credibility with China, which knew that Nixon would retaliate if China exploited his cooperation.

And yet each of these studies assume that the incentive for leaders to appear moderate is constant. However, if partisan competition for a median voter means that hawks have more to gain from cooperation, and doves have more to gain from conflict, then a leader’s standing in public opinion is an important motivation of his foreign policy. As such, these studies omit any potential variation in the strategic behavior of rival states across periods of high and low public approval. Chapter 5 illustrates this motivation in further detail by analyzing the diplomatic and policy process that led to Nixon’s rapprochement with China. A closer look at this case shows that, despite a consistent diplomatic effort which began during the first month of his administration, Nixon was only successful in reaching an accord with China.

\textsuperscript{14}In the model politicians have electoral incentives for ideological shirking and voters know the leader’s preferred policy, but they do not know which policy maximizes their utility. Cukierman and Tommasi (1998) develop a similar theoretical model, but allow for voter uncertainty over both policy and politician.
after his public approval had been hovering at or below 50% for the better part of a year, which was down from an average of 59% in the two years after taking office.\textsuperscript{15}

I build on these arguments by describing the process in which rival states and opposition parties strategically engage a leader on foreign policy. I argue that these domestic and international competitors weigh their expectations of a leader’s likely future behavior before they act. Specifically, I posit that the interactions between a leader in one state and their domestic and international competitors are formed across two dimensions: the leader’s domestic electoral support, which I define as the leader’s standing in public opinion polls, and their hawkish or dovish foreign policy preferences.

To develop this framework, I consider the general case of two-party competition for office. In the face of two-party competition for office, a leader’s electoral support shapes his incentives to appear moderate in his choice of foreign policy in order to appeal to a median voter. In addition to this, opposition parties and rival states anticipate the direction that the leader’s policy will change in the future by updating their beliefs about the leader’s hawkish or dovish foreign policy preferences.

The assumptions underlying these two dimensions are drawn from venerable literatures concerning vote choice in American politics and strategic choice in international relations:

\begin{itemize}
  \item Assumption 1: Leaders tradeoff their desire to implement preferred policies with their goal of retaining office.
  \item Assumption 2: The leader’s and the publics’ preferences over foreign policy are single-peaked and span across a hawk/dove continuum.
  \item Assumption 3: The median-voter is moderate; meaning that the median voter prefers to match the behavior of other states, rather than to respond with overly aggressive or overly cooperative actions.
  \item Assumption 4: Competing states and political parties anticipate the policy and electoral incentives motivating their counterpart before they act.
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{15}Figure 4.2 on page 62 shows Nixon’s public approval up to and during his China visit.
None of these assumptions are novel to this study and each can be found across the various literatures mentioned above. For example, assumptions 1 and 2 allow politicians to respond differently to electoral pressures. This is consistent with a rich literature on vote choice, which argues that democratic politicians make strategic choices as they align themselves along a left/right ideological scale (e.g., [Downs, 1957; Stokes, 1963]). In reviewing 50 years of research on public opinion and foreign policy, [Aldrich and Sharp, 2006] show that there is a growing consensus that voters have coherent foreign policy attitudes and use these attitudes to make voting choices. Meanwhile, assumptions 3 and 4 are rooted in the strategic choice and two-level games literatures highlighted above.

Individually, these assumptions may not be unique to this study; however, the combination of these assumptions imply several novel and counterintuitive propositions about how domestic politics influences foreign policy. Broadly, I argue that dovish executives should receive a larger rally in public support, on average, coming from confrontation in the international arena. That is, given a median voter with moderate foreign policy preferences, the same hardline response in the international arena should be positively associated with more moderate preferences by dovish executives but negatively associated with moderate preferences from hawks. Conversely, a policy of cooperation may be viewed as a moderate policy coming from a hawk, but an extremist policy if it comes from a dove (see [Schultz, 2005, 5]). This relationship should hold across all levels of electoral support, because the electoral benefits of appearing to be moderate are always present for politicians, even while the incentives to do so may vary depending on the magnitude of electoral distress facing the leader.

- Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, a dovish president will receive a larger increase in

\[16\text{In particular, this assumption derives from spatial models of vote choice that assume individual voters minimize the Euclidean distance between their policy ideal point and the candidates’}.\]  
\[17\text{For example, Colaresi (2004) and Schultz (2005) feature assumption 3 in their work on interstate rivalry, while Smith (1996) and others feature assumption 4 when they argue that states may avoid the aggressions of a foreign leader. See also Lindsay (1992-1993); Schultz (1998); Lindsay (2003); Howell and Pevehouse (2005) whose work on executive-legislative relations mentioned above also features assumption 4.}\]
popularity (rally effect) than a hawkish president from taking a hardline on foreign policy.

The expectation contained in Hypothesis 1 structures the logic underlying how rival states and political parties interact. Hypothesis 1 relies on the median voter theorem, which states that for all two-party competition decided by a plurality vote, if voter preferences can be arrayed as points along a single dimension (e.g., Assumption 2), then politicians will receive greater support as they move their positions towards the median of the distribution of voter preferences. This result holds for any distribution of voter preferences which is single-peaked.\textsuperscript{18} If the condition of single-peakedness does not hold, for instance, if the distribution of voters across left-right issue space is bimodal, then the distribution of voter preferences may will not be transitive and the logic underlying Hypothesis 1 no longer obtains (\textsuperscript{Grofman 2003} 43). Nevertheless, it is customary in spatial models of elections to assume that voters do not abstain. If one assumes none-abstention, then the median-voter logic holds in the case of a bimodal distribution. That is, either party is able to increase their support by edging closer towards the median voter and away from the modal maxima in the distribution of voter preferences. In other words, with a set of common assumptions the logic of the median voter theorem holds for all distributions (\textsuperscript{Fiorina 1999} 12).

1.3.1 Politics of Opposites, \textit{International}

Table \textbf{1.2} highlights four general expectations that build on the policy appeal of leaders with dovish versus hawkish reputations described above. It shows how a rival state behaves towards a home state depending on the electoral support and foreign policy preferences of the leader in the home state. At the extremes of each dimension, a rival state is more likely to respond by either avoiding or exploiting a foreign leader. I define avoidance behavior in this setting as a rival who over-cooperates with a home state, while exploitative behavior occurs when a rival state under-cooperates with the home state.

\textsuperscript{18} Black (1958) defines single-peakedness in the following way: a single peaked curve is one which changes its direction at most once, from up to down.
Table 1.2: Expected Rival State Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral Support</th>
<th>Preferences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Hawkish: Avoid, Dovish: Exploit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Dovish: Avoid, Hawkish: Exploit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To understand why rival states respond to a leader’s domestic environment with exploitative or avoidance behavior, consider a leader who faces electoral distress. Given the leader’s office seeking goals, the incentives for a dovish leader to provoke hostilities with a rival in order to obtain an electoral benefit by appearing to be more moderate increase as his electoral support diminishes. Alternatively, as electoral support for a hawkish leader falls, they have stronger incentives to moderate their policies by initiating greater cooperation with the rival state. It follows that if rivals know about these incentives, and they anticipate the direction of change in the policy of a foreign leader, then the rival’s behavior is likely to be a measured response to the hawkish or dovish preferences of the executive in its counterpart.

- Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus; as electoral support diminishes in the home state increases, rivals states over-cooperate (avoidance behavior) towards more dovish leaders and under-cooperate (exploitative behavior) towards more hawkish leaders.

The extension of this framework to competing political parties follows a straightforward logic. I unpack competing incentives that underly executive-opposition party interactions in the next section.

1.3.2 Politics of Opposites, Domestic

Table 1.3 displays the expected outcomes for legislative support to a president also as a function of the leader’s electoral support and his or her hawkish or dovish preferences.
Table 1.3: Expected Opposition Party Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral Support</th>
<th>Hawkish Preferences</th>
<th>Dovish Preferences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Support</td>
<td>Oppose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Oppose</td>
<td>Support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It shows that opposition parties are more likely to oppose a hawkish president with low electoral support, than a dovish president under the same conditions.

As with rival states, I assume that opposition parties are fully cognizant of the fact that political benefits accrue to leaders who appear to be moderate in their choice of foreign policy. Furthermore, how the opposition party responds to a leader’s choice of foreign policy is determined by their anticipation about the effect the policy will have in terms of public opinion. Schultz (1998) developed the intuition for this in study about crisis bargaining. In that paper, Schultz argues that legislative opposition to a president on foreign policy varies according to whether the policy is credible or not. When the leader engages in a credible foreign policy, he is more likely to receive support from the opposition because, if carried out, the policy is more likely to obtain broad public support.\(^\text{19}\)

I argue that this also relates to the more general case concerning the opposition party’s decision about when to oppose a leader’s foreign policy toward a rival state. Anytime a leader over- or under-cooperates with a rival state, such that a rival state does not reciprocate the leader’s actions, it extends the political opposition an opportunity to campaign as the more moderate alternative. Additionally, over- or under-cooperation is going to have an even larger influence on the perception of leader’s hawkish or dovish as public approval diminishes (Colaresi, 2004).

\(^{19}\)For this reason, Schultz (1998) expects that support from the opposition party for the president’s policy serves as signal to the foreign adversary about a leader’s resolve to carry-out the policy.
To see this, contrast a dove who over-cooperates with a rival state while experiencing high levels of electoral support, with a dove who over-cooperates but is experiencing much lower levels of electoral support. In the first instance, when doves enjoy high levels of public approval, meaning that their incentive to appear moderate is low, both moderate and extreme types are willing to risk extending cooperation with a rival even though their cooperation may not get reciprocated. However, as public approval diminishes, there is a greater degree of separation between types, so that only doves who hold more extreme preferences are willing to risk the political repercussions of unreciprocated cooperation. The separation between moderate and extreme doves occurs exactly because cooperation entails a greater risk of electoral suicide for a dove if it goes unreciprocated \cite{Schultz2005}.

This leads to the expectation that if dovish leaders are more likely to cooperate when their electoral support is high and rival states are more likely to strategically exploit cooperation offered by a dove, then the opposition party should be more likely to oppose a dovish leader on foreign policy. The stronger these incentives become, the more resolved doves will be to avoid any chance of that a rival state is able to exploit them. In which case they are more likely to pursue a hardline. It is precisely this mechanism that gives doves a strategic advantage over their competitors in the context of electoral threat.

- **Hypothesis 3:** Ceteris paribus; *as their public approval diminishes, a dovish leader is more likely to receive support from the opposition party on foreign policy*

The reverse logic applies for leaders with more hawkish reputations. That is, when their electoral support is high, hawks are more likely to provoke hostilities with a rival because their incentives to appear moderate are low. As a response, the Congress is unlikely to stand in opposition because they know that rival states are more likely to avoid hawkish leaders with strong electoral support. Conversely, as electoral threat increases, hawks have greater incentives to initiate cooperation, and rival states are more likely to exploit them, knowing that a hawk cannot risk being viewed as an extreme hawk in foreign policy. It follows that
a competing political party will respond to these conditions by opposing the leader’s policy, because they believe they have an advantage in terms of public opinion.

- Hypothesis 4: Ceteris paribus; as their public approval diminishes, a hawkish leader is less likely to receive support from the opposition party on foreign policy.

This asymmetry originates in the different paths that hawks and doves pursue as their electoral support varies. If rival states update their beliefs about the leader’s electoral support to inform their own behavior toward the leader, then the opposition party should use this information to anticipate whether the balance of interactions between the leader and the rival state will make it more favorable for them to either support or oppose to the president’s foreign policy.

Now consider whether a leader incorporates these responses into their decision-making. If rival states and opposition parties can anticipate the foreign policy behavior of the leader, then by extension the leader should be able to take account of these incentives as well. If so, then one might expect a leader to be less likely to take a position on an issue when he anticipates legislative opposition.

- Hypothesis 5: Ceteris paribus; as their electoral support diminishes, a dovish a leader is more likely than a hawkish leader to take a position on votes before the legislature.

The theoretical discussion offered here contends that state foreign policy results from strategic interactions between the leader of one state and his or her competitors at home and abroad. This framework makes use of an environment of strict competition, such that rival state and two-party competition are zero-sum. In other words, the nature of their competition implies that any gains that accrue to one side necessitate that a smaller share of the potential gains for the other side. This motivates a rival state and an opposition party to anticipate their counterparts’ future behavior. If leaders are office-seeking, and they compete for office by appealing to a median voter with moderate preferences, then it suggests that opposition parties and rival states stand to benefit from incorporating new information about
the leader’s standing in public opinion and their foreign policy preferences. The next two chapters position these arguments within larger literatures concerning strategic interaction at the international and domestic levels respectively.
CHAPTER 2
WHEN RIVALS AVOID DOVES AND EXPLOIT HAWKS

I have just taken an action that will prove that Democratic presidents can deal with Communists just as strongly as Republicans.

– Lyndon Johnson

2.1 Introduction

Research linking domestic unrest and international conflict argues that electoral threat gives leaders an incentive to instigate hostilities abroad as a way to gamble for a policy success or benefit from a rally 'round-the-flag effect. More than most literatures, this one is beset by inconsistent findings and consistent revision. Indicative of this are studies of U.S. foreign policy that show presidents have been more likely to use military force when economic conditions or presidential popularity are in decline (Ostrom and Job 1986; James and Oneal 1991; Fordham 1998a,b). At the same time, other studies demonstrate that presidents are more likely to use military force when economic conditions have been favorable (Meernik and Waterman 1996; Yoon 1997; Oneal and Tir 2006). Still other studies show that presidential approval and economic conditions have had no effect on the conflict behavior of the U.S. abroad (Lindsay and Steger 1992; Wang 1996; Meernik 2000; Moore and Lanoue 2003).

A recent wave of scholarship has attempted to resolve this inconsistency by highlighting the importance of strategic conflict avoidance at the international level. Strategic conflict
avoidance theory posits that rival states might be aware of the domestic political environments of their counterparts and avoid them when they expect to be targeted. This notion has found support in the U.S. case (Clark, 2003; Fordham, 2005), and in large-N studies (Leeds and Davis, 1997; Mitchell and Prins, 2004), but a lack of support has been found in other contexts (Chiozza and Goemans, 2004a; Oneal and Tir, 2006), and Arab rivals have been found to aggressively exploit, rather than avoid, domestic unrest in Israel (Sprecher and Jr., 2002; DeRouen and Sprecher, 2006).

While the possibility of strategic conflict avoidance has advanced the literature, these arguments remain incomplete. That is, even though they may explain cases where conflict has been avoided, they fail to explain the potential variation in strategic behavior between rivals. Rather than search for one specific type of behavior such as strategic avoidance, this study offers an explanation for the balance of interactions between rival states in order to capture the ebb and flow of strategic behavior. From this perspective, the more interesting question becomes when, and to what extent, do rivals avoid a counterpart facing domestic unrest, and when do they exploit that unrest.\footnote{DeRouen and Sprecher (2006) consider each of these arguments separately in a competing hypotheses framework. Their study finds that Arab rivals were more likely to exploit than to avoid domestic unrest in Israel.}

I address this question by drawing upon a nascent but related body of work concerning the partisan implications that leaders face as they adopt dovish versus hawkish foreign policies. In particular, recent work by Colaresi (2004) and Schultz (2005) posits that leaders with more dovish reputations are more vulnerable in a context of interstate rivalry. This approach provides an interesting way forward. In one literature, leaders have an incentive to use force in response to domestic problems. However, this literature typically assumes that all leaders respond the same way to domestic political pressures. A separate literature, however, is concerned with the asymmetric incentives that leaders with hawkish or dovish reputations face in a rivalry. Yet in this literature, the incentive for hawks and doves to engage in a moderate policy is constant and does not vary with their support in public
opinion.

Drawing out the partisan implications of foreign policy under conditions ranging from high to low electoral support produces a counterintuitive proposition about when rivals are likely to avoid a counterpart. Specifically, I argue that doves receive a larger domestic political rally round-the-flag stemming from interstate conflict than hawks. Furthermore, if rival states recognize these incentives, and they avoid adversaries who are experiencing domestic political unrest because they expect to be targeted, then periods of electoral distress in a home state should lead rivals to avoid doves and exploit hawks.

The next section introduces the theoretical framework to model the interactions of rival states. Following that, I discuss the empirical strategy that I employ to test these arguments. The empirical results offer strong support for these arguments in the context of U.S. foreign policy from 1966 through 1991, and those findings are discussed concurrently in the research design section.

2.2 The Politics of Opposites, International

Are doves more likely than hawks to act aggressively towards a rival state in response to electoral distress at home? The different experiences of Lyndon Johnson in the Pueblo crisis and Gerald Ford in the Mayaguez crisis help illustrate that an important part of the answer to this question depends on the expectations about how a rival responds to a leader when that leader has incentives to pursue hawkish versus dovish actions. At first glance, these crises are strikingly similar. Each crisis unfolded in the context of America’s Cold War rivalry the Soviet Union in Asia. Both crises began when a smaller Cold War communist adversary seized an American ship and held its crew hostage. Furthermore, in each case the respective U.S. president was poised to begin an election cycle where they faced a public approval rating in the low 40s. According to the indicator of foreign policy dovishness introduced in Chapter 1, however, these crises were initiated by leaders with very different foreign policy reputations. Indeed, Ford was more dovish and Johnson was more hawkish

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than any other U.S. president in the sample covering the last 25 years of the Cold War. Yet, despite Ford’s relative dovishness up to that point, he pursued overwhelming military force to rescue the American hostages from Cambodia, while Johnson, who had a very hawkish reputation, pursued negotiations with North Korea that drew out over a period of more than 10 months.

I argue that the reputations which preceded each American leader and the knowledge that each of them was operating in an environment of electoral threat weighed heavily on the crisis. While the Soviet Union remained silent throughout the Mayaguez incident (they did not have a relationship with the Communist regime there), they responded decisively to the capture of the USS Pueblo by putting diplomatic and military pressure on the U.S. “in order to protect [North Korea] in case of complications and to let the Americans understand that we are not joking, but approach this matter seriously.”

It was in this environment that Ford approved of protective air strikes on military targets inside the country and sent a company of marines to the island of Koh Tang to rescue the crew and ship. There were high risks involved and the Marines were met with heavy resistance that resulted in 15 U.S. and an unknown number of Cambodian casualties. However, the crew and captain of the Mayaguez were released within minutes of the Marines landing on the beach and the operation was deemed a success. The result was that Ford’s public approval jumped 11 points.

In contrast, the specter of a wider military confrontation with the Soviet Union, combined with Johnson’s already hawkish reputation on foreign policy, meant that the risks involved in any military action would only further weaken his electoral prospects. This context put Johnson in a weak position; if he pursued a hardline in the crisis he would move farther away from the median voter’s ideal point and also would likely be met by a defiant Soviet Union that was undeterred because of constraints placed on Johnson by voters and (by extension)

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the Republican opposition. At the onset of the crisis, Leonid Brezhnev sent a letter to
President Johnson demanding that the Americans scale back their Naval build-up in the Sea
of Japan. President Johnson replied several days later that he directed the Navy to move
its aircraft carrier and accompanying vessels “somewhat southward.” The Soviet threat
pushed Johnson toward negotiations with North Korea. Johnson’s inability to pursue a
hardline or even credibly threaten a military response severely weakened his position in these
negotiations. Those negotiations continued for 10 months a final concession was reached;
where Johnson agreed to issue an apology that admitted that the USS Pueblo entered into
North Korean waters and that all statements by the crew made during interrogation process
were genuine.

2.2.1 How Rivals Respond to the Politics of Opposites

Traditionally, the causal logic connecting domestic unrest and international conflict has
been informed two theoretical traditions. Diversionary theory builds mostly on social-
psychological in-group out-group behavior, whereby leaders may have incentives either to
divert attention away from domestic problems or benefit from a rally-around-the-flag ef-
fect in periods of electoral threat (e.g., Ostrom and Job, 1986; Morgan and Bickers, 1992).
Gambling for resurrection theory has developed more recently and builds on the assumption
that presidents have an information advantage over their public which they can exploit to
exaggerate the seriousness of a threat posed by another state, or the probability of success
if action is taken against the threat. This information asymmetry allows leaders to pursue
a risky foreign policy that nonetheless may have some chance of improving their electoral
standing (e.g., Richards and Schwebach, 1993; Downs and Rocke, 1994).

It has been a strong assumption of these models that voters are unbiased, concerned

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3 “Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union” (6 February 1968),
state.gov/ww/about_state/history/vol_xxix/zb.html, Date accessed: July 5 2010.

4 “Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State” (6 February 1968),
state.gov/ww/about_state/history/vol_xxix/zb.html, Date accessed: July 5 2010.
only about ends (outcomes) and not means (policy). This view clashes with an emerging consensus that the U.S. public has coherent preferences about foreign policy and that they use these attitudes to make voting choices.\(^5\) Alternatively, a nascent but related literature argues that given the office-seeking goal of leaders, they have an incentive to appear moderate in their choice of foreign policy to enhance their policy appeal. Early work on this front sought to formalize the concept of credibility in foreign policy by giving a theoretical account the popular notion that “Only Nixon can go to China”\(^6\) \cite{Cowen1998} \cite{Cukierman1998}. Implicit in this branch of the literature is an argument that the same policy—for instance, a policy to cooperate with a rival—may be seen as a moderate policy coming from a hawk, but an extremist policy coming from a dove. Similar to the approach taken in the Gambling for Resurrection hypothesis, this result stems from the uncertainty that voters may have about whether any particular foreign policy is in the nation’s interests. Put simply, if voters are uncertain about whether peace is in the nation’s interests, they are more likely to view the policy as credible if it is proposed by a hawk than by a dove.

\cite{Schultz2005} enters this debate by noting that previous research relating partisan competition for a median voter to foreign policy is incomplete because even if there is a politics of opposites and hawks are better at selling cooperation to the public or doves are better at selling conflict, it still remains to be answered “when do they have an incentive to even try?” He responds that it depends on the likely response of the rival state. Where the costs and benefits of risking peace fall asymmetrically on hawkish and dovish governments, this dichotomy generates an incentive for the rival state to respond differently to a cooperative gesture coming from a leader with a hawkish or dovish reputation. From the rival state’s vantage, any time cooperation is extended by a dovish foreign leader, it opens the door to future gains from exploitation of the foreign state. However, a hawkish foreign leader that offers cooperation cannot be exploited in the long-run, but can be trusted to continue to cooperate if reciprocated.

\(^5\)For an excellent review of this literature, see \cite{Aldrich2006}.
With that said, none of these studies have fully addressed the domestic political environment in which the hawkish or dovish leader is acting (i.e., whether the leader in the home state is experiencing high or low levels of electoral support). Rather, in each of these studies the impetus for leaders to appear moderate is always present. However, if the political environment shapes the incentives for leaders to take certain actions, then electoral threat is an important condition for strategic interaction. Thus, current research has omitted any potential variation in strategic behavior across a range of high and low electoral support.

Two recent studies attempt to take account of the hawkish or dovish motivations of leaders across a range of electoral threat. Focusing on the U.S. case, Foster and Palmer (2006) and Foster (2008) each contend that Republican presidents appeal to more hawkish constituencies and thus should be more likely to benefit from initiating hostilities abroad. Important here is the notion that hawk or dove is a function of the party of the president. Although this simplifies the interactions between states, it may be a strong assumption in the U.S. case where the two-party winner-take-all electoral system gives leaders a strong incentive to capture the support of a broad coalition of voters in order to gain access to political office. For example, if all leaders are either a partisan hawk or dove, then this excludes the median voter from influencing the leader’s behavior through elections. Moreover, Table 1.1 (see page 9) reported the foreign policy behavior of six U.S. presidents toward non-rivals countries and highlighted the fact that there exists significant variation in foreign policy behavior that is not captured by the president’s party affiliation.

This chapter examines the strategic behavior of rivals by separating out the structural incentives imposed on all leaders in democratic systems with two-party competition, from the leader’s hawkish or dovish preferences. I contend that rival states shape their expectations about the future behavior of an adversary along two dimensions: domestic electoral threat and foreign policy preferences.

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6 Also see Palmer and Regan (2004) who argued that more conservative party leaders are more likely to go to war in general.

7 It should be noted that this is still broadly consistent with the in-group out-group framework that Foster and Palmer (2006) and Foster (2008) appeal to as the motivational basis diversionary foreign policy.
In Chapter 1, I made the following two propositions concerning interstate rivalry. First, given a median voter with moderate foreign policy preferences, doves should receive a larger rally in public support, on average, coming from confrontation in the international arena because this makes a more dovish leader appear more moderate. This relationship should hold across all levels of public opinion. In other words, while domestic political benefit of appearing to be moderate is always present for politicians, the incentive to do so may vary depending on the context of electoral threat. This establishes Hypothesis 1: The “Rally effect” or increase in popularity that a leader obtains after engaging in a hard-line foreign policy should increase as the leader is perceived, ex ante, to be more dovish.

Second, given that leaders are motivated to retain office, a decline in electoral support should make more dovish leaders increasingly likely to provoke hostilities against a rival in order to obtain an electoral benefit for appearing to be moderate. Conversely, as hawkish leaders find themselves in an environment of electoral threat, they are more likely to initiate cooperation with rivals. If rivals know about these incentives, and they anticipate the direction of change in the policy of a foreign leader, then their behavior is likely to be a measured response to the hawkish or dovish preferences of their counterpart. This gives Hypothesis 2: As electoral support for a leader in the home state declines, rival states should be increasingly more likely to avoid doves and exploit hawks.

Having considered theoretical issues, the next section proposes an empirical test of the two arguments made above.

### 2.3 Empirical Analysis

Because Hypotheses 1 and 2 present different statistical demands, I discuss the research design and empirical analyses for each in turn.
2.3.1 Size of the Rally Effect

To assess Hypothesis 1, according to which doves are expected to receive a greater rally in public opinion from a taking a hardline in foreign policy, I estimate the following empirical model:

\[
RallySize = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Dovishness} + \beta_2 \text{Hardline} + \beta_3 \text{Dovishness} \times \text{Hardline} + \beta_4 \text{BeginningPublicApproval} + \beta_5 \text{Victory} + \beta_6 \text{Compromise} + \beta_7 \text{Stalemate} + \epsilon
\]  

(2.1)

According to Mueller (1970, 21), a rally event has three basic criteria: 1) it must be international; 2) directly involve the home state; and 3) it must be “Specific, dramatic, and sharply focused.” To meet these criteria, I use data collected by the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) project (Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 2000).\(^8\) I use the ICB data both because it employs a crises-event unit of observation that matches the theoretical story and also because the ICB data is the most frequently used dataset among studies examining rally events. To match with other key variables in the analysis, I examine a sample of all crises involving the U.S. from 1966-1991. This leaves 23 crises events involving the U.S. during the period under examination. Table [ ] on page 84 lists all 23 crises and reports the change in public opinion associated with the crisis as well as the value of the president’s perceived dovishness at the time of the crisis.

Dependent and Independent Variables. The dependent variable is the size of the rally effect. Rally Size is measured as the difference in presidential approval from the last public opinion poll prior to the crisis to the first poll following the peak of the crisis. Data on the President’s public approval is reported by Edwards and Gallup (1990) for the period 1953-1988 and the Gallup Weekly publication makes this data available for 1989-1991, while the International Crisis Behavior project codes the start date of the crisis and the date of the major response by each participant in the crisis.

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\(^8\)International Crisis Behavior dataset Version 9, file ‘ich1v9,’ available online at [http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb](http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb).
To capture the president’s *Dovishness*, I use the World Events Interaction Survey (WEIS) dataset. WEIS is an events dataset that codes a series of policy actions reported by *Reuters* News-wire service for all countries from 1966 to 1992. Because it codes newspaper reports, the WEIS data is especially ideal for describing the perceived hawkish or dovish preferences of each president. Each foreign policy action catalogued by WEIS is weighted using a scaling technique developed by Goldstein (1992) that places each event along a single dimension of cooperation and conflict. This weighting scheme gives positive values to cooperative actions and negative values to conflict ranging from 8.3 to -10 respectively. To establish these weights, Goldstein (1992) assembled a panel of 20 faculty members at the University of Southern California’s School of International Relations and tasked them with fitting each of the 22 categories of behavior on to a linear scale of conflict and cooperation. Table 2 (see page 85) reports the mean of those weights and their standard deviations for the sample of faculty members.

In order to better represent the salience of each category of event being recorded, I have taken the square of the positive weighted value and 0 minus the square of the negative weighted values. This has the effect of distinguishing between newspaper reports about military attacks, which Goldstein gives a weight of -10, and lower weighted events. It also minimizes the contribution of less salient events which are weighted below 1, such as “comment on a situation.” I take these steps because while smaller events may be reported by *Reuters* wire service, they are less likely to be reported in more mainstream media outlets, and also because these smaller events provide salient information for observers to distinguish hostile behavior from cooperative behavior. Finally, I aggregate the individual events into one-month intervals because this matches the dynamic nature of the theoretical story and because multiple crises frequently occur in the same year.

I measure foreign policy dovishness by comparing each president’s reciprocation of cooperative and hostile behaviors received from non-rival states. In Chapter 1, I specified a set of equations (see Equation 1.1 on page 7) to estimate U.S. behavior towards non-rival
states as a function of reciprocity and bureaucratic routine. I estimate each equation in progressively for every month of a president’s tenure in office. The estimated \( \beta \) coefficients summarizes the tendency of each U.S. administration to reciprocate the hostile or cooperative actions of others and I use this to construct a continuous indicator of a leader’s foreign policy preferences.

Specifically, as a leader reciprocates the behavior of non-rivals in either a positive or negative fashion, they are revealing their tendency to pursue a more hawkish or dovish foreign policy. According to the definition of foreign policy moderate, dove, and hawk highlighted above, hawks should be more likely to signal their preferences by under-cooperating (a slope of \( m < 0 \)) in response to greater levels of cooperation from non-rivals, while doves should be more likely to reciprocate (a slope of \( m > 0 \)). When faced with increasingly hostile behavior from non-rivals, a hawk should reciprocate while more dovish leaders do not. Taking the difference between the coefficient estimates for hostility and cooperation obtains the summary indicator for foreign policy preferences used in the all the analyses that follow.

Recall that Hypothesis 1 posits that the effect of foreign policy dovishness on the size of the president’s rally effect is mediated by whether the president takes a hard-line on foreign policy. As such, the analysis includes an interaction term between the dovishness of the president and whether or not a hard-line approach was taken in the crisis. Whether the president took a Hardline approach in the crisis is measured using a variable for ‘Crisis Management’ coded by the ICB project. This variable codes the combination of 9 separate techniques that a state employed to cope with the foreign policy crises. I use this variable to create a binary indicator that equals 1 if the U.S. employed military pressure during the crisis and 0 otherwise.

I also include a control variables for the outcome of the crisis using the ‘Outcome’ variable coded by the ICB project. ICB codes ‘Outcome’ as a 1 if U.S. policymakers believed they achieved a Victory, 2 if they perceived a Compromise settlement, 3 if it is a Stalemate, and 4 if the crisis resulted in a Defeat. I use the ordinal scale from ICB to create three
dichotomous variables for victory, compromise, and stalemate (using defeat as the reference category). The expectation under the above coding is for all three coefficients to be positive and significant relative to the reference category. Finally, I include the president’s *Beginning public approval* as an independent variable. This accounts for the potential that presidents receive larger boosts in their public approval if their approval at the start of the crisis was low to begin with.

**Results.** Table 2.1 reports the results of an OLS regression analysis (using robust standard errors) for the effect of foreign policy dovishness, hardline, and the interaction of these on the size of the president’s rally round the flag. Column 1 reports those results while controlling for beginning public approval, and crisis outcome, while column 2 shows a reduced form of the model that does not include the binary variables for victory, compromise, or stalemate. In both model specifications the results indicate that there is a meaningful difference in how the public responds to a crisis depending on whether the president is a dove or a hawk and whether there was a hard-line approach taken in the crisis.

To provide a straightforward interpretation of the effect of dovishness, I calculate the expected size of the president’s rally across four scenarios given by the president’s perceived hawkish and dovish preferences and whether or not the president took a hard-line and soft-line approach to the crisis. I employ the Clarify statistical software package in order to generate the predicted values and to provide confidence errors around those estimates.\(^9\)

Table 2.2 reports the expected size of the rally effect across each of the four scenarios highlighted above and places a 95% confidence interval around those estimates. Looking at Table 2.2 there is a sizable difference in the mean expected rally for doves that pursue hardline versus softline tactics in a crisis. Hardline tactics produce a 6 point increase in public approval for a dovish president on average, while softline tactics decrease presidential approval by over 7 points on average for a dove. Both hardline and softline tactics have a positive mean impact for hawkish leaders, though the 95% confidence interval encompasses

\(^9\)See King and Whittenberg (2000) for an introduction to Clarify software.

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Table 2.1: Rally Size in International Crises

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regressors</th>
<th>Column 1</th>
<th>Column 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dovishness</td>
<td>-4.918**</td>
<td>-3.308**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.118)</td>
<td>(1.545)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardline</td>
<td>5.134</td>
<td>3.877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.514)</td>
<td>(2.686)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dovishness x Hardline</td>
<td>5.012**</td>
<td>3.527**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.924)</td>
<td>(1.480)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beginning Public Approval</td>
<td>-0.313*</td>
<td>-0.188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.173)</td>
<td>(0.142)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victory</td>
<td>7.087</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.929)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compromise</td>
<td>2.320</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6.195)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stalemate</td>
<td>7.975</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.684)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>10.895</td>
<td>10.531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(8.482)</td>
<td>(6.927)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.260</td>
<td>0.169</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Table 2.2: Predicted Size of the President’s Rally

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach to Crisis</th>
<th>Doves</th>
<th>Hawks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hardline</td>
<td>5.907</td>
<td>3.417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.899, 11.522]</td>
<td>[-1.464, 9.396]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Softline</td>
<td>-7.081</td>
<td>9.453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-14.630, 0.347]</td>
<td>[1.961, 17.096]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

95% Confidence Intervals are reported in parentheses

0 for hawks that pursue a hardline. This asymmetry between hawks and doves that take a hardline approach on foreign policy supports Hypothesis 1. Specifically, doves that take a hard-line or coercive military approach in a foreign policy crisis experience a large and statistically significant increase in their presidential approval while the same is true for hawks that take a softline or political tract in crisis management.

This adds important context to research on rally effects. The quantitative literature has shown that on average, the gains in public opinion associated with U.S. involvement in an international crisis have been been small and ephemeral (Lian and Oneal, 1993; Oneal and Bryan, 1995). The findings here suggest that this practice masks important variance in the size of a president’s rally. Rather, the results show that the combination of tactics and perceived political preferences of the leader are important predictors of the size of the rally. Taken together, tactics and perceived preferences mediate the public’s response these events and the political benefits that accrue to a leader for crisis management.

The full model in Table 2.1 also shows that compared to an outcome of defeat, the president did not receive a larger “rally effect” when the outcome of the crisis was a victory for the U.S., or the crisis ended in a compromise or a stalemate for the U.S. Although the null finding here fails to conform to the expectation when compared to a base category of defeat, the coefficients on Victory, Compromise, and Stalemate were all positively signed which is consistent with the expectation on the direction of their influence.

\[\text{See DeRouen (2000) for a review of this literature.}\]
The president’s beginning public approval is included in the analysis to ensure that the rally size is not an artifact of the president having a low or high public approval at the beginning of the crisis. Given that some upper limit to the president’s public approval rating exists, then higher public approval entering into a crisis should result in a smaller than expect rally. The analysis provides some support for this conclusion. Beginning public approval is negative and significant in the first fully specified model. It is also negative and approaching statistical significance in the reduced form model.

### 2.3.2 How Rival States Respond

To examine Hypothesis 2, that rival states avoid doves and exploit hawks, I estimate the following interactive model for the U.S.-Soviet rivalry for the same 25 year period of the Cold War from 1966 to 1991:

\[
\text{Soviet Behavior towards the U.S.} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{U.S. Dove} + \beta_2 \text{Presidential Approval} + \beta_3 \text{U.S. Dove} \times \text{Presidential Approval} + \beta_4 \text{U.S. to Soviets} + \beta_5 \text{Election} + \beta_6 \text{Soviets at War} + \beta_7 \text{U.S. at War} + \beta_8 \text{lag Soviet to U.S.} + \epsilon
\] (2.3)

**Dependent and Independent Variables.** WEIS provides information for measuring several concepts. Because the theoretical story is one about how rivals strategically avoid or exploit an adversary, the expected relationship between concepts unfold over-time. Therefore, I employ a time-series of the Soviet Union’s behavior towards the U.S. and structure the data in a directed-dyad-month format. The dependent variable is the sum of all the Soviet Union’s behavior towards the U.S. in a given month. The key independent variable is again the U.S. President’s level of dovishness.

The second key explanatory variable is the President’s public approval rating, which is again provided by Edwards and Gallup (1990) for the period 1953-1988 and the Gallup
Weekly publication for 1989-1991. The observed range of presidential approval extends from a low of 24 for Richard Nixon in July 1974, to a high of 83 for George H.W. Bush in February 1991. Also, to match the conditional nature of the theoretical story leading to Hypothesis 2, I include an interaction between a president’s level of dovishness and their public approval rating.

Although it does not effect the perception of the U.S. president’s dovishness, I also include the sum of all the United States’ behavior towards the Soviet Union in a given month as a control variable because, while Soviet behavior towards the United States comprises the dependent variable, the reverse behavior (the United States towards the Soviet Union) accounts for the response by the Soviet Union to actions towards it by the United States. Other control variables include elections, and two binary variables for whether the U.S. or the Soviet Union were embroiled in a War.

Several studies suggest that the prospect of impending elections influence a state’s foreign policy (e.g., Russett, 1990; Smith, 1996; Wang, 1996). While impending elections should not bias the results in favor of either hawks or doves, they can alter the strategic calculus by shortening the window in which presidents and rival states engage in the sort of calculated risks suggested by the theory. To account for this possibility, a variable for elections is added that equals 1 in the six months leading up to a Presidential or midterm election in the United States, and 0 otherwise. Whether the United States is at war is included because incentives for the rival state to avoid a diversionary-minded adversary in the home state should be subdued when that adversary is engrossed in a war (Smith, 1996; Leeds and Davis, 1997).

In addition, because the analysis employs a time-series of the Soviet Union’s behavior towards the United States, a series of diagnostic tests were conducted on the data prior to the analysis. Some of the most standard diagnostics for time-series estimations look for violations of the assumption that the data is stationary (i.e., does not contain a unit-root) and that the residuals are normally distributed. Moreover, concerns about autocorrelation in time series analyses make the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable a point of concern.
A lagged dependent variable is appropriate in this case because the theoretical argument incorporates strategic interaction and action-reaction into the theoretical story. Additionally, however, the catastrophic consequences that an unintended conflict spiral might entail, should make the Soviet Union and the United States more likely to condition their current behavior, not only the interaction of the previous one-month, but as a measured response to their behavior over several months. This, along with the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and the Akakie Information Criterion (AIC), suggest using three one-month lags of the dependent variable.

The results of additional auxiliary tests suggest the use of an Autoregressive Ordinary Least Squares of order three, or ARIMA (3,0,0). A series of two-month lags are used for key independent variables to capture the order of causation and because it ensures that the Soviet Union can learn and adjust to the changing domestic factors in the United States.

**Results.** Table 2.3 reports the coefficients and standards errors for the effects of the president’s dovishness and public approval on the behavior of the Soviet Union towards the United States. Columns 1 and 2 present findings when dovishness is measured as a function of the presidents reciprocation rate to non-rival countries.\(^{11}\) The positive and significant coefficients presented in columns 1 and 2 for dovishness and the interaction term gives an initial indication that a president’s level of dovishness captures important variation in the Soviet Union’s behavior toward the United States across varying levels of electoral support.

Neither the lagged values of United States behavior toward the Soviet Union nor the Soviet Union’s lagged value of dovishness had any effect on how the Soviet Union acted towards the U.S. The null effect of the lag of U.S. behavior toward the Soviet Union is consistent with McGinnis and Williams (1989) rational expectations theory concerning the

\(^{11}\)I re-ran the analysis using simple partisanship as an indicator of foreign policy dovishness (see Table 3 on page 86). Though the President’s reciprocation rate is the theoretically preferred measurement of dovishness, I compare the results of using this conceptualization of dovishness against that employed by Foster (2006) who argues in favor of using the President’s party identification as a proxy of their hawk/dove foreign policy type. The null findings for Dovishness when simple partisanship is used suggests that the Soviet Union’s behavior toward the U.S. did not vary systematically with the President’s party.
Cold War and inconsistent with the action-reaction theory of Goldstein and Freeman (1991). This suggests that an important underlying dynamic of the Cold War was that it extended significant incentives to anticipate a counterpart’s likely future behavior.

The 1st and 3rd period lags of the dependent variable are positive and consistently correlated with the Soviet Union’s current behavior towards the U.S. across all models with the 2nd period lag reaching statistical significance in 3 of the 4 models. This suggests that there is a short-run memory process in Soviet’s behavior towards the U.S. Moreover, the Soviet Union’s involvement in a war was negative and significantly significant across models, meaning that the Soviet Union was more belligerent towards the United States when it was engrossed in a war. Although they approached the 0.1 cut-off for statistical significance across models, the finding for U.S. war involvement and elections are not statistically different from zero.

The quantity of interest to test Hypothesis 2 (which posits that rivals will avoid unpopular doves and exploit unpopular hawks in the home state) is given by the president’s level of dovishness his or her public approval rating, and the interaction between these two variables. Figure 2.2 graphs the conditional effect of dovishness across the observed range of presidential approval and places a 90% confidence interval around that estimate.

Figure 2.2 supports the main Hypothesis 2. It shows that during the Cold War, the Soviet Union was more cooperative towards the more dovish president’s as the president’s public approval decreased. Or more precisely, the effect of having a dovish U.S. president on the Soviet Union’s behavior toward the U.S. changes across three zones of popularity. At high levels of public approval (i.e., above 55%), dovish U.S. presidents were more likely than hawkish U.S. presidents to be confronted by an aggressive Soviet Union. Alternatively, when the U.S. president was a dove and their public approval was low (i.e., below 45%), the Soviet Union was increasingly more cooperative towards it. Whether the U.S. president was a hawk or a dove made no difference in how the Soviet Union behaved towards the U.S. when the president’s approval was between 45% and 55%. This strategic interaction shows that
in periods of electoral threat or domestic unpopularity, the Soviet Union was significantly more hostile towards hawkish Presidents and more cooperative towards doves.

### 2.4 Conclusion

This chapter features two separate empirical analyses of U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War. Both analyses support the proposed theoretical framework for a politics of opposites in international politics. The first set of results show that U.S. presidents with dovish reputations benefit from a sizable rally by taking a hardline position on foreign policy. While the difference in the average expected rally in public approval for dovish versus hawkish presidents that take a hardline in a foreign policy crisis is small (doves receive a 5.9 point increase compared to hawks receiving 3.4 point increase), there is a sizeable difference when a softline approach is taken. If they take a softline response to a crisis, doves experience a 7 point decrease on average in their public approval, while a hawk receives a net gain of more than 9 points.

The interactive effect of partisanship and public approval also appears to mediate how the
Soviet Union approached the U.S. during the Cold War. The Soviet Union’s behavior towards the U.S. changed from greater hostility to cooperation as the leadership in the U.S. was perceived to be more dovish and electorally threatened. Interestingly, this finding also implies that the Soviet Union exploited domestic political vulnerability in hawks by engaging the U.S. with greater hostility relative to the behavior of the U.S. The next chapter investigates the incentives at play in shaping how opposition party responds to the interactions between the leader and a rival state.
Table 2.3: Soviet Union’s Cold War Behavior Towards the U.S.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regressors</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Dovishness</td>
<td>0.582**</td>
<td>0.817**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.220)</td>
<td>(0.248)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Approval</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.027**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Dovishness x Presidential Approval</td>
<td>-0.011**</td>
<td>-0.016**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Election</td>
<td>0.234</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.108)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. at War</td>
<td>-0.308</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.171)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union at War</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.704***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.187)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Behavior toward the Soviet Union</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>0.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
<td>(0.058)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lag 1</td>
<td>0.291***</td>
<td>0.239***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lag 2</td>
<td>0.189**</td>
<td>0.136*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.068)</td>
<td>(0.059)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lag 3</td>
<td>0.168***</td>
<td>0.124***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.068)</td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.185*</td>
<td>-1.357***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.528)</td>
<td>(0.371)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.349</td>
<td>0.384</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed). Robust standard errors are given in parentheses.
CHAPTER 3

AN INEFFECTIVE CONGRESS OR STRATEGIC AVOIDANCE?

We have avoided making dramatic gestures which might invite dramatic rebuffs.

– Richard Nixon

3.1 Introduction

Despite frequent scholarly references to a so-called resurgent Congress in U.S. foreign policy after the Vietnam War (e.g., Lindsay and Ripley 1992, Meernik 1993), actual incidents of Congressional opposition to the president have been relatively few and far between. Indeed, Table 3.1 reports a frequency of the opposition party’s support of the president on matters of “high politics” in foreign policy.\(^1\) It shows that the opposition party supported the president in more than two-thirds of the over 200 recorded votes taken during the 25 years from the start of the Vietnam War to the end of the Cold War. This poses an empirical puzzle for research into the domestic determinants of foreign policy. Given the elevated importance of national security during the Cold War, and the ample incentive this gave lawmakers to engage in political posturing, why did the Cold War never approach the level of partisanship one might otherwise expect?

\(^1\)The definition of High politics used here is taken from Souva and Rohde (2007) who count Congressional votes on a range of national security topics including the Soviet Union, China, Arms Trade, Vietnam, and Troop Deployments.
Table 3.1: Opposition Party Support for the President on High Politics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>President’s Type</th>
<th>Supported</th>
<th>Opposed</th>
<th>Percent Opposed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Doves</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderates</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawks</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>(total)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(total)</td>
<td>(150)</td>
<td>(67)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Still more puzzling is a discrepancy which arises across these cases of congressional opposition when factoring in the president’s level of perceived hawkish or dovish preferences in foreign policy. It turns out that hawks experienced many more instances of congressional opposition than either moderate or dovish presidents. This finding appears to be at odds with a burgeoning line of research showing that dovish leaders are more vulnerable in context of interstate rivalry (e.g., Colaresi 2004; Schultz 2005). How could it be, in a period of intense security competition and rivalry, that hawks were more likely than doves to face partisan opposition in Congress?

One potential explanation for the overall lack of opposition in the Cold War can be found in a series of studies which argue that presidents strategically avoid congressional opposition (Lindsay 1994; Wang 1996; Clark 2000; Howell and Pevehouse 2005; Foster and Palmer 2006; Marshall and Prins 2007). After all, the intense political climate of the Cold War is consistent with a context that would motivate strategic interaction. In this way, strategic avoidance offers a revisionist interpretation of the congressional record on foreign policy which disputes the notion that foreign policy, even in matters of national security, is firmly in the president’s domain.

However, the strategic avoidance literature has not fully addressed either of the puzzles identified in Table 3.1. While presidents may have avoided congressional opposition during the Cold War, this does not explain the 67 cases of opposition reported in Table 3.1. A more
complete theoretical story must address both the presence and absence of congressional opposition. Moreover, current research has largely overlooked the pattern of heterogeneous congressional opposition identified above.

I address these concerns by suggesting that presidents are constrained in their ability to avoid congressional opposition by the rival state’s response. The remainder of this chapter elaborates on a theory and test of the conditions that influence partisan opposition in Congress to the president’s foreign policy. Empirical analyses are conducted on roll-call votes in the U.S. House of Representative on issues concerning “high politics” between 1966 and 1991. The results show that ignoring the anticipated response of international rivals has limited our ability to explain both the presence and the absence of partisan opposition.

3.2 The Politics of Opposites, *Domestic*

Current studies of strategic avoidance in congressional-executive relations are limited in two respects. First, they focus on the president’s ability to win legislative battles as a function of the partisan alignment of congress (e.g., Clark 2000; Howell and Pevehouse 2005; Brulé 2004). This tight focus, however, neglects the role of public opinion in provoking congressional opposition. To be sure, even in situations where the partisan alignment in congress heavily favors the president, the opposition party can still engage in political opportunism by opposing something that they expect to be unpopular. At the very least this is a better reflection of the office-seeking motivations that the president and members of congress share. If winning in the court of public opinion is the scorecard that really matters, then the opposition party’s response to the president’s choice of foreign policy should be a function of the anticipated costs and partisan implications that the president will face for pursuing a given policy.

The second limitation taken up here is that existing studies of strategic avoidance offer little guidance for when we should expect to observe congressional opposition. Even though strategic avoidance might explain the overall reduction of partisanship during the Cold War,
it does not explain the 67 cases of opposition observed in Table 3.1 or the disproportionate rates of opposition faced by more hawkish presidents.

To address both the presence and absence of congressional opposition, I propose a theory of foreign policy opposition that incorporates interactions between the executive and an opposition party, as well as between an executive and a rival state. I argue that the choice by an opposition party about whether or not to oppose a president’s foreign policy, both conditions and is conditioned by the president’s choice to pursue a particular foreign policy, as well as by the anticipated response to that policy by an international rival.

Recall from Chapter 1 that an environment of electoral threat gives leaders strong incentives to moderate their policies towards rivals because the same policy—for instance a policy to cooperate with a rival—may be perceived as a moderate policy coming from a hawk, but an extremist policy coming from a dove. In order to obtain an electoral benefit for appearing to be more moderate, a more dovish leader experiencing electoral distress may be increasingly pressured to increase hostilities with a rival, while a more hawkish leader must contend with electoral pressures to show greater restraint in their policies towards a rival state. If rival states know about these incentives, and they anticipate how policy towards it will change in the future, then the rival’s current behavior is likely to be a measured response to the domestic political environment faced by its counterpart. This applies to an opposition party because their decision about how to respond to a leader’s choice of foreign policy is a function of the anticipated political costs that will accrue to a leader for pursuing a given policy.

3.2.1 The Opposition Party’s Decision to Oppose

The logic of partisan opposition to a hawkish or dovish leader reveals a fundamental asymmetry. This asymmetry originates in the different paths that hawks and doves pursue as they balance their electoral and policy interests. To see this, consider how the interactions with congress unfold under in a scenario where a dovish leader enjoys broad electoral support. First, doves are more likely to cooperate with an interstate rival when faced with a certain
electoral future because they have little incentive to prove their moderate credentials. If rivals anticipate this, then a rival is likely to exploit any gesture of cooperation as it is offered by the dovish leader. Of course, this has the effect of making congress more likely to oppose the president’s position.

Alternatively, when they are at serious risk of losing the next election, a more dovish leader is pressured into pursuing a more aggressive foreign policy towards a rival state. If rivals know the dove’s resolve is high, then the rival is going to be cautious not to take steps that might lead to a conflict spiral. Though a dove faced with electoral threat could pursue a diplomatic track with a rival, this is highly unlikely because, simply put, it comes with a high risk of electoral suicide for the dove. This establishes Hypothesis 3, as their public approval diminishes, a dovish leader is more likely to receive support from the opposition party on foreign policy.

Alternatively, as more hawkish leader obtain high levels of electoral support, their incentives to appear moderate are low. Under these conditions, the congress is unlikely to stand in opposition. This follows because the anticipated response of a rival state is to avoid hawkish leaders who enjoy strong electoral support. As electoral electoral support diminishes, however, hawks look to initiate greater cooperation with a rival in order to obtain an electoral benefit for appearing to be more moderate. Knowing these incentives, a rival state is quick to exploit this cooperative gesture, and this builds the conditions whereby congress can oppose the leader’s initiative. This leads to Hypothesis 4, as their public approval diminishes, a hawkish leader is less likely to receive support from the opposition party on foreign policy.

### 3.2.2 The President’s Decision to take a Position

The expectations developed so far have yet to incorporate the story of strategic avoidance on the part of a president. At low levels of electoral threat, the incentive to appear moderate is low for presidents, thus the probability of opposition increases as the leader’s perceived preferences become more dovish. Conversely, when electoral threat is high the incentive
to appear moderate is also high, and the result is that more dovish president’s can avoid congressional opposition by taking a hard-line in foreign policy. If president’s anticipate these congressional reactions, then hawks may try to avoid taking positions when electoral threat is high while doves look opportunities to do so. This gives Hypothesis 5, as their electoral support diminishes, a dovish a leader is more likely than a hawkish leader to take a position on votes before the legislature.

Hypothesis 4 captures the story of anticipated reactions leading presidents to carefully select into taking policy positions which might engender opposition from Congress. Accounting for this ex-ante decision of the president’s to take a position may wash out the relationship identified in Hypothesis 3. If so, this would be an observable implication of congressional influence. I now turn to a discussion of the data and methods used to test the hypotheses outlined here.

### 3.3 Empirical Analysis

In light of the two dependent variables identified by Hypotheses 3 and 4, I break the analysis into two parts. In the first part, I focus on the opposition party’s decision whether to support or oppose the president on legislation concerning high politics. To empirically test this claim, I estimate the following interactive model:

\[
\text{Opposition} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{President's Dovishness} + \beta_2 \text{President's Approval} \\
+ \beta_3 \text{President's Dovishness} \times \text{President's Approval} \\
+ \beta_4 \text{Unified Government} + \beta_5 \text{Amendment} \\
+ \beta_6 \text{USatWar} + \epsilon \tag{3.1}
\]

Then I take up the issue of whether and when the president takes a position on legislation before the Congress has an opportunity to support or oppose this position. To gauge this, I estimate a two-stage selection model where the president must take a position in the first
stage before the congress can support or oppose the president in the second stage:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Opposition} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{President's Dovishness} + \beta_2 \text{President's Approval} \\
&+ \beta_3 \text{President's Dovishness} \times \text{President's Approval} \\
&+ \beta_4 \text{Unified Government} + \beta_5 \text{Amendment} \\
&+ \beta_6 \text{USatWar} + \lambda \epsilon
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{PositionTaken} &= \beta_0 + \gamma_1 \text{President's Dovishness} + \gamma_2 \text{President's Approval} \\
&+ \gamma_3 \text{President's Dovishness} \times \text{President's Approval} \\
&+ \gamma_4 \text{Elections} + \gamma_5 \text{Amendment} \\
&+ \gamma_6 \text{USatWar} + \nu
\end{align*}
\]

(3.2)

### 3.3.1 Dependent Variables

The unit of observation in all the analyses that follow is the roll-call vote. The respective dependent variables are comprised of two decisions, one by the president and one by the opposition party. To measure these choices, I use information compiled by Rohde (2004) on all roll-call votes in the United States House of Representatives. I include the roll-call votes that occurred from 1966 to 1991, first because this also matches the temporal span of other key variables, but also because this encompass the final 25 years of the Cold War after the start of the Vietnam War, which has been described as the era of the resurgent Congress. In this period I draw on votes that concerned China, Soviet Union, Vietnam, Arms Trade, and Troop Commitments as a representation of high politics. There were a total of 217 roll-call votes on high politics during this period.

For the decision by the president, the Rohde data codes whether the president publicly supported or opposed any roll-call vote. I use this variable to operationalize presidential position taking as 1 if a position was taken and 0 otherwise. Opposition to the president is operationalized when the party opposite of the president has a majority of their members vote against the position taken by the president.
3.3.2 Independent Variables

The main variable of theoretical interest is the perception of the president’s level of dovishness. Dovishness is a continuous concept of the president’s tendency to over/under reciprocate the behavior received from non-rivals in the international system (see Chapter 2 for a discussion). In addition to the president’s perceived dovishness, the president’s public approval rating is expected to have a modifying affect on relations between a president and Congress. Edwards and Gallup (1990) compile a monthly series of presidential approval for the period 1953-1988 and the Gallup Weekly publication and the Gallup Index makes this data available for 1989-1992. To match the conditional nature of the theoretical story, I also incorporate an interaction term between the president’s dovishness and his support in public opinion polls.

Other control variables included are Unified Government, which is a binary indicator that equals 1 if the president and the majority party in the each house of Congress are controlled by a single party, and 0 otherwise. Unified Government should make opposition less likely for a variety of agenda setting reasons (see Howell and Pevehouse, 2005). Elections are also included to indicate whether the Congressional vote took place during an the six months leading up to a national election. The expectation is that partisan activity increases in the period before an election, which should make legislative opposition more likely (e.g., Wang, 1996). Whether the vote is being taken on an amendment to an existing legislative bill is also added to the analysis. Amendments are often sponsored and used strategically to force a party line vote on an issue which should increase the likelihood of opposition (see Souva and Rohde, 2007). And finally, an additional variable codes whether the US is currently involved in a War was included in the analysis because there is additional pressure on congress to support the president when the U.S. is engaged in a highly visible conflicts abroad (see Stoll, 1987).
3.3.3 The Presence and Absence of Congressional Opposition

Table 3.2 shows the estimates of two probit analyses on the likelihood that the opposition party will vote against the president. The analyses presented in table 3.2 however, does not account for strategic avoidance by the president. This is useful because the theoretical framework offers an explanation for the puzzling finding that where hawks were more likely to experience congressional opposition during the Cold War. Hypothesis 3 posits that more dovish presidents are less likely to experience congressional opposition. As such, it addresses both the presence and absence of congressional opposition during the Cold War. Moreover, it provides a baseline comparison for the forthcoming analysis of strategic avoidance by the president.

The first column in Table 3.2 tests the conditional effect of dovishness as presidential approval changes on the opposition party’s support for the president when control variables for Unified Government, Amendment, and U.S. war involvement are included. In contrast, column 2 includes four additional variables that capture the effects of specific issue being voted on (using Troop as the as a reference category), in order to see if the results are sensitive to 1 or more of the issue areas. The results for dovishness, presidential approval, and the interaction of these, offer support for the hypothesis. This finding adds to the evidence reported in the frequency table presented at the beginning of this chapter by showing the more dovish presidents were not just less likely to face Congressional opposition in general, but more likely as their public approval diminished. This lends strong support to the argument that congressional opposition to the president is motivated by expectations about how a given policy will play out in terms of public opinion. Additionally, its highly suggestive of the fact that the opposition parties form these expectations by anticipating how rival states behave differently depending on the president’s domestic political environment.

Figure 3.3.3 shows the change in the probability that the opposition party will vote against the president across a range of presidential approval. As expected, the president is significantly more likely to experience opposition in votes on amendments. Moreover,
Table 3.2: Opposition Party Vote Opposing the President on High Politics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regressors</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dovishness</td>
<td>-3.264***</td>
<td>-3.488***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.889)</td>
<td>(1.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Approval</td>
<td>-0.057***</td>
<td>-0.081***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dovishness x Presidential Approval</td>
<td>-0.077***</td>
<td>0.081***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unified Government</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.383)</td>
<td>(0.429)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amendment</td>
<td>0.904**</td>
<td>1.028***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.314)</td>
<td>(0.365)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War</td>
<td>-1.763***</td>
<td>-2.078***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.397)</td>
<td>(0.573)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>0.498</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.566)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>0.239</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.659)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>0.775</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.670)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms Control</td>
<td>0.463</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.603)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.920</td>
<td>2.580*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.144)</td>
<td>(1.345)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.321</td>
<td>0.337</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses.
Figure 3.1: Marginal Effect of Dovishness on Opposition Party Vote

Table 3.3: Out of Sample Predictions of the Opposition Party’s Vote

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Correctly Predicted</th>
<th>Under-Predicted Opposition</th>
<th>Over-Predicted Opposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percent 79% 15% 6%

US involvement in a war significantly reduces the likelihood that the opposition party will vote against the president’s position. It may be surprising, however, given the focus of much previous academic work, that the indicator for unified government appears to be uncorrelated with congressional opposition.

Table 3.3 gauges the performance of the statistical model in making out-of-sample predictions. It shows the number of successful predictions after iteratively dropping one observation from the sample, and then running the model on the restricted sample to see how well the model predicted each observation that was dropped.

The overall model included only three control variables, though it correctly predicted
79% of the roll-call votes by the Opposition party on issues ranging from Vietnam, China, the Soviet Union, Arms Trade, and Troop Deployments. The remaining 21% of the cases are split between type 1 errors, or false positives, which consumed 6% of the predictions in the model, and type 2 errors, or false negatives, which contributed to 15% of the out of sample predictions.

### 3.3.4 The Infrequency of Congressional Opposition

By addressing strategic avoidance of congress by the president, Hypothesis 4 is designed to account for the empirical puzzle that opened this Chapter, in which the Cold War did not approach the level of partisanship that one might have expected. Hypothesis 4 states that the president’s decision to take a foreign policy position is conditioned by the anticipated response of congress. If leaders avoid taking positions on policies which engender opposition, then this leads to cases where we are likely to observe mutual support for a proposed policy, but it also suggests that there are potentially many unobserved cases where the Opposition party in Congress would have voted against the president but could not due to strategic avoidance. This is consistent with a process that includes sample selection on the dependent variable.

Table 3.3.4 shows the there are three types of outcomes that can be observed from the legislative interactions between the president and Congress. For example, it is only possible to observe Opposition, or $Y_2 = 1$, if and only if the president has taken a position on a foreign policy, meaning that $Y_1 = 1$. While $Y_1$ is completely observed, but $Y_2$ is observed only for a selected sample.

If the selection story is accurate, it requires an empirical strategy that controls for the factors that influence the president’s decision whether or not to take a position and factors that into the model predicting the Opposition party’s response. The proposed strategy for modeling this situation is to employ a bivariate probit with selection (BPS). The BPS model allows one to capture the process whereby the president makes a binary choice (0, 1) to take
Table 3.4: Hypothetical Outcomes of President and Opposition Party Interactions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>( Y_2, \text{Congressional Opposition} )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( Y_1, \text{President Takes} )</td>
<td>( \begin{array}{cc} \text{Yes}=1 &amp; 1,1 \ \text{No}=0 &amp; 0,n/a \end{array} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \text{Legislative Position} )</td>
<td>( \begin{array}{cc} \text{Yes}=1 &amp; 1,0 \ \text{No}=0 &amp; 0,n/a \end{array} )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a position, and given that the president has taken a position, it then models the binary response \((0, 1)\) of congress to support or oppose that policy.

Now consider the parameter estimates from Table 3.5 which are drawn from a bivariate probit with selection. This set-up accounts for the president’s prior decision about whether or not to take a position, before the opposition party can support or oppose the president. In the outcome equation, where the dependent variable is again the opposition party’s vote to oppose the president’s position, variables for dovishness, presidential approval, and the interaction of these are all still significant predictors of the opposition party’s vote. It seems that, by accounting for the process of selection into a congressional vote, the direct influence of congress still shows up. Importantly, these variables are also significant in the first stage, where the dependent variable is the probability that the president takes a position. In addition, Rho is also shown to be significant, suggesting that variables affecting the president’s decision to take a position in the first stage, also have an significant indirect affect on whether the opposition party will support or oppose the president’s position.

The interaction between dovishness and presidential approval in the selection equation provides the quantity of interest to test hypothesis 4. Figure 3.3.4 graphs the marginal effect of dovishness across the entire range of observed values of presidential popularity and places a 90% confidence interval around the estimate.

The dependent variable in Figure 3.3.4 is whether or not the president chooses to take a position in the first stage. It shows that the marginal effect of dovishness on whether the president takes a position is positive above 50% approval, meaning that above 50% public
Table 3.5: Presidential Avoidance of the Opposition Party on High Politics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Outcome: Opposition</th>
<th>Selection: Position Taking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dovishness</td>
<td>-1.061**</td>
<td>-0.972***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.494)</td>
<td>(0.315)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Approval</td>
<td>-0.020*</td>
<td>-0.019***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dovishness x President’s Approval</td>
<td>0.026**</td>
<td>0.021***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unified Government</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.329)</td>
<td>(0.221)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amendment</td>
<td>0.307</td>
<td>0.446***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.251)</td>
<td>(0.168)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War</td>
<td>-1.089***</td>
<td>0.141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.348)</td>
<td>(0.224)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.075***</td>
<td>0.550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.732)</td>
<td>(0.427)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations = 217 (Outcome = 96)
Rho = -1 (SE = 2.47e-10)

* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed)

Robust standard errors are given in parentheses.
approval, the more dovish the president, the more likely they are to take a position on a role call vote dealing with high politics. As presidential approval falls below 42%, however, then more dovish the presidents are less likely they are to take a position on high politics.

![Graph showing the marginal effect of dovishness on presidential position taking.](image)

**Figure 3.2:** Selection Stage: Marginal Effect of Dovishness on Presidential Position Taking

This finding runs counter to the expectation of hypothesis 4, which stated that doves should have been more likely than Hawks to take positions on issues as electoral threat increased.

Figure 3.3.4 graphs the marginal effect of dovishness for the outcome equation, where the dependent variable is whether the opposition party voter against the position taken by the president. The confidence intervals around the marginal effect of dovishness are positive for most of the observed range of presidential approval; however, they contain zero below 43% presidential approval. This means that, having accounted for the president’s decision to take a position, the opposition party is more likely to oppose a dovish president at high levels of presidential approval, but there is little or no difference as presidential approval declines.

Comparing marginal effect of foreign policy dovishness in the standard Probit (see Figure 3.3.3 on page 51) with marginal effect of foreign policy dovishness in the bivariate probit...
model after the selection stage is taken into account (see Figure 3.3 on page 56), there is a noticeable difference in the probability of opposition at various degrees of public approval. For example, at the lowest levels of public approval observed in the sample, the estimated probability of experiencing opposition for a dovish is significantly higher after one accounts for the president’s decision to take a position on a vote before the Congress. Put another way, the higher probability of a hawk experiencing opposition at low levels of public approval appears to be an artifact of an improperly specified research design. Once the president’s selection into a Congressional vote is taken account, there is very little difference in the probability of opposition to either hawkish or dovish presidents at low levels of public approval.

3.4 Conclusion

The findings presented in this chapter support the notion that opposition parties weigh their vote on matters of high politics by updating their beliefs about the president’s public approval and foreign policy preferences.
This led to the expectation that presidents should be wary of taking positions on these visible issues when they expect opposition to be present. The bivariate probit with selection (BPS) was leveraged to evaluate this claim and found that hawks were, in fact, increasingly more likely to take a position on a vote before Congress as their public approval declined. Although this finding runs counter to the expectation of hypothesis 4, one potential explanation for the unexpected finding might stem from the hawk’s incentive to gamble for resurrection in periods where they face electoral threat. That is, if hawks anticipate opposition when they are faced with electoral threat, then hawks may see their prospects for reelection as so low that any position they take will at least give a chance at a long shot victory (see [Downs and Rocke, 1994]). However, while the empirical results do not support this conclusion, they do show significant variation in presidential position taking. It turns out accounting for a president’s selection into a vote that hawks are more likely to take positions as their public approval declines even though they are more likely to face opposition than if they enjoyed higher public approval.
CHAPTER 4

DO HAWKS NEGOTIATE BETTER?

I welcome Nixon’s winning the election. Why? There is a deceptive side of him, but there is less of it. He is accustomed to use hard tactics, but sometimes also soft ones.

– Mao Zedong

4.1 Introduction

In preceding chapters, I developed implications for foreign policy if rival states are aware of the political environments facing a counterpart. The strategic perspective offered in this account is in strong contrast to the less informationally demanding view that currently abounds in much of the rational-choice literature on interstate conflict. For example, among studies contributing to a Bargaining Theory of war, interstate conflict is often thought to be the result of private information about each side’s resolve (Fearon 1995). Naturally, this prompted a search for ways that states might convey information to one another and avoid unnecessary hostilities. Among the most prominent mechanisms identified by scholars have been audience costs, which allow leaders to credibly communicate their resolve in a crisis via public threats that entail some risk the leader making a threat will be sanctioned for backing down (Fearon 1994). Hence, from this perspective, disputes may needlessly escalate if leaders do not have the benefit of information generated through audience costs.

1 Fearon (1994, 578) argues that side backs down in a crisis is more often determined by ‘unobservable’ factors such as resolve, than by the a state’s capability and/or interests.
The example of the Cuban missile crisis helps illustrate the issues at stake in these competing accounts. Audience costs theory, for instance, highlights the moment in which President Kennedy brought the matter before the public by demanding the Soviet’s remove their “offensive weapons” from Cuba. It is argued that this step was crucial for eventually reaching a negotiated settlement, because it allowed Kennedy to establish in the minds of the Soviets the minimum amount he would accept to resolve the standoff without resorting to armed conflict. For this logic to hold, however, it must have also been possible for Kennedy to have chosen some other reservation point short of removing all the missiles from Cuba without also making himself electorally vulnerable.

The discussion above underscores the point that audience costs can affect the outcome of negotiations only to the extent that new information is provided. However, despite the fact that the Cuban missile crisis is an exemplar for audience costs theory, there is good reason to believe that the public nature of this crisis may not have been the principle determinant of the outcome reached. White House transcripts, for example, show that President Kennedy privately held deep reservations about the escalatory effects his public demands had on the crisis, but also that he believed it was the only option if he was to avoid impeachment.\footnote{Audio transcripts provided by NSA (2010): President Kennedy: “It looks really mean, doesn’t it? But on the other hand there wasn’t any choice. If he’s going to get this mean on this one, in our part of the world [unclear], no choice. I don’t think there was a choice.” Robert Kennedy: “Well, there isn’t any choice. I mean, you would have been, you would have been impeached.” President Kennedy: “Well, I think I would have been impeached. [Unclear exchange] If there had been a move to impeach, I would have been under [unclear], on the grounds that I said they wouldn’t do it, and...” Robert Kennedy: “[Unclear] something else. They’d think up some other step that wasn’t necessary. You’d be...But now, the fact is, you couldn’t have done any less.”}

If the domestic political costs of the Soviet Union staging offensive weapons in Cuba were anticipated by Khrushchev, then the fact that Kennedy made this demand public would not have changed how the Soviet Union responded. In other words, for audience costs to impact the outcome of this crisis, new information must have become available to Premier Khrushchev when President Kennedy made his demands public.

Additional questions follow at the same time. For example, it is unclear why, after
Kennedy’s speech, the Soviets proceeded to harden their position, or why Kennedy went on to make additional concessions to include removing their Jupiter missiles from Turkey and extending a guarantee not to involve the US in an attempt to overthrow Castro.

Unfortunately, because both causal mechanisms are present in this example, many of the questions that follow from the Cuban missile crisis cannot be easily resolved. Any attempt to arbitrate between these causal stories will fall inevitably to further speculation about how much knowledge the Soviets had of Kennedy’s domestic position and how much this shaped and influenced each stage of the crisis. Rather than risk making these difficult and uncertain judgments, I investigate a similar case, but one that does not include the aspect of public diplomacy that featured prominently in the Cuban missile crisis.

The remainder of this Chapter investigates the negotiations leading up to US-China rapprochement as a more critical test of the contention made here. Both the Cuban missile crisis and US-China rapprochement were “successful” in the sense that they were both settled by direct negotiation. Moreover, both cases feature agreements between international rivals on issues critical to national security. The single most important difference is that the Cuban Missile crisis unfolded largely in public, while US-China rapprochement was negotiated in a series of secret negotiations. As such, audience costs could not have had a direct influence on rapprochement with China.3

Rapprochement also presents a difficult test case for the arguments made here. To begin with, Nixon frequently said his foreign policy was guided by the principles of realism. After all, rapprochement with China is a definitive example of the Realist canon that says “Nations have no permanent friends and no permanent enemies, only permanent interests.” Even in studies that employ the “only a Nixon can go to China” hypothesis, which itself implies a role for domestic politics, this reasoning is used to imply that hawks are better suited to negotiate with international rivals - either because they are more credible in making peace

3Additionally, each case includes a key private concession made by the U.S. The fact that these concessions were made in secret is not surprising since they carried obvious domestic political consequences. However, considering that the Cuban missile crisis entailed a serious threat of nuclear war and rapprochement did not, it may be a bit surprising that Nixon willingly agreed to withdraw from Taiwan.
with their rivals (Cowen and Sutter 1998; Cukierman and Tommasi 1998), or because doing so is less politically risky for them than it is for doves (Colaresi 2004; Schultz 2005).

At first glance this interpretation seems to contradict my main argument that rivals exploit electorally threatened hawks: If Nixon was so successful in reaching a major accord with China, then perhaps Hawks are better at negotiating peace with rivals. Again, however, there are several inconsistencies with the conventional interpretation of why it takes “Nixon to go to China” that warrant a closer look at this case. First, given Nixon’s presumed credibility and political immunity in making peace with China, why did Nixon need to pursue strict secrecy during the negotiations held in advance of his visit? Furthermore, why did Nixon not raise the issue of opening China during the 1968 campaign when he won only by a narrow margin of less than 1%?

4.2 Bird’s Eye View of Rapprochement

Recall the analysis I presented in chapters 2 and 3 demonstrated that, contrary to existing formulations about the role of partisanship in foreign policy, electorally threatened hawks were more likely than doves to be exploited by the Soviet Union and opposed by Congress as their electoral support diminished. My main contention was that hawks find themselves at risk of being exploited by a rival exactly because they expect to benefit more from establishing peace with a rival - the more electorally threatened hawks become the stronger their incentive to make peace with their rivals. Nixon’s trip to China in February 1972 offers initial support for this conjecture. Figure 1 shows that Nixon’s visit to China came when his public approval had been hovering at or below 50% for the better part of a year, which was down from an average of 59% approval in two-years after taking office. Figure 1 also speaks to the fact that Nixon’s approval rose to an average of just over 57% in the three-month period immediately following his trip to China.

While this is suggestive of Nixon’s desire to use rapprochement to boost his electoral prospects, it misses a key part of my argument: if rivals know these incentives, then they may
exploit the hawk’s political vulnerabilities to their advantage. If correct, this should clearly be evidenced in how the Chinese interacted with the US in the run-up to Nixon’s historic visit. Specifically, I expect China to be slow to respond to overtures by the US and should use rapprochement to maximum advantage by entering into negotiations at the moment when Nixon’s electoral viability falls so that diplomacy is most urgent for the impending presidential election. Furthermore, after diplomatic contact is initially established, I expect Chinese demands on the US to be inversely related to Nixon’s political support in the US.

Indeed, a close examination of the case shows that, in fact, China repeatedly rebuffed Nixon’s attempts to establish diplomatic ties. I explain below that documents show that China’s first positive response to a series of secret White House communiqués came only after Nixon’s public approval fell below 50% for the first time. Waiting until Nixon faced greater electoral threat greatly enhanced China’s ability to exploit Nixon in these negotiations. I argue that China knew that rapprochement would give Nixon the electoral boost he needed for reelection, and that Nixon was open to making important policy concessions as long as the details of the most sensitive matters remained secret from the public.
4.3 Early Development of Nixon’s China Policy

At the start of Nixon’s presidency, the US had no formal diplomatic ties with China. In fact, China had begun repairing its diplomatic relations with the wider world only a few months earlier, after Beijing suddenly withdrew its diplomatic corps from around the world in 1966 during a particularly extremist phase of the Cultural Revolution. The first indication from Nixon that he intended to pursue a new approach with China can be traced back to an October 1967 *Foreign Affairs* article months before he announced his candidacy for president (Nixon, 1967):

Taking the long view, we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of Nations. There is no place on this planet for a billion of its potentially most able people to live in angry isolation. The world cannot be safe until China changes. Thus our aim, to the extent we can influence the events, shall be to induce change.

The statement in Nixon’s editorial article represents a marked shift in emphasis away from a policy of isolation and containment. It may have been designed to soften his hardline image. Only a few years earlier Nixon had insinuated that the US was fighting a proxy war with China in Vietnam, saying that “A United States defeat in Vietnam means a [Chinese] Communist victory” (PBS, 2010b).

Nixon later recalled the *Foreign Affairs* article in his meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai:

[My] goal is normalization with the People’s Republic... I started down this road in 1967 in an article in *Foreign Affairs*, with some rhetoric. And now we are trying to follow it with action. The goal of normalization is the one which I alone at the outset initiated and it’s my intent to realize this goal. – Richard Nixon to Zhou Enlai, February 24, 1972.4

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4Memorandum of Conversation, Nixon and Zhou, February 24, 1972, p. 10 Memoranda for the President, Box 87, President’s Office Files, Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, National Archives.
Despite (or perhaps because of) Nixon’s public support for a new approach to dealing with China, it was China that extended an offer to resume talks at the upcoming Warsaw talks scheduled for February 20, 1969. Just two days before they were scheduled to go forward, however, China canceled the meetings with U.S. officials. However, because these talks were scheduled to so early in Nixon’s administration, the preparations by the administration should provide a window into the administration’s early expectations for a move toward China. In fact, these early preparations can provide a baseline comparison against the private negotiations that took place over the next three years culminating with Nixon’s visit in February 1972.

I focus on two separate communiqués to the President in advance of the Warsaw talks, one by the State Department and another by National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger. Each recommended a taking a slow approach toward China. Kissinger emphasized the importance of not appearing to be “abandoning our commitments to Taiwan or undermining its position,” as well as not “damaging the interests of our Asian allies, principally Japan.” In Kissinger’s view, the U.S. was being a strong position to be able to dictate the terms of rapprochement with China. The greatest danger lay in the U.S. making contact with China without offending their allies. If the U.S. could avoid an a major uproar, then it would benefit from a drawn-out process of negotiations with China, on specific areas most that were most beneficial to the US position in Asia.

What is at first most obvious about Kissinger’s recommendation is that it lacked any notion of secrecy or privacy about the fact that the U.S. was seeking to deal with the Chinese. Kissinger’s memorandum refers to three options for approaching the Chinese. The most ambitious option was to extend an immediate offer to “negotiate a normalization of relations” with Beijing. Although Kissinger noted that this option entailed “considerable risk” because it could be interpreted as “softness” on the part of the US. The second option was much less committal, and would instead offer only to “enter into serious discussions or negotiations with respect to our policies except the U.S. commitment to Taiwan.” Kissinger conjectured
that the second option was likely to leave Japan and most other Asian countries nervous if there was no immediate response from Beijing, but Taiwan would almost certainly have a “quick and negative response.” Kissinger endorsed a third option, in which he recommended that the US ask the Chinese if they “have any specific proposals to make.”

The State Department, on the other hand, proposed making an “explicit expression of willingness to negotiate normalization” without opening the door to a departure from US ties to Taiwan. This proposal was much riskier than Kissinger’s, namely because it entailed extending an olive branch to China which might not be reciprocated. For the State Department, however, the goal was to “determine how far Peking was prepared to move from its current position…”

As we will see, these early views represent a drastic departure from how negotiations were eventually conducted. The evidence points to these accounts as unrealistically optimistic about the potential for Chinese concessions on U.S. interests. Rather, the hardline approach taken by Kissinger and officials at the State department illustrates just how far Nixon moved U.S. policy over the next few years. Even more problematic for the early view that the U.S. might have greater leverage in dealing with China, if much of the administration, is that fact that the events which followed over the next several months should only have strengthened that view. In perfect succession with Nixon’s push toward negotiations with China, border clashes between China and the Soviet Union escalated drastically on March 2, 1969. In one day of fighting on March 15, 1969, 60 Soviet and more than 800 Chinese were reported either dead or wounded (Robinson, 2002).

In his memoirs, Kissinger (1979) recalled that following the Ussuri River clashes, the “ambiguity vanished, and we moved without further hesitation towards a momentous change in global diplomacy.” Then, on April 21, the People’s Daily published an editorial calling

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5 Kissinger to Nixon, Warsaw Talks, February 11, 1969, pp. 2-4 CF-Europe, Box 700 [1 of 2], National Security Council Files, Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, National Archives.

for the overthrow of the Soviet government. From any perspective, the events that unfolded in the summer of 1969 should have pushed Chinese toward establishing ties with the U.S. (PBS 2010b).

4.4 First Contact

The February Warsaw talks are not the only instance in which China canceled a planned meeting. During the summer of 1969, Nixon wanted to capitalize on the escalating border dispute between China and the Soviet Union in hopes of pressing the Chinese to resume the Warsaw talks. His first message was delivered in August by Secretary of State William P. Rogers while on a tour of Asia. However, Nixon soon grew anxious, and in September 1969 he instructed Ambassador to Poland Walter Stoessel to follow up, but this time to do so privately and to talk directly with the Chinese chargé in Warsaw.7 Kissinger later recalled:

I urged Stoessel to make some contacts first. But he wouldn’t do it because it was so against orthodoxy and in a sense so dangerous vis a vis the Taiwan lobby or China lobby in the Congress...So I brought him back and took him in to see the President and the President instructed him to do what I’d already asked him to do, namely to stop the highest ranking Chinese diplomat he could find at the next social occasion and tell him we wanted to talk.

It took Stoessel several weeks, but on December 3, 1969 he finally found the right opportunity while attending a fashion show in Warsaw. Kissinger said “the Chinese were so stunned when the American approached him that he ran away,” adding that Stoessel pursued him and finally cornered him just to give him the message (PBS 2010a). A few days later, on December 10, “to the amazement” of our Embassy “the Chinese called and said they wanted to pick up the invitation, could they come by, on very short notice,” and they drove up to “the front door with flags on their car I mean with the most conspicuous way

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possible." (PBS, 2010a). The next day Stoessel visited the Chinese Embassy where it was agreed that Warsaw talks should resume in January.\textsuperscript{8}

The Warsaw talks went forward at the Chinese Embassy on January 20, 1970 with meetings between Ambassador Stoessel and the Chinese chargé Lei Yang. Stoessel signaled two rather large policy concessions designed to induce the Chinese into cooperating with the Americans in overcoming a roadblock that halted negotiations with Vietnam. First, Stoessel expressed Nixon’s willingness to reduce U.S. military presence in Southeast Asia, and second, that the US could be inclined to back away from its Taiwan policy of the past two decades. Stoessel then suggested that the US send a representative to Beijing or receive a Chinese emissary in Washington.

Nixon’s electoral support remained high up to this point, with series of polls taken by Gallup showing his approval was above 60%. However, the next month began a steep drop in Nixon’s public approval. The fact that Nixon would offer such strong inducements to the Chinese without any promise of reciprocation indicates that Nixon believed his domestic situation was precarious despite the fact that his public approval had remained strong during this first year. If he did not find resolution to the Vietnam saga as he pledged during the campaign, then Johnson’s war could quickly become Nixon’s war.

The Warsaw talks continued to go well, and Lei Yang returned on February 20, 1970 with Beijing’s answer to the offer to send a US delegation to China, saying that “If the United States government wishes to send a representative of ministerial rank or a special envoy to Beijing...the Chinese Government will be willing to receive him.” This was the first discussion of holding a high-level meeting and for a moment the two sides appeared poised to reach a major breakthrough. However, the statement given by Lei Yang was hardly deferential to Nixon. Instead, Beijing looked to set the agenda for future negotiations by setting the condition that the issue of Taiwan would have to be resolved before the “settlement of other questions” could be achieved. Then, Lei Yang added that China was “fully aware that the

settlement of the Taiwan question requires making every effort to create the conditions."

At first glance, the last part of this statement might appear to be insignificant, but the context of the statement and the fact that it was attached to an offer to receive a high-level representative in China, suggests China was trying to reassure Nixon that it was sensitive to his political situation and understood that future discussions might need to be conducted in secret. In fact, Nixon and Kissinger had for months sought out an alternative backchannel to China through Pakistan as a way to bypass the State Department, which had already proven on numerous occasions to be too obtrusive in its execution of a new China policy. Then, almost a month before the start of the Warsaw talks, Kissinger solicited the Ambassador of Pakistan to deliver another message to the Chinese, that the US was interested in continuing talks “in a more secure manner than Warsaw or in channels that are less widely disseminated within the bureaucracy.”

In this light, it appears likely that Beijing was testing the US by making Taiwan a precondition to further talks while also responding to Kissinger’s appeal for greater secrecy. After all, Mao had been observing the US political scene for some time and seemed to appreciate the importance of political posturing. In an interview during the 1960 presidential campaign, for example, Mao reacted to a heated debate between then presidential candidates John F. Kennedy and Richard Nixon on the status of Taiwan.

It is because the Americans are afraid of war that they use this question for their election campaign. These islands are very close to the mainland and Kennedy makes use of this point to win votes. Nixon has his own idea, saying that these islands must be protected. He also wants to get more votes. The question has given life to the American election campaign (Daily 2010a).


As the U.S. and China closed in on a mutual understanding of each other’s resolve in reaching an accord, China pulled out of the next day’s ambassadorial meeting in protest of the expansion of U.S. military operations to Cambodia. The U.S. Administration believed that a settlement in Vietnam could be achieved “very quickly” if China was willing to make an effort, and Nixon clearly intended to leverage his offer of normalization to solicit China’s help (Times 1970). As for the Chinese, however, the stalemate in Vietnam made them somewhat less inclined to cooperate.\footnote{Elliot to Kissinger, May 20 Sino-US Talk in Warsaw, April 28, 1970,” p. 1 CF-Europe, Box 700 [2 of 2], National Security Council Files, Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, National Archives.} Secretary Rogers sent a memorandum to Nixon arguing that the way China handled the cancelation of the Warsaw talks “clearly implied a continuing interest in the Warsaw dialogue,” that they “attacked the US action in Indochina in milder terms than circumstances might have permitted.”

### 4.5 Backchannel Invitation

After a cooling-off period following the US invasion of Cambodia, Nixon redoubled his efforts to established an alternative forum other than the public Warsaw talks. On June 15, 1970, Nixon instructed the U.S. military attaché, Major General Vernon Walters, to contact his Chinese counterpart in Paris and make clear that any future discussion “on matters of the most extreme sensitivity” would have to be confined “to the President, his personal advisors and his personal representatives unless otherwise agreed.” As was becoming commonplace, the Chinese did not immediately reply. In a memorandum to Nixon on September 12, 1970, Kissinger relayed his frustration that there had not yet been any response from the Chinese, and he bemoaned the fact that there seemed ”no choice but to wait and see if they are willing to respond.”

At this point, the desire on the part of the US to reach an accord with China had been made clear and incontrovertible through a series of inducements and backchannel messages. Given that the Chinese eventually accepted the concept of rapprochement, the delays and
setbacks which defined most of 1969-70 are unlikely to have been based on principle, but rather should be seen in strategic terms. China seemed uninterested in accommodating Nixon’s numerous advances, even as normalization with the US offered China a way to avoid becoming dangerously isolated in the world, not to mention encircled by strategic competitors India, Japan, the US, and increasingly the USSR as a bloody border dispute threatened to explode into general warfare.

In an October interview with *Time* magazine, Nixon gave the most public signal to China yet, saying that “If there is anything I want to do before I die, it is to go to China. If I don’t, I want my children to.” Following the *Time* interview, Nixon made another attempt to establish a reliable backchannel to China. He met personally with the Presidents of Pakistan and Romania and asked them each to convey, once more, his strong desire to open negotiations.

After months of silence, Nixon finally got his reply from Zhou Enlai on December 9, 1970, who stated that “In order to discuss the vacation of Chinese territories called Taiwan, a special envoy of President Nixon will be most welcome in Beijing.” Although positive to some extent, the response clearly sought to limit discussion to the issue of Taiwan. Although this news greeted Nixon just as the latest Gallup poll showed his public approval had fallen to 52%, he decided that he could not accept these terms and gave a reply that he could send an envoy, but that talks cannot be confined to Taiwan.

Once again, just as talks seemed headed toward an impenetrable deadlock, China offered something to give further encouragement. A few days after the exchange, an article ran on the front page of *People’s Daily* of an interview Mao in which exclaimed: “I welcome Nixon’s winning the election. Why? There is a deceptive side of him as well, but there is

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less of it. He is accustomed to use hard tactics, but sometimes also soft ones,” adding that, the “Leftists, moderates and rightists should all be approved to come to China. Why the rightists? The reason is that the moderates and leftists are unable to solve any problem, and right now we must straighten things out with Nixon” [NSA, 2010].

4.6 Initial Kissinger Visit

While on visit to Pakistan as part of a tour of Asia, an incognito Kissinger boarded a 4 a.m. commercial flight on July 9, 1971 and secretly headed to Beijing. This marked the first of two secret visits by Kissinger in advance of Nixon’s visit in February the next year. To address this phase of rapprochement, I focus on Kissinger’s earlier visit to China and his negotiations with Zhou Enlai. The preparations for this visit centered on a briefing book code-named “POLO” and a Scope Paper.

In the opening statement of the POLO briefing book, Kissinger outlined what he thought the Chinese objectives were, and what he believed the US could offer them as leverage in negotiations:

In agreeing to a visit by me and to a subsequent summit, the Chinese are expecting to make major political gains. They will anticipate that the PRC’s prestige will increase enormously, and in effect China will become unequivocally one of the ”big five”; the ROC’S international position will erode very considerably; the PRC’s chances of getting into the UN this year on its terms (i.e. expulsion of the ROC) will rise; and the Soviets will be presented with a new complexity in their confrontation with the Chinese.  

Kissinger then summarized his view of the risk involved if China used his visit to invoke “disarray among US friends and allies in Asia” in order to derive “the maximum possible benefit from it.” Kissinger’s primary fear lay in “The fact that the Chinese want to publicize

my visit.” “If my visit is surfaced,” he continued, “they stand to reap some of those benefits by my very presence in China quite apart from whatever happens afterwards.”

Nixon and Kissinger met in July to review the POLO document and discuss the strategy Kissinger would pursue in negotiations. Nixon’s hand written comments on the front cover of the briefing book instructed Kissinger not to “be so forthcoming on Taiwan,” but if pushed, he wanted Kissinger to “play up our possible move toward [the] Soviets” and to “Put [the Chinese] in fear, Richard Nixon could turn hard on Vietnam,” adding that if “Vietnam [would take] too long” then “Put in more fear re: Japan.”

### 4.7 Kissinger-Zhou Direct Talks

On the evening of his arrival in Beijing on July 9, 1971, Kissinger met with Zhou Enlai for the first time. By that time Nixon’s standing in US public opinion had been hovering at or below 50% approval for 6 months. Kissinger’s first order of business with Zhou Enlai was to reiterate Nixon’s concern “that this mission be secret until after we meet, so we can meet unencumbered by the bureaucracy, free of the past, and with the greatest possible latitude.” Kissinger took the lead first, raising what he hoped were “the two principle purposes for our meeting today and tomorrow.” The first was to arrange a visit to China by President Nixon, and the second, was to settle the Vietnam issue so that it did not continue to interfere in their relationship with each other. For his part, Zhou’s response was to say that each issue should be “linked [sic] up with other items in a wider field.” This reply must have encouraged Kissinger as he prepared to meet with Zhou the next afternoon to begin negotiations.

Zhou immediately set the agenda to Taiwan on the second day, questioning what value Taiwan held for the US, and whether it was really a large issue at all. Then adding that, in

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15 Ibid.
16 Nixon’s handwritten remarks on cover. Ibid.
17 Memorandum of Conversation, July 9, 1971, Afternoon and Evening (4:35pm- 11:20pm), p. 3 China memcons and memos-origina ls July 1971, For the President’s Files, Box 1033, National Security Council Files, Nixon Presidential Material Staff, National Archives.
his view, “it would be inconceivable” that Nixon “could come [to China] without a clearcut attitude on this issue.”\(^{18}\) Kissinger cut in, saying “I would like to reply now.” What followed from Kissinger reads very much like a tirade on his part: “You, Mr. Prime Minister, followed very faithfully the presentation which I made yesterday, and dealt with both topics.” He continued, saying that the “idea [of a visit by Nixon] resulted from your initiative which we are happy to accept,” and “since this is your invitation, I will say no more about it,” but “we will have to decide at the end of our discussion whether this is an item we would wish to include in our announcement if there is an announcement.”\(^{19}\)

Kissinger went on to stress to Zhou that reaching an agreement now would be much preferred over doing so after his departure, “which could be more complicated, bureaucratic and less related to the general direction of our policies.” The fact that Kissinger was so quick to put Zhou on the defensive in order to secure an agreement on Nixon’s visit, and not on any other issue, shows how important this opportunity was to Nixon. He simply could not let this opportunity to be the first American president to visit China slip away.

As negotiations continued on into the second day of his visit, Kissinger made it known that the U.S. would withdraw two-thirds of its troops stationed in Taiwan “within a specific brief period of time” after the end of hostilities in Vietnam, with the rest to follow depending on the general state of US-China relations. Zhou conceded that China could wait for U.S. recognition of China’s claim to Taiwan, but it would require 3 assurances: 1) the US would not support two China’s policy; 2) the US would not support indigenous Taiwan independence; and 3) the US would not support Japanese troops to be stationed in Taiwan.

On Vietnam, Kissinger was unable to secure a substantive commitment from China; this is despite the fact that Vietnam was given more time than any other topic. Instead, Zhou stated only China’s main objectives, which were to remove US and allied forces and to ask that the Vietnamese be allowed to determine their own future without U.S. interference. He promised that China would likewise stay out of the affairs of Vietnam after a settlement was

\(^{18}\)Ibid.  
\(^{19}\)Ibid.
reached. Kissinger went into great detail with Zhou about precisely where negotiations stood with the North Vietnamese. There would be a very good chance for a rapid peace, Kissinger said, “If Hanoi was willing to accept a fixed date for our complete withdrawal, a ceasefire, a release of prisoners, and a guaranteed international status for South Vietnam, which can be guaranteed by any group of countries, including yourself.” Kissinger threatened that without agreement on these principles the war would have to continue. Then, as if he wanted to wink at Zhou, Kissinger added that “We know that after peace is made we will be ten thousand miles away, and they will still be there.”

Finally, on the morning of Kissinger’s departure, Zhou returned to the subject of Vietnam and added that “he would talk to Hanoi after the announcement of the President’s visit to Peking had been made.” Back in the United State, Kissinger later wrote that, “the mere fact of his talking to them is likely to compound the shock of our announcement.”

4.8 The Announcement

On the evening of July 15, 1971, two days after Kissinger returned from his secret negotiations with Zhou Enlai, Nixon appeared on TV to announce that he will visit China in the early part of 1972. How to publicly address the content of the secret negotiations that led to this point consumed much of the administrations thinking in making the announcement. The morning before the announcement, Secretary of State Rogers told Kissinger that “we ought to think about what we are going to do on Chinese representation [in the United Nations],” suggesting that “we should take a look at my statement on universality. That avoids the political problems of the two Chinas.” Realizing that this would have raised a major problem with Beijing, Kissinger objected that “If you say universality that means that Taiwan ought to be represented.”

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20Ibid.
21Ibid.
22Rogers to Kissinger, Telecon, 7/17/71 9:18 a.m.
23Ibid.
Rogers wanted to know “What is the reason that we should change our position [on Chinese representation at the United Nations]?” \(^{24}\) There were only two possibilities according to Rogers: either “something resulted from the trip” or “we believe any nation which exists should be represented.” \(^{25}\) However, Kissinger raised a third possibility, which was to take the position that “if a country has been in the UN, [then] to expel it is something so important that it should only be done by a 2/3 vote.” \(^{26}\) Rogers relayed his frustration, referring to Kissinger’s third possibility as “only a rationale.” \(^{27}\) He went on to say that “we are in the same place [even] if we win and I think we’ll lose. I feel sure it’s going to be construed that we made a deal and Taiwan went down the drain.” \(^{28}\)

The course of events that followed the announcement underscores the administrations vulnerability to accusations that there had been a secret deal made with China that could jeopardize U.S. ties with Taiwan. On August 2, 1971, the U.S. administration announced that it would no longer oppose China’s admission to the U.N., but would not vote to expel the Nationalists \(^{\text{PBS 2010b}}\). This provoked the Chinese Foreign Ministry into issuing a stern condemnation of America’s proposed ”two-China” policy as a ”gross insult to the U.N. charter” \(^{\text{PBS 2010b}}\). Then, on October 25, the U.N. General Assembly voted to seat China and expel Taiwan.

With his presidential approval remaining at 50% for months, the political fallout surrounding the announcement and the U.N. vote prevented Nixon from enjoying the public support he might have envision. George Bush, the U.S. ambassador to the U.N., complained that is was Kissinger’s presence in Beijing during the vote that ensured Taiwan’s removal from the U.N. General Assembly \(^{\text{PBS 2010b}}\). Then just three days after the U.N. vote to admit China, the Democratic majority in the U.S. Senate voted 192 to 21 to block a bill that contained $141 million in aid for the U.N. The vote split along party lines with a majority

\(^{24}\text{Ibid.}\)
\(^{25}\text{Ibid.}\)
\(^{26}\text{Ibid.}\)
\(^{27}\text{Ibid.}\)
\(^{28}\text{Ibid.}\)
of Senate Republicans and President Nixon supporting the bill \cite{Rohde2004}.

Nixon left for China on February 21, 1972. At the end of their meetings the U.S. and China issued a joint statement in which the U.S. acknowledged that there is only one China and that Taiwan is part of China. Also in the agreement, the U.S. affirmed its “ultimate objective” is the “the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan.”

Although Senate Democrats were able to mobilize opposition to the U.N. decision to unseat Taiwan, this put the Democrats in the unfavorable position of objecting to the sentiment of a 2/3rds majority vote in the General Assembly. Nixon’s careful management of the secret negotiations allowed him to revise US-China and US-Taiwan relations as a fait accompli. This highlights the benefits of Nixon’s pursuit of strict secrecy in the initial steps toward rapprochement. Had the Democrats been able to raise objections during the crucial period where Nixon sought to established a back-channel to communicate with China, they would have forced the administration to deny its intentions before the U.N. majority vote could be invoked to provide cover.

4.9 Conclusion

Despite a conventional wisdom that argues hawks have an advantage over doves in their relations towards a rival state, the case of “Nixon goes to China” highlights the more general argument outlined in this study. It shows that, even in this example, Nixon’s reputation as a hawk hampered U.S. interests. In fact, China exploited Nixon’s domestic political vulnerability, knowing that Nixon willing to make relatively more concessions than was China. Recall that the largest concession lay on the American side – its commitment, though at an unspecified date, to withdraw troops from Taiwan, while in return, the largest concession from the Chinese was a vague promise to “talk to Hanoi after the announcement of the President’s visit to Peking had been made.”

This is offered as an explanation for two puzzling facts. If hawks enjoy an advantage in dealing with a rival state, then why did Nixon need to pursue strict secrecy during the
negotiations held in advance of his visit? If rapprochement with China was successful only because Nixon was able to keep it secret, then audience costs do not convey information to the opposing state.

Furthermore, why did Nixon not campaign on opening China in the 1968 election when he won only by a narrow margin of less than 1%? The explanation offered here has implications for a fourth literature that highlights the informational advantages of making public threats in international negotiations. I argue that reputation and the resolve may be intervening variables. Kurizaki (2007) asks why in some crises leader’s conduct diplomacy almost entirely with public threats and pronouncements, while in others they choose to keep their negotiations private. An interesting extension of the framework here might respond to Kurizaki by arguing that while Kennedy (and Johnson after him) had to go public to reassure his domestic audiences that he was not going to be exploited, Nixon needed to stay private to ensure that no one knew the full extent to which he was being exploited.
CHAPTER 5

TAKING STOCK AND GOING FORWARD

There is, strictly speaking, no separate animal that we can identify as an institution. There is only rational behavior, conditioned on expectations about the behavior and reactions of others. When these expectations about others behavior take on a particularly clear and concrete form across individuals, when they apply to situations that recur over a long period of time, and especially when they involve highly variegated and specific expectations about the different roles of different actors in determining what actions others should take, we often collect these expectations and strategies under the heading institution.

- Calvert (1995, 73-74)

5.1 Taking Stock of the Politics of Opposites

In his seminal article, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” Fearon (1995, 382) postulated that “The main theoretical task facing students of war is not to add to the already long list of arguments and conjectures but instead to take apart and reassemble these diverse arguments into a coherent theory fit for guiding empirical research.” This dissertation offers a single theoretical framework that produces new and testable hypotheses about various foreign policy outcomes that had previously been the mainstay of at least three separate literatures. These literatures grew out of diverse traditions that span across qualitative case studies, formal theoretical approaches, and large-N analyses. Nevertheless, they all shared a common set of motivating assumptions: leaders make foreign policy in their own interests, and competitors anticipate the incentives of their counterpart.
The theoretical framework leverages these assumptions to address the presence and absence of strategic avoidance at the international level, between rival states, and at the domestic level, between competing political parties. Although these interactions at the domestic and international levels have previously treated separately, this project shows that in order to account for the presence and absence of strategic avoidance, scholars should take account of the fact that the interactions at one level, either between competing states or political parties, also affects the interactions at the other level.

This project appeals to the fact that, while both branches of literature argue that leaders have incentives to appear moderate in their choice of foreign policy, neither branch incorporates the domestic political environment which might motivate a leader to pursue the benefits of taking a more moderate approach in foreign policy. This brought me to a third literature that argues that leaders may respond to electoral threat by instigating hostilities. However, in more than 30 years of research, this literature has been beset by inconsistent findings and consistent revision. Nevertheless, the shared insights of each of these literatures produced a new theoretical framework. Namely, at the intersection of these literatures is an argument for separating a leader’s foreign policy preferences from their strategic environment in which they interact with one another.

By combining the preferences and incentives motivating actors at the domestic and international level, and the information available to each actor, this project introduced a series of new hypotheses about the influence of domestic politics on foreign policy which found promising support in a variety of contexts and empirical tests. Moreover, evidence raises additional stylized facts about the domestic determinants of foreign policy, such as the overall lack of Congressional opposition during the Cold War, and uncovers new empirical puzzles, such as why hawks were disproportionately more likely to experience opposition during the Cold War. It also contains important policy implications, for instance, about the timing and direction of peace negotiations which were supported in a reexamination of the canonical case of rapprochement between the U.S. and China. The scope of the evidence presented
here supports a move “From State Foreign Policy to Strategic Interaction.”

Beyond these broad empirical claims, however, the empirical analysis supports several statistical modeling techniques. Namely, it supports the notion that future research need to observe the behavior of potential targets in order to uncover a relationship between domestic factors and foreign policy. Furthermore, the analysis eschews dichotomous measures of conflict initiation, typically aggregated in one-year intervals, which is common even among studies testing strategic based claims. Instead, it supports using more fine grained measurements of conflict and cooperation that allow scholars to account for the action-reaction that comprises many strategic based theories, and to provide better empirical tests of strategic interaction.

By advancing the prospect of discovering a natural ebb and flow of relations inside of an interstate rivalry, the project also contains an important policy prescription which holds out hope for improved international conflict management. Considering that 45% of all militarized interstate disputes and more than half of all wars occur between states deemed to be international rivals (Goertz and Diehl [1993]), there are few questions of greater current relevance than those that concern the prospects for rapprochement between embittered rivals. Namely, the project locates a set of conditions that make one side of a rivalry more likely to cooperate. While the conclusions drawn here remain tentative and await further empirical analysis that extends the spatial and temporal domain, the theory is straightforward enough to help facilitate real-world diplomacy.

5.2 Going Forward with the Politics of Opposites

The dissertation features an ambitious theoretical account to explain the dynamics of competitive relationships by highlighting interstate rivalry and two-party competition for office. In principle, the politics of opposites should apply to the foreign policies of a wide range of democratic countries enmeshed in interstate rivalries. However, a future project should explore the assumption of two-party competition for office, which applies most notably to the
United States. By relaxing this assumption, future research would be able to test the basic framework in countries with multi-party systems. The United Kingdom would provide an interesting test case. Although third-parties routinely compete in British national elections, the single-member districts and majoritarian electoral rules have historically produced an environment dominated by two-party competition.\(^1\) Moreover, the United Kingdom’s experience over a number of interstate rivalries at different periods in their nation’s history could be leveraged to develop a comparative test of the various causal mechanisms identified by the theory.

In countries with proportional representation, expectations about the direction that policy will move is somewhat more complicated. However, one approach to generate these expectations is to estimate the distribution of voter ideal points across a left-right foreign policy continuum [Lewis (2001)]. The high payoff of pursuing this avenue in future research is that it would allow one to greatly expand the theory’s domain and allow research into contemporary rivalries such as India-Pakistan or Israel-Lebanon. If the theory could be shown to be useful these diverse contexts it would have immediate policy relevance.

Another avenue for future research attempt to generalize the argument to other areas of international relations that fall outside of the context of interstate rivalry. The context of interstate rivalry is important to the theoretical framework presented here because it produces strong incentives for domestic and international competitors to anticipate the likely future behavior of a counterpart. However, this has implications for other types of highly competitive relationships. The next project should examine these assumption in other domains of international relations research. For example, it would be exciting to explore whether terror organizations target democratic states that are experiencing electorally distressed. Already there has been a recent large-N study showing governments of the left are more likely to become targets of a terror attack [Kroch and Cranmer (2007)]. The implicit goal in all these

\(^1\)A large literature explains this phenomenon by appealing to Duvergers Law. That is, the claim that political party competition in electoral systems characterized by single member districts and majoritarian voting will reduce the number of (effective) competing parties to two (See Grofman 2003, 44).
projects would be to find the edge of anticipated reactions.
APPENDIX A

(Positive values signify Cooperation and Negative values Hostility)

Figure 1: Reciprocation of Cooperation and Hostility from Non-Rivals
**Table 1:** Crises Involving the United States, 1966-1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name and Date</th>
<th>States Involved</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Rally Size and Partisanship Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USS Pueblo Seized 01/25/1968</td>
<td>N. Korea, S. Korea, U.S.</td>
<td>Defeat</td>
<td>Rally:8 Partisanship:.290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC-121 Spy Plane 04/17/1969</td>
<td>N. Korea, U.S.</td>
<td>Stalemate</td>
<td>Rally:2 Partisanship:.650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam Ports Mining 05/08/1972</td>
<td>N. Vietnam, U.S.</td>
<td>Compromise</td>
<td>Rally:9 Partisanship:.868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayaguez Seizure 05/14/1975</td>
<td>Egypt, Israel, Syria, USSR, U.S.</td>
<td>Victory</td>
<td>Rally:11 Partisanship:10.649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poplar Tree 08/19/1976</td>
<td>N. Korea, U.S.</td>
<td>Compromise</td>
<td>Rally:8 Partisanship:.316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaba II 05/16/1978</td>
<td>Zaire, Angola, Belgium, France, U.S.</td>
<td>Victory</td>
<td>Rally:2 Partisanship:.315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan Invasion 01/02/1979</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Pakistan, USSR, U.S.</td>
<td>Stalemate</td>
<td>Rally:2 Partisanship:.218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iranian Hostages 04/11/1979</td>
<td>Iran, U.S.</td>
<td>Compromise</td>
<td>Rally:2 Partisanship:.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua Mig-21s 11/07/1984</td>
<td>Nicaragua, U.S.</td>
<td>Stalemate</td>
<td>Rally:3 Partisanship:1.108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulf of Syrte II 04/09/1986</td>
<td>Libya, U.S.</td>
<td>Victory</td>
<td>Rally:1 Partisanship:.359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libyan Jets 01/04/1988</td>
<td>Libya, U.S.</td>
<td>Victory</td>
<td>Rally:6 Partisanship:.183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invasion of Panama 12/20/1989</td>
<td>Panama, U.S.</td>
<td>Victory</td>
<td>Rally:9 Partisanship:.311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulf War I 01/17/1990</td>
<td>Iraq, Saudi Arabia, U.S.</td>
<td>Victory</td>
<td>Rally:28 Partisanship:.200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Detailed summaries for each crisis can be viewed at the online home of the Wilkenfeld and Eralp (2009) project: [http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/](http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/)
Table 2: Weights for WEIS Events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event Type</th>
<th>Weight</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military attack, clash, assault</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seize position or possessions</td>
<td>-9.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonmilitary destruction/injury</td>
<td>-8.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noninjury destructive action</td>
<td>-8.3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed force mobilization, exercise, display, military buildup</td>
<td>-7.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Break diplomatic relations</td>
<td>-7.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat with force specified</td>
<td>-7.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ultimatum, threat with negative sanction and time limit</td>
<td>-6.9</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat with specific negative nonmilitary sanction</td>
<td>-5.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce or cut off aid or assistance, act to punish/deprive</td>
<td>-5.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonmilitary demonstration, walk out on</td>
<td>-5.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Order person or personnel out of country</td>
<td>-5.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expel organization or group</td>
<td>-4.9</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue order or command, insist, demand compliance</td>
<td>-4.9</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat without specific negative sanction stated</td>
<td>-4.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detain or arrest person(s)</td>
<td>-4.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce routine international activity, recall officials</td>
<td>-4.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refuse, oppose, refuse to allow</td>
<td>-4.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turn down proposal, reject protest, demand, threat</td>
<td>-4.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halt Negotiation</td>
<td>-3.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denounce, denigrate, abuse</td>
<td>-3.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Give warning</td>
<td>-3.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue formal complaint or protest</td>
<td>-2.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charge, criticize, blame, disapprove</td>
<td>-2.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cancel or protest planned event</td>
<td>-2.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make complaint (not formal)</td>
<td>-1.9</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant asylum</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deny an attributed policy, action, role, or position</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deny an accusation</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comment on situation</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urge or suggest action or policy</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explain or state policy, state future position</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ask for information</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surrender, yield to order, submit to arrest</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yield to position, retreat, evacuate</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meet with, send note</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entreat, Plead, appeal to, beg</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offer proposal</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Express regret, apologize</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visit, go to</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Release and/or return persons or property</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admit wrongdoing, apologize, retract statement</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Give state invitation</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assure, reassure</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receive visit, host</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspend sanctions, end punishment, call truce</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree to future action or procedure, to meet, or to negotiate</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ask for policy assistance</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ask for material assistance</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Praise, hail, applaud, extend condolences</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endorse other’s policy or position, give verbal support</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promise other future support</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promise own policy support</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promise material support</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant privilege, diplomatic recognition, de facto relations</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Give other assistance</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make substantive agreement</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extend economic aid, give, buy, sell, loan, borrow</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extend military assistance</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table was reproduced from [Goldstein (1992)](Goldstein1992).
Table 3: Soviet Union’s Cold War Behavior Towards the U.S.

Dovishness given by President’s Party Affiliation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Democrat</th>
<th>0.093</th>
<th>0.228</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.867)</td>
<td>(0.751)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Approval</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat x Presidential Approval</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>0.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Election</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.191</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.099)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. at War</td>
<td>-0.281*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.129)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union at War</td>
<td>-0.856***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.139)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Behavior toward the Soviet Union</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.055)</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lag 1</td>
<td>0.274***</td>
<td>0.199***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lag 2</td>
<td>0.184**</td>
<td>0.112</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.068)</td>
<td>(0.063)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lag 3</td>
<td>0.172***</td>
<td>0.115**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.041)</td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.630</td>
<td>-0.581</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.784)</td>
<td>(0.627)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>303</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.350</td>
<td>0.393</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed).
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses.
‘U.S. Dovishness’ measured with Democrats are doves


Foster, Dennis. 2008. “'Comfort to our Adversaries'? Partisan Ideology, Domestic Vulnerability, and Strategic Targeting,” Foreign Policy Analysis 4:419–436.


**URL:** [http://www.gwu.edu/nsarchiv/](http://www.gwu.edu/nsarchiv/)


**URL:** [http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/china/sfeature/kissinger.html](http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/china/sfeature/kissinger.html)


**URL:** [http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/china/index.html](http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/china/index.html)


BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Jeffrey R. Weber was born in Cape Coral, Florida. He received a Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science from Bemidji State University in 2003. He attended Kansas State University and received a Master of Arts degree in Political Science in 2005. In 2005 he enrolled in the doctoral program at Florida State University.

Jeffrey’s research interests include international security, foreign policy decision-making, and quantitative methodology. He is particularly interested how domestic political institutions such as elections, and public opinion influence the onset and termination of interstate rivalry.