You are here

Against Reason a Defense of Moderate Normative Skepticism

Title: Against Reason a Defense of Moderate Normative Skepticism.
4 views
1 downloads
Name(s): Vadakin, Aron, author
Mele, Alfred R., 1951-, professor directing dissertation
Kavka, Martin, university representative
Rawling, Piers, committee member
Clarke, Randolph K., committee member
Florida State University, degree granting institution
College of Arts and Sciences, degree granting college
Department of Philosophy, degree granting department
Type of Resource: text
Genre: Text
Doctoral Thesis
Issuance: monographic
Date Issued: 2017
Publisher: Florida State University
Place of Publication: Tallahassee, Florida
Physical Form: computer
online resource
Extent: 1 online resource (161 pages)
Language(s): English
Abstract/Description: This dissertation both surveys contemporary work in metanormativity and argues for a position that I call moderate normative skepticism. I begin by evaluating efforts to characterize the normative domain and conclude that while some normative concepts and properties are amenable to naturalistic programs of reduction and analysis, other normative concepts and properties are not. I proceed to clarify accounts of reasons, reasoning, and rationality; this establishes argumentative room to maneuver for my moderate normative skepticism. Next, I evaluate moral error theories, which I count as close cousins of my own thesis, and I note how these error theories have more profound implications than their authors realize. I claim that, understood properly, these error theories extend to the domain of normative reasons in general. I accept and defend the extension of error theory as a viable position. In the final chapter of my dissertation, I defend my position against charges of self-defeat and attempt to anticipate and defuse potential criticisms.
Identifier: FSU_FALL2017_Vadakin_fsu_0071E_14258 (IID)
Submitted Note: A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
Degree Awarded: Fall Semester 2017.
Date of Defense: November 08, 2017.
Keywords: Error theory, Metaethics, Metanormativity, Normativity, Reasons, Skepticism
Bibliography Note: Includes bibliographical references.
Advisory Committee: Alfred Mele, Professor Directing Dissertation; Martin Kavka, University Representative; Piers Rawling, Committee Member; Randolph Clarke, Committee Member.
Subject(s): Philosophy
Ethics
Persistent Link to This Record: http://purl.flvc.org/fsu/fd/FSU_FALL2017_Vadakin_fsu_0071E_14258
Owner Institution: FSU

Choose the citation style.
Vadakin, A. (2017). Against Reason a Defense of Moderate Normative Skepticism. Retrieved from http://purl.flvc.org/fsu/fd/FSU_FALL2017_Vadakin_fsu_0071E_14258