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Voter-Party Linkage Strategies and Democratic Survival

Title: Voter-Party Linkage Strategies and Democratic Survival.
Name(s): Dugan, Amanda, author
Political Science
Type of Resource: text
Genre: Text
Issuance: serial
Date Issued: 2012
Physical Form: computer
online resource
Extent: 1 online resource
Language(s): English
Abstract/Description: Economic development is widely known to stabilize democratic regimes. Models of distributional conflict have revealed that with increased average income, the ability of political parties to agree on redistribution rates grows. A key assumption of such models is that parties are programmatic and will enact their mandates once elected. Yet, political parties vary in their dedication to programmatic platforms. Some parties are quite programmatic, only enacting policies that voters endorse, while others are less programmatic, preferring to attract voters using clientelism. This suggests the possibility that countries with mostly clientelistic parties could experience less conflict over redistribution rates because there would be an absence of parties compelled to represent the poor once in office. In this paper, I relax the assumption in this model that parties always follow their mandates once in office, and I test the hypothesis that countries with clientelistic parties experience increased regime stability.
Identifier: FSU_migr_uhm-0108 (IID)
Submitted Note: A Thesis submitted to the Department of Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Honors in the Major.
Degree Awarded: Spring Semester, 2013.
Date of Defense: April 9, 2012.
Subject(s): America -- Politics and government
Political science
Persistent Link to This Record:
Owner Institution: FSU
Is Part of Series: Honors Theses.

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Dugan, A. (2012). Voter-Party Linkage Strategies and Democratic Survival. Retrieved from