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Why the United States Must End the Second Cold War as It Begins

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WHY THE UNITED STATES MUST END THE SECOND COLD WAR AS IT BEGINS

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To my wife Janelle.
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ABSTRACT

The Cold War ended with the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. Things were fine for a time, but in recent years tensions have begun to emerge between these two nations. Policy makers in both Washington and Moscow seem to be reverting to their old habits of a Cold War mentality, and some have even said that we are witnessing the beginnings of a Second Cold War. But Cold War is not a natural state. In the over one-hundred and fifty year history of relations between the United States and Russia, only forty of those years made up the Cold War. The majority of these years were characterized by peace, and there were even times when the two called each other allies. Now must be another of those times.

The global threats of international terrorism, nuclear containment and proliferation, and plateauing energy supplies cannot be resolved by either the United States or Russia alone. Working for cross-purposes on these issues would lead to failure on both sides. However, due to the existing high tensions over American Anti-Ballistic Missile Diplomacy, NATO expansion into Eastern Europe, and Russia’s invasion of Georgia, fruitful negotiations on these issues would be next to impossible at the present time.

The solution must be a confidence building measure, but one as far from Eastern Europe and the Caucuses as possible; one excellent opportunity is in Japan. Near the end of World War II, the issue of Russian involvement in the war with Japan was one of the issues of contention which would lead to the Cold War. Because of America’s role in Japan during the Cold War, Japan and the Soviet Union would never reach a peace agreement officially ending World War II. Since the end of the Cold War, low
motivation and a minor border dispute have kept the two from reaching an official peace agreement. America’s role in these negotiations will be to nudge the two towards peace, while at the same time signaling to Russia that the Cold War is officially over and that the United States is open to discussions on the true issues of contention.

The United States needs Russia’s help with its greatest challenges as it continues in the twenty-first century. The time to end the Second Cold War is now.
INTRODUCTION

By any account, the first decade of the twentieth century has seen a decline in the global standing of the United States, and some have even said that this marks the beginning of the end of the United States’ global hegemony.1 This is due in part to the American response to the events of September, 2001. Initially after the terrorist attacks, the world stood in solidarity with the United States.2 However in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, the United States developed an adversarial, Manichaean foreign policy based on a good versus evil, “with us or … against us” dynamic.3 This has alienated potential friends and old allies, and so the United States has seen a major decline in its influence, or soft power.4

There is a temptation by some to place blame for the loss of this power, but this point is counter-productive. It is critical that the United States regain its global standing in the world as well as its global influence, but placing blame will not remedy the situation. An opportunity awaits us around the corner: in 2009 a new president will enter the White House, and in this atmosphere the world will be very sensitive to changes in American foreign policy. Thus, small changes during this time will have the opportunity to make a large impact on the

international scene. There are, of course, many places where this opportunity could be used, but this effort should be focused where it would most strengthen a relationship with an international power whose interests on the significant issues of our time most closely reflect ours. Russia fits this profile perfectly.

Some have claimed that the United States and Russia are entering into a Second Cold War. Undoubtedly, in recent years there has been a significant rise in tensions between the United States and Russia. These are most apparent in Russia’s steadfast objections to both the expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe, and to the American proposed Eastern European based anti-ballistic missile system, as well as the recent Russian invasion into Georgia, and recognition of its two breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

The United States should strive to end this emerging Cold War as it begins because high tensions between Russia and the United States are not the norm in Russo-American history. More pragmatically, America’s greatest challenges in the twenty-first century — international terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and plateauing energy supplies — all have two things in common: they are challenges that must be met multilaterally, and they are challenges with which the United States and Russia share common goals.

However, beginning negotiations with Russia on these important issues is problematic. If America begins by conceding to Russia’s demands against the expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe and the American proposed Eastern European based missile defense system, the United States will look weak, especially in light of Russia’s invasion of Georgia. Similarly, the United States cannot dive directly into negotiations on international terrorism and nuclear proliferation, because relations have become so fractured that serious

negotiations on these issues would not be possible without first resolving the issues in Eastern Europe and the Caucuses.

The solution is simple: to open the door to these necessary negotiations with Russia, America must begin over an issue that is off the radar, an issue that neither side has strong feelings about and thus can easily reach a compromise. This confidence building measure must be based upon something that the United States and Russia disagree, but must also be based upon something minor enough that neither side has a passionate view that would prevent compromise. Because the most contentious issues between Russia and the United States are located in Eastern Europe, an issue geographically far from Europe would be one of the best places to look for this compromise, and one excellent opportunity for this is in East Asia. The United States has a history of negotiating peace between Russia and Japan, and due in large part to the United States’ actions during the Cold War, the these two nations never technically signed a peace treaty ending the Second World War. Acknowledging these facts and offering peace in East Asia would be an indirect method of telling Russia that the United States is willing to end its adversarial stance, and would signal a desire to begin work on those issues that truly matter to both sides.
CHAPTER ONE: ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF PEACE BETWEEN RUSSIA AND AMERICA

When looking at the history of the relations between the United States and Russia, it is tempting to be drawn to the hostile dualism of the Cold War, but it is important to realize that relations between the Russia and America have been far from static. As these countries emerged as superpowers, there were times when Russo-American relations have been cordial and friendly. There have even been times when the United States has been allied with Russia. Understanding the history of Russo-American relations will go a long way to understanding that friendly relations with Russia are absolutely attainable.

Early Relations between the United States and Russia

During the nineteenth century, the United States was emerging as a world power as it expanded its territory across the North American continent. Meanwhile, Russia was an established world power that was beginning to overextend itself territorially. It was expending military resources fighting against the Uzbeks and Kazakhs in Central Asia, while at the same time expanding into North America in both Alaska and California. The first significant diplomatic missions between the United States and Russia would occur during this time.

After losing interest in California, Russia decided to sell its only claim there, Fort Ross, to America in 1842. As America continued to expand, it entered negotiations with Russia and would purchase Alaska from Russia a

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quarter of a century later in 1867. Relations between the United States and Russia would remain cordial through the end of the nineteenth century, until 1905 when the United States offered itself as a mediator for the peace negotiations between Russia and Japan at the end of the Russo-Japanese War.

The War to End All Wars Leads to Revolution in Russia

It has always been tempting to view the First World War through the prism of the American involvement in it, but it is important to remember that America remained neutral throughout much of the conflict. On the other hand, Russia was in the war from the beginning, and without a doubt the war had a more lasting effect on Russia. Situated in Europe, Russia found itself in some of the harshest fighting and absorbed some of the worst losses of the war.

During the four years of the war, the Russians lost approximately one and a half million troops in battle, as compared to Britain’s seven hundred thousand and the United States’ one hundred thousand. If this was not enough, Russia would lose another one and a half million civilians to famine and plague during this time. Though in hindsight we can see that the war was close to won when the United States entered the war in 1917, this tremendous loss would lead to extreme popular discontent — which, in turn, led to the Russian Revolution.

As the Russian people recoiled at the heavy losses they had suffered in the First World War, they were equally furious with their autocratic government that had gotten them into the war. This unrest culminated in the Spring 1917 Revolution, which overthrew the Czarist government and replaced it with a

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8 Ibid. pp. 13, 86.
provisional government with a parliamentary system.\textsuperscript{11} While a dramatic change within Russia, this did not significantly change its relations with America or the rest of the world. The new government maintained the old alliance structure of its predecessor, and as a result, stayed in World War I. But the war was not ending quickly enough for the Russian population, and the same unrest that had brought down the Czar would soon bring down the provisional government.

In October 1917, the provisional government in Russia was overthrown in what would become known as the Communist Revolution. This event would mark a significant departure from Russia’s previous foreign policy; not only had a Communist party overtaken the government of a major world power, it had also postponed the Entente victory in the World War. Understandably, this led to a significant cooling in Russian relations with America and the rest of the world.\textsuperscript{12}

\textit{The Washington Conference}

It is a popular misperception that the United States pursued a policy of strict isolationism following the First World War. While it is true that America did not join the League of Nations after participating in the 1919 Paris Peace conference, it did hold an important conference in Washington to discuss military buildup in Asia. The main purpose of this Washington Conference was

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to reduce fleet levels in the Pacific, though one important subplot also emerged during the conference: the role of Communist Russia.  

In 1917, Japan invaded the nearby Russian territory of Siberia in response to the Communist Revolution.  

Even though the United States did not invite the newly formed Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Washington Conference, the American officials at the conference remained in close contact with a newly formed government, the “Independent Far Eastern Republic of Siberia,” which was opposed to the Japanese occupation. Throughout the conference, one of America’s main goals was to stop Japan from gaining a significant foothold in continental Asia and trusting the Independent Far Eastern Republic of Siberia was a third option beyond letting Japan keep Siberia or returning the lands to the Soviet Union.

Unfortunately, the United States trusted the Independent Far Eastern Republic of Siberia too implicitly. Documents would later show that it was a “Trojan Horse,” a deliberate strategy of the Soviet government to “break the blockade with the help of America and clear the [Russian] Far East of the Japanese exclusively through American pressure.” The American diplomats were misled by this ruse, and pushed Japan to withdraw from Siberia, and Japan complied. However unwittingly, America played a large part in reuniting Siberia with Russia in the aftermath of the Soviet Revolution.

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16 Ibid, p. 79.
The Global Communist Revolution and the Beginning of the Russo-American Divide

America and the other world powers feared the Soviet Union for a very clear reason: one of the stated goals of the new government was to spark Communist revolutions in other countries around the world. Toward this end, the Congress of the Communist International or Comintern was created in Soviet Russia as a meeting place for Communist party leaders from around the world. Because the new Russian government was essentially calling for a worldwide Communist revolution, the Soviet Union understandably found itself isolated from the international community, and anti-communist backlashes occurred in America and across the world.\(^{18}\)

In hindsight, it is important to realize that the Comintern was virtually a complete failure. It failed to spark a successful Communist revolution in Europe, in any of the colonies of the imperial powers, or in North or South America. In fact, the one exception to this failure was Mongolia. Though this success is worth noting, it is important to also note that this revolution was only a success due to the presence of the Soviet Army.\(^{19}\) In the end, despite the Comintern’s stated goals, it would turn out that America had little to fear from it.

Russo-American Relations Rise and Fall during the Second World War

It is important to remember that during the Second World War, America and the Soviet Union were allies in the Western Front. For almost four years, they worked together toward the defeat of Nazi Germany. By 1945, the war in the European theater was coming to a close, and the allies began to prepare for

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the coming post-war world. These coalesced into the form of the February 1945 Yalta Conference.\textsuperscript{20} There, the United States and Russia would discuss several issues including the formation of the United Nations, democratic elections in Poland, and the establishment of a Soviet sphere of influence in Poland, and Russia joining the war against Japan.\textsuperscript{21}

Mirroring the fears of the Comintern, some American politicians would soon object to the agreements made in Yalta, saying that the United States had given too much away to the Soviets and that the results of the Yalta Conference had been detrimental to national security.\textsuperscript{22} Two months after the conference, president Roosevelt would die and his successor would take a much harder line toward the Soviets.\textsuperscript{23}

The next conference between the United States and Russia at Potsdam was fundamentally different than the previous Yalta conference; the main aim of this new conference was the restructuring of Europe. The United States struck a much more adversarial tone at Potsdam, mainly about the Russian sphere of influence in Poland.\textsuperscript{24} Thanks to declassified documents, a picture emerged as to why the new administration was so much more aggressive in its diplomacy at Potsdam. This reason would quickly become one of the major dynamics that would define the Cold War.

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{20} Athan G. Theoharis, \textit{The Yalta Myths}, (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1970), pp. 11.
  \item \textsuperscript{21} Ibid. pp. 12-17.
  \item \textsuperscript{22} Ibid. p1.
  \item \textsuperscript{24} Ibid. pp. 77-78.
\end{itemize}
Atomic Diplomacy and the Beginnings of the Cold War

The term “Atomic Diplomacy” was coined in reference to the newfound confidence that the American delegates showed at Potsdam and thereafter, due to the invention of the atomic bomb. While it was controversial at first, this supposition is now widely accepted in many scholarly writings25, and even by members of the Japanese government who “do not hold a grudge against the United States” for dropping the two atomic bombs, because it prevented the Soviet Union from entering the war with Japan.26

The concept behind Atomic Diplomacy is not that America ever directly threatened the Soviets with the bomb, but that the new weapon gave the American administration the confidence “to reverse decisions on a number of key issues — in full awareness that they were unilaterally breaching specific understandings Roosevelt had reached with the Soviet leadership [at Yalta]”.27 By far, the most important thing to understand is that the Atomic Diplomacy strategy backfired, because in the end the United States failed to secure a Poland free from Russian influence, and it drove the Russians to take a defensive stance, race to build their own atomic bombs, and partition Europe.28 This boldness in American relations with Russia closely resembles the current state of Russo-American relations.

Leading up to and during the Cold War, international relations were often portrayed as simple affairs of black versus white, good versus evil, and capitalism versus communism. The United States and its allies were united against a common enemy: the Soviet Union. While the Soviet Union was certainly a military threat, it was not merely this military threat that kept the United States and its allies united, it was the threat of Soviet communism.

By the early 1990s, the Soviet Union had fallen and the threat of Soviet communism has become a thing of the past. Many areas of goodwill had begun to emerge and many on both sides believed that the Cold War was over. Today there is no Comintern in Russia threatening to overthrow American government; there is no Communism for America to oppose. Even so, tensions are undeniably growing.

Russia’s deep concern over the expansion of NATO and the American anti-ballistic missile would leave some Russians comparing the current rise in tensions to the Cuban Missile Crisis.29 In this climate, Russia invaded a prospective member of NATO in 2008, which would lead some to conclude that a new Cold War was beginning.30


A Change in the Membership and Mission of NATO

By the early 1990s the Soviet Union had fallen; the threat of Soviet communism had become a thing of the past. Moreover, the Russian economy was in shambles. Many areas of goodwill began to emerge, and for all intents and purposes the Cold War was over. The United States had little to fear from the new Russian government, but the same was not true for the Russians.

Though the Warsaw Pact had been dissolved, NATO remained. NATO was created in the late 1940s as a regional counterbalance to the Soviet Union. During this time, it was a purely defensive alliance. At its core, NATO was a promise to protect each other in case of attack.\textsuperscript{31} In fact, throughout the Cold War, it did not have a single military engagement; it was not until three years after the fall of the Soviet Union that NATO entered into its first armed conflict in 1995, in the final months of the war in Bosnia.\textsuperscript{32} In 1999, NATO was called upon again and quickly ended the war in Kosovo.\textsuperscript{33} In 2001, NATO agreed that the terrorist attacks on the United States constituted an attack on a member nation, and in 2003, NATO took command of the war in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{34}

It is understandable how the Russians could feel threatened by this. For forty years during the Cold War, NATO was an alliance opposed to the Soviet Union, and in the few years after the fall of the Soviet Union, NATO flexed its military muscle three times. Additionally, NATO encroached on Russia’s sphere

of influence by admitting members from the old Warsaw Pact states, including three states on its border.\(^\text{35}\)

However, it is worth noting that the United States and NATO have never directly threatened Russia with military force. But like during the period of Atomic Diplomacy that preceded the first Cold War, threatening statements are not necessary to make Russia consider America to be a military threat. Without the use of direct threats, America had again become more inflexible in its demands on Russia, while at the same time promoting a newly developed military technology, and deploying it in Europe.

\textit{The Dawn of Anti-Ballistic Missile Diplomacy}

At the turn of the twenty-first century, a new American administration was elected partially on the platform of withdrawing from the 1973 Anti-Ballistic Missile (hereafter ABM) Treaty in order to “redefine war on our terms”.\(^\text{36}\) The rationale is that the United States should not be threatened by an attack from “rogue states” with ballistic missiles.\(^\text{37}\) If successfully implemented, this technology would be able to defend America from a nuclear missile attack, and thus would make the United States immune to classical nuclear deterrence. This


plan began to be implemented in 2000, and would give the United States the confidence to begin a new form of Atomic Diplomacy: ABM Diplomacy.\textsuperscript{38}

Though the United States contended that this new ABM program was not targeted at Russia, it began to develop a new confidence with its dealings with Russia concurrently with the development of its new ABM program. With this self-assurance from its ABM Diplomacy, America would push for the inclusion of several new NATO members. In 2004 NATO absorbed seven new Eastern European states, including three Baltic States on Russia's border: Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. As one might expect, Russia's response was heated, but American policy makers turned a deaf ear.\textsuperscript{39}

In 2007, plans began to emerge for a similar missile shield in Poland and the Czech Republic. Once more, the Russian government was outraged, calling it an “obvious threat,” and expressing “serious doubts” that the program had anything to do with protection from Iran, and warning of “negative consequences” should the deployment continue.\textsuperscript{40} As a result, Russia withdrew from the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty.\textsuperscript{41}

It is true that the United States never directly threatened Russia with this new technology. However, as with the Atomic Diplomacy of the 1940s, direct threats do not need to be made in order for Russia to feel threatened by the American ABM diplomacy. Consequently, it is understandable that the deep objection to the ABM program is not exclusive to the hard line elements in the


Russian government. In fact, even pro-western moderates who dislike the current Russian government are against the program. In an interview in late 2007, a former prime minister and pro-western moderate expressed grave concern about the program. In addition to the fact that it was making the United States immune to classical nuclear deterrence, the former prime minister also showed grave concern about possible offensive dual use of the ABM missiles. He continued that in the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviet Union had installed missiles with an eight minute flying time to Washington DC, and that the missiles in Poland would have a four minute flying time to Moscow. With this in mind, one can see the rationale Russia used in its decision to invade a prospective NATO member in 2008.

Russia’s Actions in Georgia Parallel Those it Took during the Cuban Missile Crisis

Though it would be naïve to think that the recent Russian invasion of Georgia happened in a vacuum, it does not mean that it can be excused. However, recognizing their motivations is the key to success in any future negotiations. The parallel to the Cuban Missile Crisis is an apt one, due not only to the threat of nearby missiles, but also to Russia’s response.

Before the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, the most effective method of nuclear weapons deployment was by airplane, a method that was readily interceptable. The advent of long range ballistic missiles changed this. In order to quickly counter the threat of Soviet long range ballistic missiles, which was exemplified by the launch of Sputnik, the United States scrambled to deploy its

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preexisting medium-range ballistic missiles within range of the Soviet Union in England, Italy and Turkey.\textsuperscript{43} At the time, the president acknowledged that this could be considered provocative by the Russians, and this assessment proved to be correct, because within three years the Soviet Union began placing mid-range ballistic missile in Cuba.\textsuperscript{44}

Despite the ensuing naval blockade of Cuba, American officials acknowledged that the mid-ranging missiles in Turkey were partially to blame, stating that “we don’t really live in fear of [Russian] nuclear weapons to the extent that [they have] to live in fear of ours … we have nuclear weapons nearby, in Turkey.”\textsuperscript{45} Though the true terms of the agreement remained classified at the time, the crisis was only solved after the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to trade the missiles in Turkey for those in Cuba.\textsuperscript{46}

In both the Cuban Missile Crisis and the current buildup of tensions with Russia, there is no evidence that the Russians were motivated to go to war with the United States. Instead, it is far more likely that Russia’s actions were instead negotiating tactics or pleas for attention. If Russia’s calls for negotiations on its issues of concern continue unanswered, it would not be surprising if Russia were to redeploy missiles to Cuba, or elsewhere in South America.\textsuperscript{47}

Like the Atomic Diplomacy that preceded it, America’s ABM Diplomacy that marked its relations with Russia during the first decade of the twenty-first century backfired. Using this ABM diplomacy, the United States has failed to strong-arm Russia into seeing the American point of view and served to do little

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid. p 241.
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid. pp. 119-125, 156.
more than make Russia rigidly opposed to American interests, and make it more difficult for the United States to reach its own security interests with Russia. Unfortunately, Russia’s invasion of Georgia has made it even more difficult for the United States to directly back down from its rigid stance of ABM Diplomacy. But this does not mean that the United States does not need Russia’s help on the important issues of international terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and plateauing energy supplies. As the twenty-first century continues, bringing Russia on board as an ally in these issues is becoming more important than ever.
CHAPTER THREE: WHY THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA NEED ONE ANOTHER

Because the challenges of international terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and plateauing energy supplies are international in nature, this may lead some to ask why the United States needs Russia’s assistance in particular with these issues. Like it or not, Russia is once again a world superpower and remains to be one of the world’s most major players in each of these issues. In 2006, Russia surpassed Saudi Arabia to become the world’s largest oil exporter. Russia remains second in the world in both the amount of nuclear armaments and the supply of fissile material for nuclear reactors. Finally, Russia has had its own significant problems with Islamic terrorism both in Chechnya and Russia proper. The United States and Russia share equal stakes in these issues; working for cross purposes serves the interests of neither nation.

Nuclear Containment and Proliferation

One of the most important issues on which the United States needs cooperation with Russia is the issue of nuclear proliferation and containment. Russia remains one of the world’s largest nuclear powers, and fortunately the Russians have given the United States a good deal of cooperation on nuclear issues, which can be seen in the 1993 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and the

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The issue of the building of the Iranian nuclear reactor at Bushehr is a slightly different story.

Despite objections from Washington, Russia has been making moves to help Iran build its first nuclear reactor at Bushehr. On a positive note, after years of negotiation, Russia made a proposal that the United States was willing to accept: “Iran could export its uranium to Russia... import the enriched uranium to fuel its ... nuclear power plant in Bushehr ... [and return] the spent fuel to Russia.” With a fragile arrangement such as this, the situation could quickly change as Russo-American relations worsen. It is obvious that in this case the United States would certainly benefit from having a dependable ally in Russia.

**Russia as an Energy Superpower**

In 2006, a former American Department of Defense official said that the Russians “are using energy today as Russia’s Cold War Red Army, the source of Mother Russia’s strength.” While this is a rather undiplomatic way of putting it, since Russia surpassed Saudi Arabia to become the world’s largest oil exporter in 2006, Russia has certainly used its energy exports as a diplomatic tool in Eastern Europe. Without a doubt, this has been a major point of frustration for policy makers in Washington. This frustration can easily be seen when one American policy maker declared that “no legitimate interest is served when oil...

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52 Ibid. pp. 175.


and gas become tools of intimidation or blackmail.\(^{55}\) This point is telling in two ways: it implies that the United States does not see Russian interests as legitimate, and that the United States fails to recognize its own role in instigating the situation.

Rather than simply criticizing Russia for using a peaceful weapon in its arsenal, it is more important to ask why Russia felt that it was necessary to triple the price of natural gas to Ukraine in 2006, and then cut off the gas supply when they would not pay.

As it had done with its other friends in Eastern Europe, Russia had been subsidizing Ukraine’s natural gas until late 2005; Ukraine was paying one-third what Western European nations were paying at the time.\(^{56}\) However, just two months before the cutoff, Ukraine was actively seeking to join NATO, and the Russian president gave the dire warning “Ukraine should think twice about any such embrace of the West.”\(^{57}\) It seems obvious that Russia was trying to punish Ukraine for moving towards NATO by removing Ukraine’s subsidies for natural gas but more to the point, Russia did this because it felt threatened by NATO expansion into Eastern Europe. As it would turn out, these fears were not wholly unfounded, as a year later America would bring its ABM program into Eastern Europe.

**America’s War on Terrorism**

Immediately following the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, Russia, along with much of the rest of the world, pledged its solidarity with the

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\(^{57}\) Ibid, p144
United States. In the buildup to the war in Afghanistan, Russia was particularly helpful in securing access to Central Asian military bases critical to the American invasion of Afghanistan, as well as providing intelligence from their own campaign into Afghanistan less than fifteen years earlier.\(^58\) This support waned when America began to prepare for a second war in the region.

In 2002, the United States began to press the United Nations for authorization to use force in Iraq, due to Iraq’s previous evasions of UN weapons inspectors. The United Nations would agree to new weapons inspectors, but Russia and France — both of whom hold vetoes in the UN Security Council — refused to authorize the use of force.\(^59\) When the United States finally went to war in March 2003, Russia was vehemently opposed, calling the war unjustified and “the most serious crisis since the Cold War.”\(^60\) Now that the Iraq War is calming, and the Iraqi government is calling for a timeline for American troop withdrawal, it may be possible for the United States to treat the Iraq War as a moot issue in its negotiations with Russia, but it is important to remember that Russia has its own controversial problems with terrorism.\(^61\)


Chechnya and the Caucuses: Russia’s War on Terrorism

There is not a doubt that Chechnyan separatists have used terrorist acts toward their goal of independence from Russia, but this is the one area where United States policy makers have refused to see foreign policy with Russia in terms of black and white. While some in the United States have compared the Russian involvement in Chechnya to America’s own civil war, saying “that no state had a right to withdrawal from our union,” others have said that Russia’s actions in Chechnya “[cast] a shadow over the entire process of Russia’s integration into the international community.” Though violence in Chechnya has subsided, new violence has erupted across the border in Georgia. When it comes time to negotiate with Russia on the issue of future cooperation on terrorism, it will be important to come prepared to discuss Chechnya as well as Georgia. But unfortunately, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to immediately begin such negotiations without an adversarial tone that would inevitably lead to their failure. The United States and Russia need to begin with a confidence building measure, on an issue as far away from Europe and the Caucuses as possible.

CHAPTER FOUR: BEGINNING THE END OF THE SECOND COLD WAR IN JAPAN

East Asia, and Japan in particular, is the perfect place to begin the end of the Second Cold War. Japan is geographically far enough from the contentious issues in Eastern Europe and the Caucuses, so that these issues can be off of the table for the initial discussions; it is also a place where those discussions may begin in a discrete manner. Japan is where the United States began its policy of Atomic Diplomacy with Russia, and it would be a fitting place for America to commence the end of its ABM Diplomacy.

Moreover, there is the possibility of actual success in these peace talks. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Japan and Russia have come close to agreeing to a peace treaty, but low motivation, and a minor border dispute have kept the two nations from finalizing the peace deal. It would be entirely appropriate for the United States to interject itself into these negotiations because America has a history of brokering peace between Russia and Japan that predates the Cold War. In addition, America has played a historical role in keeping Russia and Japan from reaching a peace deal in the aftermath of the Second World War and in the beginning of the Cold War.

Early Relations between Russia and Japan

Closer geographic neighbors, Russia and Japan began their relations on a slightly more hostile footing than Russia and the United States. This was compounded by the fact that Russia’s first contact with Japan was during Japan’s highly isolationist Edo Period. In 1793 and in 1805, Russia sent diplomatic missions to the Japanese port of Nagasaki, but they were rebuffed and asked
never to return.\textsuperscript{63} In an act of retaliation for this perceived insult, Russia would begin to raid northern Japanese cities, but eventually lost interest in the island nation.\textsuperscript{64}

Russia showed little interest in Japan for years, but sent another diplomatic mission in 1853. This mission began as hostile as the others before it, but an earthquake and resulting tsunami which occurred during the negotiations forced intermingling and reciprocity that resulted in the 1855 Treaty of Shimoda.\textsuperscript{65} This treaty established a trading relationship, rights for travel, and even a border between the Kurile Islands of Iturup and Urup, but left Sakhalin open to both.\textsuperscript{66} The Russians and Japanese would consolidate their territories in 1875, when Japan gave Russia its rights to Sakhalin in exchange for full control of the Kurile Island chain. A territorial dispute over Chinese lands following the 1895 Sino-Japanese war and the 1900 Boxer Rebellion led to the 1904 Russo-Japanese War, a war in which Russia was resoundingly defeated. In the aftermath, America stepped up to the plate to mediate the peace treaty between Russia and Japan.

\textbf{Russian Revolution Leads to another Conflict which America would Mediate}

Because Russia was allied with France, and Japan was allied with England, the assassination of an Austro-Hungarian prince in 1914 would make these two rivals into allies at the start of the First World War. The war went much better for Japan than for Russia, and by 1917 Russia was in revolution.\textsuperscript{67}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{63} George A. Lensen, \textit{Russia's Japan Expedition of 1852 to 1855}, (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1955), p. XX.
\bibitem{64} Ibid, p. XXIII.
\bibitem{65} Ibid, p. 119.
\bibitem{66} Ibid, pp. 85-93, 111, 122-126.
\end{thebibliography}
Like the United States, Japan had its own anti-communist backlash, which would result in Japan invading Siberia; it was again the United States again who brokered peace between the two nations.68

A Second War between Russia and Japan

As Japan was busy conquering northern China, Soviet Russia also moved a significant army into Mongolia and Siberia.69 In response, Japan increased its armaments in Manchuria. In July 1938, the Japanese Army had a minor border skirmish with the Soviets at Changufeng Hill.70 While this did not immediately escalate into an all-out war, this did little to resolve the situation. By May 1939, Russia and Japan would be at war in Khalkin Gol.71 After three months of intense fighting, Japan admitted defeat.72

The Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact

Even after its peace treaty with Russia after the Khalkin Gol (or Nomonhan) War, Japan found itself extremely isolated in the international system. Japan had burned its bridges with America and much of Europe due to its actions in China.73 Japan had also withdrawn from the League of Nations, and tensions were rising with the United States. It was in this environment that

Japan set forth to solidify its alliance structure. Before the Second World War began in Europe, Japan decided to ally itself with Germany and Italy in the Anti-Comintern and Tripartite Pacts, in part in opposition to Russia, but soon after, Germany reached an agreement with Russia over the division of Poland in 1941. This left Japan with an opportunity to create peace with the USSR and ensure that its only major rival in the Pacific would be the United States in the Philippines and Hawaii.

Soviet Russia considered this an opportunity as well, as it was already beginning to suspect an attack from Germany. After a month of negotiations in April 1941, Japan and Russia signed the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact. This pact is historically significant because it was the first and only time in the twentieth century that Japan and Russia bilaterally viewed each other as equals, and agreed upon peace. This pact was equally significant during World War II; neither the United States nor Germany was pleased with it. In fact, at the time “not one … major power welcomed it.”

Japan Finds Itself in the Middle of America’s Atomic Diplomacy with Russia

After the attack on Pearl Harbor, both the United States and Japan had joined the Second World War. By the end of the Yalta Conference, victory in Europe was already on the horizon and the Soviet Union had committed to joining the war with Japan. But by mid-1945, there was a new administration in

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76 Ibid. p 55.
77 Ibid. p. 57.
Washington, willing to use Atomic Diplomacy to achieve its goals. Emboldened by the Manhattan Project, the Potsdam conference was postponed to coincide with the successful testing of the first atomic bomb. The American objective was no longer just winning the war, but winning the war quickly “before the Russians got very far into Manchuria.”

Despite America’s early Atomic Diplomacy, the Russians would not be dissuaded from entering the war in the Pacific. The Potsdam Conference ended on August 2, 1945, and the Soviets entered the war on August 8 as they had agreed at Yalta. America’s two atomic Bombs were dropped on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6, and August 9. Within the span of four days, Japan was delivered three indisputably crippling blows that forced it to unconditionally surrender on August 14, 1945.

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79 Ibid. p. 3.
80 Ibid. pp. 219-220.
Sixty Years without Russo-Japanese Peace after Less than a Week of War

Japan remained occupied by the United States until 1951, but as early as 1947, the occupation changed from one based on reparations to one based on reconstruction and economic development.\(^{82}\) In 1950, NSC-68, the document outlining the strategy for waging the Cold War, would list the economic development of Japan as one of its primary goals.\(^{83}\) Even though the occupation would soon end, Japan was bound to the United States for the duration of the Cold War. Because Japan’s new constitution abolished the Japanese military, a significant part of the end of the occupation of Japan was the resulting military alliance. Understandably, this was a source of some friction with Russia.

When the occupation of Japan ended with the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951, the Soviet Union refused to sign it because of this security arrangement with the United States.\(^{84}\) Over the coming years of the Cold War, there would be several attempts to end this stalemate and make a peace treaty between Russia and Japan, but they would all hang on the issue of Japan’s security agreement and the issue of the Kurile Islands which Russia had captured during its brief campaign against Japan at the end of World War II.\(^{85}\)

The Kurile Islands: the Only Thing Standing Between Japan, Russia and an End to World War II

Now that the Cold War has ended, Japan’s security pact with the United States should no longer be an obstacle to ending World War II between Russia

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\(^{85}\) Ibid. pp. 45-47, 51-52.
and Japan. This just leaves one issue to resolve: the Kurile Islands. In over fifteen years, the two have been unable to reach a compromise on the Kurile Islands. The main dispute is that there are four main islands which the Japanese government insists must be returned.

In 2005, the Russian Government proposed giving Japan two of them, but at the time, the Japanese government did not agree. In 2006, the Japanese government floated a similar proposal, but by that time the Russians were not willing to agree. In short, in recent years both Russia and Japan have shown willingness to compromise on their final divisive issue of the Kurile Islands. It is important to remember the 1941 Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact here for two reasons: that peace between Russia and Japan is possible, and that they are more than able to do it unilaterally. If America is to be a party to this inevitable peace deal, it is urgent that the United States act quickly.

*America’s Role in the Russo-Japanese Negotiations*

Despite the fact that Russia and Japan are already close to a peace deal, there is much that America can bring to these negotiations that will serve to facilitate future Russo-American negotiations; incidentally, none of which would come at any financial cost to America. First, the United States can acknowledge its role in preventing peace between Japan and Russia in the aftermath of the World War II, and can unambiguously declare that the Cold War is over. Moreover, as a symbol to the Russians that America is open to future

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negotiations, the United States can acknowledge its use of Atomic Diplomacy beginning in 1945, and its use of ABM Diplomacy in recent years.

Some could say that such declarations would be little more than a public relations move, and they would be partially correct. This is a confidence building measure, the audience of which is the Russian people and the international community. The Pandora’s Box of ABM technology has been opened, and it will be difficult, if not impossible, to close it, but merely publicly acknowledging America’s ABM Diplomacy will send signals that the bold negotiation style that ABM Diplomacy inspires has ended. Beyond sending political and diplomatic signals, these negotiations would be the perfect place for the United States and Russia to begin discussions about the contentious issues which really matter, and begin these discussions behind closed doors.
Without a doubt, America has been dealt a blow to its foreign policy. After the 2001 terrorist attacks, the United States alienated many potential friends and old allies with its Manichaean, “with us or against us” approach to foreign policy, reminiscent to its Atomic Diplomacy of the early Cold War. Nowhere has this potential been squandered more than with Russia.

It is easy to define Russo-American relations by the hostile dualism of the Cold War. Both in the United States and in Russia, many contemporary policy makers came of age during this conflict, and echoes of its influence are certainly still present. But the United States and Russia have over one hundred and fifty years of history together, with little more than forty years of that tainted by the Cold War.

Today, the Cold War is over, there is no Comintern in Russia threatening to overthrow American government, and there is no Communism for America to politically oppose. In short, there is little reason other than bad habits for the United States and Russia to find each other at the brink of a Second Cold War.

Without a doubt, these bad habits have taken their toll on Russo-American relations. America’s ABM Diplomacy, along with its policy of NATO expansion into Eastern Europe, failed utterly when it drove Russia to attack its neighbor and prospective NATO member of Georgia. Together these issues have set America and Russia on the path to a Second Cold War, which will be difficult to avoid if they are not addressed quickly and proactively.

America needs Russia’s help with its greatest challenges as it continues into the twenty-first century. Talks about nuclear proliferation would be meaningless without Russia at the table, and the United States could certainly
use Russia’s help in Afghanistan. Additionally, the United States needs access to
Russia’s oil. But focusing on these needs alone will not lead to an end to the
Second Cold War, because there are too many harsh feelings on both sides.
Russia and the United States need a diplomatic chance to ease their rhetoric and
to warm up to the possibility of joining forces on these issues. The perfect place
to do this is in Japan.

An American inspired Russo-Japanese peace summit officially and finally
ending World War II would be a distraction from America’s rising tensions with
Russia over Eastern Europe and the Caucuses. It would give the United States a
manor of signaling that it is willing to negotiate with Russia about its ABM
Diplomacy, by acknowledging its parallel use of Atomic Diplomacy in the early
stages of the Cold War. It would also be the perfect time to confidentially begin
discussions on these issues with the world’s attention on another topic.

As these diplomatic discussions progress, it is vital that the United States
not fall into the traps of the Cold War mentality. First, beware of defining Russia
by the personal freedoms of its citizens. If the United States were to only deal
diplomatically with countries which have stellar human rights records, it would
find itself rather lonely. Even in the twenty-first century, there are many
examples of the United States’ willingness to overlook the human rights record of
a nation when that nation has something it needs, and there are few nations with
more that the United States needs than Russia.

Finally, beware of defining Russia by its leader. The personality of any
Russian leader is irrelevant, because nothing will make a leader do something
outside of the interests of his or her own country, and the interests of a country
do not change with its changing leaders. This holds true for America as well.
Regardless of the outcome of the 2008 presidential election, the fact that America
needs a better relationship with Russia will not change. The time to end the Second Cold War is now.
APPENDIX A: MAP OF NATO EXPANSION

APPENDIX B: MAP OF CAUCASUS – SOVIET ERA \(^{89}\)

Administrative map of Caucasus in USSR, 1952-1991

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APPENDIX C: MAP OF KURILE ISLANDS

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69. George A. Lensen, Russia’s Japan Expedition of 1852 to 1855, (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1955).


BIографical Sketch

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