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In the Company's Secret Service: Neil Benjamin Edmonstone and the First Indian Imperialists, 1780-1820

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ABSTRACT

Neil Benjamin Edmonstone held many important positions in the East India Company's Indian service during a career spanning 34 years, from 1783 to 1818. He was at various times Persian Translator to Government, Chief Secretary to Government, Secretary of the Secret Foreign and Political Department, Vice President of the Supreme Council at Calcutta and acting governor-general on two occasions. He served as the Company's chief intelligence officer for more than twenty years, taking on espionage occasionally himself, but more frequently directing the activities of others. He was thereafter a member of the Company's chief governing body, the Court of Directors, from 1820 until his death in 1841.

In addition to providing the first biographical study of Edmonstone, this work includes a discussion of the lives of important civil servants of his generation, many of which have never received scholarly attention. The essential thesis of the work is that Edmonstone, and the group of civil servants around him, formed the first deliberately expansionist government in the Company's history. They combined all of the requirements for imperial success--a passionately held ideology, a sound plan for achieving their aims, and more expertise on the sub-continent than any previous generation had attained.
INTRODUCTION

And many strokes though with little axe,
Hew down and fell the hardest timbered oak.—Shakespeare, King Henry VI

In June 1841, a British newspaper in Calcutta noted the passing of a man whom it equated with Warren Hastings (governor-general of the East India Company from 1773-1784) and Richard Wellesley (governor-general from 1798-1805) as one of the "originators and first workers—out of the very policy which has won for us the empire we now enjoy." Comparing an individual with two of the greatest names in early British India might seem merely the flattering rhetoric common to obituaries, but in this case the paper told the simple truth. A few years earlier, Wellesley had commented that this individual "was constantly in my unreserved confidence . . . He was my advisor and intimate counselor in all political transactions. . . . After a long and general experience I cannot justly place any name above his, either for integrity, judgment, diligence, knowledge, ability, discretion, or temper." The nineteenth-century historian, Sir John Kaye, called him "the great political foreman of a succession of Governors-General," and believed that "among the many eminent public servants who helped to build up the great Raj of the Company, he had not a superior and scarcely an equal." However, Kaye gave no evidence to substantiate his claims, and therefore few have taken notice of them. More recently, David Kopf characterized him as "a key official in the Diplomatic Office," and C.A. Bayly identified him as "the dominant figure in the Persian and Political Departments for nearly twenty years," but gave few details of his life and career. Indeed, so little has been written about him that many historians have never heard the name Neil Benjamin Edmonstone, much less the story of the important, perhaps unique, role he played in the affairs of the East India Company.

This work will demonstrate that Edmonstone was the confidant and political advisor to every governor-general from Sir John Shore (1792-98) to Francis Rawdon Hastings, Lord Moira (1813-1823), the "spy master" who originated a number of their policies and made possible many of their successes, and the jack-of-all-trades who left an indelible mark on the Company's government. More than a discussion of the accomplishments of one man, however, this work provides portraits of many of the most influential civil and military officials with whom he worked--the "lost generation" in Indian history, as most have received little previous attention in scholarship. Yet theirs was one of the most critical eras for the British in India.

It can be argued that 1783, the year Edmonstone joined the Company's service, was the real beginning of British imperialism on the sub-continent: the end of the American war turned British eyes towards India as a substitute for the empire they had lost; Warren Hastings' actions as governor-general publicized the affairs of the Company to a degree unknown before and led to furious debates over the proper role of the British in India; and William Pitt's East India Act was being formulated, which would culminate the next
year in the British government attaining a significant amount of control over the Company's affairs. Edmonstone's generation served the Company as it changed from a mercantile association based in North India and a few coastal stations to an empire spanning the sub-continent. Eighteen-eighteen, the year Edmonstone left India, witnessed the Company's final victory over the Marathas, the last great, independent Indian power. During his career, the mercantilists in the Company's service became functionaries of the new empire: diplomats, administrators, statesmen and spies replaced in importance the bookkeepers and accountants of the previous age. There was no precedent for what they were called upon to do, and no guidelines on how to build an infrastructure capable of ruling a land far larger and more diverse than Britain. Although few of them had prior training for the task, they built a workable system that endured under the Company's rule until 1858, and became the basis for every subsequent Indian government.

There were certainly imperialists in the Company's service prior to Edmonstone's generation, but this work will argue that he and his colleagues formed the first organized, deliberately expansionist government in the Company's history. They combined for the first time all of the requirements for imperial success--a passionately held ideology, a sound plan for achieving their aims, and more expertise on the sub-continent than any previous generation had attained. Theirs was not the haphazard or primarily self-seeking aggrandizement of the mercantile age, but a carefully ordered design intended to found an empire.

The work is divided into four parts. The first gives an in-depth look into the life of young men in the Company's service, focusing on the forces--cultural, ideological, economic and political--that combined to push them towards a strong imperialist stance. It discusses the imperial evolution of the Company in Edmonstone's early life and career--in Europe, internally within its Indian possessions, and externally in its dealings with the Indian states. A further theme is the considerable expertise on Indian politics, culture and diplomacy that Edmonstone and many of his generation acquired, information that would make possible the conquest of a continent.

The second part deals with the period of Sir John Shore’s governor-generalship (1792-1798), a time traditionally viewed as the calm before the storm of the Wellesley era in which little of significance occurred. It will be argued here that the opposite was actually the case: Shore's period in office saw significant change take place in Europe and India that would make difficult anything other than an imperial stance for the Company. The focus of this section is the first significant political action influenced by Edmonstone's generation--the "Revolution at Lucknow," as he termed it--which, although a relatively minor affair in itself, had significant and long-lasting ramifications. The change of authority in Awadh in 1798 instigated by Shore, and, it is argued, prompted by his young, imperialist advisors, provided a useful example and a dangerous weapon to Wellesley in the form of an expanded and retooled subsidiary alliance system.

The third part examines the close relationship between Edmonstone and Richard Wellesley. Iris Butler, Wellesley's modern biographer, noted that no one has attempted an in-depth political discourse about his Indian career, a fact she ascribes to his voluminous surviving papers. A better reason may be that his actions are difficult to explain without an understanding of the attitudes and influences of the men who made up
his government, especially Neil Edmonstone. This section discusses Edmonstone's effect on the external and internal changes of the Company in the Wellesley era. Through his advice, backed by extensive experience with the Indian states, he was responsible for much of Wellesley's territorial expansion. His grip over the Company's secret service, his participation in the governor-general's educational experiments, and his position as mentor to many of the next generation of Company employees, guaranteed that he was also an important factor in the extension of imperialist ideas within the British Indian government.

Lastly, the effect of Edmonstone and his generation on the Company from 1805, when Sir George Barlow became governor-general, until 1818, when Francis Rawdon Hastings defeated the Marathas, is examined. The group of civil servants around Edmonstone provided a vital ideological link between these ministries, making certain that, although governors-general came and went, the Company's actions in India remained consistently imperialist. The final chapter discusses this generation's influence on Company policy in the decades after Edmonstone and many of his associates took up positions in the Court of Directors on their return to Britain. The way in which their imperialism differed from that of following generations, from the 1820s to the Mutiny, is also discussed. The cumulative effect of the work brings the lost generation of Indian imperialists into a place in scholarship more in line with their historical legacy.
"Get money, still get money, boy,
No matter by what means."—John Donne, Every Man in His Humor

The Stormont was one of the graceful sailing ships called East Indiamen after the name of the company that owned them. It sailed out of Portsmouth in March 1783 bound for Bengal, reached Madras in July and, by September, had made its way to the Hugli River and Calcutta's Diamond Harbor. There it blended into the forest of masts belonging to some of the more than 300 vessels that called at the city each year. Like them, the Stormont's primary purpose was to take part in the lucrative trade in cotton cloth, saltpeter, indigo, opium and spices that made Diamond Harbor one of the world's most famous ports. As a small sideline, it also transported passengers, usually East India Company employees. On this trip, there were 42 "writers" on board. These were young men, normally between the ages of 16 and 18, who had been appointed to the lowest level civil rank in the Company's hierarchy.

Writerships were highly sought-after positions, offering one of few chances in eighteenth century Britain for ambitious young men of any class to make their fortunes and improve their social position. With hard work, luck or a certain lack of scruples, virtually anyone could advance to high office in the Company. As everyone on the Stormont must have known, the then governor-general, Warren Hastings, had begun his career as a lowly writer making £5 a year. As early as 1714, in order to cut down on the vast number of applications, the directors of the East India Company had begun requiring that each new prospect be nominated by one of their number and post two securities for £500. This did little to stem the tide; a writer's position sold in the 1770s for as much as £3,000, while in 1783 an English newspaper carried an advertisement offering 1,000 guineas for a posting to Bengal. The lure of riches and the hope of advancement drew some of the most capable minds of a generation to the East. Those already in India when the Stormont arrived included names that would soon play key roles in the Company's civil and military service: William Kirkpatrick, who joined the Bengal Infantry in 1773; James Lumsden, George Frederick Cherry, and John Kennaway, writers of 1778; George Hilaro Barlow and Archibald Seton, writers of 1779; and George Dowdeswell and Henry Colebrooke, writers of 1783. John Baillie, a relative latecomer, joined the Company's army in 1791. They were part of the generation that bridged the gap between the old mercantile-minded Company of the pre-Warren Hastings period and the new, imperialist one of the post-Wellesley era. They developed the ideology, perfected the institutions and trained the minds that administered and expanded the Company's Indian empire.

The Stormont's passengers were probably less concerned with making a mark on history than with finishing their journey. They soon discovered that their 723-ton vessel...
could take them no further. For the last 41 miles of the trip they would need to take boats small enough to safely navigate the upper Hugli's winding, sandbank-filled reaches. The solution was to find a place on one of the strange looking vessels called budgerows that made the three-day trip to Calcutta on a regular basis. This was a dismaying prospect to face after a long journey. The average budgerow was little more than a barge equipped with a flat-roofed cabin over two-thirds of its length. Many of them were decorated with a wooden figurehead carved to resemble someone's idea of a European. With its stiff limbs encased in a bright blue coat and its wide, painted eyes staring out from under a black hat, it probably did bear a resemblance to some of the more exhausted travelers, but it is doubtful that any of them was in a mood to appreciate the humor. Entertainment on the journey consisted of the view of a tangled jungle of banyan and betel nut trees, bright green peepuls, palms and bamboo thickets that flourished in the black mud of the river's floodplain. Most travelers passed the time sitting on their luggage playing cards, getting drunk or, if they were imprudent, doing both. The usual rigors of the journey were complicated in September by the last of the monsoon rains, which intermittently pounded the boat and soaked the passengers, and by the hoards of mosquitoes that bred in the wet weather.

Under such conditions, it is unlikely that the young writers noticed anything special about one of their number. In many ways he was a stereotypical Company employee. He was young, just seventeen; he was Scottish—one of the thousands who made up a majority in the Company's service; and he was a younger son in a family that had a longer history than credit line. In other ways, however, Neil Benjamin Edmonstone was anything but ordinary. It is doubtful that anyone on the boat was better suited by either background or temperament to the job ahead.

When he tired of watching the miles of swamp forest passing in hypnotic procession along the high banks of the Hugli, Edmonstone could amuse himself by recalling his numerous ancestors who had traveled abroad on similar ventures. One of these, on his mother's side of the family, had set out on the First Crusade to save the holy land and to make his fortune, not necessarily in that order. He had captured a "princess of Antioch," married her and acquired land and a title in the bargain. The Edmonstones had not lacked energetic types either. An early Edmonstone had won fame and fortune on the tournament circuit, and another had done even better by becoming an Adventurer in Ulster. There was also recent evidence that what Sir Walter Scott called the Scottish "national disposition to wandering and adventure" was strong in Edmonstone's family. His eldest brother served as aide-de-camp to Major General Friedrich Adolph, Baron von Riedesel, in America, helping General John Burgoyne oversee his battalions of German mercenaries, until illness forced him to return home following the surrender at Saratoga in 1777. One of his cousins and his brother William preceded Edmonstone to India. The cousin died prematurely and penniless, but William waited to meet his younger brother in Calcutta.

Edmonstone's appearance and temperament were also family legacies. It may have been from his half-French mother, Susanna Mary Harene, that he inherited his dark, almond-shaped eyes. The Harenes were an ancient French noble family who settled in Normandy before 1066. About 1720, Roger Harene moved to England where he married Susanna, the daughter of William Hays of Wimbledon, and prospered in business; he was able to give his daughter a dowry of £10,000 when she married Edmonstone's father in
1753. Not only did Edmonstone inherit his grandfather's business acumen, but it was probably the Harenes who bequeathed him his capacity for self-control. The auburn-haired Edmonstones had many memorable attributes--they were best known for their proud, stubborn natures and fierce tempers--but emotional restraint was not conspicuous among them. A medieval Edmonstone killed a man in a disagreement over who would be keeper of Doune Castle, a Tudor-era Edmonstone was accused of complicity in David Riccio's murder, and, in Stuart times, an Edmonstone took part in the Ruthven Raid to kidnap James VI. Neil Edmonstone always maintained the appearance of calm cultivated by his mother's aristocratic French ancestors, but the passionate nature of his father's family had been passed on nonetheless, along with the long, narrow Edmonstone nose and fair complexion. His genetic mix could have suited him for any career from diplomat to pirate; it was his upbringing that cast the deciding vote.

Born in St. Marleybone, London, on December 19, 1765, Edmonstone was the youngest of his father's five sons. His mother died in 1776 when Edmonstone was eleven and several years later his father married Hester, the daughter of Sir John Heathcote. There seems to have been genuine affection between Edmonstone and his step-mother; she gave him a gold watch a year before he left for India which remained a prized possession all his life, perhaps in part because she died before he returned from the East. He spent much of his youth in London, where the family was based during sessions of parliament. His grandfather sat in the Irish parliament during George I's reign and passed his interest in politics on to his son. With the patronage of his uncle, the 4th Duke of Argyll, Sir Archibald Edmonstone had a lengthy career in the English parliament, serving regularly from 1761 to 1796.

It was probably from his father than Edmonstone acquired the beginnings of an imperialist philosophy, although the era in which he grew up was no doubt an important factor. A number of significant dates in Edmonstone's life would coincide with landmarks in the history of British India, not the least of which was the year of his birth. Seventeen sixty-five marked the origin of empire with Robert Clive's attainment of the diwani of Bengal, which conferred the right on the Company to collect the revenues and to administer one of the most fertile regions in India for the Mughal emperors. As Mughal hegemony was quickly becoming an anachronism, the Company found itself virtually sovereign over the breadbasket of India, the traditional starting point for conquest from the time of the Mauryas to that of the Mughals themselves. However, the problems that accompanied even the early stages of empire-building soon caused consternation in Britain. The "nabobs," men who had left England paupers and returned from the East as millionaires, flaunted their successful plunder of the subcontinent by purchasing titles, grand mansions and seats in parliament, while their wives glittered through the London social scene in maharanis' jewels. Tales of corruption, financial peculation and mismanagement flowed back with the golden tide from India, along with news of a seemingly never-ending succession of wars--first against the French, then with numerous Indian rulers. This culminated in 1787 with the sensational trial of Warren Hastings for fraud and unnecessary aggression while governor-general. Edmund Burke, a prominent MP, made long speeches during Hastings' impeachment, decrying the governor-general's actions and contrasting them with those of the Indian rulers, who were portrayed as enlightened monarchs with beneficial practices. Burke's favorable view of the subcontinent was reinforced by the translations of dedicated Orientalists such as Sir William
Jones, Jonathan Duncan and Henry Colebrooke which, by the latter 1780s and 1790s, sparked Europe-wide interest in Indian history; at the same time, the Daniell brothers' and William Hodges' romantic Indian landscapes produced a new appreciation for South Asian art and culture. However, this oriental enthusiasm post-dated Edmonstone's arrival in India; his generation grew up in a very different atmosphere.

London in the 1770s was a heady place intellectually, where the Enlightenment was experiencing a few last, relatively quiet, days before the Industrial Revolution and Napoleon changed the world. It was an age that had yet to hear of Bentham and Malthus, Godwin and Shelley, Engels and Marx. Its people firmly believed that science would eventually solve all humanity's ills, that reason was a stronger force than emotion, and that there was a natural hierarchy in society on which order and stability depended. With France weakened by economic problems, Britain stood at the forefront of the European powers, a giant whose armies and trading companies, although smaller than they would become, nonetheless circled the globe. The American colonies had yet to be lost, the high price of expansion had yet to be paid, and it was possible to believe that the future held only glory. The adolescent Edmonstone imbued these concepts and the optimism behind them. A few years after his arrival in India, he evidenced this mindset in a letter to one of his brothers about the eclipse of June 4, 1788, which he witnessed while on a visit to the magnificent temple complex at Jagannath. It prompted him to ask a Brahmin,

what was the occasion of an eclipse & he told us a long unintelligible story of gods & goddesses. . . . If the Brahmins believe this story how can they calculate eclipses, but we know they do & therefore must be acquainted with the Real cause. . . . I conjecture it was done purposely to keep others in ignorance, an expedient Priestcraft has ever resorted to, to increase their influence over the minds of the people.\(^\text{21}\)

To his dying day Edmonstone remained a child of the Enlightenment, convinced that the world could only benefit from the extension of its ideals.

Edmonstone was not alone. The majority of the British people never subscribed to the views of Burke and the Orientalists, even in their heyday in the 1790s and early 1800s. Certainly in the 1770s, most British subjects aligned with the attitudes of their travelers and merchants, as many as 12,000 of whom had served in civil or military positions in India by the end of the eighteenth century.\(^\text{22}\) The often lurid descriptions of the religion, art and government of the East brought back by such men remade the medieval view, derived from Herodotus and Marco Polo, of India as "a fabulous land of miracles and monsters, of gold and heroism."\(^\text{23}\) Instead, it began to be seen as populated by despotic empires inferior politically, religiously and culturally to the West. The memoir of Edward Terry, chaplain to Sir Thomas Roe, James I's emissary to the Mughal Court, was one of the first publications to promote this attitude. He commented that, unlike the ancient legends had stated, the Brahmins of India were not great intellectuals, being instead a "very silly, sottish and ignorant sort of people."\(^\text{24}\) His belief sprang partly from his own lack of knowledge of the wealth of Indian literature, as indicated by his comment that

[of] the Latin and Greek, by which there hath been so much knowledge conveyed to the world, they are as ignorant of them both, as if they had never been; and this may be one great reason why there is so little learning . . . were there literature amongst
them, they might be the authors of many excellent works; but as the case stands with them, all that is there attainable towards learning, is but to read and write.\textsuperscript{25} He attributed Indian ignorance to their lack of the printing press and to "the worst of all governments, called by Aristotle arbitrary, illimited (sic), tyrannical, such as the most severe master useth to servants, not that which a good king administereth to subjects."\textsuperscript{26} He also averred, "there are no laws for government kept in that empire upon record (for ought I could ever learn)."\textsuperscript{27} Roe's assurance that the Mughal emperors were despots without a written law code was reinforced by the writings of Francois Bernier.\textsuperscript{28} A Mr. Vaughn, shipwrecked in 1702-3 with five other East India employees in Jehore, testified to the pervasiveness of arbitrary rule at all levels of government, recalling that the local ruler who had taken his group prisoner "never miss'd a Day without killing one or other with his own Hands on very frivolous occasions."\textsuperscript{29} The idea of Asian despotism became so ingrained that, by the 1770s, the Maratha Empire, stretching over a far larger, richer and more diverse area than the British Isles, could be dismissed as merely the home of "lawless banditti."\textsuperscript{30}

There were actually a large number of publications on India circulating in Edmonstone's youth, but the majority reinforced an unfavorable view of the East, an opinion that grew as Mughal power declined and British technology and weaponry drew ahead of that of the subcontinent. Alexander Dow's \textit{History of Hindustan} (1770) reiterated the concept of Eastern despotism by alleging that India's heat and humidity made its people too "languorous" to resist the total domination of their rulers, resulting in their living as "the most abject slaves."\textsuperscript{31} John Henry Grose, a writer assigned to Bombay, published \textit{A Voyage to the East-Indies Begun in 1750} (1766), in which he maintained that "there is no character these Asiatic princes are so fond of as that of a warrior; and, as they have no other notion of government, they have been continually at war with one another."\textsuperscript{32} Later reprints of early, largely favorable works on India had prefaces attached to them slanting the text towards the new image of the East: a prefix to the 1745 edition of Captain Robert Covette's 1607 work, the \textit{Incredible Report of an Englishman in Cambaya, the Farthest Part of the East Indies}, declared that "the mogul is an absolute monarch, restrained by no written laws; and as his ancestors first gained the country by conquest, so he maintains himself by a standing force."\textsuperscript{33} Likewise, the 1778 introduction to a reprint of \textit{The Lusiads}, an early Portuguese account of India, commented:

In former ages, and within these few years, the fertile empire of India has exhibited every scene of human misery, under the undistinguished ravages of their Mohammedan and native princes; ravages only equaled in European history by those committed under Attila, surnamed the scourge of God, and the destroyer of nations. The ideas of patriotism and honour were seldom known in the cabinets of the eastern princes till the arrival of the Europeans.\textsuperscript{34}

India's religions, and their effects on the subcontinent's people, were also excoriated in eighteenth-century works. Although some of the early sources had noted that the country was "overspread with Paganism,"\textsuperscript{35} and home to "fond superstition, and abominable idolatry,"\textsuperscript{36} on the whole they tended to be tolerant. An English traveler in 1615 reported that Jahangir "speaketh very reverently of our Saviour, calling him in the Indian
tongue . . . the great Prophet Iesus: and all Christians, especiallie us English, he useth so benevolently, as no Mahometan Prince the like. Even as late as 1715, when William Sympsone, another East India ship captain, published his memoirs, it was noted:

The Heathen Indians are naturally a People so inoffensive, that they will often take, but rarely give an affront; and there are scarce ever any capital offenses committed by them. . . . When I was at Suratte [Surat], there had not been a Criminal that suffer'd or deserv'd Death, for 20 Years past.

At the same time that Symson's account was published, however, an attack on South Asian religions was launched with a collection of letters written by Jesuit missionaries to the subcontinent, which painted India as a land of religious oppression and immorality, and asserted that "we are Eye Witnesses of the cruel tyranny the Devil exercises over the Idolaters."

Likewise, A New History of the East-Indies, Ancient and Modern (1757) included a section labeled "The Idolaters of the Indies" which berated the Brahmins for abusing the Indian people, and recounted a moving story of the sati of a young woman. The Muslim faith was also criticized: Vaughn recalled that his group was "threatened with death & bribed with gold & Wives to become Muslims" before they were rescued by a passing sea captain who bought their freedom.

Henry Southwell's New Book of Martyrs (1779) contributed to this viewpoint by depicting both religions as backward, superstitious and intolerant. Even India's artwork, which was often concerned with religious themes, was attacked: Pierre Sonnerat, the traveler, natural historian and self-appointed art critic, summed up the prevailing European opinion of South Asian art in 1782 when he dismissed the whole as "badly designed and worse executed."

There were a few sources that painted a more positive picture: Sir Charles Morell published some Indian moral stories entitled The Tales of the Genii, or, the Delightful Lessons of Horam, the Son of Asmar (1764), N.B. Halhed's A Code of Gentoo Laws (1776) belied the claim that India had no written law code, and a favorable work on Indian religions was published in 1765 by J.Z. Holwell, who had lived in Bengal for thirty years. Holwell criticized "[a]ll the modern writers [who] represent the Hindoos as a race of stupid and gross Idolators . . . and only tend to convey a very imperfect and unjust semblance of a people, who from the earliest times have been an ornament to the creation."

Other works maintained a neutral tone, delivering information without a great deal of commentary: James Rennell, the first Surveyor of Bengal, published a Bengal Atlas (1780-81), which included basic information on the geology, products and population of India, and Charles Theodore Middleton's System of Geography (1779) described the manners, dress, and manufactures of Asia. On the whole, however, anyone attempting to acquire an understanding of the sub-continent, as Edmonstone undoubtedly did once he was informed of his future profession, would have developed a poor impression of the Indian people. The views common in Edmonstone's childhood obviously influenced the way he perceived India as an adult. Although he would have friendships with a few well-educated and highly ranked Indians, one of whom gave him a jade cup inscribed with Persian poetry said to have belonged to Aurangzeb, he would always view the majority of the people with a combination of contempt and paternalism, seeing them as greatly in need of the Enlightenment's education and guidance.

Newspapers, the other great source of information readily available to the average person in Britain, were largely silent about India's people, customs and literature until after the 1780s. This silence did not extend to the East India Company, however. The
early decades of the eighteenth century had seen little intensive reporting on the Company, a fact that was largely deliberate: the Company preferred to use its close relationship with Whig ministries such as Walpole and Pelham to advance its interests, rather than resorting to the much less predictable public arena of pamphlets and newspapers. It was aided later in the century in keeping its affairs out of the public eye by the extensive coverage given to American and West Indian news after war broke out in 1776. Nonetheless, during much of Edmonstone's youth the Company featured prominently in the press.

In 1766, the first trickle of what would become a great wave of publicity began when the British government conceived a case for abolishing the Company and taking control of its Indian possessions--including the £2 million a year in estimated tax revenue gained with the *diwani* of Bengal. This may have been less a serious suggestion than an attempt to appropriate a portion of the Company's new found wealth to pay down the national debt; if so, it was a successful tactic. The Company reluctantly agreed in 1767 to pay the staggering sum of £400,000 a year in return for continued independence. The debates over the issue, and the intense speculation in Company stock that followed Clive's coup, resulted in numerous articles in the established press, as well as pamphlets and the creation of two newspapers in 1766 devoted entirely to Company affairs. The *East India Company Examiner*, which ran for eleven issues, took the side of speculators who wanted an increased dividend to run up the price of shares; the *East India Observator*, which lasted for seven issues, took the part of the directors, lobbying for an end to interference in their trade. Even after the debate was resolved, speculation in Company stock continued on the European markets, insuring that the press had a ready audience for Indian news. Stock holders, such as Sir Archibald Edmonstone, expected and soon received regular information on the Company's actions, especially military matters that could affect trade.

It was not until the 1780s, after the deluge of publicity surrounding Hastings' trial, that most British subjects began to give considerable thought to India. However, there was some concern in earlier decades that the Company's government was less a model of the Enlightenment virtues than an imitator of the despotic trends of the East. Henry Vansittart, Governor of Bengal, and his entire Council had to be dismissed for economic irregularities in the 1760s, including demanding large "gifts" from Indian rulers and engaging in private trade in competition with the Company. The suffering caused by the 1769-70 Bengal famine, which received considerable press coverage, lent little luster to the Company's already tarnished image. The activities of the nabobs also continued to cause disquiet, with a stock character in popular theatre being the returning Company man, "preceded by all the pomp of Asia . . . profusely scattering the spoils of ruined provinces" and stirring up trouble at home. A typical play had a social-climbing nabob trying to use a large loan to a struggling aristocratic family to gain him their daughter as a wife. Burke contributed to this view long before the Hastings' trial by accusing Company officials of acquiring fortunes through loans to Indian rulers at usurious interest, then avoiding punishment for their crimes by resigning when challenged. By the latter 1770s, he began to call for the construction of a government that would rule India in the interests of its people.

Edmonstone must have been very familiar with the issue of Company reform due to his father's part in the process. The 1773 Regulating Act had given the British
government for the first time considerable powers of control over the Company. In return for a sizeable loan, needed to pay its annual debt to the Crown, the Company agreed that the government could nominate a governor-general and supreme council to take precedence over the regional governors in India. It was hoped that this would result in more effective supervision over the Company's far-flung trade centers and an end to abuses. However, concerns over some of Warren Hastings' measures and his hostile relations with those chosen to serve under him--which culminated in the famous duel with his senior council member Philip Francis--made clear that further measures were needed. The Tory Sir Archibald joined with members of both parties in supporting Fox's East India Bill in 1783, despite George III's known opposition to its provision that parliament, rather than the monarch, should appoint commissioners to govern the Company's Indian territories. The press had wide coverage of the ensuing debates, including a memorable cartoon with Fox, in the guise of an eastern potentate, riding an elephant led by Burke (who was popularly supposed to have authored the bill) on a triumphant parade towards the Company headquarters in Leadenhall Street. Burke lauded the bill as a "remedy which is demanded from us by humanity, by justice, and by every principle of true policy," and with his usual flare for the dramatic, declared himself "overpaid for the labours of eighteen years, when, at this late period, I am able to take my share, by one humble vote, in destroying a tyranny that exists to the disgrace of this nation, and the destruction of so large a part of the human species." The king persuaded the Lords to throw the bill out, but William Pitt's compromise effort, again aided by Sir Archibald's support, became law as the East India Act of 1784.

As with many in parliament, Sir Archibald's reason for supporting the Act may have had less to do with rectifying abuses than with strengthening the British empire around the globe. Britain's collective self-esteem had been badly damaged by the loss of the American colonies the year before. A poem printed in a London newspaper in 1781, when victory still seemed a possibility, had taunted,

Lo! along the sea-girt shores,
Now the British lion roars!
Tremble every daring foe!

In 1783, in contrast, An Epitaph on the British Empire was published; although primarily a political weapon intended to use military defeat to discredit the North ministry, it nonetheless evidenced a significant change in public feeling:

Wide extended over half the Western World,
In piteous prostration and ruin sad,
Behold astonished reader how fallen!
That once stupendous fabric
The British Empire!

From the time of Queen Anne's War, the expanding frontiers of their colonial realm had given the British public a steadily increasing sense of national pride and imperial destiny. Now, the same people who had grown up on stories of Marlborough's victories over the forces of Louis XIV, witnessed the rise of an empire more extensive than that of ancient Rome, and thrilled to the strains of the new composition "Rule Britannia," watched as Britain's role as a world power seemed threatened. It was not a coincidence that Pitt's Act followed closely on the heels of British defeat in the American Revolution. In the midst
of the post-war depression came a glimmer of renewed hope; an anonymous letter to a
London newspaper commented:

From this humiliating and calamitous prospect of the western world, I am now to
carry my attention to the East-Indies. . . . However France might have triumphed
beyond the Atlantic; whatever success might have attended her councils and her
arms on the Continent of America--However numerous her list of captured islands,
and emancipated provinces, might be in the Western hemisphere, no laurels had
graced her in India, or trophies marked her progress.  

Under Pitt's Act, the Company retained the right to appoint the civil and military
officers sent to India and to formulate its major policies; however, a Board of Control
composed of parliamentary members was given overall supervision. It assumed the right
to choose the governors-general and regional governors of the Company and to override
the Court of Directors on policy, especially that pertaining to war and peace. This
created an ungainly dual control over the Company's Indian possessions, but gave the
British public reason to hope that the impolitic actions of a few nabobs would not cause
the nation to lose another important colonial possession. Thomas Barlow, brother of the
future governor-general George Barlow, might "think Mr. Pitt is very bold, to bring
forward within so short a space of time two Bills of such infinite importance," and be
"astonished at his being able to carry them with so powerful a majority."  

However, it is
not at all surprising when it is considered that there were many in parliament such as Sir
Archibald--who had lost his eldest son in the war to preserve the British lands in
America--who had a personal stake in supporting such an act.

Despite the provision in Pitt's Act calling for a cession of Company interference in
Indian affairs, the new wave of imperialist sentiment that swept Britain following the loss
of America resulted in considerable support for British expansion in India. The Board of
Control was monopolized from 1788 to 1801 by its president, Henry Dundas, who came
to be known as "Henry IX, King of Scotland" for his power over patronage in the
Company's service.  Pitt's great imperialist ally, he believed the Company to be the
arbiter of the Indian political world long before its position warranted it, and strongly
favored the extension of its sphere of control by whatever methods were expedient. The
Court of Directors, on the other hand, were against indiscriminate expansion: such action
often led to expensive wars and added more territory to the Company's holdings, the
administration of which had in the past subtracted from rather than added to their
revenues. They were not against all territorial acquisition, but wanted any areas gained to
be of obvious value--such as the useful port of Motupalli in the Guntur Circar on India's
east coast--and preferred them to be acquired through the inexpensive and safe method of
diplomacy. There were also a few anti-imperialists, such as Burke and the author who
blamed the "sufferings, the sorrows, [and] the horrid fears" of the American War on
British actions in India, quoting Isaiah 43:1 to show that the spoilers of the subcontinent
were now being repaid by a war likely to cost them everything they had acquired.  

Although anti-imperialist views gained considerable publicity through Hastings' trial,
their greatest effect on expansion was merely to force the Company to couch its actions
in moral terms--as necessary for the expansion of justice, the improvement of
administration and the general welfare of the people in the newly acquired areas. Despite
the power of Burke's oratory, most people in late eighteenth-century Britain viewed
expansion in India as necessary to rebuild a damaged empire.
In addition to humanitarian issues, financial concerns and patriotic motivations, Sir Archibald was tied to the new Indian system by his friendship with Lord Frederick Campbell, his cousin and a member of the Board of Control after 1788. The two had long been political allies, as both were parliamentary protégés of the powerful Argyll family. Sir Archibald had joined Campbell and Lord Lorne (another cousin) in opposing the repeal of the Stamp Act in 1766, an early evidence of his support for the exercise of governmental authority over colonial possessions. Sir Archibald's actions provided the adolescent Edmonstone with attitudes to which he would always remain faithful: for the sake of its imperial ambitions, Britain must retain a presence in India, and such was possible only if better organization and an effective means of control were established over the Company's domains.

Other than for this political education, no record of Edmonstone's early studies remains. One of his brothers went to Eton, but that was in preparation for university. As Edmonstone was eleven when his elder brother William left for India, it may have already been decided that he would follow in his footsteps. At the time, the East India Company only required their writers to have a basic understanding of accounting and a clear, copperplate handwriting, both of which could have been learned from tutors. Likewise the fashionable proficiency on the flute and pianoforte, some knowledge of painting and an appreciation for Shakespeare which Edmonstone evidenced as a young man in India. From his family and the sophisticated set in which they moved, he also acquired the elegant manners of the gentlemanly class which would mark him all his life.

In addition to the more pleasant lessons, Edmonstone must have had to learn while in London to deal with the condescending attitude common at the time toward the Scot. Two years before Edmonstone was born, Samuel Johnson had expressed the popular opinion that the "noblest prospect which a Scotchman ever sees is the high road that leads him to England." Even those who followed that road--sophisticated, accomplished Scots with London accents--were likely to be seen as somehow inferior. Edmonstone had the additional challenge of an unusually mobile childhood. The Edmonstones, due to the aforementioned Adventurer, owned the estate of Broad Island, in county Antrim, as well as the ancestral holdings in Scotland centered around Duntreath Castle in Stirlingshire.

Due to Sir Archibald's political activity, they also maintained a residence in London in Argyll Street. These multiple residences meant that, as Edmonstone's father put it, "from residing alternately in both Kingdoms we were considered as a sort of aliens in both, and scarcely at home in either." Edmonstone's experiences growing up may have contributed to a feeling of alienation, but they provided an important lesson for the future.

Duntreath Castle is a gray stone country house set in the midst of the gentle hills and silver lakes of mainland Scotland. Rabbits and grouse abound in the woods even today, and in the distance can be seen the rugged, heather-covered mountains of the Central Highlands. When Edmonstone was a boy, the castle's conical roofs had looked out over the surrounding forests of ancient oak, elm and birch for at least 400 years. This meant something in a land which was, in some ways, still quite feudal. Edmonstone's great-grandfather had raised an army of his tenants and neighbors to fight the Irish in the 1680s, and had led them in person. As a scion of the family that had dominated the area for centuries, Edmonstone received considerable deference from the local population--a reversal of the situation in London. He may have developed the talent, which he would
frequently display later in life, of easily adapting to widely differing social norms as a result of this dichotomy.

If Edmonstone was thinking about his family as he proceeded slowly up the Hugli, it was largely due to his father. Sir Archibald Edmonstone was fascinated to the edge of obsession with his ancestry. More to the point, he was concerned with restoring the Edmonstones to their past glory. Considering the family history, he had set himself quite a task. There is some confusion as to when the family Edmonstone originated, but the antiquity of the name is undoubted. The oldest legend states that the family was founded by Radbodus, a son of the King of Frisia, in 739. Another story alleges that Edmundus, the son of Count Egmont of Flanders, arrived in Scotland in 1070 as part of the wedding party of Margaret, the daughter of Edgar Atheling, when she married King Malcolm Canmore. He was said to have received a grant of land and to have settled in Scotland, thus beginning the Edmonstone line. What is certain is that, by the reign of James I, the Edmonstones were well known at the Scottish court. A Sir William Edmonstone married Lady Mary, the king's sister, and was awarded the castle and land of Duntreath in 1434. The family rose steadily in prominence thereafter. By the reign of Mary, Queen of Scots, a later Sir William was listed as a member of the Privy Council, although this may have owed something to the fact that Lord Darnley was related to Sir William's wife.

The family fortunes declined following Mary's flight to England. After undergoing torture along with three of his associates, Sir James Edmonstone was acquitted of attempting to murder James VI in the course of the Ruthven Raid, but the family never thereafter regained royal favor. The loss of patronage precipitated a financial decline. Like many families in Scotland during the second half of the eighteenth century, the Edmonstones found that living was suddenly a good deal more expensive than it had been. The union with England, cemented by the final Stuart defeat in mid-century, brought new styles of housing, clothing and entertainment into Scottish culture. This trend accelerated toward the end of the century: in 1763, for example, gentry lived in houses in Edinburgh which, by 1783, were considered fit only for tradesmen. The strain on the family purse was exacerbated by what Edmonstone's father called "Feuds & Extravagances" on the part of some Edmonstones, and by the long minority of Edmonstone's grandfather.

Sir Archibald felt this decline severely. He noted that, "I own I from the beginning felt my family fortune inferior to its Rank," and lamented that, "the Purse was often become Pedigree especially about London." In 1783 he was 66 years old. His portrait shows a grim old man wearing a perfectly curled wig and a tri-cornered hat. Small blue eyes are set in a long, sagging face that appears completely devoid of humor. "Virtus Auget Honorum" was etched onto the heavy signet ring he wore; the family motto for generations, it expressed the core of what Sir Archibald hoped to pass on to his children. His preoccupation with status and wealth, however, was to influence their lives at least as much as thoughts of virtue and honor.

Sir Archibald was constantly stymied in the pursuit of a reinvigorated family name by his lack of capital. He invested his younger children's trust funds in a real estate venture in London in the hopes of remediying this, but instead made it worse when he listened to a charlatan and lost over £9,000. He received £24,500 by selling the family's Irish estate in 1780, but this sum was swallowed up in the cost of buying back portions of the Scottish patrimony that had been sold off by previous generations. His yearly cost of
living was also high, for he felt obliged to support his "Rank & Station in every respect." Sir Archibald's determination to rebuild the family fortune, and thereby its prestige, determined the course of his children's lives to a large degree. He wrote that he "gave all my children the most liberal Education in every branch agreeable to their different lines of life." However, as paterfamilias, it was he who decided what those lines should be.

His eldest son, named Archibald in the family tradition, was given every possible advantage as he would hopefully preside over a period of renewed Edmonstone glory. Born in 1754, he received a military education at Brunswick and was then sent on a grand tour through Vienna and Paris. His father described him as "the Pride, the Glory & Comfort of my heart." Unfortunately, his father's favorite became ill during his service in America and, after his return to England, died of consumption in 1780 at age 26.

After this tragedy, Sir Archibald turned to his second son, William Archibald, in the hopes that he would be able to contribute to the family's financial support. William, able through his father's connections to obtain one of the coveted writer's positions, had been sent to India in 1776 with instructions to make a "competent fortune." It is probable that Sir Archibald, as a Company stockholder with influential friends, assumed that he could exert influence with the directors to insure his son's success. However, there was probably another reason for William's exile: while Sir Archibald described his eldest son as "modest and docile," he spoke of William as "secret[ive] and reserved." If Archibald came first in his father's affections, there is little doubt that William occupied last place. The situation was not helped by the fact that William had not wanted to go to India and, once there, hardly ever wrote home. Due to his frequent ill health, he also made little progress in advancing himself in the Company's service. Yet despite his resentment of his fate, a strong sense of duty held him in place. Sir Archibald wrote to William following his eldest son's death to explain the family financial situation. He gave him the option of returning to Europe to assume his place as heir, or of staying in India in the hopes of making a fortune to benefit the family. William chose the latter, earning him, perhaps for the only time in his life, his father's regard. Edmonstone would display similar filial devotion, insuring that his time in India would far exceed his original expectations.

The Edmonstone's straitened financial position had an effect on Sir Archibald's younger children as well. Gone were the days when the family estates could be counted on for support. Like many of the gentry in the latter part of the eighteenth century, Sir Archibald's sons found it necessary to make a living for themselves within the limits of their social position. The third son, Charles, was educated at Eton and at Christ Church, Oxford, in preparation for a career in law. George, the fourth son, attended Cambridge where he studied divinity, later becoming vicar of Pollerne in Wiltshire. Edmonstone's two sisters, Susanna Margaret and Anne Mary, were given adequate dowries and made respectable marriages.

Like William, Edmonstone was provided for at the bargain price of £380, the cost of outfitting him for the journey to India. The same year, Sir Archibald purchased an estate adjoining his Scottish property for £48,000. Such purchases were possible with two sons in what was viewed as the gold mine of the East. The expectation was that Edmonstone and William would not only be able to earn enough to support themselves, but would be able to contribute to the family finances as well. It was a heavy
responsibility, but Edmonstone had the confidence of youth and his father's parting gift, a book on the rise to prominence of "Illustrious Persons of Great Britain," to sustain him. He also had a head full of examples of those who had succeeded.

In Edmonstone's youth, Stirlingshire was filled with "opulent individuals" who had acquired fortunes in exotic lands; a contemporary historian of Stirling commented, "few towns in Scotland send more of its inhabitants abroad." The returning nabobs helped to beautify the town, spending lavishly on elegant homes and public works projects. Some of the fantastic stories told by these men were recorded in The Lounger magazine, published in Edinburgh, to which Edmonstone subscribed. It contained, among others, the "Narrative of a country family raised to sudden affluence by the arrival of a son from India," and "the tale of a poor young Scot who went to India as a surgeon . . . and in twelve years' time had a fortune of £25,000."

The sights Edmonstone passed as the budgerow neared Calcutta must have done much to reinforce his impression of India as the font of riches. From about nine miles below the city, the jungle gave way to beautifully manicured lawns studded with roses, scarlet geraniums and mango trees. Crowning the rise of ground running down to the river were elegant mansions called garden houses. Often built in a mixture of Indian and European designs, many were covered with a brilliant white plaster called chunam and all were equipped with wide verandas to provide shade from the summer sun. These were the homes of the fortunate few--leading Company men or successful Indian merchants who could afford residences outside the malodorous city.

On the water, too, were signs that, for some, the fortune hunt in India had been successful. The Hugli became more crowded as one neared the city. The elegant pinnaces and lavishly decorated private budgerows of the wealthy rubbed shoulders with the small chokey boats that delivered mail up and down the river, and with smaller merchantmen. Numerous mercantile vessels and the occasional warship completed the scene. In the words of a contemporary witness, it was a "magnificent and beautiful moving picture."

Calcutta itself, when it finally came into view along the eastern bank of the river, was a long, low city, its skyline broken only by Fort William, its impressive guardian, and by the steeple of the Armenian Church. The Esplanade, one of the main streets of the settlement, faced the river. It gave newcomers another glimpse of the more affluent side of Indian life. From the mansions of the wealthy and the impressive, neo-classical facades of the government and council houses that lined the street, Calcutta would acquire its nickname, the "City of Palaces." To a young man bent on making his way in the world, that first glimpse of Calcutta must have been an exciting, even awe-inspiring sight. It is difficult to say whether it would have been more or less so had Edmonstone had any idea that it would be his home for the next 34 years.
Percival Spear has described the extraordinary metamorphosis that took place in British Indian society from Clive's era to Wellesley's, as it transformed from a series of unsophisticated frontier-type settlements which accommodated themselves to Indian social norms, to deliberately Europeanized cities in imitation of the West; likewise, Christopher Bayly has noted how, between 1780 and 1820, colonial governments became progressively more hierarchical and exclusivist as they began to mirror the neo-absolutism of Europe.\(^1\) However, neither they nor any other chroniclers of social life in eighteenth-century India have turned the problem around; instead of looking at the way in which the growing imperialist sentiments of the post-Revolutionary world affected Calcutta, this chapter will focus on how its life-style promoted imperialism among new Company recruits. Edmonstone stepped into a different world when he arrived in India at the impressionable age of seventeen with, like most writers, many of his opinions about the world still unformed. The society he found in the city Clive dubbed "one of the most wicked Places in the Universe"\(^2\) would alternately shock, delight and horrify him, but its ultimate effect was to turn him in favor of expansion even more than his early life had done.

Since Job Charnok, the Company's agent in Bengal, founded Calcutta in 1690, the area's bamboo groves and paddy fields had been transformed into a sprawling metropolis of over 200,000 people. Other than London, Edmonstone could have seen nothing like it--Edinburgh had a population of only 70,000 in 1780, and Glasgow had even less, 60,000, in 1788.\(^3\) The Esplanade and a few surrounding areas had a European atmosphere, but otherwise Calcutta must have seemed very alien to new arrivals, especially in September when the exotic aspects of the city were heightened by the Hindu festival of the *Durga Pugas*. This drew large crowds to watch as flower-decked, gilded images of the gods were paraded through the streets and ritually immersed in the river. Many entertainers were on hand to provide additional diversion: jugglers, magicians, puppeteers and sword swallowers vied for tourist rupees with snake exhibitors, who showed off huge boa constrictors and deadly cobras to fascinated audiences.\(^4\) Edmonstone may have witnessed part of the celebration on his arrival, as he was probably met by William at the ghats, or steps leading up from the river, behind the Old Fort, which formed the main landing-place for the city. If so, perhaps the colorful festivities countermanded the off-putting fact that the fort, although used as a customs
house by 1783, was still the primary place for public hangings, and, just behind it, stood the grim obelisk raised in 1760 to commemorate the victims of the Black Hole. It was an early warning that life in India held risks as well as the possibility of reward.

Edmonstone was fortunate to be able to make his home in the private residence his brother had obtained within the perimeter of Fort William. Most newcomers were forced to move into the dorm-style accommodations, located in the logically named Writers' Building, provided for its junior employees by the Company. Bordering what would become known as Dalhousie Square, this edifice sat near the heart of the bustling city; the fort, by contrast, was about a mile below Calcutta, and was almost a separate town in itself. Fort William, just completed in 1778, was a two-mile square irregular octagon with seven gates flanked by barracks for the Company's troops. It boasted a granary, its own bazaar with a full range of shops, and accommodations for up to 20,000 men and six months of supplies. The usual complement was 15,000 troops, including two to three battalions of European infantry, an artillery battalion and an arsenal; 1200 Indian troops from their nearby garrison at Barrackpur also attended the fort on a monthly rotation. The size and magnificence of the Company's sentinel was a statement of its new position in India.

If William's house was a typical modest European establishment, it consisted of a large main hall, four to six spacious rooms with high ceilings, a deep verandah and a separate kitchen. Such houses featured plastered walls, sometimes painted in pastel colors to take off the glare, and woven reed floor coverings; furnishings were a hodgepodge of Western and Eastern pieces, much of the latter Chinese, with European prints and mirrors adorning the walls. The musical abilities of the Edmonstones insured that a piano-forte was also viewed as a necessary part of the furniture. Such a blending of cultures was common in eighteenth-century Bengal; as was noted in a 1798 letter about a later arrival, John Adam, "all the Gentlemen near him live . . . in the habit of Indians of rank." Edmonstone must have quickly become used to some of the basic requirements of residence in India: sleeping under filmy folds of kobbradool, a type of gauze used to keep away mosquitoes; leaving his hair unfashionably free of powder to avoid attracting attention from cockroaches; and changing clothes numerous times a day in the warmer months in an effort to feel clean and stay presentable.

It may have been some time before Edmonstone became well acquainted with his new home, as navigating around Calcutta could be quite a challenge: mazes of tiny alleyways petered out into blank walls, house numbers meant little, when they were present at all, and directional signs were few. When he did go exploring, he saw streets of sand-covered bricks bordered by two-story square buildings decorated with wooden balconies, bright awnings and arched doorways; from their flat roofs, strings of laundry attempted to dry, menaced by skies still laden with monsoon rains. The city was already known for its stark contrasts: crowds of pedestrians, bullock carts, goats, and camels vied for space on the clogged thoroughfares with the palaquins and carriages of the rich; tiny, mud and straw huts squatted between graceful, neo-classical buildings; muddy pools and stinking drains ran alongside spacious avenues; heaps of garbage crawling with flies bordered elegant gardens; and toads, rats and the occasional snake were commonplace in even the best homes. In August and September, the Hugli often flooded much of the town, sending water gushing into the lower stories of houses and forcing sightseers to forge
their way through ankle-deep mud. Yet the bazaars lured people outdoors despite the insalubrious weather. Markets selling specialized items took up whole streets, indicating that the main purpose of Calcutta was, as it had always been, trade. Their offerings must have appeared like the overflowing of Aladdin's cave to new arrivals: Dacca muslins, Benares silks, Persian brocades and Kashmiri shawls sprawled together in costly splendor; casks of coffee, tobacco and spices were piled in heaps; and gleaming ivory and pearls provided a contrast to Burmese rubies and Kashmiri sapphires. More prosaically, watermelons, eggplants, cucumbers, oranges, and mangoes from the surrounding countryside made colorful pyramids. The vast warehouses belonging to the Company that took pride of place near the river and the "Europe shops" of the city held further treasures: delicate furniture, exquisitely painted ceramics, and heavy silks from China, lacquer-ware, kimonos and sandalwood fans from Japan, and wines, condiments and books imported from Britain, all displayed in cavernous rooms redolent with Arabian frankincense and Malabar cinnamon.

An amusing rhyme that appeared in a Calcutta newspaper in 1780 describing arrivals' experiences gives a useful frame for a discussion of the main elements of Edmonstone's life in his new city--his employment, daily routine, and personal life--as well as the factors pushing him towards imperialism--the changes coming about in race relations, the dangers of Indian life, and the economic situation he faced.

**Part I: The Cranny**

Welcome, welcome brother Cranny,
To this hot but jolly place,
Where no Guardian, Aunt, or Granny,
Can intrude their frigid face.

"Crannys" were Indian clerks, but the term also referred to the hard-working young writers, who lived up to their title by spending long hours bent over the Company's voluminous paperwork. The *cursus publicus* in India involved a steady progression from writer to factor (after five years' service), junior merchant (after three more years), senior merchant (after three additional years), and, for a select few, councilor and governor. Most were winnowed out along the way; those who had hopes of reaching the higher offices were expected to prove themselves early. New recruits were placed in positions where they would learn about the laws and court system operable in the Company's domains, assist with the collection of revenue, and become familiar with one or more specialized offices within the bureaucracy. This normally entailed a series of short-term assignments in low-level positions, giving the young men an overview of the administration and a chance to see where they might best fit in.

Edmonstone followed a common path, spending his first three years in India as, initially, an examiner in the Secretary's Office to the Committee of Revenue, then moving on to an assistantship with a judicial office called the Preparer of Reports, and finally to a similar position in the *sadr diwani adalat*. The latter was a civil court that tried appeal cases exceeding 500 rupees in value. His work there gave Edmonstone an opportunity to meet the most important men in government, for the president and two members of the governor-general's council presided over the court; it also introduced him to the laws and customs of his new country as, in suits concerning marriage, caste or other religious matters, the laws of the *Qu'ran* were applicable to Muslims and those of the *Shastras* to
Hindus. The men of Edmonstone's generation who would be among the most prominent in future years followed similar paths: George Dowdeswell began his career in 1783 as an assistant in the Secret Department, moved on in 1785 to become registrar of the Calcutta adalat, then in 1786 to assistant to the collector of Chittagong. George Barlow, the future governor-general, started life in the Company as an assistant under the Patna Provincial Council in 1779, in 1780 became the registrar for the Patna diwani adalat, and in 1782 was made assistant to the collector of sircar rolas.

Once placed in a clerk's position, it was up to the new arrivals to prove their worth, which the most successful members of Edmonstone's generation did through a quick grasp of languages. Warren Hastings was among the first to understand the importance, now that the Company was a political power as well as a trading organization, of being able to communicate without the need for interpreters whose loyalties might be suspect. He became fluent in Bengali and Urdu, and knew enough Persian, the lingua franca of the Mughal court and the language of diplomatic correspondence in India since Akbar, for basic correspondence. The scholarly reputation established by Henry T. Colebrooke, who began a study of Sanskrit shortly after his arrival in India and became known for his translations of Indian texts, was largely responsible for his subsequent promotion to the Supreme Council in 1807 and to Supreme Court Judge in 1813. William Kirkpatrick, a long-time friend of Edmonstone's, translated his ability in Persian into an embassy to the court of the Maratha chief Mahadaji Sindhia and the post of resident at Hyderabad. Likewise, Jonathan Duncan, who began as a writer in 1772, used his position as Cornwallis's Persian secretary to obtain the prestigious post of resident at Lucknow; he ended his career as governor of Bombay.

George Barlow, also recognizing the need for linguistic proficiency, requested his father to send him a Persian grammar several years after his arrival. That he needed study materials from Europe was not surprising: there was little call for such items in Calcutta in the early 1780s, where, despite its usefulness, linguistic fluency was extremely rare. The majority of Company recruits remained ignorant of Indian languages, or obtained only a rudimentary understanding, but not Edmonstone. By 1787 he was already being noticed as one who "has been very diligent in acquiring the Country Languages and is in other respects reckoned extremely promising a man of business." His study of Persian enabled him to obtain the position of assistant Persian and Bengal translator to the Board of Revenue in January 1786. Edmonstone's demonstrated linguistic ability in this post would play an important part in his first "big break" career-wise, his selection for a diplomatic mission to Hyderabad in 1788.

Edmonstone soon learned that the system of advancement in India differed a good deal from that prevailing in Great Britain. As there was a majority of Scots in the Company's service, Scottish heritage was not a bar to success; indeed, Edmonstone would find his background helpful in some cases. Precedence in Calcutta was determined by one's Company position--length of time in service and rank in the military meant far more than titles, which were often ignored. Not that intercession from prominent men was unhelpful: Lord Frederick Campbell gave his young relative useful recommendations, and Philip Dundas, later Lord Melville, introduced Edmonstone to Warren Hastings, from whom he experienced "much personal kindness and affection during the remainder of his administration." As the rank of the person introducing newcomers often decided the reception they received, Sir Archibald had chosen well.
However, the strong emphasis on Company position as the measure of hierarchy weakened the ties of traditional social order, and increased newcomers' identification with their employer as the font of reward and prerogative.

Part II: The Nabob
Free like birds escaped from prison,
When we first Landed from the Sea
Kings, and sober fools of reason
Know not half such joys as we. 30

Warren Hastings wrote in 1784 that he rose early to ride eight miles before breakfast, took nothing stronger than tea or water with meals, and usually went to bed at ten. 31 Although the British press would often exaggerate the debauchery of Company employees in future years, not everyone followed Hastings' example. Calcutta in the early 1780s had a frontier-type atmosphere: it was known for balls and masquerades at which the phrase "drinking someone under the table" often took on a literal significance; brawls, such as the free-for-all which broke out at the Chinsura theatre after a play poked fun at Dutch traders in India; and duels, with John Shore, later governor-general, recalling that five or six duels had been fought between the twelve writers and cadets on the ship that conveyed him to India. 32 Barlow's father wrote that he was pleased to hear that George had obtained a position at Patna, "far from that dissipated place Calcutta . . . [and the] bad examples of the generality of the young men in your line." 33

Many of the settlement's entertainments took place at the Old Court House, a mellow, cream-colored edifice located beside the Writers' Building. It welcomed most evenings from October to February, the traditional Calcutta "season," with candlelight gleaming from every window, while sounds of music and dancing drifted up the appropriately named Old Court House Street until 4 A.M. Edmonstone entered into the social whirl of the city enthusiastically, often hosting his own parties as well as rehearsals for a musical group he joined. His entertaining became even more frequent after he acquired a residence of his own next door to William's some years later. 34

His daily routine was likely the same as that of most ambitious new writers: up before daylight while the air, although already heavy with heat in the summer months, was temperate compared with the blinding light and searing temperatures of mid-day. A brief morning ride for exercise was followed by breakfast and work until two when a halt was made for a light meal. Afterwards, unless additional assignments demanded continued labor, came a short nap, followed at sunset by another horse or carriage ride by the river. The evening was for amusement, with supper often served as late as ten. 35

One of the ways Edmonstone spent his free time, which would evolve into a life-long interest, was in the study of Indian literature. Sir William Jones founded the Asiatic Society of Bengal the year after Edmonstone's arrival partly to promote the translation of Indian manuscripts. Edmonstone became a member and, as his fluency in Persian progressed, began a collection of Indian works that would continue to grow throughout his lifetime. His library eventually included a manuscript that had once belonged to Abul Fazl, the famed courtier of Emperor Akbar, numerous volumes of Persian poetry, fine examples of calligraphy and many travelers' histories. 36 His membership in the Society was due to a genuine interest in his new home, but it was India's past that attracted him, the "splendor and magnificence of the Imperial Court at Delhi," 37 as he phrased it, not the subcontinent's then unsettled, and to his mind, unsophisticated state.
Edmonstone's was an increasingly common attitude; his generation would be more disdainful of Indian society and culture than any previous one in the Company's service. Of course there would always be a few "sultanized" Englishmen in India: Colonel John "King" Collins, a contemporary of Edmonstone's, traveled with all the pomp of an Indian prince, surrounded by his zenana, or harem, and a private artillery brigade to sound salutes. However, men who lived similarly to and regularly associated with the Indians were becoming an endangered species by Edmonstone's day; the Enlightenment upbringing of his generation combined with social and political factors in the 1780s to significantly change the way British and Indians interacted.

One reason for the new distance between the races was the Company's growing resolve to have only two types of people in its domains--Indians and its employees--and it made regular attempts to prevent others from regarding India as home. It had long required all Europeans in its lands to be registered with the government and to carry a license that could be cancelled at any time by the Supreme Council. The Company's resolve to discourage colonization was reinforced by the events preceding the American War, when entrenched colonial interests first questioned and then threw off the control of Great Britain. British-born subjects not in the Company's or the Crown's service were required after 1785 to post bonds for their good behavior, and anyone wanting to purchase land beyond Calcutta found themselves limited to securing a pottah, a type of long-term lease, instead. Yet Company authority was never absolute: Portuguese, Danish, Dutch and French ships conveyed people to Bengal without the Company's permission; settlements of Europeans sprang up, although never on the scale of those in America; and numerous "adventurers" of British origin took employment with Indian powers. An example of the latter would be George Thomas, who began his career in India as a quartermaster on a British ship that docked at Madras in 1781. He left the Company's service to join the Marathas and soon rose to a prominent position in their forces, at one time leading 10,000 men and controlling several forts, until he fell from favor after quarrelling with Sindhia. To prevent similar desertions, the Company became steadily more restrictive in the granting of passes for travel beyond its borders, and used the resident at Awadh and officials at Benares to keep watch over Europeans in the area. The restrictions on colonization, although not completely successful, nonetheless insured that there were few British in India who had a long-term view of their association with the country and a reason to accommodate themselves to its lifestyle. Instead, Company recruits were taught, as Robert Butcher, George Barlow's uncle, succinctly put it, that "the Indies . . . is the place to make a fortune, but old England is the place to spend it comfortably." Most recruits went out with the idea that their time in Asia was transitory, and had little reason to change this view after arrival.

Calcutta was not completely homeward looking, however. As in America, the limitations placed on British life in the colonies, and their implications, led to protest by those affected. An example would be the large gathering that took place in the Calcutta theatre in 1785 to object to Pitt's East India Act, part of which set up a British-style judicature in India. The clause that required a Company employee accused of crimes in the East to face a tribunal in England without the benefit of a jury was especially despised: "by the passing of this Act, we stand prejudiced, in as much as it sets forth, that the detection and punishment of crimes committed in India requires different laws, and severer than those which already operate over the whole body of British subjects." Yet
such protests did not stop a renewed, more intense Company effort in the 1780s to better control its Indian possessions. Much of this was the result of the extremely bad press it received from Hastings' trial.

Hastings' impeachment began on February 13, 1788, and lasted, with intermissions, for seven grueling years. Burke's tirades against the governor-general were so severe as to prompt Sir Robert Dallas, one of Hastings' defense counselors, to write:

Oft have I wondered why on Irish ground
No poisonous reptile was yet found,
Reveal'd the secret stands of Nature's work--
She saved her venom to create a Burke.\footnote{44}

The Company had reason to agree. A contemporary cartoon lampooning Burke's oratorical style showed him and Fox, assisted by a grinning devil, hurling street mud at a noble-looking Hastings.\footnote{45} The problem was that the mud splattered; the opprobrium regularly heaped on the governor-general was soon applied to East India employees in general. Burke himself quipped that employment in the Company "resembled the service of the Mahrattas [Marathas]--little pay, but unbounded license to plunder."\footnote{46} This type of comment was nothing new, but the frequency and intensity of such attacks increased beyond anything previously known as the trial dragged on. An example is the reception afforded the petition of 1785 from the residents of Calcutta, which reached parliament in early 1787 only to become another sideshow of Hastings' trial. A particularly vituperative newspaper commentary noted:

If the Company's Servants, with the wealth of India drained into their coffers, complain of the expense of a trial in England, and the difficulty of bringing over their witnesses, what is the state of the wretches from whom they have drained the wealth, --whom they have stripped, have flogged, have imprisoned, have chained, have famished, and who have no vessel to transport them to a distant and evanescent justice . . . ?\footnote{47}

It went on to aver that little else could be expected when "a motley assemblage of chimney-sweepers, shoe-blacks and pimps, found a colony and erect a Government."\footnote{48} A particularly interesting feature of the column is that it appeared in the \textit{World}, which was a pro-Hastings newspaper at the time. Defense of Hastings, therefore, did not necessarily mean support of the East India Company, yet the pro-Burke papers also had no reason to take the Company's part. A typical column in the Establishment press, provocatively entitled "Oriental Delinquents," commented that "it is somewhat very remarkable, that the heads of all the different branches of the former Government of India are now under prosecution," and went on to list the criminal trials of Hastings and Sir Elijah Impey (the Chief Justice of Calcutta, viewed by Burke as Hastings' accomplice) as well as the civil suits pending against some senior Company officials, as proof of the pervasiveness of immorality in the Indian service.\footnote{49} Before long, even George III was moved to exclaim about the "shocking enormities in India that disgrace human nature."\footnote{50}

A few authors defended the Company men, such as Major John Scott-Waring of the Bengal army, who responded (overly optimistically) to Burke's accusations that "the people of England who have been so gulled, deceived, and cheated by pretended patriots, and political adventurers, will not suppose us to be the infernal monsters you represent us, without full enquiry."\footnote{51} By the latter 1780s, however, the Company was tired of bad press and related parliamentary investigations into its activities; no longer willing to trust public opinion to take its side unaided, it embarked on a deliberate public-relations effort.
As part of this, a new governor-general with a sterling reputation was dispatched with orders to make noticeable reforms. Charles Cornwallis, although recently embarrassed at Yorktown, was a respectable choice. A bluff, practical-minded soldier with a florid face highlighted by shrewd blue eyes and a thatch of white hair, Cornwallis was honest, reliable, and too down-to-earth to play the part of the eastern potentate. His dinner parties in Calcutta traditionally began with the benign command, "Off coats!," a signal for his sweltering guests to divest themselves of the outer layer of the costume society prescribed for cooler climates.

His reforms were a reflection of his character, and were undertaken in Calcutta society as well as in the Company's business. He toned down the revelries held at the Old Court House, ordering its refurbishment as a place for genteel public entertainments rather than the "tavern brawls" of previous years. Ending gambling proved impossible, but he managed to promote charitable works, setting the example himself by making donations toward the building of a new church in Calcutta and an orphanage at Madras. He attacked the prevailing patronage system, gruffly informing those in lofty positions in Britain who endeavored to have him promote their relatives or friends that he was in "the habit of looking for the man for the place, and not the place for the man." Barlow was informed by his father of the general belief that, "Lord Cornwallis & Mr. Shore being appointed to their elevated station . . . merely from their personal merits, [had] resolv'd that merit alone in the Company's Servants should meet their countenance & support." Cornwallis lived up to his reputation by publicly snubbing a colonel in the Company's army who boasted of having obtained the bargain of two writerships and a cadetship for his three sons, for a mere £5,000 bribe to the "lads of Leadenhall Street." In 1793, he made one of his most successful reforms, greatly increasing the salaries of the Company's employees, thereby cutting down on the resorts, such as money lending and monopolies, to which some had turned to make ends meet. He also placed restrictions on private trade, and punished those who followed old-style "entrepreneurship."

Yet some of Cornwallis's reforms were not so insightful. He blamed the Indians in the Company's service for many of the prevalent abuses, commenting on one occasion that "every native of Hindustan (I really believe) [is] corrupt." Although he was sparing in punishing Europeans who had committed fraud or taken graft, believing that they could be reformed, he dismissed all Indians from important positions in the service, whether suspected of misconduct or not, and in 1790 barred them from ever holding an office worth £500 a year or more. He also disqualified sepoys from any hope of rising to commissioned status. Cornwallis's actions removed much of the daily intercourse between Company men and well-educated Indians, who were also not usually invited to Company entertainments, and thereby reinforced a sense of exclusivity and superiority in Edmonstone's generation.

The assumptions made by many in Europe about the attitudes and actions of members of the Company enraged Edmonstone. He was especially irritated with the views of his brothers in Britain, the eldest of whom, Charles, seemed to assume that William planned to spend the rest of his life in the East, amassing a fortune to aid the family and foregoing any thought of claiming his place as heir. Edmonstone had quickly become extremely fond of William, whose work ethic and perseverance under adversity he greatly admired. He constantly sought his brother's good opinion and regularly corresponded with him whenever they were parted by Edmonstone's travels outside Calcutta. He also evidenced
protectiveness, commenting in concern to their father that William lived a "life of Drudgery and labor to which his constitution was almost unequal." Some of Edmonstone's frequent parties seem to have been designed specifically to involve his brother more in society, likewise his encouraging William to join his musical ensemble. Edmonstone curtly informed Charles that William was "much gratified at the idea of our returning to Europe together" once their fortunes were made. George likewise incurred a haughty reply to a letter in which he apparently made allusions to the presumed venality of Company employees:

for we may both truly say, that whatever property we are possessed of arises from the profits of our allowances, although for my own part I do not expect to escape the imputations so good naturedly bestowed upon us nabobs of having acquired a fortune by injustice, corruption and extortion of which by the bye I will venture to assert that in the present day there is much less than among those who tax us with these enormities and who believe that with our native country we quit all the obligations of moral and religious duty.

Yet, despite his vigorous protestations, Edmonstone was influenced in some obvious ways by the changed moral climate of British India.

Part III: The Mistress
We submit to no confinement,
Keep it up boy here is Life
Store of Nautch girls most delightful.
Here no Cranny wants a wife.

_Nautch_ girls were Indian dancers who entertained at parties; some were highly skilled, such as one named Neekhee, whose singing was fine enough to assure her £150 for three evenings' work. Their profession was, as with the geishas of Japan, sometimes associated with prostitution, although this was not always the case. Dancing exhibitions, or _nautchee_, were so commonplace in Edmonstone's period that Lady Frances Chambers, wife of Sir Robert Chambers, Chief Justice of Bengal from 1789-99, recorded attending them as frequently as she did church or the theatre. However, some performers did have a reputation for augmenting their income by other means than dance; one author calculated that, excluding married men, three-fourths of the Company's employees kept Indian mistresses. Other contemporary writers confirmed this opinion, with a typical description of an employee's day including a wake up call at eight at which time "a lady quits his side, and is conducted . . . either to her own apartment, or out of the yard." Alexander MacKrabie, High Sheriff of Calcutta in the mid-1770s, likewise assured friends in Britain that even a local clergyman "maintains twenty Girls in his Seraglio."

Part of the reason for the prevalence of such liaisons was that marriage almost always took place considerably later in India than in Europe, due both to the need to make a reasonable fortune before taking a wife and because of the scarcity of European women. In the 1780s there were less than 300 English women in all of Bengal and, as late as 1809, European men outnumbered women in Bombay 3-1. Those British women who were in India also tended to be far more independent than their counterparts in Europe: they wore scarlet riding habits like men, drove their own carriages, enjoyed smoking the _hookah_, or water pipe, and often refused to wear corsets; instead, they sported masculine turbans, a fashion they exported to Europe. They also did not bother to restrain their
appetites in the socially acceptable manner: one author recorded his surprise at seeing "one of the prettiest girls in Calcutta eat about two pounds of mutton-chops at one sitting." Although Cornwallis was said to have disapproved of any Company employee taking part in theatrical performances, Mrs. John Bristow, wife of a senior merchant, established a private theatre at her home where she and many other ladies were known to perform. William Hickey recalled on her embarkation to Europe that she had been among the most high-spirited of the Calcutta belles: she rode astride like a man and bested a number of male jockeys in races, was an excellent shot, and "understood the present fashionable state of pugilism, [she] would without hesitation knock a man down if he presumed to offer her the slightest insult."

The lifestyle of the British women in India also garnered some of them a bad reputation: Barlow's father cautioned him that, "by much the greatest part of Ladies who go to India [do so] merely to sell their ware as by auction, & like auctioneers ware, is generally found, but too late, to be damag'd or imperfect." It is doubtful that such accusations bothered the ladies of Calcutta overly much, for they remained heavily in demand as escorts. MacKrabie recalled his disappointment that few men could dance at the city's frequent balls, for "the Ladies are generally engaged for two months. So we have no chance." At one assembly, sixteen young men, each desperate to stand out from the crowd, arrived wearing attire designed to match the fashionable green and pink ensemble of a Miss Sanderson, a popular Calcutta beauty.

Until the 1790s, when the practice was discontinued because of its "resembling a slave auction," newly arrived women were subject to a "sitting up," a series of parties on three consecutive nights at the house of one of the leading ladies of Calcutta society. There they would be introduced to, and scrutinized by, hundreds of eligible young Company men. The scarcity of European brides, and the lengths suitors were prepared to go to obtain one, is possibly best illustrated by the wedding announcement of the marriage at Tranquebar of "H. Meyer, Esq., aged sixty-four, to Miss Casina Couperas, a very accomplished young lady of sixteen, after a courtship of five years."

The large discrepancy between the numbers of British men and women in the settlement resulted in some of the latter acquiring a self-important attitude. As one lady poetically noted about Calcutta in a letter to a friend in 1784:

[There is] No place, where at a bolder rate,
We females bear our sovereign state.
Beauty ne'er points its arms in vain,
Each glance subdues some melting swain.

Edmonstone may have followed the example of many of his contemporaries and lined up on Sundays outside the church in Fort William in the hope of being allowed to escort a lady into service. His attempts may have been rebuffed, for he commented that more European women were needed in India as "a sufficient number of Belles to balance the Beaux [would] bring down the pride of the former & render the attentions of both more rational." He did not marry until age 38, a common occurrence among his contemporaries, many of whom agreed with Company official Samuel Brown, who preferred the more biddable Indian women to "encountering the whims, or yielding to the furies of an Englishwoman."

There is nothing in Edmonstone's experience to support Ronald Hyam's theory that the ready availability of indigenous women was a main reason for the willingness of young
British men to staff the empire. Edmonstone and his friends had far more compelling reasons for going abroad, namely financial and social advancement; nonetheless, there was some truth in the common Calcutta toast that claimed the two main concerns of young Company men to be "a lass and a lakh a day." Certainly many of Edmonstone's contemporaries saw nothing wrong in following the former part of that maxim if it did not interfere in their pursuit of the latter. George Frederick Cherry, one of Edmonstone's early mentors, acquired an Indian mistress, called Bibby [bibi, an Indian term for courtesan] Fannie, by whom he had a son; Graeme Mercer, another associate, likewise fathered at least one half-Indian offspring; David Ochterlony, resident at Delhi and an acquaintance of Edmonstone's, had a harem of 13 Indian women; and John Baillie, one of Edmonstone's closest friends, had a mistress and several illegitimate children. The handsome, brunette Baillie rarely followed convention; although he was, like Edmonstone, the younger son of an ancient but impoverished Scottish family (his father was George Baillie of Leys Castle, Inverness) he broke with custom and married an Indian wife, whom he eventually took back to Scotland dripping in jewels. Edmonstone would never do likewise, but he followed his friend's example in other matters, commenting while passing through Midnapur in 1788 that, "there is I find a very large society and several women. I suppose I shall visit them. That is, I shall do as the rest do."

There were numbers of kusbeen, or prostitutes, in India, many of whom, as Mark Berger has ably pointed out, were unwilling and exploited victims who lived short and miserable lives, especially in the brothels that grew up around the British cantonments to serve the average soldier. Most Company men of any standing preferred to acquire a permanent mistress, however, some of whom attained almost the status of a wife, living with their lovers for decades and, in many cases, being left fortunes on their deaths. Some Company mistresses, like Catherine Verlée, Philip Francis' lover, were French, and a few, especially in Bombay because of its proximity to Goa, were Portuguese, but most were Indian. By 1795 Edmonstone had followed this custom. Little is known of the other party in his liaison except that she was Indian and literate, as she would later correspond with her children by Edmonstone after they had been sent back to Europe to be educated. This may indicate that she came from an upper class family that had fallen on difficult times; however, as her letters were undoubtedly in English--her eldest sons were five and three years old when sent abroad and could hardly have been writing an Indian language at the time or have learnt one in Scotland--Edmonstone may have taught her himself. There is no indication of her religion in the letters, but the majority of Company concubines were Muslim. Her missives have not survived, but references to her in her children's correspondence with their father show that she lived at least until 1811; all of Edmonstone's known illegitimate sons were hers, indicating by their birth dates that the relationship lasted at least six years and may have continued until his marriage in 1803.

In 1796 Edmonstone's first half-Indian child was born, and three others soon followed. He had his three sons christened and allowed himself to be cited as the father, although the mother's name was not included in the records; however, the children were all given the common Scottish surname "Elmore" rather than being allowed to carry the ancient Edmonstone name. The two eldest, John and Alexander Elmore, were sent to Scotland in 1802 to be brought up by Margaret Baillie, sister to Edmonstone's friend...
John, who also took care of her brother's half-Indian children. Edmonstone's youngest son, Frederick, was sent to England in 1811 and placed in school at an academy in Leyton, Essex, managed by a Mr. William Shepherd, as Margaret was by then too old to care for yet another child. Frederick wrote to his father that several other half-Indian boys, including Graeme Mercer's son, were there as well. Despite the fact that many such children were sent to Britain and never returned to India, Edmonstone would estimate in the 1820s that the Eurasian community in Calcutta outnumbered the Europeans.

All of Edmonstone's children were well provided for: John was bought a commission in a Scottish regiment stationed at Kinsale in 1814; Alexander was placed in a merchant career in Glasgow; Eliza, the only girl, remained in Calcutta, where she was given a large dowry and married John Barker Plumb, an English merchant with the import firm Tulloh and Company, in 1825. Only Frederick did not fare well, dying in 1816 of a tumor on the neck, despite receiving the best possible medical attention. Baillie's eldest half-Indian son, George, was also well set up by his father, attending university and becoming a surgeon. He returned to India in 1815, a move which John had hoped of emulating, but Edmonstone refused to consider it. He agreed with Lord Valentia, the traveler and commentator on the East, who was in favor of "obliging every father of half-caste children to send them to Europe, prohibiting their return in any capacity whatsoever." Much of the reason for his attitude was the many restrictions imposed on the Eurasian community in Calcutta, as Edmonstone noted:

The great . . . number of that class of the community of India denominated half-caste . . . [are] generally speaking rejected and despised by the European part of the society and held in very inferior estimation by the natives. They belong in fact exclusively neither to the one nor to the other. They are debarred from the rights and privileges of British subjects, being deemed in law natives of the country, while they are shut out from most of the advantages of their imputed nativity by their religion, habits, manners and education. Precluded from holding any offices under Government but those of the most subordinate description; without capital, and consequently without the means of engaging in the commerce of the country, or establishing themselves as landholders, allied paternally with the European community, and maternally to the native population but disavowed by both they form an insulated, degraded and consequently discontented body.

The problems faced by children of mixed marriages was conveyed by the term "demi-Bengalis" by which they were known in Calcutta. They had better opportunities in Europe as, in many cases, their backgrounds remained secret. The illegitimate daughter, Anna, and son, Edward, of Lieutenant-Colonel William Scott, resident at Lucknow from 1799 to 1804, were sent back to Britain. They traveled in the care of George Robinson, a friend of Scott's associate William Yule, who had acquired the trusteeship of them after their father's death. Robinson placed the girl with friends in Somersetshire, and sent the boy to Edinburgh to live with and be educated by a Mr. Manners, another longtime associate, who had "six or seven young men in his house." He was soon writing to Yule to complain that the sixteen-year-old Edward, who had resided with his aunts in London before being sent to Edinburgh, had "got much knowledge of the fashionable pursuits of the young bloods about London. With the language of the boxers, cockfighters & jockies, he is very familiar." The young man had to be sent back to
London the next year because he became involved with a local girl and it was feared a marriage might take place.\textsuperscript{106} The problem was resolved by buying him a commission in an army regiment soon to be sent to America.\textsuperscript{107} From the letters, it appears doubtful that anyone outside the family and clique of old India friends of their father knew of the children's parentage. Such was not always the case: Baillie acknowledged his illegitimate children and brought a half-Indian daughter back to Inverness with him, where he married her to a Scot.\textsuperscript{108} However, Edmonstone's decision to give his illegitimate children British names was likely an attempt to allow them to more easily blend into the population.

The resolution of many in Edmonstone's generation to send illegitimate offspring to Britain may have solved the problem of the children's future social position, as well as helping some financially, but it created other difficulties. Edmonstone's actions removed his progeny from any further contact, except by letter, with their mother and maternal relatives; his later reluctance to allow his legitimate heirs any knowledge of their half-Indian siblings insured that his Indian sons were left without paternal family as well. No record exists of the boys having contact with him after his return to England many years later, and any meetings that quietly took place must have been few, as the young men lived nowhere near their father. Yet, to someone who had himself been sent while still young to a foreign country to earn his way and spent decades there separated from every close relation except one brother, it probably did not seem like an overly harsh fate. Edmonstone also never saw his father or stepmother again after sailing from Britain, as both died before his return, and as the years passed, his family who remained in Europe became little more than strangers to him. In the often-harsh world of the early nineteenth century, family feelings had to be sacrificed to survival.

Although it was impossible for the Company to prevent personal relationships from developing between its employees and Indian women, it could and did effectively separate the results of those unions from European society. No matter how accomplished or wealthy, the products of mixed liaisons were not invited to entertainments or socially acknowledged. Edmonstone's daughter, Eliza Elmore Plumb, is a good example: although her father held the highest positions in the Company, she was herself married to a British merchant, and her inheritance made her a wealthy woman, she could not fully participate in Calcutta society. She might be invited to private celebrations, but Company entertainments were off-limits.\textsuperscript{109} Barring the children of British/Indian unions was another way of insuring that Company employees did not establish permanent ties to India, but it also had the effect of increasing the tendency of Edmonstone's generation to consider Indians as inferior.

Edmonstone's illegitimate children all seemed fond of him--Eliza named her first child Neil Edmonstone Plumb\textsuperscript{110} -- but there is evidence of considerable diffidence in his manner. In addition to refusing them his name, he was infrequent in writing to them after they went to Britain, apparently never bothered to inform them of their ages or birth dates, kept their existence from his legitimate offspring, and seemed uncomfortable with the idea of their rising "above their station."\textsuperscript{111} Margaret Baillie originally planned to send John to university, but thought better of it once Edmonstone remonstrated with her that "it might give the Boy Ideas inconsistent with [his] views for him."\textsuperscript{112} Even when it came to his own offspring, Edmonstone was incapable of viewing Indians as his equals, although his choice of middle-class occupations for his sons and a respectable marriage
for his daughter did show some appreciation for their abilities. Likewise his comment, years later, that he believed Eurasians capable of holding positions in the Company's service.

One of the most obvious indications of the widening gulf between British and Indian society was the disapproval and sometimes censure of intermarriage that came about in Edmonstone's era. David Woodburn, a colonel in the Company's service, wrote disparagingly to his brother John in 1794 that a mutual friend, John Fullerton, had recently married a "Black Brammany Wife." By 1801, James Achilles Kirkpatrick, then resident at Hyderabad, would jeopardize his career by marrying even a well-born Indian lady whose grandfather held an important position at court. This union was later romanticized in *The Romantic Marriage of Major J.A. Kirkpatrick*, by Edward Strachey at the turn of the twentieth century. In this account, Kirkpatrick, called by his Indian nickname Hushmat Jung (Glorious in Battle), and Khair un Nissa Begum (Excellent Among Women) became so enamored after an accidental meeting that they risked their positions and even their lives to be together. Yet the reality was less glamorous: Kirkpatrick, who already had an Indian mistress of common birth, scandalized the court by also bringing the fifteen-year-old Khair-un-Nissa into the residency and building the Rung Mahal, a special *zenana*, for her. The situation was publicized when Khair-un-Nissa's grandfather, Baker Ali, complained to the captain of the residency guard that Kirkpatrick's actions were preventing her marriage with a Muslim of "great respectability," which explains why, when she became pregnant, her family tried to arrange for an abortion. Kirkpatrick prevented this, but the outrage over his affair continued to grow, eventually prompting the nizam, the ruler of the state, to write to Calcutta, bitterly complaining about his conduct. For a time it was feared by the Company that the situation might permanently damage British/Hyderabad relations. The situation worsened after an anonymous letter began circulating in Calcutta stating that Kirkpatrick had committed no crime, except "the Deviation from the Rules of Morality according to its Restrictions . . . in the polished Societies of Europe," and wondering if anyone, even then governor-general Richard Wellesley, was innocent of similar behavior. Only the interposition of William Kirkpatrick, who served as Wellesley's military and political secretary, saved his brother, especially after James converted to Islam in order to marry the lady. The romance ended in tragedy when Kirkpatrick made the decision to send their children, William and Kitty Kirkpatrick, to Britain to be educated over his wife's furious protests; ill with hepatitis, he died shortly thereafter at age 43, leaving his nineteen-year-old wife a widow.

Perhaps Edmonstone's decision to keep his mistress and their children in a separate house from his own, an unusual practice in the 1790s, was the result of a realization that the Company's tolerance on the issue was changing; it may also have had something to do with William's preferences, as he does not appear to have followed his brother's example. Changing Company practice may also have influenced Edmonstone's choice of a wife: he married a young British woman, Charlotte Anne Friell, the daughter of Peter Friell, originally of Dublin and later of Guildford, Surrey, in December 1803. She was the sister-in-law of his close friend, James Lumsden, by whom she was probably introduced to her future husband, and apparently shared Edmonstone's musical abilities. His marriage was also the result of personal conviction: he had happily commented to William on their eldest sister's marriage that the bridegroom, Colonel Reed, was
financially well-off, having £1500 a year in income and the prospect of inheriting a small fortune on his mother's death.\textsuperscript{124} Even more telling, he tried to talk a friend, Sir Frederick Hamilton, out of his proposed marriage to Miss Eliza Duncarul Collie, noting that the girl was not his equal socially and that the match would undoubtedly disappoint his family.\textsuperscript{125} Edmonstone failed to change his friend's mind and attended the ceremony anyway, but the idea of an Edmonstone following a similar path, or of marrying an Indian as Baillie did, was unthinkable. Many of his friends felt the same: British/Indian marriages like Baillie's were much rarer in Edmonstone's generation than they had been before the 1780s, when intermarriage had been commonplace.\textsuperscript{126} There would be few repetitions in the future of Job Charnock's famous 1663 rescue of a beautiful Hindu widow about to commit sati, and his subsequent marriage to her. In any case, whatever political, social and financial reasons may have helped to prompt it, Charlotte and Edmonstone had a happy marriage, eventually having 11 children.\textsuperscript{127} His Indian liaison, however, underscored for Edmonstone that many things considered improper in Britain were permissible in India. Although he was always highly conscious of his background and strove to act the gentleman, he viewed his activities as acceptable under the circumstances. He would later use the claim of expediency and the idea of "doing as the others do" to maintain his self-image while employing whatever tactics were needed on the political front.

Part IV: The Risks

Drunk and wench like Alexander,
Drive our Naggs and laugh at fate
Over Assia thus we squander,
But beware the Prison gate.\textsuperscript{128}

Calcutta's public prison in 1783 was located in "an old ruin of a house" in Lall Bazaar; it had no infirmary, no jail allowance and everyone bathed in the same tank in the center of the enclosure.\textsuperscript{129} The squalor of the accommodations did nothing to lessen the frequency of use--in the year of Edmonstone's arrival, even Mr. Motte, then head of the Calcutta police, was himself locked up for debt.\textsuperscript{130} Yet the possibility of incarceration was small in comparison to the other, daily menaces of Calcutta life.

To live in India in Edmonstone's day was to be in constant danger. Kidnapping, robbery, assault and murder occurred frequently in Calcutta,\textsuperscript{131} especially in the area across the Maratha Ditch, ironically erected to protect the city during the 1742 attack, where the court system held no jurisdiction. At night, pickpockets, prostitutes and thugs loitered in the unlit streets and shadowed archways, and from the many taverns echoed loud altercations that added variety to Calcutta's evening serenade from screaming jackals and grunting alligators. The "large numbers of vagrant Europeans"\textsuperscript{132} on the loose in Bengal worried the government, which regularly tried to enlist them in the military or export them back to Europe; in 1791, eight who had evaded such attempts were incarcerated for robbery or murder.\textsuperscript{133} Additionally, thousands of dacoit, or robber, bands of Indians made travel within and, especially, beyond the city extremely perilous without an armed escort. Fourteen of these, captured in 1789, were exposed to the harshest sentence: pinioned to the ground in an unshaded area, they had their right hands and left feet cut off, after which they were left to slowly perish from loss of blood and heat stroke.\textsuperscript{134} Their punishment did not noticeably reduce the danger to residents of the
city, however, who learned to avoid such places as the infamous Gullakutta Gully in Bowbazar, better known as "Throatcutter's Lane."\(^{135}\)

Newcomers to the city met with numerous reminders of their own mortality. Relics of previous Company wars—soldiers missing arms and fingers, hobbling on wooden legs, or blind in one eye—surrounded Edmonstone at Fort William, as hundreds were still on the duty rolls awaiting medical treatment. Like the rest of his generation, he must have dreaded the frequent deliveries of black-edged cards sent to announce deaths and the regular passing of hearses on their way to other burials. Hickey recorded that there were 70 British funerals in Calcutta during September 1791 alone.\(^{136}\) As a contemporary account noted "it often happens in gay circles, that a friend is dined with one day and the next in eternity . . . and the mental question, for the period of internment at least, which will be tomorrow's victim?"\(^{137}\) Typhoid, malaria and cholera were common, but just as dangerous for new arrivals was a fever which affected almost everyone their first season. Disease was spread by the general unsanitary condition of the city, the drinking water for which came from open reservoirs, or tanks, that were regularly contaminated by animals bathing in the water and by the run-off from the city's drains; during one particularly wet season, the remains of dead Portuguese, whose shallowly buried bodies had become unearthed due to flooding, were added to the pestilential mix.\(^{138}\) Sunstroke was another serious threat in the hotter months of mid-March to mid-October. Few breezes fanned the sweltering city, being blocked by the surrounding groves of mango trees; it was reported that, in summer, meat could be broiled on the cannons mounted on the ramparts of Fort William.\(^{139}\) Inside the more gracious houses, \textit{punkahs}, room sized fans that hung from the rafters, and \textit{tatties}, window screens of woven grasses that were kept moist by servants, could reduce the heat by as much as 30 degrees,\(^{140}\) but the direct sun of Calcutta at mid-day could kill. It regularly took a toll on newcomers who mistakenly declined parasols as effeminate.

The physicians of the city were notoriously bad; although Dr. Rowland Jackson, Calcutta's leading medical man in the 1780s, was well respected, most doctors in India were known to have "deserted from East-Indiamen, or escaped from sweeping shops in Edinburg."\(^{141}\) The resulting incompetence was reflected in regular jests made against the medical profession, most of which were not good-natured, as a satirical poem in \textit{Hickey's Bengal Gazette} illustrates:

\begin{quote}
Some Doctors in India would make Plato smile,
If you fracture your head they pronounce it the bile . . .
A sprain in your toe, or an Augish shiver,
The faculty here call a touch of the liver . . .
If a compound of ills, from such treatment you boast,
The plan next devised is a trip to the coast.\(^{142}\)
\end{quote}

The huge cemeteries that dotted the city, decorated with the elaborate pyramids and obelisks of the fashionable European dead, were testaments to the poem's truthfulness on the ineffectiveness of available medical help. The impression of ubiquitous death must have been further heightened by the practice of the poorer Hindus of leaving their dead to be carried off by the Hugli, considered sacred because it is a branch of the Ganges. Vultures, alligators and the large cranes known as adjutant birds could be seen on a daily basis tearing at corpses that had washed ashore, while East India ship captains had to regularly order their men to free up bodies that became tangled in their anchor lines.\(^{143}\)
Like everyone else he knew, Edmonstone's life was touched by frequent loss: two of his cousins, James and Archibald Edmonstone, died in India, as did numerous friends. Even worse was William's chronic ill health, which trips to the sea for the "salt water cure"—usually just a prescription for getting out of Calcutta's summer heat to the relatively cooler air of the shore—did little to alleviate. He died on September 7, 1803, and was buried at the South Park Street cemetery in Calcutta under an elaborate monument erected by Edmonstone. Even more dangerous was life in the military; as Colonel David Woodburn bluntly informed his brother, who had asked him to help his son find a position in India, "I can't afford from my very small fortune to send him to India as a Writer, that would cost £3,000, and I would as soon shoot him as send him out anything else." Edmonstone's brother-in-law, Simeon Philip Friell, died in 1804 in the Second Maratha War after six years in the Company's service. Edmonstone, although blessed with excellent health and vitality, nonetheless suffered from migraines and was quite accident prone, leading to regular confinements.

The stress of their lifestyle led some new arrivals to develop a carpe-diem attitude, accounting for the prevalence of high-stakes gambling, alcoholism and drug use among Company men. Cards at home or billiards in one of the many taverns of the city whiled away the evening hours before dinner. Eliza Fay recorded playing five card loo for a rupee a fish, while bets were even larger among the men. At the highest stake matches, it was possible to win or lose thousands of pounds in a single game: Philip Francis reportedly won £20,000 at one game in 1776, although he later lost £15,000 in another. Heavy losses might have been one reason why another contemporary of Edmonstone's noted that a single man at a dinner party might imbibe three bottles of claret or two of white wine, piling the bottles beside him as "trophies of his prowess." Even women regularly drank at least one bottle of wine per meal, and often exceeded this minimum: a group of ladies became so inebriated on cherry-brandy at a party in 1775 that they began pelting each other with bread pieces, starting a short-lived fad at Company entertainments. The stresses of Indian life also made the addition of opium to the popular hookahs a common occurrence. Possibly because of William's steadying influence, Edmonstone managed to avoid such pervasive Calcutta pastimes: he eschewed cards in favor of chess and does not appear to have indulged in drugs at all or in drink to excess.

Some of Edmonstone's contemporaries could not take the pressure mentally: as Edmonstone casually commented about a relative named Binges, "some time ago a gentleman saw him standing under a tree with a petticoat on & something like a helmet on his head & a spear & shield in his hands, & when the gentleman spoke to him he said he was Andromache--I believe he is recalled." Edmonstone himself could not afford recall, as, like the other penniless young men who accompanied him to India, he had no prospects at home. He was in the Company's service until death or fortune came his way, but the bright hopes of the latter soon faded in the light of reality.

Part V: The Rewards

But my bucks when first a stranger,
Your sarcar damn'd tricks will play,
The Rupees will be in danger.
You'll be stript that knave to pay.
The Sircars of the poem (sarcars, Persian for "head of affairs," also called banians) were bilingual Indians used by Company men to bargain with shopkeepers, make purchases and keep their household accounts. Some had a reputation for cheating their employers, as noted, and perhaps exaggerated, by MacKrabie, who informed a friend that he was forced to employ "an endless Tribe of Banyans . . . together with their train of Clerks, who fill a large Room, and controul or rather connive at . . . Accounts. We are cheated in every article, whether of the House, the Garden, the Stable, or our own private Expenses." However the sarcars were a small inconvenience in comparison to other financial problems awaiting newcomers to the city. Living expenses were high, and even a small house in an unfashionable part of town could rent for 200 rupees per month (£25), although the average writer in the 1780s made no more than that; more lavish quarters on the Esplanade could cost thousands of pounds per year. Clothes were also expensive, especially the satin and gold brocade waistcoats popular among the younger men which could cost as much as 300 rupees each. Even new arrivals were expected to maintain many servants; Edmonstone took 12 with him when he traveled and considered them his main expense. His overall monthly expenditure by the 1790s was a minimum of 400 rupees per month, although this included 145 rupees for rent and maintenance for his mistress. Other young men with similar expenses took advantage of the easy credit available in Calcutta from the many pawnbrokers in the Armenian sector, or from one of the city's numerous money-lenders, even though exorbitant interest rates were usually charged. Eliza Fay noted that "several have been pointed out to me, who in the course of two or three years, have involved themselves almost beyond hope of redemption." A friend of Edmonstone's named Hall may have been one of these, for he managed to amass £10,000 of debt, leading to his arrest and imprisonment.

Due to Cornwallis's salary increases and his promotion to the important office of Persian translator discussed later, Edmonstone was able by the early 1790s to draw 2500 rupees monthly in salary. This was reassuring as he had met shortly after arriving in India a Colonel Fraser, a second cousin of his father, who was "about 65 years of age a good deal broke & of a very melancholy cast of mind owing to the small means he has of supporting a very large family in England." Edmonstone was moved when Fraser, who had recently lost a son, burst into tears while showing him a painting of his family--due to his poor financial position, it seemed unlikely he would ever see them in person again. Edmonstone did not intend to be a similar lonely figure still trying to eke out subsistence in old age.

Almost from the first, Edmonstone made regular plans to go home, carefully calculating how long it would take to save the requisite amount, but family concerns about the inadequacy of his fortune forced continual postponements. This was despite the fact that he was "by no means disposed . . . to protract my return to my native country for the sake of acquiring a very large fortune. It is my object to be possessed of so much property as will enable me to live in the style that by Birth and connections I am without presumption entitled to." As years passed with the goal of returning in style to Europe as elusive as ever, he and many of his generation began to feel, as a contemporary poem bewailed, that they had been

Deluded, listening to the tales they told,
Lands rich in mines, and rivers streaming gold;
Whence twelve short years in Luxury's lap beguiled,
Would bear me homeward, fortune's favorite child . . . 
Alas! twice ten revolving years, or more, 
Must prudence guide the helm and swell the store, 
Not one rupee in useless frolic spent, 
And steady interest at eight per cent . . .

Not surprisingly, then, when the possibility of reducing salaries was talked about at the beginning of Richard Wellesley's governor-generalship, Edmonstone was vehement in his opposition, noting that "offices are looked up to by the servants of the Comp[an]y as those which are to afford them the reward of a long and weary pilgrimage in a foreign land, & if those rewards are removed, those servants must and will have recourse to other means of securing a provision." The argument was apparently effective, as salaries remained high.

A number of social forces combined in Calcutta to create an atmosphere conducive to the development of an imperialist ideology in Edmonstone's generation. The feeling of European superiority engendered by the Company's new manner of treating the Indians and the separation of the races removed the stigma of conquest, allowing an early version of the "White Man's Burden" to develop. Calcutta's liberal society encouraged the belief that India was somehow outside the sphere of traditional moral values, and that actions could be taken there that would not have been justifiable in Europe. The dangers of life in the East led to a feeling of imminent peril in many, resulting in great pressure to escape from the city known as "the grave of thousands" by whatever means were necessary. Into this mix were added the reforms enacted by Cornwallis and his successors, which removed traditional methods of acquiring a fast fortune, and thus an early retirement, from India. The result was two important ideological changes: first, the new rules gave Edmonstone's generation reason to identify their prosperity with that of the Company more than any previous group had done. Their fortunes increased only as the Company's did: it paid their salaries; many Company men, like Edmonstone, became stockholders; and, by the 1790s, the only legal way to make a fortune in India was to rise in the service. The easiest way to do that, as would be demonstrated by the promotions and rewards heaped on those who helped Cornwallis to victory in the Third Mysore War, was through expansion. Secondly, Edmonstone's contemporaries paid for the Company's new public relations campaign with many additional years of life in India, slowly amassing their retirement through careful tending of their salaries. With little hope of a sudden windfall to cut their time short, the dangers of Indian life became of even greater concern than before. An important motivation behind many of Edmonstone's future actions would be the need to provide for the Company's, and thereby his own, security in what he increasingly viewed as a perilous situation. This mindset would first begin to surface during his diplomatic debut--the mission to Hyderabad in 1788.
Despite the intellectual and familial influences of Edmonstone's early years and the pressures of Calcutta society, it was not until he came into direct contact with the political situation in India that his mental evolution was complete. He first became involved in politics in 1788 when he was assigned to a two-year diplomatic mission to Hyderabad, an undertaking that has not been closely examined in scholarship despite the fact that its outcome proved significant to the future British position in India. The assignment had three lasting effects on Edmonstone: giving him personal experience with an Indian court, instilling in him a fear of Indian power, and opening the door to important advancement with the Company. It also completed his transformation into an ardent imperialist, persuading him that the Company had to expand or perish, and that all Europeans on the subcontinent were in danger unless India was brought under British hegemony.

One of Edmonstone's earliest mentors, and his first tutor in diplomacy, was John Kennaway, who had traveled to India at the age of fourteen in 1772 along with his sixteen-year-old brother Richard. Only thirty in 1788, he was nonetheless a veteran employee and a favorite of Cornwallis, who commented to Lord Lansdowne, "I have selected the ablest and honestest men in the different departments for my advisors . . . . I have . . . brought forward the two Kennaways, who are both very deserving men; the soldier [John] is my aide-de-camp, the other I have put into the Board of Trade." On April 13, 1788, Cornwallis informed John that he was to be sent on a diplomatic assignment to Hyderabad, and invited him to choose his assistants. Kennaway selected Lieutenant John Doveton to lead the escort of troops which accompanied the mission, Charles Russell to be the delegation's physician, and a Mr. Stewart to act as his diplomatic aide. Stewart, however, was at the Maratha chief Sindhia's camp and could not make a return journey quickly enough to be of use to Kennaway, prompting Cornwallis to suggest that Edmonstone go in his place. It was an honor Edmonstone would later learn he owed to a strong recommendation procured for him by his father from the Duke of Argyll. There had been little previous contact between Kennaway and Edmonstone, but they became life-long friends as a result of their shared experiences in Hyderabad. Kennaway was apparently impressed by Edmonstone's character early, for he was the only person on the delegation to whom John confided the secret portion of the mission.
The issue at hand was a delicate one, but serves admirably as an introduction to Indian politics in the period because it involved most of the major players on the stage: Hyderabad, Mysore, the Marathas, and the Company with its ally the Carnatic. All four were evenly matched in strength—with armies of between 80,000 and 100,000—and in training, with the Indian states having acquired Western methods and instruments of war. In the power vacuum that appeared in India mid-century owing to the weakening of Mughal control, the four great powers began jostling each other in a series of wars over boundaries and lands. The controversy brewing in 1788 over a relatively small area known as the Guntur Circar played a part in a war that helped to decide important future alliances. Although they could not have known the turmoil into which they were headed, Kennaway and his small party certainly had enough information about the Company's competition to expect their task to be a difficult one.

The ruler of Hyderabad since 1762 was Asaf Jah II, Nizam ul-Mulk, Nizam ud-Daula, Nawab Mir Nizam 'Ali Khan Bahadur, Fath Jang, Sipah Salar, better known to the British simply as Nizam Ali. His ancestor, the Turani noble Qamar-ud-din, received the title Nizam-ul-Mulk from the emperor Farruksiyar for helping him to gain the throne of Delhi. Uniting with another powerful Mughal noble, Sa'adat Khan, Nizam-ul-Mulk overthrew the infamous Sayyid brothers, the "kingmakers" who had deposed and killed Farruksiyar in 1719 in order to put a series of their puppets on the throne. Sa'adat went on to found the Awadh dynasty which, perhaps because of its proximity to Delhi, maintained some ties to the Mughals, although by Edmonstone's day it was autonomous in all but name; Nizam-ul-Mulk was even more independent-minded. After two years as the new emperor Muhammad Shah's vizier, he left Delhi for the south Indian province of the Deccan on the pretense of going on a hunting expedition, but his aim was to set up a virtually self-governing kingdom. Muhammad Shah sent orders to Mubariz Khan, his subahdar, or governor, in Hyderabad, to oppose the vizier, with the viceroyalty of the Deccan his prize for success. Instead, Nizam-ul-Mulk defeated and killed him in 1724, afterwards boldly sending his head to the emperor with a note of congratulations on the overthrow of the "rebel." In an effort to conciliate his errant noble, Muhammad Shah gave him the title Asaf Jah that same year, meaning "of the rank of Asaf" (supposedly one of Solomon's ministers); the hereditary dynasty he founded in Hyderabad was thereafter known as the Asafia dynasty. His and his descendants' official title was subahdar of the Deccan, but the British would always refer to them as the nizams.

Nizam-ul-Mulk's death in 1748 was followed by a lengthy struggle for the throne in which the British supported his second son, Nasir Jung, and his ally Muhammad Ali, a contender for the throne of the Carnatic; the French supported Muzafar Jung, one of the nizam's grandsons and his ally, Chanda Sahib, Muhammad Ali's opponent. Nasir Jung succeeded, but was killed in 1750 in an encounter with French troops at Arcot. Muzafer Jung then ascended the throne, but governed only briefly before he was murdered and Salabat Jung, Nizam-ul-Mulk's third son, was put in his place. His rule was also abbreviated, for in 1762 his youngest brother, Nizam Ali Khan, dethroned him and began a forty-year reign that brought stability once again to Hyderabad politics. Fifty-six in 1788, Ali fully deserved his reputation for being clever, daring, restless and ambitious. He was also even more sovereign than Nizam-ul-Mulk had been, conducting war, making treaties, and conferring titles without Delhi's approval; by 1780, even the ceremonial
reception of Mughal *farmans*, or royal orders, and the celebration of the emperor's regnal year were rarely observed.\(^{15}\)

In 1788 another independent ruler, Tipu Sultan, son of the long-time foe of the British, Haidar Ali, ruled Mysore. Theirs was a new dynasty even by the lenient standards of a continent in flux. Haidar Ali's father, Fat'h Muhammad, had been employed as a soldier by Dargah Quli Khan, the *faujdar*, or commandant, of Sira in Karnataka. The family moved to Seringapatam in 1721 after Fat'h Muhammad was killed in battle; there, some years later, Haidar joined the service of Nanjaraj, the raja's powerful minister. Although illiterate and not handsome, Haidar's natural military ability and great personal charm insured that he quickly became one of the minister's favorites.\(^{16}\) When, in 1750 during the contest over the throne of Hyderabad, Nasir Jung demanded military aid from the raja of Mysore,\(^{17}\) Nanjaraj and 15,000 men, Haidar among them, set out to assist. In the subsequent confusion, the wily cavalry officer managed to seize enough of the nizam's treasure to allow him to raise a large number of troops in his own right; when Nanjaraj subsequently turned against his master, Haidar took the side of the raja and soon replaced his old patron as chief minister. By 1761 he had acquired full power in Mysore, but still allowed the raja his empty title.

Not so Tipu, who succeeded to his father's position in 1782 at age 32. From the beginning he considered himself the rightful ruler of Mysore and an independent sovereign. The raja was pensioned off, the Mughal emperor's name was dropped from the coinage, and Tipu began using the title of *padshah*, or king, in 1786.\(^{18}\) He thereby became the first sovereign in India to forgo the increasingly threadbare cloak of Mughal rule, and along with the repudiation of the emperor's authority naturally went any interest in the wishes of his provincial governor, the nizam. If he had little use for the Mughals and their officers, Tipu had even less for the Company. Like his father, who had used French military advisors, he admired Gallic martial ability, despite their decisive defeat at the Company's hands in the 1750s. He had no similar esteem for the British: having grown up fighting them at his father's side in territorial battles over southern Indian lands, Tipu would always view them as a serious threat, an attitude history would amply validate.

The last great Indian power on the subcontinent in 1788 were the Marathas, the warlike peasant caste of Maharashtra, who had obtained coherence under the leadership of the famous "mountain rat," Shivaji Bhonsle (1627-80). Using mountain fortresses in their native state as a base of operations, the Marathas had employed daring new guerrilla-warfare and scorched earth tactics to confound the mighty Mughal armies sent against them, while their cavalry insured that Aurangzeb's "conquest" of the Deccan cost him 100,000 casualties a year and never drew to a close. By the time Shivaji died, he controlled 50,000 square miles of territory and had a revenue between one-fifth and one-sixth that of the emperor.\(^{19}\)

After Aurangzeb's death, the leadership of the Marathas passed to a pentarchy consisting of four powerful generals--Gaekwar at Baroda, Holkar at Indore, Sindhia at Gwalior, and Bhonsle at Nagpur--who were technically united by allegiance to the *peshwa* of Poona, the chief minister of the raja of Satara. By the 1760s the Marathas, under the peshwa's leadership, controlled a vast area spreading from the Indus river to the far south of India, and even their loss at the battle of Panipat in 1761 to the Afghans over control of Delhi was not the disaster it first appeared. The Afghans did not follow up
their advantage and the Marathas quickly regained their strength; nonetheless, thereafter they acted less as a united confederacy and more as an alliance of powerful chiefs, the most important of whom, Sindhia and Holkar, dealt with the peshwa as equals.\textsuperscript{20}

The Company was the final major power in the south, based in theory only in their coastal port of Madras and a few adjoining villages, but in reality their successful support of Muhammad Ali against Chanda Sahib in the Second Carnatic War (1750-54) led to their obtaining considerable control over his state. Ali was technically an autonomous prince with large territories, an independent civil administration and his own army; in fact, he had ceded large parts of his state to the Company, which derived 40% of the Madras yearly budget from leasing them back to him; 10 out of the 21 battalions in his armed forces were British, for which he was required to pay, and the Company garrisoned all his forts; and the large loans he owed to members of the Madras government insured that the Carnatic's policies perforce followed theirs.\textsuperscript{21}

There were few certainties in the Indian political climate of the 1780s, by which time most of the major powers had been at some point both allies and enemies of the others. The Carnatic Wars (1740-61) pitted Hyderabad and the French against the Company and the Carnatic, with the Marathas helping Clive defeat Chanda Sahib in 1752; Mysore fought on both sides at different times. The First Mysore War (1765-69) involved an alliance between the nizam and Haidar to remove Muhammad Ali from his position. It failed, but the enmity between the three states, which due to the Company's close connection with the Carnatic involved the British as well, was demonstrated again with the outbreak of the Second Mysore War (1779-84), prompted largely by Muhammad Ali's desire for territorial advancement to help pay his tremendous debts. By this time the nizam was less willing to aid Mysore, however, as the growing power of its rulers and their territorial ambitions were beginning to concern him.

To further complicate matters, there was a long-running conflict between Hyderabad and the Marathas over taxes in the Deccan. In 1718, during the tumult in Delhi preceding the murder of Farruksiyar, one of the Sayyid brothers, Hussain Ali, had promised the Maratha leader Sahu the right to collect chauth and sardeshmukhi from the six Mughal provinces of the Deccan in return for military aid against the emperor.\textsuperscript{22} With the Sayyid victory had come farmans confirming the grants to Sahu, and from 1719 the Marathas regularly entered the Deccan to collect between 25% and 35% of its revenues.\textsuperscript{23} They also made regular raids on Mysore from the 1760s for plunder and to check the increasing power of its rulers, and fought the Company in the First Maratha War (1775-82) over the Bombay government's attempt to install a puppet peshwa at Poona. Thus the regular practice in Deccani politics was a constant realignment of alliances, as none of the great powers was strong enough alone to humble any of the others. Two factors--the growing strength of Mysore, which threatened to upset the balance of power, and the seemingly small Circar dispute--would finally determine the allegiances of the great states for the decisive period of British expansion.

The Circars, maritime provinces on the eastern coast of the subcontinent, had long been an explosive issue in Indian politics, for many of the major powers had reason to desire them. The presence of French forces there in the 1750s provided the Company with a motive for coveting the area, and when the Seven Years' War broke out between France and Britain in 1756, the British seized the opportunity to send an army into the Circars. Salabat Jang marched to defend his territory but, rightly worried about Nizam
Ali's intrigues in Hyderabad while he was away, soon agreed to cede the fortress of Masulipatam to the Company in return for peace. In the First Mysore War, Nizam Ali, now ruler of Hyderabad, invaded the Carnatic but was pushed back by a British force, while another Company army occupied the Circars. The hostilities, as well as a farman which Clive obtained from the emperor, gave the British an opportunity to claim the area. Unable to fight on two fronts effectively, the nizam reluctantly agreed to the cession of the Circars to the Company in 1768 in return for an annual tribute payment. The only exception was the Circar called Guntur, the southernmost of the line, which had already been given by the nizam for the support of Basalat Jang, his brother. It was therefore agreed that Basalat would retain the area, which would revert to the Company at his death.  

The Madras government upset this arrangement by persuading Basalat to rent them the Circar in 1779 in return for a guarantee of protection against Haidar Ali, an act which enraged the nizam both because of the way it was decided--any change in the treaty was supposed to be discussed with him rather than his subject--and because the Madras government thereafter made the extremely insulting move of renting it to his long-time enemy, Muhammad Ali. Upon hearing of the new agreement, the nizam declared that he considered it an act of war because it violated the 1768 treaty; he backed up his words by taking French troops into his pay and starting negotiations with Haidar and the Marathas for a possible alliance against the Company. Haidar, likewise, was alarmed by Basalat's decision, as he had been active in the area surrounding Guntur (Gutti, Bellary, Cuddapah and Karnul) for some time. He may have intended to make an attempt on it himself eventually, or perhaps he was being sincere when he commented that "it is not in my power to consent to his Excellency's giving up the Guntur Circar to my old and bitter enemies, for it joins my country." In any event, he expressed his displeasure by threatening Adoni, Basalat's capital, with a large force. Madras responded to Basalat's cry for help by sending three battalions of sepoys to Guntur; unfortunately, with their usual lack of foresight, they had them march through Haidar's territories in Cuddapah en route, a fact that helped to prompt the Second Mysore War. The issue was finally settled by the intervention of Calcutta, which forced Madras to renege on its agreement with Muhammad Ali and return the Circar to Basalat in 1780. The problem was only put into abeyance, however, and when Basalat died in 1782 it once again threw open the possibility of the Company acquiring an area abutting the lands of both Hyderabad and Mysore. Not wishing to alienate the nizam while they were still enmeshed in the Second Mysore War with Haidar, the British at first did not insist on the implementation of the 1768 treaty, but the directors remained anxious to acquire the Circar. It had great strategic value, for the two Mysore Wars had shown that Haidar and Tipu would not scruple to attack the Company during the monsoon, when it was virtually impossible to reinforce the southern presidency by sea, and Guntur formed an important link in a land route from Calcutta to Madras. It was also economically useful due to its nearness to the port of Motupalli. Despite Guntur's history as a potential powder keg, then, Cornwallis was sent to India with instructions to obtain it. Cornwallis believed that the British had never had a better opportunity for pressing their claim to Guntur than in 1788, as he informed Kennaway in a private discussion: 

The news from Europe . . . just inform'd us of the glorious termination of the troubles which threatened . . . in consequence of the Dutch Disputes, in which the weakness
of France appear in a striking point of view & must inevitably dishearten the native powers of this Country who trusted to her alliance for protection & support & had been used to embark their Interests in the Event of a war with us in the same balloon with her.  

In 1788, the British were in the unusual position of being at peace in both Europe and India; furthermore, three new regiments of European soldiers were expected to arrive at Bombay about the same time that Kennaway's mission reached Hyderabad, a fact that the governor-general believed would "set our Power in a point of view in which it is equally to be courted or feared." Kennaway was therefore instructed to settle the amount owed to the nizam by the British for the Circars, as the peshcush, or tribute, was in arrears, and to obtain his assent to their occupation of Guntur. Although astute in many ways, Cornwallis would repeatedly demonstrate throughout his time in India that he was a military man who always looked first for a martial solution to any problem; diplomacy was not his forte--he knew better how to command than how to persuade. This was one such instance: Cornwallis believed Kennaway's mission to be virtually impossible through diplomacy alone, for the nizam's "known character for duplicity & intrigue" would probably lead him to ally with Tipu or the Marathas to prevent the British taking the area. Before Kennaway even began his journey, then, the governor-general decided to "take possession of the Circar with a body of troops from the Carnatic after giving the Nizam a short previous notice of our intentions & making the formal demand of the surrender of it." He did not intend to leave Nizam Ali time to plan or execute defensive measures in the area.

To make matters worse, Kennaway was expected to avoid promising to fulfill the 1768 treaty stipulation which obligated the Company to provide two battalions of sepoys and six cannon to the nizam whenever they might be needed. He was also given secret instructions to acquire as much information about the nizam--his finances, his character, the state of his government and his negotiations with other powers--as possible. The latter was especially important for, as Cornwallis admitted candidly to Sir Robert Abercromby, commander of the Company's forces in Madras, "should the nizam desire it, and Tippoo determine to support him against us, [the Circar dispute] will no doubt bring on a War Calamitous to the Carnatic and Distressing to the Company's Affairs." It was a sentiment the governor-general took care not to mention to Kennaway.

Cornwallis gave the delegation an excellent send off at the Old Court House on April 30, 1788, and they departed the next morning. Kennaway may have been weighed down with the difficulties of his task, but his 22-year-old aide viewed the trip as a combination of holiday and grand adventure. Excited about his first lengthy excursion beyond Calcutta, Edmonstone invested in a small elephant, an expensive acquisition that cost 500 rupees and required him to hire a driver and a grass cutter to attend it. It allowed him to carry additional baggage, however, and he piled it high with instruments, music, a camera obscura a friend loaned him, his painting supplies and many volumes of Shakespeare. He enjoyed most of the trip: touring the vast temple complex of Jagannath, where the party stopped for several days to allow their Indian servants to make the pilgrimage; eschewing the palanquin provided for him for the freedom of riding his elephant or horse, leaving the rest of the delegation creeping along at four miles an hour while he went off on hunting side-trips; and riding through the surf when the group's route took them by the sea. When they reached Ganjam, he, Russell and a Mr. Binny, Doveton's aide,
abandoned Kennaway to diplomatic niceties with the chief while they visited a country house he owned on the shores of the Chilika Lake. It reminded Edmonstone of some of the locks in Scotland and was, he thought, "the most beautiful place unassisted by art that I ever saw in my life."\textsuperscript{42}

Yet despite the pleasures of his adventure, the aggravations attending eighteenth century travel plagued the delegation, including sunburn, inconvenient rains that swelled rivers and delayed crossings, bad roads, constant foraging for water, grain, firewood and other necessities in the long stretches between cities, Company tents that magnified the 98-degree heat by blocking all breeze, and servants demanding an increase in wages.\textsuperscript{43} One of the party's Indian followers was even "murdered and plundered by the hill people" as they passed through Ganjam,\textsuperscript{44} an incident recorded by Kennaway but which Neil carefully kept from William, perhaps not wanting to worry his brother. The incident may, however, have formed the first in a series of circumstances that would eventually cause him to change his carefree attitude towards his assignment.

Kennaway had little interest in tourist pursuits, as he had already passed through the area twice while with the army during the Second Mysore War. Instead, he used the journey to discover possible advantages to the Company. Some of these clearly showed an imperialist mindset, although a milder one than his young aide would later evidence. While traveling through Orissa, Kennaway could not help wondering if there was a way for the British to claim that area as well as the Circar. Orissa had been a sub province of Bengal in the Mughal system when, in 1741, the Maratha general Ragunath Bhonsle attacked Calcutta. Ali Vardi Khan, then ruler of Bengal, promptly appealed to the peshwa to aid him; Balaji Rao agreed, marching on a fellow Maratha in return for chauth from Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. The latter province was ceded in 1756 to the Marathas in payment of the taxes for the three provinces, prompting Kennaway to wonder if there are any original Records in the Khalsa or other offices of the agreement & if the chout (sic) is paid in money [and] if we as succeeding to the rights of former soubahs could not claim the restoration of Orissa, which would render the continuity of our possessions complete from C[ape] Cormorin to Balasore.\textsuperscript{45}

Kennaway evidenced more appreciation for Maratha methods of doing business when his group stopped at Jagannath. He was impressed with the wealth associated with the temple--even the elephant assigned to the idol, which passed by the British encampment several times, he described as "the finest animal I ever saw & I should conceive to be worth between 16 & 20,000 rupees."\textsuperscript{46} He made inquires as to the yearly revenue received from pilgrims, but found no one willing to give him an estimate; still, he discovered that each of the thousands of devotees who made the journey paid between 13 and 15 rupees in fees along the way in addition to any free will offerings they might make.\textsuperscript{47} Of this amount, he concluded "that the whole or at least 4 fifths of the income is greedily & rigidly secured by the Mahrattas who have spies placed on the faujdars [upper-level magistrates] & officers employed in the collections."\textsuperscript{48} He saw no reason why the Company could not "levy a duty on the Pilgrims in the same proportion as is done by the Mahrattas."\textsuperscript{49}

Kennaway also, after his own observations and a long talk with a Mr. Maxwell,\textsuperscript{50} an acquaintance of his in charge of the haveli [fortress] of Ganjam, determined that there was considerable corruption in the Circars, "from nothing so much as, not the distance, but the want of connection between these countries & the Parent colony. The Circars can
only be well governed in the Circars which ought to be under the superintendence of the General Controlling Government, & by servants from Bengal. He did not trust the Indians assigned to the collection of revenue in the area, believing that no "native of honor or honesty were to be found." In short, Kennaway acquired two convictions on the journey to Hyderabad: first, that the Marathas were efficient, if demanding, taskmasters, and the fledgling British empire in India could learn much from an imitation of their successful practices; and, second, that a greater British presence was needed in its far-flung territories to oversee their administration. The Company would appropriate Maratha tax collection practices in future years, and Edmonstone would later encourage the expansion of the system of British residents to insure a supervisory presence in important areas. He would also find uses for the Maratha practice of demanding land instead of cash payments for debts.

Hyderabad was finally reached on July 31, 1788. Occupying an enviable spot on the table lands of the Deccan, it possessed more than 80,000 square miles of territory and an annual revenue of between 1 1/2 and 2 million pounds. Its physical beauty was apparent to travelers as they slowly climbed 1700 feet from the flat land of the seacoast, through the thick forests of the interior, to the mountainous region of the capital itself. At six miles in circumference, shielded by a high stone wall complete with bastions and thirteen gateways, the city of Hyderabad was an impressive sight. Surrounded by oak and palm trees, it occupied the south bank of the Musi River, which cascaded over a number of the red-brown stones of the region to form a waterfall nearby. The tops of numerous mosques showing over the wall gave a hint of the architectural treasures within. The antiquity of the city as an administrative center was evidenced by the existence of buildings such as the great granite Char Minar, with the four minarets of its name rising 184 feet, built in 1591 by Muhammad Quli Qutb Shah to commemorate the end of an outbreak of plague; the Char Kamas, dating from 1595, its fifty feet high arches erected over the city center to cover the point at which the four principal roads met; and the Mecca Masjid, so named because it was copied from one at Mecca by Aurangzeb in 1687, able to accommodate 10,000 people at a time. In addition, numerous caravanserais, many other mosques, hospitals and Turkish baths adorned the city.

Edmonstone, however, was not enthusiastic about the great Deccan capitol, commenting that "the streets are narrow & dirty & the houses of the common sort of people much as are in the black part of Calcutta," the latter perhaps a reference to the many straw-roofed, wooden shops that surrounded even the elegant Char Minar. The nizam's court was another matter, however, appearing to Edmonstone's wondering gaze as "the only remaining sample of the splendor & magnificence of the Imperial Court of Delhi." The palace stood in extensive grounds surrounded by high walls, and was guarded by the nizam's famous Zuffer Pultan, or Victorious Battalion, comprised of 2,000 female soldiers. Edmonstone and Kennaway had an opportunity to witness the grandeur of the court when, the day after their arrival, Musher ul Dowlah, the minister's eldest son, conducted them to an audience. As Edmonstone informed William

The Durbar is held in a kind of saloon about 150 feet long & I judge about 70 or 80 feet deep supported by five ranges of pillars, with arches that spring from the capitols [with] the whole open both ways. In the middle of the five aisles formed by the ranges of pillars sat the Nizam and his nobles, and courtiers lined the two sides
of the aisle. Kennaway only embraced him, we were seated cross-legged on his right hand.  

Karen Leonard has noted that customary court behavior in Hyderabad was highly stylized and carried on largely by intermediaries, who brought "a continuous ceremonial exchange of greetings and gifts" to the nizam on behalf of their masters. She points out that the British residents later established in the state essentially fulfilled the role of one of these, becoming in essence vakil, or representative, of the East India Company. Kennaway, already familiar with Indian customs and, at that time, far more proficient in Persian than his aide, was able to quickly adapt to this role; his assistant took a little longer. Edmonstone was amused by the elaborate expressions of politeness paid to the nizam by supplicants, not yet understanding enough of common court behavior to interpret them correctly. He had had the opportunity on the trip out to begin his tutelage in Indian manners and customs, but had not yet learned to discern subtleties: he was pleased, for instance, by the politeness of the nizam's conduct towards the delegation, not realizing that it meant no more than the profuse compliments of the courtiers. In time, he would learn much of Indian etiquette by watching Kennaway, who impressed him as "most particularly well qualified from his knowledge of the customs, disposition [and] languages of the natives." Kennaway's attitude also helped to imbue his young aide with a sense of skepticism about Indian reliability, for he believed that  

Faith and Friendship are expressions which are constantly in the mouth of a Mussulman and it is not easy to describe the beauty of these virtues in more just or glowing colours than they do, yet . . . these qualities operate with them no longer than their interest or necessity lasts.

As Edmonstone later noted, his experiences on the trip "opened a wide field of political instruction & experience and afforded a favorable opportunity of practical acquaintance with the language, Habits & Institutions of the Natives of India in every grade of society."

Edmonstone's education in political realities continued when he discovered that, to the court of Hyderabad, the arrival of the British delegation was hardly the event of the decade. The nizam regularly received ambassadors from the major Indian states; just in the period that the British were there, he entertained delegations from Awadh (March 1789), Poona (September 1789) and Mysore (January 1790). The British also had the misfortune to arrive just after a large number of visitors descended on the city to celebrate the marriage festivities of one of the nizam's relations; the revelers took up most available space, leaving the Company's representatives to manage in rather cramped quarters. Edmonstone described the two houses allotted to them by the nizam, in the Shamshir Jang, a garden beyond the city wall, as peaceful and framed by a number of cypress and fruit trees, but they were so small that Russell had to pitch his traveling tent outside in order to have enough room to sleep. Other experiences soon underscored the fact that the British were not viewed in the rest of India with the same respect they received in Bengal.

Edmonstone became the butt of a joke after Kennaway informed the nizam in their second meeting that his aide wanted to paint his portrait. The few surviving remnants of Edmonstone's artwork on the edges of letters show him to have had some ability with portraiture, and a sample painting of Russell was produced for the court's inspection. As Edmonstone recorded:
[the Nizam's] minister who visited us shortly after personally paid me some high compliments on . . . Russell's picture . . . [commenting that] "one might say he is actually standing before one." He then passed it around to his sons & attendants (to the imminent danger of the poor picture) who looked at it some turning it up-side down others viewing the wrong side of it, till I got it again much damaged by greasy thumbs and dirty fingers. 69

Based on the somewhat damaged portrait, the nizam decided not to sit for Edmonstone, much to the young man's disappointment. 70

Edmonstone also received little consideration in the streets of Hyderabad, as he noted to William, "[i]n going to the Durbar the common servants elbowed & pushed us about. It would have been dangerous to have resented it but we longed to chastise their insolence." 71 He may have been referring to the frequent occurrence of syccees dashing into the crowds, pushing people back and calling for them to make way for an important nobleman, or he might simply have been battered by the usual heavy street traffic. Arabs, Sikhs, Persians, Marathas, Parsis, Bengalis, Pathans and Europeans all mixed together in cosmopolitan Hyderabad and, as the average pedestrian was heavily armed with "pistols, daggers, swords in his cumberband (sic) & the long Arabian gun slung over his shoulder," brawls were common. 73 It was a different world from Calcutta, where Edmonstone had lived safe within the confines of Fort William, surrounded by 15,000 Company troops.

Edmonstone's new feeling of vulnerability was greatly heightened by the proximity of Tipu, whom he would always thereafter refer to as a villain and a monster. 74 The sultan became for Edmonstone a dreaded symbol of Indian power, and one he feared more than any other on the subcontinent. This attitude, which increased while he was in the Deccan, was already in place before his trip and could have arisen from a variety of sources. Many Calcutta families with members taken prisoner in the Second Mysore War were still waiting anxiously for their release in 1783 when Edmonstone arrived in India. In September of that year, Margaret Fowke, a young woman in Calcutta whose father and brother sometimes worked for the Company, committed a serious faux pas by repeating to Mrs. Strachey, whose son was one of the captives, a rumor that the prisoners in Tipu's custody had been released. 75 The story, like many previous ones, was premature, severely disappointing the man's mother. However, with the conclusion of peace in 1784, many captives were finally freed, and brought stories of deprivation, cruelty and murder back to Calcutta.

The worst of these tales were told by survivors of the 200 British captives taken after the famous debacle of Colonel Baillie's detachment, defeated and practically destroyed by Haidar and Tipu at the Battle of Pollilur near Conjeeveram on September 10, 1780. One of these, Colonel Cromwell Massey, spent three years and nine months in captivity, much of it at Seringapatam, during which he managed to keep a tiny diary hidden from his jailers. In it he recorded being starved by his captors in an effort to persuade him to accept Islam, enter the sultan's service, and teach British combat methods to the Mysore army. 76 When he refused, he was circumcised anyway (a prerequisite for employment), beaten and confined in "as miserable a condition as vermin, dirty clothes, bed & c., could reduce a man to." 77

George Latham, a factor from Madras, painted an even more tragic picture, remembering the gory battle itself in vivid detail: he recalled the massacre of British
troops even after Baillie had surrendered and ordered his men to drop their weapons; the murder of many women and children among the British camp followers by Mysorean soldiers; the sick and wounded being butchered as they lay in their litters; and the memorable image of an officer forced to carry the severed head of another from the field of battle into Haider's camp. While Latham was paraded around with the rest of the captives "in the Heat of the Sun, almost naked, until most of the Party dropt down with Loss of Blood," he saw Baillie sitting in shock on a large drum outside Tipu's tent. Numerous stories filtered back to the British lands about Baillie's fate. One alleged that, although seriously wounded, he had been carried before Haider and forced to watch as he received the heads of Company officers. Another, which became generally accepted by the British, was that Baillie and several of his officers were murdered in captivity by being forced to drink poison, which Captain Henry Oakes, Adjutant General to the army under General Mathews, swore was also the fate of a number of prisoners taken at the fall of Bednur.

Tipu's modern biographer, Denys Forrest, doubts that Baillie was poisoned, believing that he probably died from the untreated wounds of battle before it was necessary, but allows that the rumors might have been true about the prisoners taken at Bednur. The battle of Pollilur was not particularly important strategically for either side, but its propaganda value was high. The Mysore rulers used it to demonstrate that British forces could be decisively defeated by an Indian army, and had it made the subject of a series of wall paintings in the Daulat Bagh palace at Seringapatam. Likewise, Oakes' prediction that, "this conduct of the Nawaub's must naturally impress every British subject with a shocking idea of the man's savage cruelty" was abundantly fulfilled; whether he and others recounted fact or fiction, there can be no doubt that many British believed them.

The remnants of Baillie's company had their tales reinforced by those of other Company captives, such as Richard Bowyer, taken when an East Indiaman, the Hannibal, was boarded by the French in 1781. He and his fellow captives were turned over to Tipu's army at Cuddalore, after which they were marched more than 300 miles to Bangalore. Bowyer, who was ill, remembered the march as a nightmare of blistering sun, starvation--they were fed one meal a day, usually only of rice--and insomnia, for he spent many nights huddled together with fellow prisoners under a blanket in the pouring rain because no tents were provided. Confinement at the Bangalore fortress was little better, consisting of a small, tile-covered shelter for sixty men, and the regular wearing of leg irons. There the captives continued to live on a diet of rice and water, as they refused to enter Tipu's service to obtain better rations.

Not all were so intrepid. The teenaged James Bristow, captured during Sir Eyre Coote's campaign in 1780, was not released at the conclusion of the war because he had entered Tipu's service along with a number of other young British men. He escaped in 1790, always maintained that he had been forced to join Tipu's army, and published an account of his experiences filled with stories certain to appall a British audience. It included tales of some of the youngest European captives being made into nautch performers for the amusement of the court, and of a number of European women taken at the siege of Bednur being "torn from [their husbands] whom the villains sent to Chittledroog, and afterwards allotted to four of the black slaves."

The British fascination with Tipu as the embodiment of Eastern despotism was well entrenched by the early 1790s, by which time he had already become almost a cult figure.
A print was even offered for sale in Bombay depicting a man named Cowasjee, an auxiliary of the Bombay army, who had reputedly had his nose cut off by order of the sultan in 1792. Selling for 10 rupees, it had a number of takers, although whether out of interest in Tipu or in the exotic medical procedure it depicted—the man had reputedly had a new nose grafted onto his face—is uncertain. Hopefully the physician in charge of the procedure was not John Levesley, a "presumed doctor" captured with James Scurry, another prisoner from the Hannibal, who agreed for a fee of six rupees to attach a new nose to another sufferer by sewing on a piece cut from the man's shoulder. The appendage lasted for three weeks until the stitches weakened and it fell off, at which time the outraged patient demanded a refund. Scurry also added to Tipu's reputation for cruelty, recalling that Malabar Christians who refused to allow their daughters to join the sultan's harem had their noses, ears and upper lips cut off, and were otherwise treated so badly that many died. He likewise averred that Tipu used sadistic punishment methods on his own men who misbehaved, such as throwing some to the tigers, making others ride a wooden horse with spikes imbedded in the saddle, and having many more chained to an elephant's foot and dragged over rough ground until, instead of just finishing nose-less, they had "no faces left."

To the prisoners' tales and bizarre prints were added several documents, reportedly from the Mysore sovereigns, attempting to heighten feelings against the British. The first of these, undated but with a seal inscribed 1769, was in Tipu's name, although it was posted on the gates of Seringapatam and Trichinopoly in Haidar's reign. It warned "all whose Blood is not contaminated by the Europeans" that the British had already made the ruler of the Carnatic subject to them and would be unlikely to stop there. It enjoined everyone, "whether Civil or Military . . . wherever you find any of the low Wretches [the British] destroy them," and advocated a similarly hostile attitude towards Muhammad Ali as a collaborator and British puppet. A more famous document was The Manifesto, or Remonstrance of Hyder Ally Cawn to the Rajahs and Princes of India, published in London in 1781. It complained at length of the "the great men of Bengal, whose thirst for gold all the wealth of that country could not satisfy," and of the "threats and menaces and force" they had used to enrich themselves at the expense of the people of India. A coalition of Indian powers was called for "to drive away those infamous invaders of rights and properties . . . into the salt waters."

William Kirkpatrick, who translated the poster attributed by the British to Tipu, had some doubts that it had been written by him, as it was obviously not in his handwriting, but because the seal appeared genuine and the document was written in the distinctive silver and gold ink Tipu liked to use, he accepted it as authentic. The references to Muhammad Ali certainly reflect Tipu's attitudes: one of the large murals painted by the sultan's order on the buildings of Seringapatam depicted the ruler of the Carnatic prostrating himself before an Englishman, who had a foot on his neck. The poster was probably an authentic piece of military propaganda, written on the sultan’s command during the First Mysore War, and its main purpose may have been to gain Haidar allies rather than merely blaming the war on the British. It promised that surrounding states, such as Tanjore and the Carnatic, would "be given their rightful sovereigns without any violation of faith and national customs," by Haidar, but that the British would surely aspire to rule all.
The *Manifesto*, on the other hand, although supposedly carried from Madras to London by a recently returned Company man, fits so conveniently into the political situation in Britain as to be suspect. It was certainly printed less as a way of raising public ire against Mysore than as part of the campaign of colonial reform that culminated in Pitt's East India Act. A diatribe it included against British judges, furthermore, reflected the prevalent opinions of many in Bengal rather than anything with which Haidar would have been concerned.\(^{103}\) A tradesman in Calcutta in 1781, for instance, when asked his opinion of the law, responded with the popular belief that "a Man in the Clutches of a Lawyer may be exactly compared to a Sheep in a Thicket. He never gets clear without leaving the best of his Wool among the Brambles."\(^{104}\) Haidar's *Manifesto* concurred, commenting that there were those in Bengal whose heads, as my Vakeel informs me, are covered with a vast quantity of grey hair, taken from a horse . . . and are called sometimes Lords, sometimes Judges, these men assume powers far superior to Princes and Emperors; they demand a large sum of money to-day, and if that is given to them, they repeat their demands for a much larger sum to-morrow.\(^{105}\)

However, propaganda has never had to be genuine to be effective, and to anyone already inclined to view the rulers of Mysore as a danger, accounts threatening to drive the British into the sea would have seemed both believable and alarming.

A few attempts were made to defend Tipu in the British press, although, as Edward Moor of the Company's Bombay Army noted, to do so was to try to countermand the avalanche of reports on the other side:

That Tippoo is a great man, may, we think, be asserted without much hazard of refutation: that he is a good one, has never been said; and he who has the boldness to declare so, must prepare himself to oppose the opinions of all who have ever heard the name of Tippoo mentioned. Of late years . . . vocabularies of vile epithets have been exhausted, and doubtless many have lamented that the English language is not copious enough to furnish terms of obloquy sufficiently expressive of the ignominy, wherewith they . . . deem his memory deserves to be branded."\(^{106}\) He pointed out that Tipu's attempts to expand his kingdom were no different than those practiced by the European nations, and that the sultan must be doing something right for his lands to evidence many newly founded cities with prosperous inhabitants, expanded commerce, well cultivated fields, and a population that seemed largely content with his rule.\(^{107}\) He also noted, in answer to the aspersions of judicial cruelty, that "divested of national and local prejudice, it is of very little consequence whether a delinquent suffers on a gallows, guillotine, or by an elephant or sabre; or whether his body be gibbeted, anatomatized, [and] given to the worms of the earth."\(^{108}\) He might have added that the treatment meted out by Tipu to his British captives was no worse, and in some cases was better, than was common in war at the time; it was certainly more humane than that which befell American prisoners of war consigned to one of the dreaded British prison ships during the Revolution. One author, referring to such incidents as the 150 men put to death by the British after the surrender of the Penagra fort in 1791, commented, "the fault of Tipu, then, was that he gave quarter and took prisoners alive. The English gave no quarter, and so they had few prisoners with them to ill-treat."\(^{109}\) A Major Dirom, who wrote an account of the Second Mysore War, also had a positive view of Tipu, commenting that his country was prosperous, his soldiers capable, and

\[\text{48}\]
his government, though strict and arbitrary, was the despotism of a politic and
able sovereign, who nourishes, not oppresses, the subjects who are to be the means
of his future aggrandizement: and his cruelties were, in general, inflicted only on
those whom he considered his enemies.\textsuperscript{110}

Edmonstone could not have seen either of these defenses before he went to
Hyderabad, for they were not published until the early 1790s, but he did have access to
another of Tipu's military admirers in the form of the leader of his mission. Kennaway
kept a diary during the years 1781-83 when he served in the Second Mysore War that
gives examples of his respect for his opponents, although it also demonstrates that he
viewed Haidar as a despotic ruler guilty of "the double crime of treason and ingratitude"
for his betrayal of his former master.\textsuperscript{111} At the time this was written, however, Kennaway
had just visited as part of Sir Eyre Coote's force the scene of Baillie's defeat, and had
participated in burying the hundreds of bones still scattered across the ground from the
British killed there\textsuperscript{112}; all the while, his detachment was menaced by Haidar's force, who
circled the area looking for an opportunity to repeat their victory and threatened to "lay
our Bones . . . with those of our Brethren.\textsuperscript{113} His attitude on less emotional occasions
was more generous:

Hyder has been accused of a savage & cruel Disposition & is said to have delighted
in Blood. He was certainly a severe and rigid Master, and kept the Tone of his
authority wound up to the highest Pitch, but this his personal safety & the safety of
the new form'd & unsettled kingdom [required] . . . I do not consider him as the author
of the War. The seeds of which were sown by our Rapacity, and well known avarice of
dominion long before, and with equal justice might we condemn the Traveller for
crushing the snake that threatens his life.\textsuperscript{114}

He believed, furthermore, that Tipu possessed "signs of a noble & generous Disposition," and admired his military skills.\textsuperscript{115} He hoped that the excellent education Tipu was known
to have been given, in contrast to that of his illiterate predecessor, might lead him to
outgrow the "prejudices of Temper of his Father [and] the Pursuit of Conquest [which]
was [his] only Passion."\textsuperscript{116}

Kennaway's opinion of Tipu's character does not seem to have impressed Edmonstone,
who viewed the sultan as "a villain who is a disgrace to human nature,"\textsuperscript{117} but his respect
for his military prowess may have had more effect. Edmonstone's first recorded act of
espionage was attempts to spy on the ambassadors sent by Tipu to the nizam in January
1790.\textsuperscript{118} They were camped about a mile from the delegation's house and he regularly
watched them through a spyglass as they went to the \textit{durbar}. He was surprised to note
that the several hundred troops sent by Tipu to accompany the delegation were "habited
exactly like the coast sepoys & I think look very well," but was never able to see them
drawn up for battle and thereby to judge their discipline.\textsuperscript{119} The issue of Tipu's maneuvers
had a direct effect on the main object of the mission, for Edmonstone believed that the
sultan was interested in obtaining the Circar, although he doubted he would risk a war
over it.\textsuperscript{120} Following Tipu's activities carefully, Edmonstone became convinced that he
had as his ultimate object "to clear the Malabar Coast of Europeans,"\textsuperscript{121} and that only a
war was likely to stop him.\textsuperscript{122}

The nizam apparently felt similarly threatened, as his attitude towards the British
obviously improved as war became more likely. On their arrival, Nizam Ali, who was
"noted for the politeness of his behavior," had been affable if offhand with the delegation, but his attitude changed for the worse when Kennaway broached the real purpose of his mission. This had been delayed because Tipu had been making preparations that caused Cornwallis to suspect him of planning to attack the Company's ally, the Raja of Travancore, whose state Haidar had long wanted to add to his dominions. The governor-general had hurriedly sent a missive, which Kennaway received before arriving in Hyderabad, instructing him to avoid delivering the letter he was carrying to the nizam in which the British demand for control of Guntur was plainly stated. Instead, he was to confine himself "to general expressions of friendship and assurances of our earnest desire to cultivate a good understanding between the two governments." The Company could not risk offending the nizam when a possibility existed of being drawn into a conflict with Tipu in which they would need his assistance or at least his neutrality. Another complication was the presence of the nizam's general Seyf Jung with 1800 sepoys and 700 cavalry in Guntur. They had been sent there in January 1788 to "quell some refractory polygars," the local Indian authorities of the area, but were still in place. Cornwallis worried that, unless Kennaway persuaded the nizam to voluntarily cede Guntur, the British were going to have quite a fight on their hands, for Jung could also call on the aid of 20,000 armed men under the command of the local zamindars, or landlords.

Throughout August the British waited and watched Tipu, hoping in the meantime that the nizam would withdraw his forces from Guntur. Nothing happened on either score, and on August 28 Abercromby gave Kennaway permission to go ahead with the negotiations, for Tipu had been quiet for six weeks. On September 9, Kennaway and Edmonstone visited the nizam and presented Cornwallis's letter. Ali was at first calm, probably having been warned of the tenor of the conversation by his minister, who had discussed the matter with Kennaway before the nizam appeared. To the British demand he merely commented that, as his people would have to review the accounts concerning the peshcush, it would take several days for him to give an answer. As Edmonstone put it, Kennaway then "with all the delicacy that its nature would admit of," went on to explain that Cornwallis had issued orders for British troops to march into the Circar fourteen days from the delivery of the letter. Apparently he was not delicate enough, for the nizam became indignant, and informed him that "if it was the Company's intention to act contrary to the terms of the Treaty he was ready for War." He also reminded the British that "the Company's taking possession of the Guntur prematurely had before helped to sow the seeds of a General War . . . and that he was as ready for Action now as he was then." Ali's reaction to the British request caused Abercromby to worry that he might have begun negotiations with Tipu and was temporizing until a reply was received, while Kennaway fretted that he might be planning an alliance with Tipu or the Marathas to regain the Circar once British troops crossed the border. Yet, other than for some wrangling over financial matters, Guntur was transferred with little opposition by the nizam, who ordered Seyf Jung to cede it to the Company's troops in mid-September.

Kennaway made no attempt to account for his good fortune in his letters to Calcutta, but Neil was somewhat more observant when he informed William that

The Guntur has long been the favorite object of Tippoo & it was imagined he had formed some plan for obtaining possession of it . . . He is hovering about this
part of the country reinforcing his army & garrisons, & it is generally supposed he has some hostile plan in view[;]... the Nizam is I believe under some apprehension concerning his designs.  

Historian Nani Gopal Chaudhury believes that "of all his enemies [the nizam] dreaded the Marathas most" because he "could buy the English by the surrender of Guntur but not the Marathas, who were always ready to make incursions into his territory." Yet Chaudhuri also records several events that tell a different story. At the same time that Kennaway's delegation arrived in Hyderabad, the nizam was attempting to strike a deal with the French at Pondicherry in which he would cede Guntur to them in return for a guarantee of protection against the British and Tipu. He also sent an envoy, Fakir-ud-din, to Tipu, proposing an alliance between their two states, although negotiations broke down when the sultan demanded both Guntur and a marriage between their families; the nizam's pride—not to mention the outrage of the women of his household—would not permit him to accede to such an alliance with an unpedigreed upstart.

The point of commonality between the nizam's triple negotiations does not seem to have been concern over the Marathas, or even an attempt to retain Guntur, which was used as a bargaining chip. Instead, it appears that his real interest was to gain some measure of protection against the newest threat in the south—the rising power of Mysore—and that Sir Penderel Moon was correct when he laconically commented that Nizam Ali was "mortally afraid of Tipu." While the Marathas were probably the strongest force on the subcontinent at the time, and they and the nizam had a history of conflicts over chauth, they were not currently menacing him. Unlike Chaudhuri's belief, it was possible for the nizam to "buy them off" by making concessions over the tax issue, as he would do in the short-lived hostilities between the two states that followed the Third Mysore War. It was also the case that Maratha strength was greater than that of the nizam only if they acted collectively, which they were showing less and less of a tendency to do. Nizam Ali correctly assumed that Tipu was a much greater problem; therefore, when negotiations with the sultan broke down and the French failed to give him the guarantee he needed, Ali made concessions to the British to insure that they would aid him in reducing Tipu's power.

This became quickly apparent to Kennaway, who in October 1788 had another audience with the nizam, this time to present him with a gold watch as a gift from Cornwallis. Ali soon had Kennaway draw near to the throne, away from the rest of the court, so that he could confer with him privately. He wanted to know the reason for the new British troops that had recently arrived at Bombay. He was told that they had been sent to India when a war with France seemed likely, but even though it had been avoided Cornwallis planned to keep them, for he thought the Company's army "should always be in a condition to prosecute if necessary a vigorous War." The answer obviously pleased the nizam, who went on to ask in uncharacteristically blunt terms "if it was the wish of our Government to enter on a War with Tippoo?" Kennaway replied that it would depend on Tipu's adherence to the treaty of Mangalore, which had ended the Second Mysore War, prompting Ali to note that the sultan's ambitions in the south made that unlikely. Although the interview ended without discussion of an alliance between the Company and Hyderabad, that followed soon enough, for by December the nizam had sent his courtier Mir Alam (Abul Qasim) to Calcutta to discuss an alliance with Cornwallis. Kennaway favored the idea, noting to the governor-general that, in the event
of war, the nizam's cooperation would insure that the British force had adequate cavalry and easy access to supplies, both of which had been a problem in the Company's previous conflicts, although he preferred the British to eventually acquire their own cavalry so as not to depend on any Indian state. ¹⁴⁶

The nizam began to pay more attention to the delegation as negotiations continued in Calcutta: he sent his British guests a trained cheetah with which to hunt deer; paid a personal visit to Kennaway on June 29, 1789, at which he was "very gracious"; gave Kennaway the nickname Dilawar Jang, or Bold in War; and sent Edmonstone a present of fruit, an act Edmonstone took as "a great condescension on his part for he is most scrupulously particular in observing all the formal ceremonies necessary to keep up his dignity."¹⁴⁷ He also enjoyed abusing the ambassadors that Tipu had, too late, sent to ameliorate his displeasure. As Edmonstone happily observed, "the Nizam, by way of retaliation for the treatment his ambassadors received on a Deputation to him, keeps them in their tents surrounded by four encampments of his own troops[,] . . . [it shows] a degree of spirit that does the Nizam credit."¹⁴⁸

Cornwallis, meanwhile, was finding his negotiations far less enjoyable. Mir Alam was pressing for the military aid due the nizam by the 1768 treaty--a difficult request to refuse in light of Ali's cooperation over Guntur--but the treaties of Madras and Mangalore, ending the two Mysore Wars, strictly forbade the Company to give support to Mysore's enemies. The governor-general resisted making a new treaty with the nizam, instead writing him a letter, which Kennaway delivered in July 1789, affirming that, in the case of hostilities, the British would furnish the requested military aid. Forrest views this as "a faintly disguised offensive alliance with the Nizam against Tipu," for the letter clearly listed the powers against whom the Company's troops were not to be used--a list that included every major state in south India except Mysore.¹⁴⁹ It seems more likely, however, that Cornwallis was merely hedging his bets. To refuse the nizam the aid promised in the same treaty by which the British had just claimed the Circar would be virtually impossible to justify, but the treaty had not made any provisions as to the use of such a force and the governor-general had no intention of being drawn into an unnecessary war with the Marathas or Mysore. The letter corrected this problem by adding important exclusions to the employment of the British troops, but Cornwallis could hardly have included Tipu in these if, as has been argued, the nizam's fear of his ambition was the main reason for Mir Alam's mission. Yet he did insure that Hyderabad could not precipitate a war with the sultan and expect British aid by making the alliance defensive only. Cornwallis may have hoped that Tipu would not dare to attack a state as large and as well prepared as Hyderabad, and thus believed that he was giving little away--and that in a letter instead of a formal treaty. If Tipu did attack Hyderabad, however, the Company would probably be drawn into the war anyway, as it could not risk the balance of power in the south being entirely overthrown, a certainty if Tipu was able to absorb a large part of the nizam's territory into his own. In this instance, Cornwallis' decision would at least insure the British a strong ally to assist them. The traditional British view, promoted by Alfred Lyall, that Hyderabad was a weak state which carried little political weight in the Deccan,¹⁵⁰ is impossible to reconcile with the emphasis Cornwallis placed on placating the nizam. The agreement finally decided upon permanently changed the face of south Indian politics, for the alliance between the British and Hyderabad, although severely tested at times, remained in effect until 1947.
Cornwallis' reasoning was faulty in one respect: it did not provide for the contingency of Tipu instigating war with the Company by finally attacking the Raja of Travancore in January 1790. Forrest believes that the alliance between the British and Hyderabad hardened Tipu's attitude in his dispute with the raja over the ownership of border fortresses in the far south, but it seems likely that other factors played a bigger role. Tipu had acquired a poor opinion of the Company's faithfulness to their allies and the strength of their army when he and his father opposed them in the first two Mysore Wars. It was therefore reasonable for him to assume that they would not risk war with him over a few forts in Travancore or, if they did, that he would be able to deal with them. Cornwallis, however, bore little resemblance to the often perfidious Madras officials of Tipu's experience, a fact the sultan would soon discover to his cost.

Neil reassured William that the Company and the nizam were together more than a match for Tipu, and felt that the sultan's decision to fight them both at the same time was perfectly unaccountable . . . even tho' he imagined himself able to cope with us, the late strong connection which has been formed between our govt. and the Nizam must have led him to apprehend what has now actually happened [i.e. the alliance] . . . it can only be called madness, a madness that seems instigated by providence to effect the down-fall of a monster.

After a formal treaty of alliance had been signed between the nizam, the peshwa and the Company in 1790, he was even more elated, noting to William that, "it would appear from the Public papers that the approaching war is a subject of exultation in Bengal . . . . I am much inclined to be glad of it too [and that] two powerful states unite their arms with ours to oppose a single enemy." The Tripartite Treaty seemed a coup for the nizam, who agreed to supply 10,000 cavalry, the expense of which was to be borne by the Company, in return for a third share in all advantages accrued from the war. Cornwallis's military success in 1792, which deprived Tipu of one-third of his kingdom, also insured that Nizam Ali received his hedge against aggression, as the sultan would never again pose a threat to his state. The power struggle in the south was far from over, however; the nizam and his successors would soon learn that they had a menace greater than Mysore with which to deal.

Edmonstone received a brief taste of battle when, in May 1790, the delegation accompanied the nizam and an army of 40,000 men to rendezvous with two Madras battalions of sepoys under the command of Major Montgomery. The combined force succeeded in capturing Vanoo and a number of Tipu's other frontier stations before Edmonstone left in July to take the original draft of the treaty to Madras, following which he sailed to Calcutta. Edmonstone's dislike for war, and his life-long preference for solving problems through the less risky avenue of diplomacy, may have grown out of this first encounter with the rigors of a campaign, as he complained to William: "The heat . . . is very great. The country consisting of vast plains & rocky hills & tents furnishing but a poor defense against a vertical sun." The actual hostilities seem to have made even more of an impression, for he informed his brother thereafter, only partly in jest, that he would travel to Madras with 80 or 90 soldiers "for the security of my precious person" and would take "the first cock boat going to Calcutta." Although he felt that, "there is . . . some satisfaction to be derived from the hope of reducing the too great influence & putting a stop to the cruelties of that infernal monster," the war removed forever Edmonstone's early, comfortable illusion of British invulnerability. Cornwallis' eventual
victory over Tipu was hard won, and there were times when the Third Mysore War could have easily gone the other way. The impression Edmonstone acquired in Hyderabad of the strength of the larger Indian states, and of the ease with which their alliances shifted, left him with a conviction of the necessity for reducing all powerful Indian rulers before they, like Tipu, could threaten the Company's position. This opinion would eventually grow into an obsession, one that would greatly influence his future politics and those of the governors-general with whom he worked.

While in Hyderabad, Edmonstone completed five years of service with the Company and moved up a grade in rank, to that of factor; however, a much more important advancement came because of his rapidly improving language skills. He had quickly become bored with the music and books he had taken on the trip and, although he swam daily in a tank in the delegation's garden and went for rides and hunts with the rest of the party, he nonetheless had a good deal of time on his hands. Early on, therefore, he began to spend three hours each morning with a munshi, or Indian tutor, to improve his Persian. He also studied Hindi while in Hyderabad and, although he would never be as fluent in it as in Persian, attained some proficiency. At first his understanding of Indian languages was still fairly basic, for Kennaway told a friend in confidence that a Persian translation Edmonstone had done was "faithful enough but harsh and inelegant." Yet, by November 1788, Edmonstone was already informing William that he had "learnt more of the language within the short time that we have been here than I had done for a year before." That December he still needed his munshi to act as an interpreter at times, but by the next year he was fluent enough to dispense entirely with the use of an Indian secretary, a rare accomplishment among Europeans. By the end of the mission Kennaway believed that "his Knowledge of the Persian language is good and he writes it better than any European I know."

Kennaway remained in Hyderabad as the first British resident in the state until ill health forced his retirement in 1793. In recognition of his services he was created a baronet and received a £500 annual pension from the Company, part of which he and his brother used to build a stylish manor house in Devon. His greatest accomplishment while in India may have been his training of Edmonstone, particularly the assessment of the young man's potential that he conveyed to his superiors:

I parted with him with great respect. His disposition is tractable, mild and good and he is very anxious to do right, but his want of knowledge and experience of the world ceded to great modesty renders him the most diffident of any young man I know. Having always had some person or other on whose counsel he has depended he is on all occasions unwilling to act from himself tho his understanding is a very good one and he possesses qualifications and Talents which falls to the lot of few[;] . . . my whole aim has been to correct what he is deficient in, but I do not think there is any likely mode of doing it so well as his being placed in some temporary commission or investigation should an opportunity offer, where he will be obliged to act from himself. His principles & disposition are stricktly [sic] and I think unalterably honorable and he only wants more confidence [sic] in himself.

Cornwallis may have had a position in mind for Edmonstone as early as the spring of 1789, for Kennaway noted in April that "I do not know a finer young man than he is, or one that is better qualified both by talents and disposition for the department which his Lordship has thoughts of placing him." However, Kennaway's recommendation
probably played a large part in that decision, and in the fact that Edmonstone was informed even before he left Hyderabad of his elevation to a position that would give him ample opportunity "to act from himself."
British expansion into Bengal's wealthy, neighboring state of Awadh, beginning in 1765 and culminating in the Company's annexation of the country in 1856, formed one of the most important events in their obtaining hegemony in India. The huge amount of money they derived from the state funded much of the expansion of the Wellesley and Moira eras, the cost of which the Company could not have borne alone, and Awadh's experienced soldiers contributed greatly to the strength of the British armies from Cornwallis's period to the Mutiny. Edmonstone's first, and one of his most far-reaching, political actions was to assist the Company to bring the resources of this pivotal state under its control.

Historians have identified a number of reasons for British expansion in Awadh. The earliest explanation, typified by the work of C.C. Davies and Purnendu Basu, was essentially the same argument used by Company officials to excuse their actions to the Court of Directors. Bordering the British territories in Bihar, Awadh formed an important buffer between the Company's lands and those of the predatory Afghans and expansion-minded Marathas. To insure the safety of its domains, it was necessary for the Company to maintain a military presence in Awadh that, as the troops protected both states, its rulers were expected to subsidize. The inability of the nawab wazirs of Awadh to regularly pay the subsidy forced the Company to assume more and more control over their administrations, a process that culminated in eventual annexation.

Peter Marshall and Rudrangshu Mukherjee see the traditional depiction of events as too simplistic, arguing that economics also played a key role in expansion. Marshall notes that hundreds of European merchants settled in Awadh in the 1760s and 1770s, and in some cases built large mercantile concerns, such as John Scott's huge cotton piecegoods factory at Tanda. These men soon began to petition the Company to interfere in the nawab's government to lower export duties, see to it that justice was regulated in favor of Europeans, and insure their protection. Mukherjee takes the economic thesis further, believing that British expansion in the state was primarily due to the Company's desire to transform it "into a supplier of indigo to be used by manufacturers in industrial England and into a supplier of raw cotton to the China market to maintain the balance of trade in favour of the British imperialist interests."

Lastly, the character of Asaf-ud-Daula, ruler of Awadh from 1775 to 1797, has often been cited as a factor in British expansion. Eric Stokes notes that the Company in the 1780s was careful to avoid interference with the social structure of its Indian lands, preferring to work through established elites, from the village level to the highest authorities, rather than risk a serious revolt. This was equally true in their relations with
neighboring states, such as the Carnatic, where they maintained hegemony for decades prior to annexation through the influence they exerted over its leaders. Richard B. Barnett sees a similar state of affairs existing in Awadh from the time of Asaf, whom he views as merely a British puppet. He believes that the nawab became demoralized and uninterested in government after seeing many of his prerogatives pass into Company hands; his disinterest led to disorder in his kingdom, which further increased the possibilities for British intervention. Although kinder than the traditional image of the wazir as a weak-minded, obese, sexually suspect pawn of his ministers, Barnett's thesis perpetuates Asaf's reputation as one who, lost in dissipation and uninterested in reform, was "little more than a passive tool" in the hands of devious Company employees.

Michael Edwardes similarly sees Asaf as "a puppet in the hands of the Governor-General, and the State of Oudh [as] a dependency of the East India Company." These writers draw on the traditional British view, elucidated by Alfred Lyall, who believed that, by Cornwallis' first governor-generalship, incapable rulers and a weak political and economic system had caused Awadh to become nothing more than a British protectorate. Michael Fisher is the only modern writer who has tried to rehabilitate the nawab's image, especially as a patron of the arts, but even he comments that Asaf-ud-Daula remained preoccupied with the cultural revival he was fostering in his capital of Lucknow while allowing the Company to acquire a dominant position in his state.

The difficulty with all these explanations is that they address more the how than the why of Company expansion. The British troops garrisoned in the state, the economic penetration of European traders, the exertion of pressure on the nawab, all helped to insure the Company an important position in Awadh, but they do not explain why it resorted to open interference there when its normal practice and the emphatic orders of the directors were against it. The threat of invasion was certainly an issue, but it is most believable in the early period, from 1765 when Awadh's army was weakened by its defeat at Buxar, until early 1769 when the Afghan ruler Ahmad Shah Abdali pulled back from his last incursion into India. It is less so thereafter as decades passed and no invasion attempts were made on the state; indeed, from 1765 to its annexation in 1856, the only foreign troops in Awadh were the Company's. More plausible was Governor-General Sir John Shore's confession that the threat of foreign invasion was the excuse, not the impetus, for some of his political actions. There were always alarmists on the British side, but the majority, including Shore, agreed with General Robert Barker of the Company's army, who commented that the Afghans would not cross the Indus for fear of the Sikhs, and "as long as the Khalsa army was on the watch, no one could march on India unopposed." Likewise, it was in times of peace with the Maratha Empire that the Company made its most significant intrusions into Awadh, not when war and invasion threatened.

Similarly, P.J. Marshall views the merchants as merely a contributing factor in British expansion, and indeed wonders how many really wanted to change the loose control of "a weak autonomous state" for the stricter regulation of the Company. Unlike Mukherjee, he sees "no case for suggesting that increased trade had so undermined the Wazir's authority that annexation had become inevitable," a view echoed by C.A. Bayly, and Mukherjee fails to give substantial proof of his thesis. The maxim that Asaf's weaknesses encouraged British involvement in his affairs is also not substantiated by the evidence; this section will argue that in fact the opposite was true: the British were
motivated to intervene in Awadh precisely because Asaf had proven unwilling to play the part of the puppet, had made considerable advances in freeing Awadh from British hegemony, and was planning further actions to increase his independence. This chapter focuses on the era from 1790 to 1794, examining the background of the Company's alliance with Awadh and offering a reassessment of the political ability of Asaf-ud-Daula; chapter five discusses how court intrigue in Lucknow and political maneuverings in Calcutta from 1794 to 1797 led to Shore's decision to personally intervene in the affairs of the state; and chapter six relates the history of the political revolution of 1798 that ended all hope of autonomy for Bengal's neighbor.

To understand British expansion in Awadh, it must first be recalled that there was a considerable difference of opinion in India on the subject. The young imperialists who were beginning to move into positions of importance in the Company's government heavily favored expansion, as did some members of the British mercantile classes in Awadh and a few military men. As will be seen, these groups loudly advocated increased interference or outright annexation of the country. The chief opponent of imperialism in this period was undoubtedly Shore, who took seriously the prohibition in Pitt's East India Act against interference by the Company in Indian states, and was well aware that he would face censure from the directors for any unauthorized aggression.

Assuming the governor-generalship in 1792, Shore seemed the antithesis of the burly, boisterous Cornwallis both in appearance and pastimes. His thin face and delicate features were often drawn with pain from frequent illnesses, and he never managed to exude the air of command that came so naturally to his predecessor. He would always show a preference for the study of Indian languages (he knew Hindi, Persian and some Arabic) and antiquities (he served as president of the Asiatic Society of Bengal after the death of Sir William Jones, whose biography he wrote) over parties and plays, although he was an enthusiastic member of the Calcutta Cricket Club. Yet he had the distinction of being the first non-military man appointed as governor-general; his long service in Bengal--he arrived as a writer in 1769 at age 17--and the high opinion Cornwallis formed of him during his time in office persuaded the directors that a trading company might after all be best supervised by a merchant.

Leadenhall Street soon had ample reason to be pleased with its choice. Despite being frequently portrayed as "having a thoroughly conventional and, indeed, excessively timid and dependent mind," being "a very cautious and over-prudent politician," and, in extreme cases, as "one of the worst of the few really incompetent Governors-General," Shore was actually one of the most successful at fulfilling his mandate from the directors. He increased the profits of the Company, kept the peace in India, and, other than in the case of Awadh, avoided entanglements with the Indian powers. In doing so, he demonstrated considerable strength of character, adhering to his beliefs despite their unpopularity with some in his administration at the time and with historians since. He annulled the treaty that Lord Hobart, governor of Madras, had persuaded the Raja of Tanjore to sign giving the Company more control over his administration, for he believed the raja had been "dragooned into it," and he refused to assist the nizam of Hyderabad in a war on the Marathas, as it would be a violation of Pitt's East India Act. Yet his strong moral sense--his brother was a clergyman and Shore himself would later play a prominent role in the British and Foreign Bible Society--caused him to waver in that resolve when he became convinced that the general welfare was at stake. As he
commented to George Frederick Cherry, his resident in Lucknow from 1793 to 1796, "I see no difficulty in combining an effectual interference [in Awadh] directed by the sole object of the Public Good, with an ostensible disavowal of it."[19]

Ironically, it may have been Shore's admiration for Cornwallis, whom he described as "manly, affable and . . . of excellent judgment,"[20] that would ultimately cause him to depart from his predecessor's stated policy of non-interference, for he tended to favor the young imperialists that Cornwallis had started to bring forward in the Company. The two who would play the most important roles in his decision concerning Awadh were undoubtedly Edmonstone and Cherry, who additionally recommended themselves to the new governor-general by their facility with Indian languages, their enthusiasm for the Company's welfare, and their diligence in the Persian translator's office.

Born in 1761, Cherry was the son of George Cherry, a Lincolnshire gentleman who had made a career for himself in the British Navy despite losing a leg in a sea battle with the French in 1747.[21] Although they came from different backgrounds, Cherry's life in many ways paralleled Edmonstone's: he entered the Company's service as a writer at age 17 in 1778; he had a brother in service (Peter Cherry), an Indian mistress and an English wife (the latter the daughter of William and Ann Paul); and he quickly moved up in rank due to his linguistic ability, becoming Persian translator in 1789 and accompanying Cornwallis to Seringapatam in 1792 for the treaty negotiations with Tipu Sultan.[22] He also shared with Edmonstone some artistic talent, as evidenced when he painted the stiff, yet recognizable portrait of the sultan presently in the Victoria and Albert collection in London, and he was strongly imperialist. Edmonstone, who became deputy Persian translator and Cherry's assistant on his return from Hyderabad, would later recall that it was his superior who taught him "both by example and precept" not to trust the Indians.[23] The two men became regular companions, not only spending long hours together at work, but also being frequent guests at Shore's home for dinner parties.[24] Edmonstone would refer to him as "my more than friend Cherry,"[25] and assisted him in such diverse ways as serving as a witness for his will and attempting to find a suitable ayah, or nurse, for his young son.[26]

The term Persian translator is somewhat deceptive, as Cherry and Edmonstone were responsible for a variety of tasks that required more than linguistic ability. Their office translated all correspondence received by the Company's government from the Indian states into English and put the Company's replies into Persian, but a group of carefully selected Indian secretaries provided much of the labor. The Persian translator and his assistant spent most of their time involved in diplomacy, as when they attended the weekly durbars, or audiences, given for Indian ambassadors and nobles by the governor-general, and officiated at important conferences where Indian representatives were present. In addition, the translator received numerous vakils, or representatives, who stopped by his office to explain the concerns of their masters, which he then communicated to Shore at daily meetings.[27] He was also expected to accompany the governor-general when he traveled and to draw up and sign treaties with the Indian states. The office gave Cherry and Edmonstone the opportunity for an unparalleled education in Indian politics and allowed them, as Edmonstone proudly noted in a letter home, to be "much about the Governor."[28] Their regular intercourse with Shore soon resulted in promotions: Cherry was appointed resident at Lucknow in 1793, a post considered one of the most prestigious in the Company's service, and Edmonstone moved up to Cherry's
Edmonstone was soon required to pay for his promotion by undertaking the huge task of translating into Persian the *Code of Forty-Eight Regulations* promulgated as part of Cornwallis's Permanent Settlement. 29 Shore was so pleased with his work on the project, which he accomplished by translating at night after his other duties were completed, that he recommended to the directors that Edmonstone's salary be raised from 18,000 to 30,000 rupees a year, noting that the position of translator was "not only one of the most important and confidential, but one of the most laborious under Government." 30 By 1797, Shore's opinion of Edmonstone's "merit, Ability, and Discretion" 31 insured that he took seriously his advice, as demonstrated in the case of a letter from the rajah of Arakan that arrived in Calcutta that year along with a delegation. The letter demanded in "unexpected and peremptory terms... little short of insult" the return of refugees who had taken up residence in the Company's lands during the 1784 war in which Arakan was annexed by Burma. 32 The missive was received with concern by Shore, who originally read a translation of it made by a member of the Arakan delegation. However, Edmonstone's version of the original, which the ambassadors had also brought, was much softer in tone, calming the governor-general's fears and allowing his report of Company/Burmese relations to the Board of Control to be reassuring rather than alarmist. 33

The close relationship that developed between Edmonstone, Cherry and Shore would play an important part in the governor-general's perception of events at the court of Awadh, but the myriad appeals addressed to him in the Calcutta press may have also had an effect. A series of anonymous letters appeared in Calcutta newspapers starting soon after Shore's accession to the governor-generalship, urging him to depose Asaf-ud-Daula, annex Awadh and convert it to a series of districts under the administration of the Company as had been done in Bengal. 34 This was unrealistic at the time--the Company was still attempting to find a workable system of administration for its own lands, and certainly did not have the resources or manpower to manage Awadh's. Yet the justifications were tempting, with some obviously designed to appeal to Shore, such as repeated statements that the Company should extend its "paternal care" and the benefits of better administration and justice to the people of Awadh, and not let "the happiness of some millions of subjects... be sacrificed to a mistaken and reprehensible delicacy." 35 Others were more clearly aimed at Henry Dundas, to whom a collection of the letters was sent in 1795, which mirror the attitudes of modern historians. An extremely optimistic assessment alleged that the cultivation of new crops, such as indigo and sugar, that had recently begun in Awadh would, under proper management, double the current yearly revenue of the country to 4 *crores* of rupees. 36 This could provide a large pension to the nawab and still insure the Company greatly increased revenues. Similarly, Asaf's fitness to rule was attacked, with the wazir characterized as being "bred up in habits of indolence and pleasure... with an unconquerable aversion to business," and "being addicted from his youth to some of the most detestable vices (which have left him without progeny)." 37 His only redeeming trait was that his "imbecility and dependent State" would make the employment of the Company's plans easy. 38

Several important points were raised in the letters, however, which show that contemporary proponents of expansion varied in their motivations from those commonly identified by historians. The possibility of the invasion of Awadh by hostile forces is not
mentioned in the letters; instead, the authors' military concerns center on the threat to the Company of Awadh itself, either singly or in concert with other Indian states. The British had to absorb the revenues of their neighbor or have them eventually "turned against us to our final destruction." It was feared that, "from the knowledge the Country Powers have acquired in European War, we must fail in the first contest" with them without a much enhanced military. The funds for improving the Company's army could be obtained, and a potential rival destroyed, by annexing Awadh. Yet another motivation for expansion was the belief that such was the Company's right. After the defeat of Shuja-ud-Daula, then nawab of Awadh, in Buxar in 1764, the British were "entitled to the Subadary of Oude, as they were on a former occasion to the Dewannee of Bengal, & might have established this right with the concurrence of the Mogul at as cheap a rate as the Nawab obtained the title & appointment of Vizier." Nothing stopped the British from "openly and boldly tak[ing] the country, to which so just a claim can be made," except "a too rigid adherence to [the Company's] engagements, & a studious, perhaps a culpable compliance with the prejudices of an interested party in England."

Events were to show that these sentiments reflected the attitudes of Shore's young assistants, but the governor-general had at that time a different viewpoint. Although Shore often longed "to adopt the language of authority" with the nawab and be able to force his obedience in matters affecting the Company, he recognized him as a sovereign prince who could only be cajoled through appeals "to his sense, to his Pride, to his Interest, to his Reputation, and to his Fears." Action such as that advocated in the letters was repugnant to Shore, who viewed it as dishonorable and morally inexcusable.

Asaf had been a consistent friend who had done the Company many favors, such as offering men and money for the Third Anglo-Mysore War and putting the best of his troops temporarily under its command. Shore wondered if anything could hurt the British reputation in India more than being false to such an ally.

Two main points need to be made concerning Asaf's attitude towards the Company: first, regardless of his personal preferences, it is almost certain that he could not have rid himself of the British alliance. The first three nawabs of Awadh had been renowned soldiers, with Asaf's father, Shuja-ud-Daula, said to be able to cut off the head of a buffalo with one stroke of the sabre. Yet, although his forces were considerably larger than the Company's, he was defeated by the British at Plassey and Buxar. When he thereafter reconstituted his army—expanding it, bringing in European advisors to provide training in the latest modes of warfare and establishing factories for making high quality munitions—he used it to bring the areas of Etawah and, with the Company as his ally, Rohilkhand under his control, not to again challenge the British. When he died of blood poisoning in 1764 from a wound sustained in fighting the Rohillas, Awadh had a strong army and a full treasury, but it also had the beginnings of a British protectorate in the yearly subsidy Shuja paid to support a battalion of Company troops in his state and in the presence of a British resident at his court. As the remnants of Mughal control collapsed all over India, a power vacuum much more intense than that in Shuja's day followed, with the Marathas, Mysore, Hyderabad, and, increasingly, the Company, jockeying for power, while the smaller states aligned with or were conquered by the larger. If Shuja, a capable military leader in a more settled time, had not been able to successfully oppose the Company, what chance did Asaf have to do so? His only hope would have been an
alliance with another power such as the Marathas, with no guarantee that their aid would not end in loss of sovereignty.

Secondly, Asaf had numerous reasons for most of his reign to value, rather than deplore, his association with the British. An examination of his actions as nawab shows a man who overcame considerable obstacles to establish himself on the throne, created a glittering court which eclipsed that of the Mughals and rivaled those of the great states of India, and maneuvered steadily towards the goal of full sovereignty in an era when other Indian states were coming under the control of one of the great powers. A significant factor in his reaching these goals was his shrewd use of the British alliance.

When Asaf took the throne in 1775, he immediately faced serious threats to his sovereignty. Ultimately, the most dangerous of these would prove to be the Company, but that was not immediately apparent. On the contrary, he had an early opportunity, when faced by a challenge from his younger brother Sa'adat Ali, to learn that the Company could be a very useful ally. In 1778, Sa'adat joined Basant Ali, one of Asaf's generals, in a plan to assassinate the wazir and assume the throne. Asaf outwitted the conspirators, drawing Basant into a trap and beheading him, but Sa'adat escaped and joined a group of disaffected nobles to incite a mutiny in the army. The Company sided with the nawab, sending a brigade under Colonel John Parker to oppose Sa'adat's forces. The revolt was suppressed when the disparate groups of mutineers failed to unite and 500 of Sa'adat's troops were butchered in battle with Parker. Sa'adat was forgiven by his brother, who nonetheless prudently had him exiled--to Benares, where he would be constantly under the Company's eye.

Fisher erroneously believes that Asaf received no help from the British, who merely stayed out of the contest between the brothers, and that, "unconstrained by the Company, Asaf al-Daula managed to crush the weak bid of his rival." Although Asaf might have been able to deal with Sa'adat's challenge without Company assistance, it is undoubted that he had Hastings' complete support. Likewise, Fisher's claim that "the continued presence of his rival, waiting under the Company's wings [in Benares], provided a clear warning to Asaf al-Daula not to oppose the advice of its Resident," also seems doubtful. The Company, in no position to attempt such a coup in Asaf's lifetime, never threatened him with removal, and the nawab became well known for opposing the wishes of his residents on a regular basis. It seems more likely that the British preferred Sa'adat in their territory so that his actions could be monitored to prevent any further attempts to foment trouble.

Asaf soon began to use his ally to help rid him of other threats to his sovereignty, such as that posed by his ambitious mother. Umat-ul-Zohra, better known as Bahu Begum, daughter of the governor of Gujarat and foster child of the Mughal emperor Muhammad Shah, married Shuja-ud-Daula in 1745. She won her husband's lasting esteem by her generosity in sending him everything she possessed in his hour of greatest need after the defeat at Buxar, including even her pearl encrusted nose ring. Thereafter, Shuja made her virtual treasurer of Awadh, regularly placing his excess revenues in her hands as well as giving her a number of profitable jagirs for her personal expenses. Amusingly, he also agreed to pay her a fine of 5,000 rupees whenever she caught him visiting one of his mistresses; considering Shuja's reputation, she must have amassed a considerable fortune in fines alone.
When Shuja ud-Daula died, Bahu Begam did not return her estates to the government as was customary, nor did she hand over the treasure entrusted to her keeping. She may have believed that, with her son on the throne, her influence in government would be great, but it soon became apparent that the new nawab did not intend to be the puppet of anyone, including his mother. Her opposition to the Treaty of Benares in 1775 renewing the British alliance was unsuccessful, and it is accepted that Asaf's move to Lucknow later that year, which he would eventually make his capital, was prompted by a wish to get away from her. She administered justice, collected taxes, and observed all the pomp and ceremony of a monarch in the old capital of Faizabad after her son's change of venue, including maintaining a force of 10,000 men to collect the taxes in her jagirs, as well as a personal army of 2,000 mounted soldiers to guard her palace. Displeased by her son's independence, she openly requested British intervention in Awadh's government, informing the Company that she would see to it that the subsidy for its troops was promptly paid if her choices for chief ministerial positions in the state were substituted for Asaf's.

Hastings, who once remarked that he did "not know a better tempered or better humoured man" than Asaf, was strongly inclined to take his part in disputes. He refused the begum's request to name Awadh's ministers and further agreed with the nawab that it was inappropriate for her to carry on an independent correspondence with the Company. He also opposed the decision of his council to allow her to give Asaf 30 lakhs of rupees in 1777 in return for a guarantee of no further impositions, as this would leave the majority of Shuja's treasure in her hands. He was therefore easily persuaded by the nawab's suggestion, made when Asaf was pressed for arrears in the subsidy payment, that the funds be obtained from the begum. A combined British and Awadh force compelled her to give up 100 lakhs of rupees in 1781, thereby providing Hastings with the funds he needed to fight his Maratha and Carnatic wars, and allowing Asaf to reclaim many of the jagirs formerly administered by his mother. Hastings received considerable opprobrium at his trial over this "plunder" of the begum, but she was by no means beggared by the event, which left her able to live in queenly style for life. However, the decrease in her revenues and the obvious support of the Company for her son's administration insured that she ceased to be a significant political factor during the rest of Asaf's rule.

Considering the problems he had with his family, it is not surprising that Asaf took steps to remove many of his father's ministers from high positions in his administration. Throughout his reign he preferred to advance men of insignificant origins who would owe their elevation solely to him and who could be destroyed as easily as they had been elevated if the necessity arose. He also preferred to appoint fellow Shi'ites whenever possible, perhaps believing that their shared religion would insure loyalty. Understandably, Asaf's actions were not popular with the ruling class, as demonstrated by the bitter comments of the begum's accountant:

There was no low or low-minded class--barbers, greengrocers, butchers, fuel vendors, elephant drivers, sweepers and tanners, but some of them rode proudly through the market places in fringed palankeens, on elephants with silver litters, or on state horses. The sight of it was enough to make the sky fall and the earth shake.
The wazir's first chief minister, Mukhtar ud-Daula, was a Shi'ite who had previously managed Asaf's jagirs and was related to him by marriage. He was assassinated in 1778 at the outset of Sa'adat's revolt, but Asaf soon put another Shi'ite, Hasan Riza Khan, in his place, possibly because he had more than two hundred relatives in the capital who could form a useful counterweight to entrenched noble families at court. As Hasan Riza was known as a capable military man but had little practical experience in administration, Haydar Beg Khan was made his assistant. He had held important administrative positions in Awadh until, it was rumored, Shuja became infatuated with his sister and, upon being rebuffed, had Haydar Beg and his brother imprisoned on a charge of embezzlement. This and the fact that he was a Sunni mattered less to Asaf than his ability, and possibly the fact that his family was insignificant. The wazir also altered the dewan, or finance department, appointing Maharaja Tikayt Ray finance minister in place of Surat Singh, whose family had owned the office for over sixty years. Asaf's continuing strong alliance with the Company insured that there was little his nobility could do about this restructuring of power, especially once he deprived many of them of their military commands in favor of British officers after Sa'adat's revolt. The nawab was more concerned in his early reign, with reason, about the threats from his family and nobility than the he was about the Company.

Asaf further employed his relationship with the British to free him from anything but the nominal control of the Mughal emperors. He was called upon on two occasions to imitate his father and fulfill his role as wazir of the empire by sending an army to Delhi to assist the Mughals to regain their sovereignty. To refuse such a command could prove awkward, for his family's right to rule rested, at least technically, on the grant of the emperor, and he enjoyed his title of chief minister. To accede, however, would be to reawaken the hostility of the Marathas, who controlled the emperor but were then at peace with Awadh, and possibly to assist in a restoration of Delhi's power and thus insure a diminution of his own autonomy. Asaf therefore sent no reply to his suzerain, but obtained the Company's assurance that they would support his action in ignoring the claim of his nominal overlord. He maintained throughout his reign an outward show of loyalty to the Mughals, but, unlike his father, refused to be drawn into their quarrels.

Finally, Asaf used the Company to expand his territory at the expense of the Rohillas, whose chief, Faizullah Khan, held Rampore as a jagir from Shujah. Asaf's father had brought a large part of Rohilkhand technically under his control but had not been powerful enough to annex the whole of it; he therefore confirmed Faizullah, the chief Rohilla leader, as his jagirdar in the area, probably with the intention of obtaining complete control at a later date. His death prevented this, but Faizullah's own demise in July 1794 opened up the possibility of Asaf finishing his father's work, or at least appropriating a considerable amount of the chief's treasure. The nawab, who lacked an excuse to refuse his succession, initially acknowledged Faizullah's eldest son, Muhammad Ali, as the new jagirdar of Rampore. Yet Ali quickly proved to be an incompetent military leader and failed to show the proper respect to the other Rohilla chiefs, who helped his younger brother Ghulam Mohammed to depose, imprison and later kill him. Ghulam immediately conveyed the customary presents to the nawab as his nominal overlord, and sent Cherry a letter promising obedience to Asaf and the Company if he was confirmed in his father's position.
Asaf contacted Shore to explain the situation, and received word that the Company's troops would assist him to insure that Ghulam "should not be permitted to succeed to the management of the Jaghir . . . which he has usurped and by criminal means endeavored to support." 69 Abu Talib, a contemporary chronicler living in Lucknow, believed that the British complied with Asaf's request because they were afraid of the strength of the Rohillas, who, had they combined with the Sikhs, "would have fallen on the Wazir's Subah, and he would have been placed in great difficulties"; similarly, modern writers have portrayed the Company as worried about what would happen if the Rohillas received support from the Afghans. 70 The evidence, however, shows that Asaf was primarily interested in profit, 72 whereas Shore saw the issue in moral terms, remarking to Sir Robert Abercrombie, his commander-in-chief, "there was never a clearer case, in my opinion . . . for the just exertions of the Company's arms. . . . To have compromised with an usurper and an assassin would have reflected indelible disgrace on the British nation." 73 Cherry, however, had a different motivation. He had written exuberantly to his old mentor Cornwallis that being selected for the position of resident at Lucknow was "far above my most Sanguine Expectations," and assured him that he would be zealous in the performance of his duties. 74 His later attitude in dealing with the nawab suggests that he hoped his assistance with Ghulam's deposition would place Asaf under obligation to him, and incline him to listen more readily to his advice.

Abu Talib noted that Cherry was largely responsible for the ease with which Ghulam was dealt: he deceived Ghulam's agents into believing that the Company's troops were acting under the nawab's orders, and that the British were unhappy over the attack and would do all they could to restrain Asaf. 75 Since Cherry traveled with the nawab and a combined British/Awadh army to Rohilkhand, the rebels had reason to believe he would act as a restraining force on the wazir. The Rohillas therefore made few active preparations for the conflict, a fact that contributed greatly to the overwhelming defeat of their forces. Yet they still did not lose faith in the resident's supposed good will, offering him eight lakhs of rupees to favor them in the treaty negotiations, which Cherry declined after receiving a letter from Edmonstone. His friend informed him that that he had seen Ghulam's vakeel, Gotum Chund, whom he had admitted to the governor-general's durbar to make the fiction of British friendship more believable, and reported that

I shall send you tomorrow two representations [Gotum Chund] has made from which you will collect the probability of Ghullaum Mouhumm being in the possession of a great command of money and that he is frightened out of his wits which last conjecture tends to confirm what has all along been my opinion . . . that he will not oppose the execution of [any terms] or think he will be able to do it. 76 Before terms could be discussed, however, Cherry had to convince Ghulam to surrender himself, which was likely to be difficult owing to a letter sent to him from the nawab that used abusive language and promised him his life only if his guilt was not proved. As Edmonstone pointed out to Cherry, since "that very guilt . . . is predeclared in the letter itself what inducement does this hold out for him to repair to Lucknow?" 77 Edmonstone believed that the letter was deliberately framed to induce the rest of Ghulam's family to join him in revolt, which would give Asaf an excuse to claim the whole of the jagir. 78 Edmonstone's interpretation seems likely: Cherry noted to Abercrombie that the nawab had made negotiations difficult, and that "the utmost circumspection was necessary to confine the Services of the Company's arms to the purpose for which they
were intended, not to assist any views of conquest, but to inflict merited punishment on assassination and Rebellion." In the end, Asaf only agreed to give Faizullah's jagir to another of the chief's sons in order to detach his family's support from Ghulam, and even then he failed to spell out any definite terms, only promising "to be kind" to any of Faizullah's relatives who were obedient to him. He was probably hoping to renege on any promises at a later date, but Edmonstone and Cherry did not give him the opportunity. Edmonstone advised Cherry to use the news writer at Rampore, who was in the pay of the resident, to convince Ghulam that the British would guarantee his life if he surrendered. Edmonstone wrote this on his own, noting to Cherry that, although he had spoken about the Rohilla issue with Shore that morning, he had not brought his plan forward, preferring to deal directly with his friend. Cherry was successful in persuading Ghulam to come to Lucknow to negotiate, which cost him the support of those Rohillas willing to continue resisting. The terms eventually worked out were very favorable to the nawab: Faizullah's considerable treasury was turned over to Asaf and the Company, his jagir was bestowed on Muhammad Ali's infant son (who would not be a threat to anyone for some time), and Ghulam was given a small pension and sent to reside in Benares.

Asaf was delighted as, although he did not receive the whole of Faizullah's lands, he acquired direct control of several large districts and an impressive amount of treasure. He generously assigned eleven lahks of rupees as a present for the British soldiers who had served in the campaign, and set up funds for the families of officers who were killed. A honeymoon period followed in British/Awadh relations, with the nawab assuring Shore that Cherry's "great understanding prudence and wisdom" would doubtless continue to augment "the prosperity and splendor of my Government." For his part, Cherry informed Edmonstone that the wazir, "is not the senseless block he has hitherto been considered" and believed that he would soon acquire a great deal of influence over him. Only Edmonstone was less than pleased, for his support for the war had been generated by his distrust of a militarily capable Indian ruler near the Company's lands. Despite receiving regular messages of Ghulam's goodwill conveyed through Gotum Chund in Calcutta, he remained suspicious of his intentions and recommended his destruction. When Shore assured his young assistant that the deposed chief was no longer a problem, Edmonstone asked Cherry to forward any negative information he might hear about the man, to help him convince Shore to take further action.

Despite the Company's usefulness in helping him overcome threats to his sovereignty, Asaf had long been aware that it posed a new set of problems, most of which were financial. Following Mughal practice, the Company declared in 1775 that all treaties between the British and Awadh were voided by Shuja's death, forcing Asaf to renegotiate before he was firmly settled on the throne. There was no interest in subverting his authority at the time, merely a desire to have Awadh support the augmentation of the Company's armed forces, something seen as necessary by the government at Calcutta but for which the directors were unwilling to pay. In addition to ceding Benares to the Company, which improved the British strategic position on the Ganges, Asaf also agreed to provide 3,120,000 rupees per year for the Kanpur brigade of Company troops which his father had supported, and 3,700,000 rupees annually for a new Fathgarh, or "temporary," brigade that in the end became permanent. The subsidy payments, unpaid previous debts and upkeep on Asaf's forces under British officers had the Company
claiming more than half of the entire state's revenue by 1777, triple the burden during Shuja's reign. Of course, this was a paper assessment much of which the nawab evaded, and it was reduced by Hastings in 1784 and again by Cornwallis in 1787 as unrealistic. However, over assessment of the wazir's revenues caused the Company to blame his failure to pay the subsidy on extravagant personal expenditure, resulting in a reputation that persists today.

There is no doubt that Asaf was a generous prince. One hundred years after his death, the merchants of Lucknow still reverently recited a couplet attesting this fact when opening their shops in the morning: "who from Heaven nothing receives, to him Asaf-ud-Daula gives." His reign stands out as the height of luxury and culture at the court of Awadh, when it dazzled and amazed visitors from across India. Shuja-ud-Daula and his predecessors had concentrated on establishing themselves on the throne and on martial exploits, as most dynastic founders, including the early Mughals, were forced to do. As commonly occurred, later rulers turned their attention to the cultural reputation of their house; what Shah Jahan did for the memory of the Mughals, Asaf accomplished for his dynasty, transferring the cultural center of northern India from the Mughal court to his own. The tendency of most historians to portray Asaf's court as "buffoonish . . . devoted to amusements such as nautches and cock and elephant fighting" is a considerable distortion. Certainly such past-times were common at the Awadh court, as they were among the British in India in the same era, but, as Fisher has demonstrated, alongside these flourished the Persian and Arabic scholars, Urdu poets and numerous artists, musicians and performers whom the nawab patronized.

The prevalent British misunderstanding of Asaf's court may have come in part from the nawab's habit of giving them the type of entertainment he believed they preferred. An example is a carnival held on the banks of the Gumti in 1788 to which Asaf invited Edward Ives, then the Company's resident, and the British population of Lucknow. The nawab conducted his visitors to a terrace overlooking the water where they were seated at tables covered with white linen and flowers and lit with candles in green and white cut-glass shades. In front of them a cavalcade of beautifully decorated and illuminated boats drifted slowly down the river, while fireworks in the form of peacocks, tigers, flowers and bears illuminated the embankments. The evening's entertainment was largely in the form of circus-type acts, puppet shows, animal tricks and acrobats. The only intellectual offering was an elaborately staged play which Sophie Elizabeth Prosser, the British diarist who recorded the event, found dull since she could not understand it, although she did note the beauty of the costumes.

Prosser likewise attended a nautch while in Lucknow given by Haydar Beg Khan at which a number of court entertainers renowned for their singing ability participated. Although Lucknow was famous throughout India for the talent of its nautch performers, she thought them "ugly & some very fat & old" and did not enjoy the music, which sounded harsh to her Western ears. She was much more entertained by an elephant fight Asaf arranged which also featured mimes, one of whom did a hilarious impression of a monkey. Perhaps, as they staged such things for him, like the cockfight hosted in 1788 by Colonel Mordaunt of the Company's army, Asaf believed the British would best appreciate this type of entertainment. He was probably correct--in the 1780s and 1790s, men such as William Jones, John Shore and Edmonstone, who studied Indian history and were at least somewhat conversant with its literature, were still distinctly in the minority.
The outcome of one of the nawab's few attempts to involve his British visitors in a more meaningful court occasion illustrates this.

Lucknow exemplified its master's sophistication: by the end of his reign, Asaf might have paraphrased Augustus and bragged that he found it mud-brick and left it marble, or at least well-designed sandstone. It was a gracious city of palaces, mosques, gardens and the incomparable Imambara, which even his detractors had to admire. Built to celebrate the Shi'ite Moharram festival—commemorating the martyrdom of Hussain on the plains of Karbala—imambaras are religious theatres connected to mosques in which a play is enacted depicting the deaths of the three Imams—Ali, Hassan and Hussein. Asaf's version in Lucknow, visited by Prosser in 1788, was the impressive building that can still be seen in the modern city. Then it was "hung with blue cloth with devices in silver & gold bunting," and contained a turban said to have belonged to Hussein and twelve models of Shi'ite tombs cast in silver. Although impressed with the building's appearance, Prosser found the elaborate parade of flagellants and historical reenactments that took up the evening of her visit incomprehensible and tedious: she complained about how long they had taken and that she had caught a cold going home in a howdah at 2 A.M.

Perhaps sensing such reactions, Asaf usually offered his British visitors the kind of pastimes that their lack of Indian languages, history and literature would allow them to appreciate, and kept most of the poetry and music for which his court was renowned for his courtiers. This would explain why many of the parties and festivities to which the British were invited were exclusively for Europeans, with only token numbers of Awadh's courtiers present. The only Indians at the carnival described above, other than the entertainers, were Asaf himself, his eldest son, Vizier Ali, and Cassim, the son of one of the nawab's uncles. Likewise, the elephant fight was primarily intended for Asaf's British guests.

Asaf's taste was eclectic and, like his father and brother Sa'adat, he always expressed admiration for foreign as well as Indian schools of art. He acquired a collection of several thousand English prints, Chinese drawings and ornaments, European mirrors and clocks and "instruments and machines of every art and science" many of which he deposited in the Ina Khanah, which served as a museum of foreign art and design. He was occasionally mocked by visiting Europeans for such faux pas as placing a wooden cuckoo clock next to a "superb time-piece which cost the price of a diadem," but the wazir's was certainly not the only museum to group objects by type rather than cost, and he evidenced an appreciation for foreign objets d'art several decades before a similar craze came into vogue in Europe.

A fabulous court and an extensive art collection had a considerable price tag. To maintain his palaces required an army of 7,000 servants, the salaries of which, combined with other household expenses, amounted in 1784 to 21% of the gross revenues of Awadh for that year. He inherited from his father, who had kept a large menagerie, a love of animals: his stables contained 800 elephants, including one said to be the tallest in India, and a thousand "of the finest horses in the universe," according to Charles Madan, who remembered seeing an awe inspiring parade of them when he was in Lucknow as Cornwallis's aide-de-camp. They also housed the curiosity of an extremely over-weight English dray-horse which, renowned for its size, was so overfed that it could hardly walk. Additionally, Asaf had a magnificent jewelry collection, which he enjoyed showing off to visitors to his court: Prosser saw him wear two strings of pearls.
around his neck and a topaz the size of a pigeon's egg in his turban, and he showed her a diamond worth a lakh of rupees and a turban jewel of pearls and diamonds worth two lakhs. Asaf's gardens featured monkey, snake, scorpion and spider houses, all of which were expensive hobbies, and his hospitality was lavish: as a British visitor to his court recalled, "he sometimes gave a dinner to ten or twelve persons sitting at their ease in a carriage drawn by elephants." Probably his greatest single public display was the marriage of his eldest son and heir, Vizier Ali Khan, in 1793, when an English visitor fortunate enough to acquire an invitation left an account that reads like a passage from a fairy tale:

The Nawab had his tents pitched on the plains, near the city of Lucknow . . . we were received with great politeness by the Nawab, who conducted us to one of the largest tents . . . . His highness was covered in jewels, to the amount of at least two million sterling . . . . From thence we moved to the shumeeana [great tent] which was illuminated by two hundred elegant girandoles from Europe . . . . Above a hundred dancing-girls, richly dressed, went through their elegant but rather lascivious dances. About seven o'clock the bridegroom Vazeer Ally, the young nawab, made his appearance, so absurdly loaded with jewels that he could hardly stagger under the weight. . . . From the shumeeana we proceeded on elephants to an extensive and beautiful garden, about a mile distant. The procession was grand beyond conception; it consisted of above twelve hundred elephants richly caparisoned. . . . About a hundred elephants in the center had houdahs, or castles, covered with silver; in the midst of these appeared the nawab, mounted on an uncommonly large elephant, within a houdah covered with gold, richly set with precious stones. . . . On each side of the procession were dancing girls superbly dressed, on platforms supported and carried by bearers, who danced as we went along. . . . The ground from the tents to the garden, forming the road on which we moved was inlaid with fireworks; at every step of the elephants, the earth burst forth before us, and threw up artificial stars in the heavens. The total expense of the marriage, the festivities for which continued for three days, was estimated at £200,000.

Asaf's accusers use such stories as proof of his supposed profligacy, noting that he "squander[ed] every rupee he could extort from his ministers," neglected his army in order to embark on a life of debauchery, and was often so late in paying the allowances to his father's dependents that the women of Shuja's harem were known to raid the local bazaars in order to carry away grain and other necessities. Yet, a closer look at his finances reveals a different story. Other than for the subsidy, the wazir had only three areas in which he could cut expenses: personal expenditure, pensions to family members and retainers, and the army. In the first instance, he was no more extravagant than other rulers of his day, including his contemporary George III, who ruled over a country of equal size but annually spent twice as much on his court. Monarchs were expected, both in India and in Europe, to put on a lavish display--especially if they were trying to increase the prestige of their family, as Asaf was. In the early years of his reign it must also have been a consideration for him that, if he saved anything, it would go to the British and their seemingly bottomless subsidy, not to enrich himself or his kingdom. At least Asaf's expenditures encouraged trade and created employment; it was said that he had the Imambbara built partially to provide work for families during a time of famine in
Lucknow, and allowed the construction to continue at night so that members of the upper class who had been temporarily reduced to manual labor could retain their anonymity.\textsuperscript{115}

The difficulties to Shuja's harem from late payments of their pensions came early in Asaf's reign when the majority of his father's treasure was still in the hands of his mother. In later years, Asaf regularly paid the pensions due his extended family, although he economized as much as possible--especially in cases such as Sa'adat's, whose previous actions gave the nawab no reason to be generous--but family honor required that a certain standard be maintained. It must also be taken into consideration that the harem incident was recorded by Abu Talib, who had not prospered at Lucknow; in his later years he became a British partisan who advocated the assumption of Awadh's administration by the Company and Asaf's reduction to a figurehead, using his claims of the nawab's extravagance as justification.\textsuperscript{116}

The army bore the brunt of the wazir's efforts at economy; the Company encouraged this, as did the mutiny Asaf faced early in his reign, which gave him little reason to equate a strong military force with his protection. However, as has been argued, even had he spent as much on his armed forces as Shuja had done, it is unlikely that he could have used them to rid himself of the British without outside aid. Yet he nonetheless maintained an 80,000-man force, and, as will be seen in the next chapter, he persistently refused British advice to whittle it down to merely a token. He also kept it a distinct entity from the British forces, even in times of joint operation such as the Rohilla campaign when he insisted that Hasan Riza lead his cavalry rather than allowing it to fall under Major-General Robert Abercrombie's control.\textsuperscript{117}

Cherry and the anonymous writers in the Calcutta press complained that there was mass nepotism and embezzlement at the Awadh court, which Asaf did little or nothing to prevent.\textsuperscript{118} Certainly favored courtiers lived well: Hasan Riza was known for the richness of his dress, for giving away huge sums to the poor and for building religious edifices at Karbala during Mohurram.\textsuperscript{119} However, the charges of embezzlement arose from a single incident discussed in the next chapter, and were not the norm. The British also failed to take into account that allowing ministers and favorites to enrich themselves and provide court positions for their extended families was a favorite way for Asaf to insure loyalty. It was similar to his action, soon after coming to the throne, of distributing large gifts to his nobles to insure their support of his accession.\textsuperscript{120} Courtiers expected to profit from their positions in Awadh as they did in other Indian states, and their money, much of which was spent on luxury goods to maintain a high profile at court, enriched the merchants of Lucknow and attracted business to the city. Their lavish hospitality, too, often played a part in the nawab's campaign to keep on good terms with the British. Prosser recorded a sumptuous breakfast given to some of the British women in Lucknow by Hasan Riza as part of the celebrations for his daughter's marriage. After providing an excellent repast of mixed Indian and English dishes, the minister gave generous presents to his departing guests, including gold and enameled bottles of rose water, beautifully embroidered shawls, and necklaces of pearls with pendants of precious jewels.\textsuperscript{121} That afternoon, an elaborate nine-course dinner was also sent by him to the home of each of his guests.\textsuperscript{122}

Asaf likewise bestowed numerous presents on anyone whose good opinion it might be useful to have: he sent 60,000 rupees along with a letter of congratulation to George III on the king's recovery from a bout of madness,\textsuperscript{123} and offered Shore a present of 5 lakhs
and 8,000 gold mohurs for Lady Shore (which was declined). He also used his undoubted charm to great advantage. At the previously mentioned carnival, Asaf personally placed a necklace of yellow jasmine around the neck of Prosser's young daughter; at the cockfight given by Colonel Mordaunt, he asked her many questions about her children; and when she expressed an interest in a song, the words for which the nawab had composed, he immediately offered to have them translated and sent to her. If her experience can be assumed to be standard, it is no wonder that Asaf gained the reputation among the British for being "mild in manners, polite and affable in his conduct." The nawab used both his money and his charm to try to insure that only favorable reports of him made their way to Calcutta.

Cherry alleged to Edmonstone at the time of the Rohilla campaign: "the nawaub cannot either defend his own Territories without our Troops nor manage them without a progressive destruction tending to risk the resources from whence those troops are paid," and wondered "when [Asaf] wants our assistance [on the Rohilla issue] cannot plausible arguments be found to commence a negotiation with him on grounds for adjusting the nature of our interference and its extent?" He wanted Edmonstone to use his influence with Shore to persuade him to demand a share in Awadh's political affairs in return for British military help; Edmonstone demurred, however, commenting that "the measure you propose does not appear to me compatible with that already adopted by Sir John Shore nor to promise any advantage . . . for adjusting the nature and extent of our interference." Edmonstone knew better than to waste his time, and possibly damage his prestige, asking for the impossible; Shore was not in any way ready for such a step in 1794.

Cherry's claims that the wazir mismanaged his state were joined by the anonymous authors in the Calcutta press, who painted a picture of a devastated country tottering on the brink of ruin:

- emigration is frequent, cultivation has been on the decline for many years . . .
- prosperity is insecure, murders and robberies are daily committed, and pass unpunished, & even unnoticed. Ultimately, there is neither police, nor efficient government in his country, these facts . . . prove the necessity of the Company extending, without delay, their paternal care to the subjects of a friend and ally, whose prosperity is so intimately blended with our own.

Yet, the comments of a later British observer on the lands controlled by Asaf's chief noble, Almas Ali Khan, who acted as amil for most of the southeastern portion of the state, directly contradict the expansionist thesis: "he held for about forty years districts yielding to the Oudh Government an annual revenue of about . . . £800,000. During all this time he kept the people secure in life and property . . . and the whole country under his charge was, during his lifetime, a garden." Likewise, the extensive properties held by the begum were well managed, prosperous and peaceful. It is also undoubted that the annual revenue of Awadh increased greatly under Asaf's rule: from one crore and fifteen lakhs of rupees per year at the time of Shuja's death, it jumped to two crores and twenty lakhs by 1784-5 despite the cession of the Benares district to the Company, and to two crores sixty six lakhs in 1794, the latter increase partially due to the annexation of districts in Rohilkhand that year. It seems ridiculous to accuse a government of mismanagement which had, in less than twenty years, more than doubled its yearly revenues, fostered the rapid expansion of trade in the state, kept the peace and presided
over a cultural renaissance at court. The adverse comments make sense, however, in light of the Company's new concern for public relations in the post-Hastings' trial period. Cherry and the anonymous writers in the Calcutta press who alleged catastrophic problems in Awadh were using the concern stirred up by Burke for better government in India to excuse the Company's interference in a state where, in reality, there was nothing seriously wrong. Modern historians have, too often, taken the British comments at face value, exaggerating minor issues and overlooking the overall state of the country.

Asaf's reputation as a poor manager was primarily the result of the almost constant arrears in the subsidy, about which every resident and governor-general of his lifetime complained. Like the modern critics of Asaf's reign, they did not seem to realize that he had no motivation to pay any more to the Company than absolutely necessary to maintain the alliance, and that, from his perspective, it made more sense to appropriate funds earmarked for the British for projects that would be more useful to him or Awadh. Not surprisingly, he made no attempt to aid the Company during a short-lived experiment in the early 1780s in which the British tried to extract the money owed them by directly collecting it in Awadh, meeting widespread evasion, fraud, and even revolt in the process. Although C.A. Bayly contends that uprisings, such as the 1781 tax rebellion of Rajput landholders in the southern portion of the state, led to "damage to the power and credibility of Awadh," in reality they were useful to Asaf in that they made clear to the British that serious arrearages would continue to mount without his cooperation and support. After the British failure at direct collection, first Hastings and then Cornwallis decided to reassess their demands. Once repeated attempts to acquire back payments from Asaf had failed, Cornwallis realized that there was no way of acquiring the money from the nawab "in a mode satisfactory to him" and without extreme difficulty, resulting in his decision to write off much of the debt. In an effort to maintain a good relationship with him, the governor-general also reduced the subsidy payments to 50 lakhs of rupees per year, an amount which Asaf could and did pay regularly.

Cornwallis was strongly opposed to any interference in Awadh's government: his personal inclinations and those of the directors were against it, Hastings' trial was providing an example of the price the home government might exact for such action, and previous attempts to coerce the wazir had proven less than successful. He promised Asaf in 1787 that no resident would in future be allowed to interfere in the workings of his government; as he wrote to the directors, he thought it preferable to "bear deficiencies of no great importance on the part of his Excellency with a little Patience rather than attempt to renew the Species of Interference in the Details of his Government through the medium of our Resident which has been so judiciously reprobated by your Honble Court." Shore initially agreed, insuring that, from 1787 to 1794, Asaf enjoyed a decreased subsidy, continued Company aid on projects such as the Rohilla campaign, and British recognition of the autonomy he craved. For a time it seemed that Asaf had achieved more than his father with far less danger, using ingenuity to bring him what confrontation could not. His success was to be short-lived, however, a fact that would owe as much to the actions of Shore's eager young assistants as to changing circumstances in Europe and India.
In January 1796 Edmonstone took his second major trip beyond the familiar boundaries of Calcutta when he, Shore and John Collins began the long journey to Lucknow. Shore's first visit to Awadh would witness him take an important step away from the Company's doctrine of non-interference, owing to Asaf's changing attitudes, political factors at home and abroad, and the influence of his young assistants. The stage for the new act in British/Awadh relations was set on the road to Lucknow, where lasting impressions were made on the governor-general's party before they arrived at the capital or encountered its ruler.

Anyone traveling from Calcutta to Lucknow in those days had several months to contemplate their agenda as they slowly made their way across the 700 miles separating the cities. The journey usually began by water, with budgerows and pinnaces towed against the current of the Hugli and then the Ganges by sails or, in periods of calm, strings of Indian servants on the water's edge, who heaved the crafts along by cables thrown over their shoulders. The banks were lined by dense groves of coconut and mango trees, with occasional breaks from villas, huts, pagodas, and, further north, pastures framed against the distant mountains of Behar. The area from Buxar to Benares exhibited particularly stunning views, especially in February when huge fields of roses and poppies were in bloom, their flamboyant crimsons, oranges and pinks contrasting with the dark green mimosa and purple harebell of the region. The roses would be harvested to make the perfume that scented courts throughout India; the poppies had a darker purpose, supplying the opium that was quickly addicting an entire country through the Company's China trade.

For the most part, Edmonstone passed the journey pleasantly with the aid of "the beautiful scenes which a great part of the road exhibits, & . . . with my reading." Yet he and the other members of the party must have felt at least some of the unease expressed by Charles Madan, who had taken the same route a decade earlier with Cornwallis. After studying a map and realizing that the British flotilla was hundreds of miles from the sea in any direction, Madan noted that it was unsettling to think that, "our own little island would lose much, nay, would sink to nothing, by a comparison" with the "scale of this part of Asia." The boatmen's habit of drawing a circle around their campfires when the procession stopped at dark to prevent a European venturing too close to the preparations for their evening meal (which would be immediately thrown out if the circle was breached) did nothing to lessen the sense of being alien intruders into another world. Likewise the regular sights of large numbers of ash-covered, naked ascetics at Secrole
and Benares, with wildly matted hair and foot-long fingernails, rolling river mud and rice into small balls for sale as offerings to the Ganges.\textsuperscript{6}

Travel arrangements largely fell to Edmonstone as the only fluent Persian speaker of the group. Far away from other sources of advice and forced to communicate in a language with which he was less than proficient, Shore had to depend heavily on his young aide; as Neil commented to William, "I . . . am all day with the Gen. whos only assistant I am at present in everything but military matters."\textsuperscript{7} The latter was the responsibility of the diminutive Colonel Collins, a twenty year veteran of the Company's service who, although a somewhat ridiculous character in appearance--he favored the old-fashioned military coats and large, highly powdered wigs of another era--had intelligence and experience behind his shrewd black eyes.\textsuperscript{8} At Benares, where the British broke their journey for a week, Edmonstone complained of being "harassed by the black people & engaged in business & preparations from morning till night without intermission,"\textsuperscript{9} but in the end managed to arrange a \textit{dawk}, or series of bearers, to carry the party overland to Lucknow.\textsuperscript{10} This was necessary as, although Asaf's capital was on a river, the \textit{Gumti}, or "meander" in reference to its many twists and turns, only small vessels could navigate its shallows.

Meetings with many important Indians took up much of Shore's time during the interval at Benares, to which he expected Edmonstone to accompany him. His most significant state visit was no exception, as Shore recorded in a letter to his wife:

At half past two [on February 7] I proceeded in state, accompanied by Collins, George, and Edmonstone, to visit the Begum, or widow of the eldest son of the present King of Delhi . . . . These poor descendents of Imperial dignity maintain the forms of royalty: and we mutually acted parts inconsistent with our real characters; I, the representative of our power, professing humility and submission before the dependents on the bounty of the Company; whilst they . . . thought it incumbent to use the language of princes.\textsuperscript{11}

Although he went through the usual ceremony in which an inferior was arrayed in presents by his overlord--in this case a turban, sword and shield--and even good naturedly exchanged jackets with the princes, Shore could not overcome a "sense of the ridiculous character" he was acting.\textsuperscript{12} The meeting highlighted the fact that, if the governor-general viewed the Mughals as being of little consequence next to the power of the Company, Asaf, as their servant, was hardly likely to fare better.

Along with the feelings of alienation and superiority reinforced by the journey, the group also had many reminders of the wealth of the land beyond the Company's holdings. The road past Benares, which was cooled by winds blowing down from the mountains, wound through a richly cultivated area that Edmonstone believed was the "most luxuriant I ever beheld . . . . indeed [it] is an absolute garden. The cultivation of wheat & barley in that part of it which we have passed thro' is so great that scarcely a vacant spot was to be seen."\textsuperscript{13} As they neared Lucknow, the scene changed to a wilder country, with the road frequently bordered by jungle and overhung with vines from which the numerous monkeys of the region jabbered at passersby.\textsuperscript{14} The party paused briefly at Jaunpur, a city thirty-five miles from Benares that would play an important role in a future trip, although at the time it merely provided an opportunity for Edmonstone to sightsee. He enthusiastically wrote William that it was "a place well worth visiting, it was formerly a place of great note (or as the Irishman said, it was formerly a very ancient city)."\textsuperscript{15} He
duly admired the fort, towering on its hill above the surrounding forests of palm and
tamarind trees, and the impressive stone bridge (said to have been built by Akbar after he
found a woman weeping by the river because she had no money to pay the ferry) which
he described to William as similar in construction to the old London bridge. After
climbing 120 feet to the top of one of the local mosques, he could look out on an
"uncommonly beautiful" vista of verdant fields interspersed with ancient tombs, their
cupolas rising beside the Gumti as it flowed "as broad and clear as the Thames at
Richmond" towards Lucknow.

Asaf left his capital on February 7 to greet his guests, with the first meeting between
the two parties taking place February 15 near Jaunpur. It was merely an exchange of
pleasantries; as Shore informed his Council shortly thereafter, he preferred to acquire a
measure of the nawab's personality and to inform himself of the political situation in
Awadh before talking politics. Meanwhile, the two groups traveled together to
Lucknow. The city extended along the south side of the Gumti, surrounded by extensive
gardens of orange trees, poppies, marigolds and blue larkspur laid out as part of Asaf's
beautification scheme. Much of it was built on cliffs overlooking the river, with its most
obvious point when seen from a distance the large mosque attached to the Imambara. As a poetic observer approaching the city would later note, its "multitude of mosques,
with their gilt spires and towering minars, give it an air of splendour to be only increased
by a mid-day sun, reflecting them as masses of living gold."

Considerable changes had taken place in Lucknow since the early years of Asaf's
reign. Madan recorded in 1784 that it was "a large, dirty city with narrow streets, form'd
chiefly of mud houses" and that his party's accommodations were "in the center of a nasty
Bazar." Edmonstone's experience was quite different: he noted that Asaf allotted the
delegation a town house adjacent to the palace which was enclosed by a large courtyard
filled with plants and fountains. The opulence of their surroundings at court was
impressive: a contemporary account described Asaf's palace, the Daulat Khana, as
consisting of six principal courts, with the main entrance through two "lofty gateways"
over the first of which an orchestra played martial music in the morning and evening.
A grand hall surrounded by a double arcade fronted a long flower garden, divided into
parterres with fountains, which led to yet another garden around which the state
apartments were situated. The accommodations provided the British were not only
attractive, but gave them regular access to the wazir and put them in close proximity to
the Residency, which was also attached to the palace. Edmonstone, Shore and Collins
usually spent mornings in their town dwelling, but returned to dine and sleep at several
"extremely elegant & commodious" country houses, built in the European fashion, which
Asaf had provided for them about a mile and a half outside the city.

Edmonstone's opinion of the capital, which resembled a construction zone as Asaf's
own building projects joined those of the many merchants attracted to the new
commercial center, was varied. He complained to William that

"I cannot imagine myself in a more vile country than that about Lucknow. The
whole of the Vizier's country thro' which we passed is beautiful excepting within a
few coss [about four miles] of Lucknow & one would think . . . that he has pitched
upon the most disagreeable spot in the whole for his residence."

Yet he described the palace as "very pretty, very extensive & neat & clean in the highest
degree," and the Imambara as "grand & splendid beyond description." His luxurious
surroundings and an increased dignity of office soon gave Edmonstone a heightened sense of self-worth. As he would later recall, many envoys from other states accompanied the governor-general to Awadh and added their daily petitions to those of the officials already in Lucknow. With Shore preoccupied with his negotiations, it was largely left to Edmonstone to meet on a regular basis with the cream of the Indian nobility. He remarked to William that he "thought it proper to have a pretty large retinue & I have consequently entertained 3 chobdurs & 6 hircarrahs besides my own 3 who arrived three days ago."  

The type of servants Edmonstone added to his retinue is instructive. The harkaras, or messengers, might be explained away as a necessity for communicating with the large number of diplomats and courtiers wanting to arrange meetings, but chobdars were another matter. Literally "one who commands silence," a chobdar was an attendant on a prince or other important individual who served as a symbol of his rank and kept order in his household. Preceding their employer wherever he went, they carried five-foot-high silver staffs similar to the fasces Roman lictors once bore before a consul; the more chobdars in attendance upon a person, the higher his status was presumed to be. Edmonstone lamented to William that it would probably be impossible to "charge Govt. . . with the whole expense of them, as they may not be considered strictly necessary." However, at a court known for the high lifestyle of its officials--Haydar Beg's dining and entertainment expenses alone were said, probably erroneously, to reach a half million rupees annually--he felt that efforts were needed to uphold British dignity. No longer the hesitant young diplomat of the Hyderabad mission, Edmonstone had become a force to be reckoned with, preceded by three chobdars--a number worthy of a prince.

Edmonstone was adding to his stature in more than his official position. While in Lucknow, he received letters from home, including one from his father who was "irrecoverably hurt," at the news that William had again been passed over for promotion to the Board of Trade, an important and lucrative position for which he had long been eligible. Soon thereafter Edmonstone informed William that Sir Archibald had persuaded Henry Dundas to write in favor of his son's cause, and that Edmonstone had spoken to Shore himself about it and felt confident that, as long as it remained in the governor-general's gift, the next vacancy on the board would be William's. His only fear, he told his brother, "is that a vacancy may not occur during Sir J. Shore's govt. but I shall not scruple to request him to bequeath the recommendation . . . to his successor." Shore's young aide was discovering that his superior was more easily influenced when isolated from the many other voices offering counsel in Calcutta.

Where Asaf was concerned, Shore's attitude quickly came to parallel that of his aide and of other Europeans with whom the nawab had contact. A visitor to Lucknow early in the reign remarked that the wazir "possessed no great mental powers, [but] his heart was good," and left the memorable image of him sitting in the midst of the precious jewels of his treasury, "handling them as a child does his toys." Edmonstone likewise commented that "there is scarcely an European house that does not belong to the Vizier who like a child, the instant he sees anything new is miserable till he gets possession of it & with possession ends the pleasure & the use of it." Shore echoed the sentiment, recounting in a letter a story someone had told him as an example of the nawab's temperament: a few years ago, an Englishman, for his Excellency's amusement, introduced the elegant European diversion of a race in sacks by old women: the Nabob was
delighted beyond measure, and declared that although he had spent a crore of rupees, or a million sterling, in procuring entertainment, he had never found one so pleasing to him. So much for the amusements of sovereignty! Yet he also noted that Asaf's "disposition is naturally good" and believed that he would do well if not for being influenced by "bad advisors, mean associates, and absolute power; which, however, he does not exercise cruelly." This had also been Cornwallis's view; he had commented that Asaf "is apt to suffer his conduct to be influenced by very undeserving People with whom he sometimes associates." On the contrary, a closer look at the wazir's actions shows that Asaf's genial, dim-witted and easily influenced persona masked a shrewd intellect fully capable of manipulating the British authorities. An excellent example of this would be the conflict between the nawab and Cherry that immediately preceded Shore's visit to Awadh, and indeed provided one of his reasons for making the journey.

Cherry, only 32 when he attained the coveted position of resident at Lucknow after a meteoric rise in the Company's service, had assumed his new position with high hopes of justifying his mentors' confidence in him. As he enthusiastically informed Cornwallis:

Sir John Shore has honored me with his approbation. He says that he leaves his reputation in my Hands. The deposit, my Lord, is great and valuable, but in proportion, it stimulates my zeal, and united with an earnest desire to answer your Lordship's Prognostication of me, is the greatest Inducement that can be held out for the Exercise of every possible Exertion.

Cherry had been sent to Awadh with one main point on his agenda--to cut Asaf's expenses and insure that the Company's subsidy payments, which had once again fallen into arrears, were promptly made. The governor-general had Cherry sit in on three conferences he held with Hasan Riza, Asaf's chief minister, and Tikayt Ray, the nawab's finance minister and Hasan's deputy after Hyder Beg's death in 1792, during their visit to Calcutta for Shore's accession. Ray duly promised to devote himself to the cause of financial reform on his return to Lucknow, and to take a letter written by Cornwallis to the nawab outlining a plan for the better economic regulation of the country. Cherry was sent along to report on the minister's progress and to push the matter of reform whenever possible. He threw himself into the work managing, in a little over a year, to persuade Asaf to reduce the size of his menageries and to cut down on his kitchen staff, which saved him 14 lakhs annually; to get a full account of the nawab's debts from Ray; and to abolish the government's habit of borrowing money at high interest rates, often from Europeans, to pay existing debts and thus end by incurring greater ones. Shore was pleased with Cherry's work and his initially favorable reports of the wazir, commenting to the directors in August 1795 that Asaf "has evinced a disposition for reforming his administration which I shall never cease to promote by every effort on my part." At the same time, Cherry proudly informed Cornwallis that "the Business [of reforming Asaf's finances] is seriously in hand."

As early as 1794, it was clear that Cherry had higher ambitions than merely the payment of the subsidy, as evidenced by his attempt to persuade Shore to make British help in the Rohillah matter conditional on Asaf's agreement to give him a share in government. Once the Rohillah campaign ended, Cherry began to realize that his early optimism had been misplaced; it became an uphill battle simply to acquire the subsidy, much less to implement more grandiose plans. Despite Asaf's assurances that he was
"resolved on making great reductions in the expenses of his Government," little was actually being done. Shore attempted to assist, writing first to Tikayt Ray, complaining that he had failed to implement more than "temporary measures and expedients without offering or suggesting some plan of permanent arrangements" for improving the nawab's finances, and then to the wazir, informing him that Cherry had his "fullest confidence," and that he hoped Asaf would give "attention to his representations and advice... and that you will consider Mr. Cherry as the only channel of communication of my sentiments." Yet Shore's letters also produced no apparent result, causing Cherry, after a year's residence in Asaf's capital, to take the bold step of meeting with the nawab directly, rather than through a minister, to lecture him about his finances. At one such meeting he informed Asaf in very plain terms that "the Incumbrance in his Affairs demanded an immediate and effectual reform" and if he were unable to bring it about himself, he should turn over the control of his pecuniary affairs completely to the British. As usual, the nawab was affability itself, surprising Cherry when, despite the unpleasant nature of many of the resident's statements, he left in what appeared to be good humor; but again, no tangible changes resulted from such meetings.

Cherry made little headway because, incapable of seeing things from the wazir's viewpoint, he overlooked the real financial issues in Awadh. Firstly, the subsidy, which amounted to a fourth of the state's revenues every year, was too high to allow Asaf to regularly pay it, meet his other commitments, and still support his own armed forces--unless he lived as a pauper, which he had no intention of doing. Cherry complained to Edmonstone that the nawab's army was too large, and cited it as an important cause of the deficit in the Company's payments. Likewise, the directors blithely instructed Shore to have the nawab disband "his own useless cavalry" and apply the money to defraying part of the Company's decision to raise two additional regiments. Shore would later with equal insouciance inform the wazir that he should place the fortress of Allahabad, the strongest in Awadh, under the Company's command, as "your Excellency cannot entertain a doubt of the superior military skills of the English arms after the Proof exhibited by them in favor of your respected Father and yourself." The reference to Shuja could, of course, evoke memories of Buxar as easily as more recent campaigns when the two states had fought as allies, although it is doubtful that Asaf needed a reminder after his turbulent early career that today's friends may be tomorrow's enemies. Considering the strength of Awadh's army at the end of Shuja's reign--when British officers in the state reported that the nawab's forces consisted of 17 battalions of well-trained sepoys and 30,000 cavalry, carried the latest matchlock rifles and had canon equal to that of the Company in quality--it is difficult to give full credence to stories of the army's complete decrepitude just a few decades later. It seems that the anonymous writers in the Calcutta press, who feared that Awadh's forces were too strong rather than too weak, had been nearer the mark, and Asaf intended to keep it that way.

On both previous occasions when the subsidy had fallen into serious arrears, the governor-general of the time had responded by greatly decreasing Awadh's assessment. It seems at least possible that Asaf, having achieved a reduced subsidy from Hastings and Cornwallis by evidencing an inability to keep up his payments, was attempting to force a similar concession from Shore, whose character was universally reported to be much milder than that of either of his predecessors. The Fathegar brigade, which was responsible for more than half the subsidy had, after all, initially been proposed to Asaf
as a temporary measure; it would be understandable if, seventeen years after its inception, he was becoming suspicious that it had become a permanent drain on his finances and, after an earlier request to have it disbanded was refused,\textsuperscript{61} was using other means to acquire relief from Shore.

Not surprisingly, then, the arrears continued to increase despite Cherry's best efforts, providing him with the spectacle of failure for the first time in his career. The zealous young resident did not intend to give in, however, and set himself to discover why he and previous Company representatives had so little success exerting significant control over Asaf's actions despite the strength of the Company's position and the wazir's supposedly malleable character. He was soon convinced that he had found it in the underlying power structure of Awadh. As he informed Cornwallis, both the previous British residents and the nawab himself had been merely the tools of the wazir's unscrupulous ministers, who used tales of the Company's ambition to make the nawab suspicious of the residents' advice, and stories of Asaf's supposed extravagance to keep the residents convinced that he was the cause of the financial problems in Awadh, while they appropriated great amounts of the country's revenues for themselves.\textsuperscript{62} He was encouraged in this belief by Abu Talib, who had been denied advancement at court by Tikayt Ray, who he assured Cherry "had neither presence nor ability, and was, moreover, excessively fond of boys . . . [and] was guilty of great excesses in grants of villages, land, daily stipends to Brahmins, and in bestowing gifts, and monthly allowances of thousands of rupees upon these young lads."\textsuperscript{63} Asaf, too, was fond of blaming his financial situation on his ministers whenever challenged, although his disinterest in replacing them belied his words. As Edmonstone noted to Cherry, "it is a maxim you know in all Governments, ostensibly to throw the blame of wrong measures or neglect in adopting right ones upon the ministers of state."\textsuperscript{64} Cherry was nonetheless convinced that Asaf's ministers were the real source of power at court and were thus to blame for the arrearages; he therefore made the seemingly logical conclusion that to gain control of ministers would give him effective control of Awadh. As he informed Cornwallis, "if the Nawaub was the tool of a Minister . . . I was sensible that victory [over him] would place the Company where the Minister stands . . . the Prize was the command of the Nawaub."\textsuperscript{65}

Tikayt Ray had been admonished repeatedly by Shore about his failure to reform Awadh's finances; he had replied that the expenses of the Rohillah campaign and the nawab's expenditure had made it impossible for him to immediately effect the change that Shore hoped to see, but assured him that "by Degrees the excess of expenses and of Debts may be provided for."\textsuperscript{66} Talib, however, told Cherry that "all Tickait Rai wanted was that thirty or forty lakhs of rupees should be cut off the Wazir's and his servants' expenditure and devoted to the payment of the yearly interest, and was quite regardless of the waste by his own protégés and his personal prodigality."\textsuperscript{67} Cherry decided to try to create a breach between the wazir and his minister, allowing him to arrange a new system of administration more to the Company's advantage. As he glibly informed Cornwallis:

I mean to endeavour at establishing three grand Offices of the State; one to superintend the Revenue Department, one to manage the Disbursements, and the third to regulate the Army. The system of one minister is abolished. The Nawaub [is] to have the supreme command [but will] be checked by the ruling passions of his Heart, vanity and a love of money. . . . It will be evident to your Lordship that in such a system, the Company must exercise a powerful Control.\textsuperscript{68}
Talib agreed that creating a breach between Ray and Asaf would force the former to support the English interests at court, but he warned the resident that trying to make Asaf a puppet prince was a mistake. Cherry optimistically responded, "the Marhattas are notorious for their craft and cunning, and I have managed them. I must be left to deal with these who are nothing to them, and see what the results will be." Informing Cornwallis that he was "sanguine in my expectations of success . . . [in] recover[ing] the Influence so long lost in this Durbar," Cherry began his gamble to gain for the British absolute authority in Awadh.

Cherry could have used several men as the puppet ministers in his scheme, all of whom would play important parts in the years to come in British/Awadh relations. The first of these was Tafazul Hussein Khan, who, although from a Shi'ite family and having held the post of Asaf's vakil in Calcutta since 1788, had long been a British partisan. Coming from a family who had a record of service with the Mughals for three generations, he had attached himself to Shuja's court and become tutor to the young Sa'adat Ali. He left Sa'adat's service after the abortive coup of 1778 and went to Calcutta where he soon gained employment with Hastings, who appointed him an assistant on several British diplomatic missions. On one of these, he traveled with David Anderson to Sindhia's camp. Although his primary duty was to write elegant Persian letters of introduction for the delegation, he also spent time learning English from Anderson and eventually became fluent. He was thereafter a well-known member of Calcutta society, admired by the English for his erudition--he was interested in math and astronomy, read English well in addition to some Latin and Greek, and translated Newton's *Principia* and several mathematical works into Arabic--and because of his friendship with many Company officials, including Sir William Jones, Shore and Edmonstone. He became such an Anglophile that at one time he even contemplated returning to England with Shore. Edmonstone was especially impressed with him, remarking that, "for general knowledge, acuteness of understanding, learning, deep penetration, politeness of manners Eloquence & dignity of conduct I never met with his equal & to these qualifications I sincerely believe that he adds those of honor & integrity."

Asaf had probably chosen Tafazul as his liason with the British because he recognized the affinity between the two, and hoped to use it to his advantage. His vakil did make attempts to render his master good service, remonstrating with Shore, for instance, for having allowed "disrespectful and improper" remarks about Asaf to appear in the Calcutta press and reminding him that the wazir was careful about his dignity and considered himself "in every respect as one with the English sirdars." However, he also had regular, secret meetings with Edmonstone which the translator went out of his way to insure had no witnesses. The topics discussed ranged from events at the Awadh court to the conduct of the nawab and various of his ministers, and often resulted in Tafazul writing letters to Asaf to try and influence his actions along lines favored by the British. The wazir's vakil was also in the habit of keeping from Asaf’s ministers his knowledge of complaints soon to come from the Company, thus denying them the advantage of extra time in which to frame a reply, and he regularly shared the correspondence he received from Tickayt Ray with Edmonstone. Needless to say, the British viewed him as the perfect choice for Asaf's minister, but Tafazul, under no illusions as to the difficulty of
controlling the nawab, preferred his much easier assignment in Calcutta. His close associate, Raja Bachhraj, acted as his informant at Asaf's court to whom he sent news of occurrences in Calcutta with the caution that Bachhraj was to discuss them with Cherry before relaying any information to Ray.\textsuperscript{81}

Another obvious choice because of his stature in Awadh was Almas Ali Khan, the most powerful noble in the state whose memory was still alive in the 1850s when a British visitor remembered him as "the greatest and best man of any note that Oudh has produced."\textsuperscript{82} A less generous account described him in 1800 as "a venerable old woman-like being, upwards of eighty, full six feet high, and stout in proportion."\textsuperscript{83} He held the position of amil\textsuperscript{84} of most of the southeast portion of Awadh, exercising near sovereign powers in his area. However, the British were unsure of Almas' devotion to their cause, and would always view him with some suspicion.

Cherry's attack on Ray seemed at first to go as planned: he accused him to the wazir of embezzlement, Asaf indignantly dismissed him from office, Ray aligned with the British, viewing them as his only chance of regaining his position, and Hasan Reza soon followed suit because he believed his best chance of retaining power to be an alliance with Cherry. Yet, according to Bahadur Singh, a Brahmin from Lahore employed by the nawabs of Awadh who left a history of Asaf's reign, things were not quite as they appeared. Singh stated that Asaf had been irritated with Ray long before Cherry made his indictment, owing to the fact that, after Haydar Beg's death, the minister had given high government positions to his relatives and friends for which many of them were unqualified. Asaf had been inundated with complaints that Ray's protégés had become so jealous of each other that they could barely stand to be in the same room, and that their animosity was interfering in the operation of their departments; accusations of embezzlement and extortion were also being made of them.\textsuperscript{85} Cherry does not appear to have understood the situation, although he noticed that the nawab was upset with Ray for some unknown reason as early as June 1795.\textsuperscript{86} Asaf was lenient with his ministers, but there were limits to what he would tolerate and Ray had overstepped them. It seems likely that the nawab used Cherry's accusation as an excuse to get rid of a minister who no longer pleased him; Asaf may have pretended to Cherry that Ray was dismissed as a sign of his trust in British advice, thereby using the necessary dismissal as an opportunity to also gain British goodwill. It is almost certain that Asaf suspected Cherry's real intent in requesting Ray's removal, and his actions when the resident finally submitted his official proposal for a restructuring of the government of Awadh, in May 1796, indicate that he was more than prepared for it.

In the proposition given to the wazir, a copy of which was conveyed to Shore, the resident called for the severe reduction of Awadh's army with the remnant placed under the command of Hasan Riza; Ray, whom Cherry had previously depicted as a wicked embezzler, was now referred to as "among the oldest adherents of his Excellency's family," and was to control the finance department; either Asaf himself or Bachhraj was to oversee the Treasury.\textsuperscript{87} Cherry was probably gambling that Asaf's dislike for the day-to-day workings of government would insure that Bachhraj would complete the triumvirate of British-controlled ministers in the most important offices of Awadh. He did not realize that his attempt to dramatically increase British influence offered Asaf an opportunity to make a play for complete autonomy--an opportunity he was quick to seize.
The nawab's response to Cherry's plan was to bypass all ministers who had any relationship with the British: he refused to reinstate Ray, pointing out to Cherry that the resident's claims of having found no discrepancies after examining three years of Ray's accounts was irrelevant: "how can the suspicion of Tickait Rai's dishonesty, which you had said was proved, be removed by these false documents of his and your cursory examination of them?" Asaf then used a time-honored method for getting rid of an inconvenient minister by sending Hasan Riza on a pilgrimage to Mecca, and he simply ignored Bachhraj. He thereafter calmly informed the flabbergasted Cherry that he intended to have no minister in future, but to attend to the state's affairs himself with the assistance of his favorite, Jhou Lal. Lal, although a Saksena Kashastrya from an unimportant family, had won Asaf's favor by adopting Muslim dress and prayers and observing the Ramadan fast; more importantly, he provided his master with excellent service, at one time working for five days in monsoon rains to complete a bridge so that Asaf could continue a journey. He was also openly anti-British, and had been briefly disgraced early in the reign for cursing the presence of British officers at court. By 1796, however, Asaf had made him honorary maharaja, general, commander-in-chief and paymaster of the army, as well as giving him many duties in the financial department.

The idea of someone not only devoted to Asaf but also with known enmity for the Company as minister in all but name was intolerable to Cherry, who had believed himself on the brink of success. Circumstances worsened from the resident's perspective when the nawab put two of his sons in the place of his dismissed courtiers: Vizier Ali, Asaf's fifteen-year-old eldest son, was given charge of the finance department, while Raza Ali, at age twelve, took on the important office of bakhshigari, or paymaster of the troops. Basu maintains that the ages of the boys guaranteed that they would be little more than pawns of Lal, but how better for Asaf to insure the loyalty of his senior ministers than to place his own children in the positions? At age fifteen, Vizier Ali was certainly old enough to begin training as his father's successor, and who else should instruct him than someone whose loyalty to Asaf was guaranteed by his being wholly dependant on him for his position? The new administration meant the virtual annihilation of British control at Asaf's court, a fact understood quite clearly by Cherry. As he dejectedly wrote to Shore: Those hopes I once entertained, and have with perseverance encouraged . . . exist no longer[;] . . . the constant advice given to his Excellency by JouLal as far as I can ascertain it, rests on hopes of not only a change in the Residency here, but also in the Government of Ft. William, and on pursuing a line of conduct that shall keep matters in suspense, until these changes are effected[;] . . . [he intends] to press the argument of noninterference in the affairs of Oude . . . and to resist with the utmost force, all connection with the English Government, except the regular payment of the subsidy.

Edmonstone had long been counseling his friend to be careful of his treatment of Asaf, as it would do no good to "make use of the language of reproach or reprimand which may probably have the effect of irritating or disgusting him when it is so essential an object to keep him in good humour with this Government." Yet the continued failure of Cherry's attempts to coerce the wazir hardened Edmonstone's attitude, causing him to remark: I have read your report upon your interview with the Vizier . . . should this display of the alarming state of his affairs fail to inspire the Vizier with a resolution to reform them I should suppose he must be alarmed in a different manner. I presume we ought
Cherry, whose fear of failure was by now acute, may have taken the advice a bit too much to heart; by the spring of 1796 his actions were becoming desperate. He ignored a report from his secretary who had had a spontaneous conversation with the nawab while they waited for a knife to be brought to open one of Cherry's regular, complaining letters. The wazir made it clear that money was not at the heart of his struggle with the resident: "I am from my heart ready to pay the Company's Kists. I have empowered the Resident to investigate and ascertain the Debts due by my Government, whatever he decides upon I will pay to the last Anna." He insisted, however, that money, not sovereignty, was all the Company could expect, commenting dramatically that Cherry could either leave him alone to control his government or let him go "unattended to Calcutta; give me a bit of Bread and a little Water and make which of my brothers you please the Master." In other words, if the resident was going to rule in Awadh, he would have to remove Asaf first, something the wazir knew Cherry was in no position to do. Cherry's secretary reported that "his Excellency was in a humour and anger that exceeds any thing I ever saw in him." Cherry refused to heed the warning obvious in Asaf's attitude, instead declaring in open court, in front of "a large concourse of the Relations and dependents of the Vizier" that he could not lend his support to Lal, would no longer attend the durbar if he were present, and had sent for four battalions from Kanpur to protect himself and the other European inhabitants of Lucknow from his enmity.

The wazir responded by firing off a letter to Shore charging that Cherry had disregarded Asaf's "hate of Servitude and Subordination" and had written "repeated letters, conceived in the most exaggerated and importunate terms, delivered them to me with his own hands, and read them himself in my presence" employing such harsh language that it could only have been "calculated to disgrace and lower me in the eyes of all ranks of people." Asaf expressed concern about "what calumnies (God only knows) he might write to you against me," and informed Shore that Cherry had attempted the overthrow of his independence and tried to bring about his utter disgrace. Shore, horrified at the open breach between the Company and the nawab that Cherry's actions had caused, rebuked him, reminding him that the wazir's independence had "the support of a Treaty and although we are by the nature of our Connection authorized to advise and remonstrate with him[;] . . . we have no claim but what is founded on his application and acquiescence." He also wrote, too late, absolutely prohibiting Cherry's action of summoning British troops to Asaf's capital, wondering what could possibly "justify . . . a step of this Nature so pregnant with the most ruinous consequences"? At the same time, he assured the nawab that "it has ever been my primary wish that your Excellency should yourself undertake the controul of your own administration that the efforts of this Government should be employed to assist not to direct the conduct of your affairs." Shore hoped that the breach between Cherry and the wazir could be healed eventually, but Asaf soon made it clear that he had no intention of having further dealings with him. Employing a favorite device for avoiding annoying residents, Asaf commented to Shore in May that "I set out with much satisfaction . . . on a Hunting excursion towards Briatch leaving Mr. Cherry at Lucknow." Cherry considered the British to have lost their best chance for controlling the nawab because Shore had refused to support him, writing bitterly to Cornwallis that, "a
temporary suspension of Cordiality [between him and Asaf] took place, which, with the most trifling support of the Governor General I should have re-established, but which, under a reprimand, it was impossible to recover. 

Shore saw things more clearly and, in the hope of healing the breach, moved the aggrieved Cherry to a judgeship at Benares. Cherry had seemingly failed in his mission, yet the situation he had helped to bring about in Awadh was soon to force Shore into more open opposition to the wazir than he had previously dared to show.

Edmonstone did not lose his connection with the Awadh court at Cherry's removal, for the new British resident, James Lumsden, was also his close friend; indeed, Lumsden traveled to Lucknow with his wife and her sister Charlotte Friell. Lumsden was a good choice on Shore's part to ameliorate the nawab for, although he shared Edmonstone's and Cherry's imperialistic views, he was much less forceful in manner. A contemporary portrait of him shows a pleasant looking young man with soft brown eyes, brown hair cut in bangs that almost meet his thick eyebrows, and a rather large nose. He looks quiet and unassuming, and apparently his personality echoed his appearance. Asaf had written Shore that he hoped his new resident would "fulfill those general observances which are proper and becoming in conduct," and Lumsden apparently passed the test with ease; less than a month later Asaf was delightedly informing Shore that he "has all the qualities of extreme politeness, penetration, wisdom, goodness and abilities." Apparently the wazir had had time to discover what would soon be obvious to Shore--Lumsden, although unlikely to give offence to Asaf, would also never be able to influence his conduct. Asaf had achieved almost complete autonomy, and it soon became obvious that he intended to keep it.

There was a chance that the wazir might succeed in negating British influence in Awadh for his lifetime, as the directors were not willing to risk the subsidy for the imperialist ambitions of some of their employees. However, the timing was wrong, with political circumstances in Europe and India working against Asaf. Concerned about the renewed Anglo-French antagonism in Europe possibly reopening old rivalries in India, the directors instructed Shore to obtain an augmentation to the subsidy in order to increase the Company's army, and informed him, "we deem it your indispensable duty to interfere [in Awadh] whenever it shall be deemed necessary." Shore, who was due to return to England shortly to enjoy the benefits of a long career in India, was thus relieved from any worry he may have had about his actions annoying the people shortly to be determining his pension. However, the directors made it clear that the interference to which they referred should be in the form of "advice . . . [and] remonstrance," thus presenting the governor-general with a considerable dilemma. It was difficult enough to imagine a scenario in which he might persuade Asaf to augment a subsidy which he was already protesting was too high and which, when the proposal was made to him by letters delivered through Lumsden, he had already "peremptorily refused." When Shore was also cautioned to use nothing but words to accomplish the feat, it seemed even more unlikely, especially if, as Cherry had noted, Jhou Lal was telling Asaf to temporize and wait for a change in the government of Calcutta. Shore's answer to the problem was, first, to make a journey to Lucknow himself to negotiate with the wazir, counting on the prestige of his office to add weight to his words, and second, to play up the danger of invasion as much as possible to provide him an excuse for the enlargement of the Company's forces in Awadh.
On the latter point, he was able to take advantage of the incursion of Zeman Shah, the Afghan ruler, into the Punjab for his favorite occupation of sacking Lahore. The excuse was somewhat weakened by the shah's inconvenient return to Afghanistan while Shore was actually en route to Lucknow, and by reports Shore received that made it seem unlikely that he had any intention of returning there the following year, but he could still use the incident as an example to Asaf of the need for constant vigilance. As he noted, "on my part nothing shall be wanting, on yours I expect the same, and it is incumbent upon us both to sacrifice every personal consideration, to our mutual security." Shore also wanted Asaf to acquiesce to British troops garrisoning the Allahabad fortress. Described by a contemporary witness as "built by Akbar, Jehangir, and Shah Jehan . . . proudly situated at the confluence of the Ganges and Jumna . . . [its] expensive gates and other costly workmanship, rather indicates the elegant enclosure of a palace than a strong . . . fortification." Yet it was a fortress, and one of the most strategically placed in northern India. In any contest with the French, it would certainly be a prize, but Shore found Asaf adamantly against ceding it despite the governor-general's promise that "the British troops shall be ordered to withdraw from Allahabad, the moment the danger which calls them there is over." Because the danger was, in fact, removed before Shore was able to reach Lucknow, his inability to convince Asaf to relinquish the fortress is understandable.

Whereas Shore's primary interest was the increase of the subsidy, Edmonstone's was focused on removing another powerful Indian from a position of authority. In the case of Ghulam Mohammed, Edmonstone had only suspected his enmity towards the British, whereas in the case of Jhou Lal he was certain of it, and his fear of the man's influence was consequently greater. He described him to William as that arch villain whom you must have heard of . . . a wretch of the lowest origin uneducated unprincipled, without sense or ability & only happy in a cunning policy which taught him to soothe and flatter his master with a success that left the reigns of Govt. in his hands or should I say the whip, with which he scourged the people to enrich himself & reduce the country to ruin. Edmonstone was especially concerned because, from his perspective, the lessening of British influence in Awadh could not have come at a worse time. As the conduit through which all correspondence from the Indian states was relayed to the Company's government, Edmonstone was apprised of political occurrences throughout India. He had been watching the situation in the Deccan for some time with uneasy eyes, as the nizam and the Marathas edged closer to open war. He envisioned a nightmare scenario in which the Marathas absorbed the nizam's dominions into their confederation, and then used the extra resources and manpower to ally with Tipu against the Company. He was already certain in 1795 of "the expediency of Strengthening our standing army . . . our Security does not I am convinced depend upon our System of pacification and neutrality. It depends upon our power to resist the efforts that may be made to disturb our tranquility."

Calcutta had begun to resemble in Edmonstone's mind an outpost set in a sea of mighty and antagonistic powers, all of which were eyeing it with acquisitive eyes. Hyderabad had set in motion a change in Edmonstone's perceptions that events in Awadh would complete, starting him down a road of uneasiness and fear from which he would never be able to completely back away. Jhou Lal embodied that fear for him as long as
he stood in the way of the increase of the British forces. As Edmonstone wrote to
William from Jaunpur, the return of Zeman Shah to Afghanistan did not lessen "the
necessity . . . for the Gov. Genl's meeting with the Vizier . . . & I think it particularly
fortunate for us that he has been enabled at this time to effect it. The task he has to go
through is difficult but his point must be carried." Shore, who frequently suffered from
illnesses, was in particularly poor health in Lucknow. As Edmonstone recorded, "he has
a fever every night & a headache almost constant & a general depression upon him." Under
the circumstances, the ardor for the British cause expressed by his young assistant
must have played an important part in keeping him focused on the issues at hand.

Shore agreed with Edmonstone's assessment of the wazir's favorite, and worked from
the beginning of his trip to persuade Asaf to agree to Lal's banishment. He was
particularly concerned to discover that, unlike previous ministers who had questioned
Asaf's orders at times, Lal had "no other rule of conduct than the gratification of his
Master." The nawab did not help matters by agreeing that he "inspected, superintended
and directed the whole [administration] himself, that Jao Loll was nobody . . . and
nothing more than the Channel of Communicating Representations to him, and his orders
upon them." Shore did not find Asaf's proclamations of independence reassuring, and
professed to believe that Lal rather than the nawab actually controlled the government.
If this had actually reflected his opinion, however, he would have been satisfied if the
anti-British Lal was banished, as Asaf finally, reluctantly, agreed to do; but Shore also
informed him that, although "it was my ardent wish that he should ever preserve the
control [of his state] in his own Hands . . . the Details required a Degree of
Superintendence which he neither did nor could exercise." Unlike Aniruddha Ray
maintains, the last thing Shore wanted was for "the existing system [in Awadh to be]
changed from within by the Nawab"; instead, Asaf was to have a minister to manage
the state for him, and, although Shore announced that "the Selection was left to himself,
with no other Recommendation than that he should be a proper person," the final
caveat clearly indicated that Asaf was not free to elevate another nobody whose loyalty
he could trust.

Instead, four people were brought forward by Shore for Asaf's "choice": Tafazzal,
Hasan Riza, Ray and Almas, the first three of whom were known British sympathizers.
Shore commented to his council that he was convinced Hasan Riza's and Ray's
"attachment to the Company is most sincere" and that they would be preferable to any
others, save Tafazzal, for the choice of ministers. The wazir naturally preferred Almas,
but Shore considered him to have "a severe, arbitrary and unaccommodating Disposition,
which might have led him into opposition or inattention to the Recommendations of the
Resident." As soon as it was clear that Almas would be Asaf's choice, Shore used a
memo written by Cornwallis in 1792 against his becoming minister as an excuse to
remove Awadh's most powerful noble from consideration. In the end Tafazzal was
selected, over his own objections, prompting Edmonstone's comment that
the difficulties of this situation are very great indeed. He has to control the weak,
puerile propensities of a pampered fool without offending him, to engage him to
authorize measures which militate against his established habits & of which he is
unable to comprehend the benefit. . . . With the limited powers of the G.Gl. more has
been done than could have been reasonably hoped for & if this arrangement fail of
effect, the English legislature must either sanction a more authoritative interference or abandon the Vizier's country altogether.\textsuperscript{134}

In addition to the banishment of Lal and the appointment of Tafazzal, Shore also obtained the augmentation of the subsidy he had wanted, although not without great difficulty\textsuperscript{135}; Asaf remained adamant on the subject of Allahabad, but the governor-general could nonetheless claim a "success far beyond his expectations."\textsuperscript{n136} Why had the wazir given up so easily the independence he had worked for so long? Both Edmonstone and Shore expressed surprise at the extent of their success, as Shore had been prevented from using intimidation or force by the directors' orders. Despite the fact that he did not arrive in Awadh with an armed escort, however, Shore's presence was itself intimidation, as Asaf could hardly forget the battalions of troops he represented; for all the wazir knew, if he did not compromise, the next time he saw the governor-general might be at the head of an army. He had no knowledge of the directors' instructions, and could not have known how far Shore was willing to go to obtain his ends. Asaf therefore agreed with the elements of the governor-general's plan that could be reversed most easily--a minister could always be dismissed later, and the subsidy had, after all, frequently been evaded in the past--and balked at that which warned of a permanent change, namely the cession of the Allahabad fortress.

In the months after Shore's first trip to Lucknow, it became obvious that the governor-general intended to keep tight reins on Asaf. Tafazzal kept Shore fully apprised of occurrences in Lucknow, noting that "as my credit and reputation so absolutely depend upon the Governor General's favor and support . . . a desire to obtain his approbation must ever be the whole and sole objects present to my mind."\textsuperscript{n137} The wazir was well aware of this, as Shore commented:

Tufazl Hussein Khan . . . enters upon his new office under a suspicion of a partial attachment to the Interests of the Company, and although the Nabob is compelled to acknowledge his superior worth and talents, he feels the ascendancy of them . . . he cannot but feel a natural Desire to preserve his own power & controul, and [views] every Interference of the English Government as an Encroachment upon them.\textsuperscript{n138}

In June the governor-general required Jhou Lal, who had been residing at Benares, to move with his family to distant Patna, removing him from any possibility of contact with Asaf.\textsuperscript{139} Shore was also soon writing the wazir to complain about arrears in the subsidy and warning him that "further delay . . . may be attended with very serious consequences."\textsuperscript{n140} It must slowly have become apparent to the nawab that no change in the status quo could be expected.

Barnett records that Asaf refused medications during a serious attack of dropsy in 1797 and died as a result.\textsuperscript{141} Edmonstone, however, informed Kennaway that Asaf "had for a great length of time been in the habit of taking a vast quantity of opium which for some months before his Death he had increased until it shewed its effects in a dropsical complaint."\textsuperscript{n142} Edmonstone's description of the wazir's condition, "his limbs swelled, his body wasted away, his appetite forsook him--and the latter part of his life was little more than a continual lethargy,"\textsuperscript{n143} accurately describes an individual suffering from opium poisoning. Asaf had long indulged in opium, a common habit in a land where it was plentiful--even the Company's employees often added it to the tobacco in the popular hookahs. Yet the fact that he was considerably overweight most of his life indicates that he had not taken his habit to extremes, as virtually all opium addicts are skeletally thin
due to the drug's side effect of suppressing the appetite. It is possible that Asaf increased his opium intake in the months following Shore's visit as a way of forgetting his recent defeat in the sense of well-being and illusory comfort it brought. However, his refusing medication in his final illness may point to his death being a deliberate choice on the wazir's part.

It could be argued that there was no real reason for Asaf's depression to reach suicidal depths, for it was well known that Shore was soon to return to England as he had long requested to do, and a new governor-general would replace him. Since the nawab had managed good relations with the Company's previous governments, why would he not have waited to see what options arose from the new regime? Possibly, the thought of Lord Hobart, the aggressive governor of Madras and, it was thought at the time, Shore's replacement, offered the wazir little hope for reversing recent developments, as Hobart was known to favor interference far more than Shore. However, it is also possible that Asaf, who had seen firsthand the attitudes displayed by the younger generation in the Company's service, realized that the voices calling for the furtherance of British hegemony in Awadh could only get louder with time. His "hate of Servitude and Subordination" may not have allowed him to live with such a specter hanging over him.

Santha records an emotional scene between Asaf and his mother, who had been summoned hastily to his bedside from Faizabad: having maintained his composure before everyone else, he broke down when Bahu Begum reached him, and the two wept together for hours before Asaf slipped into coma and died on September 27, 1797. With him passed the last of the independent nawabs of Awadh, for both of his possible successors--his eldest son, Vizier Ali and his brother Sa'adat, had very different attitudes towards British interference than Asaf. Within days of his father's death, Vizier Ali was writing Shore, "may the almighty preserve you, whom I consider in the place of my late Father, nay even as the Superior to him, as my respected uncle, as the disposer of me and mine." Even more clearly, Sa'adat, who immediately put forward his own claim to the throne, promised, "I shall while I live manifest my zeal for the Interests of the Company on every occasion . . . in all matters whatsoever I shall incessantly endeavor to manifest my obedience to them." How different from Asaf, who had never promised obedience to anyone and considered himself, at the very least, the equal to the British. Yet, although his death opened up vast new possibilities for the Company, the road to British supremacy in Awadh was still not clear, and the final showdown would be the most dramatic of all.
On New Year’s Day, 1798, a darkly comic scene was played out in Lucknow when James Lumsden invited Vizier Ali to dinner at the residency. Edmonstone, who was present with the governor-general, found the event to be most entertaining, unlike Ali who had reason to believe that the British were in his city for more than to wish him a happy new year. In fact, he was so afraid that they planned to attack him while he ate that he had come to the table virtually surrounded by bodyguards, and had stationed a large number of troops between the residency and the palace. The nawab’s servants milled about the room during the meal, their pistols, swords and daggers on prominent display. The resulting atmosphere was, as Edmonstone put it, “turbulent in the greatest degree and I never in my life was witness to such a scene of confusion.”

He watched events with some amusement, knowing that, while the delegation had no intention of abrogating good manners to the point of seizing him at the dinner table, Ali’s days were numbered.

The delegation’s second visit to Awadh was prompted by circumstances arising from Asaf’s death. Although the nawab had been ill, no one had expected his sudden demise and Lumsden had been given no instructions as to what action to take in such a contingency. Tafazzul, perhaps fearing another civil conflict over the throne, informed the British that delay in proclaiming a successor might cause “some disturbances and insurrections in these Dominions.” He, Lumsden, and Bahu Begam, who remained in Lucknow for Asaf’s funeral, therefore agreed to the immediate accession of Ali. To Lumsden, he appeared the obvious choice: he was the eldest of Asaf-ud-daula’s sons, the begum favored him, and, although Asaf left no will, he always treated Ali as his heir. Born in 1781, Ali was only sixteen when he received the khilat, or robe of state, and took the throne. His youth was a point in his favor, however, as Lumsden assumed it would make him more amenable to British influence than any of the powerful, leading subjects of Awadh would be. This seemed borne out by Ali’s letter to Shore thanking him for his “unparalleled benevolence . . . liberality and goodness” in supporting his accession, and declaring that his “welfare and prosperity [were] inseparably connected with the good will and regard of the English Gentlemen.”

Edmonstone informed Kennaway that the change of government had passed with no commotion; however, at least one person was extremely displeased by the new system. Sa’adat Ali had long endeavored to maintain a good relationship with the British. He had originally fled to Agra after his failed coup attempt in 1778, fearing that Asaf’s offer of a jagir of three lakhs for his expenses might be merely a ruse; his “want of confidence” in his brother persuaded him that he would be safer outside Awadh.
Hastings, however, wrote to him promising British protection if he returned, resulting in his settling in Benares. There, he soon evidenced many of the trappings of his English neighbors, as recorded by Charles Madan, who saw him in 1787:

If you hunt with him, his pack I’m told is so very well managed that you may fancy yourself with “Lord Fitzwilliam,” or “Mr. Mennell.” He always rides in cap and boots, leather breeches, &c. and upon the most capital horses. If you dine or sup with him, the same appearance of everything “English” strikes you: and to complete it, he is now, I’m told, learning our language.6

Sa’adat may not have acquired aspects of European attire and habits solely in order to win British favor, for both his father and brother demonstrated similar interests, but Madan recalled that he was “much liked by the English, from his so entirely adopting their manners.”7 A frequent guest at Company entertainments in Calcutta, at one of which he was formally introduced to Lady Shore, Sa’adat eventually purchased a second home there over Asaf’s objections.8 He hoped that his close connection with the British would improve his political chances or, as he put it, he had “a well founded hope of future numerous benefits.”9

Sa’adat regularly complained to Shore in his brother’s lifetime of the small jagir he had been assigned, especially in the summer of 1797 when Asaf, possibly prompted by Shore’s increased subsidy demands, lowered his brother’s pension. Sa’adat immediately requested that the governor-general intervene, noting that Asaf was well known to be extremely rich, whereas he had to try to support a large family on a pittance.10 Shore replied with a terse message in which, ironically considering his recent negotiations with Asaf, he claimed to have no right to interfere in the nawab’s affairs.11 The death of his brother barely two months later afforded Sa’adat a much greater opportunity than a mere addition to his income, and he was again quick to press his claim with Shore. He reminded him that he had “abandoned my relatives and my native country, and placed myself under the protection of the Company’s Government, in the firm belief, that my connection with it was calculated to promote my present and future interests.”12 Sa’adat averred, a little brashly considering his own past behavior, that the right to rule “to the late Nabob Assof ud Dowla as the eldest it first descends, and no one had any ground for disputing that right.”13 But now that Asaf was dead, it should pass to him for, he stated plainly, his brother had been “absolutely and unquestionably without offspring.”14

The questions often raised about Asaf’s sexuality seem strange when it is considered that his harem was said to have contained "over five hundred of the greatest beauties in India"; he became so annoyed with Shah Alum’s heir for attracting one of his favorite dancing girls that he all but exiled the prince from his kingdom; and he had two children of whom he was unquestionably the father, although both died young.15 The poets at Asaf’s court did at times dress in female attire to recite, but this had more to do with a literary convention than any predilection on the nawab’s part.16 Perhaps the rumors arose from the restraint he usually showed in his personal life, which contrasted markedly with Shuja’s habits, but more likely they were the result of his failure to have the large numbers of children that usually resulted from a harem.

Asaf did have offspring, although Sa’adat claimed that all of them, including Ali, were adopted, assuring Shore that "by way of an amusement and employment to his mind, [Asaf] nominated an adoptee, that is to say an elective son," to succeed him.17 This argument, at least initially, made little impact on Shore, who had a variety of reasons to
ignore it. The nawab had always acknowledged Ali as his son and had introduced him as such to John Bristow and Edward Ives, previous British residents at Lucknow, to Cornwallis and, on his 1796 visit, to Shore himself. He had also made a habit of pushing Ali forward at entertainments devised for his British visitors. Sophie Prosser saw "the Nabob's son a young child of 7 years old," at the elephant fight Asaf arranged, to which he was accompanied by a large honor guard, and on the occasion of the carnival, she remembered that the wazir insured Ali caught his visitors' eyes by having him conduct the resident into the festivities. The title of "the young Nabob" which Prosser casually assigned him in her diary, shows that as early as 1788 Ali's accession had already been determined and was generally known. The huge amount spent on his marriage was another indication of Asaf's intentions, as none of his other children were so honored. In deciding to support Ali's claim, Shore also took into consideration that he was reported to have been born in the zenana, had been educated as a prince, and had been recently given an important state position by Asaf.

Sa'adat's claim did not concern his brother's intentions, however, as he must have expected Asaf to oppose his succession and an heir would therefore have had to be found. Instead, he challenged the boy's right, which Aniruddha Ray feels was merely a ploy to advance himself. Yet the weight of the evidence agrees with Sa'adat. Abu Talib recalled that Asaf once, when angry with Ali for allegedly taking omens to predict the date of his death, confiscated his property and commented that "this son of a farrash [carpet maker] has returned to his origin." Although Asaf later relented, he was occasionally heard to remind the boy of his background when annoyed with him. Additionally, Ali's birth was not announced publicly in Awadh or Calcutta as those of Asaf's first two children had been; Shore recalled hearing while he was in Lucknow a rumor that Asaf could no longer father children (possibly a side-effect of his regular opium use); and the fact of Ali's adoption was generally accepted in Awadh. His appearance also weighed against him, for he looked nothing like Asaf, being "of a dark complexion, and not handsome," and having "nothing very princely in his appearance."

Shore was still not impressed with Sa'adat's claim, however, for Islamic law stated that Asaf's acknowledgement of Ali was, as long as the boy's real parentage remained unknown, sufficient to make him his son. It was also the case that, as the governor-general noted to the Secret Committee, there was seemingly no way of substantiating Sa'adat's allegations without making an extremely insulting "public Investigation into the secrets of the Seraglio," which no one with honor could do. He therefore informed Sa'adat that, as he was well acquainted with Islamic law, he must be aware that Shore had no choice but to support Ali, and wrote to the young man offering congratulations on his accession. He even had a "Royal Salute" fired from Fort William as a mark of respect for the new ruler, an act Ali politely returned at Lucknow before writing to the governor-general that he "took my seat on the musnud and dismissed from my mind every care and every grief."

Not all was quite as calm as it seemed in Awadh, however. Although the begum had spoken of Ali as her grandson and officiated at his investiture, she was more interested in improving her political position and in keeping a rival's son off the throne than in any right of inheritance. She wrote Shore in reply to a letter of condolence, "I am fully confident, that matters will be arranged as I could wish[,] . . . this will involve the arrangement of many affairs of importance." Shore, although willing to support her
choice for nawab, cautioned her that "no Government can be conducted where more than one authority exists," and hinted that she might be more comfortable at her palace in Faizabad than in Lucknow.\textsuperscript{33} She was unwilling to move, however, for she had formed a political alliance with Almas Ali Khan; together, they controlled large areas of land and the majority of Awadh's armed forces. With an inexperienced ruler on the throne, they expected to dominate the government, an arrangement that could have proven propitious for Awadh as both had shown ability in the administration of their own land holdings and were experienced politicians. Unfortunately for their plans, Ali proved far less malleable than they had hoped, giving an early indication of this when, to the begum's disgust, he began holding court while Asaf's body was still lying in state in the palace.\textsuperscript{34}

Shore was also soon having doubts about Ali, partly due to the young man's rate of expenditure--he had long been accustomed to a lavish lifestyle, and he naturally saw no reason to restrain his spending once he came to power--but other rumors were also reaching Calcutta. Stories of licentiousness at court began to circulate, including that the new nawab was addicted to wine and drugs, had formed a "club of prostitutes" at the palace, and was said to so covet the wife of his brother, Reza Ali, that her father, Asaf's brother Mirza Jangley, had to remove her hastily from court.\textsuperscript{35} Even more worrying from the British standpoint was the new nawab's military interests. Bahadur Singh noted that Ali had "assumed the habits of a soldier" soon after his accession, but knew little of war and quarreled with his officers.\textsuperscript{36} Yet Edmonstone heard that he had given munificent presents to the military, and had thereby gained much of their support.\textsuperscript{37} Equally alarming was his disinterest in following the advice of Tafazzul, whom he viewed as a British agent. In Asaf's last months, the minister had reigned supreme at Lucknow, reporting to Shore that he had "frequent marks of his Excellency's favor, he has repeatedly told me . . . he will always concur in my suggestions."\textsuperscript{38} Despite the fact that, as Shore noted, Tafazzul "even speaks plainer to the Nawob than I do," Asaf maintained "a very kind and conciliatory conduct" towards him.\textsuperscript{39} What he may have said beyond the minister's hearing cannot be known, but Ali certainly showed an aversion to him from the beginning.

There is no doubt that Tafazzul was primarily concerned with gaining the British greater advantage in Awadh: he was one of a number of professional bureaucrats in northern India who, like the early Confucian scholars or the civil servants of Renaissance Italy, took employment with whatever state offered them the best rewards. He had been connected with the British for years, and was even considered at one time by Cornwallis to lead a diplomatic mission to the nizam of Hyderabad.\textsuperscript{40} Although formally in the pay of the Awadh government, Tafazzul was considered both by the British and by Ali as primarily in the service of the Company, a fact alluded to numerous times by Edmonstone, who later obtained his friend's family a large British pension after Tafazzul's death.\textsuperscript{41} Ali resented the minister's attempts to control him, and Tafazzul equally became disenchanted with Awadh's new ruler. Within two months of Ali's accession, Tafazzul was informing Edmonstone that the young man listened only to the advice of "the low interested people that he has about him," interfered with appointments and dismissals that the minister had planned to make to government positions, gave away some of the kingdom's finest horses to his friends, and was trying to appropriate Asaf's treasure, although Tafazzul had withheld it.\textsuperscript{42} In these instances, Ali was doing no more than Asaf
had upon his accession—putting his friends into power and trying to obtain the state
treasure which was, after all, his right. Tafazzul's real concern was evident when he
recommended to Edmonstone that the British use "down right coercion" to remove the
"evil designers . . . [and] instigators of his conduct," and admitted that he and Lumsden
were unable to control Ali's actions. Such advice was unnecessary; only a little over a
month after Ali's accession, Edmonstone had already decided that

the young man himself is incapable of estimating the value of our guidance
and only feels the advice that is given him as a restraint upon amusements . . .
I really think we are called upon both by our own security and by the charge
of maintaining that of the Oude government . . . to adopt coercive measures
and a more direct interference.

By November, Shore, who had hoped to return to Europe by the end of the year,
instead found himself on the road once again to Lucknow. Edmonstone was selected to
accompany him, and was no happier about it than the governor-general. As he remarked
to his brother Charles, "I hope I shall at one time or other reap the benefit of all this
flying around the country." The group decided to travel by dawk as, by keeping to a
rigorous schedule, they could reach Lucknow more quickly overland. They tried to keep
the reason for their visit as quiet as possible, but even John Adam, then a newly arrived
writer with little experience of Indian politics, was able to make a reasonably accurate
guess as to their intentions. As he commented in a letter to his father:

Sir J Shore [goes] in great haste to Lucknow. Their motive is secret but . . .
the recent death of the Nabob Asoph u Dowlah & the doubtful right of his
successor who is said not to be really his son, tho' acknowledged by him, may in
some measure account for their journey.

Not surprisingly, Ali had equally little difficulty in surmising the delegation's intentions.
He wrote to Shore before the governor-general left for Lucknow that he was glad for the
visit, for it would allow him "to prove to you and the whole world that the aspersions my
Calumniators and enemies have conveyed to you are all false and unfounded.

Edmonstone would later comment on the delegation's mission in a letter to his sister
Suzanna:

It was rather an extraordinary situation to be employed in a conspiracy
against the Prince whose guests we were and sounds as criminal as
extraordinary. However, although I was a conspirator for all intents and
purposes I beg you will not have the worse opinion of me.

To say that the delegation's actions were extraordinary in light of the Company's
expressed maxim of non-interference was an understatement; that Edmonstone was a
main conspirator was, however, quite accurate. Shore hoped to be able to reason with the
nawab, to persuade him to change his habits through advice or threats, but Edmonstone
viewed such efforts as a waste of time. His impression of Ali had led him to believe that
he possessed "a very depraved disposition which I fear will . . . be productive of great
trouble;" He did not envision finding a solution to the problems in Awadh "without
exercising a degree of coercion which we have hitherto disavowed our right to assert."

On the way to Lucknow, the delegation paused at Jaunpur to meet with Tafazzul and
hear first hand about the problems in Awadh. The minister painted a grim picture for
British hopes: Ali had virtually annulled British influence at court by openly treating the
minister and resident with contempt and, as soon as Tafazzul left to meet the delegation,
he seized the assets under his control and distributed much of them to the military. The nawab further showed his intentions by recalling many of his troops from the countryside and levying others. The minister also confirmed their fears that "Vizier Alli bears no resemblance whatever to Asoph u Dowlah[;] . . . [he has] an idea that by bringing out the troops and making a display of power and authority he will get into his own hands the entire control and management of affairs." An excellent example of Ali's propensity to use force, instead of relying on persuasion as Asaf had commonly done, was his actions in dealing with Tehseen Ali Khan, the eunuch in charge of the harem who also kept some of the royal jewels. Tehseen, probably at Tafazzul's urging, had refused to make over some property to Ali, and then fled to the minister for protection when the nawab attempted to seize him. Ali pursued him to Tafazzul's residence, surrounded it with 800 troops and demanded that Tehseen be handed over. The situation became dangerously tense when the minister refused, but Lumsden managed to diffuse things temporarily by brokering a nominal reconciliation between the nawab and Tafazzul; however the latter was under no impression that it would last. It is possible that, as Sa'adat's old tutor, the minister was his partisan from the beginning, but had not seen a way to bring him to the throne without risking another civil war. However, as he informed Edmonstone, the present situation was intolerable--he feared for his life, and only "the Governor Generals and your coming gives me hope of safety." Whatever the minister's original attitude towards Ali had been, by late October he had already decided the nawab had to go. He bluntly informed the delegation at Jaunpur that "the title of Saudet, by the rules of Justice was indisputable." Edmonstone was an easy convert to this opinion, for he believed that for the British to accept dismissal at the hands of a child would cause them considerable problems with other states: “to Relinquish the design of re-establishing our influence would have disgraced us in the eyes of all Hindostan and have been a fatal blow to our political consequence in India.” Before leaving Jaunpur, the delegation determined to reassert the Company’s paramountcy, although a means to do so had yet to be determined. Shore hoped the change could be made without the use of force, which was unlikely to be met with enthusiasm on the part of the directors. After speaking with Tafazzul, however, he took the precaution of calling for an armed escort from Calcutta.

In addition to Ali's intransigence, a more alarming problem had occurred rendering Shore's journey inevitable. Almas and the begum had discovered, as the British were quickly doing, that Ali intended to rule as well as reign. Almas had left court after the British declined a proposition for giving Bahu Begum a formal share in the administration of the country, which Edmonstone felt would have been "tantamount to the introduction of his own authority." Adam heard a rumor that he had taken an army and "gone off & joined the Rohillas." It turned out to be false, but more accurate reports confirmed that he was raising large numbers of troops in the Doab. Edmonstone hoped he intended this as a defensive measure, to protect himself in case of Ali's enmity, but he nonetheless felt that Almas was "by far too powerful for a subject[;] . . . [he] is very rich and can command an immense body of forces, [and] his military talents are by no means contemptable." Edmonstone's usual distrust of any powerful Indian played a part in convincing him that the British needed to gain control over the Begum/Almas faction as well as Ali, but Tafazzul's regular letters were also a factor. The minister assured Edmonstone that Almas's "obstinacy, pride and disregard of orders are admitted,"
although whether he intended open revolt was uncertain. Tafazzul had placed "a person to look after him"—in effect, a spy in his camp—and promised to relay to Edmonstone whatever information he received. Still supporting Ali, Shore instructed Almas to disband any troops not authorized by the nawab and not to give "room for imputations to your prejudice." The delegation was delayed so long at Jaunpur waiting for their escort that the nawab set out to meet them. He started out with a large number of troops and an artillery train but soon sent them back, proceeding only with his usual bodyguard. He also moderated a letter he had written to Shore which Edmonstone was informed was originally "so intemperate and violent . . . that [it] required an answer either of implicit acquiescence in the most inordinate demands or a drawn sword." The version actually sent was very different, reminding Shore that he had "exchanged turbans with my late father, and [I] truly consider you . . . in the place of my deceased parent." Thereafter followed regular letters expressing Ali's appreciation for Shore having "come . . . to extend the shadow of your protection over me," and assuring him that "night and day the recollection of your kindness occupies my mind." He also sent his father-in-law, Sherif Ali Khan, a man Edmonstone deprecated as "a cunning knave of mean understanding, devoid of principle, [and] a sycophant," running after Tafazzul to mitigate the minister's account of recent events.

Ali's change in strategy was the result of a new, closer alliance with the begum, whose support he had become convinced he needed in light of the approaching delegation. Tafazzul made certain that the British were aware of the new situation, and Shore apprised his council that the begum was in a "union of plans & Interests with [Ali] & his advisors." While the begum had no love for the British, she also had no desire for a war, especially as she saw an easier way to gain her objects. She candidly informed Shore that she and Ali were agreed that all their possessions were at the Company's disposal, apparently under the impression that this governor-general, like Hastings, was more interested in wealth than power. An uneasy peace followed as Shore’s and the begum’s desire to avoid hostilities aligned. Shore hoped to re-establish the previous system of British control in Awadh by making it clear to Ali that he was "a minor under tutelage . . . compelled to submit to the direction of the Company, thro' the Resident and Minister." As a backup plan, however, he agreed, as the delegation continued to Lucknow, to launch an investigation into the new nawab’s background.

As the Company had approved of the accession of Ali and Shore had written to the directors in support of his right, it would be difficult to remove him from power on no other grounds than that he had decided to do the job he had been given. However, if it could be proven conclusively that he was not Asaf’s son, the Company could claim merely to be rectifying a “mistake” in the succession. As the only fluent Persian speaker in the group, Edmonstone was given the task of making the inquiry. He was to aid a cause that he wholeheartedly supported. As he commented:

The inquiry was difficult and delicate to make without exciting suspicion, this was principally my task and I contrived to obtain the Sentiments of many Respectable persons who all explicitly declared that Vizier Ali was not the son of Assof ud Dowla and indeed seemed to wonder that I should speak of him as such.
As Edmonstone would later note, his task was complicated by the fact that everyone seemed to know the rumors about Ali, but "I question if there are ten people who know the circumstances of his birth." He did manage to find a number of Awadh's nobles who gave him information against the nawab, but none of it was conclusive. Meer Abdul Cassim told Edmonstone "the young man himself knew what his birth was, but [said] that his government was a deodad [God-given one] . . . and therefore [he] should maintain it." Another noble, Bissember Pandit, stated that "not an individual allowed Vizier Ally had a shadow of right to the station he held," and that his obtaining it was just his good luck.

Edmonstone's questions made it clear that he was as concerned with Ali's popularity as with his right to rule; he asked Mahomed Ishauk Khan whether he conceived the people in general attached to [Ali]? To which he replied . . . that those to whom he had been lavish of his favors, of course were so. . . . I asked whether he supposed the people had any attachment to him out of regard for his family? He smiled at the question, and averted to the spuriousness of his birth.

He also told Edmonstone that he had seen Sa'adat at Benares who challenged him on Ali's right, commenting bitterly that "you are going to carry a kelaat to the son of a Bhisty [servant]: a pretty successor, to be sure, has been devised by my brother." Likewise, Edmonstone was informed by Mohibbut Khan "that people appeared to consider the point of succession with indifference, whatever were their sentiments with regard to [Ali's] title to the Musnud, and looked upon him as a person set up to represent the late Nabob." This was encouraging, should a change in the succession be necessary, but it gave the delegation little more to work with than the rumors they had already heard in Calcutta.

Edmonstone finally interviewed Tehseen Ali, whose account contained the facts the British needed. The story he told was an intriguing one: after Asaf's first two children died and no more were forthcoming, the nawab ordered Tehseen and later Jhou Lal to arrange for expectant mothers to come live in the zenana and have their children there. In that way he eventually accumulated sixteen sons and a number of daughters, none of whom were his natural offspring. After extensive conversations with Tehseen, some of which Shore attended, Edmonstone concluded:

It came out upon full proof that the Mother of Vizier Ali was merely a Servant of the women in the zenana, that she never resided in it, that she was married . . . was not known by sight to the Nabob, was delivered of Vizier Alli in the house of the Informant and that the Nabob knew not of her pregnancy until after the birth of the child, which being informed of, he took as his own, paying the mother 500 Rs. and forbidding her appearance about the zenana ever after.

Edmonstone's patrician sensibilities were deeply offended to discover that the person giving the British so much trouble was not even of noble origin: his mother, Rehmut, having held "the lowest occupation of a menial servant," on wages of four rupees a month, and his father being likewise a "servant in one of the public establishments." As Ray points out, Tehseen, who had been threatened with violence by Ali, had an obvious bias; however, if his account was false, it is strange that neither Ali nor any of his partisans made an attempt to refute the evidence--names, dates, and living witnesses--provided by the eunuch. To his account was also added that of Shums unissa Begum.
Asaf's widow, who referred to Ali as "a Worthless Boy" and complained that he had been placed on the throne without an inquiry into his background. Edmonstone's investigation had uncovered not only proof of Ali's true parentage, thus negating his legal right to the succession, but evidence that there were numerous people at court who did not favor his government. The question of the nawab's right to rule being answered to Shore's satisfaction, the problem of what to do with the information remained. Ali had been busy acquiring troops, which, along with those of Almas and the begum, gave him a large enough army to make the British think twice about changing the government by force, but all was not well with the new alliance. The delegation received a lucky break when Almas and the begum began making overtures to them in the hopes of replacing Ali with someone more malleable, specifically Mirza Jangley, the second surviving son of Shuja ud Daula. Almas even went so far as to offer to remove Ali with little commotion, provided that his candidate was appointed in his place. Hasan Riza and Tickayt Ray, still out of favour politically, approved of the plan.

The British saw no advantage, however, in replacing one independent-minded ruler with another. Yet Almas’s suggestion did raise an interesting point. If he and the begum could elevate a new nawab to be under their control, why could the Company not do the same? It was well known that Sa’adat would be quite willing to come to an accommodation with them in return for help in obtaining the throne. As recently as October 17, he had written to Shore confirming that, if the British helped him to power, "I shall incessantly endeavor to manifest my obedience . . . and believing every act of good will and service towards the Company that I may perform, as still falling short of their claims, shall from my heart study to increase their number." The course of action seemed clear to Edmonstone, but not all members of the delegation felt the same. General James Henry Craig, commander of the Company forces in Awadh, and Sir Alured Clarke, the commander-in-chief of the army, strongly advised against an attempt to change the succession, as they feared it would result in a war. If it was to be done, however, they insisted on a pre-emptive coup, to seize both Ali and Almas, and warned Shore that he would be "answerable for every drop of blood which should be shed" if he failed to take their advice.

Long meetings took place among the delegation in which three alternatives were discussed: first, retain Ali and somehow attain control over him; second, accept Almas’s choice of Mirza Jangley; third, elevate Sa’adat. Only Shore, who was shortly to be facing the directors in person, held out a hope of the first alternative; the Company’s military commanders favored the second, as it would not require the use of force on their part; Edmonstone, Tafazzul and, presumably, Lumsden preferred the third. Problems, however, existed with all of the proposals.

The first seemed unlikely in the extreme, as Edmonstone noted:

We had very sufficient proofs of Vizier Alli’s inimitable disposition toward the English. . . . He and his partizans talked with contempt and defiance of our power and we had the best reasons to believe that he was determined to sacrifice his life rather than yield to our subordination. We were even informed that he . . . meditated a plan of assassinating the party and we were actually cautioned thro’ a variety of channels not to put ourselves in his power.

It was also difficult to imagine what kind of control could be placed on Ali. Tafazzul had proven incapable of managing him, Almas refused to guarantee the nawab's co-operation with British demands if he was made minister, and Edmonstone seriously doubted that
Ray and Riza were strong enough to influence him and also suspected them of favoring the begum's interests more than those of the British. At this time that the New Year’s dinner party came about, proving that the nawab greatly distrusted the British and was unlikely to ever do anything else. Yet to forcibly remove him from power seemed difficult, if not impossible, without the active consent and participation of Almas and the begum. In addition to the growing strength of his army, Ali had the advantage of popularity among some of the people, who applauded his tough stand with the Company.

Accepting Almas’s offer, however, seemed equally impossible. Although Mirza Jangley had some popularity and the change could be easily effected with Almas’s help, the Company would have difficulty justifying such a move. How could they claim to be deposing one ruler on the grounds that he had no right to the succession only to replace him with another in the same position? The next in line was Sa'adat, not Mirza Jangley. It was also a factor that the prince would be indebted to Almas for championing his cause more than to the British. The Company had no reason for helping Almas to put his puppet in place and, as Edmonstone phrased it, “have committed another act of injustice and lost the wages of the sin.”

As Edmonstone candidly admitted to his friend William Kirkpatrick, the real reason for the British preferring Sa'adat to Mirza Jangley had nothing to do with questions of legitimacy:

- it remained to determine whether our Govt should continue to acknowledge him [Ali] as the legal heir to the musnud or change the succession. The former might have been fully justified, but the situation of affairs certainly rendered the latter expedient. . . . the Begum & Almas actually proposed to depose him & substitute a son of Shudja ud Dowlah younger that Saadet Alli, [but] the measure would have been equally injurious to our influence by throwing it into their hands.

Unfortunately, from the British point of view, there were also problems with the idea of making Sa'adat nawab. He was unpopular with the people of Awadh, mostly due to his perceived avariciousness, and was especially so to the begum, whose son he had once attempted to depose and who must have realized that her hopes of influencing policy would end with his accession. Sa'adat also had no followers, no army and, to further complicate matters, was not even in Lucknow so that the British could elevate him if they were so inclined. The obvious question to Sa’adat’s claim arose as the debate became prolonged; the answer would help to determine not only the fate of Awadh, but also the future of British policy in India. According to Edmonstone,

- the question arose, by what right can we, who profess to consider the Kingdom of Oude as an independent State, force upon the people a Prince obnoxious to them all. To this it can be answered that Oude is in fact not an independent State, the defense and protection of it by specific engagements depends on us. Edmonstone’s conviction that Awadh had forfeited the status of an independent state by accepting British protection was an immense step away from Company policy. It implied that any time a treaty was signed in which British troops were promised to, or garrisoned in, an Indian state, that state was thereafter to be viewed as a British dependent. The implications of this were not immediately felt outside of Awadh, but the next administration would use the precedent to the utmost extent.

If the right of the British to force a ruler on Awadh who its people did not want was put aside, only two problems remained: Almas had thirty battalions of well-trained troops under his control in the state while the Company had only two, and the Company’s
choice for nawab was not easily accessible. While discussions continued between Almas, the begum and the Company about Mirza Jangley, therefore, a plan was devised for getting Sa'adat to Lucknow.

Sa’adat was at Benares, 200 miles from Awadh’s capital, and Ali had spies watching his every move. To send a detachment to retrieve him would have been tantamount to declaring war; yet, if he left by dawk as was customary, he was in danger of being intercepted by the nawab’s spies. A plan was nonetheless formed and sent to Cherry in Benares. It was encased in a sealed envelope and Cherry was told not to open it until he received word; Shore had still not fully decided what course of action to take. He would claim in an official Minute that he was, at that point, "still without any positive determination to place Saadut ally on the Musnud," and that he viewed bringing him to Lucknow as a precautionary measure. Considering his past dealings with Asaf, it is difficult to fully accept Shore's claim that "no man can be more adverse to every species of deception or appearance of treachery than myself," but it does seem that, "determining [Ali's] rights, at a time when I am his guest, assuming and professing the character of a friend," bothered him. Certainly the risks involved, both of physical danger and censure from the directors, gave him reason for reluctance to act if he saw a reasonable alternative. Yet, as more and more of Ali's troops arrived from the countryside, it became apparent that something would have to be done. Significantly, Craig and Clarke, who opposed elevating Sa'adat, were absent when the final decision was made. Edmonstone recorded that

on the 8th [of January] a congress was held consisting of Sir John, [James] Lumsden, [John] Collins, [William] Scott and myself. The whole morning was taken up in discussing the various plans tho’ they had before been canvassed till scarce anything was left to be said upon them; but the design was to decide. It was at length determined to depose Vizier Alli and substitute Saadat Alli.

Regiments were summoned from Kanpur, a British stronghold forty miles from Lucknow, and Cherry was sent instructions to open his packet. Cherry found within it a proposition. In return for British backing, Sa’adat had to agree to a stronger subsidiary treaty than had ever been proposed by the Company to an Indian state. It increased to 76 lakhs Awadh’s annual protection payment, ceded the long-coveted fortress of Allahabad to the Company, increased the number of British troops in the country to 10,000 and severely limited the nawab’s army. The Company would, from then on, be entirely responsible for the protection of Awadh and Sa’adat agreed further to have no dealings with other powers without the Company’s consent. It was, in effect, a treaty of vassalage, and a prototype of the subsidiary treaties that would play such a large part in the next administration. Perhaps Sa’adat did not realize exactly what he was giving away, or perhaps he felt that even limited rule was better than the virtual exile he faced without British support. Whatever his reasons, the proposal was accepted.

The problem still remained of how to get Sa’adat to Lucknow in one piece. Cherry’s solution was as ingenious as it was simple. He laid bearers to Kanpur, but let it be known that they were for his benefit; his servants assumed that he was returning to Lucknow to take up once more the position of resident. Next, he arranged for Sa’adat to send him a chest of drawers, which he told everyone contained a set of unusual china. Cherry ordered it carried to his bedroom where, when he retired to dress for dinner, he unpacked
Inside were Sa’adat’s clothes and provisions for the journey, which Cherry transferred to his own luggage. He then called one of his most trusted servants and instructed him to ignore any orders he might give at dinner regarding the palanquin and to take it instead to a spot near Sa’adat’s house. At dinner, Cherry loudly told his servant to send the palanquin several miles along the Kanpur road where he would ride to meet it. The man had it carried instead to Sa'adat's house as ordered, and the British candidate for nawab was soon on the road to Kanpur. By the time anyone realized that Sa’adat had gone and Cherry had remained, it was too late for anything to be done.

The delegation in Lucknow had not been idle while preparations for Sa’adat’s journey were made. Considering the enormity of what they were about to do, they thought it prudent to remove themselves from harm’s way. Edmonstone and Lumsden prepared letters to all the European inhabitants of Lucknow, notifying them of the governor-general’s intention of moving his residence to a house at Beibiapur, about five miles from the city. The resident’s treasury was sent off with a guard the night before and, on the morning of January 10th, the letters were delivered and the delegation left Lucknow under heavy guard.

Almas had meanwhile ordered a battalion to Lucknow to converge with one of Ali's, although he assured the British that the report they had received of the move was "wholly false and without foundation." During the delegation's residence in Awadh, Almas had been in regular contact with Major General Robert Stuart, who informed him that it was known he was levying troops and cautioned him that "the impracticable thoughts that you entertain are far from advisable, for should they be made known to the Governor General, many bad consequences may ensue." He advised him to return to Lucknow, but Almas replied that he was only following his suzerain's orders—Asaf had instructed him to raise an additional 3,000 infantry and 500 cavalry for Awadh's forces, but he had not previously had time to accomplish it; he also claimed that some of his talukhdars were refusing to pay their taxes and he had to stay in his area to discipline them.

Edmonstone believed him to be playing a double game, negotiating with Shore while also aiding Ali so as to be on the winning side whatever the outcome of events. During the British move to Beibiapur, however, they actually met Almas's battalion heading toward Lucknow, prompting Awadh's first noble, when he heard of it, to exclaim in disgust, "why did not the troops take a different road?" Ali, the begum and Almas were informed of the delegation’s change of residence after the party had already set out. To allay their suspicions, Shore agreed to appoint two of the begum’s associates as ministers of state and a third as the commander of Awadh's army, thus leading her to believe that the British intended to support her candidate for nawab and insuring that she took no aggressive action.

The European inhabitants of Lucknow, worried that something was about to happen, decided that it would be prudent to join the governor-general’s retreat: Edmonstone reported that soon half the town was encamped around the delegation’s house. He was meanwhile nervously anticipating some action from Ali. Reading the Persian newspapers, he was mortified to discover that many of the British actions had been reported. He noted:

The Persian newspapers circulating thro the place detailed with perfect exactness the visits made to Saadat Alli by Cherry; his explaining to him an English paper; his meeting him at a third person’s house (Mr. Davis’s)
to seal it; every express (and they were numerous) sent or received was specified; the laying of bearers however was not mentioned. Edmonstone was afraid that someone would draw the obvious conclusions from these reports. It seemed impossible to him that no one would notice the constant consultations the British held among themselves, the extra guards surrounding the party, and the delegates’ evident anxiety. As involved as he was, the plan seemed all too obvious; to Ali and the Europeans encamped in the governor-general’s garden, however, there was only speculation.

At this point, Shore began to have second thoughts about his decision. Edmonstone wrote with some irritation that, even though the official decision had been made on January 8th, Shore “wavered” and did not accept its finality until the 13th. However, once he finally made up his mind, he lost no time in getting on with the necessary preparations. When the report of Sa’adat’s safe arrival at Kanpur was received, he sent for Almas, Ray, Riza and Jawahar Ali Khan, an adherent of the begum’s. With Edmonstone and Lumsden in attendance, he announced the British decision. He reminded Almas of his declaration, made when he was trying to convince the British to support Mirza Jangley, that Ali had no valid claim to the throne, and informed him that the rightful heir, Sa’adat, was at Kanpur. At this, Hasan Riza protested, producing a Benares newspaper that stated Sa’adat was on the road to Jaunpur. The report was the result of Cherry’s precaution of laying bearers in all directions in order to confuse matters. Once convinced that Sa’adat was actually on his way, the group fell silent, refusing to answer Shore’s query for ideas on how the change of power could best be accomplished. Seeing that another tactic was needed, Shore took Almas into another room to confer with him privately.

Almas was in a quandary. He and the begum had been convinced that the British were about to support their candidate; now he discovered this to be false and that the hated Sa’adat was practically on the scene. Knowing that the delegation suspected him of secretly aiding Ali in his military preparations, Almas had been forced to disband some of his troops to allay suspicion. He was thus not only caught off guard by Shore’s announcement, but was also in a weakened state. Awadh’s forces were still stronger than those the Company had on hand, but Almas was aware of the powerful British army in Bengal. Presented with a fait accompli, he made the decision to join the British. Shore proceeded to add insult to injury by telling him that, as he was known to have the majority of Awadh’s troops under his control, the task of maintaining order in Lucknow after the change was his alone.

After Almas left for Lucknow to break the news to the begum, Shore called for Sherf Ali Khan and sent him to the nawab with an offer of terms. Shore promised Ali that he would not be harmed and would receive a reasonable pension if he agreed to step down quietly. He also wrote to Asaf’s widow and Ibrahim Bey, the chief military officer in Lucknow, and issued a general proclamation on January 18 announcing the change in government. Later that day, after news arrived that Lucknow was being fortified as if for a siege, Shore sent another message to Ali, this time by one of Lumsden’s servants, warning him not to oppose the change. The servant came back with an encouraging tale. As Edmonstone noted, “he . . . reported that Vizier Alli was in great despondency and frequently shed tears. He described him as an object of pity and apparently resigned to the Governor General’s pleasure.” It may seem odd that the nawab, who had just been
preparing for a fight, would so easily back down. Yet it must be remembered that he was an inexperienced teenager who had surrounded himself with counselors who told him only what he wanted to hear. Faced with an unexpected and frightening reality, and witnessing most of those same counselors running for cover, his nerve failed. He expressed "astonishment and anxiety" at Shore's leaving Lucknow, and protested that the battalion that had recently arrived in the city came "without my knowledge and without my orders." Ali then tried to convince the governor-general that "mischief makers and liars have conveyed false accounts to your ears" and that his conduct had been "marked by nothing but obedience." The British were later informed that Ali had thought of resisting, but Cassim and Sherf Ali convinced him otherwise. The begum, however, showed more resolve.

By afternoon it became apparent that the forces fortifying the city did not belong to the nawab, but were under the begum's control. The British were seriously worried about what she would do; apparently Ali shared this fear for, by evening, he had arrived at the British camp, seeking asylum. With some reluctance Shore agreed. Ali and the delegation sat down to supper together, in an ironic replay of the New Year's scene, after which a spare tent was found for him and his attendants.

Shore, as if unaware of the hostile preparations, informed the begum to prepare to invest Sa'adat with the khilat the next morning, January 21. The delegation watched in concern as the defensive preparations continued throughout the night. By morning, Shore had decided that there was no alternative but to brazen it out. He wrote to the begum that he was ordering his army to escort Sa'adat into Lucknow; if opposition were made, they had been told to force their way into the city, but otherwise no one would be harmed. Once it became obvious that hostilities would result from any attempt to keep Sa'adat off the throne, the begum finally relented. She sent the troops back to their quarters and assured Shore that she had actually been working all night to reason "with all the people belonging to the artillery and the sepoys and [I] withheld them from any improper measures."

Edmonstone and Lumsden went to meet Sa'adat halfway between Beibiapur and Kanpur and escorted him to Shore. Sa'adat, who had been out of touch with events as he traveled to Lucknow, had not known if he were going to a crown or a premature death. Edmonstone commented, "I suppose no man but one just reprieved from the gallows was ever more rejoiced than he was at Joining us." Sa'adat and the governor-general then rode into Lucknow on the same elephant, preceded and followed by a British force. Edmonstone and the rest of the delegation accompanied the procession. He later recorded his feelings on the occasion:

I never saw so grand a sight as was our entry into town. The concourse of people that had assembled to view the spectacle was immense, the whole space except the lane formed for us was one cluster of heads, but there was not the smallest appearance of disorder.

Sa'adat was duly given his sinecure and the British resumed their town residence. Shore, ironically considering that he had been the most opposed among the British to changing Awadh's government, soon acquired the sobriquet of "the Setter up & puller down of Kings." He had little more contact with the ex-nawab, concentrating instead on making arrangements for a speedy trip to Europe before the season for travel ended. Edmonstone, however, spent the following days largely in Ali's company as they worked
out how much of the family property he should be allowed to keep and what allowance he would be made. Edmonstone observed, "he does not appear to be much affected by his fall. . . . I think he has rather the feeling of anger and sullenness than of submission and despondency." He did not overly worry about Ali's mood, however, but finished the negotiations and sent the young man to Benares, where he was placed under Cherry’s supervision. Edmonstone was very pleased at the outcome of the “bloodless revolution” and, while in Lucknow, sat down to write an account of it while his memory was fresh. He closed his work with an accolade of Cherry, commenting, “the success of the Revolution is in a great degree owing to good fortune but more under Providence to good management. Cherry’s share of the latter is very great, but for his caution and prudence it might have been frustrated.” Edmonstone might have also thanked Ali for insuring that British ascendancy in Awadh was securely established. Shore's temperament would probably have led him to adopt the less dangerous route of confirming the young man had he seen any likelihood of continuing British influence through him. Like Asaf, Ali valued his independence; unlike his predecessor, however, he was unable or unwilling to maintain the facade of good humor and friendship with the Company that was necessary to keep it. As a consummate politician, Asaf had done more than profess his good will. In addition to the lavish entertainment of his British guests, he regularly sent large presents and flattering letters on the birthdays and special occasions of prominent Company officials, and strove to maintain friendly relations with the officers and civil servants assigned to his court. He blamed opposition to British wishes on incompetent or dishonest ministers while he continued to look like a staunch ally. More importantly, although he maintained a large army and long refused to give over the Allahabad fortress, he never gave the British cause to perceive him as an immediate military threat. For most of his reign, then, Asaf managed the British better than they controlled him. Although times were changing towards the end of Asaf's life, and even his decades of political experience could not completely compensate for the ambitions of a new generation of Company men, had Ali imitated his political style he would probably have retained his throne. Awadh might also have escaped the harsh price for Sa'adat's accession that Wellesley would soon exact. Bahadur Singh, although a partisan of Sa'adat's and therefore hardly unbiased, was nonetheless correct when he observed that it was primarily from Ali's "disagreeable conduct [that] the English grew apprehensive of him."

It is difficult to accept Aniruddha Ray's assessment of Ali as an early Indian freedom fighter, struggling to save his people from British dominance. Certainly, Shore's primary complaint of him had been "that he would submit to no dependency," but there is no evidence that Ali's actions had their motivation in anything but a desire for personal gratification without interference. He showed no more concern for Awadh than he did wisdom in dealing with its greatest threat.

In the final assessment of the causes behind the Company's ascension in Awadh, Edmonstone's praise of Cherry's role makes an important point. Cherry set the scene for Awadh's absorption into British hegemony, regularly cautioning Shore that a stronger hold over its nawab was a vital asset in attaining the Company's goals there. His plan for placing a pro-British minister in charge of the government was adopted by the governor-general in his first visit to Lucknow, and Shore apparently continued to be convinced of its necessity: Ali's refusal to heed Tafazzul's advice weighed heavily against him in the
governor-general's decision. Cherry also helped to quietly move Sa'adat into a position to vie for the throne, and therefore played an important role in the "revolution" at Lucknow. However, Edmonstone, Tafazzul and Lumsden were the men on the scene keeping the pressure on Shore to reverse Company policy, and his own previous practice, to openly interfere in the succession. Their advice, alarmist reports and, in Edmonstone's case, persistence in making an investigation into a delicate subject, were critical to the outcome of the delegation's mission. It must be remembered that Hastings's dealings with Awadh had been at the center of his impeachment, and Shore's actions there were considerably more intrusive than his predecessor's had been. Without the excuse Edmonstone provided for his actions, there is little likelihood that Shore would have felt justified in risking a change in Awadh's government, or believed himself able to explain it to the directors. The younger generation in the Company's service probably did more to influence the course of events in Awadh than any other single factor. Ali certainly agreed with this assessment: a year after his deposition, he murdered Cherry.
SECTION THREE: THE WELLESELY YEARS, 1798-1805

CHAPTER SEVEN: WILD AMBITION: THE MASSACRES OF 1799

"I shall begin by taking. I shall find scholars later to demonstrate my perfect right."—Frederick the Great

It has become a maxim in Indian historiography that, as Lawrence James described it, there was never a master plan for the conquest of India. No minister in London or governor-general in Calcutta consciously decided that the ultimate goal of British policy was paramountcy throughout the sub-continent. Instead, there was a sequence of tactical decisions made in response to local and sometimes unexpected crises.¹ Or, as J.R. Seely more pithily commented, "nothing great that has ever been done by Englishmen was done so unintentionally, so accidentally, as the conquest of India. [The empire was acquired] in a fit of absence of mind."² At the same time, however, it is also commonly noted that a change occurred in this haphazard attitude towards acquisition with the arrival of a new governor-general, Richard Colley Wellesley, Lord Mornington, in 1798. Percival Spear notes that Wellesley's advent coincided with a changed opinion on Eastern expansion in Britain: the threat to India posed by Napoleon's conquest of Egypt, fears that either Tipu or the Marathas might "yield to French blandishments" and ally with them against the British, and greater pressure in Company circles to increase trade through territorial aggrandizement all combined to open the way for conquest.³ Wellesley is seen as taking advantage of these new attitudes to expand British territory in India, leaving it to his successors to complete the conquest through, one presumes, more absent-minded actions.

The four chapters that compose this section will argue that this traditional view does not go far enough: instead of simply seizing opportunities to add to the Company's territory, Wellesley's era saw the formation of a deliberate and largely successful strategy designed to gain control of the entire sub-continent. It maintains that C.A. Bayley was essentially correct when he noted, "the political theory and practice of the Wellesley circle represented the first coherent imperial policy in British Indian history" and began the era of "true imperialism."⁴ Yet it is also demonstrated that it was Edmonstone and his circle—the imperialists already in India when Wellesley arrived—who encouraged, aided and greatly influenced the governor-general's plan of conquest. Furthermore, it shows that, although the British would continue to add to their Indian possessions after Wellesley, their dominion over the sub-continent was largely complete by the time he was recalled in 1805. This chapter deals with the destruction of one of the chief obstacles in the way of British hegemony—Tipu Sultan of Mysore; chapter eight addresses the expansion of British control throughout India by the strategic use of diplomacy; chapter nine discusses Edmonstone and Wellesley's transformation of the Calcutta government into an imperialist vehicle; and chapter ten describes the
Company’s wars with the final remaining great threat to Company domination--the Marathas.

Seventeen ninety-nine would prove pivotal for the British fortunes in India, although its major events had their origins in the previous year, the first of these being the change of regime in Awadh. Before leaving Lucknow to return to Calcutta, the British heard a rumor that Khaunazad Khan, one of Ali's counselors, had advised him after his flight to Biebiapur to go back to his capital, assemble troops and artillery, then open a negotiation with the Company to regain his throne. If they refused to reinstate him, he should resort to arms, and, if the battle began to go badly, load as much of the treasury as he could onto his horse and set out for the Marathas to seek help. The existence of such a plan seems at least plausible: Shore reported that Ali still had some adherents in Lucknow, among them those who simply preferred him to the secretive, parsimonious and Anglicized Sa'adat; but the prince also had "numerous Partizans among the Soldiery, and the lowest orders, who were adverse to any successor, and numbers had sworn allegiance to him, and had excited an activity in his cause, which they knew . . . might induce punishment" from the new nawab. Ali had reportedly ordered horses prepared for his return to the city to put the plan in effect, but several of his close associates, including his cousin Cassim and father-in-law Sherf Ali, talked him out of it. However, if the prince lost his nerve at the point of crisis, it appears that he regained it quickly and bitterly resented being deposed. This feeling may have been heightened by the fact that Edmonstone had set his pension at two lakhs of rupees per year, an amount that, while more than adequate for a comfortable lifestyle in his new home of Benares, was a pale reflection of the riches to which he was accustomed.

The second crucial event of 1798 was the surprising news about the identity of Shore's replacement. Shore had written to the directors as early as September 1797 that he was "almost worn out: and shall most gladly resign my station, either to Lord Hobart or to any other person you may think proper to appoint." Yet it is doubtless that he was pleased to learn that his friend and mentor Cornwallis had been selected over his old rival Hobart. Edmonstone, however, was less sanguine about the turn of events. As he wrote to his father, "[Shore's] departure is a source of real regret. I have lost by it a friend and benefactor." Cornwallis had given Edmonstone his start, but Shore had provided him with a position of power and influence, a situation threatened by a change in government. Soon after news of the appointment reached India, however, Edmonstone received an even more alarming report--Cornwallis had been redirected by parliament to deal with a rebellion in Ireland. Instead of the experienced governor-general, India was getting a last-minute replacement, Richard Wellesley, who had never been in the East and, at thirty-seven, was only five years older than Edmonstone.

Wellesley had come to his lofty appointment through a series of calculated maneuvers combined with good fortune. His outspoken support for war on France made him the ally of Addington, Dundas and, especially, Pitt, of whom Wellesley commented that he was like a brother. In 1797, at Pitt's request, Wellesley penned a patriotic, if somewhat turgid, ballad for a celebration given by the Company in honor of the British victory at Camperdown, part of which opined:

Nor yet can Hope presage the auspicious hour,
When Peace shall check the rage of lawless power; . . .
Exhaustless Passion feeds the augmented flame,
And wild ambition mocks the voice of shame.\textsuperscript{12}

The sentiments were so popular that they were later printed in the \textit{Anti-Jacobin}, a pro-war publication. Wellesley could not have realized that similar words to those he used to excoriate the French would one day be applied to him. He became a member of the Board of Control in 1794, and in 1797 persuaded Cornwallis to take him in his entourage to India as governor of Madras. His superior's unexpected transfer gave him a golden opportunity and he immediately requested to be allowed to replace Cornwallis; with the directors under pressure to reach a decision, Pitt and Dundas were able to persuade them to agree. When Wellesley sailed for India on November 7, 1797, it was as the new governor-general. Wellesley's qualifications for the appointment were few: to send a man who had never fought in a battle or served in the ranks of the Company, whose sole experience with India were the reports he had heard in board meetings in London, to oversee the Company's entire Indian operation seems the height of folly. Perhaps, as he had been on Cornwallis' staff, the directors managed to convince themselves that they were getting a younger version of the general; if so, events quickly proved them in error.

Wellesley was small in stature, but nonetheless imposing in appearance, with deep set blue eyes, thinning black hair, a prominent hooked nose and a taste for fashionable attire.\textsuperscript{13} He was once depicted as having a "sonorous voice [and] placid countenance," a description which seems at odds with his reputation as a vigorous debater in parliament and much of his known history.\textsuperscript{14} He had the distinction of having attended both Harrow and Eton, as he had been expelled from the former for inciting riots; his adult life proved equally unconventional, involving a scandal over the fact that he and his wife had five children together before they were married. Although gifted with intelligence and ability, Wellesley's most obvious character traits were vanity, arrogance and ambition. He was well aware that Cornwallis was given a marquisate for his actions in India and even Shore, whom Wellesley once described as "of low birth, vulgar manners and eastern habits,"\textsuperscript{15} received an Irish title and a generous pension for his service. Wellesley assumed he would be able to do even better; as would soon become evident, his hopes centered on an impressive title and possibly membership in the Order of the Garter.

While Wellesley made preparations for the journey East, Edmonstone contrived plans to win his new superior's favor. Shore was easily induced to write a letter to his successor, recommending Edmonstone in "the strongest and most flattering terms."\textsuperscript{16} He also wrote to Alured Clarke, who became interim governor-general after Shore's departure on March 7 for England, and Edmonstone thereby became Clarke's private secretary. Edmonstone obtained additional recommendations from Dundas and Cornwallis, owing to his father's efforts in Britain. Still, he remained uncertain about the reception he would receive from the new governor-general.

Wellesley landed at the Cape of Good Hope in February 1798, where he met three people who gave him troubling reports on Indian affairs. Lord Hobart, who was returning to England still stinging from the directors' decision to refuse him the governor-generalship, painted a grim picture of affairs in the south. He warned Wellesley about the French mercenaries who had been employed by the nizam and Tipu to help train their armies, and of the danger for the British in India that he believed this
created. General David Baird, a one-time prisoner in Tipu's dungeons, added to the alarming reports, noting that Tipu had a large army, 70 pieces of artillery, and expectations of receiving soldiers from France. Most importantly, the new governor-general met Major William Kirkpatrick, who was recuperating from an illness at the Cape.

William Kirkpatrick joined the East India Company as a cadet in 1771 at age 17, became captain in 1781 and major in 1790. In 1793, he was appointed aide-de-camp to Sir John Shore, and was sent as an envoy to Nepal, to mediate between the Nepalese, the Tibetans and the Chinese. He was an old friend of Edmonstone's and Cherry's who shared their political opinions, as had been evidenced when, under the pseudonym Asiaticus, he wrote a strong rebuttal to a pamphlet issued during the Third Mysore War castigating the Company for its attack on Tipu. Kirkpatrick proudly referred to the Company as "a great and powerful Sovereign ruling by Delegation over some of the finest Kingdoms in the East" and praised the Machiavellian tactics which had "obtained Dominion over them either by Conquest, or Circumvention; under the specious name of Aid, that is either by open Force or underhand Fraud." In his view, the Company had to strike first, using whatever means were most effective, or they would not last long in Asia: "zeal & Fidelity . . . I take to be mere expletives in most languages, but particularly in those of the East[;] . . . although [Indian sovereigns] may have been taught to lisp the words, in their Hearts they are utter Strangers to & disclaim their practice." As resident at Hyderabad from 1795 to 1798, Kirkpatrick managed to build up a sizeable intelligence network to report on Tipu's military capabilities and troop movements. He convinced Succaram Pandit, one of Tipu's own secret agents in Hyderabad, to inform on his employer, and received information from the nizam's spies, such as Mohammed Ameer Khan Arab, whose information on Tipu's army was regularly shared with the resident. Kirkpatrick also used intermediaries, such as Mahomed Ameer Khan, to collect information from many sources, like the khiladar of Bulhare who employed local people to scout Tipu's troop movements. He even hired ex-officers of the sultan's, such as Shoo Purshaud, who had held a position that enabled him to "speak with exactness respecting his preparations in the ordnance line," although Kirkpatrick did not trust him on matters of policy for he had not been important enough to gain access to Tipu's inner circle and could only repeat general rumors at court. As William was succeeded as resident by his younger brother, James Achilles, he was kept well-informed about events in southern India. Wellesley, who perhaps remembered Kirkpatrick from their time together at Eton as boys, was so impressed with him that he took him back to India in his entourage. During the Fourth Mysore War, Kirkpatrick served as General Harris' Persian interpreter and later became Wellesley's military secretary.

While at the Cape, the governor-general questioned his new military advisor closely about the force the nizam's French general, François de Raymond, commanded at Hyderabad, which Ali had acquired after Shore refused to aid him against the Marathas. He was alarmed to learn that Raymond had 11,000 troops and was planning to acquire 4,000 more. Kirkpatrick added, however, that the corps had come into being because of the nizam's desire to bring his army to a par with that of the Marathas, who had European-led battalions, not because of hostility towards the Company. A number of
factors should have assuaged Wellesley's fears: the nizam had appointed other foreign officers over his troops, including an American named Boyd and an Irishman named Finglass; many of Raymond's recruits were not French, some being Germans and others deserters from the Company's army; and most were not well trained or disciplined. Kirkpatrick also noted that

Raymond would not appear to be a man of vigorous mind, or in any respect of a very decided character. He has never shown himself to be much of a soldier. . . . He is undoubtedly Republican in principle, but I don't know that he is a violent one and should rather suppose from the general mould of his character that he was not.

The only real problem reported by Kirkpatrick concerned one of Raymond's regimental commanders, Perron, whom he described as an being "an outrageous Jacobin" who sent his namesake, General Perron in Sindiah's service, "a silver tree and cap of liberty," a present that was declined by its recipient.

Despite the lack of proof of an actual threat in Hyderabad, Wellesley viewed the nizam's corps as a serious potential problem. As he informed Dundas, "the dangers to be apprehended from the existence of this corps are not to be estimated by a consideration of its actual state of discipline, or even of its actual numbers, or degree of present influence over the councils of the Nizam. I consider it as the basis of a French party in India." Before he left the Cape, he was already formulating plans for somehow persuading the nizam to give up his French-led forces, for brokering a series of treaties between the nizam and the Marathas, and for entering into treaties with the major Indian powers, except Tipu, for a defensive alliance against the possibility of another Afghan invasion. Coming from the politically-charged atmosphere of the European conflict, Wellesley was concerned to the point of paranoia over any possibility of French aggression in the areas under his control. He warned the directors while still at the Cape that he was not sure that events in India would permit him to follow the pattern of non-interference they had discussed.

Wellesley's ship, the frigate La Virginie, made port at Fort St. George, Madras, on April 26, 1798. He arrived at Calcutta soon thereafter where, on May 18, he officially assumed control of the government. Edmonstone soon realized that his concern over his reception had been unfounded. Wellesley greeted him graciously, mentioned Dundas' and Cornwallis' recommendations, and immediately appointed him his personal secretary. As Edmonstone wrote in relief to his father, he soon acquired "the same free access to his house and his table that I had under Sir John Shore's government."

Edmonstone once commented to his brother Charles, who expressed amazement at how quickly he was able to come into favor with his superiors, that his success was merely due to his language ability, for he was "their only channel to speak to the natives." He was being somewhat disingenuous--Edmonstone's abilities may have been his chief attraction for Shore, but Wellesley also valued other things, such as his background, polished manners and sophistication. This was especially true as the governor-general was not impressed with most of the people he met in India, viewing them as "vulgar, ignorant, rude and stupid" and rebuffing "all approaches to familiarity." Edmonstone had an additional point in his favor for sharing his superior's political views. Edmonstone regarded the anti-war party in Britain as a "crew of Jacobins" and wondered "at the blindness of those who cannot or will not see that the views of the French respecting Great Britain have been the same from the first."
called the French "Scourges of the Earth" and, in 1798, gave a voluntary donation of Rs. 5,000 (about £625) to aid the war effort in Europe, commenting "what a happiness it is for the civilized world that England is engaged in the war." With so many elements in his favor, it is not surprising that, shortly after their meeting, Edmonstone reported that Wellesley had "done me the honor to desire that I will wear the king's frock uniform as one of his family." The governor-general was soon using Edmonstone "in other branches of the political department of the administration, both local and distant," in addition to his office of Persian translator.

In Edmonstone, Wellesley found a capable, experienced and charming Company servant who was also a kindred spirit—he had been urging British intervention in Indian affairs for years and working towards that end as much as his position permitted. On Edmonstone's part, he found in Wellesley someone who, although often thoughtless and demanding, combined the most useful attributes of both previous governors-general: like Cornwallis, Wellesley made quick decisions and rarely second-guessed himself; like Shore, his opinions could be swayed if the advice was properly presented. It was the beginning of, for India at least, a dangerous friendship.

Wellesley's concern over French intervention in India was soon heightened by the third seminal event of 1798—the arrival of French forces in Tipu's domains. In 1797, a French privateer had docked in the port of Mangalore on Tipu's western coast; its captain, François Ripaud, announced that he had come as an envoy from the French on Mauritius. He stated that a French army had landed on the island with the stated purpose of driving the British from India, and wanted Tipu's help. The sultan's ministers were doubtful of the privateer's story, but Tipu was intrigued. When Ripaud returned to Mauritius, two diplomats from Mysore accompanied him in the guise of merchants to investigate the matter. The delegates quickly discovered that Ripaud had been less than honest. Anne Joseph Hyppolite Malartic, the French governor of Mauritius, disowned the captain and explained to the envoys that most of his soldiers had been sent to help the Dutch in Batavia (Jakarta), but offered to call for volunteers for service in India if Tipu wished. Despite the governor's protestations, Edmonstone considered it possible that Ripaud was working under his orders, to stir up trouble between Tipu and the Company. Should troops have to be sent to aid the Company in India, it would relieve pressure on the French in Europe.

Only about a hundred volunteers answered the call for service with Tipu, and were thereafter sent to Mangalore. The incident would likely have been soon forgotten had not one of the notices calling for volunteers fallen into British hands; it came to the attention of Lord Macartney and Sir Hugh Christian at the Cape, who forwarded it to Wellesley. The governor-general was genuinely alarmed at first, but soon ascertained that Mauritius could ill afford to support Tipu, that few recruits, and those of a questionable quality, had been raised by the notice, and that the Company was in no danger of a combined Mysore/French assault. He nonetheless felt that the opportunity Tipu's actions had given him was too good to be missed, as it provided the perfect excuse to recreate Cornwallis' attack on Mysore—with Napoleon causing havoc in Europe, no one was likely to question actions against a supposed French ally in India. As he wrote to Dundas in July 1798:

If the war should continue in Europe, there is little doubt but that the impetuosity of Tipu will afford frequent justifiable opportunities to this government of reducing his
power. My wish is to know distinctly whether the Company be prepared to encounter the temporary inconvenience which must be endured before they can obtain permanent security for their possessions in India.\textsuperscript{41}

A number of factors contributed to Wellesley's rigid attitude on Tipu. The governor-general's strong anti-French sentiments and Kirkpatrick's belief in pre-emptive strikes no doubt had important roles, but so did thoughts of the rewards of victory. The latter were probably paramount in Tipu's case: Wellesley was well aware that Cornwallis's actions had effectively de-clawed the tiger of Mysore, but, as the peace-through-aggression argument had proved an acceptable reason for initiating the Third Anglo-Mysore War, it was possible to use it to justify a fourth. He therefore concentrated his efforts on persuading the directors that Tipu still posed a threat to the Company. The directors had issued a proclamation stating that the landing of "any considerable French force" in Tipu's territory would be considered grounds for war.\textsuperscript{42} Wellesley therefore inquired of Dundas what constituted a "considerable force." The landing of a hundred or so ill-equipped and untrained recruits, with little prospect of more to come, did not seem to fit the criteria. However, he advised his friend that even a small French presence could pose a threat to the British by inciting the Indian rulers against them, and that he viewed the landing of any number of French as grounds for war.\textsuperscript{43} The letter to Dundas was merely to insure that Wellesley had help in justifying the action he had already determined to take. A month prior to sending it, he wrote to General George Harris, ordering him to "call upon the allies without delay, and to assemble an army upon the coast with all possible expedition.\textsuperscript{44}

Edmonstone, although bearing no love for Tipu, preferred to see British aggrandizement come about through treaty, as had been the case in Awadh, rather than through war. He did not feel the French to be a serious threat to India, especially in the case of those on Mauritius. As he wrote to his father:

The French have not been idle in this part of the world in their endeavors, limited as the scope of them, to incite tumult between us and our neighbors[;] . . . a species of Revolution has, however, taken place in the Maritins, which must preclude the French from affording any material aide to Tippoo.\textsuperscript{45}

With French troops occupied elsewhere, dissatisfied Mauritians had revolted and blocked the harbor. Far from being able to send aid to Tipu, the French officials on the island were themselves in need of assistance. Yet Edmonstone was not at all inclined to jeopardize his new friendship with Wellesley to save his old enemy harassment.

Others were much more outspoken. Mr. Webbe, the secretary of government at Madras, cited an empty treasury and the high cost, in money and men, of previous wars with Mysore as reasons for avoiding a fourth, and predicted "shocking disasters . . . and the impeachment of Lord Mornington for his temerity" if such a course of action were followed.\textsuperscript{46} Arthur Wellesley, the governor-general's younger brother, and General Harris believed that Tipu would agree to a settlement with the British, but their ideas of conciliation were not welcomed by Wellesley, who realized that no war meant no glory. His generals were therefore instructed to prepare the British forces for conflict.

Wellesley informed Dundas in July 1798 that he had written to Tipu, demanding that he explain his actions, but this was in fact untrue--no such letter had been sent to the sultan. Instead, Edmonstone translated a number of communications to Tipu professing Wellesley's "sincere desire to maintain the good understanding" existing between the
Company and Mysore.47 At the same time, Wellesley clearly stated to the Company's officers in Calcutta that to allow Tipu a chance to explain his actions would be both dangerous and futile—he would only lie to give himself more time to make military preparations. To allow him to make reparations was also impossible, as the principle "could not be applied in cases of intended injury."48 Therefore, while Tipu was being reassured by repeated protestations of British goodwill, the Company began negotiations for allies for a war against him.

Overtures were made to the Marathas and the nizam for a coalition against Tipu. The Marathas were uninterested, but the nizam was induced to join the British side. He had never felt secure from Tipu, and the problems between himself and the peshwa had left him feeling crushed between two hostile states. He was so eager for the alliance that he dismissed his French-trained units and, in June 1798, signed a subsidiary treaty agreeing to support six battalions of Company troops in his land.49 As the nizam was one of the leading powers in India, and therefore could not be treated as cavalierly as Awadh had been, the treaty was in the old style, being a simple military alliance. Its intent, however, went far beyond its words. As Wellesley noted:

The establishment of our subsidized force at . . . Hyderabad will afford effectual means of guarding, not only against any such intrusion [a foreign invasion], but against the undue growth of any native power. While we possess so formidable a force in the center of India, no such event can happen without our knowledge and consent.50

The obvious question is, where did Wellesley gain such a quick grasp of the usefulness of the subsidiary alliance system? He had only been in India just over six months when he made the above remark; he had been in active control of the government for only four. When it is considered that his primary counselors were Edmonstone, William Kirkpatrick, and his brothers Arthur and Henry Wellesley, the answer is not difficult to determine. Kirkpatrick reinforced Edmonstone's political opinions until his retirement from the Company's service in 1801, while Wellesley's siblings were as unfamiliar with the subcontinent as he. Arthur, beginning the military career that would culminate in a dukedom, had landed with his regiment at Calcutta in February 1797 and Henry arrived with Richard as his confidential secretary.

Edmonstone's influence with Wellesley was achieved partly due to his own efforts and abilities, and, as with Shore, partially the result of the governor-general's attitude and habits. Wellesley's poor opinion of the Company's employees kept him from socializing freely with them except on state occasions. Other than for the members of his household, of whom Edmonstone was numbered, he lived a solitary existence. He relied on his brother Arthur to advise him on many military issues, and on Henry to assist with the day-to-day paperwork of government, but it was to Edmonstone that he turned for advice in dealing with the Indians in a diplomatic capacity. This exclusive clique of four remained in existence throughout his time in India and, although Arthur and Henry were often parted from their brother on assignments, Edmonstone was virtually Wellesley's shadow for seven years. As Wellesley noted:

From the time of my arrival at Fort William in 1798 until my departure in 1805, Mr. Edmonstone was constantly in my unreserved confidence; he was not only my advisor and intimate counselor in all political transactions, but my faithful & active instrument in the execution of all my political arrangements & plans. The success
which attended my measures is, in a very great degree, to be ascribed to Mr. Edmonstone's judgement in advising[;] . . . he was scarcely a moment absent from me during the whole of my eventful career in India.\textsuperscript{51}

Thus the man who had agitated for the depositions of Ghulam Mohammedi and Vizier Ali, who had reinvented the subsidiary alliance system in Awadh and who distrusted and feared all Indian authority, became Wellesley's closest political advisor.

While diplomatic negotiations were underway with the nizam, word reached India that French forces under Napoleon had landed in Egypt, and rumors were soon flying that India was the Corsican's next target. The French seemed to be employing the same tactic used by Malartic in their propaganda: if the British could be made to think that a large force were soon to land in India, they would have to send troops that were badly needed in Europe to Asia. Napoleon may have been attempting to convince Tipu to attack the Company, and thereby provide a needed distraction, when he wrote to him that he was "on the borders of the Red Sea, with an innumerable and invincible army, full of the desire of delivering you from the iron yoke of England."\textsuperscript{52} Yet, as the letter was, possibly purposely, allowed to fall into British hands before it reached Tipu, it might have been meant simply as another scare tactic. Either way, it gave Wellesley an excuse to write to the directors requesting an augmentation to the Company's forces. They supplied 4,000 seasoned troops, but warned the governor-general to "exercise the utmost discretion, that we may not be involved in a war in India without the utmost necessity."\textsuperscript{53} The caution had little effect, as Wellesley had already determined the necessity for war to his satisfaction.

By November 1798, when the British forces were almost prepared for war, Wellesley finally wrote to Tipu concerning the French. His letter contained an ultimatum: to avoid the possibility of hostilities with the Company, Tipu had to banish all French from his lands, accept a permanent British residency at Seringapatam, and surrender his seacoast province to the Company. Arthur strongly opposed the terms, telling his brother that they were unreasonable, and that Tipu would never give up his only outlet to the sea without a fight. That was, of course, exactly what Wellesley hoped.

After the letter was sent, Edmonstone and Wellesley sailed for Madras to supervise the final military preparations. Edmonstone informed William that "we landed the evening of the 31st [of December] and dined at Lord Clive's gardens[;] . . . beds were prepared for the party at the admiralty house in the Fort & I slept there the first night, but have since got a room at Lord M[ornington]'s where I have fixed myself and my office."\textsuperscript{54}

Soon after his arrival at Madras, Edmonstone paid a diplomatic visit to Umdat-ul-Umara, the ruler of the Carnatic since 1795. The meeting serves to highlight the Indian perception of Edmonstone's authority:

[Umdat-ul-Umara] received me when I went the day before yesterday to visit him . . . with the most extraordinary degree of fondness. He called me the blessing of God, told me that I had bought him & his whole family, Hugged me fifty times over, kissed my hands & in short was so extravagantly happy to see me that I thought him down-right mad. All this in requital for the service he supposed me to have rendered him during the dissentions between Lord Hobart & Sir J Shore.\textsuperscript{55}

Umdat obviously believed Edmonstone to be involved in making the decisions he transmitted, rather than just translating them. He seems to have viewed him as
occupying a position in the British administration similar to that of chief minister or vizier in an Indian court, a largely accurate perception. In this case, however, the nawab was mistaken about Edmonstone's actions—as he candidly admitted to William, he had made no efforts at all on Umdat's part. It is likely that he was far more in sympathy with Hobart's attitude toward the Carnatic than Shore's, but was not about to say so to the nawab; Edmonstone had a friend involved in a dispute with Umdat, and he intended to use his influence to help him. Had Umdat-ul-Umara had any idea what Edmonstone's future actions in the Carnatic would be, it is safe to say that his welcome would have been far different.

At Madras, the party found Tipu's reply to Wellesley's communication. He stated that he had no desire for hostilities with the Company, and that the existing treaties between himself and the British were sufficient to insure continued friendship without further concessions on his part. Edmonstone thought the letter full of "paltry subterfuge," but believed it demonstrated that the sultan was "disinclined to the contest" and was unlikely to initiate hostilities. This was a perceptive interpretation: Tipu could not realistically oppose the Company in his weakened condition without considerable reinforcements; as the nizam had taken the side of the British, the peshwa was staying neutral and no sizeable help was forthcoming from France, Tipu was no threat to the Company. Edmonstone's disinterest in war, however, was about to be drastically altered.

While Edmonstone was making diplomatic rounds in the Carnatic and translating letters to and from Tipu, news of events at Benares reached him. At eight a.m. on January 14, 1799, Ali arrived at Cherry's house at Secrole, about three miles outside Benares, to have breakfast with him; as usual on these occasions, he brought a retinue of attendants, many of whom were heavily armed. Not as usual, however, his attendants, of whom there were more than normal, did not disperse into the local bazaars to amuse themselves after seeing him safely to his destination; instead, they stayed outside Cherry's residence in military formation. Ali and a few companions, Izut Ali and Warass Ali, went in, were greeted at the door by Cherry, and shown into the dining room where breakfast was to be served. The party also included Richard Evans, a houseguest of Cherry's. Almost as soon as they sat down, just as tea was served, the conversation turned to serious matters. The following account was largely obtained from Cherry's servants by Hubert Cornish and Graeme Mercer, two of his neighbors.

Ali began by complaining of the inadequacy of his pension and of the governor-general's plans to move him to Calcutta. shore had thought it prudent to eventually move Ali farther away from the frontier, but had done nothing about it before his departure for Britain. Wellesley, prompted by a request from Sa'adat, had issued an order on December 24, 1798 for Ali's removal to Calcutta. Lumsden sent letters thereafter to Cherry indicating that there were rumors in Lucknow about Ali plotting to regain his throne, plans with which a change of venue would interfere, and warned him to be careful. Cherry, as usual, preferred his own assessment to anyone else's, and ignored the advice.

Although Ali seemed "much agitated, and expressed himself with intemperance" over the move, Cherry was not immediately alarmed, perhaps because Ali had asked to meet with him that morning "with the avowed intention of taking his leave before his departure for Calcutta." Wellesley would later note that, although Ali had at first
seemed unhappy with the news of the move, "in a short time he appeared to be entirely reconciled." 65 Cherry therefore merely protested that he had nothing to do with making the decision, but had relayed the orders as instructed by Calcutta. 66 Ali replied that Cherry "had ruined the house of Asoph ud Dowlah" 67 and that he was not going anywhere, and Warass Ali stood up and stationed himself on the opposite side of Cherry, who was caught between the two men. 68 Cherry unwisely informed the prince that, if he persisted in his attitude, he might have to report him to government. 69 At that, an enraged Ali grabbed Cherry and began shaking him; apparently finally realizing the seriousness of his situation, Cherry cried out, "For God's sake don't strike me, what fault have I committed? I will write anything to Government you wish." 70

When Ali's attendants drew their weapons a moment later, Cherry broke away from the prince and ran for the hall door, although hampered by Ali grabbing the skirts of his coat. 71 Izut Ali struck him across the shoulders with his sword, but the wound was apparently not serious for Cherry tore free and ran through the hall and across the verandah to the garden. 72 There he was forced back by some of Ali's attendants on horseback, who fired at him and slashed at him with their swords. 73 He fled to a spot near the verandah where Warass Ali stopped him by thrusting a poignard through his chest, 74 after which some of Ali's other attendants fell on the dying man, stabbing him repeatedly and hacking one hand completely off. 75 As Cherry was being murdered in the garden, Izut Ali attacked Mr. Evans, but the young man grabbed both his hands and hung on, making it impossible for Izut to draw his pistols. Several of the house servants rescued him by attacking and killing Izut. 76 but Evans was nonetheless fatally shot by some of Ali's men, and "afterwards much mangled," 77 in his subsequent attempt to flee. Captain Conway, an old acquaintance of Cherry's who had not seen him since their voyage to India twenty years before, was also a houseguest. He had not been to breakfast, as he had gone on a morning ride, but he returned in the middle of the melee and was shot dead before he could dismount his horse. 78 He was afterwards hacked into so many pieces "that hardly any remains of a human figure were left." 79

After "plundering and breaking everything" in Cherry's home, 80 Ali's group rode off towards the house of Samuel Davis, a local judge, with whom Ali had a longstanding feud. Davis had been complaining to government about "the style of magnificence in which [Ali] lived, his numerous & increasing Retinue of armed men, his contumacious conduct towards the Court of Justice at Benares, & the independence he affected upon all occasions." 81 The prince had especially angered Davis by refusing to allow several of his servants to answer questions in his court about a breach of the peace in which they were implicated, which the judge interpreted as a sign of contempt for it had happened several times before. 82 After leaving Cherry's, Ali sent detachments of his followers to check nearby bungalows, most of which were empty as Hubert Cornish and a Mr. Sealy, Cherry's closest neighbors, had been invited to the house of the local doctor, Graeme Mercer, for breakfast and had already departed. 83 Although Cornish had been verbally abused by some of Ali's retainers as his palanquin passed Cherry's house earlier, violence had not yet broken out and they left him alone; another neighbor, Robert Graham, who left later, was not so lucky. Just as he set off in his palanquin for Mercer's bungalow, one of Ali's detachments crossed the field separating the two houses, killed him, and plundered his belongings. 84 A local European merchant, Mr. Hill, whose Ali's party met on the way to Davis', was also attacked and "dangerously wounded." 85
Ali reportedly offered his followers one thousand rupees for Davis' head, but the assault did not go as planned. The prince's men shot the sepoy sentinel at Davis' house when he attempted to raise the alarm, but the judge was nonetheless alerted by the sound of gunfire. When he looked out a window and saw horsemen enter his garden, he quickly led his wife, their two children and some of the house servants to the terrace surrounding the roof; he then positioned himself at the top of a very narrow, circular staircase which provided the only access to the promenade. It was built of wood and positioned in the corner of a room; with its base only about four feet wide, the ascent was so steep that only one person at a time could go up. The last turn before the terrace was reached faced a wall, allowing those below no target at which to aim. Davis therefore managed, with the help of an iron pike, to hold off all attempts by the assailants to mount the stairs.

Several regiments of British cavalry troops arrived from their quarters at Bataber, about ten miles from Benares, after an hour and twenty minutes. They had been alerted by some of Davis' servants who fled the house to escape assault, and scared the remaining assailants away. Ali did not wait to see the outcome of events at Davis', but went back to Benares where he joined with a fellow conspirator, Muzzafar Bakht, a grandson of the Mughal emperor, and a group of his followers. Ali then issued proclamations stating that he had "destroyed the English gentlemen & that his authority was now established in the City," and distributed money to his followers to insure their loyalty. Soon, according to a British report, "every Scoundrel in the city flocked to his standard for the sake of plunder," and Ali collected between two and three thousand adherents. In fact, some may have joined him for different reasons: the prince had made himself popular in Benares by his generosity, such as his habit of spending large amounts on the marriages of friends' children. In any case, he soon had enough followers to send a group to attack the treasury and the jail, but they were repelled at both places. Meanwhile, three thousand British troops began marching through the city toward Ali's residence in Mahdoo Doss' garden, although hampered somewhat by being fired on along the way by the prince's adherents from rooftops and alleyways. Mukherjee records that, once the British reached their objective, Ali's men fled "at the first puff of gunpowder" and the prince, who wanted to fight on single-handedly, was only persuaded to leave the battle by Muzaffar Bakht. The British accounts, however, tell a very different story:

When the firing commenced at Mahdoo Doss' Vizier Ali it is said was in one of the Turrets busily firing at the Seapoys advancing, but when he had got up to the Gate, he told his people to remain firm & that he would mount his horse and with another party attack us in the Rear. He however took the opportunity of getting out at the back door where he had horses in readiness & immediately fled to the Eastward. 

The latter version seems more plausible. If Ali's men had fled before the prince, the British would almost certainly have been able to apprehend him that night; as it was, he used the time it took the Company's troops to get past the defenders at the gate to make his escape. He left behind his wife, thirty members of his harem, and a good amount of money and valuable articles, prompting the suspicion that his plan was not well-thought out, but made shortly after finding out that he was to be moved. The resistance put up by those Ali left behind ceased soon after he escaped, following the destruction of the front gate by a British fieldpiece, although it took more than...
a day to stop the looting which had broken out in the city.\textsuperscript{102} More than twenty sepoys were killed in the attack.\textsuperscript{103}

Ali and a small group of supporters took refuge in the lands of the Rohilla chief, the Raja of Bhutwal, on the border of Nepal and Awadh. The raja, who was a vassal of the Raja of Nepal as well as of the vizier, was on a visit to Katmandu, but his attendants gave Ali protection. He immediately began raising troops, although Edmonstone heard they never amounted to more than "6,000 rabble,\textsuperscript{104}" most being the followers of several discontented zamindars.\textsuperscript{105} Ali's sojourn in Bhutwal was short, as the Raja of Nepal not only refused to approve his sanctuary, but sent a force against him.\textsuperscript{106} A British force under General Stuart caught up with Ali on his retreat from Bhutwal and, although most of the prince's followers deserted him during the fight, he escaped through, as Edmonstone heard, "the treachery of a party of the Vizier's house which had surrounded him and effected his retreat in disguise."\textsuperscript{107}

Edmonstone, who sent an account to Shore of the event, soon known as the "Massacre at Benares," called it "a scene of horror scarcely to be surpassed in the annals of mankind."\textsuperscript{108} He was so devastated by the news of his friend's murder that it was several months before he could bring himself to write about the incident to William. He commented that he had

hitherto avoided writing to you about the dreadful massacre at Benares.--so closely connected as I was with all the transactions which led to it & so interested as a private man in the shocking catastrophe you will judge what my feelings have been upon this occasion. It is not a subject that I wish to write upon, I never think on it without horror & I have long endeavored to drive it from my thoughts but it is forever returning to mind.\textsuperscript{109}

The members of the Company were far from home and anything familiar. The friendships they formed were therefore unusually strong, perhaps substituting for the family members they had left behind. Losing Cherry was, for Edmonstone, almost like losing a brother. Of course, he had lost friends in India before through illness, but the gruesome facts of Cherry's death made it especially hard to take. At almost the same time, news arrived that another friend of his had been killed by violence on the way to India when the French boarded his ship.\textsuperscript{110}

Despite his distress over his friend's death, Edmonstone nonetheless felt that Ali had been able to attempt his coup only because Cherry was too trusting. He had received a letter from Cherry soon after Ali's arrival in Benares which informed him that the prince did not seem to be the villain he had been reported. Edmonstone was skeptical, but his "belief in his innate depravity was staggered by the repeated commendations which poor Cherry bestowed on him."\textsuperscript{111} As Edmonstone informed Shore, Cherry's "unaccountable infatuation" with the ex-wazir had led him to discount "the various indications he gave of a violent, ungovernable & intriguing spirit."\textsuperscript{112}

Cherry's murder was more than just a personal tragedy, for it changed Edmonstone's perception of the British position in India. He had always thought them vulnerable and had wanted the army strengthened and neighboring states allied more closely to British interests, but it had been something of an academic issue. Now that the threat had been brought home in a personal way, he began to view the Company's, and his own, position with increasing apprehension. This was especially true once he learned of papers found at Ali's residence after his flight from Benares, which contained a plan that Edmonstone
believed "menaced in its consequences the absolute subversion of the British power in India." Letters to and from Ambajee Ingle, an important commander and agent for Daulut Rao Sindhia, were discovered in which he agreed to aid Ali's revolt with Maratha troops, and the prince also had promises of assistance from the rajas of Bundelkhand, tributaries of the Maratha chiefs. Ali had even sent emissaries to Tipu and Zeman Shah requesting help, and promised the latter three crores of rupees and an annual tribute of 35 lakhs if he was restored.

The agent sent to Zeman Shah, Mulla Mohammed, was an old adherent of Ali's, and had at one time tutored Asaf-ud-Daula. He was sent with jewels and provisions worth about 50 lakhs, along with a sealed letter to the shah, but he never reached his destination. The British learned of the mission and wrote to their ally, the Raja of Bekanur, to detain him and send his papers to Calcutta. The raja relieved Mulla Mohammed of the expensive gifts he was carrying, killed him and sent the missive in his keeping to Wellesley, for whom it provided yet another reason to insist on Ali's removal to Calcutta. After reading the additional letters found after Ali's flight from Benares, Wellesley informed the directors that they made it clear that "a conspiracy had been formed for the purpose not only of restoring Vizier Ali to the throne of Oude, but also of favoring the invasion of Zeman Shah, and of expelling the English nation from the provinces of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa.

Lumsden added to the government's concern over intrigues by reporting in March that a man named Indermun, carrying letters of introduction from Ambajee and General Perron, had contacted the resident requesting aid. The man claimed to have traveled to Lucknow from Sindhia's camp to attend the wedding of a relative, but that some of his fellow travelers had surrounded his house and threatened to charge him with being an agent of Vizier Ali's unless he paid them. As the British force under Stuart was just about to set off in pursuit of Ali, Lumsden viewed Indermun's appearance as highly suspicious, and immediately sent a message to Sa'adat requesting that he detain Indermun's accusers for questioning and have the man himself followed while he remained in Lucknow. Sa'adat's servants arrived at Indermun's house within two hours of the note reaching Lumsden, but neither Indermun nor his accusers could be found. Lumsden strongly suspected that he had been warned to flee by someone in the government.

Edmonstone also informed Shore of a subsidiary plot revealed by a letter found in Mahdoo Doss' garden from Shams-ud-Daulah, the brother-in-law of Nasir ul Mulk, Nawab of Murshidabad, to Zeman Shah. From it the British found that Shams, and probably the nawab himself, had hoped to obtain Afghan help to assist their own rebellion, to drive the British from India and to place the nawab in control of Bengal. They were willing to combine with Ali, who was to reclaim his position in Awadh.

Both plots came to nothing--the Marathas, Tipu and Zeman Shah all failed to send the would-be revolutionaries any aid, much less did they combine to do so. The Marathas had no reason to risk much for Ali, and Edmonstone felt it probable that Ambajee had been leading the prince on in order "to obtain money from him under the pretence of assisting him." He also thought it barely possible that the Marathas, nervous about a new incursion into India by the Afghans in 1798, "had conceived the project of diverting the object of Zemaun Shah's invasion from the Marhatta territory to that of the Vizier . . . by laying a foundation of insurrection in Oude."
Unlike the picture Aniruddha Ray has painted of Ali as merely "a tool in the hands of others [who] paid the price for it," his actions in 1798-9 make his character clear. His willingness to kill anyone, either British or Indian, whom he met during his insurrection could be, with difficulty, blamed on followers who became overly zealous; his leaving adherents and family on the field of battle in Benares might be, with equal difficulty, attributed to necessity; his attitude towards Awadh, however, is impossible to dismiss. In addition to placing his homeland in a tributary relationship to the Afghans, Ali was apparently willing to allow "Zemaun Shah's views of plunder & ambition," to be gratified there if he received aid in reclaiming the throne. The shah's disinterest in doing more than once again plundering Lahore was soon evident, however, and news of his brother's plots against him prompted his return to Afghanistan before the Massacre at Benares took place. The conspirators were unable on their own to raise a significant force and, if Indermun were in Lucknow to find assistance for Ali, he failed miserably.

The plan's impracticality did not, however, reassure Edmonstone considerably--even the vague possibility of several great powers combining against the British was appalling, and the fact that Ali and Shams' plans had failed did not mean others were not plotting, possibly with more effect. The whole affair left a deep impression on Edmonstone--probably because he felt himself at least partially to blame for Cherry's death. Edmonstone had often spoken to Wellesley about Ali, as "I still thought him dangerous & I was earnest for his being called (not to Calcutta) but to someplace between Patna and Calcutta." The knowledge that he had, however unwittingly, helped to set the stage for the massacre must have added an additional weight to his grief. It also set the seal on his attitude towards the British position in India. As he informed his brother Charles:

The dreadful catastrophe of my more than friend Cherry made an indelible impression upon my mind[;] . . . [it] opened my eyes still more than before to the existence of principles, views & sentiments in the inhabitants of the Company's Dominions & of India in general with respect to those of our nation [different] from what are believed to exist among them by those who have not had the opportunities that I have to know of them[: . . . they entertain the utmost hatred towards us, especially the Mohammedans whose power has been annihilated by our supremacy. They consider us as polluted beings, as wretches devoted to damnation . . . by the tenets of their religion the persecution & murder of Infidels is a merit entitling them to the highest rewards in a future state[;] . . . can you wonder that I should detest a country where such a system exists, & must exist in spite of all the benevolent efforts of the ruling power to dispense justice & maintain the rights and religion of its subjects? . . . I have not withheld [these views] from this govt & in conversation I have been still more explicit. From being a land of adventure and opportunity, India had become for Edmonstone a minefield where any wrong step could lead to destruction. He believed that "assassins are to be met with at every corner & that while we are thus secure and confident . . . the most dangerous schemes may be conceived and executed." The advice Edmonstone said he had not withheld from government was his belief that the Indians could not be won over by what he called "the modern French philosophy," the acknowledgement of their right to have some say in their government. On the contrary, he felt that "every step we take . . . to approximate the natives to ourselves is dangerous to our
existence." In Edmonstone's perception, the revolt at Benares was an indication of a much larger problem. He became convinced that to avoid addressing the issue of British/Indian relations would result in a massive rebellion and a mob "that should cut all our throats." Edmonstone's influence over Wellesley's thoughts on the issue is clear. On March 27, 1799, Neil wrote to William that the great body of Mussulmen from whom we have wrested the Govt. & whom we now exclude from all situations of extensive trust & power, will ever harbor a wish to regain the supremacy. They hate us not only as we are usurpers but as they are bigots. Their religion will justify while their instinct prompts their attempts to destroy us. In this class too I reckon a very large proportion of the Hindoos. To conciliate enemies of this description is impracticable. We must control them.

A month later, on April 22, Wellesley informed the directors that it is a radical imperfection in the constitution of our establishments in India, that no system appears to have been adopted with a view either to conciliate the goodwill or to control the disaffection of this description of our subjects [the Muslims], whom we found in possession of the government, and whom we have excluded from all share of emolument, honour, and authority.

He and Edmonstone concluded that the expansion of British territory in India and the new restrictions on Indian life were behind the proliferation of rebellions; however, they also believed that the establishment of better control over the Indians, both inside and outside British areas, was the best solution, rather than a return to the old, less restrictive style of government. As the governor-general told the directors less than a month after Cherry's death, although Bengal and Awadh seemed quiet after Ali's abortive uprising, "it will require much consideration to devise such a system of measures as shall afford permanent security to your Possessions against the ultimate consequences of an event of such evil." Edmonstone would begin working on that system immediately.

In the coming years, the concept of gaining control over the Indians was to become an obsession with Edmonstone. He wrote on the subject many times and, although he often acknowledged that the British had brought at least some of their problems on themselves, his solution to the issue of Indian animosity remained the same. He recommended increased control over the Indians under British authority, alliances with all neutral Indian powers and the subjugation of any hostile ones; the system became the prototype for British/Indian relations for the rest of the Company era. His old nemesis, Tipu, was for Edmonstone a symbol of everything that had gone wrong in recent years between the British and Indians, and his destruction was something to which Edmonstone looked forward with relish. C.A. Bayly notes that, in later years, Edmonstone "called into being a demonology of Indian politics which used Indian sources to justify territorial expansion by painting a picture of British strategic weakness." This was the beginning of that practice; the point Bayly overlooked is that Edmonstone fully believed the bogies he reported to government. Cherry's murder had given Wellesley a staunch ally in Edmonstone, who would thereafter employ his considerable knowledge of Indian affairs in the furtherance of the governor-general's dreams of conquest.
It seems that Tipu had failed to make preparations for a war with the Company because he simply did not believe such a thing to be likely, at least not over the Mauritius affair. He appears to have interpreted Wellesley's war preparations from an Indian perspective: a show of force was often used by Indian rulers to obtain a desired end without war. The Marathas had used the tactic in the early days of their dispute with Nizam Ali, and Tipu had employed it against the Company before the Third Anglo-Mysore War. He viewed the Company's protests as a similar diplomatic tactic--designed to elicit further concessions, not to provoke actual hostilities. Tipu therefore took his time replying to a letter sent in January 1799 containing a Company ultimatum. Wellesley wrote that Tipu had to either receive a British delegation headed by Major Doveton, whom Tipu knew from the negotiations following the Third Mysore War, to discuss a settlement or face "dangerous consequences." Realizing that he had little choice but to negotiate, yet wanting to preserve his dignity, Tipu sent the governor-general a somewhat offhand note in acceptance of the terms. He said that he was going on a hunting trip, but would make time to receive the British delegation.

Tipu's letter did not arrive in Madras until February, giving Wellesley an excuse to withdraw Doveton as a negotiator, and to inform him that he would have to deal with General Harris instead. Considering that Harris had set out with an army on February 11 for Tipu's territories, the offer was unlikely to further good relations between the two parties. However, Wellesley had no real desire to negotiate; he was pleased at having involved the sultan in a war, as evidenced by his comments to Lord Grenville, "I have had the satisfaction to succeed completely in drawing the Beast of the jungle into the toils." Realizing that he might have seriously mistaken the British plans, Tipu made belated attempts to halt the advance of the Company's forces, but neither scorched-earth tactics nor surprise cavalry attacks on the Company's forces were successful. From the governor-general's side in Madras, Edmonstone followed the accounts of Tipu's frustrated attempts to stop the British advance with an emotion approaching glee. He was somewhat bothered by Wellesley's decision to march the army on February 11, two days before Tipu's answer to his ultimatum arrived, as it did not seem honorable, but he justified the action to William by remarking that Tipu's attempts to come to terms with the Company were nothing more than "palpable duplicity & evident deceit." Being convinced by the attack on Cherry of the duplicitous nature of the Indians, Edmonstone interpreted Tipu's every action in the worst possible light. If the sultan tried to negotiate, it was obviously a ploy to gain time while he readied his troops; if he attacked the armies invading his territory, it was evidence of his warlike nature; his obvious lack of preparation for war was likewise interpreted, not as evidence of his belief in the negotiation process, but proof of the extent of his "dissimulation which necessarily obliged him while in the practise of it to refrain from active measures against us." Edmonstone believed the war to be necessary to show all of India that the Company was not a minor power whose officials could be murdered at will and whose survival could be constantly threatened by plots against it. He thoroughly supported, and probably encouraged, Wellesley's determination to avoid negotiation. He commented that "the temper of men's minds in this country as well as of recent occurrences which have betrayed that temper, [show that] the necessity for boldness & exertion is greater than ever." With such an attitude from his chief advisor, and with Wellesley himself
pre-disposed towards a glorious victory, it is not surprising that Tipu's offers to negotiate fell on deaf ears.

Harris reached the walls of Seringapatam in early April 1799, which was, ironically, tiger-hunting season in India. Tipu sent a letter to the general on April 20 requesting that he "appoint such persons as you judge proper for conducting a conference and renewing the business of a treaty." Harris responded as previously instructed by Wellesley that, to escape further hostilities, Tipu had to surrender half his remaining territory, pay 20,000,000 rupees to the Company and give eight hostages for his future good behavior, four to be his best generals and four his sons. Such terms seem designed to be rejected, and Tipu at first did so, but soon began to reconsider as the second British force, led by Lieutenant-General James Stuart, joined Harris and the city fell under daily bombardment. On April 28, Tipu offered to send two officials to discuss terms with Harris, but the general refused to receive them unless the hostages he had demanded accompanied them. Seeing victory close at hand, Harris was in no mood to negotiate. His attitude was no doubt aided by knowledge of his superior's wishes; Wellesley soon thereafter commended him, noting "I entirely approve of your determination not to negotiate with the Sultaun. I trust that, before this letter can reach you, you will be in possession of Seringapatam."

The governor-general's hope was rewarded; on May 3, the walls of Seringapatam were breached and the next day, at one p.m., the British stormed the city. In an obvious contrast to Ali, Tipu fought well, with even the British accounts admitting that he rallied many who were trying to flee before the assault, and "encouraged them by his voice and example to make a determined stand." Nonetheless, after several hours of intense hand-to-hand fighting, the city fell. General Baird found Tipu's body that evening "under a vast heap of the slain"; the sultan had been wounded by bayonets three times while fighting alongside his men, and finally killed by a shot to the temple. Only 120 French were found in the fort; their tricolor flag was captured and eventually sent back to Britain where it was presented to George III.

That day and all night, the British forces engaged in a frenzy of arson and plunder, some of which was prompted by the severe lack of supplies in the Company's camps, in which most of the carriage animals and some camp followers had starved to death. Yet the casualties of battle give evidence that a massacre of the city's inhabitants also took place. The British lost only 1500 men in the entire campaign, less than a fifth of that number in the capture of Seringapatam, yet Indian losses on that one day were more than 9,000. The next morning, some discipline was enforced on the army and, after laying in state in the palace for a day and a half, Tipu was interred beside his father in the family mausoleum in the Lal Bagh, or Garden of Rubies, that he had built in the eastern part of Seringapatam.

By May 11, Edmonstone had heard the news in Madras and shortly thereafter he and Wellesley made plans to travel to Mysore. Edmonstone wrote in elation to William of the victory and his excitement at the thought of visiting Tipu's capital, and promised his brother to bring back souvenirs for him to display on his cypress walking stick. Edmonstone was not alone in wanting mementos of the battle, especially anything to do with the person of the sultan who was already legendary. Even the small, silver-encased copy of the Qu'ran, which Tipu had habitually worn as a necklace, was carried away by one of the officers who participated in the torchlight search for his body. Tipu's pet
tigers, kept in one of the palace courtyards, were shot "for fear of accidents," but little else from the city was lost. Arthur Wellesley recorded that such a looting spree took place that, "scarcely a house in town was left unplundered, and I understand that in camp jewels of the greatest value, bars of gold, etc. etc., have been offered for sale in the bazaars of the army by our soldiers." The official looting was as extensive: the prize money taken from the city totaled over £1,000,000; Tipu's tiger was removed from his music room and sent to England where it was presented by the directors to the king; the diamond, emerald and ruby-encrusted phoenix that had topped the sultan's throne was likewise made a present to the queen; and the Company acquired many of the sultan's other possessions, including the painting Cherry had done of him in better times.

The governor-general's party did not begin the 300-mile journey to the city until more than three weeks after its fall, delayed by the lack of carriage animals (for the army had taken most of the available ones) and Wellesley's habit of constantly changing his mind about the date of departure. Before they left, more detailed accounts of the storming of the city had arrived. Although pleased about Tipu's death, Edmonstone was uneasy over the numbers of other Indians killed in the attack. He wrote to William that it appears that between 9 & 10,000 men of the enemy were killed in the assault. What a horrible carnage! & all to have been done by about 5,000 men in the short space of little more than an hour! . . . The resistance seems to have been but little, yet it is the inevitable practise & the soldiery cannot be withheld from it, to put to death all who are met with.

Edmonstone completely missed the ironic parallels between the two massacres of 1799: Wellesley and Vizier Ali both struck while proclaiming friendship, both were motivated by dreams of power and glory, both killed indiscriminately (although Wellesley's casualty figures easily won the day), and both ultimately failed to obtain their desires. Wellesley arrived in Seringapatam late, but with his natural flair for the dramatic intact. As reported by the Calcutta Gazette, "the Governor-General, advancing a few steps with a dignity not easily to be described, laid his hand upon the Standard of the once haughty and perfidious Mysorean, and by a firm and instant pressure, bent it towards the earth." He was soon exulting over the victory to friends at home, prophesying that his conquests would result in "a large accession of Revenue to the Company . . . a stronger frontier and the total ruin of the French interests in India." In return for his success, he expected great rewards; as he informed Lord Grenville in characteristically straightforward style:

- the manner in which I have conducted this war has been received with exultation, and even with the most unqualified admiration in India; and . . . you will gain much credit by conferring some high and brilliant honor upon me immediately. The Garter would be much more acceptable to me than any additional title, nor would any title be an object which should not raise me to the same rank which was given to Lord Cornwallis.

Wellesley did not take into consideration that what was a cause of exultation in Bengal was not necessarily so in England. The governor-general had his champions, including the author who exulted that "a kingdom, equal in extent to two-thirds of the ancient monarchy of France, and yielding an annual revenue of more than a million sterling, [has been] transferred in full sovereignty to the Company and their Allies, in the short
space of two months," and praised Wellesley for averting a dangerous coalition against the Company by Tipu, Zeman Shah and Vizier Ali.163 His supporters also saw to it that a rush of publications flooded the market, recounting the most lurid tales of Tipu's cruelty to British prisoners during the Third Anglo-Mysore War. A typical example comes from the Authentic Memoirs of Tipoo Sultaun, Including his Cruel Treatment of the English Prisoners, by an Officer in the East India Service (London: 1799), which tells of a British naval officer named Hamilton who was a captive in Mysore for so long that he gave up thoughts of rescue, took an Indian wife and settled down to become a carpenter. When the British forces neared Tipu's lands, however, he was scheduled for beheading as a security risk. "He took leave of his children and their distracted, weeping mother--then, submitting himself to the executioner's stroke, suffered with unparalleled fortitude." Other publications took a different view when recounting the governor-general's actions, however, with some accusing him of stealing a country from its rightful ruler and portraying Tipu as a martyr.

There was also controversy in parliament over Wellesley's conquest, although it was lessened by the feeling that an ally of the dreaded Napoleon had been extinguished. Even so, the honors the governor-general had hoped for were out of the question. He was awarded a pension of £5,000 a year for twenty years as his share of the war bounty and was made Marquis Wellesley in December 1799; but in what he viewed as a deliberate insult, it was an Irish title, which was considered inferior to an English one. The new Marquis Wellesley was also denied membership in the Order of the Garter. Upon hearing the news, Wellesley wrote in disbelief of his "bitter disappointment at the reception which the King has given my services" and signed himself, "Mornington (not having yet received my double-gilt potato)."165

Ali fared far worse. After escaping the Company's forces under Stuart, the prince sought asylum with the Raja of Jaynagar, a Rajput chief who handed him over to the Company in return for the 50,000 rupee bounty on his head, although he did make the condition that the prince not be killed or imprisoned in irons.166 Ali was taken through Benares as a prisoner exactly 12 months after his attempted revolt began; from there he was transferred to Fort William where he was incarcerated "in a room built to resemble an iron cage"167 in a bomb-proof building. Edmonstone wrote to his brother Charles that the assassin Vizier Ali is safe in our custody. . . . We are detained by the condition of his surrender from bringing him to the Gallows, but the punishment and the example is perhaps as great and signal by perpetual confinement. The villain has made frequent inquiries after me, but I have not seen him and never mean to see him.168 Edmonstone's decision not to see Ali may have been prompted in part by fears for his safety. Wellesley had conveyed to the directors the belief, which he almost certainly acquired from Edmonstone, that Ali had murdered Cherry for revenge over the part he played in getting Sa'adat out of Benares, and aiding him on his way to Lucknow where he replaced the prince.169 If Ali resented Cherry, whose role in his deposition had been relatively small, how much more must he have wanted revenge on Edmonstone?

However, as it is difficult to imagine what threat Ali could have posed in his imprisoned state, Edmonstone's avoidance was more likely a result of continued animosity. He mourned his friend by working to see that such a thing did not happen again; in the near future, all of Ali's contacts--Mysore, the Marathas, the Bundelkhand rajas--among other
Indian powers would lose their ability to aid in any further insurrections. While Ali languished in prison, where he remained until his death in May 1817, preparations for the conquest of much of India were underway.
SECTION THREE: THE WELLESLEY YEARS, 1798-1805

CHAPTER EIGHT: WAR IN MASQUERADE, 1799-1801

Such subtle covenants shall be made,
'til peace itself is war in masquerade.--John Dryden

Edmonstone accompanied Wellesley to Seringapatam in June 1799 in renewed spirits. The reason for his mood was the ease of the conquest of the rest of the sultan's kingdom; following the fall of the capital and Tipu's death, the British encountered little resistance. At Seringapatam, Edmonstone found another reason to celebrate: an extensive library of Persian manuscripts had been discovered in the sultan's palace, as well as many rare books described by an eye witness as "richly adorned and beautifully illuminated," some of which later ended up in Edmonstone's personal library. 1 Besides the valuable books, a large quantity of Tipu's private papers were found which proved of inordinate value as propaganda for the British and, in Edmonstone's case, salve for a troubled conscience. He wrote in triumph to William that the papers provided "such a body of evidence as not only justifies our measures against Tippoo but clearly proves that had we not undertaken the war nothing could have saved us."2

In fact, the papers showed intent, but not ability. There can be little doubt of Tipu's animosity towards the British or of his wish to see India freed from the presence of the infidel Europeans. However, the desire for something and the means to accomplish it are different things; as Edmonstone himself admitted, no letters from the French government were found at Seringapatam, nor was there any evidence of tangible preparations for war on the British possessions. They found only grandiose plans that were completely unworkable without the assistance of a sizeable French army and a considerable naval force. They were the remains of daydreams and wishful thoughts, but were enough to justify Tipu's destruction to authorities in Britain.

Edmonstone was given the immense task of translating and preparing Tipu's letters for publication. As he noted, "I was commanded by his Lordship to examine a Mass of Papers of the late Sultan found in his palace at Seringapatam, & to select & translate such of them as were . . . elucidatory of the late Sultan's prospects of hostility against the British Government."3 The need to quickly transmit some proof of the validity of the war to the directors and parliament was imperative, to justify past actions and those about to be taken. Edmonstone believed that the British had discovered "materials for a complete history, not only of Tippoo's govt, but of his mind."4 In his published work, he not only printed the sultan's records, but added "such observations as occasionally arose from the subject."5 The tenor of his efforts was to reinforce the idea that "Tippoo Sultaun had, for many years, entertained the design of calling in the aid of the French, for the extermination of the British power in India."6 Wellesley's actions were portrayed as a necessary preventative measure to stop Tipu from eventually gaining an opportunity
to put his plans into action. It was an excuse that would soon be applied to British conduct in many other areas.

Wellesley, unlike Cornwallis, did not intend that surrounding states should benefit from the war while the Company received only token territory. Whereas Cornwallis had been interested in containing Tipu's ambitions, Wellesley's concern was conquest; the settlements negotiated by each party clearly evidence this difference. Edmonstone played a major role in the settlement of Mysore, both in its justification and in its formation. As he wrote to William, "his Lordship has upon this [the settlement with Mysore] as upon almost every other political occasion done me the honor to consult me. . . I truly acknowledge that I find my political situation much more distinguished than under Sir J Shore." With Shore, Edmonstone had had to contend with a man determined to adhere to Company policy; with Wellesley, he had the luxury of dealing with someone whose arrogance often led him to act as if he was the Company. As could be expected with Edmonstone under few, if any, restraints, the settlement with Mysore was even harsher than that of Awadh had been. As he excitedly informed William, "one of the greatest questions is now pending that ever engaged the attention of a nation--the absolute disposal of a whole Kingdom." Edmonstone would have preferred to annex the entire state, but agreed that, at that point, the Company could not have held it. In August Wellesley wrote to the directors of the settlement finally arranged for Mysore. He informed them that, as the previous situation in Awadh had shown, the interposition of British power over that of Indian rulers invariably led to "double governments and conflicting authorities"; he would therefore assume full control in Mysore. As had been the case with Ali in Awadh, Tipu's heirs were pensioned off, in their case to the Carnatic, where they would be under constant British supervision. Mummadi Krishnaraja Wodeyar III, the three-year old grandson of Chiam Raj, whom Haidar had dispossessed in 1763, was put in their place. Wellesley assured the directors that the raja would "feel that his continuance in that state depended on the stability of the new settlement in all its parts." The settlement to which he referred was the treaty providing for the partition and vassalage of the kingdom.

Wellesley took the entire seacoast of Mysore for the Company in the form of the province of Canara. He annexed the province of Coimbatore in the south, which linked the British territory of Salem to that of Malabar, thereby insuring that the Company bordered Mysore on two sides out of three. He also kept the fortress of Seringapatam, giving the Company a stronghold within the remaining territories belonging to the raja. Nizam Ali received a considerable area of Mysore's northern lands, including Kurnool and Cuddapah, but he did not long retain it. In 1800 he ceded it to the Company in requital for the annual payment he owed for the subsidiary force they had established within his borders, prompting Company employee John Malcolm, when he heard the news while on an embassy to Teheran, to proclaim, "What a change!! Lord Wellesley has added an Empire to our possessions in India." Not quite, but the governor-general was soon to fulfill Malcolm's prediction. The remaining lands were assigned to the raja, but as he was also required to accept a subsidiary alliance, in effect the Company controlled Tipu's entire kingdom.

The subsidiary treaty of Seringapatam was concluded on July 13, 1799. It provided for the Company's power in Mysore in no uncertain terms. The raja was to pay for a
large British force to be stationed within his lands, yet he was to have no say in how they were used. He was required to turn over any forts in his possession to the Company upon demand for the garrisoning of their troops, and to build or dismantle any such fortifications that the British deemed necessary. The Company could, in time of war, extract as much revenue as it wished from Mysore to increase its military strength, even if the war did not threaten that state. If the raja failed at any time to pay the annual fee of £280,000 for "his" army, the governor-general could annex a portion of his kingdom in deferment of the money owed, or take over the revenue collection until such time as the money was paid. The raja could have no communication with any state without the knowledge and consent of the Company, and no foreigners not bearing Company passports were to be allowed in his land.

Shore's complaint that dealing decisively with Asaf was difficult because his sovereignty was guaranteed by treaty was taken into consideration in the settlement with Mysore. The treaty insured that the raja's lack of authority to contradict British wishes in his state was clearly elucidated:

His Highness Maha Raja . . . hereby promises to pay at all times the utmost attention to such advice as the Company's Government shall occasionally judge it necessary to offer to him, with a view to the economy of his finances, the better collection of his revenues, the administration of justice, the extension of commerce, the encouragement of trade, agriculture, and industry, or any other objects connected with his Highness's interests.\(^{13}\)

Colonel Barry Close, later resident at Pune, was made the first resident at Seringapatam to see that British control was maintained, although a token Hindu minister was appointed to satisfy the people. Arthur Wellesley was made military commander in the region to deal with any problems that might arise from the change of government. Edmonstone wrote to Charles that the settlement had substituted for Tipu's hostile government one which "owes its existence to our liberality and whose ability to give us disturbance is circumvented by the relative situation of our territory and by the effectual control we have established within it."\(^{14}\) Edmonstone was briefly worried that "the Mahomedan Supremacy so firmly established during two successive reigns might have alienated the minds of the inhabitants of the Mysoor Dominions," and that the people would object to the reinstatement of the old ruling family, but was happy to find his concerns unfounded.\(^{15}\) The change of authority was accomplished with little difficulty, with the only opposition coming from a few bandit groups.

The elation of victory was dimmed considerably for Wellesley by the cavalier treatment he considered himself to have suffered at the hands of a miserly parliament; it also made him determined to effect even more conquests, to "heap kingdoms upon kingdoms, victory upon victory, revenue upon revenue" in order to prove to the British government their mistake in viewing him worthy of only an "Irish or pinchbeck" reward.\(^{16}\) Tipu had stated in a letter to the Ottoman Sultan Selim that he believed the British planned on subduing all of India.\(^{17}\) The Company's actions following the fall of Seringapatam seemed to bear this out: within two years, Tanjore, the Carnatic and a large amount of Awadh were annexed, and Wellesley began to refer to the Company's possessions as an empire. As Edmonstone wrote, "the overthrow of Tipu's dominion has added to the terror of our arms and the consequences of it have increased our resources and our power to awe surrounding states."\(^{18}\) In all of the diplomatic conquests that
followed Tipu's fall, Edmonstone's attitudes and decisions played a prominent role. As Wellesley would later remark, his political secretary was "intimately concerned in the settlement of Tanjore, of the Carnatic, & of Oudh; also of Mysore after the War." Edmonstone agreed that he was "in constant personal communication with and attendance on his Lordship," and that Wellesley always reigned "unbounded confidence" in him. It was Edmonstone's aggressive style of diplomacy and inventive use of the subsidiary alliance treaty form which enabled Wellesley's dream of heaping "kingdoms on kingdoms" to become a reality.

The treaties employed by Edmonstone and Wellesley were masterful pieces of diplomacy that largely mirrored the settlement with Mysore. Large British armies, not the small forces previously common, were stationed within allies' territories to either replace their armies or, when this was not possible, to give the Company a force equal to or greater than that which the Indian ruler possessed. The subsidies required for the upkeep of these troops were large, and the Indian rulers were required to pay them in monthly installments. Due to the seasonal fluctuation in the finances of primarily agricultural states, this practice weakened the allies' economies and undermined the Indian rulers' authority. As in Awadh and Mysore, forts were ceded in the new regions that, with the subsidized army occupying them, guaranteed that any attempt to throw off Company control was doomed to failure. The residents saw to it that the British also assumed authority over much of the allies' administration, reducing local rulers to little more than Company appointed governors. All contact between the allies and any foreign powers was prohibited without the Company's consent. Of course, these stipulations were unnecessary in areas that the British completely annexed. Both methods became common under Wellesley's administration, the former usually as a prelude to the latter. Wellesley and Edmonstone acquired territory like puzzle pieces, with the map of India as the finished object.

Edmonstone had written concerning Tipu's destruction, that "I believe that nothing short of the success which we have met with could have saved British India. We have been for years tottering on the brink of destruction." Despite his pleasure at Tipu's overthrow, he did not believe that the conquest of Mysore had relieved the Company of all threats to its security. From his perspective, the more of India that was brought under their authority, as Tipu's dominions had been, the safer the British would be. In his mind, control had become equated with domination. It is likely that, given Edmonstone's aversion to warfare and his reaction to the casualty levels in the conquest of Seringapatam, he hoped that the use of treaties to expand the British territories would eliminate the need for such destruction. For a time, this would prove to be the case as area after area came under British rule without a shot being fired. Yet his treaty system would eventually prove lethal to the peace.

The first state to fall under British control following Mysore was the small principality of Tanjore. Its ruler, Amer Singh, who opposed the Company's interference in his land, was supplanted by a relative who was willing to come to an agreement with the British. The raja was replaced in October 1799 by his half brother, Sarabhoji, who signed a treaty giving the British complete administrative control over his state and the right to collect its revenues--only the empty title remained his. The last ruler of the line, Shivaji, was pensioned off under Dalhousie in 1855 at £40,000 per year and Tanjore passed completely into the Company's domains. In Tanjore, as in
Awadh, there had been little difficulty finding someone close to the throne willing to make a deal with the British. In the case of Wellesley's next target, however, the Company had to tread more carefully, as they were dealing with a long-time ally and a much larger area; any attempts at annexation would have to stand up to considerable scrutiny in London.

There is no doubt that Mohammed Ali and Umdat ul Umara, the rulers of the Carnatic, had been in contact with Tipu, for their letters were found among the sultan's papers in Seringapatam. However, the contents were vague, consisting primarily of the flowery compliments and profuse assurances of friendship that were a regular feature of Indian political correspondence. Edmonstone was assigned to lead an investigation of the papers with the mandate to discover any possible intrigue between the two states. It was not an easy task, necessitating considerable translation work, most of which Edmonstone did personally; it also involved the cross-examination of Gholam Ali Khan and Ali Reza Khan, Tipu's ambassadors, who had accompanied the sons he sent as hostages to Madras after the Third Anglo-Mysore War. As had previously been the case in Awadh, British actions in the Carnatic would depend on Edmonstone's ability to find a pretext for them.

From the letters discovered in Tipu's library, Edmonstone painstakingly amassed a considerable quantity of circumstantial evidence. In a June 1792 meeting between Tipu's ambassadors and Mohammed Ali, the nawab was recorded as saying:

"may God long preserve Tippoo Sultaun, who is the pillar of the religion of Mohammed. Night and Day, I used to be absorbed in this contemplation, and to pray for his highness's prosperity. I call God to witness this fact, because the confederacy of three Allies [in the Third Anglo-Mysore War] was for the subversion of the Mahommedan Religion. . . . Believe it true that I from my heart desire the welfare of the Sultaun."

The nawab also paid a visit to Tipu's hostage sons, sitting the boys on his knees and talking to them for two hours, in which he reiterated his comments about Tipu being the only hope for Islam in India. He added, "I have passed my Eightieth year, and in that time, many are the things I have seen & done & experienced. What is past is past." His cryptic final remark began to make sense when the princes and the ambassadors returned his visit the next day. At that meeting, the nawab asked Tipu's representatives to start negotiations toward "establishing a friendship & harmony between me and Tippoo Sultaun." They diplomatically replied that Tipu had spoken highly of the nawab, calling him "one of the leaders of the faithful and a Pillar of the Faith." At this, Mohammed Ali, "could not suppress his Tears and said, I am what I know myself to be. Tell the Sultaun that he is the Pillar of the Faith & may God preserve him and grant him long life, since I and all Mussulmen derive support from him." Nautch performers, musicians and finely embroidered robes set with "the finest Jewels," were then given to the princes as they departed. On another occasion, he presented the boys with a clock and a European bird cage, and told them that he considered them "as his own children." He also gave a "sumptuous dinner" and entertainment to Tipu's ambassadors, and began sending an emissary to inquire after the princes' health every week.
These attentions might seem strange, considering that Mysore and the Carnatic had long been enemies, each trying to profit territorially at the expense of the other. However, with British power steadily increasing in the south, and with it their financial demands on Mohammed Ali, it seems possible that his change in attitude towards Tipu was genuine. The nawab made the gesture of warning the sultan in 1793 that war had broken out in Europe, and that it might be prudent for him to avoid communicating with the French in writing for the present, as it would be taken badly by the Company if discovered. He further informed him that he had heard that the British suspected Tipu of attempting to form an alliance with the Marathas against them, and to be careful of doing anything that would provide them with proof. Despite his contempt of Mohammed Ali, Tipu also had reason to favor improved relations between the states—he was in a hostile relationship with Hyderabad and the Marathas, had been recently defeated by Cornwallis, and badly needed a new ally. He instructed his ambassadors to continue to communicate to the Nawaub Wallajah [Mohammed Ali] every possible expression of friendship, attachment, and regard; you will tell him, that he is wise, and attached to the Faith, and that the preservation of the Religion of Mohammed, in that quarter, entirely depends upon him, and that it is incumbent upon him to suggest whatever points may be calculated to promote the increase of friendship. They were further told "to represent to him, in a proper manner, the expediency of Friendship and Union among the Followers of Islam, and, having ascertained his intentions, communicate them to me."

Umdat ul Umara, Mohammed Ali's successor, supported the reconciliation with Mysore. When he was deputed to accompany Tipu's sons to a fireworks display, he asked the sultan's ambassadors to "give my respectful compliments, by way of remembrance, to His Majesty, and inform him, that he may consider me from my heart attached to him, and that, please God, at a proper season, my fidelity towards him shall be made manifest." Not long afterwards, Tipu's ambassadors were informed by Mohammed Ali that he had something he wished to say to them in secret, and that, if they would go to view a mosque he had recently built, he would send Umdat to them with a message. The meeting was held on June 21, 1793, with Umdat informing them that, "there had been without a cause a veil or want of cordiality between his Highness and your Majesty, which had been productive of injuries to both, but now . . . a system of harmony, such as is becoming among the Professors of Islamism, had taken place." Tipu's ambassadors were requested to ascertain their master's wishes on the subject of a new friendship between the two states. The three met again the next day in a garden, when Umdat once again assured them that he was "exerting himself with zeal" to improve relations between the two states.

Tipu responded to the overtures with alacrity. Under his instruction, Gholam Ali and Ali Reza invited "all the servants, high and low, belonging to the Circar," to meet with them on a Friday at the Jamma Mosque in Madras. The most important Islamic religious figures, about a thousand onlookers, and Mohammed Ali's sons all participated in a service held in the vernacular so all could understand. Gholam Ali asked the religious leaders to explain a letter with questions on Islamic orthodoxy that he had received from Tipu:
one of them accordingly explained the contents of the Khootba [khutba or speech] which comprised the command of God, 'to wage holy war, not to take flight in combating with Infidels, to form a union among all the professors of Islamism. . . .

I then asked the Cauzier what was the law, if any Mussulman acted contrary to these commands, to which the Cauzier replied, that according to the duties and obligations of Mussulmen, whoever neglected to act up to those commands, was a sinner. 42

Gholam Ali then dramatically informed them that it is written that the prayers, which are offered up in the Khootba in favor of a Prince who fights for the Faith, are accepted of God, but the prayers in favor of those who do not are rejected, either reconcile the law in this instance in the case of him in whose name you have read the Khootba, or else conform to the law. Why are you thus knowingly guilty of sin? . . . I addressed all the people and said, the error, of which ye have hitherto been guilty, is, for the sake of God and his Messenger, forgiven on the part of His Majesty. 43

The crowd surged to its feet and "bound and engaged themselves, that hereafter as long as they lived their conduct should manifest nothing else than fidelity, devotion, truth and zeal, that they would never be guilty of flight in the face of an enemy." 44

Tipu continued to support the cause of better relations following Mohammed Ali's death in 1795, sending Umdat an impressive present of robes, horses and jewels on his accession, 45 prompting the nawab to respond with an even grander gift of an elephant, five horses, beautifully embroidered robes, and several pieces of jewelry. 46 The exchange showed a new affability between the states, but there is no extant evidence that an actual alliance was formed, nor that any concrete plans to oppose the British, separately or in concert, were conceived. Yet Edmonstone managed to use the papers to "fix a charge upon his late Highness the Nabob Walajah of a breach of the alliance subsisting between His Highness and the Honble Company, [and] to implicate the present Nabob Omdut ul Omrah as a party therein." 47

Edmonstone based his case on three main facts: firstly, that the secret communication between the two states was, in itself, "subversive to the alliance subsisting between His Highness and the Honble Company and directly adverse to the British Interests in India." 48 Mohammed Ali was a Company ally, bound by his 1792 treaty with the British to enter into no alliances with any power without their consent, and had no reason to be holding surreptitious discussions with a known British enemy. The secrecy of the communications, and the discovery of a cypher used for decoding letters from Tipu's ambassadors found in Seringapatam, convinced him that this had not been an innocent correspondence. The cypher listed suggestive pseudonyms for important people in Indian politics:

The Nabob Waulajah [Mohammed Ali] (The Friend of Mankind)
The Nabob Tippoo Sultaun (The Defender of the Faith)
The English (New comers)
The Marhattas (The mean or despicable)
Nizam ud Dowlah (Nothing, a non-entity) 49

Edmonstone argued that the cypher's very existence "would almost suffice to establish the fact of a clandestine correspondence between the Nabob and Tippoo Sultaun," as otherwise, why would such a thing be needed? 50
Secondly, the nawab was guilty of "communicating certain articles of intelligence of a nature calculated to betray the interests of the Honble Company and to favor the sinister designs of Tippoo Sultaun against them." Especially alarming were Mohammed Ali's actions in warning Tipu to be careful about contacting the French, and the letter in which he informed Gholam Ali that he had received word "from certain Emissaries in Bengal, whom he employed for the purpose of collecting & transcribing secret Intelligence" that the British suspected Tipu of "maintaining a sinister negotiation with the Mahtrattas," and recommended that he "suspend his views, until a more favorable opportunity." "What construction," Edmonstone demanded, "must be put upon the conduct of an ally who . . . far from endeavoursing to dissuade him from the prosecution of his supposed views manifested a participation in them," the latter by advising the Sultan to put his plans on hold for a more propitious moment.

Edmonstone drew even more damaging inferences from these warnings:

But why, it may be asked, should the Nabob think it necessary to caution the Sultaun with respect to his . . . correspondence with the French, unless he was aware that the nature of Tippoo Sultaun's intercourse with them . . . was . . . likely to be adverse to the British Interests, since Tippoo Sultaun was not bound by the provisions of Treaty, to abstain from all intercourse with foreign powers? A suspicion hence arises . . . that his Highness was not ignorant of the views which we now know Tippoo Sultaun at that very time entertained against the British Power.

Edmonstone took the nawab's comments about the Third Anglo-Mysore War as indicative that he had "wished success to the arms of Tippoo Sultaun against the power with which he was connected by the most solemn obligations of union and alliance." Mohammed Ali's remark that the war had been undertaken to undermine Islam in India came under special, and understandable, attack, as Edmonstone averred, "no other construction can be put upon the Solicitude he shews in support of the Mohammedan Faith, than enmity against the power by which he considered it to be endangered." He believed that "the Nabob Wallajah would not scruple to betray those Interests, which as an Ally of the Company, he might at a future period be called upon to Support."

Thirdly, Umdat ul Umara was "a principle channel of communication between his father and the Vakeels for maintaining the secret intercourse" and had kept up the contact after his accession. Edmonstone found, at the bottom of the cypher, a pencilled note in the handwriting of one of Tipu's secretaries, noting that the paper had been written by Umdat; when Edmonstone compared the penmanship with that on letters in the Company's archives from the nawab, he declared himself satisfied that "there cannot remain a doubt of their being the same." Even more telling from his perspective was the letter describing the convocation in Madras, which he described as "preaching the language of Rebellion in the very heart of the Company's Dominions," and noted that, if Umdat was truly loyal to his state's alliance with the British, he would not have failed to report the meeting to them.

Edmonstone's conclusion from the papers was to make a strong accusation against the Carnatic's rulers:

while Tippoo Sultan (as we have now discovered) was endeavoring by Emissaries, by Correspondence, by every means in his power to conciliate the Alliance of every State in India for purposes hostile to the British nation in India, it is not probable that he would neglect any attempt to contract an alliance with a Mussulman Prince who, like
the Nabob of the Carnatic, might have it in his power to be of the most essential service to his Views in the Event of hostilities between him and the Company, and it is not perhaps going too far to suppose that when (as appears by the printed Translations of documents found at Seringapatam) Tippoo Sultan proposed the landing of the French troops . . . he had reason to depend upon every Assistance which the Nabob could afford towards the Success of the Expedition; it is even not improbable that the Nabob was made acquainted with the plan. 62

He ended his initial report by saying that there was no doubt in his mind that "the whole constitutes a body of powerful proof" that, had Umdat had the opportunity, "he would have openly supported the cause of Tippoo Sultan and the Mussulman Interest against that of the Company." 63

Edmonstone's examination of Tipu's papers was thorough. Rather than just translating those from the sultan's own reign, he went back to the beginning of Haidar Ali's. As a result, he found several communications that gave him the opportunity to construct an image of the Carnatic's rulers having long been duplicitous in their dealings with the Company. Mohammed Ozman was a vakil from Haidar who visited Mohammed Ali in 1773 to request passage for a shipment of arms through the Carnatic. He informed his master that Mohammed Ali not only agreed to the request, but also led him to the top of the palace, where there was a room with a handsome view of the sea and of Fort St. George in the distance, for a private discussion. The nawab commented "what a beautiful spot it was, and added, may Almighty God soon produce a cause from which the Nabob Hyder Ali Khaun and I shall be enabled to sit and enjoy ourselves together." 64

He went on to complain that Haidar, inattentive to the value of my friendship, has always considered me separate from himself, whilst I have ever considered us as one. I may say indeed that I look on his existence as my own flesh and skin, and it is incumbent upon him to do the same. It is necessary that a friendship should subsist between us[;] . . . both our countries also should be as one, that if any Enemy, which God prevent, should burn one of his villages, I ought to feel as if one of my own was Consumed, and were one of mine to be destroyed by the fire of an Enemy, he ought to feel as if one of his own were destroyed. . . . It is my wish to establish such a friendship with your Master, that our children after us may be united in the bonds of affection and of love. 65

Haidar's vakil inquired why, if Mohammed Ali was such a friend of his master, he had not come to his aid in his recent war with the Marathas. The nawab replied that Haidar had not previously shown a desire for his friendship, and he therefore had no understanding with him, but that he was willing to forget the past. The growing power of the Marathas was, as the nawab finally admitted, the main object of his overtures: "may the Almighty destroy and root out the Mahrattas. It is with this object in view that I am anxious to establish an alliance with your Master, that in future whatever we may do, may be concerted." 66

He promised that, if Haidar chose to ally with him, he could purchase as many arms in the Carnatic as he chose in future. 67 The vakil also reported that the nawab had remarked, "laughing at the same time, that when your Highness came down upon the English [in the First Anglo-Mysore War] . . . the people told him, 'today the English Gentlemen are embarking upon a Pilgrimage.'" 68 Edmonstone noted in a footnote that the nawab's last statement was "supposed to mean that they would all be cut off by Hyder, at which humorous Intelligence the Nabob was much pleased." 69
Not surprisingly, Edmonstone seized on the letters as disclosing a scene of political intrigue between [Haidar Ali] and the nabob of Arcot particularly illustrative of the views and disposition of the latter and furnishing a clue to his conduct in the transactions which took place between him and the British Government, not only at that period, but during the whole course of his connection with the British power, assuming as a leading principal . . . that he aimed at absolute independence, and that he felt as a grievance the superiority of the English power and his dependence on it. He was especially outraged at the close connection Mohammed Ali had formed with Haidar at a time when he was supposed by the British to have considerable animosity towards him. Edmonstone found it remarkable that the Govern[men]t of Madras in their comments upon the Treaty of peace concluded in 1769, express an opinion that the Nabob would rather suffer his whole country to be laid waste, and Submit to all the fatal consequences so justly to be apprehended from persecuting the war, than consent to a Peace. These sentiments they ascribe to his rooted enmity against Hyder. Had they been aware of his ambitious views, they might perhaps have ascribed them to another cause. Edmonstone wondered how someone could be considered an ally who had "a desire for the Subversion of British power in India, and an anxious wish to establish his own independence upon the ruins of it." He noted that, in the years following 1773, the nawab had lost increasing amounts of both power and revenue to the British, which almost insured that his sentiments of resentment towards them had increased rather than lessened. As evidence, he pointed out "the backwardness he manifested in the war, which commenced in 1780 [the Second Anglo-Mysore War], to assist the exertions of the Madras Government by Troops, by supplies and by Money at that perilous period, backwardness so loudly complained of at that time." Edmonstone felt that this gave additional credence to the charges of perfidy he had already made against the Carnatic's rulers, for, considering the role Umdat had played in assisting his father's communications with Tipu, "the testimony which fixes the charge of treachery upon the Father, must operate relatively with respect to the son." Edmonstone did not stop with paper evidence, however; he also conducted verbal examinations of Tipu's ambassadors to obtain additional data to add to what remained a circumstantial case. He found Gholam Ali Khan's testimony to be "such a compound of inconsistency and falsehood, that no dependence can be placed on any part of it not supported by known facts." Ali Reza Khan, however, was more rational and made a considerable effort to counter Edmonstone's suspicions of Umdat ul Umara. He made some headway by protesting that the British could not put too much emphasis on the language of the letters, as it was the accepted practice in Indian diplomacy to use extravagant compliments; this was something with which Edmonstone had much experience. The ambassador also claimed that Tipu's officials often exaggerated the flattery paid to their master, "for the purpose of gratifying the Sultan," but had to admit that the basic facts of their reports of the nawab's conversation were correct. He maintained that the advice given to Tipu from Mohammed Ali in regards to the French was simply to prevent any discord between him, a fellow Muslim, and the Company, and arose exclusively from his attachment to his faith. Further, he asserted that only Mohammed Ali's younger sons were present at the public meeting at the mosque, not
Umdat ul Umara, and that the nawab himself was never aware of the events of that day. Edmonstone was assured that Umdat had not been planning any clandestine activity with Tipu; instead, his involvement was an attempt to bring about a marriage, not military, alliance between the states. The secrecy surrounding the meetings was attributed to fear that a marriage between the two families would cause alarm to the British. Ali Reza also denied knowing of any particular reason why the cypher had been created, merely commenting that it had been arranged after the departure of Tipu's sons for Madras, to be used as needed. However, he had difficulty explaining to Edmonstone's satisfaction why such a thing would be prepared "for purposes purely innocent."

Edmonstone found a number of inconsistencies in Ali Reza's replies, noting that there was, "a great appearance that some of his Answers are the effect rather of immediate invention than of recollection, the object apparently to avoid being convicted of inconsistency." He could not explain, for example, why, in the accounts of the two meetings--one in a mosque and the other in a garden--between Umdat ul Umara and the ambassadors, there was no mention of a marriage alliance if that was the main reason for the conversations. Unlike the case with Gholam Ali, Edmonstone did not believe that the ambassador had gone so far as to make up most of his statement, but he had obviously "endeavored to render his evidence as favorable as possible to the nabob." Edmonstone thought it possible that the ambassadors were telling the truth when they insisted that no specific negotiations for an alliance had taken place between the two states, but he was not convinced that "a proposition of simple friendship" was all that had been discussed.

He saw the whole series of talks as an attempt "to establish a close union of Interests" that could only be prejudicial to the Company. His final report to Wellesley stated unequivocally his opinion that the nawab of the Carnatic had hoped, "in the revolution of time . . . [that] an opportunity might offer to emancipate himself from the control of the British Government, & that a connection with Tippoo Sultaun might enable him to take advantage of any event . . . favorable to the accomplishment of such." Along with the plans found at Tipu's palace, some of which called for an invasion of the Carnatic to overthrow British dominance were help to arrive from France, Edmonstone's report was enough for Wellesley to accuse Umdat of treachery. He described the correspondence to the directors as

a secret intercourse with Tippoo Sultaun, the determined enemy of the British name, founded on principles, and directed to objects, utterly subservive of the alliance between the Nabob of the Carnatic and the Company, and equally incompatible with the security of the British power in the Peninsula of India.

Umdat ul Umara died on July 15, 1801, and was succeeded by his son, Ali Hussain. Wellesley immediately demanded that Ali pay for his father's actions by agreeing to accept a pension in return for the annexation of his country. When the young nawab refused, a nephew of Umdat's was found who was willing to cooperate. Azim ud Daulah was made nawab in place of Ali and, in July 1801, agreed to the Company's control of the entire civil and military administration of the Carnatic in exchange for a pension of a fifth of its annual revenues. The British afterwards controlled an area reaching from the Northern Circars to Tinnevelly in the far south; along with the
acquisitions made during the Fourth Anglo-Mysore War, this brought most of India's coastline under their rule.

Wellesley had written to Dundas shortly after the fall of Seringapatam, that the British conquest of Mysore should satisfy his "voracious appetite for lands and fortresses," but if not, he might, "be able to give you a supper of Oudh and the Carnatic, if you should still be hungry."\(^{92}\) Many of the directors protested these acquisitions, but were powerless to control the governor-general. The secret committee, a group of three directors empowered by parliament to act separately from the rest, communicated directly with Wellesley, who also had the support of Dundas and the board of control. Many decisions were transmitted to and from India without ever coming before the entire court of directors, which kept most confused about just what Wellesley was doing and whether or not it was necessary. Along with this was the fact that it required at least six months to receive news in London of what was happening in India, assuring that whenever news did come before them, it was as a fait accompli.

In parliament, too, Edmonstone's meticulous efforts to justify the annexation were soon needed. Henry Addington informed Wellesley in 1802, "you will learn from various quarters that an attack on some of your measures, and particularly (and, as I believe, exclusively) on the transactions in the Carnatic, is to be expected very early in the ensuing [parliamentary] session."\(^{93}\) However, Addington promised that the House of Lords would support Wellesley, and that he would have in the Commons, "the cordial and strenuous support of Pitt."\(^{94}\) For a time, his political allies were able to excuse the governor-general's actions. Neither change of succession, much less the annexation of two sovereign states, had been necessary to insure the British against any immediate threat to their safety, but they were justified as such. In Tanjore, the reason given for the change was Amer Singh's supposedly poor government, which could lead to chaos in his state and thereby cause problems in the Company's southern territories. In the Carnatic, "the duty and necessity of self-defense" was cited as motive for the deposition of a schemer's son.\(^{95}\) Yet security was not the only reason used as justification for the acquisition of territory. In the case of Surat, which came under British control in March 1800, Wellesley excused the annexation by saying that it was necessary for the good government of the region. The Bombay government had long wanted the area around Surat, but previous governors-general had held them in check; Wellesley, of course, saw no reason to do so. It seemed that, under the new regime, justification could be found for any desired acquisition. Doing so in Awadh, however, would prove a difficult task.

Edmonstone was aware of the coming change in Awadh as early as June 1799. He told William in confidence that Lumsden would shortly be replaced as resident at Lucknow. The provocation for this was not his performance, for "his Lordship entertains the highest opinion of Lumsden's good sense, good character, zeal & conduct," but rather particular reasons why a military man should have the position.\(^{96}\) The addition of Awadh to the British lands was the next logical step in territorial aggrandizement. As in Tanjore and the Carnatic, British troops were already stationed there in large numbers, and Awadh abutted lands the Company held, making it easier to defend than a non-adjacent area would have been. Edmonstone, of course, strongly favored the idea, as he remarked to Charles, "it yet remains for the complete establishment of our Security to form a proper arrangement in the Vizier's dominions which may surpress [sic] the latent seeds of disorder in that ill governed country."\(^{97}\)
Acquiring control of Awadh presented more of a challenge than any previous area. Unlike historian Michael Fischer maintains, the Company never planned to replace the wazir with "another at his court to act as its cat's paw." Wellesley undoubtedly would have liked to do so, but Sa'adat Ali could not be replaced with impunity as the nawabs of Tanjore and the Carnatic had been. The British had elevated him to the throne on the pretext that he was the only true heir of Asaf, and he had scrupulously followed the stipulations of the treaty made with him. His only weakness was that he was not popular among the people, to the point that he needed British troops to guard his palace and had sentinels placed at the entrance of his bed chamber to prevent assassination attempts, but the Company could hardly use that as an excuse to depose him when they had been perfectly aware of it at the time of his accession. He also continued to act as a strong British supporter and a thorough Anglophile. He may have sat on a traditional musnud, covered in silver plates and gold ornaments and surmounted by a velvet canopy, but he lived otherwise in European splendor at his palace, "a very comfortable English gentleman's house, with suitable furniture, beds, prints and chairs," and at the Grecian-style country house he erected three miles outside Lucknow. He was also careful to entertain any passing British subject as an honored guest, and generally made a good impression. The nineteenth-century travel writer Viscount Valentia, who visited him shortly before the nawab’s death, described him having "most pleasing manners, and his appearance is dignified and princely, though his manner of life has made him too corpulent. His hair is now gray, and he has lost many of his teeth, but the fire and intelligence of his eye still lights up his countenance."

With little of which to complain in Sa'adat's conduct, the British concentrated on pointing out perceived weaknesses in his army. In Vizier Ali's abortive attempt to reclaim his throne, some of the troops Sa'adat had sent along with the Company's forces to hunt him down had actually joined his rebellion. With the threat of another invasion of India by Zeman Shah (the Afghan ruler had occupied Lahore in November 1798), Wellesley painted the alarming picture for the directors of Awadh's disloyal troops rising up to join the invader. He claimed that Sa'adat's forces had to be replaced to assure the protection of Awadh and Bengal. This was a specious argument, as the British were well aware: Almas Ali Khan had retained his position as chief amil of Awadh, and in 1801 had 150,000 troops under his direct control, including cavalry and infantry. The strength of his forces, which were loyal to Awadh and not to the Company, that worried the British, not their weakness. Lumsden kept a close watch on the powerful amil, demonstrating his importance to the state. He informed Edmonstone in 1798 that, "Almas continues to hold out astonishingly considering his Age, but as he is seldom two Days together free from fever I still think his life in imminent Danger." The two devised a contingency plan for putting Rehmat Ali, another courtier, in Almas' place if the older man died, but were unhappy with it as it had "a strong tendency to raise up another Almas." They would have much preferred to subdivide the huge area under Almas' control to insure that no single force in Awadh remained strong enough to challenge them, but ultimately decided that it would have to take second place to preserving the tranquility of the state. Almas, far more than Sa'adat, was responsible for the stability of Awadh after Vizier Ali's banishment, and his position, however threatening the British might find it, was necessary to maintain order in an area far from happy with its new, Company-imposed ruler. Edmonstone and Lumsden therefore
turned their attention to ways to bring Awadh's army under increased British control; however, Lumsden informed his friend that, in his opinion, even putting British officers over the troops would not prevent conflicting loyalties unless their corps could be made responsible only to the Company. Wellesley was quickly brought around to Edmonstone's opinion; as he commented in December 1798, whenever the great amil died, the Company "ought to succeed to the power of Almas, and the management if not the sovereignty, of that part of the Doab which he now rents ought to be placed in our hands." The situation remained unchanged for a year, but after the destruction of Tipu, the British were in a position to force the settlement they had deemed too risky a short time earlier.

An amendment to the existing treaty was proposed to Sa'adat in the fall of 1799 in which he would agree to disband his army and accept in its place more Company battalions. He was, of course, expected to pay for these, with an additional subsidy of Rs 500,000 a year considered adequate for the purpose. The sum was to be in addition to the large subsidy Sa'adat was already paying. Perhaps envisioning the problems that would ensue if he tried to extract even more taxes from his people, the nawab stated that he would prefer to abdicate rather than to sign such a treaty. Wellesley was, of course, pleased to accept the offer. He wrote the directors that he hoped to "profit by the event to the utmost practicable extent; and I entertain a confident hope of being able . . . to establish, with the consent of the Vizier, the sole and exclusive authority of the Company within the province of Oudh." The operative phrase, however, was "with the consent of the Vizier," something which, given the Company's previous relations with Sa'adat, was imperative.

A new treaty was drawn up in November 1799 requiring Sa'adat to give the Company complete authority in Awadh in exchange for being allowed to retain his title and much of the treasure he had inherited from Asaf. The nawab refused to sign it, however, stating that he had thought that his son would be elevated to the throne in his place, not that his state would be absorbed by the British. A revised version of the subsidiary treaty was used to give the Company a way around Sa'adat's refusal. Instead of a subsidy payment for the new Company troops, a portion of Awadh was to be annexed for their support. Unlike the previous arrangement, it would insure that the nawab had "no right to prescribe either the number or the disposition of the British troops" in the area. The concept had previously been used in the Carnatic and Hyderabad, but with an important difference: Mohammed Ali had never given land to the Company--only the revenue from a portion of his territory had been set aside to pay for their subsidiary force; likewise, the land ceded by the nizam to pay for the Company's troops was not a traditional part of Hyderabad, but had been newly acquired in the Fourth Anglo-Mysore War. Trying to avoid what was obviously a dangerous precedent, Sa'adat attempted to placate the British in February 1800 by disbanding much of his army and agreeing to make an additional monetary payment for more Company troops. This did at first satisfy the British, probably because they did not believe Sa'adat could keep up the payments, thereby giving them an excuse to claim that he had violated his agreement. If this were the hope, Sa'adat frustrated it by making the payments on time.

In January 1801, Wellesley grew tired of waiting for his prize and ordered Lieutenant-Colonel William Scott, the new resident at Lucknow, to draw up a fresh treaty. Sa'adat was given two choices: permit the annexation of his entire country (a
copy of the Tanjore treaty was sent along as an example for Scott to follow), or agree to cede lands equal to the upkeep of the Company's forces stationed in Awadh. The second option would require the cession of more than half of Sa'adat's territory; furthermore, the ceded areas were to surround the nawab's remaining lands on three sides. This arrangement would, assuming the concurrent negotiations for a Company alliance with Nepal were successful, insure that the nawab was "beyond the reach of foreign connections and foreign dangers."¹¹¹

The Nepalese had recently revolted against their ruler, Raja Ran Bahadur Shah (1777-1799), who had begun a reign of terror after the suicide of his wife, Kantamati Devi, over the loss of her beauty to smallpox. The king had ordered the Brahmin priests who had prayed for her recovery executed, along with any soldier who refused to carry out the massacre, and declared his eldest son illegitimate, replacing him with Girvan Juddha Bikram Shah, the son of his recently deceased wife.¹¹² His council of nobles opposed his rule and he was forced to flee to Benares in 1799 for sanctuary, where he threatened his estranged people with turning Christian, eating beef and making over his entire kingdom to the Company.¹¹³ Wellesley ordered a diplomatic mission to Nepal "for the purpose of ascertaining whether the Nepaul administration would or would not settle upon him such a Jageer as corresponded to his dignity."¹¹⁴ Captain William D. Knox was put in charge of the negotiations, and reported to Edmonstone that, although he found the raja lacking in "shame, reflection [and] foresight; his conduct is either rash or perfidious, & often a mixture of both," he might nonetheless "prove the means of our acquiring a footing in Nipaul."¹¹⁵ Knox was successful in getting a treaty signed with the Nepalese, who were willing to agree to almost anything that did not require the return of their hated raja. As Edmonstone candidly informed Kirkpatrick, they need not have worried about British military intervention on the raja's behalf, for the Company could not afford to endanger their trade privileges in China by upsetting it over Nepal; the Nepalese, however, were not aware of this.¹¹⁶ In the end, Knox obtained a jagir for the ex-raja, a treaty of mutual friendship between the Company and Nepal, and the admission of a British resident to Kathmandu.¹¹⁷ The agreement was primarily useful for insuring that Sa'adat was afterwards completely surrounded by either Company lands or those of a British ally. Of course, this negated the whole pretext the Company had used for being in Awadh in the first place--that it was a bulwark against an invasion of British territory. Now they were proposing the acquisition of possessions directly on the Maratha border and in easy reach of any invading Afghan force. Wellesley, however, was becoming less concerned with excuses; in his eyes, the Company was invincible and could dictate at will.

Edmonstone informed Scott, an old colleague from previous trips to Awadh, that the idea of annexation was to be pushed with Sa'adat as much as possible. Scott was to do his utmost to "demonstrate to the Vizier that the terms of the first proposition, as affecting the real dignity and honor of himself & his family, his personal ease and safety, the security of Oude, and the happiness & prosperity of his subjects, are far more advantageous to him, than the second."¹¹⁸ This new line of persuasion may have been prompted by a previous letter from Scott to Wellesley, describing Sa'adat's comments during a fit of intoxication:

Addressing a person attending upon him little above the condition of a menial Servant, he observed that the means of gratifying all sensual appetites were possessed
by him in as great abundance in Benares as they are here. Complaining of the cares of state, he compared the repose he enjoyed at Benares with the life of solicitude he was now exposed to. And after declaring that for the small remnant of his days, it was not worth while to bear such a load of anxiety, he expressed his determination of withdrawing himself from a situation with which he was so thoroughly disgusted.\footnote{119}

Despite his disillusionment with the pleasures of the position for which he had so long waited, Sa'adat was not prepared to sacrifice his dynasty's right to rule. He informed Wellesley in uncharacteristically blunt terms in January 1801 that, "my consent to the first proposition is altogether impracticable[;] . . . it is impossible for me with my own hands to exclude myself from my Patrimonial Dominion (for, what advantage should I derive from so doing?), this therefore is a measure which I will never adopt."\footnote{120} He further demanded, "as I have not in any way delayed or neglected to discharge the Kists for the expenses of the troops, but have paid them with punctuality, where is the occasion for requiring any territorial resource?"\footnote{121} The nawab also noted that, under his brother's government, when the amounts due to the Company were almost always late, no demands for territory had been made, and he could see no reason why they should be now.\footnote{122} He wanted substantial changes in the Company's offer, which would leave the reigns of power in his and his descendants hands, specifically that an amil of his choosing collect the revenue in any ceded territories for the Company; that the British only be given rights to lands west of the Ganges and in Rohilkhand; that the amount they were demanding to reimburse them for a recent diplomatic expedition to Afghanistan be reduced; and that Sa'adat retain exclusive and independent authority in his remaining lands.\footnote{123}

Wellesley's reply stated that the first demand was "subversive of the fundamental principles of the territorial cession," namely that the Company should have a source of income from Awadh independent of the ruler's authority to guarantee the upkeep of their troops. The second proposal was also rejected, for the lands on offer were seen as too limited to provide for the size of the force the Company intended to station in Awadh. Thirdly, Sa'adat would only receive a lessening of the payment demanded for the diplomatic mission if he agreed to the first proposition, the complete annexation of his lands, as that would make the defense of Awadh the Company's sole responsibility. The mission had been undertaken to convince Zeman Shah of the futility of raiding beyond Lahore, and was therefore as useful to Sa'adat as it was to the British. Lastly, Sa'adat was to be given no concessions on the issue of sovereignty; he would still retain a large state with enough revenue to raise a substantial army against the Company if he wished, so it might become necessary "in a certain degree to circumscribe his Excellency's authority."\footnote{124}

Scott kept Edmonstone apprised of the situation at court, including bouts of "unusual gaiety" interspersed with deep dejection on the part of the nawab, who was also observed to have begun to drink heavily.\footnote{125} Scott informed Edmonstone that my moonshee [munshi, or secretary] having waited on his Excellency on the 30th of last month [June 1801], to announce the arrival of the relieving Regiment from Cawnpoor, he found him at four o Clock in the afternoon, in the dress which he had worn hunting in the morning, in a state of perfect inebriety. In reply to the usual compliments from me, and inquiries after his health, he said to the Moonshee, why you see Moonshee I am particularly cheerful today, I have not a single care about me,
no not an atom, and continued for some time, conversing in the same ridiculous strain.\textsuperscript{126}

However, when Scott visited the wazir the next morning to introduce the officers of the new regiment, he found him in a strong depression, to the point that he "shed tears at Breakfast."\textsuperscript{127} Despite his deteriorating state of mind and repeated demands by Wellesley, Sa'adat continued to resist his two unappealing options. His resolution is best explained by his probable belief that Wellesley did not want to use force, which would be difficult to explain to Leadenhall Street, against him. Edmonstone informed Scott that he must disabuse the wazir of this notion:

The right of the Company to secure the British interests in the province of Oude must be considered as the fundamental principle of every arrangement. It is the Bond of connection between the Dominions of the Company and the throne of his Excellency and exists independently of his Excellency's will. The inference to be drawn from his undesirable position is that the British Government would be justified in pursuing the measures necessary for the security of those interests, not only without his Excellency's consent, but even in opposition to his endeavours to counteract them.\textsuperscript{128}

It was not a bluff. Edmonstone instructed Scott to announce to the nawab in explicit terms the British intention to assume the entire civil and military administration of Awadh, and, if the declaration did not help to sway his decision, he was to ready the army to force the issue.\textsuperscript{129} He also informed William Kirkpatrick that he had sent instructions to the resident to order the Company's troops to establish British authority in the state.\textsuperscript{130}

The threat of force did what previous diplomatic maneuvering had failed to achieve. The letter was written on Edmonstone's third journey to Awadh in the fall of 1801. Irritated with the delay, Wellesley had decided to emulate Shore and take a trip up the Ganges to deal with Sa'adat in person, and Edmonstone, as always, accompanied him. Before the party arrived in Lucknow, however, they received a reply from the nawab agreeing to the second proposition. In response to a letter from his brother Henry, who had been sent ahead to assist Scott, conveying the good news, Wellesley made it clear how intimately Edmonstone had been involved in the negotiations:

I have this moment received your letter of the 20th and have no hesitation in returning my immediate consent to the conditions stated in the Vizier's Paper, as the terms of his accession to the 2nd Proposition. . . . To the best of my recollection my last Instructions sent through Mr. Edmonstone would have sufficiently authorized you to consent to the Vizier's condition; but as Mr. Edmonstone happens not to be at hand I reply to your letter without a moment's delay. . . . [postscript] Mr. Edmonstone is arrived, and I find that the Vizier's present proposition had never before been distinctly under my consideration.\textsuperscript{131}

Edmonstone was suspicious of Sa'adat's motives for cooperation, writing to William Kirkpatrick that the nawab had agreed only on condition that he was allowed to go on an extended pilgrimage, leaving his son as regent. Edmonstone worried that his motive may perhaps be to proclaim to the world by a measure which is frequently the result of disgust & disappointment, his sense of the injustice which he affects to suffer at the hands of the British Govt, or it may be one purpose of his temporary secession to leave the Govt in the hands of a person who may plead want of authority to introduce any arrangement which may be proposed to him for the reform of
existing writs . . . in the administration & thereby oppose an obstacle to any . . .
interference on the part of the British Govt calculated to weaken the independence of
his . . . dominions.\textsuperscript{132}

Sa'adat was ultimately prevented from making his pilgrimage and, with no further
options, agreed to the treaty of annexation on November 10, 1801; Edmonstone signed
on behalf of the Company.

The following visit by Wellesley's party was marked by apparently friendly meetings
between the British and the wazir, beginning with Almas' reception of the delegation at
Kanpur, followed shortly by a visit from Sa'adat and five of his sons.\textsuperscript{133} Wellesley's
party entered Lucknow to an enthusiastic reception arranged by the nawab: the streets
had been freshly painted, those of important merchants were lined with silks in a
dazzling array of patterns, and the tops of the houses were covered with musicians and
dancing girls.\textsuperscript{134} Part of the enthusiasm of the huge assembled crowd, which so closely
pressed the procession's elephants as to risk injury, was due to Wellesley and Sa'adat
scattering large amounts of rupees to onlookers.\textsuperscript{135} The nawab was extravagantly
courteous, causing Charles Metcalfe, a young member of the delegation who was still
rather naïve about Indian diplomatic practice, to record in wonder that the "Nabob and
the Lord grew so attached to each other, that the Nabob declared that he could not exist
unless he always dined and breakfasted with the Lord."\textsuperscript{136} However, the following
round of visits, nautches and fireworks displays did not disguise the fact that
circumstances in Awadh had permanently altered.

On January 24, the nawab visited Wellesley at the Farhat Baksh, a palatial home he
had bought from Major-General Martin and set aside for the governor-general's use, and
the details of the new political arrangement were finalized. Sa'adat lost half his territory
to the Company, including the areas of Rohilkhand, the agriculturally rich lands in the
Doab that had been under his control, and Gorakhpur, the revenues of which supported a
much-increased Company army. The nawab's force was, at the same time, reduced to a
tenth of its former strength. In 1803, Archibald Seton, an old acquaintance of
Edmonstone's, was made agent to the governor-general in the ceded provinces, with
orders to communicate to the resident at Lucknow any disturbances or news of
importance in the area.\textsuperscript{137} That same year, Gore Ouseley, a long-time British resident of
Lucknow, became the commander of Sa'adat's bodyguard with the rank of major.\textsuperscript{138} He
was also an old acquaintance of Edmonstone's, who had warned him of Vizier Ali's
dislike for the British prior to his second trip to Lucknow, insuring that Sa'adat was
thereafter surrounded by guards loyal to British interests.

Although the common representation in modern histories of Sa'adat as the ablest of
Shuja's successors who had to "pay the penalty for the incompetence and
misgovernment of his two immediate predecessors"\textsuperscript{139} owes more to the imagination of
the nawab's supporters than historical evidence, he was not without ability or concern for
his people. However, the treaty he had been willing to sign to gain the throne, and the
reduction in his army and revenues it required, left him with no effective method of
opposing British acquisitiveness. With no outlet for anything other than pleasure left to
him, Sa'adat devoted himself to building projects and patronage of art until his death in
1814. This practice was continued by his successors until 1856, when a second treaty of
annexation brought the remainder of Awadh under British rule, and proved Vizier Ali's
prediction finally true--together, Cherry and Edmonstone had managed to destroy the
house of Asaf-ud-Daula. Fittingly, the signature on the 1856 treaty was that of George Frederick Edmonstone, the son Edmonstone had named after Cherry.
SECTION THREE: THE WELLESLEY YEARS, 1798-1805

CHAPTER NINE: THE POMP AND THE POWER, 1802-1803

Knowledge itself is power.
- Francis Bacon

The changes of the Wellesley era were not confined to politics alone. From the windows of the grand new Government House the governor-general erected in Calcutta, Edmonstone could look out onto a pristine lawn, its expanse of green interrupted only by the carriage-way leading to an impressive, lion-topped gate. It might have been the view from a window in England, except for an occasional passing palanquin. Begun in 1798, Government House cost £170,000—which explains why Wellesley failed to mention its existence to the directors until 1802 when it neared completion—yet it was a magnificent statement of the Company's change in status from merchants to emperors. It consisted of a central block surrounded by four wings connected by circular passageways. Elegantly appointed offices, apartments and a grand ball-room decorated with Ionic pillars occupied the wings and upper floor; the ground floor had a meeting room for the governor-general’s council, where they could plan strategy surrounded by busts of the twelve Caesars, and vast reception areas. The most impressive of the latter was Marble Hall, modeled on a Roman atrium, which served as the state dining room. It featured gray marble and Doric columns, its white ceiling picked out in gilt—just one example of the fact that no expense had been spared in outfitting the grand Georgian building as a palace. Far removed from the oriental ambiance of the Indian section of the city, Edmonstone and his fellow employees worked surrounded by true Neoclassical style.

Wellesley took on more of the trappings of empire than simply removing the Company’s headquarters from a counting house to a mansion. He also increased the prestige of the position of governor-general, to the point that more deference was paid to him by the end of his term than to any other figure in the British Empire, possibly including the king. This tendency had been visible from the beginning: the Morning Chronicle wrote on his departure for India, “his frigate [is so] encumbered with stores, carriages and baggage, that should the rencontre of an enemy make it necessary to prepare for action, Lord Mornington will inevitably suffer from clearage in the course of six minutes a loss of at least £2,000.” His penchant for self-glorification was not really seen until after the defeat of Tipu, however, following which every year witnessed the use of increased formality and protocol. This was partly evidenced in the title he favored: His Excellency, with the courtesy prefix of Most Noble in recognition of his holding a marquisate. Cornwallis, on his second trip to India in 1805, would dispense with the added honorific, but it was commonly used by most of Wellesley’s successors. The new governor-general also made his attitude towards his office clear on his trip to Awadh in 1801: he traveled along the same route as had Cornwallis and Shore, both of
whom had submitted to the *khelat* ceremony when visiting the Mughal emperor in Delhi. Wellesley, however, found the ceremony degrading—he wore his uniform and received the gifts on trays.³

Wellesley lived in grand style. He used a coach and six horses instead of the carriage and pair favored by his predecessors. His state budgerow, on which he traveled to Awadh, was described by Viscount Valentia as an ornate green and gold vessel that had at its “head a spread eagle gilt; its stern a tiger’s head and body. The center would contain twenty natives with ease and was covered by an awning and silk curtain: forward were seated twenty natives dressed in scarlet habits with rose colored turbans who paddled away.”⁴ Wellesley also conceived the idea of building himself a large summer house at Barrackpur, fourteen miles from Calcutta, although his plans were somewhat stymied by lack of funds. Valentia, who was much impressed by the governor-general, kindly noted that the house was set in a beautiful location, nestled among “pagodas, villages, and groves of lofty trees,” just across the river from the Danish settlement of Serampore, and featured shady verandahs on all sides and outlying bungalows for secretaries and aides.⁵ An anonymous writer who saw the dwelling a decade later was less impressed, calling it “a small indifferent house,” but admitting that it did have an attractive, English-style park, well stocked with deer, and an excellent menagerie.⁶

It was in his formal actions as governor-general in Calcutta that Wellesley evidenced his most impressive shows of pomp and pageantry. In 1804, Sir James Mackintosh came closest to identifying the idea behind Wellesley’s actions:

> The Governor . . . is indeed an ingenious and intelligent man; but every Englishman who resides here very long has, I fear, either his mind emasculated by submission, or corrupted by despotic power. M Duncan may represent one genus, the *Brahminized* Englishman; Lord W is indisputably at the head of the other, the *Sultanized* Englishman.⁷

In fact, Wellesley aimed at something a bit grander than simply sultan, as his subsequent actions showed. When he returned from Awadh, he was met by troops lining both sides of the street between Government House and Fort William, while from the ramparts of the latter a salute was fired.⁸ On Sundays, Calcutta society went to church along with the governor-general. He set out from Government House with an honor guard of troops lining the streets on the way and a salute announcing his departure. The leading civil and military officers, including Edmonstone, followed Wellesley’s coach in carriages and palanquins, and were watched by “a great concourse of the Native Inhabitants of Calcutta,” who assembled for the spectacle as their ancestors once had for Mughal parades. The chaplains met him at the entrance of the church and conducted him into the service, during which another salute was fired at the Te Deum and a third on his return to Government House.⁹

The greatest pageantry of Wellesley’s era took place at his new palace, in which few weeks passed during the cooler months without some type of activity designed to show the power and heighten the prestige of the administration. These included grand breakfasts, such as those given to celebrate the fall of Seringapatam every year—the one on April 30, 1802, was attended by 700 guests and marked the first time the great apartments at Government House were opened for the admiration of Calcutta society.¹⁰ Wellesley attended attired in full imperial regalia, prominently wearing the star and badge of the Order of St. Patrick which General George Harris had had made for him.
from Tipu’s jewels as a present from the army. A similar breakfast was held on May 5 the following year, with Tipu’s standards intermixed with the floral arrangements for decoration, and yet another was given on August 9, 1802, to General David Baird and his officers on their return from an expedition to aid the British forces in Egypt.

Suppers and balls occupied many evenings at Government House, with the most elaborate held on January 26, 1803. It was ostensibly to commemorate the Peace of Amiens the previous year, but was actually to celebrate the completion of Government House, the assembly rooms of which had not been ready in September when the news first arrived. It was so flamboyant that it was remembered afterwards as something of a vignette of empire: Lord Curzon, Wellesley’s ideological reincarnation, hosted a fancy dress ball on January 26, 1903, with the same type of costumes as those worn to the extravaganza a hundred years earlier. It is doubtful that Curzon’s recreation was quite the spectacle of the original, however. Eight hundred guests, including Edmonstone, were in attendance at what would be Wellesley’s greatest display. They passed on their way to Government House the impressive sight of the ramparts of Fort William illuminated with thousands of small blue lamps for the occasion. The shipping in the harbor, including the Company’s newest vessel, the Marquis Wellesley, as well as the state yacht and all of the most prominent buildings along the Esplanade, were lit with white lights; other lamps were suspended from bamboo poles along the main streets. A series of brightly lit transparent paintings lined the drive to Government House, including, opposite the southern entrance, a forty foot high façade of a temple containing an image of Britannia receiving an olive branch from Peace. Nearby, a double range of Doric pillars led to temples dedicated to fame and valor, from which ascended a luminous pyramid 36 feet high. In the center of the Esplanade was a multicolored Indian temple of fire, which appeared about ten o’clock, “and afforded a pleasing contrast to the paler lights of the surrounding illumination.”

The guests began to assemble at nine o’clock, allowing Wellesley to make a grand entrance at ten, preceded by a color guard, a detachment of native infantry and fifty of his body guard. He once again wore his diamond star, easily his favorite decoration, and was attended by a large entourage of aides. He held a durbar on the northern veranda to receive the compliments of the nizam’s ambassador and other leading dignitaries before the entertainment began, then entered the ballroom and took his place on a specially prepared dais. It was covered by an octagonal Persian carpet on which sat a crimson and gold chair, both of which had belonged to Tipu and were part of the spoils of Seringapatam. Above the governor-general’s head hung an impressive state canopy, which had cost £820. The effect was that of a king on his throne, especially when he was flanked by the members of his council, the chief justice, and the judges of the supreme court, who sat in chairs in a semicircle in front and below him. Down to the door on each side of the room, on blue satin chairs and sofas, sat the wives of the leading Company men in order of their husband’s rank—not in British society, but in the Company’s service.

Soon after Wellesley had taken his seat, the dancing began. Viscount Valentia, who was present on the occasion, recalled the swirl of activity and color in the ballroom, with ladies in shimmering jewels dancing under elaborate chandeliers, their colorful silk gowns reflected in gilt edged mirrors; black clad Armenians mingling with British officers in dress uniforms of red and gold or blue and silver; and exotically attired Indian
nobles adding an element of masquerade to the overall effect. Supper was announced at midnight, with all 800 guests served by scarlet-clad servants simultaneously from five rows of tables in the Marble Hall and another in the north-east wing, while the governor-general’s band played “a variety of martial airs.” The tables were decorated with dioramas depicting recent imperial triumphs, the chief being a temple representing the peace, consisting of eight Corinthian pillars supporting four pediments and a light dome. The pediments were ornamented with paintings of the battle of the Nile (1 Aug. 1798), the storming of Seringapatam (4 May 1799), the action off Cape St. Vincent (14 Feb. 1798) and the landing of the British army under Sir Robert Abercrombie in Egypt (8 March 1801). All, from Wellesley’s standpoint, being equally important for the preservation of empire.

The pinnacle of the evening came at one o’clock, when a rocket was set off to announce the beginning of a special fireworks display, for which Wellesley had imported from Lucknow the finest technicians in India. The guests positioned themselves along balconies and windows facing the Esplanade and were entertained until two-thirty by imaginative creations, including a globe, which after discharging sparks for a while, opened to reveal a transparency in Persian characters saying “may your prosperity be perpetual.” The show cost the directors £3, 248. It is difficult to imagine all this panoply occurring barely four years after the understated government of Sir John Shore, who had employed a scant three aides, never had a body guard and refused official attendants, not even permitting men to run on foot with his carriage when he drove out. Wellesley’s pomp and pageantry was intended to send an unmistakable message—that a new empire had assumed Mughal authority.

The Enlightenment’s emphasis on the collective over the individual had long been in vogue on the sub-continent; the British assumption of Mughal prerogative therefore made more of a change in form than function. The new linking language of India was English rather than Persian, the new ruling class preferred Shakespearean plays to elephant fights and Calcutta replaced Delhi as the capital, but little else changed. A small ruling class continued to monopolize power, the wealth of India was still concentrated in a few hands, and rebellion, as always, was dealt with harshly. The tradition-bound, Enlightenment-bred young men arriving in the Company’s service had no difficulty adapting to such a familiar system. At an impressionable age and with their education largely incomplete, they were easy to indoctrinate. The process focused on three main ideas: the natural inferiority of the Indians, the duplicity of the same and the superiority of British rule to that of the Indian states. As a caste system of sorts was in place in Europe, the first point was easy to assimilate; the other two concepts were impressed on new arrivals by more experienced Company men, most of whom had come up through the ranks in the imperialist era unwittingly begun by Cornwallis. The best and brightest of the new employees received the most intense indoctrination under Edmonstone’s tutelage in the Governor-General’s Office at Government House.

In 1802, Edmonstone laconically referred to the bureau over which he had superintendence as a district office in which the governor-general’s official correspondence was carried on. Looking back on the experience years later, he would offer a somewhat expanded, and more accurate, assessment:

Marquess Wellesley established an office denominated “The Governor General’s Office” for the purpose of preserving in regular order copies of minutes, and other
documents of importance connected with . . . branches of the administrative Government which the Governor General deemed it proper personally to conduct. Over this office I was appointed to preside. It formed an admirable school of instruction for the young men attached to it, whose duty it became to arrange the records of the office, to transcribe papers, form précis and indexes, supply documents, and generally to assist in any way in which they could be useful. They thus had the opportunity of acquiring early habits of business, of becoming acquainted with the political & other important affairs of state, of imbuing sound views of policy and elevated principles of public conduct, and thus qualifying themselves for their prospective duties in the actual administration of public affairs. . . . The truth of this has been verified by the distinguished career of many of those Civil Servants of the Company who were attached to the office, among whom must be especially mentioned the late Mr. [John] Adam, Sir Charles Metcalfe, Mr. W[illiam] B[utterworth] Bayley & Sir Richard Jenkins.  

Edmonstone’s comments make clear that later views of the office, such as Curzon’s observation that it was composed of “half a dozen of the most promising young civilians from the newly founded College of Fort William, who took down and copied the Governor General’s Dispatches, and generally filled the place now occupied by stenographers and typewriting machines,” missed the point. The office allowed the best new recruits to be trained not only in government practices but also in Edmonstone’s own version of “sound policy” regarding the Indian states.

The men of whom Edmonstone makes special mention received a double dose of his instruction, for all of them were also his students at another of Wellesley’s innovations—the College of Fort William. As Edmonstone commented to his brother Charles in 1800:

I am to become school Master or, in the more dignified language of the College, Professor. . . . I am employed in framing dissertations and lectures upon Persian literature and language[;] . . . you may possibly have heard of the proficiency of the Civil Servants in the language of the Country, our real ignorance of them is truly deplorable.”

Edmonstone, who always maintained a somewhat romantic view of himself, did not care for the title of professor, as he noted, “this is not the mode in which I would chuse [sic] to be compensated for my acknowledged claims.” He did not have a choice, however; Wellesley was determined that his new venture would succeed, and as Edmonstone delicately described it, “under the difficulty which was of course at first experienced of finding individuals competent to undertake the duties of the various professorships, I was requested by his Lordship to assume and exercise for a time the duties of Professor of the Persian Language which I accordingly did.”

He delivered lectures at the College’s temporary home in a house on Tank Square on Tuesdays and Saturdays at 10:00 AM starting on November 25, 1801. His lectures were supposed to begin earlier, during the college’s first term commencing February 6, but his trip to Awadh with Wellesley delayed them. He continued to offer classes for two years, until the burdens of his other departments made it necessary to desist.

Edmonstone taught alongside a number of leading Company figures, including many old friends and others with whom he would have much future contact, indicating again that the ruling circle of the Company’s government in India was a small, intimate group.
George Hilaro Barlow taught the laws of the civil government of the British territories in India; Claudius Buchanan, the Company’s leading chaplain in Calcutta, was vice-provost and professor of Greek, Latin, and English classics; and William Kirkpatrick briefly helped instruct in Persian. Barlow, Edmonstone and Kirkpatrick also comprised a council to govern and regulate the college along with Buchanan and the provost, Reverend David Brown. John H. Harington, another Persian specialist, was High Court judge and an Asiatic Society member who had been in India since 1780, and John B. Gilchrist, who taught Hindi, had published an Urdu grammar and dictionary. More unusually, William Carey, a 39-year-old Baptist missionary, was hired to teach all the courses offered in languages other than Persian, Arabic and Hindi. He had been born a farm laborer’s son and was self-educated, yet had managed to learn Latin, Greek, Hebrew and Dutch before arriving in India, and was soon thereafter proficient in a number of Indian languages. He demonstrated his qualifications for the post by translating the New Testament into Bengali, but was a choice of desperation for Wellesley, who suspected the Baptists of being secret spies for the French.

In addition to manpower shortages and political tensions, the college was also plagued by sometimes intense personal rivalries among men who saw their positions as means to gain the governor-general’s favor. Edmonstone found himself caught up in one of these when his old friend, Lieutenant John Baillie, was added to the faculty in 1801 to teach Arabic and Islamic law. Baillie was more than qualified: in 1797 Shore had used him to translate from Arabic a text on Islamic law originally compiled by Sir William Jones, and he later published an original work, the Digest of Sheeah Law. His son, Edmonstone Benjamin Edmonstone Baillie, found another part of the latter work in his father’s papers after his death, and published it as part of his Digest of Mohummudan Law. The problem arose with Francis Gladwin, professor of Persian and an old Company soldier-diplomat whom Hastings had sent to Tibet in 1783. He was a gifted linguist who had written an English-Persian vocabulary in 1775 that analyzed the influence of Arabic on Persian and Persian on Hindi, but he soon evidenced considerable jealousy towards Baillie. By May 1, 1801, Edmonstone wrote William Kirkpatrick of the considerable problems caused by the personality clash:

I am sorry to inform you that the Persian Dept of the College, during the last term, has been almost entirely at a stand. As my official avocations would not admit of my attendance at the College, the whole burthen of instruction was thrown upon Gladwin, whose state of mind was ill adapted to bear so heavy a weight, nor perhaps could the individual exertions & abilities of any man suffice for the instruction of 70 young men, the number to which the Persian Class amounted. Gladwin was therefore extremely anxious for assistance. But it became extremely difficult to find any person whose services could be shared, sufficiently qualified. I therefore proposed the expedient of uniting the Persian & Arabic Professorships. Mr. Baillie’s knowledge of Persian is very great & his proficiency in the Arabic language gives him an advantage that no other European possesses. I was delighted with the notion of providing by this arrangement in the most effectual manner, not only for the success of the institution, but (as I conceived) for the relief of Gladwin, who I concluded would be highly gratified. . . . But Judge of my surprise when I found that Gladwin absolutely refused to act with him, not upon the plea of Mr. B’s want of capacity, nor from any mistrust of his temper & disposition, but declaredly because of Mr. Baillie’s
superior qualifications. Gladwin interpreted the arrangement into degradation & a virtual dismission of himself, & under that impression he withdrew altogether, in a state of mind that exceeds all description.  

Gladwin’s attitude might have had something to do with the known friendship between Edmonstone and Baillie, which must have convinced him that he was being shunted aside. Not surprisingly, the subsequent visit made to him by Edmonstone, with Baillie in tow, in which they used “every argument in our power to undeceive him, & to convince him, that neither his credit nor his influence would be diminished,” was tense. He was not convinced that there would be “no competition for superiority” between them, and it was not until Baillie offered to be appointed at the rank of his assistant and to “act entirely with Gladwin’s advice & concurrence” that his consent to return was obtained. It was a brief victory, however, for another clash soon rose between Gladwin and the provost, David Brown, and Gladwin resigned in a fit of temper. Edmonstone despaired that “the Professorship is now to be filled by Baillie & as an Asst. Mr. Matthew Lumsden, & by me. I know not how we can give sufficient attendance to 70 scholars without Gladwin’s aid, but there is no remedy.”

Wellesley’s attempt to found a British-style university in Calcutta was prompted by the critical need in the Company’s growing empire for competent, well-trained political functionaries, which they had somehow to create out of the few untrained teenagers with whom they were supplied by the directors. As Edmonstone wrote to James Achilles Kirkpatrick, resident at Hyderabad, who had requested an aid for Charles Russell, his overworked secretary, “all our young men are in such demand & the number from which an assistant to your Secretary can be selected is so limited, that it is difficult to find one.” Yet the problems with the College were substantial, not the least of which was the cost. Between November 24, 1800 and October 31, 1801, 630,000 rupees, roughly £79,000, was spent on it. A large amount of this went to pay salaries for the European teachers, who made up to £320 a month each, and the Asian faculty, who received up to 200 rupees a month. Ultimately, it was an unworkable idea with the resources in men and funds the Company possessed at the time in India, but in the few years of its operation it did much to reinforce the overall imperialist mindset of the Wellesley era. An example was the celebration on February 5, 1802 to commemorate the college’s first year, which consisted partially of debates held in Persian, Hindi and Bengali. The topic for the latter language was, “The Asiatics are capable of as high a degree of civilization as the Europeans.” It was defended by W.B. Martini and opposed by William Butterworth Bayley and H. Hodson. Unsurprisingly, Bayley won the first place medal for Bengali and Hodson was later awarded a medal for written Bengali; there is no record of Martini gaining any accolades that evening.

All of the men specifically mentioned in Edmonstone’s autobiography as being under his direct tutelage in the Governor-General’s Office and at the college—Adam, Metcalfe, Bayley and Jenkins—became devout imperialists, reflecting Edmonstone’s and Wellesley’s views throughout their long and influential careers. Richard Jenkins was among the best students at the college, acquiring proficiency in at least two Indian languages and winning many honors. His first official appointment was secretary to the resident with Sindhia, which resulted in his imprisonment during the Second Maratha War; he later became resident at Nagpur and ended his career as a director. Bayley climbed higher, serving as interim governor-general after the departure of Amherst, then...
entering the court of directors which he eventually came to chair. Other members of the Governor-General’s Office who distinguished themselves were Arthur Henry Cole, fourth son of the 1st Earl of Enniskillen, who entered the company’s civil service in 1801 and rose to be resident at Mysore, and Charles Lushington, who became chief secretary to government in 1825. Without doubt, however, the two closest to Edmonstone, who also had possibly the most distinguished careers, were Metcalfe and Adam.

Charles Theophilus Metcalfe, the first student admitted to the College of Fort William, was assigned to Edmonstone’s and Baillie’s Persian classes. He was not a prepossessing figure, being short, corpulent and homely, with brown hair that continually threatened to obliterate his low forehead, a round face, a pug nose, an aversion to sports and no ability with either horse or gun. Yet he had important assets: although born in India, he was educated at Eton, where he first gave evidence of a brilliant mind, and his father was considered by Wellesley to be a valuable ally on the Court of Directors. He was soon identified by Edmonstone as a suitable candidate for special training, and joined the Governor-General’s Office at age 17, shortly after his arrival in 1801. The pressing need for more administrative personnel insured that his training in Calcutta was short, however; in 1802 he was appointed as John Collins’ assistant at Sindhi’s court, where he irritated the grizzled thirty-year veteran with unsolicited opinions on virtually everything. However, he managed to keep his eyes open while in the field; when he returned to Calcutta, he impressed Edmonstone enough to be offered a place in the chief secretary’s office, where he submitted a memorandum in 1803 citing Kutch as the most suitable place for a subsidiary force within Sindhi’s territory. Edmonstone, proud of his protégé’s grasp of the subsidiary system, kept the initial draft of the memorandum all his life.

Wellesley shortly thereafter assigned the young man as political assistant to General Gerard Lake, commander-in-chief of the Company’s forces, whose good opinion he won by being one of the first in the breach at the storming of the Digh fortress. Metcalfe eventually became a member of the supreme council and ended his career in India as acting governor-general in 1835. He went on to become governor of Jamaica and governor-general of Canada before his death in 1846.

Despite his fondness for Metcalfe, Edmonstone’s favorite student and closest protégé was undoubtedly John Adam, a fellow Scot who arrived in India in 1795. Adam took up the study of Indian languages early, having acquired, by 1796, a language tutor with whom he worked daily. He evidenced an early penchant for dressing in an oriental fashion, but soon dropped that habit when it was hinted it might hurt his career. He was selected for the Governor-General’s Office shortly after its inception and soon thereafter became Edmonstone’s personal assistant when his mentor was promoted to Secretary in the Secret, Foreign and Political Department in 1801. Adam succeeded him in that position in 1812 and continued Edmonstone’s work in building up the department into a systematized, orderly repository of extensive information on the Indian courts, with subject files on virtually every individual of consequence on the subcontinent. Adam rose high in the Company’s service, becoming acting governor-general in 1823, during the interval between the Moira and Amherst governments.

Adam sailed to India on the same ship as his cousin, the 16 year old Mountstuart Elphinstone. Adam’s affection for his cousins, Mount, as he was known to his friends, and James, who arrived in 1796, perhaps in part accounts for Edmonstone’s assistance to
them, although it no doubt helped that one of their uncles was a director. Edmonstone would be particularly key in forwarding Mountstuart’s career under Minto’s governor-generalship. In short, there was virtually no leading civil servant of the next twenty years who was not instructed by Edmonstone in some capacity; in many cases they had also been his guests, for he continued his previous practice of regularly entertaining, thus insuring that he met socially the up and coming Company recruits.53

In January 1801, Edmonstone took on a new role, that of Secretary of the Secret, Foreign and Political department, while simultaneously maintaining his position in the Persian office.54 This dual role was necessary as Wellesley was unsure of being able to find anyone who could interact with the Indian courts as well as he.55 William Kirkpatrick was initially chosen to head the Secret, Foreign and Political department but, as Edmonstone expressed it, “the appointment of a Military Officer to that situation being disapproved by the Court of Directors I had the honor of being selected to succeed him.”56 The first edition of Wellesley’s Despatches, which was overseen by the former governor-general himself, explained that Edmonstone had been the only choice to replace Kirkpatrick, as his “profound knowledge of the Eastern languages, laws, manners and customs, and of the state and disposition and interests of the several native courts, as well as to his excellent temper, and to his judgment and unwearied attention to business,” was unequalled in the Company’s service.57 Edmonstone received the princely salary of 50,000 rupees a year for his multiple functions, despite the fact that, in 1803, the directors decided that no civil servant could occupy two or more offices at the same time if the combined salaries exceeded set limits. However, these varied depending on length of time in service, with those persons having more than 12 years in India being subject to no limit—a requirement that Edmonstone more than met. The Persian secretary (the title of translator was dropped in the reorganization) also received a capable assistant in Claude Russell to help him with his added duties.58

As Edmonstone noted, his new position placed him even more than before “in a situation of constant personal communication with and attendance on his Lordship,” a state of affairs which continued throughout Wellesley’s time in India.59 This was especially true as the new department did not function along the same lines as the others. Edmonstone’s new office was a recent invention, resulting from a reorganization of the government by Wellesley in 1800. A separate secretary was appointed over each of the four main departments of the administration: the Military, the Public, the Revenue and Judicial, and the Secret, Foreign and Political. A chief secretary was appointed to oversee them all, but the departmental secretaries had complete authority over the way in which their offices were managed.60 As Edmonstone put it:

the business of the Political Department, except in matters of mere ordinary routine, was not carried on like that of other Departments of the Government at the Council Board, but by the Governor General himself ministerially & subordinately aided in the execution of it by the Secretary who subsequently placed the dispatches received, their answers & other documents relating to them on record.61

In other words, Edmonstone and Wellesley made the political decisions themselves, and afterwards informed the council, which ratified them. In the case of all other departments, the secretaries attended council meetings and presented their information for the perusal of the group as a whole, normally a week in advance, before a decision was reached.
Edmonstone set up an office in a three-storied house at 22 Old Court House Street, just down from his own residence. A large space was needed as between 40 and 50 clerks were employed in the Foreign branch of his office in sending and receiving correspondence from the Danish, French, Dutch and Portuguese settlements in India, as well as from the Indian states and the islands surrounding the subcontinent. It is impossible to know exactly how many people Edmonstone supervised, as he commented, “many more were occasionally employed in season of an extraordinary pressure of business,” which was a euphemism for times of war. In his supervision of the Political and Foreign divisions, every issue of importance in Wellesley’s period came through Edmonstone’s hands.

It was in the Secret branch that Edmonstone left one of his greatest legacies to the Company. As has been noted, he transformed it into a vast storehouse of information on the subcontinent, one that he augmented whenever Company officials traveled through India. Edmonstone’s was an organized and logical mind that deplored confusion and disarray. He was especially displeased with the quality of reports field officers turned in, when they bothered to do so at all, concerning the areas through which they had traveled. He therefore authored a minute on “General Observations of an Officer employed to take a Military Survey of a Country,” a work that can only be called a spy manual, to acquaint them with the type of detailed information he expected on their return. It showed an eye for detail and a particular interest in military matters. He warned that

the officer employed on this duty must lay his account with no small degree of labour, but which at the same time is to be overcome by a constant and undivided attention to this duty only. He must exercise the greatest patience with the People of the Country through which he is passing. Interrogate Several on any points of Information he may be looking for, take notes on what he receives, and from those he will be able to form a more just and correct opinion on the subject of inquiry than by trusting to the reports of his own Servants alone, who will be too apt to be misled by an over anxious desire to meet what they might consider the particular wishes of their Master. It is not however meant that the officer should totally disregard the Reports of his own Servants—only to be very careful to compare, before he adopts them.

Officers were cautioned to differentiate in their reports between information they received from informants, of whatever persuasion, and that they gathered themselves. In preparing for a journey into new territory, officers were always to take with them a theodolite, a surveyor’s instrument resembling a telescope mounted so that it could swivel horizontally and vertically, and two perambulators, another term for a waywiser or odometer. In Edmonstone’s day, this last consisted of a large wheel that rolled along a level surface with a dial attached to register the distance traveled. Two were needed “in case of one getting out of order which is by no means uncommon,” and the officer was to test his daily to make sure it was giving an accurate reading. Instructions were included for doing this, consisting of comparing “any distance as given by it, with that as given by a common hundred feet chain and if any considerable difference, it will be better to allow for such accordingly, than to attempt to correct the Perambulator.” A surveyor’s compass and a moderate sized telescope were also to find a place in his luggage, as was a field book in which he must write in pen and ink so as not to let his observations smudge. Edmonstone also included advice, perhaps taken from

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experience, on using the walk of a horse or the regular stride of troops to measure distance, in the event of local objections to a formal survey; such readings would, along with compass bearings, be somewhat useful. The detail put into the relatively brief instructions is impressive, including advice on determining the actual names of local settlements—should two near each other have the same name, the officer would find that locals distinguished between them by attaching the name of the next town or the nearest landlord—and of the length of the coss used in that part of the country, which varied considerably across India.

There followed a list of things on which Edmonstone expected detailed information. A few examples should suffice to show the extent of his records. He wanted to know about the roads through a region: their breadth; the nature of the soil; their ability to support heavy guns, especially after rain; any repairs that would be necessary to make the passage of artillery possible; any impediments; whether they passed through large towns and, if so, if the width was at least four bullocks abreast with few narrow or sharp turnings; and, if there were two or more roads from place to place, which was better? As far as the country was concerned, he wanted to know if it was cultivated and to what extent; how many harvests there were a year and when the crops were ripe; what resources of grain and forage it offered; whether it was wooded and, if so, to what extent this would prevent infantry or cavalry from maneuvering; if mountainous, were there passes and how difficult would it be for a British army to cross them; how they could be made impenetrable to an enemy; and were there any passes the locals did not mention? Rivers were “of so much importance to the purposes of War that too much pains cannot be bestowed in producing the most accurate Survey of all.” He expected to be informed which rivers an army would have to cross; what fords there were and which were practical for an army’s use; if there were no fords, how many boats were available; what bridges there were and, if none, were there materials available to construct one; what the bank was like on either side; how deep the water was at varying times of year; all major river turnings and windings, the height of the banks, the breadth of the river, what islands there were, and if there were any towns and forts on the banks; also, in the case of a small rivulet being present, could an enemy divert it? He also expected detailed information on mines, forts, fort commanders, and seasonal weather variations. Lastly, he wanted local guides and spies recruited at every possible opportunity.

In addition to officers in the field, Edmonstone received a good deal of his intelligence from the British residents, all of whom were expected to recruit local spies, as William Kirkpatrick had done while at Hyderabad, and to keep Edmonstone informed of local personalities and events. As he recalled in his autobiography, “in addition to the official correspondence I carried on a voluminous private or semi-official correspondence with several of the principle diplomatic Functionaries,” giving him added information beyond that contained in the official reports. He sent instructions to the residents, training them in intelligence gathering as he had the officers on assignment. An example is the letter he sent James Achilles Kirkpatrick complaining that a recent communication had not included all the information necessary for a judgment to be made on the issue in question. Kirkpatrick had complained about Maratha raids on areas of the nizam’s territory, but had not
stated whether the District of Mulkapore from which Sindiah and the Raja of Berar are said to have demanded the sum of three lacks of rupees, is of the number of those districts which are Subject to the double authority of His Highness the Nizam and the Rajah of Berar, and whether Bhoker which is said to have been plundered by the Troops of Sindiah is Subject to the dominion of any of the Company’s allies. He was advised in future to relay such additional information along with any similar reports.

Yet, despite the fact that Edmonstone’s meticulousness resulted in much better intelligence for the Calcutta administration and more accurate reports to London, it was another weight on his already over-burdened schedule. It is probable that the manpower shortage of Wellesley’s era fell on Edmonstone more heavily than any other individual. He complained of exhaustion to his brother Charles in 1803, commenting that he regularly worked 9-10 hours every day, a total that did not, of course, include the extracurricular activities which he was expected to attend. He remembered years later the excessive labors of the departments over which I was appointed to preside, being those departments to which much of the largest part of the great & complicated measures and transactions therein recorded . . . Departments embracing also the extensive correspondence between the Supreme authority & the subordinate Presidencies on political subjects and with the British Residents at Native Courts & other political functionaries. To advert in any detail to the ministerial labors involved in these transactions & events would be to review the History of British India during those eventful portions of it to which they relate. He was not exaggerating: in addition to the Persian department, the Secret, Foreign and Political department, his supervision of the Governor-General’s Office, his teaching duties at the College of Fort William and his constant attendance on Wellesley, Edmonstone had other tasks assigned to him from time to time. A few examples would be his translation work on Wellesley’s Persian Code of Regulations; his work on a committee including Barlow, J.H. Harrington, William Kirkpatrick, and W.C. Blaquiere to conduct examinations of the junior civil servants in Hindi and Persian and special translation work that, because of its confidentiality, could only be done by him. He complained of the latter to James Kirkpatrick in October, 1803, in a letter that gives a good description of the amount of work with which Edmonstone was daily inundated: Permit me . . . to prefer a request on my own account which is that you will have the goodness when practicable to send transmissions or abstracts in English of the Persian documents which you may have occasion to transmit for the Gov Genl’s information. A great many of the public officers have lately been in the habit of transmitting papers in the country languages to my department without translations. The accumulation of labor which this produces, greatly impedes public business, whilst the trouble saved individually to those who transmit such papers bears no proportion to the trouble given to me. I have frequently been obliged to neglect such papers altogether. The abstracting the papers of intelligence from the Rajah of Berar’s court which you occasionally transmit generally occupies the greatest part of the morning & papers of that nature & importance can alone be abstracted by me. The current correspondence of the Persian Department is alone very heavy & I have but two assistants in that department.
He confessed, “the duties of my numerous departments are in fact more than I can perform. I can only execute any extraordinary duty by neglecting other points of business which would otherwise obtain my attention.” Edmonstone’s exhaustion was also partially a result of the tumult in his personal life that same year. He had never lost his desire to return to Britain, and in the early years of Wellesley’s administration was making every effort to prepare the way for a speedy repatriation for himself and William. He was under no illusion as to how the British ascendancy was viewed by the Indians. He wrote to Charles that he was "living among a people who as a European hate & despise me & whom as an officer of administration more particularly connected with them, they consider me as the express object of that hatred.”

There were several barriers to his departure, however, the most obvious being monetary. The reason he had come to India in the first place continued to hold him there; he felt it his duty both to accumulate enough wealth to support himself on his return, and to be of assistance to the family fortunes. To accomplish this without a protracted stay in India, continued advancement was vital. He noted to William prior to his promotion in 1801 that

I know from conversations I have had with Mr. Wellesley [Henry Wellesley] that my position is considered in point of importance equal to any under government[;] . . . [he] even upon one occasion intimated his supposition that I had no idea of seeking another, conceiving that I had already attained to as high a situation as the subordinate servants of the Company could well look to. I of course undeceived him in this respect.”

Edmonstone was successful in acquiring preferment for William as well. In 1800, he finally obtained his brother the long-awaited seat on the Board of Trade, which brought increased salary and added prestige—both of which Edmonstone believed William had earned after twenty-four years in Company service. This also opened the way for the removal of the second barrier to his and William’s homecoming—his brother’s miserable relationship with the family.

Edmonstone regularly wrote to his relatives, occasionally sending small trinkets as well, trying despite an absence of twenty years to maintain some type of connection. He knew, as he commented to his uncle B. Harene, that

when after a long term of life and labor in a foreign country I may hope to return to my native land [I] shall find none to care for me but those with whom I am connected by the ties of consanguinity—for when I shall have quitted the society of those friends among whom I have lived for so many years in this distant quarter, and when the season for forming attachments shall have passed away, I can hardly hope to form new ones among men whose habits and pursuits are foreign to mine and with whom there will exist no link in the chain of connection to bind them and me. . . . I am sensible of the necessity of studiously maintaining a mental and epistolary intercourse with the several members of my family.”
William did not recognize this need, or perhaps felt he had no ties at home to maintain. He may have been correct in this estimation where his father was concerned. Sir Archibald was bitterly upset that

with every advantage of Birth, Talents, Education & Recommendations he might by this time have made himself and me in my old age happy by his Return home with a Fortune for the discharge of all my necessary incumbrances—Instead of which, after setting out with the highest character & most flattering respects he (as I’ve been since informed) very early estranged himself from society—declined every attention and even common civilities to his Protectors—kept to the mere business of his office, without the least seeming desire of either honourable Distinction, wealth, or Promotion. 87

He was thoroughly disgusted with his elder son, certain that William would return “with a Pittance instead of a Fortune.” 88 His son’s continued ill health made no apparent impression on the family patriarch, nor did Edmonstone’s repeated assurances of William’s “dutiful & affectionate feelings” for him and their other family members. 89 Edmonstone did manage to engineer a rapprochement, however, by using Sir Archibald’s greatest weakness against him. In either 1799 or 1800, he persuaded William to send home a large monetary gift. An astonished Sir Archibald was soon thereafter writing in amazement of “William sending over (in a letter of Edmonstone’s) Five Thousand Pounds towards lightening the Kilsyth Debt, or for my unlimited disposal in any way I please! . . . This most amiable, meritorious, and generous act, removes every impression of my mind to his disadvantage.” 90 Whether Edmonstone contributed anything to the gift is unknown, but at his rate of salary it would not have been impossible, nor would it have been out of character—throughout his life Edmonstone was generous in gifts to charity and, especially, to his intimates. In any case, he made sure Sir Archibald was aware of William’s promotion, and that, by 1805, he was confident that they would each have £50-60,000 saved and be able to return in style, a fact that could only have reinforced his father’s good opinion. 91 The wily diplomat had pulled off a more difficult coup than many of his Indian triumphs, and paved the way to a successful homecoming, for Sir Archibald would certainly insure a warm welcome for William from the rest of the family. Edmonstone had as carefully coordinated his personal affairs as he did his official work, but there was one circumstance he could not prevent.

William, always prone to illness, died in September 1803, less than a year after being appointed to the Board of Trade. In a letter written at the end of February that year, Edmonstone informed Charles that he and William were both in “perfect health,” 92 yet, just over six months later, William was dead. It may have been from his longstanding condition, probably the tuberculosis that also killed their eldest brother, or from the same illness Edmonstone experienced in July. Whatever the case, the shock seems to have caused Edmonstone to re-evaluate his life. At thirty-seven he had made no permanent attachments and had no legitimate heirs other than for his family in Britain. William's fortune, so painstakingly acquired over years in India, reverted to their father by British law, as he died intestate. The family's monetary problems were thereby largely alleviated, leaving Edmonstone free to make a life for himself. After being content with his Indian family for years, he married Charlotte Friell on his thirty-eighth birthday, December 19, 1803. Buchanan officiated, with Matthew and James Lumsden
and Thomas Boileau as witnesses (the latter was on the examination committee of college with Edmonstone).93 That same year, Edmonstone stopped using the family seal on letters, substituting instead an elaborately entwined NBE; it was perhaps a sign that, with William’s death, the final tie with his old life had been severed. His father’s demise a few years later insured that there was no one in Britain for whom he needed to return.

Edmonstone had little time to mourn his loss, as the last two years of Wellesley’s governor-generalship were frenetic. The annexations of 1799-1801 had given the Company the majority of the seacoast of India and lands ranging from the southernmost tip of the sub-continent (Tinnevelly) to the upper north (the area of Rohilkhand in Awadh). Instead of bringing security, however, the Company's new acquisitions brought it into conflict with numerous groups: privateers roaming the Indian Ocean, the Afghans and the Marathas. Steps had to be taken to deal with all these threats, steps that soon led to more expansion. To combat the privateers preying on the Company's shipping, Wellesley assembled an army in 1800 for an expedition against their strongholds on Mauritius and Bourbon. Admiral Rainier, commander of the British fleet in the Indian Ocean, refused to cooperate with Wellesley, however, complaining that his authority did not extend to the seas, and the detachment prepared to fight the pirates ended up being sent to aid the British forces in Egypt fighting the French. That same year the embassy from the Company for which Wellesley would afterwards insist that Sa’adat Ali help to pay, arrived in Teheran with orders to cause trouble between Zeman Shah and his half-brother, Shah Mahmud. It was an unnecessary trip, as the delegation soon discovered that Mahmud had already decided to replace his half-brother, which he accomplished by blinding and imprisoning him before he even gave audience to the British.

Wellesley's decisions to assemble an army and to send ambassadors beyond the confines of India, neither of which had previously been done, illustrate his perception of the office he possessed. Former governors-general had been conscious of their status as Company employees, and others beyond India still viewed the office in that light—as evidenced by Rainier's refusal to take orders from Wellesley without confirmation from London. Wellesley, however, as has been demonstrated, transformed the governor-generalship into almost a royal office, with access to him severely restricted and most of the formality that would later characterize the Raj put in place. This exclusiveness removed him from any counselors besides his inner circle, however, which itself decreased as time passed. The coming conflicts kept Arthur away from his brother and the content of their letters evidences that Wellesley's youngest sibling, who opposed many of his brother's policies, was no longer in his confidence. Likewise, Henry was made lieutenant governor of the British portions of Awadh to insure compliance with the settlement there, and William Kirkpatrick retired from the Company and returned to Britain in 1801 for health reasons. Wellesley's circle was thus on many occasions reduced to two—himself and Edmonstone.

In August 1800, Arthur wrote to Major Munro a prophetic warning:

in my opinion, the extension of our territory and influence has been greater than our means. Besides, we have added to the number and description of our enemies . . . by the extension of our territory, our means of supporting our government, and of
defending ourselves, are proportionately decreased. . . . I am in general inclined to decide that we have had enough; as much, at least, if not more than we can defend. Arthur often complained that his brother had no one around him who would explain to him the dangerous nature of the British policies, and that his own warnings fell on deaf ears. Arthur was a military man in the field seeing first-hand the effects of his brother's actions, but the governor-general and Edmonstone were far from the danger in Bengal. They saw what they wanted to see, and from their perspective, more alliances meant increased prestige and security. Arthur's inability to influence his brother was evidenced when Wellesley ordered him, in October 1803, to lead the Company's armies against the last remaining great Indian power--the Marathas.
Tipu was dead, but two powerful states yet stood between the British and dominance of the Indian subcontinent--Hyderabad and the Maratha confederation. In the case of the former, Edmonstone had personal experience, knowing many of the important figures at court from his early assignment to the Deccan and from visits Hyderabad diplomats made to Calcutta. He also had a source of regular information at court: one of the officials with whom he kept up a private correspondence was James Achilles Kirkpatrick, resident at Hyderabad from 1798 to 1805.

Kirkpatrick was from an old Scottish family originating in Closeburn near Dumfries, which claimed Robert the Bruce as an ancestor by marriage. He was the second of three sons--William, James and Henry--of James Kirkpatrick, a colonel of the Madras cavalry, who had married James' mother, Katherine Munro, in 1762. She was the eldest daughter of Dr. Andrew Munro, surgeon in charge of the hospital of Fort St. George, Madras, from 1742 to 1756. Born on August 22, 1764, James Achilles lost his mother at age 18 months and was taken to England three years later. In 1779, at age 15, he returned to India, his father having bought him a cadetship in the Madras Army. James was in military service for the next 14 years, fought at the siege of Seringapatam in the Third Mysore War and acquired fluency in Persian and Hindi. As noted, his half-brother William was resident in Hyderabad during Shore's government. After Wellesley made William his military secretary in 1800, James was appointed resident to the Deccani capital.

Like William, James had attended Eton with Richard and Arthur Wellesley, giving him useful ties to the new governmental regime in Calcutta. He was also a typical young Company man who had much in common with Edmonstone, including siring a half-Indian son whom he took back to England in 1791 and left with his father. He cultivated a relationship with Wellesley’s senior advisor by responding with great generosity to a request Edmonstone had made for an opal necklace for his fiancée. Kirkpatrick first sent a strand of “beautiful beads and cross of opal,”—Hyderabad was known for its magnificent jewelry, and opals were its official gemstone—and later followed up with an additional supply of the jewel.1 His scrupulousness prompted Edmonstone to comment, “I am particularly gratified by the disposition which you have manifested to oblige me & I should be happy if you would afford me an opportunity of returning the obligation.”2 The opportunity was soon in coming.

When Kirkpatrick’s affair with Baker Ali’s granddaughter became public, he needed all his friends to help preserve his career. Edmonstone was put in the uncomfortable position of having to order Kirkpatrick to help find “Philolethes,” the anonymous writer
who had defended the resident's conduct with the old argument that everyone was doing it, including the governor-general. William Kirkpatrick helped to mitigate Wellesley's anger somewhat by writing him a letter stating that, despite rumors to the contrary, his brother had never denied nor attempted to conceal his affair. Edmonstone was finally able to convey the news to James that, as Wellesley had more important matters with which to concern himself, the issue would be dropped. One must wonder at the amount of persuasion Edmonstone may have applied in this case, for he certainly had reason to sympathize with the young man's dilemma, even though his own Indian relationship was probably over, and he was in a position to point out to Wellesley Kirkpatrick's usefulness in a difficult area. In any case, the event does not seem to have hurt their friendship, which remained strong and provided Edmonstone with valuable, behind-the-scenes information from the Deccan.

One reason for their friendship was that Edmonstone and Kirkpatrick shared similar views on Indian affairs. In 1799, shortly before assuming the resident's position, Kirkpatrick authored a lengthy analysis of Indian politics in the aftermath of the Company's victory in the Fourth Mysore War. If Edmonstone had written it himself, it could not have more accurately reflected his attitudes. Kirkpatrick's argument was that, although the danger of Tipu was now over, the British position in Hyderabad, especially in the form of their subsidiary force, should be strengthened rather than diminished. The state formed an important barrier between the Marathas and the Carnatic, an area in which the Company had all but the title of sovereign authority. He acknowledged that some in government might be concerned that adding to the subsidiary force might strengthen "the only great and independent Mahommedan State remaining in India, and contiguous throughout an extensive line of frontier, either to our own possessions or to those of our allies." However, he made clear that he was not advocating the build up of the independent power of the nizam. Quite the contrary, "every addition made to that Force [the subsidiary troops] would, by its natural tendency to diminish the proper military strength of his Highness, increase the dependence of his government upon our Support, and consequently our Security in that quarter."

Kirkpatrick's analysis did not end with Hyderabad. He also believed it necessary for the Company to interfere in Maratha politics, especially to remove Baji Rao II, the peshwa, from his "thralldom" to Sindhia. He argued that Daulat Rao Sindhia, nephew and adopted son of the great Mahadaji, was both powerful and unpredictable, and could easily open the Maratha's many seaports to the French if he chose; there was also little reason to assume that he was well-disposed towards the British. It would do no good to defeat Tipu only to have the French find a new ally in Sindhia. He concluded that there is great reason to believe that nothing less than that . . . weight of influence which we should derive from the constant presence, near the seat of the Mahrattah Empire, of a respectable body of our troops, would prove adequate to the due prevention of the intrigues of the French. [The British no longer had to worry about a war between the nizam and the Marathas as] every struggle between them which should produce the effect of equally weakening them both, or which should terminate without operating any material change in their relative situations, would now contribute to our security in India; because they are the only two native powers from whom we have now any thing to apprehend.
Despite the lofty goals contained in Kirkpatrick's political analysis, obtaining control over either power was to prove much easier said than done. Nizam Ali, for example, was less than pleased with his chief minister, Azam-ul-umara, for persuading him to agree to the original subsidiary force of British troops which, even though the threat of Tipu was gone, showed no sign of being withdrawn. The misunderstanding between the two escalated to the point that the minister sought permission either to go on pilgrimage to Mecca or to retire. Kirkpatrick, with a Bible in his hands, assured the nizam that the subsidiary force was stationed in Hyderabad only for his security and the punishment of rebels. The Bible was presented to the nizam afterwards, which he kept as a memento.\(^\text{12}\)

The nizam's original assessment had been correct, however, as Edmonstone informed James in May 1801:

Auzim ool Omrah is now to be considered as a Dependant of the Company. . . . I entertain no Doubt that you will avail yourself of this circumstance, to recall [him] . . . to a Sense of his relative Situation, and of his real Interests, as much as to a true regard for the Justice and Equity of the Company's claims upon the Nizam.\(^\text{13}\)

Nizam Ali's failing health (he died in August 1803) would create new problems for British hopes of retaining control over Hyderabad, as his designated successor, Asaf Jah III (1803-29), better known to the British as Sikandar Jah, was less inclined to retain either the subsidiary force or a resident who presumed to dictate to him at court.

The British had even more difficulties with the Marathas, who proved to be Edmonstone's blind spot diplomatically. They were the one significant power in India with which he had no first hand experience, and with whom he had no close associates to supplement official reports. Furthermore, he had been influenced early on by Cherry's poor impression of the Marathas, and his mentor's habit of underestimating Indian powers caused him to portray them in a very inaccurate light. Edmonstone's ignorance of the true nature of the Marathas, coupled with his increasing weariness as his workload steadily increased, would result in the most serious diplomatic mistake of his career.

The problems between the Company and the Marathas began in 1800 with the death of Nana Farnavis, the chief minister of the peshwa whom the British had always viewed, accurately, as the real power in the state. Peshwa Baji Rao II thereafter approached the Company for assistance in freeing himself from the control of Sindhia, whose power had grown so great as to eclipse his own. The internal dispute between the Maratha chiefs over the leadership question had preoccupied them during much of Britain's conquests, including the war with Tipu. Seeing the growing power of the Company and hoping to use an alliance with them to combat Sindhia's rivalry, Baji Rao contacted the British about obtaining a subsidiary force of their troops. Wisely, he did not wish these garrisoned in his land, but to keep them within the Company's domains unless needed. In his eyes, he was merely paying for mercenary troops to use to intimidate his rivals; Edmonstone and Wellesley, however, seized the opportunity as a godsend to their plans to extend British authority over a potentially dangerous opponent.

While negotiations continued between the Company and the peshwa, the internal power struggles of the primary Maratha chieftains increased. In October 1802, Jeswant Rao Holkar attacked Poona in retaliation for opposition the peshwa and Sindhia had made to his succession to the chiefdom of Holkar. Nicknamed "the one-eyed" because of a disfigurement resulting from one of the hundred battle scars he was said to bear,
Jeswant Rao was a formidable adversary. He defeated the combined forces of the peshwa and Sindhia at Hadaspur on October 25, forcing Baji Rao to flee his capital for Bassein, near Bombay, where he petitioned the British to help him regain his throne. From being a strong ruler who could afford to place conditions on the Company's assistance, Baji Rao had become a refugee who had to accept what terms were offered.

True to form, Wellesley's price for assistance was high. The agreement finally worked out between the Company and the peshwa, the Treaty of Bassein, effectively reduced the Maratha leader to a British vassal and was only slightly less harsh than the settlement with Mysore had been. Baji Rao agreed to cede territory to the Company equal to Rs. 2, 600,000 to support more than six thousand British troops to be stationed within his land, to have no contact with other powers or to employ any Europeans in his service without the consent of the Company, and to turn over his fortresses in the ceded territories to British control. He also agreed to give up all claims to Surat, which had become a matter of contention between his government and the Company following its annexation.

Edmonstone officiated at a ceremony in December 1803 in which the peshwa's ambassador was given a khelat, or ceremonial robe of honor, in celebration of his master's restoration to the throne of Poona. The observance should have taken place earlier, but Edmonstone was ill and, as he was the only official of sufficient status to perform the ceremony who also had the necessary diplomatic and language skills, a postponement had been necessary. It was fitting that it should have been his honor to officiate, as Edmonstone was at that same time coordinating a war to uphold the peshwa's, and thereby British, influence over the Marathas.

Edmonstone summed up the British policy that was to lead to war in a letter to Lieutenant-Colonel Barry Close, who had followed up his time as adjutant to Lord Harris to become resident at Mysore and then at Poona, in May of 1803:

The destruction of the hostile power of Mysore, accompanied by the consolidation of our alliance with the Court of Hyderabad, left no possible antagonist to the British Government among the native states in India, excepting the Mahratta power. The Mahratta states, unconnected with any European ally, could never become formidable to the British Government, excepting in the event of an actual union of the feudal chiefs under an efficient sovereign power. . . . You will, therefore, understand that the principle object to be accomplished by the Treaty of Bassein, is the prevention of any hostile union of the Mahratta states, under the sovereign power of the Empire, against the British Government or its allies. Edmonstone gave Close instructions to do whatever he could to insure that the peshwa remained isolated from the other Maratha chieftains. Without an alliance of their stronger members, Edmonstone believed the Marathas would not dare to attack the Company, and at first it seemed that such diplomatic stratagems would work. The British restored the peshwa to his throne, Holkar declined to contest the issue, and Sindhia remained seemingly docile at his capital. The Company began to believe that Holkar, having had his revenge by plundering the peshwa's lands to his satisfaction, had gone home contented. Wellesley confidently wrote the directors that "the complete establishment of the interests of the British power in the Mahratta Empire" could be realized "without the hazard of involving us with any party." It was to prove a naive hope.
In May 1803, Sindhia marched with a large army to the south of the Nurbuddah River and camped there. The rumor that reached Calcutta was that he and Ragogee Bhonsla, the Raja of Berar, had entered into an alliance against the British and the peshwa. He was also said to be attempting to persuade Holkar to join them. The rumor, for once, was accurate. The Marathas had determined that the large British force established within the peshwa's lands by the Treaty of Bassein represented a serious threat to their confederation and had to be removed. Upon hearing the rumor, Edmonstone attempted to counter any aggressive measures by the old route of diplomacy, while trying to determine the extent of the threat.

At first Edmonstone and Wellesley believed that the rumored alliance between Sindhia, Berar and Holkar might be merely a defensive measure on the part of the chieftains. As Edmonstone commented to Kirkpatrick, "the territories of those chieftains are too much exposed to the British power to justify an apprehension of any measure on their part which would hazard a rupture with the British Government." That was in April, however, and continuing disturbing reports in May, especially that the Raja of Berar had assembled his forces on May 17 with the intention of taking them through the nizam's lands to rendezvous with Sindhia, caused Edmonstone to order Kirkpatrick to deliver a letter of remonstrance from Wellesley to the rajah. James was to have the nizam furnish him with a similarly worded letter, which was to make clear that "an unjustifiable violation of the territories of His Highness the Nizam [was] an act of hostility both against his Highness and the British Government." Edmonstone sent a private letter to Kirkpatrick along with the official communication, commenting that he considered him, owing to his proximity to Berar's planned route and his knowledge of the Maratha chiefs, by far the best person to talk some sense into the raja before events reached a crisis point.

Kirkpatrick had no luck persuading Berar to change his course of action, but he was useful in keeping a close watch on Maratha activities and transmitting information about them to Calcutta. Yet even this soon found him in trouble with the governor-general, after he took it on himself to inform Company officers Colonel Barry Close, Colonel Stevenson, Lieutenant-General Stuart, and Major Malcolm, that intelligence he had received from contacts in Hyderabad indicated that a combined Maratha opposition to the British was likely. Wellesley interpreted this as a deliberate attack on his policy, probably because his chances of obtaining ratification of the Treaty of Bassein in London were based on the assurances he had given the directors that it was unlikely to cause commotion in India. If they received contradictory information from other sources, his entire plan would be in jeopardy. James did not help his position by his usual recalcitrant attitude, evidenced in remarks to Edmonstone:

On the practicability or otherwise of a confederacy of the great Mahratta chieftains, it would not become me after the decisive judgement pronounced by his Excellency to offer any further opinion, and I shall therefore restrict myself to observing that the error, if it be one, which I have long entertained on this head, has been lately fallen into by the Resident at Scindiah's Durbar, and adopted on the strength of his information, by all the public authorities in the Deccan.

He further informed Edmonstone that he thought it was part of his duty as resident to transmit information of a likely confederation of the chiefs to the appropriate officers to allow them to make preliminary plans for an attack. In the same vein he communicated
to government officials at Madras and to Colonel Barry Close his views on the necessity for the use of the subsidiary force at Poona to prevent a union of Sindhaia and Holkar's forces.\textsuperscript{21} James was always more the practical soldier than the suave diplomat, and understood better how to manage a campaign than to win a war, especially one which required the assent, or at least a lack of opposition, from Leadenhall Street. He helped his cause, however, by comments that reinforced the view Wellesley and Edmonstone had already adopted regarding the Marathas:

I confess, all things considered, whether it could not under existing circumstances be the most desirable of the two alternatives, that the Maharatta Chieftains should compel us by their proceedings to proceed immediately to extremities against them, as the result would in all probability afford us such means of providing against their future enmity, and of attaining the great end of his Excellency's present measures—the permanent pacification of the Deccan, as could not well be looked for in the event of their confining themselves merely to a defensive Combination until it should suit their purpose to convert it into an offensive one. In the one case, we should probably have it in our power to require them at the close of the contest, to accede to the Treaty of General Defensive Alliance, and thereby effectually close the only remaining avenue to French Intrigue and French Connection.\textsuperscript{22}

Edmonstone soon sent Kirkpatrick notice, in a private communiqué, that the letter cited above had persuaded Wellesley to forgo any investigation of the resident's conduct. However, he warned him as a friend to insure that, in future, he evidenced "a general spirit & temper, favorable to the system of policy of which you are a principle Instrument in a subordinate capacity."\textsuperscript{23}

Edmonstone was obviously becoming tired of defending the resident's thoughtless actions and, perhaps due to doubts about his friend's judgment or fatigue from his numerous responsibilities, he discounted rumors Kirkpatrick transmitted of a possible Maratha alliance. Edmonstone informed Kirkpatrick of his conviction, which echoed Kennaway's long ago advice, that

the invariable object of Asiatic Policy, is aggrandizement of the power & dominion of the State, and the accumulation of wealth. The political principles of the Eastern world attach no degree of censure to the prosecution of wars of conquest without the shadow of a provocation. The establishment of general tranquility by respecting and supporting the just rights of other States and by promoting among them a just balance of power and a salutary equipoise of interests has ever been foreign to the views of Asiatic Princes. Their projects of ambition have only been bound by their power. The conduct of the Court of Hyderabad both before and since the commencement of the war with Tippoo Sultaun, has manifestly been influenced by those principles.\textsuperscript{24}

Likewise, it was Wellesley's view that Hyderabad's actions in the Fourth Mysore War had been "directed solely to the acquisition of wealth & territory by the partition of the treasures & dominions of Tippoo Sultaun" and that it might be attempting at present to cause a conflict between the British and the Marathas with a similar objective in mind.\textsuperscript{25}

Kirkpatrick replied in defense of his views that, although it was doubtless that Hyderabad would greatly like to rid itself of the chauth claims, he was inclined to believe that "the enjoyment of Repose which the increasing infirmities of both the Prince and his Minister [Nizam Ali was less than a month away from death] render
indispensably necessary, joined to the impoverished state of the public Finances have latterly greatly damped their former ardour on this head."26

Although Edmonstone did not respond favorably to Kirkpatrick's hints of intrigue brewing among the Marathas, he did not entirely dismiss such reports. Indeed, the month before receiving Kirkpatrick's letter, he had already written to Colonel John Collins, his old acquaintance from the Awadh delegation, who was the British representative at Sindhia's court. He gave Collins detailed arguments to present to Sindhia concerning the advantages of an alliance with the British. He also included a warning, to be conveyed to Daulut Rao, that "any attempt . . . to disturb the operation of the Treaty of Bassein, may justly be considered to be an act of hostility against the British Government."27 Edmonstone also wanted Collins to obtain Sindhia's assurances that he did not mean to interfere in the Company's alliance.28 In reply, Sindhia informed him that the chiefs were still discussing the matter but, if they decided for war, they would let him know. When Daulut Rao's response was conveyed to Calcutta, Wellesley, who interpreted it as an insult to British authority and an indication of hostile intent, began preparations for war. In July, after the Company's army had been assembled, he sent Sindhia and Bhonsla an ultimatum. To avoid hostilities, Sindhia's army had to withdraw beyond the Nerbuddah and Bhonsla return to his capital. The chiefs sent seemingly friendly messages to Calcutta in response, but their forces on the peshwa's border did not move. As a result, in August 1803, the Company declared war.

As war with the Marathas began to be seen as inevitable, Calcutta acted to make new allies and to secure old enemies. The first order of business was to wrest control of the Mughal emperor from the Marathas. The British technically held Bengal, Behar and the Northern Circars only as vassals of Shah Alam. Of course, the Mughal empire was more or less defunct, and its ruler firmly under the thumb of the Marathas, but the propaganda value of his title was still large. If the Marathas were to wage war on the Company in his name, the British might be faced with insurrections among their disgruntled allies, most of whom were also Mughal vassals. Even worse would be trying to justify such a war to London. Wellesley had already been condemned in some quarters for destroying Tipu; how much worse would a war on the Emperor of India appear?

Gerard Lake, the sixty-year-old veteran of wars in Germany, America and the Netherlands, was the Company's commander-in-chief. A stickler for propriety, he was known for always appearing in full uniform, with all his buttons done up and a perfectly powdered wig in place, even when a march began at 2 AM.29 He was also a capable and imaginative soldier, however, and an able diplomat when the situation required it. Wellesley gave Lake the task of bringing the Mughals under British authority as soon as his army reached Delhi; indeed, he was instructed to formulate his whole battle strategy with a view to securing the person of the emperor.30 Wellesley further commanded him to insure that he and all of his officers showed the greatest respect to the entire imperial family, especially Shah Alam and his heir, Mirza Akbar Shah, to convince them that they would be treated better by the British than the Marathas.31 By drawing the emperor into their cause, the British hoped to avoid the charge of having attacked sovereign states in order to uphold a dubious treaty; instead, it could be claimed that they were defending Shah Alam from his refractory vassals.
To further guarantee that the emperor would not oppose the change, and thereby make the British look like kidnappers rather than liberators, Wellesley penned a long letter for Lake to present to him, deploring the "injuries and indignities, to which your Majesty and your Illustrious Family have been exposed" and promising "the interposition of the British Power for the purpose of affording to your Majesty effectual relief from the oppressive control of injustice, rapacity, and inhumanity [of the Marathas]." Although no precise terms were stated, Wellesley did promise the emperor that

if your Majesty should be disposed to accept the Asylum, which, in the contemplation of such an event, I have directed his Excellency the Commander in Chief of the British Forces in Oude to offer to your Majesty in the Name of the British Government . . . every demonstration of respect, and every degree of attention, which can contribute to the ease and comfort of your Majesty, and the Royal Family . . . [will be given] and that adequate Provision will be made for the support of your Majesty, and of your Family and Household. The negotiations were aided by successful British campaigns around Delhi, and Lake had the pleasure of informing Wellesley on September 10 that the emperor had agreed to accept British protection. The Company was now in a position to copy the Marathas and rule much of India through the fiction of the Mughal name, but they first had to defeat the confederation.

The other main area of concern was Awadh, where there was considerable resentment over Sa'adat's rule and the recent British annexations. Wellesley informed General Lake in August that William Scott, the resident at Lucknow, had been instructed to negotiate with Rajah Sunsaur Chund, the Rajput Zamindar of Nadown, about surrendering Edmonstone's old nemesis, Gholam Mohammed Khan, into British hands. Lake assured Wellesley that all precautions for securing Gholam Mohammed would be taken, as well as every effort made to insure that it did not become generally known that it was the British who wanted him. By this time the Company was unpopular enough in Awadh that such a fact would probably have helped to draw support to any rebellion Gholam Mohammed might have tried to raise.

The apprehension did not go as planned, however. Scott was handicapped by the need for secrecy, and by Gholam's sudden disappearance from Nadown. Scott heard rumors that he remained somewhere in the raja's territory, and decided to send a Brahmin astrologer, "who has frequently visited me at Lucknow, a traveler and man of intelligence, and who from his reputation and knowledge of the stars possesses almost unbounded influence with the Hill Rajahs," to try to convince him to return. The astrologer's reputation for holiness would hopefully make him above suspicion, and would render him immune to ill treatment even if he were found to be working for Scott. However the astrologer was not in Lucknow at the time and Scott's messenger was unable to locate him. Scott also reported that Gholam's sons had left Benares for Rampur in May, supposedly to arrange their marriages, but British informants at Rampur alleged that the young men had written letters to their father and that some of them were preparing to join him. In the end, the intrigues, if such they were, came to nothing, although the cause was not a lessening of resentment against the British. Instead, the careful watch placed over those, such as Gholam Mohammed, who had the best chance of leading a revolt, prevented rebellion, and was aided by the fact that the
government remained in the hands of the pro-British Sa'adat Ali. Although he was not well liked, many in Awadh were pacified by the thought that their government continued in the control of a legitimate scion of Asaf-ud-daula's family. Resentment against the British would not boil over until that pretense was removed in 1856.

The Company made such elaborate preparations for war because it was well aware that the Marathas were a formidable foe. Their empire had a population of approximately 40 million people, with the combined armies of the chieftains in 1803 totaling 210,000 cavalry and 96,000 infantry. Even worse from the British perspective, most of the infantry was under the command of European officers, with those in Sindiah's service, "accoutered, formed, and brigaded, nearly in the same manner as the native regiments in the British Indian army." Their cavalry was probably the best in India, with excellent horses, medium sized but strong, of a distinctive dark bay color. They were so prized that some sold for as much as 5000 rupees. A contemporary description of the Maratha forces gives something of an idea of their magnificence in the field:

The Indian camps display a variety of standards and ensigns; each chieftain has his own; red seems the prevailing colour. . . . The Mahratta cavaliers of distinction frequently ornament their saddles with the bushy tails of the Tibet cows, as also the horse's head. The cuppers, martingales, and bridles of the horses, are ornamented according to the rank and wealth of the owners, with gold and silver plates, knobs, coins, and a variety of decorations; the tails of the grey horses are frequently dyed of a red and orange colour, and the manes plaited with silk and ribbands, interspersed with silver roses[;] . . . the magnificence of the Indian tents, pavilions, and canopies far exceeds anything of the kind in Europe.

Despite the strength of their foe, the British were fortunate in several regards. In 1794 the Marathas had lost their most effective leader when the great Mahadaji Sindhia died. His nephew and successor, Daulat Rao, was young and less capable in governance and war. Additionally, the speed with which the war came about insured that, at its commencement, Holkar was undecided whether to join his old enemies against the British or not. Faced with having to make a sudden decision, he chose what appeared to be the safer path and remained neutral. That deprived the Marathas of his fifty thousand men and 300 cannon. As the last Maratha chieftain, Gaikwar of Baroda, had been persuaded by the British to stay out of the fight, Holkar's decision left only Sindhia and Bhonsla to face the British army. Yet, even at half strength, the Marathas were not an enemy to be taken lightly. Sindhia's forces alone amounted to forty thousand infantry, thirty thousand cavalry, and five hundred pieces of heavy artillery. In response to the threat they faced, the British army was divided in two parts for the conflict. Arthur Wellesley was given command of the Company's main force in Bombay in order to protect the peshwa, while General George Lake was entrusted with a smaller force in order to make a lightening run on Delhi and implement Wellesley's plan to acquire control over the Mughal emperor.

December 1803 was an important month for Edmonstone for more than one reason; along with his marriage and officiating at the khelat ceremony of the peshwa's vakil, he also succeeded in gaining more land for the Company by diplomacy than Wellesley would acquire in the war when he brought Bundelkhand under British control. In this Edmonstone was assisted by John Baillie, who had returned to the army with the rank of
captain of the 1st Battalion, 4th Regiment of Native Infantry at the outbreak of the Maratha conflict. Edmonstone had insured that Baillie was given a glowing recommendation to General Lake by drafting a letter for Wellesley's signature stating that "Lt. Baillie’s intimate acquaintance with the language and with the habits and disposition of the natives of India, and the judgment of abilities which that officer possesses, qualify him in a peculiar degree to aid your Excellency in the conduct of any political negotiations." Edmonstone wanted someone in the area whom he could trust, for Bundelkhand was vital to any plans to divide the Maratha confederation. Its lands bisected the great Maratha holdings, guaranteeing that, if British soldiers could be stationed there in force, there would be little likelihood of a union of the chiefs and would make maneuvers much more difficult for them.

Edmonstone had laid the groundwork for British aggrandizement in Bundelkhand even before the war began, instructing Graeme Mercer, the political agent in the area before Baillie, to encourage the local rajas to make subsidiary alliances with the Company in order to undermine Sindhia's and Bhonsla's authority. Mercer was instructed to assure the rajas that the Company had no interest in controlling their internal administrations, and to do whatever else he felt necessary, including the use of bribery, to make the Company allies. Baillie was more subtle in his efforts; acting under Edmonstone's instructions, he obtained a supplemental treaty with the peshwa ceding most of Bundelkhand to the Company as one of the requirements for continued British support of his cause.

Because of the confused political situation in Bundelkhand, however, the treaty was only the first step to solidifying British control of the area. Edmonstone's part in the proceedings serves as a good example of the type of painstaking research he did to aid British military and diplomatic efforts, and the impressive store of information collected by the departments under his control. A lengthy report in Edmonstone's own handwriting, as apparently a subordinate could not be trusted to do the background research in such a sensitive matter, survives to give a glimpse into the type of in depth records Edmonstone had amassed on states across the subcontinent. It follows the history of the area from the weakening of Mughal control, when the Raja of Bundelkhand, Chuttersaul Singh, formed an independent state outside imperial control in the 1780s. He thereafter entered into a close alliance with Baji Rao II, to whom he left a third of his dominions in his will on the understanding that the peshwa and his heirs would protect the right of his sons to rule the remainder. Edmonstone's account included a detailed genealogy for each of Chuttersaul Singh's two primary heirs, Savoy Hurdah Sah and Juggut Ray, as his younger fifty or so sons were given only minor bequests. Savoy Hurdah Sah, Chuttersaul's eldest son, received the Raj of Punna, with the fortress of Kalinger, Eutch and Dhamoony; Juggut Ray was bequeathed the fortress of Bhondah Ghur, Bhoraghur and the Raj of Banda. Then Ally Behadhur, whom Edmonstone described as "the son of an illegitimate son of Bajy Row," invaded Bundelkhand to try to annex more lands, and was partially successful, taking most of Banda and Punna before his death in 1801. The situation became even more complicated when Ally Behadur's youngest son, Zoolfóocar Ally, who had been on the campaign with his father, was proclaimed Ally Behadur's heir, rather than his eldest son, Shamsheer Behadhur, who was at Poona.
Edmonstone did not believe the assertions that this had only been done to guarantee a continuance of leadership during the campaign and was intended as a temporary situation, because Zoolfoocar Ally was a minor who was soon under the control of Gunny Behadur, one of his father's old officers. 50 Officers loyal to Shamsheer wrote urging him to invade to reclaim his rights, and he succeeded in taking back his inheritance from his brother; however, the peshwa had since ceded Bundelkhand to the Company owing to Baillie's diplomatic efforts, leading to a conflict over who had rights to the area--the British, Shamsheer or the descendants of Chuttersaul Singh. Edmonstone received word from Baillie in early 1804 that Shamsheer had arrived in the British camp and was willing to accept compensation for his claims rather than face a war. 51 This was excellent news, as yet another enemy was something the British could ill afford at the time. Edmonstone informed Baillie that he had earned the governor-general's "highest approbation of the Judgement, temper, and ability, which you have manifested during the whole course of the negotiations." 52 Baillie conferred a khelat on Shamsheer in Wellesley's name, and the new British ally responded with a gift of 101 gold mohurs for the governor-general, although Wellesley declined the gift with thanks. 53

Yet, from Edmonstone's perspective, the incident was frustrating, as Baillie's careful diplomacy had done little to advance the British cause. As the Maratha conquest of the country had been incomplete, the people of Bundelkhand had never acknowledged Shamsheer as their lord and therefore had little reason to respect any agreement he made with the Company. 54 Edmonstone therefore concluded that "the right of the English to Bundelkhand must be established by conquest, or by Treaties with those who have an inherent right to the country." 55 He advocated buying off the remaining heirs of Chuttersaul Singh, as it would mollify the people and encourage them to drive out any usurpers who had taken advantage of the chaos to acquire territory. He attached a genealogy to his notes for clarification of the various claims. 56

Along with financial inducements to accept British rule, a military reason was added when a detachment of troops under Lieutenant-Colonel Martindell was raised in 1804 and paid for from the revenues of the British areas of Bundelkhand. This gave much needed support to Baillie, who had been holding a tenuous position near Banda on the Betwa River with only a thousand sepoys and a few hundred cavalry, with constant threats from Sindia and Holkar. 57 The British position was further strengthened by Baillie's continued work among the minor rajas of the area to find out what would induce them to enlist as British allies. For example, in 1806, Baillie transmitted a treaty to Edmonstone for the government's ratification, pledging the support of Nana Govind Rao of Calssee in return for the Company's promise to uphold his rights to territories in Bundelkhand as a feudatory of the peshwa. He also wanted a detachment of British troops to help him conquer some forts in the Colra area in exchange for the lands he was ceding to the British, but Baillie believed he would be satisfied with a few canon. 58 Baillie remained the political agent for Bundelkhand from 1803-7 until appointed resident at Lucknow on the death of Collins in 1807, a position which he retained until his retirement in 1815. He kept up the practice of exchanging both formal and private correspondence with Edmonstone, with his last letter written from India dated June 1814. 59 Baillie thus served as another of Edmonstone's private informers, a list that would greatly expand in the coming years.
While Edmonstone was kept busy with diplomatic conquests, Arthur Wellesley was taking a more active approach. He captured the fortress of Ahmadnagar on August 11, 1803, giving the British a strong base camp and many supplies. He then took the offensive against Sindhi and Bhonsla, who were attempting to bring the war into the nizam's territories. He succeeded in forcing them to turn north, then caught up with them at Assaye on September 23. The battle that ensued ended in victory for the Company, although it was bought at a high price: Arthur's forces lost 1,600 either killed or wounded, while the Marathas suffered 1,200 killed and three times that number wounded. In later years, even after his defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo, Arthur would recall Assaye as his greatest victory, for it demoralized Sindhi's forces and, shortly thereafter, all Daulut Rao's strongholds in the Deccan fell to the British. Sindhi was forced to ask for a truce, leaving only Bhonsla to face the full might of the Company's army.

The conflict was forcing Arthur to invent new combat techniques, some of which he would one day use against Napoleon. In his time in Mysore, he had had to contend with Dhundia Wagh, a raja based in the Western Ghats who briefly challenged the British after the fall of Seringapatam. Wagh had been hunted down and destroyed, but only after Arthur learned to move his forces with much greater speed than had previously been the norm. The practice of carrying supplies on heavily laden, and therefore slow, bullock carts was disappearing. Faster pack animals were beginning to be used and the amount of luggage allotted each man was reduced. Arthur instituted forced marches that often covered as much ground in a day as would have taken a week or more previously. The element of surprise this tactic brought into the British arsenal was one of their most important weapons in the contest with the Marathas. It certainly worked to their advantage in the attack on Bhonsla. After a quick march, Arthur surprised the forces of the raja of Berar on November 29 at the village of Argaon. The battle that followed was another British victory, and was bought with far fewer Company lives than had been the case at Assaye; the British lost only 360, but the Maratha dead numbered 5,000. On December 15, the fortress of Gwaligarh was taken by Arthur's victorious army, marking the end of the war in the Deccan as Berar soon thereafter asked for terms.

Meanwhile, the other part of Sindhi's army, which he had sent to prevent Lake from reaching the emperor, had been no more successful. At almost the same time that Sindhi's main force turned to face Arthur at Assaye, Lake attacked the raja's lesser force outside Delhi. The British victory was easier than it should have been. Sindhi's French general, Perron, deserted to the Company at the onset of war and took a number of officers with him, thus leaving the army guarding Delhi without much of their leadership. Lake took control of Delhi and, more importantly, of the emperor. He thereafter captured Agra and destroyed the last of Sindhi's forces at the bloody battle of Laswari, where 800 of the Company's soldiers fell as opposed to 7,000 of the Marathas.

With their forces decimated and many of their principal fortifications in British hands, Sindhi and Berar were forced to accept British terms for peace. In January 1804, both rulers agreed to cede considerable amounts of territory to the Company and to accept a subsidiary force of British soldiers within their lands; Sindhi was also required to renounce control over the emperor and to accept the treaties worked out by
Edmonstone and Baillie during the war with many of his feudatory chieftains in Bundelkhand and Rajputana. Edmonstone wrote in exultation to Kirkpatrick that His Excellency directs me to apprise you that he considers the Treaty concluded with the Rajah of Berar to be in the highest degree advantageous, honourable & glorious to the British Govt & that it is his intention to ratify it in Council as soon as a copy can be prepared for that purpose. He further directs me to request that you will immediately communicate the Treaty to the Court of Hy[derabad] & apprize the Court of his Ex[cellency]'s intention to ratify it. . . . Accept my cordial congratulations on this important & satisfactory event in the glory & interest of which every British subject must participate.63

Edmonstone's elation was in recognition of the fact that the Second Maratha War left the Company as the undisputed dominant power in India. In authority and in the scope of their rule, they had replaced the Mughal power. However, the rosy picture Wellesley was transmitting to the directors of a pacified India, content and well governed under the Company's control, was far from the truth. The Marathas were not finished as a military power, as would soon become apparent, and the limitations placed on the military strength of the subsidiary states led to chaos in many areas, providing unending problems for the new empire in India.

Despite the jealousy and frequent ill-will between the two brothers, Richard publicly applauded Arthur's victories—which were also his own—giving a magnificent ball, supper and illumination in honor of the peace concluded on March 15, 1804, with Sindia and Berar, and a dinner on September 23, 1804, in honor of the victory at Assaye. Yet Arthur was finding little comfort in his success. He wrote to his brother's secretary, Major Merrick Shawe, that

upon the subject of subsidiary alliances, I have to tell you that I am perfectly aware of their benefits. . . . But they undoubtedly have a tendency to reduce the strength of the powers with which we are connected; and this is an evil . . . [the rulers] have no power beyond that of the sword. Take from them the exercise of that power and they . . . can collect no revenue, can give no protection, and can exercise no government.64

He was especially concerned because of the large numbers of unemployed ex-soldiers set loose by the disbanding of the Indian armies. Many of these men had never known anything but the military life; to expect them to settle down to become farmers or traders was optimistic to the point of naïveté. He commented that groups of these ex-soldiers were roaming around the peshwa and nizam's lands, plundering indiscriminately. He believed that the extension of the subsidiary system would lead to equal problems in the territories acquired from Sindia and Bhonsle.

Arthur felt that the remedy for the unrest in the Indian states was a reduction in the control exerted over them by the Company. He wanted to see the Indian armies increased in size and the Company's troops only used within their borders in the case of sizeable rebellions. Arthur complained to Shawe that his advice went unheeded, however, as

Mr. Edmonstone says . . . that to put the military establishments of the allies in a state of efficiency is inconsistent with the fundamental principles on which all the treaties of defensive alliance have been framed, which were to make the powers dependent upon the British government.65
Although Edmonstone recognized problems with the system, he remained convinced of its necessity, writing in 1811 that it was the "most effectual and apparently the only mode of counteracting the weaknesses in the system of direct rule." In later years, he would move away from the strict form of the alliance system, advocating instead the raising of troops in an Indian ruler's pay to help him keep order, but insuring that they were under the command of British officers. Otherwise, as he commented to Baillie:

The prince reposes in indulgent security under the assured protection of his ally; his military is neglected [and therefore] . . . the protecting power . . . is burthened with the control of discontent and insubordination . . . without possessing the means of exercising restraints of local authority. It retains only the negative although certainly most essential benefit, of being no longer exposed to the disquietude or the danger arising from the existence of an independent dominion left at liberty . . . but it incurs a danger of considerable magnitude, the danger arising from the eventual aversion of the present or future head of the State to an alliance, which while it protects his dominions, controls his power, and wounds his pride, [an aversion due to] the weakness, the folly or the vices of his character, and the intrigues and machinations of his ministers, advisors, or feudatory chiefs, who have no natural interest in the preservation of the alliance . . . demonstrates the importance of obtaining, if possible, a security . . . of placing a corps in the pay of the allied state under the command of British officers.

In 1804, however, Edmonstone was not in any mood to consider modifying, even in a minor way, the system he viewed as essential for British security in India, and with him constantly at Wellesley's side, there was little chance of Arthur's views being considered. As Arthur wrote in bitterness to Shawe, "I see clearly that the Governor-General has never contemplated this state of the question [of the dangers of the subsidiary system]; indeed he could not contemplate it for it has never been brought before him in any shape."

Arthur's dislike of the system grew as he was forced to race back and forth across India putting down rebellions, rounding up bandit groups, and trying to keep order in the areas of weakened allied governments. He wrote in exhaustion in December 1804 that:

Our policy and our arms have reduced all the powers in India to mere cyphers . . . Nothing can keep [the bandits] in order excepting the Company's arms . . . [which] cannot be everywhere . . . There remains then only to force the allies to take some measures to defend themselves; and upon this point I have already written volumes.

Edmonstone had Wellesley's ear, however, not Arthur; both the designer of the revised subsidiary system and the governor-general who had seen it conquer much of a continent for him, were unwilling to listen to criticism of it.

Arthur might oppose his brother's policies in private, but publicly he supported him. Wellesley needed all the support he could get, for it soon became clear that Arthur was not the only one to deprecate the new arrangement in India. Wellesley's coalition of support in Britain was weakening; as Pitt and the others came under fire themselves, they could ill afford to attempt to shield the governor-general from the directors, who were outraged over the fact that the worth of the Company's stock had plummeted since the outbreak of the Maratha War (falling by almost a third in value, and its debt had doubled. In conquering much of the sub-continent, Wellesley had come close to bankrupting the Company. Being large stockholders themselves, and answerable to the
other stockholders, the directors found themselves both poorer and in danger of losing
their positions because of Wellesley's aggrandizing policies. It was an ominous sign
that, after the Maratha war, although Arthur Wellesley was knighted and Lake was made
a peer, no further honors were granted the governor-general. Instead, Arthur wrote
Richard in January 1804:

It appears that the King's Ministers . . . are not sufficiently strong, or they do not
choose to incur the risk of supporting you against the Court of Directors. . . . In
addition to this, the Prime Minister . . . says that, as your private friend, he cannot
advise you to remain in India.\footnote{71}

The new head of the Board of Control, Lord Castlereagh, was not Pitt's friend as
Dundas had been. He wrote Wellesley a letter strictly condemning the Treaty of Bassein
and, as it had been sent before news of the war reached England, strongly advising
against an open breach with the Marathas. Castlereagh plainly stated, "British power in
India is too firmly consolidated at this moment, and the prospect of attack from any
quarter too remote to justify us in prudence in risking a war, with a view of providing
against a danger merely speculative."\footnote{72} He also called the subsidiary alliance system a
"dubious policy" and noted that it was ridiculous to expect the Marathas to agree to any
treaty that placed the head of their confederation under British control.\footnote{73} Even before
learning of the war, in February 1804, Castlereagh hinted broadly in a letter to Wellesley
that his resignation would be appropriate. Yet, two months later, the governor-general
was not on a ship for England, but was engaged in another Maratha war:

Arthur Wellesley had commented in March 1804 to Major Malcolm

I have but faint hopes that I shall succeed in inducing the Governor-General to
alter his intentions, as, by a letter which I received yesterday from Mr. Edmonstone,
it appears that he insists upon the confirmation of all the treaties made with the
feudatories of the Raja of Berar; some of which were signed at Cuttack, not less
than 10 days after the intelligence of the treaty of peace. . . . My dear Malcolm, we
shall have another war.\footnote{74}

Edmonstone and Baillie's success in bringing Bundelkhand into the Company's territory
was not going to go uncontested. Holkar, angry over the annexation of areas he
considered his own and realizing from the strictures placed on his fellow chieftains that
the British intended to gain control of the entire confederation, began overtures to
Sindia shortly after the war ended proposing an alliance against the Company. Letters
were also sent, some of which the British intercepted, to various minor rajas
encouraging them to ally against the Company. Holkar meanwhile made demands to the
British for the return of large tracts of Sindia and Bhonsle's ceded territory, claiming
that it was in fact his own, and he threatened immediate reprisals if his demands were
not met.

It might have been thought that Wellesley, considering the financial and political
pressures he faced, would have come to terms with Holkar or stalled for time. Arthur's
forces were in Mysore and, owing to a famine in the Deccan, he could not provision his
troops for the long march north. Lake's forces were thus alone, with no possibility for
reinforcements. The Company's new Maratha "allies" had promised military aid in the
treaties forced on them, but, naturally, no troops were forthcoming. To make matters
worse, Sindia, although not recovered sufficiently from the war to be able to openly
join Holkar, worked for his cause behind the scenes. Yet Wellesley, who had never
faced defeat in a contest in India, was confident enough to engage Holkar in hostilities in April 1804.

The conflict was followed closely at courts across India, and the worse things went for the British on the battlefield, the less respect they received. Edmonstone had a first-hand lesson in the precariousness of the British reputation at a durbar on August 9, 1804. Wellesley had called it to welcome the Turkish ambassador, but had also invited the other leading envoys to be present. Yawur-ud-Daulah, the ambassador from Hyderabad, had received a hand-written note from Wellesley specifying that the time of the gathering was 9:30 P.M. As Edmonstone recalled:

The persons composing the Durbar had all paid their respects & had taken leave, the personages of the highest rank & the Turkish Envoy (who were present during the whole continuance of the Durbar) . . . were moving out of the Hall of Audience & his Excellency was about to retire to his sleeping apartments & the whole assembly had in fact broken up, when (at ½ past 11) Yawur oo dowlah made his appearance.

Notwithstanding this extraordinary conduct, the Gov Genl resolved to receive him & accordingly permitted him to be introduced. His Excell[enc]y addressing him in the most gracious manner asked him how he happened to be so late. To which he replied (laughing) that he was at dinner. After this you will not be surprised to learn that Yawur oo dowlah was dismissed with marks of his Excell[enc]y’s high displeasure. Edmonstone viewed the entire scene as a calculated insult to the governor-general, and by extension to the British government, and highly approved Wellesley's resolve to never see the vakil again.

The incident reinforced Edmonstone's belief that it was vital to have a pro-British vizier at the nizam's side, to see that any problems faced by the Company in the conflict did not damage their alliance with Hyderabad. On May 9, 1804, Azam-ul-umara died after a long illness and Raja Rajindra temporarily took over as the vizier. James Kirkpatrick informed Wellesley that "[Azam-ul-umara] only required to be told what our wishes were, to conform to them even against his own Judgement and inclinations," but that Sikandar Jah was not of the same disposition. He believed that the death of the pro-British vizier would jeopardize British influence in Hyderabad, for "I am at present inclined to think, that . . . Secunder Jah if left entirely to himself would be likely enough to make choice of some Companion of his Youth extremely unqualified for the Office of Prime Minister. Yet he thought that the nizam would probably listen to his recommendation, and that the pro-British Mir Alam was the best person for the post. He wrote to Edmonstone privately that Mir Alam was "it is true, a most deplorable object (I am told) to the Sight, as in addition to his former deформities, his nose is now fallen in and Crooked, but his mind Appears to be as active and energetic as ever," and he swore that his illness (probably leprosy) would not interfere with the performance of his duties. Sikandar Jah seemed unwilling to go along with the British candidate for vizier, so Edmonstone had Kirkpatrick investigate all other possible candidates, delving into their backgrounds and political preferences, to determine who might be acceptable to the nizam who would also be susceptible to British manipulation. A list was duly formulated and transmitted to Calcutta, with Kirkpatrick's recommendation falling strongly with either Mir Alam or Mir Tajooddier Ruffèhood Daulah Behadur, whom he described as "a natural Subject or Dependant of the British Government both by Birth

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and Family, being born at Surat of which City his Father and Uncle were Nawaub and Bukhshy [paymaster of the troops]." He was a young man, barely thirty, who had only "a very moderate capacity" for the position, but was likely to be acceptable to the nizam as he was his son-in-law. In Kirkpatrick's view, that fact plus his "family connections and mild tractable Disposition joined to his General Attachment to our nation to say nothing of his particular Intimacy with myself, to whom he acknowledges obligations, would render him perhaps the most eligible successor to Azam-ul-umara." Yet Mir Alam proved willing to go much farther in following British directives, even to the point of signing a letter stating that, as he had been

raised . . . from the corner of Retirement to the Dewany of the Asophiah State which is the most important of all Offices, I will with the utmost purity of Intention be obliged, grateful, obedient and Submissive, and I will from my Heart and Soul consider myself to be included among the number of the Dependents on the powerful Seikar of the Honble Company. Whatever Suggestions the British Resident may convey to me I will consider to be highly beneficial both for the present and for the future, and I will without Hesitation or demur comply with them to their full extent."

Mir Alam's pro-British sympathies resulted in Edmonstone informing Kirkpatrick that

the Gov Gen[era]l has resolved that Secunder Jah shall be required to appoint a minister of our selection & that that Minister shall be Meer Alam. His Excell[enc]y is determined to carry this point, but wishes that it should be effected in the manner least offensive to the feelings of Secunder Jah."

The idea of the British selecting the most important official in Hyderabad, and thereby putting themselves in the position to dominate the state's politics, was a delicate one, and Edmonstone wanted to insure that the British machinations were kept completely confidential. In June 1804, he informed Kirkpatrick that Wellesley was writing to Sikandar Jah to recommend Mir Alam's appointment, but that there would be a short delay before the missive was transmitted; Edmonstone thought it necessary to translate the letter himself rather than allowing a subordinate to see it, and he was constantly being interrupted by other business.

At the same time that the minister's appointment was being approved in Calcutta, however, Edmonstone was using every possible means to determine the real extent of Mir Alam's attachment to British interests. Kirkpatrick sent numerous spies to report on the minister's private conversations; the spies were then debriefed and their statements transmitted to Calcutta. The first of these was a female attendant to a lady acquaintance of Mir Alam's. The attendant's mistress had been acquainted with the minister for years, was in constant attendance at the durbar and had free admittance to his presence. The Company's spy usually accompanied her mistress whenever she visited Mir Alam's house, and was therefore in a good position to overhear their conversations. On one of these visits, Mir Alam's acquaintance expressed concern over the deteriorating power of Hyderabad and the ascendancy of the British government. Mir Alam replied:

During the Period of his administration of affairs between the two governments he had not given one inch of his H.H.'s territory to the British Government, that Auzim ool Omrah had excluded him, and in opposition to his principles, had so completely introduced the English, that to reverse the system and eradicate their influence from
this Government would be impossible, but that, by the blessing of Providence he 
would make such Exertions that, although what had been done was irretrievable, they 
should not be further introduced.⁸⁸

Despite the report, Kirkpatrick acquired the position of diwan [vizier/chief executive 
officer] for the British favorite, perhaps because he had received the impression that, 
despite his words, Mir Alam's primary interest was his own advancement, which would 
be best served by conforming to British directives. The truth of this belief was borne out 
when, as Kirkpatrick noted to Edmonstone, within "six week's ministry he has already 
carried the system of bribery and corruption, the source of that dreadful disorganization 
under which this Govt. labours, to an extent unknown under the most rapacious of his 
Predecessors."⁸⁹ A pro-British assistant, Raja Chandulal, was thereafter appointed as 
Mir Alam's aide, with the mandate to improve the finances of the state.

Surveillance of the new vizier did not stop with his appointment, but, if anything, 
increased. The same female spy accompanied her mistress when she called on Mir 
Alam to congratulate him on his promotion. Her mistress commented that she hoped he 
could regulate the affairs of government in such a way as to "obliterate from the minds 
of the People all recollection of the reign of Asoph Jah [Nizam Ali]."⁹⁰ In other words, 
she hoped to see a return of Hyderabad's autonomy and its position as one of the great 
states in India. Mir Alam replied as he had on her previous visit, that the British were so 
entrenched at court that there was no realistic way of removing them, but that he would 
endeavor to make certain that their influence did not grow any greater.⁹¹ This was an 
acceptable answer from the British point of view, as their influence was already great 
enough to insure compliance with almost any request.

It is probable that Mir Alam, long active in Hyderabad politics, was well aware that 
his had spies checking on his every move; certainly the reports the British received from 
their agents tended to be suspiciously favorable. Syed-ud-Daulah, described as "a near 
relation" of the minister's, reported that

Meer Allam told a respectable Person that he was indebted for his Elevation solely to 
the sincere kindness of the governor general, that he so firmly possessed the 
confidence of His Lordship that it was not in the power of any one to effect its 
diminution and that the Exertions of Major Kirkpatrick for the Extension of his 
Influence was caused by the orders of his Lordship.⁹²

Mir Alam also made certain that his own precarious position was reported to the British, 
commenting that the nizam had not liked having a minister arranged for him and that he 
had had to make "many oaths and promises of obedience" in an attempt to win his 
favor.⁹³ The informant on this occasion had seen the vizier give the nizam a Qu'ran, at 
which point the Sikandar Jah commented that “by the Blessing of God the Loyalty and 
Devotion of Meer Aulum would be displayed.”⁹⁴ The nizam seemed to become more 
favorable towards him thereafter, especially once his new minister had promised to have 
the British guards removed from the palace.⁹⁵

Yet, the impression of the vizier as someone who was less than completely satisfied 
with British rule was augmented by other informants, such as Gholaume Sahib, who 
had talked with Kysur Jung, the former auruzbegi (master of ceremonies) for Sikandar 
Jah. He reported that
I have lately heard that certain turbulent disaffected Persons in order to effect their own advancement have represented to His Hs that if they had been distinguished without the Interference of the British Govt. they would have disposed of the English with the greatest Expedition. But that as they had now been promoted with the Participation of the English, they could not effectually dispose of them in less than three years. That in short the English should not remain.  

Ishmaeil yar Jung, munshi to the previous minister, added to the British worries by commenting, when asked how the nizam viewed the British, that "as long as . . . Meer Aulum continues . . . with expressions of Hatred, of complaint and of circumvention, as he is in the habit of doing against the English Gentlemen, how is it possible that His Hs should be free from Prejudice or his mind be unbiased." Kirkpatrick informed Edmonstone that, although such reports concerned him, complaining to Mir Alam about his behavior was unlikely to provoke change, other than to insure that the vizier would be more cautious in the future to hide his true feelings. Rather, “the Dismission of Meer Aulum from his office, by a vigorous and timely exertion of our Influence with the Soubah for the purpose, before he shall have acquired so decided an ascendancy over that weak and perverse Prince’s mind [was the only remedy].”

Despite Kirkpatrick's strong words, Mir Alam was not replaced, for he did not follow up his threats against the British with action. In all likelihood, they were designed to reassure the nizam that his chief minister shared his dislike of British influence at court, thereby making himself a more trusted minister. Until his death in 1808, Mir Alam continued to follow British guidance and is remembered today as their champion, a title he might well have abhorred in life. His son-in-law, Munir-ul-Mulk, succeeded him in his position, but Raja Chandulal, Mir Alam's British selected assistant, continued in office and held the real power. He proved his loyalty to the Company by assisting Henry Russell (resident at Hyderabad from 1811-1820) to complete a long-held dream of Kirkpatrick's.

Kirkpatrick wrote to Calcutta in 1804 that the only reason he had been able to bring about the elevation of Mir Alam when the nizam obviously opposed it was that, at the time, "our influence was still in its fullest vigour, and supported by the splendour of our recent martial achievements . . . with the subdued Marhattah Confederates." Such an impression would not last, however, and without a strong military force at his beck and call, Kirkpatrick despaired of keeping the current level of British ascendancy at court. He wanted “the immediate Augmentation of the British force at this Capital by . . . at least 2 Batt[alio]ns of Native Infantry and 1 Regiment of Native Cavalry . . . with the further addition . . . of 1 Regt of European Infantry.” Such a force would not only secure the capital and surrounding areas against attack, but would also "by its presence restore to us our full Influence in the Hyderabad Cabinet." As Kirkpatrick was faced with a hostile court and a vizier whose loyalties were suspect, his request is understandable, but he failed to take into consideration the Company's finances, which were in no condition to support more troops. Kirkpatrick explained that Edmonstone's advice, given in a letter sent in 1800, for him to maintain his position through persuasion rather than intimidation, was no longer feasible. Although he continued to "admire the mild and just system, which by more slow but surer means, will equally in the end accomplish all our just objects, by convincing our Native Allies that their weakness
cannot find a safer Refuge, than in our strength, and in our Justice," he doubted that such tactics would be successful with the current nizam.\(^{103}\)

Edmonstone replied with a negative on any additional British-paid troops, but relayed Wellesley's wish that the nizam would raise a new cavalry regiment in his own pay.\(^{104}\) Considering the continued problems with the Marathas, especially Holkar whose troops were largely mounted warriors, the intent was obviously to give the British more cavalry on which to call if needed. The nizam proved obdurate on the point, however, and Edmonstone informed Kirkpatrick not to press the issue, as doing so might further the belief which however unjust, appears to be generally entertained of a Systematic design on the part of the British Government to establish Control and authority over every state in India. It is the primary objects of His Lordship’s policy to remove this unfavorable and dangerous impression by abstaining in the utmost degree practicable, consistent with the general Security of the Company’s Dominions, from all interference in the internal Concerns of other States.\(^{105}\)

In the same vein, Kirkpatrick was told to accede to Mir Alam's request to remove the sepoys from about the royal palace, as their presence was distasteful to the nizam.\(^{106}\)

At a time when the Company was already facing war with the Marathas, pushing their alliance with Hyderabad to the breaking point would have been foolish. However, the desire to retain more troops loyal to the British in Hyderabad was not forgotten. In 1812, Henry Russell, with the help of Raja Chandulal and without bothering with a treaty or agreement with the nizam, raised an army of 2,000 soldiers commanded by British officers known as the Russell Brigade. This was in line with Edmonstone's changing sentiments as noted above; as the perceived danger to British dominance became less, it was possible to relax slightly the subsidiary system. Yet the new version worked much the same as the old. Within six years the Russell Brigade was raised to seven thousand men, and its maintenance began to be a serious drain on the nizam's finances. To avoid a financial crisis, Raja Chandulal borrowed, in 1816, 36 lakhs of rupees at 25% interest from the trading firm and private banking house William Palmer & Company. By 1823, the nizam's debt to Palmer & Company had risen to 78 lakhs of rupees, in addition to the 28 lakhs he owed to the Company.

The situation was not resolved until 1823 when Charles Metcalfe as resident at Hyderabad investigated the matter, and brokered a deal whereby the East India Company paid the nizam's debts in return for his waiving the tribute they owed for the Guntur Circar; however, the army remained in place, the only change occurring in its name, which became the Hyderabad Contingent. A large force loyal to the British was thus maintained in Hyderabad, insuring that the days of the nizams' independence of Bengal's wishes were over.

The great Deccani state had been brought under British domination without a shot being fired, but the same was not true of the Marathas. In March 1804, Wellesley instructed Lake to communicate either directly with him or with Edmonstone about all military affairs and negotiations.\(^{107}\) It was a poor decision, as Edmonstone's counsel was not up to its usual standard and conflicting views might have proven useful. Edmonstone was managing too many delicate negotiations at the same time, was tired and was unfamiliar with the intricate inner workings of the Maratha confederation. He had underestimated Sindhia's resolve in the previous conflict, too easily disregarding the warning notices he had received from his informants, and was about to do the same with
Holkar. He and Wellesley were so close to obtaining their ultimate goal—control over the last major power that could successfully challenge them—that they gambled one too many times.

It is not necessary to guess what Edmonstone and Wellesley thought about the war with Holkar, as Edmonstone left a detailed account of their deliberations in July 1804. His notes show an unusually high level of aggression for one who preferred to use diplomatic means to gain his ends. However, Edmonstone had never shirked from military methods when he judged them necessary, and never after Cherry's death had he lamented Indian losses as at the siege of Seringapatam. His attitude was clear: "No expectation can be entertained of any accommodation with Holkar as long as he shall remain in any degree of force . . . [and] a defensive War on our part would be attended with the most serious consequences to our reputation and Interests." Since no help could be expected from Sindhia, who was handily evading his treaty responsibilities to the British, a long and expensive war seemed likely if Holkar were allowed to continue in strength in the field, attacking at will the British troops under Lieutenant-Colonel Monson and Colonel Murray. Edmonstone and Wellesley were aware that they were running out of money and time, with the latter being an even more pressing matter than the former as Wellesley's recall could come on the next ship to dock at Diamond Harbor. It is not surprising, then, that they opted for aggressive warfare that would hopefully bring a swift conclusion to the conflict. As Edmonstone noted, "it appears to be highly expedient to adopt immediate measures for the attack of Jeswunt Row Holkar."

They expected to achieve victory by augmenting the main British armies in the field to enable either of them to best Holkar singly, in case the wily chief continued to prevent a junction between them. Lake was further informed that

the principle [sic] object of the Commander in Chief will be directed to the means of making an Early and Vigorous attack on the resources of Holkar, and of entirely reducing his power, if that measure should become necessary. Holkar must be made sensible of the Superiority of our strength, before he will submit to the terms on which alone can he be safely admitted to the protection of the British Power which he has insulted and attacked with so much wanton outrage. The moment of Victory on our part will afford the best opportunity of commencing a negotiation with that restless freebooter.

Lake was additionally instructed to guard the northern passes and to use the British control over Bundelkhand to insure that no aid reached the chieftain, while cutting off any avenues he might use for escape. Holkar's forces were not to be allowed to retreat and regroup.

Holkar was prepared for the British attack. Unlike Sindhia, who had relied on tactics taught by the European officers in his forces, Jaswant Rao employed the old Maratha style of warfare. As cavalry constituted the majority of his forces, they could move swiftly, negating the previous British advantage of speed and maneuverability. Holkar led Lake on a chase around the countryside, refusing to join battle and drawing several of his sub-commanders further and further into Maratha territory. In August 1804, Lake's column under Colonel Monson advanced too far into Maratha lands and found itself facing Holkar's entire army. The reinforcements encompassed in the governor-general's plan had been impossible to find, and Monson was not at sufficient strength to have any chance of success. He was forced to retreat almost two hundred and fifty miles
through hostile territory, losing half his men and all his heavy artillery in the process. It was the first major British defeat since the pre-reform days. Instead of crushing the Maratha resistance and consolidating their gains, Wellesley and Edmonstone had shown all of India that the Company was not as invincible as it had appeared. The defeat caused Britain's allies to waver, with the Raja of Bhurtpore beginning a correspondence with Holkar.

Yet Holkar proved his own worst enemy, attacking Delhi and allowing the main body of Lake's army to catch up with him in October. Jeswant Rao was forced to break off his siege and retreat in order to regroup his forces and, believing Lake to be some distance behind him, he paused for a rest seventy miles beyond Delhi. It was a major mistake. Covering the distance between them in twenty-four hours, Lake attacked Holkar's army at dawn, inflicting huge losses and forcing him to retreat to the Punjab. After annihilating 3,000 of Holkar's cavalry at Furruckabad on November 17, Lake attacked the fortress of Deig belonging to Holkar's new ally, the Raja of Bhurtpore, but was unable to effect another victory as the fortress proved difficult to take. Orders were meanwhile received in Calcutta from London calling for an immediate halt to any and all conflicts.

To say that London was furious over events in India would be an understatement. Besides the considerable economic consequences of Wellesley's actions, moral concerns had been raised about the methods he employed to extend British control into new areas. Jacob Bosonquet, chairman of the East India Company, delivered a minute in December 1803 commenting that it was "repugnant from my honor & my conscience to approve the Conduct of the Governor General" in dealing with Awadh and stating firmly that he could not give sanction "to measures which appear to me to be fundamentally unjust." It was also a factor that many of the directors viewed massive territorial acquisitions as more of a burden than an aid, for a trading company was not adequately designed to administer and defend them.

Not surprisingly, then, Wellesley's decision to continue his Maratha wars resulted in his recall in May 1805, his place to be filled by the much more conservative Cornwallis. Many in India mourned his passing, for the younger generation in the Company viewed their governor-general as a great hero. Edmonstone, who had been ambivalent about Wellesley's arrival, had come to feel a great affinity with the cocky nobleman. As he wrote years later,

I here obey the restless impulse of my feelings in acknowledging a grateful sense of the favor & kindness I uniformly experienced at his Lordship’s hands and the unbounded confidence with which he favoured me while thus ministerially employed under his immediate order throughout that most interesting & eventful period of the History of British India.

Wellesley and Edmonstone had conquered half a continent. The problem left in the secretary's hands would be how to keep it.
Although Charles Cornwallis was sixty-six years old in 1805 and no longer in the best of health, he felt restless after returning to England from quelling rebellion in Ireland. He found it impossible "to contemplate the dangers of my country, with the prospect of being a mere cypher, without arms in my hands," and offered to serve in whatever part of the world he was needed.  

Cornwallis was easily convinced to return to India, having followed the news from the sub-continent with steadily increasing alarm since 1803, commenting at first that he was not sure he had been wise to decline to take up his old position in 1797, and, by 1804, he was calling Wellesley's Maratha wars insane.  

Arriving in Calcutta on July 29, 1805, Cornwallis was met by a large party sent by Wellesley to welcome him in proper style. Edmonstone was not among them, but rather waited at Government House to greet his old benefactor. In place of the brash, naïve young man Cornwallis had known, he would find someone who had decided the fates of countries, divided up areas of land larger than England with a stroke of a pen, and forced kings to bend to his will. Edmonstone was one of an elite group of Company employees who held posts similar in scope to the highest government offices in England; moreover, through his friendship with Wellesley, he had long been even more influential than his varied positions implied. The experienced politician he had become would have been able to deal with Cornwallis in his prime, but fate did not require such a showdown. The man who stepped on the Calcutta quay at mid-morning, sick and emaciated from a difficult outward journey, was a shadow of his former self.  

Over the next few days, Cornwallis, already showing signs of the illness that would soon take his life, found himself in a bewildering new world. The Calcutta he had known was gone; in its place was an imperial capital. Upon his arrival, he was conducted to palatial quarters in Government House which would not have been out of place in a mansion in England. He protested that his chambers were much too large and that he would prefer smaller ones on the ground floor, but Wellesley eventually persuaded him that such surroundings would not be suitable to his station. The apartments were reluctantly accepted, although the sentries, who were stationed every few feet, were dismissed. As Cornwallis put it, "I could not divest myself of the idea of being in a prison, for if I showed myself outside a door, a fellow with a musket and fixed bayonet presented himself before me."  

Cornwallis had difficulty adjusting to the deference Company men and the Indian representatives of allied states afforded him--it was roughly equivalent to that reserved
for the king in Britain. Not surprisingly, he clung to the familiar faces he saw in the fawning crowd, perhaps explaining why Edmonstone became his chief secretary within a matter of days. Wellesley left India a month after his replacement's arrival, but Edmonstone remained, insuring the continuation of an imperialist agenda as he was the source through which all of the new governor-general's orders were sent out.  

A few days after his arrival, Cornwallis wrote to the directors:

Finding to my great concern that we are still at war with Holkar, and that we can hardly be said to be at peace with Scindiah, I have determined to proceed immediately to the Upper Provinces . . . to terminate by negotiation a contest in which the most brilliant success can afford us no solid benefit.  

Naturally Edmonstone went with him. Cornwallis intended to please the directors and end the war by the simple expedient of returning to Maratha control lands taken from them by Wellesley. As his impressive barge was towed up the Ganges, however, his health became continuously more fragile. At times he seemed his old self, capable of giving Edmonstone instructions on how he wanted to deal with the upcoming negotiations, but increasingly he could do no more than sign his name to the letters Edmonstone had written for him. Because of Cornwallis's extremely poor health, it was largely Edmonstone and George Barlow who ran the government, the former at Cornwallis' side and the latter in Calcutta. To the end, however, he continued to try to complete his mission. Only five days before his death, he remained preoccupied with business; as a member of his party wrote, "he is impatient of detention here [at Ghazipur], speaks of the impropriety of delays, [and] has inquired after Edmonstone," without whom he could no longer function. As Edmonstone recorded:

One of the symptoms of the disease which was gradually undermining his existence was an almost constant and overpowering drowsyness [sic] from which nothing seemed to rouse him but the claims of the public business. Whenever I approached him for the purpose of reading dispatches or drafts of letters or communicating with him on the business of my office, he exerted himself to the utmost of his faculties to attend to & converse with me till by degrees the powers of mind & body were exhausted.  

Despite the depth of his commitment, however, at his death from dropsy on October 5, 1805, after what Edmonstone described as "a few days of insensibility & wandering of mind," none of his peace plans had been implemented.

Meanwhile, Lake had reached an agreement with Holkar. In return for the areas he viewed as his in Bundelkhand and those north of the Chambal, Holkar was offered peace with the Company and unquestioned suzerainty over his remaining territories. After his recent defeat, the chief saw no alternative to acquiescence. The settlement ended the war and, while it returned to Holkar some Maratha territory and thereby satisfied him and the directors, it also assured the British unopposed control of the remainder of Bundelkhand.

The governor-generalship of Sir George Barlow, who was appointed acting head of the government on Cornwallis' death, has often been portrayed by historians as a period which reversed many of Wellesley's policies. This would be surprising if true, for one of Barlow's first official acts was to make Edmonstone his private secretary while also retaining him as Secret, Foreign and Political Secretary. Barlow noted that "the high opinion which I had formed of his talents determined me to give him my unlimited
confidence, and the result fully justified my expectations." He would comment that, of all the people with whom he worked as governor-general, he owed the most thanks to Edmonstone, whose "established reputation and conciliatory manner invariably obtained for him the esteem and confidence of the Ministers deputed by [the Indian states] to the British Government." Barlow's action caused Edmonstone considerable relief, for it allowed him to turn over the Persian department completely to Mr. Monckton, his long time aid, thus lightening his burden without necessitating a reduction in salary.

Barlow and Edmonstone had been acquainted for years, since the time of Cornwallis' first governor-generalship when Barlow was sub-secretary in the Revenue Department. It had been Barlow's work on the Code of Government Regulations that Edmonstone was involved in translating when trouble first arose in Awadh. Barlow was thereafter appointed to a seat on the Board of Trade in 1796, where he made a name for himself by implementing economic measures that saved a lakh per year in the secretary's office. He was also an honest man, having, in 1806 after 26 years in the Company's service, only a "trifling fortune," despite occupying many positions that would have allowed him easily to augment it. His reputation had resulted in an appointment as sub-governor of Madras followed by the vice-presidency of the supreme council, which allowed the two old friends to work closely together as Edmonstone's positions as Persian translator and political secretary required frequent contact with the council. They were also colleagues on the staff of the College of Fort William. Barlow would later call Edmonstone "the most distinguished diplomatic Officer of his time," and ascribe to "his able and judicious advice . . . my having succeeded in reconciling the conflicting interests who opposed the final adjustment of the treaties [with the Marathas] and ultimately of completing the pacification of India." Therefore, although Edmonstone's close association with one whose policies were so deplored by the directors, and Barlow's seniority and reputation as financially prudent, assured that the governor-generalship did not fall to Wellesley's closest advisor, Edmonstone's influence did not diminish.

Sir John Kaye was correct when he commented about the new government, "Barlow, aided by Mr. Edmonstone, had been . . . for some time at the helm; and stern necessity compelled our perseverance in a line of political conduct which . . . had been sanctioned by Lord Wellesley before his departure from the country." There was no chance of a government headed by two ardent imperialists relinquishing the control that they had just obtained. They succeeded instead at giving the appearance of compliance with the directors' wishes, while in fact relinquishing none of their dominion over India.

Edmonstone began his campaign to subvert the directors' plans as soon as Cornwallis arrived. He wrote under the governor-general's authority to Barry Close at Poona that the British would be forced to interfere with the peshwa's government if he could not control the brigands causing an uproar in his lands, and that the Company would not even discuss the peshwa's claim to any areas in Bundelkhand. This was at the same time that Cornwallis was writing to the directors that he hoped the Company could avoid "mixing ourselves in all the intrigues, oppression and chicanery of the active management of distracted and desolate Provinces." Edmonstone piously informed John Malcolm that, whether one agreed with the decisions of one's superiors or not, it was a requirement of office to aid in carrying them out, but that did not stop him from doing his utmost to influence Cornwallis' perception of the Indian situation. He apparently had some success, for he wrote to Kirkpatrick that "His Lordship is aware of
the embarrassments, and even the dangers which might ensue from an immediate and total suspension of that interference which we have been accustomed to exercise in the administration of the State of Hyderabad." Cornwallis' secretary assured that he quickly reached the conclusion that any withdrawal of British power would have to be done gradually, for most of the allied rulers had only token armies with which to maintain control and were almost completely dependent on British arms. This perception assured that Cornwallis had done nothing before his death to withdraw Company influence in any state; following his demise, Barlow and Edmonstone concentrated on the consolidation, not the restriction, of British power.

In reviewing Barlow's settlement with the Marathas, conquest historians have frequently commented that he gave away too much, a belief that may stem from the attitudes of many young Company men at the time. Charles Metcalfe, for one, wrote: "Lord Wellesley's system was abandoned at an unfortunate period, when its success was almost complete," and he accused Barlow of throwing India "back into its former state of confusion and uncertainty" by betraying the Rajput chiefs who had signed treaties with the Company during the Second Maratha War. Barlow did ignore the British obligations to the Rajput states, and also returned Gwalior and Gohud to Sindhia as Cornwallis had planned. Wellesley had bought the loyalty of Ambajee Ingle, the Rana of Gohud, by promising him the supremacy over Gohud and the great Gwalior fortress, both of which were claimed by Sindhia, who was unlikely to give them up without a fight. By relinquishing areas that, because of their position beyond the Jumna and deep within Maratha territory, would have been difficult to defend, Barlow satisfied the directors and solidified the Company's control of Bundelkhand. This insured that, with the British forces sitting in the middle of the confederation, there was a strong deterrent to a renewed Maratha threat.

The line Edmonstone and Barlow were walking was a fine one, for they were defying London's orders at the period of the directors' greatest strength. From a representation of 60 directors in parliament in 1784, the number had grown to 103 by 1806. This power base at the seat of government made open opposition to their wishes risky, as Wellesley was learning to his discomfort. Upon his return to Britain, although his friends managed to prevent his impeachment, he still had to stand trial, and his detractors assured that it dragged out until 1808. By their settlement with the Marathas, Edmonstone and Barlow seemed to be following orders by ending the war and returning some territory; the directors were insufficiently familiar with the situation in India to realize the significance of the areas retained, which included the past seats of Mughal power in Delhi and Agra.

Despite their skillful handling of the directors' commands, Edmonstone and Barlow had to take a risky stand against Leadenhall Street's wish to modify the Treaty of Bassein that, owing to their protests, was allowed to remain. Barlow further stretched a point where Hyderabad was concerned. Cornwallis had commented to Arthur Wellesley that he "disapproved very much of all subsidiary treaties, as they tended to involve the British Government in quarrels in which they had no real concern," and that he had no intention of entering into any more. Barlow, however, made it clear to the nizam that Hyderabad would not be allowed to alter its arrangement with the British. He assured the home authorities that the situation had improved drastically once the Company bolstered the position of Mir Alam, whose "firm attachment to the British Interests" was
unquestioned, and he was afterwards vested with complete control of the government by
the nizam.  Barlow also took every opportunity to assure London that he had no
intention of acquiescing to any actions likely to cause problems with the Indian states.
This, combined with Napoleon's preoccupation with Europe, would insure "that we may
reasonably indulge an expectation that the tranquility of our Indian dominions is not
likely to be again disturbed for a considerable period of time."  

Barlow was able to get away with modifications to his orders because of his
successful economic policy.  Nothing was so calculated to please London as an
improvement in the Company's finances, which were in such poor shape that Cornwallis
had been forced to confiscate the treasure sent by the directors to China in order to be
able to pay off and disband even a fraction of the Company's engorged army.  As the
ever outspoken John Collins noted, the "impoverished state" of the Company's finances
should have convinced anyone, even supporters of the "late good old Marquis," that
peace was not only advisable but imperative.  Under Barlow, the finances that had
been teetering on the brink of disaster started to be put back on a sound footing.  His
measures for reducing the financial strain on the Company were considerable: he shrank
the Company's standing army to roughly what it had been before the escalation caused
by the Maratha conflict, although much of the huge subsidiary force remained.  He
eliminated the Governor-General's office on December 15, 1805, and abolished the
office of Compiler and Translator of Mohammedan Law held by Baillie.  He also took
away the position of vice-provost at the College of Fort William, making the Reverend
Claudius Buchanan, an Anglican clergyman in Calcutta and holder of that office,
provost, thereby combining the two offices in one person and one salary.  Orders were
also given that no new roads or public buildings were to be constructed, the governor-
genral's bodyguard was reduced, and many unnecessary state boats and barges were
eliminated.  

Barlow was popular with the directorate, who believed that they had found a
governor-general who, like John Shore, had ample knowledge of the sub-continent and
held their interests, rather than his own aggrandizement, paramount.  They wanted to see
his position made permanent, but the Crown had other ideas.  George IV ordered him
removed from his position in 1806, not, as the directors were assured, because of any
defect in his abilities or actions, but because

the Person entrusted with the extensive Powers belonging to that distant Government
should be one who possesses the cordial Confidence of Government at home . . . also
that the Rank, weight and Consideration in the Metropolitan Country must add much
to the Authority and the efficiency of those who administer great and remote
Provinces.

In other words, Barlow, although knowledgeable and experienced, was simply not
important enough to govern a realm that was now far larger in extent than the mother
country.  He was made a Knight of the Order of the Bath in 1807 and given a pension in
recompense for his service, but it was made clear that he would be replaced.  The
directors were furious at being overridden, commenting that the Crown's decision
amounted to a precedent allowing it to appoint all future governors-general, but to no
avail.  Still, the debate took time and, in the two years required for a permanent
replacement for Cornwallis to be decided upon and conveyed to India, Barlow and
Edmonstone did much to consolidate the Company's gains.  None of the subsidiary
states were given control over their administrations or allowed to renew their armies as Arthur Wellesley had suggested. Furthermore, the areas retained from the Maratha war were put in economic submission to Bengal, allowing additional revenues to begin to flow into the empty Company coffers. Edmonstone's vision of a controlled India seemed to have been realized, but there were some disturbing notes, many of which stemmed less from the Indian community than the European.

In 1805, the publication of a pamphlet by Claudius Buchanan sparked a bitter eight-year debate over the right of Christian missionaries to operate in British India. The issue became the subject of dozens of pamphlets, many emotional sermons, and nearly a thousand parliamentary petitions. While missions advocates stressed the need to combat immorality and convert the unsaved, their opponents argued that such work caused disaffection among Indians and undermined British political authority.

Most modern scholars have assigned motives to the two groups involved in the dispute similar to those publicized in the original controversy. Those sympathetic to the pro-mission forces, such as Eli Potts, portray them as concerned only with the well-being of India's people: "they thought the conversion of its people to Christianity was intimately bound up with the progressive improvement of their condition." According to this view, the anti-missions group cared more for conquest and profit than for humanitarian issues. George D. Bearce notes, "the missionaries were proposing changes which would disrupt the imperial order. Imperial attitudes, thus, were normally in opposition to the projects of the missionaries and humanitarians." The other side of the issue is discussed by Penelope Carson, who sees the Company as not so much anti-missions as pro-common sense. By attempting to curtail missionary activity, she argues, the Company was acting out of a "concern for the security of British India." In the same vein, C. H. Philips sees the missionaries as shortsighted individuals who did not consider the possible ramifications of their actions: "fanaticism tends to obscure rather than clarify political issues."

Although both of these analyses contain truth, they overlook more subtle motivations. Consideration of underlying social and political conditions in Britain and India reveals that the debate was concerned less with missions and political security per se than with power. It became a focal point for the struggles between the Church of England and dissent, and between the Company and the Crown over who was ultimately to control India, religiously and politically.

When William Carey and John Thomas, the first dissenting missionaries to arrive in India, reached Bengal in 1793, the foundation for controversy had already been laid in both Britain and India. In Britain this took the form of two significant events, one religious and one political. The Protestant dissent, churches such as the Baptists, to which Carey and Thomas belonged, and the Methodists, who rejected the authority of the Church of England, had grown into large denominations by the late eighteenth century. The "new dissent," as such denominations are known, to differentiate them from the "old dissent" comprised of denominations such as the Puritans and Lutherans, had become so prevalent by the early nineteenth century that, according to an 1811 House of Lords report, the Church of England was on its way to becoming a minority religious establishment. A number of Anglicans became concerned about the spread of dissenting churches and their effect on the official religious establishment: evangelicals within the Church of England were beginning to adopt some dissenting views, becoming
interested in social and religious reform measures and in missions. The same year that
the dissenters arrived in Bengal, William Wilberforce, an evangelical member of
parliament who is perhaps best remembered for his anti-slavery reform efforts, proposed
that the Company be required to finance missionary endeavors in its territories. The
measure was defeated by the combined efforts of the Company, which objected on
financial grounds, and Anglican leaders, who were more interested in combating the
threat of dissent at home than in proselytizing abroad. Anglican evangelicals responded
by helping to form missionary societies such as the Church Missionary Society in 1799
and the British and Foreign Bible Society in 1804. They also assured that a number of
evangelical chaplains were sent abroad with the Company.\(^{38}\)

The passing in 1784 of Pitt's East India Act also affected the controversy. Since the
Company had been chartered in 1600, it had governed itself with minimal interference
from the Crown. Pitt's Act, which formed the first significant limitation of the
Company's right to govern its Asian possessions as it saw fit, also, as the directors had
feared, began a trend. Thereafter, until the final assumption of the government of India
by the Crown in 1858, each time the Company's charter came up for renewal more
power passed out of its hands--a fact deeply resented and bitterly contested by the
Company.

The expansion of the Company's Indian possessions was another important factor
underlying the debate. As the Company's territories grew more extensive, more than
doubling between the 1790s and 1813, its government became more restrictive. The
large acquisitions of Wellesley's era were accompanied by government censorship of the
press and restraints on Europeans' freedom of movement. Edmonstone justified such
measures as necessary to control those Europeans who were not employed by--and
therefore directly answerable to--the Company. Carey and Thomas may have assumed
that they would be classed with this segment of society, for they failed to apply for the
permits required for British subjects residing in India and did not even travel to the
subcontinent on a British ship.\(^{39}\)

After spending some years in language study, the missionaries settled in the Danish
town of Serampore in 1800. There they began translating and printing the Bible,
circulating religious pamphlets, and preaching, often in Calcutta. Their activities soon
brought them to the attention of Buchanan, who strongly approved of the missionaries'
efforts, especially their translation work. Years earlier, while studying at Queen's
College, Cambridge, he had asserted that "nothing but . . . the constant perusal of the
New Testament seems capable of delivering men from unnecessary prejudices and
prepossessions. Grace does not necessarily do it. . . . Grace converts the heart, but it does
not teach the understanding."\(^{40}\) He may have first been attracted to the Serampore
missionaries because of their establishment of a religious printing press. Buchanan
wanted an inexpensive English Bible to be easily available to the Company's troops and
European civilians in India, but found that "there are few copies to be had at any
price."\(^{41}\) Soon after meeting the Baptists, who had modestly augmented their numbers,
he commented that "instead of thirty missionaries, I wish they could transport three
hundred. They can do little harm, and may do some good."\(^{42}\) Carey, whom he described
as "a man of unquestioning integrity," especially impressed him.\(^{43}\)

Among both Europeans and Indians Buchanan saw what he considered to be gross
immorality. Calcutta he compared to the Biblical Sodom, where it was impossible to
find ten righteous men, and was convinced that the lack of ministry was to blame. He
noted that services were not normally held at the Company’s cantonments, where "the
Christian Sabbath is no otherwise distinguished than by the dignity of the British flag.”
Buchanan lamented that for the 30,000 British soldiers and civil servants in India, there
were only six military chaplains and three churches, fewer than on the island of
Jamaica. The missionaries filled this gap somewhat, at least in the area around
Calcutta. As early as January 1800, soldiers were attending services at Serampore, just
across the Hugli River from the large Company cantonment at Barrackpur. The
missionaries’ primary interest was the conversion of the Indians, however, and their
efforts helped to increase Buchanan's interest in missions.

From Buchanan's perspective, the moral state of the Indians was even worse than that
of the Europeans. He wrote with horror of children sacrificed to the river at Saugor, a
station at the mouth of the Hugli that East Indiamen passed on their way to Calcutta, and
of female infanticide among the Rajputs. *Sati*, the practice of immolating women on
their husbands' funeral pyres, often against their will, also appalled him. The light from
burning pyres could be seen at night from the terraces of the city, causing him to wonder
how many instances of *sati* occurred practically on the Company's doorstep. Buchanan
may have learned of some of these practices from the missionaries, whose petitions to
the Company's government helped to bring about the 1802 ban on child sacrifice and
who regularly protested against *sati*. This similarity in outlook, as well as the dearth of
other Anglican clergy in India, led Buchanan to work closely with the Serampore
Baptists in the years leading up to 1805. He was instrumental in obtaining for William
Carey a position as a language professor at the College of Fort William, and he assisted
the missionaries in raising funds for translation work. Buchanan also helped to protect
them from Wellesley, who suspected dissenters of having Jacobin sympathies.

The governor-general had some cause—William Ward, for example, had a police record in
England for openly supporting the French Revolution.

A series of letters, written by Buchanan during a journey around India from 1806 to
1808, make his attitude on the religious state of the country abundantly clear. He
traveled to the famous Jagannath shrine that Edmonstone had seen in 1788, located in
the area of Cuttack. It had come under the Company's jurisdiction in 1806, one of the
cessions from Wellesley's Maratha wars, and the right to superintend the temple went
with it. He reported that he could tell when he neared his goal by "the number of dead
men's bones which lie by the road side. . . . I see the parriah Dogs now eating a Pilgrim
who died last night." A few years later, William Carey calculated that, out of the
approximately 1.2 million pilgrims who made their way to Jagannath each year, as many
as one in ten died from illness or deprivation on the journey. Buchanan was even more
shocked on arrival at the temple, commenting that "no record of ancient or modern
history can give an adequate idea[,] . . . here Moloch maintains his empire to this day." He
entered with a group of approximately 4,000 pilgrims, with whom he waited while
they slowly proceeded through the outer gate and on to an inner one, where the temple
tax was collected. Buchanan was almost trampled by the crowd as it surged forward,
but managed to move to one side as the mass of people jostled through the final barrier.
He recorded a kaleidoscope of horrific images once inside the compound: vultures and
dogs fighting over corpses, dead and dying pilgrims on almost every street, and a stench
so intense it made even one used to the pungent air of Calcutta nauseous.
surprisingly, the Company officials in charge of collecting the taxes at Jagannath had their homes situated a mile outside the town, near the sea where fresh breezes continually blew.

Despite his revulsion at his initial foray into the temple, Buchanan remained at Jagannath for nine days, carefully recording impressions that would become the basis of numerous books in future years. His description of Jagannath's image was especially vivid:

On . . . the great day of the Rutt Jattra, Moloch was brought out of his temple amidst the voices of thousands & tens of thousands of his worshippers. I was so close to him that his Chief Priest presented to me a Garland taken off Juggernaut's neck. . . . In Juggernaut's Temple nothing is to be seen of importance. . . . the chief abomination within is perhaps the dancing women who twice in the day exhibit themselves before him[;] . . . When the Car [containing the image] had moved about 20 yards on the first day, a pilgrim was exhibited ready to devote himself to the God. He placed himself before the Car, lying on his face, and one of the wheels crushed him to death. . . . He was left to view the whole of the day, and at night was carried off to the Golgotha [Buchanan's term for the cremation area belonging to the temple.]

He finished his account by noting, "I write this from the plain of Sculls near the Sea, & it so happens that a Scull is under my chair, half buried in the Sand." Buchanan wrote numerous letters to Wellesley and influential members of government describing his experiences in Cuttack, but his pleas that the Company do something to regulate the practices allowed at the temple were ignored.

Buchanan continued south on roughly the same route Edmonstone had followed on the delegation to Hyderabad, but he noticed very different things. At Ganjan, for instance, he recorded details of sati in local practice: "The Brahmins behind the Chilka Lake offered to carry me to a Suttee in the flaming Pit. Six, Eight or Ten females often accompany the Rajah, the wife in the husband's Pit, and the concubines in their own private and separate pits." He remarked that, although the pagoda at Seemachalum was situated in a beautiful spot, "the idolatry of Jagannath is exhibited in another form, but the substance is the same."

Although evidences of Hindu worship elicited only condemnation, Buchanan saw signs of promise for Christianity in southern India. At Madras he found a thriving Roman Catholic community and visited St. Thomas' bones, which had been preserved in a golden shrine. He was warmly received by the Catholic community, who seemed to believe, erroneously in some cases, that the denominational differences of the West were of little concern to Christians in India: "I am greeted by them," Buchanan wrote, "as one who comes in the name of Government to do them good. . . . From every quarter there is a cry of the sheep for a Shepherd. They meet & pray under a tree & the Brahmins mock." He heard a service performed in Tamil, and noted that many of the 200 Indians in attendance took notes on large leaves, which the local missionary informed him was to allow them to repeat the message to their children that night. Equally impressive were the Jesuit missionaries he found at Pondicherry, who had amassed an extensive collection of ancient Indian texts that they gladly shared with him, as well as giving him a list of their missionary endeavors in India; one of the brothers even requested that he and Buchanan correspond after the chaplain's tour ended. His approval of the Catholic missions may have been behind a sermon he gave to the
European inhabitants of Trichinopoly on the wise men's comment in Matthew 2:2: "we have seen his star in the East and are come to worship him." It would later be published, becoming one of his most famous addresses and possibly the strongest exhortation to increased missionary endeavor ever penned in India.

Tanjore made even more of an impression, with Buchanan calling it "the grand scene of all. This is the Garden of the Gospel." The local missionary, Mr. Kolhoff, took him through "a long street inhabited by Christians" as they proceeded to the residency; the locals "stood in rows as we passed and bowed affectionately to their Pastor." The rajah showed him every courtesy, as might have been expected for a visiting British dignitary, especially finding favor by displaying a plan for a sculpture depicting the famous German missionary Christian F. Schwartz, who died in 1798, and declaring it "to be his purpose to befriend the Christians forever." Buchanan found the people in surrounding areas "clamorous for a teacher. They have Eight churches and no European Pastor. When occasionally Mr. K[olhoff] visits them, the joy is so great, that the news of his arrival flies through the woods with as much rapidity as formerly a signal for an attack on a caravan." As a Company official, he found the people looking to him for guidance and convinced that he could provide them with ministers, more churches and Bibles in Tamil. Kolhoff gave him a gold and agate snuff box, a Hebrew psalter and a Greek New Testament that had belonged to Schwartz as a farewell present.

Buchanan traveled on to Travancore, where he pleased the raja by showing him a miniature painting of the ruler of Tanjore. The raja was so taken with it that he asked to keep it briefly to show his ladies, causing Buchanan to joke, "it was three days before I could get the Raja of Tanjore out of the zenana." His camaraderie with the raja, along with the Company's growing importance in the South, allowed him to obtain permission for a Protestant church to be built in Travancore--a significant concession as the raja was known not to favor Christians. Yet Buchanan's journey resulted in more than that: it greatly reinforced his prior conviction that, for Christianity to spread in India, organization and leadership were desperately needed to draw the disparate missionary efforts together.

In 1805, Buchanan had published his concerns regarding the immorality of British India in a Memoir on the Expediency of an Ecclesiastical Establishment for British India. The first part dealt with the need for a formal Anglican presence in India to minister to the Europeans there. His primary argument, other than that of the moral laxity prevalent among Company men, was that India was "the only instance in the annals of our country where church and state have been dismembered. We seem at present to be trying the question, whether religion be necessary for a state." It was a powerful argument, as the link between church and state in Britain was strengthening owing to perceived threats of social unrest and the growth of dissenting churches.

Although Buchanan did not say so explicitly in Memoir, it is clear from his actions that he believed a strong Anglican presence was needed in India to guarantee that the Church of England retained control over dissenting missionaries. The same year Memoir was published, an argument broke out between Buchanan and the Serampore Baptists over funds they had raised for translation of the Bible. Buchanan assumed the right to distribute the money as he saw fit, ignoring the wishes of the Baptists; two years later he attempted to take full control of the Serampore translation work, an event that led to "a dreadful collision." As Buchanan later wrote, his motivation was "that the important
work might be conducted strictly in the principles of the national church, and not fall entirely into the hands of dissenters."  

Buchanan's determination that the Anglican church should control Christian religious activity in India was also apparent when he visited selected Syrian churches out of a group of fifty-five begun by immigrants to Tanjore centuries before. He reached the first Syrian congregation, housed in a large building that reminded him of the parish churches of England, in November 1806. Inside he found paintings of Biblical scenes adorning the walls and a seventy-two-year-old priest named Iona with a "venerable beard" stretching to his waist. He and his two assistants, Alexandros and Thomas, were intrigued to find that Buchanan could read their Syrian books, whereas the chaplain found "nothing objectionable" in the service he observed.  

Their initial rapport, however, came under serious strain after Buchanan made a suggestion for the union of all Indian churches under Anglican leadership:  

Matters appeared very gloomy... My servants informed me that the people were alarmed. I was the friend of the Raja and he was their oppressor; I was a friend of Colonel M[acauley] & he was a Roman Catholic; I myself was suspected to be Roman Catholic. I had slept in Romish churches, and had conversed with the Priests in Latin. At all events, I belonged to the Nation of the Great Ones of the West (the English) who, if they were not Roman Catholics, seemed to have no religion at all. Buchanan discovered that an assembly had been called as soon as he left that was marked by a heated debate. The Syrians were especially worried that he had arrived with an honor guard of the raja's men; if they refused his request, would the raja allow him to harm them?  

As he continued his journey, he met some wealthy Syrian Christians willing to fund the translation of the Bible into Malayalam so a larger number could read it, but he made real headway only upon meeting with Mar Dionysius, the Syrian bishop and metropolitan over all the churches, at Candenad.  

Mar Dionysius was an elderly man, reputed to be 107 years old, with a long white beard and a feeble manner; however, he greeted the chaplain dressed majestically in a red silk robe with an enormous gold cross around his neck and surrounded by a large number of his clergy. Buchanan assured him that the Church of England wanted to "protect and defend" the Syrians and to use them "as an instrument of future good in the midst of her own Empire." He pointed out, however, that the Anglicans might find some of their practices objectionable and hinted that any union would require the Syrians to submit their beliefs for Anglican approval. Buchanan elicited from the bishop a promise to "write a public letter stating his desire that his Church should be subject to the direct influence of the Church of England, and that his Successor & all future Bishops should be appointed by the English Church or by the English Government in India." The bishop's reasons for such a step were twofold: he informed Buchanan that obtaining new bishops from Antioch had always been difficult, and recently the quality of available replacements had declined and were no longer well educated. Mar Dionysius was himself from Malabar, born of Syrian parents, and proposed that all future bishops be so as well, and that they function under the Anglican archbishop of Goa's direction. Such an arrangement would remove the necessity of a direct union with the Anglicans, which would probably be opposed by members of his church. It would leave the Syrians largely autonomous, but give them the great advantage of British aid to protect them from the Raja of Travancore, who was "hostile to the Christian name and
religion, as we have learned by painful experience." Buchanan was willing to agree to these conditions, just as he reassured the Roman Catholic priests at Verapoli, who believed him about to call in British arms to force them to come under his direction, that he had no current plan to do any such thing. Yet he did tell them in very clear terms that "all the Christian churches are, and necessarily must be, cognizible, in respect of interior management and the appointment of Bishops, by the Christian King who is now sovereign of India." Deeds as well as words evidenced that Buchanan had acquired an imperialist outlook in religion by the end of his trip. When he heard that members of the Jewish community at Cochin had amassed an archive of ancient scrolls, he offered to buy them to add to his growing collection of antique religious works. He was told, however, that "they would not give up the books for a Lack (sic) of Rupees. They could not sell their law for money." Buchanan therefore commandeered a "file of musqueteers" from the Madras government and was soon writing happily that the "spoils were brought in Triumph to my house in Cochin under British guard, amidst the dire execrations and deep lamentations of the Jewish mob." Buchanan's only comment on their protests was that they should have sold the collection to him while they had the chance, as "I have it now for nothing." 

By the time he reached the Portuguese colony of Goa, Buchanan was accustomed to exercising his Company authority in religious matters. He decided that he wanted to see the Inquisitors Hall and would not take no for an answer. The Inquisition, abolished in 1774, had been re-established in 1779 with the understanding that there be no public burnings. After examining the Hall, Buchanan demanded to inspect the dungeons and prisoners, commenting to the Inquisitor:

> You say the Inquisition is very lenient [and] that you do not burn the victims. But let me know how many die in a year in confinement, how many are confined for life. You have, by your own confession, 200 dungeons, each 10 feet square, in which the captive never sees the light of the sun. I want to see the chamber of torture. . . . If you do not lead me down I shall believe that you are afraid. My imagination will multiply the numbers of your captives . . . [and] the public will suppose that matters are worse than perhaps they really are.

He was nonetheless refused, but, after leaving briefly, turned up unexpectedly during the trial of a woman for heresy. Looking significantly at the woman and then at the officiating priest, he leaned forward and whispered a final warning in his ear, "delenda est Carthago." The point could not have been clearer--Portugal may have once dominated Indian trade, but its glory days were over, eclipsed by the quickly rising British power. Displease the Company, and Goa might well find itself in a similar position to that of Carthage after Scipio's armies had finished with it. Declaring himself "not less indignant at the Inquisition of Goa than I had been with the Temple of Jagannath," Buchanan complained to the local Company authorities and informed the Inquisitor that he meant to ask the Archbishop to write the court of Portugal to abolish it.

The second part of Buchanan's *Memoir* dealt with the question of missions to the Indians. He praised the Serampore missionaries for reaching out to them, castigated his own church for not doing likewise and was also critical of the East India Company:
Providence hath been pleased to grant to us this great empire, on a continent where, a few years ago, we had not a foot of land. From it we export annually an immense wealth to enrich our own country. What do we give in return? Is it said that we give protection to the inhabitants and administer equal laws? This is necessary for obtaining our wealth. But what do we give in return? Such statements elicited a furious response from members of the Company in Britain.

In 1806, an event occurred in India to make the issue of missionary activity--Anglican or otherwise--even more controversial. On July 10, 1806, Indian sepoys at Vellore in the Madras presidency revolted against their officers and killed 200 in the garrison of 370 before a British force from Arcot restored order. Edmonstone listed his part in containing this threat, as well as gaining the appointment of the pro-British Mir Alam to the dewan of Hyderabad, as one of his main achievements during Barlow's period as governor-general. Barlow agreed, noting that "he united the most unshaken firmness and resolution in times of internal difficulty and danger. This valuable trait in his public character signally displayed itself on the discovery of the conspiracy formed at Vellore." A historian might argue that his dealings with the missionaries was at least as important in the long term, for it would greatly influence the Company's attitude on the issue thereafter, but the two issues were so interconnected that perhaps in Edmonstone's mind, they were identical.

The spark for the mutiny was new government regulations concerning dress: Edmonstone was informed that a new turban, designed to resemble a grenadier cap, was primarily to blame, but the rules prohibiting the wearing of caste symbols or earrings and regulating the shape of beards were also resented. Yet there was, and remains, considerable debate over the role played by missionary activity in the event. It began with a sweeper in the nizam's palace in Hyderabad who was, like many other of the ruler's servants, in the habit of picking up any papers he found lying around and giving them to contacts, who compensated him well for his trouble. This allowed the British to keep themselves informed of information the nizam might not have shared willingly, although most of the documents so obtained contained little useful information. The bundle of papers found in the interior apartments of the palace in 1806 was an exception to this rule; it was given to a sepoy through whom it was eventually routed to Thomas Sydenham, the resident at Hyderabad after Kirkpatrick. One of the documents within the bundle was a petition from sepoys in the subsidiary force at Hyderabad, which Sydenham learned had been secretly presented some time before, but the nizam had returned no answer to it. The paper, which was quickly forwarded to Edmonstone, stated that the sepoys would not "wear the Dress of the Hat wearers [and] . . . will not Consent to depart from the Faith of the Islam, or to embrace that of the Hat wearers." The nizam was informed that the sepoys considered him their true sovereign, and that, if he would signal them of his support by going either on a hunting expedition or to the Fort of Mohammed Nuggar, they would rise in revolt against the British five days afterwards.

A lengthy inquiry was made into the events surrounding the mutiny, but conclusive evidence was difficult to obtain. As Sydenham commented, it was impossible to get many sepoys to discuss the issue, as they were afraid of "the vengeance of those who were engaged in the Plot against us." Of two who did offer some information, one begged Sydenham not to return him to his regiment thereafter, for, if it was discovered
he had talked to the resident, it would cost him his life; another similarly pleaded that the British refrain from mentioning his name, as he would otherwise certainly be executed. Sydenham believed that getting any testimony to use in court would be difficult; the conspirators had prevented anyone known to have an attachment to the British from hearing their plans, and had "sworn to inflict their vengeance upon those who should betray their cause." He nonetheless found two, Hulass Singh and Subhah Singh, both of the 2nd Grenadier Company of the 1st Battalion, 15th Regiment of Indian infantry, who were willing to testify that Siddee Hussain and Kadir Beg, subhadars of their regiment, had spread the rumor that the British planned to convert the troops to Christianity. They therefore advised that the troops should destroy all Europeans in the force and enter the service of the Buckshe Begam, who would give them each a reward of 24 rupees and pay them at the same rate they had received from the Company.

Edmonstone conducted his own investigation simultaneously with Sydenham's, with rather different conclusions. As Sir George Barlow's closest advisor, he naturally accompanied him to Madras to investigate the incident. Barlow later wrote that Edmonstone's "wise and steady counsel afforded me important aid and support in carrying into effect the measures necessary for counteracting the impressions made by that alarming event." Edmonstone merely commented that his work load at the time was "of an extensive and arduous nature." He informed Sydenham that every piece of information he had obtained refuted the idea that rumors issued by officers in the nizam's corps had been the primary cause of the rebellion; instead, "the obnoxious orders respecting the dress of the Sepoys unquestionably constituted the foundation of the late disaffection in the Army of Fort St. George, whatever it has appeared." The alienated forces at Madras had tried to incorporate any group hostile to the British in their plans, including those at Hyderabad known to dislike the growing British influence in their state.

Barlow echoed Edmonstone's sentiments, informing Wellesley in a private letter that reports of the Vellore Mutiny had been "considerably exaggerated by the activities of apprehension and alarm, and by the effects of an erroneous opinion with regard to the original sources of the late agitation in the Army of the Coast." The measures proposed to counter the effects of the mutiny are also telling: Edmonstone and Barlow both concluded that the most effective preventative measure was to rescind the offensive orders and work to "restore the Confidence and fidelity of the Sepoys" so that they would have no reason to listen to any conspiracies hatched by discontented subjects of the nizam. Plans were also made to move Tipu Sultan's sons, who were suspected of complicity in the mutiny, to Calcutta, where they would be closely confined and carefully watched. No mention was made of missionary involvement, nor were any orders issued to remove those in residence at Madras. When writing about the incident years later, Edmonstone would make no mention of the missionaries, but would cite the influence of Tipu's sons to foment discord among the soldiery as the reason behind the "perilous conspiracy."

Nonetheless, with Edmonstone's concurrence, the Calcutta government subsequently issued a statement that the underlying cause of the disaffection was a rumor that the Company intended to convert its soldiers by force to Christianity. Although there were no missionaries resident in either Vellore or Arcot, and very few in Madras, the Company implied that disruptive missionary activity had given rise to the rumor. A
similar report was made to the directors in March 1807. The reason why had much to do with the conclusions Edmonstone had drawn from his years with Wellesley, who had always viewed missionaries, especially Baptists, with extreme distrust. In 1799 he had even attempted to arrest a group attempting to disembark at Calcutta, on suspicion that they were spies—and was only prevented by the American ship captain’s refusal to surrender them. Edmonstone’s views were even more forcefully influenced by three recent experiences of his own.

The first event was Edmonstone’s part in quelling a controversy in 1804 over the choice of subject matter for a student debate at the College of Fort William. The topic selected was the benefit the Indian people might derive from having their sacred scriptures, as well as the Bible, translated into the common language of their regions. Some students were designated to support the idea, others to dispute it, with the main concern of their professors being the students' ability to argue persuasively in Persian or Hindi. A protest from a number of leading Muslim residents of Calcutta that the resulting contest might involve comments derogatory to Islam, prompted Wellesley to order the subject changed and for Edmonstone to issue a public statement on the situation. Edmonstone assured all concerned that it was Company policy not to interfere with the religious beliefs of the Indian people, and that no derogatory comments would have been tolerated in the discussion. In case the alarm had spread to Hyderabad, Edmonstone forwarded a copy of the declaration to Kirkpatrick.

The second, similar event had to do with a proselytizing pamphlet, written in Persian, that was printed at the Serampore press in 1807. Entitled "An Address to Mussle mans with an Appendix Containing Some Account of Mahomet," the pamphlet sharply criticized the Islamic faith. A young Muslim who found it offensive complained to the government. Edmonstone, as official censor, was the person to whom the missionaries had to answer in the Persian pamphlet affair, and his attitude was clearly demonstrated in a letter he sent to Carey calling the work at Serampore, "evidently calculated to produce consequences in the highest degree detrimental to the tranquillity of the British dominions in India." He thereafter restricted the preaching activities of the Serampore Baptists and ordered them to move their press to Calcutta, where all future printing would be subject to censorship. The missionaries were quick to defend their activities, and pointed out that, of the 300 Persian pamphlets distributed in Calcutta, only one had prompted complaint, and William Ward commented on Edmonstone's letter to Carey that "such a letter was never written by a Christian Magistrate, and I never suppose by any Magistrate since the fall of pagan Rome." Despite their protests, government inspection remained in effect throughout the Company's rule, and was expanded to include other religious presses that afterwards came into being. For example, the press at Surat established in 1821 was kept under close watch by John Adam, one of Edmonstone's protégés. All publications were examined by government for "anything of a dangerous tendency," no government documents were published on it, and local officials were "enjoined to avoid every proceeding that may even in appearance at all connect the missionary press with Government."

A third reason for Edmonstone's attitude resulted from an event that occurred in Allahabad in 1806 while he and Barlow were in the city to negotiate an end to hostilities with the Marathas. While at Allahabad they stayed in an ancient mosque that had been converted into accommodations for the British delegation. As Edmonstone put it:
For several weeks before the time fixed for our departure, a Mussulman fanatic had been hovering about the place of our residence, occasionally sending in Petitions through me soliciting employment & offering his services, engaging among other propositions to accomplish the personal destruction of Holkar, seeking also to be admitted to an interview with the Governor General. Edmonstone, suspicious as always, gave him no encouragement. While on a walk one morning a little way from the mosque, Edmonstone felt a tap on his shoulder and, when he turned around, found the man in the process of drawing a dagger from his belt. He later learned that the man was angered by the unintentional violation of the mosque and intended revenge--on Barlow if possible, but as the governor-general remained elusive, Edmonstone was selected as the secondary target. He grappled with the man for some minutes, managing to hold him off until a sentry heard his calls for help and came to his rescue. The man was arrested and subsequently "placed in unlimited confinement," but the incident left Edmonstone shaken.

These events taken together were enough to persuade Edmonstone to view missionary activity as inherently dangerous to the Company's interests. He believed that the mutiny at Vellore, had it been allowed to spread, could have become "the most Serious danger to which the British Empire in India has ever been exposed." His own investigation had shown that missions activity had not sparked the incident at Vellore, but the missionaries were a constant annoyance to the Company who might, if allowed free reign, cause future problems. For someone as convinced of the need for Company control of India as Edmonstone, the missionaries were as dangerous as disaffected Indians, and their actions needed to be curtailed. Edmonstone's own problems with the results of proselytizing pamphlets in Calcutta and knife-wielding assassins in Allahabad made him very wary of any activity around which resentment and thereby conspiracies could form. Barlow agreed, commenting that, although he believed the missionaries' work to be largely beneficial, it must be conducted without any "active support of the ruling power"; a formal connection to the Company's government could result in accusations of favoritism that might seriously endanger "the very foundation of our Empire in India."

The report sent to the directors blaming missionary work for sparking rebellion at Vellore added strength to the controversy over Buchanan's Memoir. Two men were especially concerned about the role of missionaries in India in general and specifically about those from dissenting churches. Thomas Twining, a proprietor of the Company, had served for years in a high-level civil service position in Bengal. He protested against Buchanan's Memoir on a number of grounds, objecting especially to one sentence stating that the government should "use every means of coercing this contemptuous spirit of our native subjects." Assuming that Buchanan was recommending forceful conversion of the Indians, Twining warned the court of the dangerous consequences of such an attempt.

When news of the Vellore mutiny reached London, Twining and several of the Company's directors immediately claimed that Christian missionary activity was responsible for the incident. Although they failed to convince the court to recall the missionaries, the two men responsible for issuing the objectionable orders at Vellore--Commander-in-Chief Sir John Cradock and Governor William Bentinck--were recalled. The directors may have thought this would satisfy Twining, as Bentinck was known to
have evangelical inclinations and might have been expected to support missionary activities in the future. Instead, Twining decided to bring the matter before the public in an 1807 pamphlet entitled "A Letter, to the Chairman of the East India Company: On the Danger of Interfering in the Religious Opinions of the Natives of India." Twining was quickly joined in his protests by Major John Scott-Waring, a retired East India Company officer, and by numerous other writers who argued against missions from both a religious and a political standpoint. They attacked the missionaries' legitimacy, noting that they had not been sent out by the Church of England but were dissenters, and their character: they were "illiterate, ignorant, and as enthusiastic as the wildest devotees among the Hindoos," and William Carey was narrow-minded and puritanical. Dissenting missionaries posed a serious threat to the Church of England as they had "set themselves up as the standard of religious orthodoxy, and the models of moral conduct ... who attack all existing regulations, and propose their own crudities as the perfection of reason and faith." They were "little detachments of maniacs, benefiting us much more by their absence than the Hindoos by their advice." Evangelical clergymen in India who assisted them, especially Buchanan, were condemned for having "cordially co-operated with the various sectarian missionaries now unhappily spread over India." The dissenters had deserted "the good old church of England" to "court the friends of the church to aid in its oppression. Missionary societies were also targeted:

These sometimes consist of some members of the church, and of some sectaries, who, while they seem to press no more than the diffusion of Christianity, are most earnest in disgracing and subverting the establishment. . . . They seek the shelter of the Church, that they may undermine it. The natural consequences are clear--the sectarian missionaries will preach against the establishment. Readers were presented with a picture of dissenters spreading out over India like a virus, slowly destroying the Church of England as it went. As Buchanan noted, "it is supposed by their adversaries that, if they can in any way impeach the credit of a promoter of Christianity they gain somewhat in the present question." The political picture recounted by anti-missions pamphleteers was even grimmer. The object of his letter, Twining said, was to "oppose measures, involving the extinction, not only of the East India Company, but of the British Empire in India." Scott-Waring called the missionaries "dangerous men" who recklessly pursued their activities without thought of the consequences. He had, he claimed, seen letters from "very sensible men in India" informing him that the actions of the missionaries, especially their work in distributing tracts and translations of the Bible, had been an important factor in the Vellore mutiny. He went on to state that the work of the Serampore missionaries and the Memoir had "caused the greatest alarm throughout Hindostan," and he castigated Buchanan for his continued efforts to promote the cause of missionary activity in the months following the mutiny: "when the walls of Vellore were red with the blood of our countrymen, so profusely shed by religious enthusiasts, a rational man might have expected that we should have heard no more as to converting the natives to Christianity." Scott-Waring joined Twining in warning that if Buchanan's plan were followed, British India would be lost.
The public was further informed that in addition to the threat of internal revolt, there was a more menacing enemy to guard against. As the bogey of the age, the most extravagant rhetoric was reserved for Napoleon:

The laurels of conquest refuse to flourish, and fade upon his brow, until this nation shall send its princes to follow his triumphal car. The sword of our Edward, and the armour of our Henry, the tapestries of Blenheim and the trophies of St. Paul's . . . are wanted to decorate the capitol of the spoiler of the world. 135

It was only a matter of time before Napoleon turned his attention to India, Hopkins said, and if the missionaries caused enough disaffection among the Indians, they might join the French against the British. Under the circumstances, the safest thing was to prohibit all missionary activity, whether Anglican or dissenting, and to stop the circulation of the Bible. Alluding to the Persian pamphlet incident, Scott-Waring wondered what it would take for the government to recall "these madmen from Bengal." 136

Naturally, the pro-missions forces could not ignore such a challenge. Andrew Fuller, secretary to the Baptist Missionary Society, replied for the Baptists, and Claudius Buchanan and John Shore, now Lord Teignmouth, led the evangelical response. Their strategy was not only to refute their opponents' main points but also to renew the call for additional missionary activity in India. Fuller's response to Twining was fairly calm, for Twining's pamphlet had refrained from personal attacks. He merely asserted that the missionaries had never attempted to convert anyone forcibly, nor did they desire to do so; Twining had simply misunderstood Buchanan's intent. He reminded Twining that he had offered no proof that missionaries had had anything to do with the incident at Vellore, and averred that "nothing will so effectually establish the British dominion in India, as the introduction of Christianity." 137

Fuller was less kind to Scott-Waring:

[T]his gentleman is sufficiently aware of the prejudice which exists against Protestant dissenters, and knows how to avail himself of it. He can condescend to call the missionaries sectaries and schismatics. And would he have liked them better, if they had been Churchmen? No, for he speaks of certain gentlemen, as "classed under that description of our clergy, who are termed 'evangelical,'" and of their being all for "converting the Hindoos to Christianity." Clergymen of this description are, in his account, as bad as sectaries and schismatics. The truth is, it is as Christians that we earn his displeasure, only he judges it prudent to attack us under other names. 138

Part of Fuller's conviction that Scott-Waring was no Christian may have come from the accurate assumption that he was the author of two anonymous books entitled A Vindication of the Hindoos. Published in 1808, the volumes explained the basics of Hinduism and argued that it was as well suited as Christianity to be the religion of a civilized society. Scott-Waring even hinted that Hinduism might be the better religion, commenting that "the religion of Brahma has done more for the lower orders of the Hindoos than Christianity seems to have done for the corresponding classes in Europe." 139

Buchanan also responded to his opponents' comments, noting, for instance, that missionary work was commonplace in India: "There have been for ages past, numerous castes of missionaries in Hindostan, Pagan, Mohamedan, and Christian, all seeking to proselyte individuals to a new religion." 140 There was no reason to view missionary activity as dangerous in a country where it had long existed. For the most part, however, he appealed to the sympathy of the British public on behalf of India, which he portrayed
as mired in superstition. He wrote about his experiences at Jagannath, calling special
attention to the devotees who annually allowed themselves to be crushed underneath the
idol's cart to prove their devotion. He graphically described the burning of widows and
child sacrifice that he had seen in Bengal, and recommended to his readers a work by
one of the Serampore missionaries that went into even greater detail. Buchanan's
position was clear: the Company had acquired more than land in the conquest--they had
taken on a moral responsibility to their new subjects, and could not simply ignore
practices that harmed hundreds of thousands of those subjects each year.

Buchanan's writings were extremely popular in England and America, where they
went into numerous printings. Part of the reason for this was the timing of their
publication: it was the beginning of the reform era in Britain, when concern over social
issues such as slavery and working conditions in the factories was increasing. Buchanan
was a tireless propagandist for the cause of Indian social reform, and he seemed
instinctively to know what issues would grip the public's imagination. He was among the
first, for instance, to point out the inconsistency in the East India Company's stated
neutrality in religious matters and their role as collector of the lucrative pilgrim tax at
the Jagannath temple complex. Buchanan argued that the Company was more concerned
with making money than with the welfare of the Indian people. John Shore, now Lord
Teignmouth, made even more of an sensation when he entered the contest. As a member
of the Board of Control, his voice carried weight, as did his argument that he had been in
India longer and more recently than Scott-Waring and, based on that experience, could
definitely say that the missionaries posed no threat. Shore's rebuttal hinged on three
main points: first, Scott-Waring had never named the letter writers who held the
missionaries responsible for the Vellore mutiny, thus making them suspect. Second,
one of the soldiers questioned after the incident had mentioned the missionaries as a
factor. Finally, the Memoir had not been translated into any Indian languages; the
Indians were unaware of Buchanan's call to expand missionary activity and were
uninterested in the debate.

The disputation resulted in less public controversy as well. Director Edward Perry
wrote in concern to Dundas that the court was uncomfortable finding itself imitating the
Mughals and Marathas by making a profit from Hindu superstition, a reference to the
taxation of Jagannath. Dundas replied that, when the Company acquired control of
Cuttack, it "contracted an obligation, before you drew a single rupee of revenue from the
Country, to support & maintain on a proper footing under proper regulations those
establishments which have immemorially been held in reverence & deemed sacred by
your native subjects." Charles Buller, a member of the Bengal civil service who had
helped to frame the tax regulations for Jagannath, entered the debate by writing a
lengthy defense of Hindu worship to the directors, arguing that Buchanan's report
contained considerable exaggeration. Buchanan responded with a furious defense of
his claims, which he felt necessary to reverse the impression that Buller's work had
made on the House of Commons, where it had been submitted for consideration by the
directors. He agreed with Buller that the occasions of worshippers sacrificing
themselves under the god's cart at Jagannath were rare, but only when compared to the
number of satis regularly perpetrated there, estimated by Carey at a thousand a year,
two of which Buchanan personally witnessed in his nine day stay. Buchanan did not
believe that Buller, despite occupying a position over the tax collection at Jagannath,
knew much about the actual situation there, as he had never heard in his eight years in India that Buller was interested in the slightest degree in investigating the customs, religious or otherwise, of the people he helped to rule:

I dare say he will candidly confess, that while he held his high station at Jagannath, he never dreamed of putting his person to inconvenience or danger, by prosecuting researches of this kind, and that, instead of visiting frequently, with such intent, the noxious precincts of the polluted town and Temple, he preferred the salubrious gates of his residence on the pleasant Shores of the neighboring Sea. He also refuted the idea, put forth by Buller and others, that a tax on the temple would reduce the number of pilgrims, noting that the Company charged less than the Marathas had done and neither levy had noticeably affected the popularity of the shrine.

The result of the debate was mixed: the Company continued to tax Jagannaut on the basis that it was necessary to pay for the British troops required to protect the pilgrims and guard the temple. Yet, when Twining forced a vote by the Board of Control on the issue of missions in India in 1808, he lost 7 to 13. Company arguments that such activity threatened British security were unconvincing, for British India had not been so free of danger in years. Externally, Napoleon's army in Egypt had been defeated by a combined British/Ottoman force in 1801, and Wellesley had thereafter ousted all French sympathizers from the subcontinent. Internally, the Indian powers capable of resisting Company expansion--Tipu Sultan in the south, Hyderabad in the Deccan, and the Marathas in the north--had either been defeated militarily or rendered harmless by treaty. The government observation and censorship to which the few missionaries resident in India were subject allayed any remaining fears.

Within a few years, however, another reason for opposing missionary activity in India arose. Buchanan had never allowed the primary premise of his Memoir, that a formal ecclesiastical establishment be set up in British India, to be lost in the discussion. His writings and those of his supporters steadily grew in popularity among British churchgoers, and Buchanan became hopeful that parliament would amend the Company's charter to provide for a formal Anglican presence in India. As the date for the charter's renewal grew closer, the missionary issue was reexamined. By this time, however, it had nearly ceased to be a religious issue and become instead a focal point for those who wanted to keep the Company autonomous from the British government.

The debate of 1813 revolved around who should regulate religious activity in India, the Company or the Crown. The issue was hotly contested as its resolution would set a precedent for future questions of Company authority. The subject of control had always been a factor in the discussion. In the fourth edition of his Observations on the Present State of the East India Company, Scott-Waring had defended the Company's right to manage its own affairs, and one of his objections to the Serampore missionaries had been the way "they stole out to India" without permits, ignoring the Company's sovereignty. Another writer had complained that the missionaries' actions denied the Company "the first principle of civil government," which was to regulate religious activity within its domain. With renewal of the charter pending, however, the issue came to the forefront.

The question was argued in pamphlets, in petitions to parliament, and in debates in the Court of Proprietors and in parliament. Most of the proprietors opposed any missionary activity, viewing it as inextricably linked with Buchanan's proposal. They
feared that a state-sanctioned Anglican presence would undercut the Company's authority: "no man could go out [to India] in the situation of a bishop, without holding the same rank as within this country--a rank quite inconsistent with the policy and government of India." One proprietor noted that "the love of power and prerogatives was . . . so predominant in a Church dignitary, that he was afraid the establishment of a Bishop would not contribute much to the ease and comfort of the government of India." As in 1807-8, the dissenters were portrayed as ungovernable rebels who would be the ruin of India if permitted to remain. When one man attempted to speak up for the missionaries in a Court of Proprietors meeting, he was shouted down by other members. The anti-missions argument also had support in parliament, where it was argued that granting licenses to missionaries would give "the sanction of the British Government against the jurisdiction of the Colonial Governor."

Pro-missions forces were greater, however, and members in both houses presented hundreds of petitions from British churches urging "the propagation of Christian Knowledge in India." Lord Castlereagh, then British Foreign and Colonial Secretary, spoke in favor of missions, arguing that "no danger would arise from allowing a certain number of persons, under the cognizance of the Court of Directors . . . to proceed, as missionaries to India." However, the real champion of the missionaries was William Wilberforce, who spoke at length in their favor. Carey and the other missionaries were "entitled to our highest respect and admiration," and far from harming British interests in India, they would help to establish them. This theme was echoed by Joshua Marshman, one of the Serampore Baptists, who published a defense of his group's activities in 1813. Responding to the question of missionary involvement in Vellore, he argued that the uprising was solely the fault of Company officials and likened the debate to Nero burning Rome and then blaming it on the Christians.

The pro-missions group also received support from those who accused the Company of assuming powers in India it was never meant to have. "We are not a little alarmed," an article in the Edinburgh Review noted, "at the tone in which their advocates have begun to talk of their rights . . . with which, they more than insinuate, the Legislature of Great Britain has no more right to interfere, than with the rights of any other sovereign."

The final point in the pro-missions argument was an extension of Buchanan's portrayal of the Company as profiteers. In contrast, the missionaries were depicted as "Christian philanthropists" to whom "it appears a matter of comparatively small importance, whether or not Britain be enriched by the commerce of the East, provided she be the means of rescuing millions of rational and immortal beings from the dominion of idolatry, superstition and ignorance." The argument was effective: parliament renewed the Company's charter with Buchanan's proposal intact, 89 to 36. The dissenting missionaries were allowed to remain and evangelicals within the Company received a free hand to send more abroad, although the Company continued to curtail missionary activity in India as much as it could. The question of who was ultimately to govern India had been answered, as the British government imposed its will on the Company over the strenuous objections of its leadership, a practice that would be repeated frequently in years to come. The issue of formal religious control had also been decided; the Church of England was established in ecclesiastical control of India, but by
linking his argument with his defense of the Serampore Baptists, Buchanan had made certain that dissenting missionaries would continue to play an important role.

The 1820s and 1830s witnessed a great increase in all types of Protestant missionaries in India. Working with the Anglican establishment, they fulfilled many of Buchanan's goals by helping to decrease practices such as sati and female infanticide. By the end of the nineteenth century, there were half as many missionaries spread throughout the empire as ordained Anglican clergy, and British missionary societies annually spent £2 million on their efforts, a sum equal to 2% of the central government's gross annual expenditure, and as much as the entire budget for civil service salaries. Britain had given its judgment on the missionaries, and it agreed with Buchanan's. "Are there good men among these sects?," Mar Dionysius had asked Buchanan. He had answered without hesitation, "Excellent men, almost in all."
By the time Gilbert Elliot, Lord Minto, arrived on July 30, 1807, to replace Barlow, the Company's control was too firmly fixed and the Indian states too dependent on British arms for him to be able to alter the system, even had he wished to do so. It must have been with great relief, however, that Edmonstone discovered shortly after greeting Minto at Diamond Harbor, that the new governor-general was a kindred spirit as well as a fellow Scot, whose main concern was the consolidation of past gains. As he had once written to Edmonstone, Minto felt like "a sort of comparative Griffinage of European notions about character & conduct," referring to the Company slang of a "griffin" being a newcomer to India, whereas Edmonstone was an "old Indian" who understood nuances Minto could not hope to do. The new governor-general informed Edmonstone that he was anxious to compare "my sentiments with yours before any measure of consequence is taken." It was a sentiment that would last throughout Minto's governor-generalship, during which his respect for Edmonstone continued to grow. Indeed, as far as appointments and emoluments were concerned, the Minto years were better for Edmonstone's career than any previous period, including the Wellesley era, had been. Therefore, although Barlow was removed from Calcutta--being given the important position of governor of Madras in recognition of his services--Edmonstone's influence in government did not diminish.

A good example of the type of counsel that only one completely familiar with the main figures and courts in India could have given occurred in 1813, following the death of the Munny Begum. She was one of Mir Jafar's wives who, despite having begun life as a dancing girl, died in possession of a large fortune. Viscount Valentia, in a work published two years before her death, left a description of this colorful character:

She is sixty-eight years of age. Mrs. Pattle, who has seen her, informs me that she is very short and fat, with vulgar, large, harsh features, and altogether one of the ugliest women she ever beheld . . . [but] she has a good understanding, though her temper is exceedingly violent. There is no doubt about her being very rich; but what will become of her property is uncertain. Nothing can induce her to make a will: the very mention of a thing that insinuates a supposition of its being possible she can die, throwing her into a violent passion.

When death finally did catch up with her, Ali Jah, the nawab of Bengal from 1810-1821, who Valentia remembered as a handsome, reserved young man, produced a phony will deeding all the begum's estate to him. On learning of the nawab's actions, Minto
informed Edmonstone that "I feel some diffidence . . . in my own views of points connected with native manners and prejudices, and with the claims founded upon them, having been introduced, perhaps, too late in life, to the imperfect knowledge I may have acquired of them." He preferred "to defer and conform to the utmost" with Edmonstone's attitudes on the issue, as long as certain points were retained in the final settlement. Minto was especially anxious that the full amount of the Munny Begum's property be ascertained, that a list of proper beneficiaries be compiled, and that Ali Jah be brought back into line with the Company's wishes, although he left it to Edmonstone's discretion "to leave him subject to the disgrace and other consequences of his villainy, or let him escape from personal degradation through any hole which the proceedings may afford." Minto urged Edmonstone to "favour me with your sentiments whether differing from my own or not, without scruple or reserve."

Edmonstone responded in several letters characteristic both of his understanding of Indian customs and his preferred method of achieving results. He castigated Mr. Brooke, the British representative at Murshidabad, at which the deposed nawabs of Bengal had their residence, for not understanding that Ali Jah had every right to the inheritance, and was acting out of fear that the British meant to deprive him of his rightful claims. Brooke's actions in attempting to ascertain the full extent of the Munny Begum's fortune had, moreover, been extremely insulting to the royal family, especially his decisions to affix seals on rooms where jewels and other treasure might be secreted, to begin an inventory of the begum's property, and to contemplate putting sepoys around the zenana so that nothing could be smuggled out. Brooke had further petitioned government to allow him to break up terraces and hack into palace walls in search of hidden caches of treasure. All of this was designed to guard against embezzlement by Ali Jah, whereas, Edmonstone asserted, the issue should be "to secure the property from the embezzlement of others with a view to make it over to the Nabob."

Edmonstone informed Minto that the fabrication of the will and the nawab's decision to send his wife to take over the Munny Begum's zenana and guard anything it contained was probably the result of his worry over Brooke's intentions. Minto was possibly unaware that the Company had been less than generous with Mir Jafar's heirs, cutting their pension from the original 53 lakhs per year promised in 1765 to 16 lakhs after 1770, leaving the nawab with reason to view any pecuniary arrangements offered by the Company with considerable suspicion. Edmonstone strongly cautioned against any search of the zenana by Brooke, commenting that it would be taken as the worse possible insult, and would likely yield nothing anyway. Instead, he thought the issue could be dealt with by having Brooke make clear to the nawab that the Company did not intend to deny him his rights and to invite Ali Jah to join him in making an inventory. Otherwise so long as he imagines that Govt. has it in contemplation to deprive him of the inheritance he has an insuperable motive to embezzle & conceal & to oppose all the measures that Mr. Brooke is instructed to carry into effect. The coercive measures contemplated by Mr. Brooke seem likely to be productive of serious consequences; but if he proceeds on the principal above suggested, they will be unnecessary. Edmonstone was convinced that "by taking the Nabob along with us, instead of considering & treating him as an adversary, all our objects may be easily obtained." Once he was assured of his inheritance, the nawab would likely put aside the false will,
pay the Company the amounts he owed them, and see to it that the Munny Begum's intentions toward her retainers were fulfilled.  

Minto acquiesced to Edmonstone's recommendation, only asking that a full account of the begum's estate be made so that any property she had bequeathed to the Company could be claimed and used for the good of the people of Murshidabad. He even reluctantly agreed to forgo the pleasure of informing the nawab of British annoyance at his recent intransigence, remarking wistfully that it "must be renounced as one of the right things which are wrong in India." Edmonstone responded by commenting, with what must have been some amusement considering the voluminous records in the Company's archives, that "we already possess the fullest information respecting every class of pensioners & dependants"; all that remained to be decided was the amount of the pensions due the Munny Begum's ladies and which persons would be supported by the nizamut, the pension supplied by the Company, and which by the nawab. He further commented that, if Minto wished to send a rebuke to Ali Jah he could certainly do so, but that it should come in a formal letter from the governor-general himself and not from Brooke.  

Minto was accepting and even eager for Edmonstone's advice on such issues as he had enough previous experience in diplomacy to know how useful it could be, having served as governor of Corsica, ambassador to Vienna and president of the Board of Control. He also had a self-deprecating sense of humor that allowed him to take himself, and some of the more surprising elements of life in India, less seriously than Wellesley had done. For example, he complained,

the first night I went to bed in Calcutta, I was followed by fourteen persons in white muslin gowns into the dressing-room. One might have hoped that some of these were ladies; but on finding that there were as many turbans and black beards as gowns, I was very desirous that these bearded house-maids should leave me. Minto had to conform to more ceremony than he would have liked on other occasions, however, as Wellesley's changes in the status of the governor-general were difficult to remove entirely. He commented in annoyance that, when he took his daily drives in the morning and evening, "the formality of these airings is uncomfortable to a degree that I cannot at all accustom myself to." The spectacle of being followed by an officer and six bodyguards, all of whom had to continually dodge the four servants, who ran alongside his horse with their fly swatters in action, was too ludicrous even for Minto's sense of humor. It was, he asserted, only eclipsed by the scene that ensued when he took a palanquin: "thirty people go before in two lines, which extend a great way forward. They carry gold and silver maces and halberds and embroidered fans, and cows' tails to keep the flies off." Minto, who had left his wife in Britain and therefore lacked a hostess, used the excuse to reduce the number of dinners and parties associated with his office, thereby gaining some relief from the formality.

Despite his occasional impatience with cultural practices and ceremony, however, Minto was the perfect successor to both Wellesley's conquest policy and Cornwallis' pacification plans. The thought of the immense problems involved in returning to Indian control many of the recent conquests was enough to make certain that the new governor-general pursued a different policy, which also fitted in well with his personal views. Minto felt that it would be a disgraceful violation of my great trust, to let the most powerful and noblest Empire
of the East suffer in my custody the slightest debasement unless the commands of my sovereign and superiors should require in very explicit terms a change so much to be deprecated.24 Yet he was by nature conservative and disinclined to initiate conflict, insuring that he would probably have had no desire to repeat Wellesley's conquests even had the Company's financial situation permitted it. Minto's close connection with the directors guaranteed that they would not interfere in his measures unless they began to lose money again, which his financial acumen assured did not happen.

Minto is not remembered as one of the great governors-general, but in fact, his period in office was vital to the era of consolidation. This was demonstrated early when he was faced with problems in the Company's recent acquisitions. Bundelkhand, like much of India, was overrun with bandits. Although the Company was perfectly happy to have banditti groups roaming the Maratha territory to give the chiefs something to occupy their time other than intriguing against the British, in the strategically important area of Bundelkhand they could not be tolerated. Minto eradicated the bandits and their strongholds in the area. He also, in 1809, sent an army to turn back a force that Holkar had sent to raid the territory of the Raja of Berar. Holkar was sent home, not because Minto was interested in protecting Berar, but in order to prevent any one of the Marathas from strengthening themselves by overwhelming another. That same year, he added the small area of Hariana in the Punjab to the Company's domains as it had become the base for bandit groups in the area. Its annexation was accomplished without military force, although a show of strength was needed to effect it.

More importantly, Minto showed his inclinations by upholding the subsidiary alliance that had been concluded in 1805 with Travancore. The British had had a treaty with Travancore since 1795, but it was in the old, pre-Edmonstone style. The new one required the small state to support four battalions of sepoys, which created a heavy burden on its economy. When the raja protested the arrangement, Minto merely advised that disbanding his own army would enable him to more easily make the payments owed to the British. When Travancore and its neighboring state of Cochin subsequently rebelled against Company rule, they were put down harshly. The Raja of Travancore committed suicide before the Company could punish him, but his brother, who had been involved in the uprising, was hanged without trial. The point was clear: what the Company had, it intended to hold.

Minto was similarly firm in dealing with a mutiny in the Madras army. The sepoys in Madras had been behind the previous problems there, but this time it was the European officers who rebelled. Barlow had sparked resentment by severe economic retrenchments intended to improve the Company's still shaky finances. He and Minto had felt that these were needed both to appease the directors, who were seriously concerned about the large debts of the Indian operation, and also to put the Company in a position to be able to afford a defensive conflict should one be required.25 Minto, with Edmonstone accompanying him, took the Dover to Madras in July 1809 to deal with the situation personally, although, owing to the monsoon rains, the ship did not arrive until September 11.26 Edmonstone and Minto were involved in a lengthy repair process, including, as Edmonstone recalled, "quelling the existing disturbances, of investigating & passing sentence on the conduct of the Officers and re-establishing the completely subverted organization of the Army of the Coast."27 They were still following up
independent cases eight months later, for the governor-general remained in Madras until May 12, 1810, indicating the government's determination to wipe out all disloyal elements.

Even those not directly involved in the abortive mutiny could be suspect, as was illustrated when Edmonstone wrote to Captain John Sydenham, the resident at Hyderabad, condemning the role he had played in the affair. Lieutenant-Colonel Doveton had defended himself at his trial by stating that he had abandoned his post and led his detachment towards Fort St. George because of a letter he received from Sydenham, which he admitted into evidence, instructing him to "place himself at the head of the detachment in the event of the officers resolving to march for the purpose of supporting the corps of the Subsidiary force at Secunderabad, and other stations whose officers were in a state of opposition to the Government of Fort St. George." Edmonstone informed Sydenham that his excuse of using Doveton's authority to control his men's actions was no defense, as he had employed secrecy in transmitting his instructions and had deliberately kept them from his superiors. He was especially enraged that Sydenham had sent him a personal letter, in which he quoted part of the communiqué he had sent to Doveton, but had deliberately left out any mention of the questionable orders. Sydenham had further repeatedly assured the government that any efforts of the Jaulna detachment to march on Madras would be dealt with decisively—a direct contradiction to his orders to Doveton. The resident was censored for his actions, but others were treated more harshly. Minto gave Barlow carte blanche in dealing with the soldiers, which resulted in the court martial of all the mutiny's leaders.

Edmonstone described his actions during Minto's era as "inferior only in labour, anxiety & responsibility to those which appertained to the more eventful and momentous period of Lord Wellesley's Government." He listed numerous British gains under Minto, including the concluding of a subsidiary alliance with the Raja of Nagpur, which brought yet another powerful Maratha chieftain under British control, and the shoring up of the subsidiary relationship with Hyderabad. When Mir Alum died in 1808, it fell to Edmonstone to insure that a suitable, pro-British minister was appointed in his place, which he managed even without his able ally James Kirkpatrick, who had died in 1805. As previously noted, Edmonstone arranged a complex, but ultimately successful, triumvirate of Mir Alam's son-in-law, Munir-ul-Mulk, Raja Chandulal, Mir Alam's British selected assistant, and the British resident to dominate court politics. As Raja Chandulal had much more real power than the vizier and continued in office until 1843, Edmonstone was correct when he wrote that his negotiations had resulted in a lasting settlement.

Edmonstone's usefulness to Minto was reflected in his steadily more important positions. In 1809 he became Chief Secretary to Government, with oversight of all the other secretaries, and on October 30, 1812, he was elevated to the governor-general's Supreme Council by a unanimous vote of the Court of Directors. The council formed, other than for the governor-generalship itself, the most important level of the Company's Indian government. Edmonstone was not surprised at the appointment, as he had heard as early as 1810 that his nomination had been prompted by a number of directors, including the influential William Elphinstone, but nothing had been done because it was universally assumed that he intended to return to Britain soon and would not be available. He had, in fact, planned to do precisely that, his dislike of India having
never abated, but decided otherwise after family members in Britain expressed concerns about his finances. Edmonstone was persuaded to remain in India not only by the thought of augmenting his fortune, but because he "entertained the ambition of closing the career of long & labourious service by obtaining the honourable distinction of an appointment to a seat in council." It also allowed him to officially exercise oversight of the Company's entire Indian operation, instead of being restricted to one or two aspects. In reality, of course, this was nothing new, but doing so in his new office was easier and less precarious than in his old rank.

Although Edmonstone was, after 1812, in a position to challenge the decisions of any governor-general the Company appointed, and to have the directors give serious consideration to his views, there was no conflict between he and Minto. The two Scots had a good working relationship and an easygoing friendship; the good rapport pervaded the Supreme Council, the other members of which were Edmonstone's old friends James Lumsden and Archibald Seton, the latter another Scot who had arrived in India as a writer in 1779 and served as resident at Delhi and Senior Judge of the Court of Appeals at Barelli. Minto would remark about his council, "I cannot recall one moment of unpleasant altercation, nor one instance of unbecoming acquiescence. Our Consultations have been real, and our decisions the result of a candid comparison of opinions." Yet Minto was closer to Edmonstone than to any other council member, keeping in close communication with him at all times and dining with him regularly. Sometimes these meals were for the companionship of a family circle, but on other occasions they allowed business to be conducted in a relaxed atmosphere, such as the dinner arranged in March 1808 with a Monsieur Bruix, a French commander, to discuss a prisoner exchange.

Part of the reason for the two men's easy accord was that Minto's naturally cautious nature combined perfectly with Edmonstone's desire to consolidate and protect the British holdings. An example would be the research Edmonstone did in 1807 on the Company's past agreements with the Portuguese colony of Goa, which had requested military aid. Minto wrote in appreciation that Edmonstone's memoir on the subject had made it clear that the British were not bound by any agreements to cooperate with Goa against its neighboring chiefs, and that "we are, therefore, not at liberty to do so, otherwise than in vindication of some claim of our own." Minto requested that Edmonstone send a copy of the memoir to the resident at Goa to advise him against cooperation with the Portuguese and to teach him how to use diplomacy to keep the governor of Goa from engaging in further contests with his neighbors.

In a similar vein, delegations were sent to the neighboring states of India in 1808 and 1809 to form alliances against a possible French incursion. After Napoleon signed the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807 with Tsar Alexander I, there was concern by the British of a possible Franco/Russian assault on India, either by way of Persia and the Punjab, or by sea after docking a naval force in Sindh. Minto considered it unlikely, but nonetheless sent three delegations--to Persia, to the Punjab and to Afghanistan--in an attempt to create buffer states between the Company's holdings and any route an invading army might take. Edmonstone was closely involved in these measures, the first of the "Great Game" to come, and in the course of them made a number of recommendations with far reaching consequences.
Edmonstone presented a memorandum in March 1808 on the importance of Sindh to any plan for British protection of India. His lengthy analysis included a review of the history of the area from the upheavals following Nadir Shah's invasion, when Mughal control was superseded by that of the Talpir rajas, to the Company's presence there, dating from 1758 when a factory to produce woolens for the army was established at Tatta. The factory closed in 1775 and reopened in 1798, but was plundered and burned to the ground in 1800 on the urging of the Afghan government, which was enraged over British attempts to persuade Persia to attack Afghanistan to keep its rulers too busy to attempt another invasion of India. After witnessing Wellesley's triumphs over the Marathas, the Talpirs decided that the British were more of a threat than the Afghans, and a diplomatic mission was sent to Bombay with gifts and apologies for the looting. As this corresponded with news that the French "had commenced some intrigues with the Govt of Sind (sic) the object of which was to obtain an establishment in that country," the government of Bombay decided to receive the ambassadors. However, no attempt had been made to establish a resident in Sindh or to build a connection with its government.

Edmonstone felt that the British were in danger of missing an important opportunity, for "the route of Sind [sic] is more practicable for an Embassy to Caubool [sic] than that of Lahore & the distance is much shorter from the shores of Sind than from Delhi." With amazing foresight, considering that the events of the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839-42) were still decades away, he also noted that this route also would probably be the most practicable for a body of troops & better adapted . . . for no rivers appear to intervene. . . . Moreover, Candahar [sic] is the [best] position for a body of troops the purpose of which is to obstruct the progress of an army intended for the invasion of India through the territories of Persia.

Edmonstone believed that, under the circumstances, the Bombay government's intransigent demand that reparations for the burned factory be received before any negotiations with Sindh were carried out were shortsighted and damaging to the British position. He suggested instead that the cooperation of the amirs of Sindh be exchanged for the indemnification, thereby saving British pride and allowing for the needed alliance. The Company would not annex Sindh until 1843, but the foundation for it lay in Edmonstone's memorandum, which first pointed out its importance to British interests. The first Company survey of the area was also completed that year.

Also in March 1808, Edmonstone sent Minto a memorandum recommending the establishment of better relations with the Mughal emperor. As he gracefully phrased it, when the present king [the "King of Delhi" was the usual title used by the British for the emperor at this point] manifested symptoms of a disposition gradually to emancipate himself from the control of the British Govt & to assume the exercise of sovereign authority, the principles of security indispensably required that every demand founded on such unwarrantable assumptions . . . should be tenaciously resisted.

Resisted they had been, with the emperor forbidden to name his third son as heir apparent as he wished, to be crowned at Agra or to make excursions from Delhi with the pomp and ceremony of his forefathers. Yet, although successful in convincing the emperor to abandon his "assumptions of authority," the British had thereby subjected him to "extraordinary humiliation which however merited & necessary must naturally
have produced in his mind sensation of disgust & must have tended to alienate his attachment to the British Govt." He urged that "some measure of voluntary concession" be given the emperor to show that "a just attention to the wishes of the British Govt may produce concessions which can never be obtained by demand & assumption." Edmonstone always preferred the carrot to the stick, and felt that conciliating the emperor would insure that he was not likely to engage in any plots against the Company, which was important because "the name and the cause of the King may still be employed with effect in promoting the objects of ambition." He suggested augmenting the emperor's pension, and joked with Minto that it was unlikely he would use the additional funds to raise an army against the Company as "it is very seldom found that the chief who possesses a treasure is inclined to part with it for any purpose whatsoever." Edmonstone's point was clear—if a little extra in the annual pension could buy the emperor's loyalty at such an uncertain time, pay it and avoid the possibility that his resentment would lead him to join in plots against the British. Edmonstone would proudly list the settlement of the "stipends of the Emperor Shah Aulum (sic) & the Royal family and the concerns, disputes & relative condition of all its numerous branches," as one of the important accomplishments of his time under Minto.

The delegation to Persia was placed under the control of Brigadier-General John "boy" Malcolm, the son of a Scots border farmer, who had received his nickname for his boyish enthusiasm for sports and playing practical jokes. He had delighted the directors when they interviewed him in 1781 prior to his departure for India with his answer to a query as to what he would do if he ever met Haidar Ali of Mysore. "Do?," Malcolm had asked in amazement, "Why sir, I'd oot wi' my sword and cut off his heid!" The colorful Malcolm had already undertaken a mission to Tehran in 1800, during which he impressed the shah with his charm and the present he brought of a number of gigantic mirrors. However, this time he was to be disappointed, for the Crown had already sent its own representative in the person of Sir Hartford Jones, who superceded him. Edmonstone was less than pleased about this state of affairs, commenting that Jones had exhibited "extraordinary conduct" in refusing Calcutta's request that he withdraw from the negotiations and let Malcolm handle them. Edmonstone felt that Jones' presence would hurt the discussions more than help them, but in fact the somewhat confused diplomacy did no lasting harm and a treaty of defensive alliance was signed in 1810.

Edmonstone's student, Charles Metcalfe, had even better luck in the Punjab, where he was delegated to make an accord with Ranjit Singh, the clever Sikh leader who had begun a campaign to forge the loose confederation of Sikh misls, or clans, into a strong kingdom. In addition to Ranjit's undoubted shrewdness, Metcalfe had to contend with the fact that he had been preceded by a Captain Matthews, an officer who infuriated Minto by engaging in political discussions without Calcutta's permission. Minto fumed:

While we are feeling our way with caution . . . a traveling tourist breaks through all our fences & preparations . . . & by the help of his mounshee (sic) becomes the organ of the English Government to all parties in those countries. In reality, this mounshee, the native servant of an officer traveling on leave of absence, has the complete discretion of those delicate transactions on the success of which . . . the issue of the approaching contest for this Empire must in a great degree depend. . . . I confess that I do not like to find myself responsible for Capt M's mounshee.
Matthews was ordered out of the area, and Metcalfe took his place, with instructions from Edmonstone to encourage the Sikhs to "resist or impede the progress of a French Army which may endeavor . . . to the invasion of India." This was Metcalfe's first important assignment, on which he began his rise to prominence as a noted negotiator, but as Edmonstone personally directed the mission via long letters from Calcutta, his attitude must be seen as playing an important role.

Metcalfe, who had already impressed Edmonstone with his grasp of the use of the subsidiary alliance system in Indian affairs, added to his credentials for the assignment by using his time with Lake to obtain some knowledge of the north. However, Edmonstone was taking no chances on his protégé making a possible gaffe, and gave him instructions about even the smallest details of his assignment, from the fact that he should be certain to check with the resident at Delhi for advice on what presents would be suitable for the raja, to the letters he would need to take with him to assure easy passage through the Sikh lands to Lahore. He was instructed to make the Sikh chiefs no promises of military aid against the raja, but to "convince them of the interest which Government takes in their welfare and prosperity." Edmonstone wanted Metcalfe to be especially careful to "render yourself by personal intercourse and observation acquainted with the Character and disposition of Runjeet Sing [sic] and of his principle officers, and to endeavor to create an interest with them by conciliating their confidence and goodwill." He was to wait until he had learned enough of the court's main figures and underlying politics before beginning negotiations; until he was ready to do so, he could use the excuse of a recent letter Ranjit Singh had written the governor-general to explain his visit, passing it off as merely Calcutta's wish to improve relations. If, however, there was any sign of French intrigue at court, he was not to delay, but immediately open negotiations. He was to assure Ranjit Singh that opposition to the French was the only way of "Securing his territories and independence from the effects of that Spirit of insatiable ambition and unlimited encroachment and violence which activates the Views and projects of the present Ruler of France."

Edmonstone especially cautioned that Ranjit Singh was not to be promised British aid in any "schemes of conquest" he might have, especially in regard to the Sikh states between the Sutlej and Jumna rivers. Instead, Metcalfe was to attempt to convince him to permit a British army passage through his lands, to provide supplies for that force, and to join the Company in resisting the French; all this was to be managed solely by a description of the devastation to his holdings that an invasion would cause. If there was no other way to gain the raja's favor, however, Edmonstone was willing to ignore any conquests Ranjit Singh might make over the lesser Sikh chiefs, as the British had no standing defensive treaties with them. However, he viewed such a concession as a last resort--Edmonstone was not comfortable with the powerful Sikh ruler gaining lands any closer to the British possessions--and ordered Metcalfe to send any proposed defensive treaty to Calcutta for perusal before acting on it.

Equally important in Edmonstone's view was Metcalfe taking immediate action to send "intelligent and faithful native Agents" throughout the Punjab and into Afghanistan to gather information. It was hoped that Metcalfe might even be able "to establish such a chain of agency not only through the territories of Caubul but even through the different provinces of the Persian Kingdom to the capital of the latter, as would furnish a regular Supply of intelligence," and would permit correspondence with the British envoy.
The spy in Edmonstone could not pass up the opportunity to expand the Company's web of informants, especially in areas on which he had only sketchy records. Metcalfe was himself to act the part of a British spy, with strict instructions to collect and communicate information on the political state of the areas he passed through, the supplies available for an army in those locations, the best route for troops, and the "extent of [Ranjit Singh's] resources, the number, description and character of his troops, the constitution of his Government, the extent of his dominion, the nature of his relations with other States and generally all Circumstances connected with his Administration." Edmonstone was particularly interested in having Metcalfe investigate rumors he had heard of a possible alliance between Ranjit Singh and the Marathas, which had been supposedly negotiated by one of Ranjit's servants while on a pilgrimage to Benares and Allahabad.

Edmonstone had examined a letter allegedly from Ranjit Singh offering to form such an alliance, but he was almost certain that it was a forgery. He had examined a letter brought back by Captain Matthews that was undoubtedly from the raja and had found it "perfectly Correct in points both of style and address," as were two letters written to the governor-general in 1800 and 1801 that he unearthed in the archives. He doubted very much that Ranjit was himself a Persian scholar, but it was obvious that he had one in his employ for framing important correspondence. The suspect letter, on the other hand, was written in "a most uncultivated style," which made little sense if it was genuine as it was highly unlikely that the raja would not have someone capable of writing a proper Persian letter in his employ at any given time. Edmonstone had also carefully examined the letter's seal, and although it seemed genuine, he noted that it had been applied to a slip of paper that was then wrapped around the letter, and therefore could have been taken from an authentic communication and attached to the forgery. Edmonstone also doubted the missive on internal evidence, as it was dated May 14, 1808, but was received in Benares on June 6, only 22 days later. As Edmonstone sarcastically commented, "unless it be supposed that a man can travel on foot 40 miles a day for 22 days consecutively," the letter could not possibly have originated in Lahore, which is almost 900 miles from Benares.

Edmonstone believed that the bearer of the fake letter was actually an agent of Saheb Singh, the Raja of Pattiala, a Sikh chieftain who wanted British aid against any attempts by Ranjit to annex his territory. Making the British believe that Ranjit was conspiring against them with the Marathas might improve his chances for protection by drawing their anger down on his enemy. Edmonstone wanted Metcalfe to investigate in the hopes of having even more evidence that there was no danger of the Sikhs and Marathas forming an alliance against the British. Furthermore, Metcalfe was to make it clear to Ranjit that Captain Matthews did not have a commission from the British government to make any diplomatic agreements. Therefore, any promises he had made, such as the impression he had apparently given Mahtaub Coor, Ranjit Singh's wife, that the Company might be willing to join forces with her to overthrow her husband, were not sanctioned by Calcutta.

Metcalfe showed himself to have learned his old teacher's lessons well when he shortly thereafter succeeded in wresting from Ranjit Singh the suzerainty of the Cis-Sutlej states under his authority. Edmonstone approved of the treaty, which promised that the British would stay out of the area north of the Sutlej and that Ranjit Singh would
attempt no conquests nor keep troops to the south of it. He informed Metcalfe that it was the opinion of government that Ranjit Singh might well have preferred a contest with the British to curtailing his conquests, but that he would not do so without an ally and he had found none. Edmonstone believed that

the ill will naturally excited in the Rajah's mind by the defeat of his ambitious schemes and by the humiliation to which he has been subjected must be expected to remain, but by the conclusion of the Treaty, the Rajah will be relieved from that Apprehension of our designs which might induce him to contemplate the hazard of a contest with the British power and urge the continuation of his efforts to confederate with other states.  

Although Edmonstone had proven the letter concerning an alliance between Ranjit Singh and Holkar a forgery, he was nonetheless convinced that the raja had been seeking help from the Marathas, Sindhia in particular, but had been rebuffed. The treaty would make certain that this sort of intrigue ended. In reality, the Cis-Sutlej states, adjacent to Delhi, came under the Company's jurisdiction because Ranjit Singh was not willing to risk a war to keep them. His well-known visit to Lake's camp during the war with Holkar, in the guise of a common soldier so as to spy on the British military, had caused him to have a great respect for the discipline and effectiveness of the Company's troops, and he had no desire to become involved in a war with them if it could be avoided.

The peace between the Company and the Sikhs held during Edmonstone's era because Ranjit Singh and Minto shared a common attitude. Edmonstone informed Lieutenant-Colonel David Ochterlony, the resident at Delhi, in 1809 that

the interposition of Govt for the protection of the Siek (sic) Chieftans on this side of the Sutledge (sic) against the encroachments of the Rajah [Ranjit Singh] is altogether gratuitous. By excluding the power of the Rajah of Lahore, the British Govt confers an essential obligation upon those Chieftains in general and is not required by any principle of justice to extend its interference beyond the territories and its own convenience.

Edmonstone and Minto had no intention of going to war with the Sikhs, and were content simply to have the Sutlej as the border between their holdings. Edmonstone informed Metcalfe that Ranjit Singh should be allowed to retain the areas on the British side of the Sutlej which he had long held, but had to be persuaded to return those he had recently acquired, as his taking them when discussions were already underway between himself and the Company "violated the respect due to the British Power" and could not be tolerated. Any sign that Ranjit Singh was unwilling to remove his army back across the river was to result in Metcalfe immediately leaving his camp and returning to Delhi, thereby breaking off diplomatic relations. Yet Metcalfe was warned to be careful to discern the difference between the full army of the raja and a few detachments of troops remaining to guard his long held areas, although even those would eventually need to be recalled. The British had gained an ally to guard one of the main invasion routes to India for the price of a few presents, and Edmonstone had no intention of risking that advantage by pushing the raja into a conflict.

The incident served to display the pervasiveness of imperialist philosophy on all levels of the Company's service and of the differences in application that were becoming apparent. Edmonstone was content with the current arrangement: he had wanted British control over the sub-continent and had achieved it; he now wished to protect what they
had. However, this complacency was not shared by many of the younger generation, who had dreams of conquest and glory. Metcalfe, who was only twenty-three at the time of his acquisition of the Cis-Sutlej area, is a good example of the type of Company man who was not content with control, but wanted complete domination. Metcalfe had deplored Barlow's decision to return much of the Maratha land gained in the war with Holkar; turned loose in the Punjab, he transformed a mission designed to bring peace into an opportunity for aggrandizement. In future years, such young men would become the leaders of the Company and bring an aggressive imperialism to the forefront of its policy. Despite the fact that it went beyond his own preferences, however, Edmonstone was far from unhappy with Metcalfe's work, perhaps because it resulted in no hostilities. Indeed, when Edmonstone accompanied Minto to Madras to put down the mutiny, he took his trusted young aid with him as his deputy.

Another young man whose career was greatly forwarded by Edmonstone was Mountstuart Elphinstone, who received the appointment as ambassador to Kabul on his personal recommendation. As Edmonstone would later recall:

I had the good fortune to be the means of this most distinguished public servant being employed on this important Mission. Lord Minto, in consequence of his recent arrival being imperfectly acquainted with the Character & qualifications of the Company's Civil Servants, was pleased to consult me with regard to the selection of an individual of that Service competent to undertake the delicate & important duties of this projected Embassy & I had no hesitation in pointing out the Honorable Mounstuart Elphinstone.

Elphinstone, like Metcalfe, would become one of the stars of the Company's service in the coming decades. Arriving in India at sixteen in 1796, he began a thirty-one year career on the subcontinent that would end with his appointment as governor of Bombay. He had many advantages in his favor, including being the fourth son of the eleventh Lord Elphinstone, one of sixteen Scottish peers in the House of Lords and the governor of Edinburgh castle during Mountstuart's childhood. Mountstuart's mother was a niece of the third earl of Bute, George III's prime minister, while an uncle, George Keith Elphinstone, was raised to the peerage as Viscount Keith. Another uncle, William Elphinstone, the well-known East India Company director, promoted the careers of five of his nephews, including Mountstuart, his brother James, and his cousin John Adam. He would also be the first to suggest Edmonstone for a place on the Supreme Council, perhaps in repayment for Edmonstone's assistance to his young nephew's career. Mountstuart did not advance solely because of his family connections, however. He impressed Arthur Wellesley while serving as his political assistant during the Second Maratha War, and afterwards obtained the post of resident at the court of the raja of Berar at Nagpur, where he remained until Edmonstone tapped him for the position of envoy to Shah Shuja.

Although plagued by migraine headaches throughout his life, Mountstuart was outgoing and charming as well as being a fixture in Calcutta society whenever he chanced to be in the capital. For example, he and a group of young friends held a risqué masquerade party at Moore's Assembly Rooms on December 17, 1807, to which some guests came attired as a devil complete with flaming pitchfork, a quack doctor who promised the ladies to cure them of their "propensity to scandal," a Turkish man with two wives in attendance and an ayah, "with a babe in leading strings, measuring about
six feet high [who] managed its rattle with great address, and was . . . very assiduously attended by the careful nurse.n86 Mountstuart found his natural charm to be very useful on the Afghan assignment, which was made ticklish as Malcolm had previously persuaded the Shah of Persia to attack Afghanistan when it was under the leadership of Zeman Shah. Edmonstone instructed Mountstuart to assure Shah Shuja that the measures against his brother had been "founded exclusively on the declared design and repeated endeavours of his majesty's predecessor to invade Hindostan," and were therefore in self defense.87 Mountstuart was told to take the offensive and complain about the hostile actions of Zeman Shah rather than to be drawn into apologizing for British actions.88 He was further to point out that the Company had no reason to incite Afghanistan's enemies and was well disposed towards making a permanent alliance.89

Mountstuart reported that he had obtained a relatively private audience with the king, in which only he, his aid Mr. Strachey, and a few "principle Khans" and eunuchs were in attendance. Elphinstone presented his gifts and informed the shah that the French, having found it impossible to defeat the British in Europe, were now bent on attacking them in the East, and that he and the Company therefore had reason to ally to oppose the assault on their lands.90 On Edmonstone's orders, Mountstuart also paid bribes to the amount of 231,565 Kabul rupees to the king and various important officials, thereby winning the British friends at court.91 He was pleased at his reception, and was soon attempting to further his mandate as Metcalfe had done by obtaining from the shah the area of Sindh.

Edmonstone was not supportive of this measure, despite his own recognition of Sindh's importance. He chided Mountstuart by remarking that, as the shah did not control Sindh, he could hardly bestow it on the British, and informed him that the likelihood of success in annexing the area was too doubtful to warrant an attempt at that point.92 Edmonstone also did not see any advantage in attempting to extend the subsidiary system beyond the borders of India, for the main British force would be too far from Kabul to insure its compliance with Calcutta's wishes, and the whole scheme would be "too bothersome in its execution, too hazardous in its progress, too unsuited to the nature and objects of our establishment in India to be the subject of a moment's deliberation."93 Gaining territory so far away from the Company's power base was unwise in the current situation, and unnecessary for thwarting the French. Edmonstone further cautioned Mountstuart not to promise too much on the monetary issue as he did not intend to authorize large payments to the shah of the type given in Europe to allies willing to fight Napoleon. As Edmonstone commented,

the practice of policy pursued by our Government in this quarter of the world have been hitherto directly opposite to those which have prevailed in Europe. It has been more easy for us in India to furnish troops than money to our allies, and instead of paying subsidies for foreign armies we have given armies for subsidies[;] . . . [giving monetary subsidies] would be destructive and intolerable here, where our pecuniary resources are limited and do not enable us to put even our own armies into motion, without distressing, if not a ruinous augmentation of debt.94

The only way Calcutta would be willing to subsidize Kabul, Edmonstone stated flatly, was in the case of an actual invasion of India by the French.95

Edmonstone instructed his eager young pupil to negotiate the treaty of friendship and alliance his mission had called for, but not to push for anything further. He understood
the tenuous political situation in Afghanistan better than Mounstuart, and saw no
advantage in any more intricate diplomacy as "the benefits gained under one revolution
might be lost by another."96 His views proved prophetic for, although the desired treaty
was obtained, it proved less than a complete triumph; Shah Shuja was defeated in battle
by Shah Mahmud on June 29, 1809, and forced to flee the country. Fortunately, the new
ruler sent declarations of friendship to the British, so the mission was not a complete
waste of time.

The new treaties of alliance allowed the Company to experience some genuine
security in India, a feeling heightened by the fact that Napoleon was soon engaged in a
series of conflicts within Europe that precluded any possibility of an invasion of the
East. This allowed the Company to take vigorous action outside its borders to aid the
extension of British hegemony in the area. The large military machine created by the
subsidiary alliance system was used to capture Amboyna, the Molucca Islands, Bourbon
and Mauritius in 1810 and 1811. Minto led the assaults himself, and would have liked
to take Edmonstone with him, but felt that his senior advisor's presence in Calcutta was
vital in his absence.97 Minto remarked that the administration of the Secret, Foreign and
Political Department and the Chief Secretary's Office were on Edmonstone's shoulders,
and while they could be handled from Madras it would be difficult in the extreme to do
so from a military campaign in Indonesia. He could not
consult my personal convenience and to provide for the exigency of any single Affair,
however important, at the expense of the general efficiency of the Government of
India and the more comprehensive Interests of the Honourable Company. Such,
however, would be the effect of withdrawing the Experience & the Superior Talents
of Mr. Edmonstone from the very Centre of all the Political Concerns of India, a loss
which we who have ample and daily means of appreciating his extraordinary
Endowments & Services known the impossibility of compensating.98

Minto added that nothing but the belief that the government could not function without
Edmonstone was adequate to renounce "the invaluable Advice as well as assistance of
which I experienced the public benefit as well as personal consolation last year at Fort
St. George.99 Minto demonstrated his complete trust in Edmonstone by leaving a sheaf
of blank, signed sheets with him--and him alone--to authorize whatever measures
Edmonstone thought necessary.

Edmonstone lived up to expectations, not only handling the needs of the government
at Calcutta, but also assisting Minto on campaign. When the Dover and Chichester were
lost in a storm, for example, along with the supplies that were supposed to maintain
4,000 troops for two months, he quickly assembled replacements.101 As Edmonstone
would recall, "almost all the arrangements connected with the plan of proceedings and
the voluminous & extensive correspondence relative to the conduct & execution of these
important expeditions appertained to the department of my office."102 Edmonstone
communicated only the most important matters to Minto, as he was sure that "his
Lordship's time and attention must be completely & anxiously engrossed by the
momentous concerns of which he has undertaken the personal conduct," and he did not
want to follow Bombay's example and plague the governor-general with "ponderous
dispatches" about every minutiae of government.103 The territories wrested from French
control, such as Mauritius and Bourbon, were restored to France four years later at the
end of the Napoleonic Wars, but their capture made it obvious that the British were the paramount power, not only in India, but also in its surrounding areas.

Along with the attacks on French possessions, the expedition had brought under British control Dutch islands in Indonesia and, in 1811, Thomas Stamford Raffles became the lieutenant-governor of Java. Raffles was another of the young men Edmonstone had patronized in Calcutta, thus carrying his version of the Company's destiny beyond the confines of the sub-continent. When threatened with removal from the governorship of Java in 1815, Raffles wrote to Edmonstone asking for support against the aspersions cast on him by General Henry Gillespie, commenting that "as a man and a Friend I place my honor as unreservedly in your hands as I would do in that of a Brother." He remarked that Minto had instructed him to look to Edmonstone for firm and substantial support, and that he had already won Raffles' thanks by "not hestitat[ing] to declare your conviction of the purity of my motives." That Raffles continued in his position and, indeed, advanced to become lieutenant-governor of Bengkulu in Western Sumatra in 1818, the position that would allow him to establish the settlement of Singapore, owed much to the support of his friend on the council.

By the time Minto was recalled in 1813, there was no longer any question that the British empire in India was there to stay. Opposition to Company rule had been put down in the vassal states, bandit groups had been contained and their leaders executed, and new treaties of defensive alliance had been formed to protect the Company's borders. Minto ascribed much of the success of his period in office to Edmonstone, devoting three times as much space to thanking him in his farewell address than anyone else. Among many other praises, he noted that "he is as deeply and intimately versed in the vast & complicated Political interests of India as other men can be in the simplest and most familiar branches of knowledge." Minto believed that Edmonstone could more accurately be seen as "the minister, rather than the Secretary, of the Departments with which he was charged," and that "the Public have been indebted for more than one important and successful measure to his discernment which prompted & his talents which were the principal instruments of accomplishing them."

Edmonstone would likewise long remember Minto, who died in 1814 shortly after his return to Britain, with fondness; a decade later, he would be the obvious choice for J.E. Elliot, the governor-general's son, to turn to when derogatory comments were made about his father's administration in the form of an exposé by Minto's successor. Edmonstone commented then that he would be happy to vindicate Minto's actions, not only because his own records would be required as proof of the necessity of the governor-general's measures, but also because of the "indelible respect & attachment" he had for the memory of his old friend. It did not prove to be necessary, as the document in question was privately published and never submitted formally to the Court of Proprietors, although Edmonstone was prepared to act in Minto's defense if it was.

The relative calm of Minto's era, and the easy freedom of Edmonstone's relations with a series of governors-general, came to an end when Francis Rawdon Hastings, better known as the earl of Moira, arrived in Calcutta in October 1813. Moira was a soldier, not a diplomat; he received the appointment to India, over the protestations of the directors, because of his friendship with the prince regent. Furthermore, owing to his military experience, he was made both governor-general and commander-in-chief of the army in India, giving him a great deal of power over the Company's Indian
operation. Unlike Minto, he was fond of ceremony, and had brought his wife, Flora Mure Campbell, who held the title of countess of Loudoun in her own right, with him. Together, they soon restored much of the pomp of the Wellesley days, and indeed at times exceeded it. Shortly after their arrival, the countess held her first reception, at which "the ladies were all attired in full dress, and most of them wore long trains and plumes. . . . Lord Moira took his station in front of the canopy and chair of state . . . with the Countess of Loudoun on his left hand, her train supported by two pages, dressed in uniforms."\textsuperscript{110}

Perhaps because he saw himself primarily as a soldier, Moira viewed it as his responsibility to finish the job Wellesley had begun. He worked steadily in his nine years in office toward two goals: bringing the rest of India south of Delhi under British domination, and increasing Company control over the allied states. The fact that the first issue required years of warfare to accomplish and the second would cause dangerous resentment, were not objections that concerned him. His actions were designed to win him recognition and praise in Britain; how they affected India was less important. Although Edmonstone would advance to Vice President of the Supreme Council under Moira, a position that left him second in command after the governor-general himself of the Company's entire Indian operation, he found his power base seriously challenged.

Moira's ideas were diametrically opposed to those of his chief council member. Edmonstone abhorred war and the carnage that accompanied it; he had supported it under Wellesley because he viewed it as a necessary evil, but it was no longer so. British control of the sub-continent had already been attained: Moira's wars were not necessary to prevent serious threats to the Company, and indeed, seemed more likely to engender them. Edmonstone also felt strongly that the British residents at the Indian courts were able to prevent insurrections and maintain British domination, whereas additional, open interference was likely to be seriously resented.

Moira would praise Edmonstone's "able & indefatigable application of his talents," which he stated greatly assisted the public interest during his time in office,\textsuperscript{111} but in reality the two men had a very rocky relationship. Moira liked soldiers--straightforward, men of action--not paper pushers and diplomats who solved problems by such ungentlemanly means as bribery, flattery, and generally undermining British values with what he viewed as impossibly intricate eastern politics. He was uninterested in the beliefs of his council; indeed, he rarely bothered to explain himself even to the directors, knowing that he had royal backing. His cavalier attitude was reinforced as, over the years of his tenure in office, many of the directors lost their seats in parliament, causing the Company to become a minor voice politically. Edmonstone was faced with a difficult task in moderating his new superior's actions, as, for the first time in decades, he was not the governor-general's right-hand man. Although his trusted associate, Charles Milner Ricketts, became Moira's private secretary in January 1817,\textsuperscript{112} it was too late to allow him to successfully oppose the Nepalese and Pindari wars that formed the main events of Moira's governor-generalship.

As Edmonstone would recall, "It was my misfortune to differ with Lord Hastings on various subjects of great political importance while associated with him in the Government of India."\textsuperscript{113} That was putting it diplomatically. Edmonstone was so opposed to the governor-general's actions that he drafted several dissenting minutes,
public documents that, although carefully worded, nonetheless expressed open resistance to Moira's policies and were communicated as such to the directors. The first of these came in 1815 after the commencement of the war with Nepal, which began over a territorial dispute and ended after eighteen months with a British victory that brought territory in the foothills of the Himalayas under Company control.

Edmonstone had initially tried to avoid open opposition to Moira by attempting to persuade him to a pacific policy by showing how financially disastrous a war could be. Mr. Egerton, the Accountant General, had composed a lengthy analysis of the Company's debts, which Edmonstone transmitted to Moira. This document showed them to amount to Rs. 34,435,000 for the 1815 fiscal year, an amount which Edmonstone felt threatened "an absolute failure of resources" if any extraordinary demands were made on the budget. Of that amount, Rs. 4,500,000 had to be sent to London to permit the Company to pay its annual debt to parliament, and another Rs. 12,935,000 was earmarked for China to sustain the tea trade. If either of these payments failed, Edmonstone argued, "the Company have absolutely no recourse but to apply to Parliament for relief, a measure which is deprecated in the strongest terms by the Court of Directors," especially at so soon a date after the Charter renewal. Since the rest of the debt was completely military in nature, the only possible retrenchments were in that area, the very thing that continuing the Nepalese war into another campaign season would make impossible.

Moira was not displeased at receiving the communication, which Edmonstone had worded with his usual care, but also did not take its implications to heart. Instead, he wrote back to reassure Edmonstone that he had arranged to receive a substantial loan from the nawab of Awadh, insuring that the Company's financial prospects were "tolerably good." He cheerfully remarked that he had hopes of receiving as much as two and a half crores of rupees from the nawab, the first crore of which he had already obtained and at "a lower rate of Interest than was ever before known in time of War." The governor-general congratulated himself on arranging such a useful loan, instead of leaving the Council to manage the burden of finding resources as best they could, and obviously expected Edmonstone to be pleased. Moira did not understand that Edmonstone was actually less concerned about finances than in unnecessary war with potentially explosive results for India's stability. He did notice one of his council's actions that was worrisome, noting that there was a mention in a recent financial report sent to London which

I could have wished . . . had been couched in other terms. As it present stands, it seems to insinuate a question as to the necessity of the Increase in our Military Establishment, and the other measures adopted by me for the public safety, on which I am sure you would not have thought sufficiently informed to justify the Suggestion of such a doubt.

Moira was certain that Edmonstone and his Council must understand what was at stake--that a peace that left Nepal with "undiminished resources and with . . . the reputation of having foiled us, would be an irrecoverable step to absolute ruin." If needed, the Company's government at home would have to swallow its reluctance and take what steps were necessary to finance such a worthwhile project. Moira was, however, happy to report to Edmonstone shortly thereafter than a second crore of rupees had been obtained from the nawab at 6% interest, a fact that, along with his belief that Egerton
had "overrated to a very large amount" the financial danger to the Company, made him sanguine as to the fiscal impact of the coming contest. He believed the second campaign should end the problem of Nepal raiding areas claimed by the Company, but if not, a third year of warfare might be needed, and that Edmonstone should begin to look for ways to fund it. To Edmonstone, this letter must have conjured up the appalling spectacle of a long conflict, ruining the tenuous financial stability carefully built up through the Barlow and Minto years, and possibly precipitating other conflicts during its course.

Moira had warned Edmonstone to be careful about what information he relayed to London, as "your late Financial despatches will create an alarm in the Court of Directors which you have not at all apprehended" and could cause some of the less well-informed to doubt the necessity or the Judicious application of Expenditures so distant from any expectations they had indulged. That was, of course, what Edmonstone must have hoped, but when the directors proved unwilling, owing to Moira's political connections, to oppose his actions, stronger methods had to be employed. All three members of Moira's Supreme Council--Edmonstone, Seton and George Dowdeswell--openly came out in opposition to the Gurkha war in an address made to the governor-general on March 21, 1815, commenting that it would "effect a radical change in the state of our external relations," and was unnecessary to the security of India. The Council felt that "those States or Powers to which may be ascribed a solicitude to ... take up arms against us are neither very numerous nor individually formidable," and that included Nepal.

Edmonstone identified as hostile entities only the Marathas, the nizam of Hyderabad, the Pindari chief Amir Khan and Ranjit Singh, but felt that none of these individually had any chance of successfully opposing the British, and that their hatred of each other would prevent a general alliance between them under normal circumstances. Edmonstone's main concern--which the later governor-general Lord Dalhousie would have done well to remember--was that, by continuing to take over new areas, the Company would eventually convince the powers who resented them to join forces, seeing the British as a common enemy bent on universal domination. He also saw no need for war against Nepal--it was not a serious threat and the territorial dispute could be settled through diplomatic means. He also spent considerable time outlining for Moira the complicated system of alliances which currently guarded the British lands, pointing out that it was "a course of questionable policy" to add more areas under direct British administration when they already had difficulty managing the territory they had. He was unusually blunt in informing the governor-general that continual warfare, even if successful, would lead to "a system [too] vast and complicated either to be susceptible to efficient management or to possess within itself the principles of consolidation and the elements of durability.

Edmonstone did not expressly say so, but it was clear that he viewed Moira as being too unfamiliar with the Indian situation to judge what constituted a real menace. The governor-general apparently recognized this attitude, for he sarcastically replied to Edmonstone's opposition, "If the reasoning of Mr. Edmonstone be valid, I must with unaccountable imbecility have presented to myself imaginary dangers and must have culpably expended large sums of the Company's money in providing against fancied Enemies." His opponent probably thought that he could not have put it better himself.
Although the entire council opposed Moira's actions, Edmonstone was singled out for castigation, accused of being wedded to an outdated policy that was no longer practicable. Moira clearly viewed him as the driving force behind the Council's antagonism to his plans, and he was very likely correct.

Another issue over which Moira and Edmonstone differed was the need for war on the Pindaris. These were originally Afghan horsemen who had enlisted under the banners of Sindhia and Holkar, and had long been used to collect provisions, cut off the supplies and desolate the lands of Maratha enemies. They were "paid" by being allowed to keep the spoils they took. The Pindaris had been a nuisance to the Company since the weakening of Maratha control with Wellesley's wars, and as early as 1811 it was noted by the Supreme Council that their power appeared "to be gradually assuming an organized form, and they already possess considerable tracts of country, and many strong fortresses." Sydenham had commented in 1809 that groups of between one and four thousand raiders, unencumbered by tents or baggage trains, would invade areas so quickly that "the account of their depredations is generally the first intelligence of their approach." He estimated their numbers at 25,000 all together. The Company took defensive action against the raiders in 1812, placing troops along the frontier from Bundelkhand to Ganjam, but disbursed them the following year as no attempt had been made by the raiders to enter Company lands. That changed in 1816, when a group of Pindaris plundered the Guntur Circar, causing the directors to authorize Moira to take what steps were needed to repel the invasion and to pursue and punish the perpetrators.

Edmonstone viewed the Pindaris as an annoyance and had kept an eye on them, obtaining a list of their main groups and leaders in 1812 in case they ever became a serious problem. However, he did not believe that time had come, and further noted that, as the Marathas still used the Pindaris as auxiliaries to their armies to collect tribute and to punish refractory vassals, they would probably object to their extermination. He did not see how the gains from removing the Pindaris' occasional raids could be balanced against the threat of causing another war with the Marathas which, although the British would no doubt win, would "obviously involve a very heavy expense nor can we anticipate with certainty its limitations to the term of a single campaign." The directors had called for the Indian administration, which formed the main drain on the Company's profits, to cut expenses by £500,000 a year, which made it obvious that they could not afford a war. Edmonstone suggested instead that defensive measures be taken to demonstrate to Amir Khan, the leading Pindari leader under Holkar and the Company's chief annoyance, that any further actions against British territory would be more costly than they were worth.

Moira did not take this advice, disdaining to be taught the business of war by a bureaucrat. He was especially incensed at Edmonstone's suggestion for a diplomatic solution, which he took to mean "a clandestine negotiation with Certain persons in the Durbar of Holkar under the pretence of emancipating that Chieftain from the virtual domination of Ameer Khaun," which might convince the Marathas to destroy the British problem for them. Moira commented that he would have nothing to do with such "an underhand plot," and that he doubted its effectiveness in any case. Edmonstone responded by professing surprise to hear that he had proposed a "clandestine intrigue" by making the obvious statement that the fall of Amir Khan would result in the restoration
of the freedom of Holkar's government, and that it would undoubtedly improve relations
between the British and the chief.\textsuperscript{142} In reality, a plan similar to the one Moira accused
him of was perfectly in character for Edmonstone, to whom it made no sense to risk
lives and financial ruin to pursue a war which a few deft negotiations would make
unnecessary. Moira had dramatically claimed that "either central India will come under
our influence or we shall be driven from our Possessions," a fact Edmonstone flatly
refuted, with the comment that the Court of Directors would have to decide which of
them to believe.\textsuperscript{143} Although Seton dropped his opposition in June 1816 after being
castigated by the governor-general, Dowdeswell continued to agree with Edmonstone,\textsuperscript{144}
but even together they could not sway Moira, who left Calcutta in 1817 to pursue his
war.

Despite their conflicts, Moira named Edmonstone Vice President in Council in 1814
when he took command of the war against Nepal. The 1813 Charter Act required the
governor-general, if it became necessary for him to leave Bengal, to nominate from
among the members of the Supreme Council a vice president to rule in his absence.
This individual also became Deputy Governor of Fort William with the same power
over Bengal, Behar and Orissa that the governors of Bombay and Madras exercised over
their presidencies. Minto had done essentially the same thing when he left Edmonstone
in control of the government when he went to Java, but the Charter Act had not been
passed at that point so no official title was needed. Edmonstone held the office from
December 1814 until October 1815; he served again in the same capacity from July
1817 until he left India in January 1818 when Moira was engaged in fighting the
Pindaris.\textsuperscript{145} It seems that, despite their differences, Moira recognized Edmonstone's
importance to the smooth running of the Calcutta administration, although he did not
follow his predecessor's action of stating such openly.

Edmonstone viewed the wars into which his pacified India was plunged with horror,
and, for the first time in his career, openly opposed a governor-general's desire to go to
war. Yet, despite the fact that he was joined in his protests by the other members of
council, the opposition failed. As time progressed, Edmonstone began to side more and
more with the directors in their attitude toward Moira, but he was no more effective than
they at controlling him. Ironically, while Edmonstone's formal position in government
had never been higher, his actual power was at its lowest ebb in decades.
On January 22, 1818, the East Indiaman *Carnatic*, with Edmonstone and his family aboard, set sail for England.¹ The Edmonstones had embarked at Chandpaul Ghaut on the previous Sunday evening, leaving Calcutta with a special salute from the guns of Fort William echoing in their ears, to sail to Diamond Harbor to catch the frigate home. The surroundings on the trip were palatial, as befitted the status of one of the Company's leading members. As Edmonstone commented to his friend Charles Ricketts, "nothing can be more comfortable and even elegant than our accommodations. They are really so handsome . . . & are almost misused by being occupied with the vulgarities of sea furniture. We have ample room for our large Family & even for our superfluities."² Edmonstone tactfully refrained from mentioning the other, less agreeable points of sea travel at the time, such as the constant noise--from penned fowl and animals brought along for fresh meat on the journey and the regular "exercising" of the ship's guns--and bouts of seasickness.³ Of course, Edmonstone was not a novice traveller, so for him the physical aspects of the homeward trip were undoubtedly less bothersome than the emotional.

The reduction in his political influence under Moira may partly explain Edmonstone's decision to finally leave India, along with the fact that his tenure on the council was over. That he was fifty-one in a country where the life-span of the average European was less than fifty was no doubt also a factor, especially as Calcutta suffered a particularly virulent outbreak of cholera in the autumn of 1817 that devastated the European population. Yet, however practical his departure may have been, it could not have been easy. He left behind a brother and a best friend in Indian graves, a mistress and a half-Indian daughter, neither of whom he would see again, and the country in which he had spent all his adult life. His family in Britain had long been strangers, from whom he received a few, terse letters once a year or so; his real family were the Company men and their wives who made up Calcutta society and a few close Indian friends. "Mejnoon"--a name borrowed from a popular, if doomed, Persian romance of the Romeo and Juliet variety--published a poorly written but probably heartfelt sonnet in the *Calcutta Gazette* about the time Edmonstone left for England. It gives what must have been a common sentiment for departing, long-time Company employees:

Sad clime adieu, yet in thy realms still dwell,
The friends by exile ever render'd dear;
For them I feel the anguish of farewell,
And see the land receding thro' the tear.
And thou, my Leila, tho' belov'd in vain,
Thy name still binds me to thy hapless shore;
Thy charms pursue my vision o'er the main,
And thou shalt bid the Scottish glen deplore.
Yes, I can wish our glance had never met,
But never, never, can that glance forget.

The European part of Calcutta was not pleased to see Edmonstone go. On hearing of his intention to leave India, the most prominent members of society called a meeting at the town hall to decide how to honor him. The public address on which they finally settled was delivered in front of a large crowd on January 8, 1818. It noted how changed British fortunes were from Edmonstone's early days: "our empire, which at your first outset in public life was confined within limits comparatively narrow, and with difficulty maintained itself amidst numerous powerful and jealous enemies, has . . . established a paramount influence, reaching to the utmost corners of Hindoostan."

Edmonstone was given much credit for this change: "not only to have been an eyewitness to a revolution so striking, but, by the successful application of rare and diversified ability, to have largely contributed to the measures by which it was effected." He was especially praised for his labors under Wellesley's administration, when he "immediately shared in the direction of affairs," for which, it was erroneously assumed, he would always be remembered. It was thought that he must feel great satisfaction to know "at the moment of your retirement, those great and beneficial plans, which are calculated to ensure the lasting peace and security of India, were upon the eve of final accomplishment." The address tactfully omitted the fact that Edmonstone had opposed many of Moira's "great and beneficial plans," although without much effect.

The governor-general had ignored Edmonstone, his other advisors and the wishes of the directors to complete his plan of aggrandizement. The defeat of the Gurkhas brought the Company large new tracts of land, including the beautiful area of Simla in the foothills of the Himalayas, which would soon replace Calcutta as the summer capital of the Raj and become an important retreat for the British elite. The treaty with the Gurkhas also provided for a British resident at Kathmandu, the first since Knox's mission fifteen years earlier. The war on the Pindaris ended the power of the remaining bandit groups in the Deccan, tightening the Company's grasp on central India. Most importantly, however, the June 13, 1817 Treaty of Poona, which forced Baji Rao to cede even more land to the Company, helped to precipitate the final clash with the Marathas that would end any hope of a renewal of their power.

The Company's aggressiveness under Moira had concerned Baji Rao, who had remained quiescent under Barlow and Minto's eras. As Edmonstone had feared, the peshwa viewed Moira's wars as the sign that a new era of conquest had begun and, as early as 1814, he started to look for allies against British encroachment. When the Treaty of Gwalior--forced on Sindhia on November 5, 1817, by which he promised to help the English to suppress the Pindaris--followed the humiliating Treaty of Poona, the peshwa took it as a sign that the British considered the Marathas as little more than mercenaries to be used whenever it suited their convenience. In retaliation, he sacked and burnt the British Residency at Poona, thus beginning an attempt to regain Maratha independence. He followed this by attacking the British forces at Khirki in 1817 but,
Despite having approximately 27,000 men to just 2,800 British, was decisively defeated. Then Madhavrao Holkar II, successor to Jeswant Rao, joined the conflict along with Appa Saheb of Nagpur. However the Nagpur troops were defeated at Sitabalsi on November 27, 1817, and Holkar's forces were likewise overcome at Mahidpur on December 21, 1817. After the peshwa was again defeated at Koregaon on January 1, 1818, and at Ashti on February 20, he surrendered to Sir John Malcolm on June 3 and was given the pension of an annual payment of 8 lakhs of rupees.

The British thereafter abolished his office, incorporated his lands into the Bombay Presidency, and took large tracts of land from his allies. In return, they formed the small kingdom of Satara on the throne of which they placed Pratap Simha, a descendant of Shivaji, as the confederation's puppet head of state. Thus the Third Anglo-Maratha war meant the total destruction of Maratha power. Yet the years that followed showed that Edmonstone's opposition had been prudent, at least from the Company's point of view. It was not capable of effectively administering so extensive an empire with the small number of civil servants under its command, and its many subsequent problems with the princely states gave parliament reason to claim a continuously larger share in Indian affairs. Moira's wars assured that India was well on its way to becoming the chief jewel in Victoria's crown.

Edmonstone's answer to the public address made no mention of his conflict with Moira. He confided to Ricketts that, as the governor-general had advanced many people to important positions in government on Edmonstone's advice, he did not wish to upset him just as he was leaving. Imperialists of Edmonstone's type, who had once been the aggressive members of the service, had come to represent the conservative position, and were fast disappearing from view. The few more conservative men who remained behind, such as John Adam, Chief Secretary to Government, owed their positions to Edmonstone, and he naturally did not want Hastings' annoyance with him to have repercussions on their careers. A wish to continue to influence politics in India after his departure may explain why Edmonstone informed Ricketts, who had assumed Seton's position on the Council after Edmonstone's friend retired in 1817, "next season you positively do not & ought not to come home." Likewise, in 1818, Charles Metcalfe took over Edmonstone's former position as Secretary in the Secret, Foreign and Political Department, insuring that his mentor's ideals would live on there, as well as on the Supreme Council.

Edmonstone responded to the address by giving his justification for his career, perhaps intending the comment as a reminder for the governor-general:

when we contemplate the splendid fabric of the empire which the wisdom of our counsels and the valour of our armies have raised in this quarter of the globe . . .

The British nation . . . may allege with pride, that the unsought aggrandisement of her dominion in the East, has uniformly been directed--not to still further extension of our possessions--but to the maintenance of general tranquillity and peace. Despite Edmonstone's retirement, no one listening to him speak that day was under the impression that his influence in Company affairs was ending. As the address noted, although the Calcutta administration was giving up a friend and valued colleague, the Company was not losing his talents. It was apparently already well known that Edmonstone had plans to remain in the Company's service, just in a "higher and more extended sphere."
Before Edmonstone's egress from his long-time home came a whirlwind of parties and receptions, as befitted one who had long been not only an important Company official, but also a mainstay of Calcutta society. Mrs. Edmonstone gave a "brilliant and fashionable party" in October and Edmonstone hosted a "grand dinner" on the prince regent's birthday for all the senior officers and Company men of the settlement. Calcutta responded with a lavish ball and supper given in honor of the departing couple at the town hall near the end of December 1817. The ballroom was filled with the usual decorations, including a large transparency along the east end and, on the west, a platform covered with crimson velvet to seat the guests of honor and the leading ladies of the city. At one A.M., the assembled crowd went in to supper, which featured "every delicacy that the season affords, and the champagne was unusually sparkling." A large number of toasts to the happiness of the couple were made before Edmonstone rose to address the crowd. The newspaper correspondent covering the event could not hear the entire speech, but the overall impression was that "the honor which had been conferred on him and Mrs. Edmonstone would be remembered with pleasure to the latest hour of his life," and he thanked all concerned for "this striking proof of their attachment and esteem." Dancing resumed after supper until the party finally adjourned at approximately half past two A.M.

A long-standing loose end was tied up just before Edmonstone left the subcontinent. Vizier Ali, his old nemesis, had been a prisoner in solitary confinement in Fort William for 17 years. Arrangements had been made by Moira for his removal in 1817 to Vellore, where he would have much greater liberty and comfort than anything he had known in the claustrophobic lock-up in Fort William. How Edmonstone must have viewed plans to give the man whom he had wanted executed on his capture, comparative ease and freedom at the same age at which Cherry had been brutally murdered, can only be imagined. However the proposed move never took place. Instead, the young man died, reportedly of water on the chest, in May 1817, six months before Edmonstone had left India.

Edmonstone's ship stopped briefly at both the Cape and St. Helena, where he was greeted with elaborate receptions and "public honors." At the Cape, where the ship had a three-day stopover, the governor sent two staff officers to greet him and to offer accommodation at the his mansion, but Edmonstone declined as his stay was to be so short. At St. Helena, the governor, Sir Hudson Lowe, invited Edmonstone and his family to be his guests at Plantation House, where they stayed for ten days. Lowe was the official in charge of guarding Napoleon, but so many British tourists had come to gawk at the fallen emperor that he no longer received guests; if he made an exception in Edmonstone's case no record of it remains. There is, from a historian's standpoint, an ironic parallel between the two men. Napoleon, who had once conquered half of Europe and whose name is used to mark an entire age, was then little more than a tourist attraction for bored passengers on the sea route to India and would soon die in captivity. Edmonstone, who had not only helped to conquer as large an area as Napoleon, but had seen it consolidated firmly under British rule, was going home wreathed in laurels, but to a future that would not remember his name. Had he been given the choice, Edmonstone would doubtless have preferred his fate.

The Edmonstones settled down in London in a cream-coloured, six-story mansion at 49 Portland Place, near Regent's Garden, in the heart of fashionable London and within a
short carriage ride of Leadenhall Street. Edmonstone lived surrounded by a large library of rare Persian books, some of which had been acquired long before from Tipu's library and which were bequeathed to the Royal Asiatic Society as none of his sons had his passion for Orientalist studies. The house also contained, scattered across its two drawing rooms, numerous other mementoes of his life in Asia: a bust of the late Sir John Kennaway, who had long since died in peaceful retirement in Britain, ivory chessmen and other carved figures from India, and a rosewood map cabinet containing Asian prints and drawings. Otherwise, it was a normal British gentlemen's residence, filled with ornamental porcelain figures and vases, a grand piano forte, and much conversation from Edmonstone's many children, sons and daughters-in-law and friends who regularly came to call. The Lumsdens were especially frequent guests, for Edmonstone's daughter Susanna married her cousin, Thomas Lumsden, in 1832, thereby doubling the tie between the two families.

Edmonstone did not relax into family life for long, however; less than two years after his departure from India, in October 1820, he was almost unanimously elected to the Court of Directors. Baillie, who had preceded his friend to Britain, also found readjustment to European life quite easy. Upon returning to Scotland, he used some of the fortune he had amassed in India to rebuild the family home, furnish himself a lavish townhouse in Inverness, and buy his way into parliament, where he represented Hedon until 1830 and the burgs of Inverness until 1832. He was also elected a director for the Company in 1823 and served until his death in 1833. Baillie and Edmonstone remained close friends for life, and the two were often found together in the impressive Company headquarters on Leadenhall Street.

Shortly after Edmonstone joined the directorate, Moira's government came to an end. The last few years of his rule were marked by regular controversy, problems in the Company's new territories, and charges of corruption against his government. The strain was so great that his hair turned completely white and his usual vigor deserted him, leaving him looking far older than his actual years. The final straw came when the directors refused the contribution of £200,000 made by the nizam to build a new courthouse in Calcutta, which would have allowed the old building to become the bishop's palace. Despite the fact that the gift was ostensibly for public works, it looked unethical considering that the British trading firm Palmer & Company had recently loaned the nizam money to cover his debts. Moira took the snub, and the censoring of some of his subordinates who were involved with Palmer & Company in charging the nizam usurious interest rates, as the final step in his deteriorating relationship with the directors. He resigned his position in 1821 and, although he was required to remain until a replacement could be found in 1823, no further conquests were made.

Moira died two years after leaving India, but not before stirring up more controversy in an attempt to justify his actions on the subcontinent. He published a pamphlet entitled Operations in India with their Results from the 30th of April 1814 to the 1st January 1823 in which he claimed to have found on his arrival "no less than six Hostile Discussions with Native Powers, each capable of entailing resort to arms." He therefore refused to economize where the army was concerned, for that would be "parting with the Sinews of our Strength" which was needed to deal with threats such as the Pindaris, because "the atrocity of their character . . . forbade the degradation of negotiating with them." The subsequent war had been expensive, but Hastings justified
it on the grounds that, otherwise, yearly raids would have been made on the Company's territories that would have proven even more expensive. He likewise assured the Company that he only undertook war against the Gurkhas in Nepal because he knew he had a source of income to supply it:

Soon after my arrival some British officers came to me from the Nawab Vizier Saadut Ali, Sovereign of Oude, bringing to me a representation of the painful and degrading thraldom in which, thro' gradual and probably unintentional encroachments on his freedom, he was held inconsistently with the Spirit of the treaties between the two States. The System from which he prayed to be relieved appeared to me no less repugnant to Policy than to equity. On my professing a Disposition to correct so objectionable a course, those officers... assured me that any persuasion of my having such an inclination would cause Saadut Ali to... offer from his immense Hoard the advance of any sum I could want for the Enterprize against Nepaul. 20

Although Sa'adat died while Hastings was on his way up the Ganges to meet him, the governor-general claimed that the arrangement "was perfectly understood by his successor," who offered him a crore of rupees as a tribute on his succession to the throne of Awadh. Hastings refused to accept this except as a loan that, with later advances, raised the sum obtained from Awadh to £2.5 million, part of which was paid off by land cessions to the nawab from the spoils of the war. 21

Baillie, bent on revenge over Hastings' decision to deprive him of the lucrative and prestigious position of resident at Awadh, answered the address. He recalled the governor-general visiting him at Kanpur in October 1814 to charge him with obtaining a crore of rupees from the nawab, commenting, "I should then consider myself rigged out for the war." 22 Baillie noted that the loans he was able to obtain for the governor-general were "by no means voluntary or spontaneous" but had required considerable coercion on his part. 23 He also averred that, once his initial comments refuting Hastings' claims had been made, the governor-general spitefully published documents relating to Baillie's dismissal from the residency. 24

Edmonstone did nothing to aid the embattled governor-general, but most of the opposition he made to Hastings' government has not been recorded. Edmonstone's preferred method of action in such cases was one-on-one discussions and dining table debates, which seldom leave tangible records. In one important instance, however, concerning the controversy over press censorship in India, Edmonstone did make a formal complaint about the governor-general's behavior. The issue rose out of the old tug of war between the Company and the British government that escalated following the Charter's renewal in 1813. An example would be the furore caused in 1816 when the Court of King's Bench issued a writ commanding the directors to transmit an order to India dealing with the allocation of a sum of money to purchase rice. The directors had previously refused, but the Board of Control had asked for and received judicial interference. 25 The directors were incensed over yet another chip off their prerogative and began to cast about for ways to limit such interference in future. Shortly after Edmonstone joined the directorate, some proprietors decided that the strict press censorship in India was to blame for their often having to accept blindly whatever the government said was best for their Indian possessions. As was noted in a debate at the East India House on March 23, 1825:
everything they heard on the subject of Indian affairs came from individuals who made their communications under the fear and alarm of being subjected to banishment if they boldly promulgated their opinions. The great evil of this was that they, the Court of Proprietors, were ignorant of what was going on in India.  

The biggest debate over the issue arose during the governor-generalship of Lord Amherst, who succeeded Moira. Whatever Edmonstone's resolutions may have been upon joining the directorate, he soon found out how difficult it was to maintain control over an empire on the other side of the world. Lord Amherst flouted the direct orders of the directors and initiated a war on Burma in 1824, causing the directors to observe that the Government of India had commenced hostilities against a state which could not possibly interfere with the safety of our territories. They had done this, too, at a time when the resources of the country could not be called into efficient action, and the consequence was that an excellent army had been reduced to its present lamentable condition. The war had been begun in imbecility and carried on in ignorance. 

The conflict cost the Company £13,000,000 and the lives of 20,000 men; it also led to a mutiny in the army at Barrackpur that, although quickly contained, was extremely worrisome. 

The proprietors noted that they had received frequent complaints in private letters about the government of India, and that it seemed clear that the European and Indian populations alike had lost confidence in the governor-general. However, it was difficult to be certain as, whenever "any remarkable political transaction" took place, the government sent letters to all the newspapers forbidding them to mention it until an official statement was drawn up; anyone who ignored these commands could have his newspaper shut down. Even private persons risked much by sending accounts unfavorable to the government: many begged that their names not be mentioned in communiqués, "or ruin will be the result!" In fact, several indigo planters who had sent scathing reports to England were forced out of Bengal, as was a Mr. Fair in Bombay. The control exercised by the government of India was called a "complete reign of terror, an authority more purely arbitrary and despotic, could not be imagined."

However much Edmonstone may have disliked Amherst's action, he objected strenuously to any restrictions being lifted from the press. He rebutted the allegations that the Burmese War had been allowed to take place because of the censorship of the press, noting "the most brilliant and fortunate period of Indian history was precisely that in which the censorship of the press had existed." Edmonstone alleged that the "licentiousness of the press had a tendency to encourage insubordination in India, and actually had produced it[;] . . . the establishment of unlimited freedom of the press in India would be the first step towards the ruin of our empire there."

Edmonstone's views were already well known on the subject, for he had written a lengthy "Report on the Subject of the Freedom of the Press in India" in 1823. Proponents of a free press believed that no restraints, other than the law against libel, should be placed on newspapers in India--in other words, they should be just like the British press. Edmonstone's report argued strongly that India was not Britain, and could not be treated as such. He made a number of points that did much to sway the court's opinion. First, the government of India was, in his view, responsible to the directors and not to the Indian people. This made the Company's government despotic, but he
claimed that India could be governed in no other way. He pointed out that, exclusive of the army, there were less than 10,000 Europeans resident in the subcontinent and, even if one counted the military, they were outnumbered approximately 6000 to 1. Clearly, Company rule could not be maintained if the Indians became seriously disaffected, which could easily happen if the press were allowed to stir up the people, and Indian newspapers tended to copy the tone of the European ones. As Edmonstone powerfully argued:

The opinion by which our ascendancy has been in a great deal promoted, and is in a great measure sustained is the reverential impression produced on the minds of the Natives of India by the astonishing spectacle of our almost unvarying successes, successes obtained in the face of difficulties so appalling, and by means apparently so inadequate as to inspire them with a notion that a mysterious Providence which human strength would in vain oppose, aids and befriends our purposes. . . . This feeling invests all the acts and proceedings of the British Government with a species of sacredness in their eyes immanently calculated to favor submission and obedience[;] . . . a stronger argument against the Establishment of a free Press among the Natives of India cannot well be adduced.

He quoted approvingly the words of the Advocate General of Bengal, spoken in a libel suit against the Calcutta Journal, that "we stand here . . . as in a besieged Garrison, few in number and unable to escape from the evils which surround us[;] . . . we cannot . . . govern this country by the British constitution."

Secondly, Edmonstone believed that it was "the acme of absurdity" to equate Europeans in India with those in Britain, as they had always been subject to restrictions—such as those on their freedom of movement and residence—that were necessary for the Company to insure that they did not instigate trouble. The restriction on the press was just another example of this. In addition, only two types of Europeans were allowed in India in the first place, employees of the Company and those who were permitted to stay in the country on its sufferance—the first could not question the Company’s orders and the second had no right to do so. He was especially incensed at a notice in the Calcutta Journal of its intention to compare the Company's revenues at the end of Wellesley's, Minto's and Moira's governor-generalships, and to determine thereby "what is actually gained or lost in the way of Revenue by our Conquests." Edmonstone was appalled that "any anonymous Writer . . . seated in the chair of a self-constituted authority may assume the privilege of approving or condemning the proceedings of the Government." He also knew perfectly well that an examination of the books would show the Company's revenues to have suffered in times of its greatest conquests. Edmonstone held up for the Court's scorn another excerpt from the Calcutta Journal that queried

But if a man be placed in office high,
Shall not his conduct bear our scrutiny
Though thousands suffer from his want of Sense
His selfish knavery or negligence . . .
Who in the eyes of those whom he oppresses
Is placed above the Law which he transgresses
Shall not the arm of satire hurl his dart
Whetted by truth in vengeance at his heart?
Edmonstone's answer to that question was, of course, a resounding no. As the Europeans in India were not privy to the documents and thought processes behind the government's decisions, they could make no judgements on policy.  

As the person responsible for censorship under Wellesley, Edmonstone felt capable of speaking with authority on the subject of why it had been instituted in the first place. In 1799, Wellesley had placed the newspapers of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay under the scrutiny of the Chief Secretary to Government, who thereafter acted as ex-officio censor of the press. He had been ordered to exclude from publication any articles that "reflected upon the Public Authorities at home or abroad or were of a nature to offend the religious prejudices of the Natives, to create political evil or to disturb the peace." In 1801, the editor of the Government Gazette was prohibited from publishing any military matters, except those approved by the Chief Secretary, and the other papers could only reprint what the Gazette had used. Nothing whatsoever could be published relating to the strength, location or progress of the army by any paper. The newspapers were additionally prevented from printing the departure dates of ships or information about naval manoeuvres in 1803. These measures were seen as necessary in a time of war, both to keep up morale and to prevent security violations. Edmonstone recalled that, when Cornwallis was in the field in 1791, an unregulated press had circulated a rumor that he was dead and that General Meadows was ill, which could have had devastating effects on British morale had it been widely believed. These restrictions meant, however, that Indian newspapers usually contained far more information on European affairs than Indian ones.  

In 1813, Moira lifted the censorship after a supreme court decision that the Company could not regulate what a magazine run by Anglo-Indians printed, as they were not considered European and were therefore subject to Indian law. Not being able to regulate one group made censoring anyone difficult, for a conduit had been opened for those unhappy with the government's actions to bring their views before the public. However, although papers no longer had to submit their articles to the Chief Secretary, a number of restrictions were left in place. A fairly long list of prohibitions was issued in August 1818 that included any criticism of the Court of Directors, the bishop and justices of Calcutta, and government officers. Discussion of political transactions, anything that might be interpreted as religiously offensive by the Indians, and private scandal was also prohibited. Yet, Edmonstone pointed out, when formal supervision was removed, some editors refused to adhere to this list, believing that Moira had ended all restrictions on them--a misapprehension which he castigated the governor-general for supporting through vague comments Moira had made during a public address. Some people thereafter began printing what Edmonstone viewed as libellous invectives against the government, most noticeably Mr. Buckingham of the Calcutta Journal, who arrived in India in 1818 just after Edmonstone's departure.  

John Adam, Edmonstone's faithful protégé and Chief Secretary to Government, informed Mr. Buckingham in January 1820 that his newspaper was in violation of the rules established by government for the press. Buckingham ignored the warning, afterwards printing criticism of the bishop of Calcutta, prompting Adam to inform him in July 1821 that he would be forced to leave the country if his stubbornness continued. When Buckingham's license allowing him to remain in India came up for renewal, Adam insured that it was declined, and Buckingham sued. He lost his case and
was deported, to the satisfaction of the directors. Moira, however, was less pleased at the outcome of events, viewing Adam's actions as a condemnation of his policy of a more liberal press. He noted that, in all European communities, there was "some mode of appeal to the Sentiment of the Community which may carry with it Public Opinion." Adam was castigated for taking the position that this was not needed by the government of India and that no one there deserved the right to comment on what was happening around them. Ultimately, as Hastings left India and Adam remained, the issue was de facto decided in favor of censorship, with Edmonstone insuring the directors' consent to maintain such measures. Censorship of one kind or another remained in effect throughout the period of British India, a practice Edmonstone did much to aid.

As Edmonstone settled into life in England, some of his children opted to return to India. The fates of three of his sons seem almost to have been determined by their names. William Archibald Edmonstone, named after Edmonstone's unfortunate brother, died young--at age 22--on July 19, 1827 at Nusseerabad, of an illness. Edmonstone Benjamin Edmonstone II had, like his father, a prosperous career in India (1827-1840) and thereafter retired for health reasons to England. Edmonstone's most famous son, however, was George Frederick Edmonstone, who oversaw the annexation of Awadh, the land for which George Frederick Cherry had died. G.F. Edmonstone had a long and illustrious career, serving initially as the commissioner and superintendent of the Cis-Sutlej States, then in the Secret, Foreign and Political Department during the Mutiny and, later, as lieutenant-governor of the North-West Provinces (1859-63). He was awarded a knighthood in 1863 for his work in creating the government of the Central Provinces.

After a prolonged illness, Edmonstone's wife died at their London home on March 18, 1838. Edmonstone tried to retire from the directory later that year, but was persuaded to remain by the loud protests of his fellow directors and by the ageing Richard Wellesley. The latter had remained in contact with Edmonstone, sent him an autographed copy of his published dispatches in five volumes bound in green Moroccan leather, and brought his name and service record before the king during a visit to Windsor Castle in October 1836. The visit was probably part of a plan to obtain for Edmonstone a knighthood in recognition for his aid in the formation of the British empire in the East; Wellesley also wrote on his behalf to the directors, a letter which was read aloud at a meeting that same month. In 1840, Edmonstone submitted a brief autobiography of his Indian service, along with recommendations from Wellesley, Barlow, Minto and, amusingly enough, even a few old testimonials from the safely deceased Lord Moira, to Sir John Hobhouse, president of the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India. Having heard that titles were finally being awarded to civil servants as well as to military personnel who served abroad, he requested that his record be considered for royal honors. Although it was certainly true that Edmonstone had probably brought more territory under the Company's banner than any number of generals, he never received a title for his contributions. However, the reason probably had more to do with the poor timing of the request, which came just before his death, than to a perceived lack of merit.

On April 30, 1841, Edmonstone took an open carriage to a meeting in Leadenhall Street and was caught in a sudden storm. He ordered the carriage to return home, but nonetheless caught a chill. Although it seemed at first that he had contracted only a
minor illness, it soon became worse. He had been complaining of infirmity and decreasing energy in recent years, but had not been troubled enough to relinquish his position on the directorate. Yet, although he had shown remarkably good health in India, and his father lived to be almost 90 in an era with little medical care, Edmonstone died of his infection on May 4, 1841, at age 76. He was shortly thereafter buried alongside his wife in a vault at All Soul's Cemetery at Kensal Green outside London. The inscription on his grave reads, in part, "his zeal, ability, and perseverance in the discharge of his public duties during upwards of half a century . . . secured for him universal esteem and admiration."

That admiration extended, even twenty-three years after his departure, to India. The newspaper accounts of his death in England pale in comparison to the tribute that Calcutta paid him. A long account in a local newspaper reflected the dismay brought by news of his death. The article began by recalling, "Towards the close of the last century and the opening portion of this one, he was deeply engaged in the chief public measures of the day, and particularly those of the Wellesley era, which have largely led to our present paramount position and supremacy." The author noted that Edmonstone had been publicly acknowledged by Wellesley for his part in the conquest, that he had obtained steadily higher positions in succeeding administrations, and that, after his return to England,

not a measure of any importance for the last quarter of a century has passed into operation, but it had the benefit of his advice and patient correction, or, it may be, his often judicious opposition; his loss at the India House and at the Board of Control as a reference in points of difficulty, or as a practical counsellor and authority in matters calling for interposition, will be long and deeply experienced. The article mentioned more than his public duties, however, recalling that "his tastes were peculiarly elegant; . . . [he] was ever the life of his own domestic circle and the delight of numerous connections and friends. Notwithstanding all this, a more humble, retiring or sensitively unobtrusive individual could seldom be met with." A London paper likewise noted that he was "as benevolent a man as ever breathed, and who, in his public and private character was truly an honour and an ornament to human nature." Despite the saccharine journalistic style of the period, the impression is conveyed of a man who was viewed by many as a paragon of contemporary virtues. Yet, it may be difficult for the modern reader to reconcile the picture of someone who was so lauded by his friends and co-workers both before and after death with that of the individual who worked unceasingly for the conquest of a continent. On the one hand, there is the Edmonstone who was well liked and respected both by Europeans and by many Indians, who deplored violence and who was devoted to art, music and Oriental studies. On the other hand, was the Edmonstone who was hated and feared by many Indians, who worked for and rejoiced over Tipu's death, and who used his knowledge of the subcontinent to help Wellesley conquer much of it. He was a devoted family man, who nonetheless denied his half-Indian children the right to bear his name; he had close Indian friends, yet treated the majority as inferior; he professed loyalty to the Company, yet worked on many occasions to keep its directors in the dark about events in India.

It would be easy to dismiss Edmonstone's motivations as opportunism, and view him as one who sold out his personal beliefs in order to advance himself, but that would be far too simplistic an answer for such a complex character. It was doubtless to his
advantage career-wise to assist Wellesley's dreams of conquest, but he had been advocating similar measures long before Wellesley arrived in India. He encouraged intervention in Awadh in Shore's day, even though he knew it was a risky endeavor that went against the governor-general's preferences; likewise, he and Barlow risked much to uphold the Treaty of Bassein after Wellesley had left India and was no longer in a position to grant anyone favors. Neither his actions before nor those after Wellesley's time in office could have helped Edmonstone's career, and indeed could have backfired with severe repercussions for his position in the Company. Edmonstone cannot be viewed, therefore, as having been motivated solely by hopes of personal gain.

As has been stated throughout this work, Edmonstone's chief motivation must be seen as stemming from a desire for security and self-preservation. India at the time of his arrival was a hazardous place to contemplate living for any length of time. The fact that his early assignment in Hyderabad resulted in a long stay in what was essentially a war zone did not contribute to a feeling of safety, and Edmonstone's animosity for strong Indian rulers can be traced to this first assignment and the dread of Tipu's power that resulted. The time he spent in Awadh, with warnings from friends about Vizier Ali's animosity and assassination plans, and the fact that such a plan was eventually carried out on his best friend, did much to intensify his feeling of imminent peril. The later attempt on his own life by a religious fanatic in Barlow's era must have been almost expected.

Edmonstone lived at a time which saw massive changes in the world order: a bloody revolution toppled the centuries-old monarchy in France, Napoleon eliminated the Holy Roman Empire and redrew the map of much of Europe, and the United States and Russia emerged as new powers. He received letters from home with accounts of the local militia being mustered to defend against a possible French invasion and of the insanity that rendered George III incapable of effective rule over long periods. War and chaos seemed the order of the day and the fate of the East India Company of little importance to the authorities in Britain. There seemed to be no island of sanity and the old order of things left in the world. Edmonstone, being the person he was and in the positions he occupied, therefore decided to make one--in India.

Gaining the British control of the sub-continent insured Edmonstone's own and his remaining friends' safety. It also gave him a feeling of power over the events around him--instead of waiting for what fate would send his way, he was taking charge of his destiny. He tried to do this without war whenever possible, but did support it when necessary to achieve his ends. Moira's wars infuriated Edmonstone because British dominance over India had already been assured by Wellesley and Minto's measures; additional aggression threatened the Company physically and financially, but offered little in return. Edmonstone once told an Indian delegate to Leadenhall Street that he thought of India as his own country; it was that possessiveness, over what he had helped to build, that was threatened by Moira's actions.

An assessment of Edmonstone's personality is hampered by the fact that, although he was an intelligent and cultured individual, he was also a product of his era and class and did not often rise above the prejudices of his age. He admired much of the architecture and art he saw in India; he made friends with some of its people; he had half-Indian children; yet he could not view any product of India as equivalent with that of Britain. These attitudes were based in his childhood teachings and early education, and nothing
that followed was able to eradicate them. He would not marry his long-time mistress, as Baillie had done, because an Edmonstone, scion of one of Scotland's oldest houses, simply did not marry beneath himself. No matter his feelings, the conventions had to be obeyed.

Yet Edmonstone was far more appreciative of Indian abilities than most people of his era. Perhaps his many Indian associates, such as his long-time Indian mistress, the Indian clerks whose work in the Translator's Office and in the Secret, Foreign and Political branch he long supervised, and well educated friends like Taffazul Hussein Khan, allowed him to see ability and merit that escaped many of his contemporaries. In some ways, Edmonstone was far more akin in attitude to the older, pre-Hastings era than to that of the Wellesley years and beyond. Yet his acknowledgement of Indian ability was one of the main reasons he feared strong Indian rulers so greatly. Unlike Cherry, Edmonstone would never have sat unarmed at the breakfast table with Vizier Ali and a bevy of his retainers, for he did not share his friend's casual dismissal of the threat capable Indian leaders presented to British dominance. It would have been interesting to know what Edmonstone would have done about the decision made by Moira to move Vizier Ali from his cramped lock up in Calcutta to more spacious accommodations in the south. It seems unlikely that the suspicious Edmonstone, who had aided Barlow to investigate the Vellore Mutiny that centered around Tipu's imprisoned heirs in the same locale, would have allowed Ali to be relocated, but the ex-wazir's sudden death made any need to oppose another of the governor-general's plans unnecessary.

Along with class-consciousness, his sense of honor was a guiding force in Edmonstone's life. He had to be able to believe that what he did was right, not for others' benefit, but for his own self-image. This need was reflected in the generous gifts he made to charity throughout his life, in the care he took of his Indian family and in the outraged replies he sent home in response to questions about his honesty. In his letters to his brother William, he defended his own and the government's actions again and again on the basis that they were the honorable thing to do. As these sentiments were conveyed in private letters to his brother and other family members, they can be taken as evidence of his actual attitudes, rather than merely official propaganda. Yet, Edmonstone lived by his own definition of honor, which was not always in accord with that accepted in his own time or later. It seemed to him perfectly acceptable to profit from the numerous offices he held simultaneously in the Company's service, and to use his influence to obtain for his brother a position of high prestige and salary. He also did not scruple to name the missionaries as a danger to India and as the cause of the Vellore Mutiny, even though his own investigation had proven otherwise. They were inconvenient for the Company, demanding that it give up its lucrative pilgrim tax and do something about social problems such as sati, and they would doubtless cause additional problems if more were allowed to arrive. Any excuse was therefore justifiable in bringing them to heel. Likewise, bribery and intrigue were perfectly acceptable means of obtaining the Company advantage in Indian courts, and indeed were preferable to more open means of negotiation that had less likelihood of success. Hastings' horrified response to his councillor's casual suggestions for employing such tactics with the Marathas shows how much Edmonstone had drifted from the attitudes common in the Britain of his day.
His ability for self-deception enabled Edmonstone to believe that India would fare better under British rule despite evidence to the contrary. Just as he had ignored as a young man the prosperity of Awadh under the rule of its nawabs, so in later years he was able to overlook the numerous problems rising from British policy. The chaos that resulted in the Indian states that had signed subsidiary treaties with the Company was, in his mind, merely a transitory situation that would eventually lead to a stable and well-governed country. He had to believe this in order to assist with the conquest and also live with his conscience. Rudyard Kipling was decades away from immortalizing the concept of the White Man's Burden, but it was a sentiment in complete accord with Edmonstone's attitudes. In fact, the ideas Kipling recorded were much aided by Edmonstone, who disseminated his attitudes to a whole generation of young Company men and did much to establish the apology for British imperialism used for the rest of the century. The reasons Edmonstone gave, to his family, himself, his students and, later, the Court of Directors, to excuse British hegemony in India were the same ones that later formed the heart of the British imperialist ethos. The Victorian idea of benevolent British rule was begun long before Victoria reached the throne, with Edmonstone's and his generation's excuses for the expansion.

Edmonstone's psychology might have been complex, but his methods for obtaining control of India showed a brilliant simplicity. He was quick to understand that decisions transmitted to India from London were made by businessmen influenced more by profit and loss and stock fluctuations than by political realities. He saw that the Company had grown beyond a mere business venture and that, by the end of Cornwallis' first administration, was spending more of its time dealing with politics than trade. Managing a country on the funds allocated to a mercantile operation was difficult enough; adequately protecting it was impossible. It became obvious to Edmonstone that London's penny-pinching ways might well result in catastrophe for Bengal. He therefore concurred heartily in the attitude prevalent among the younger recruits that, if the Company would not pay for its employees' defence, India would have to do so.

Taking the old subsidiary alliance system and reworking it into an effective weapon was a masterpiece of diplomatic warfare. By using the Indian thrones as bait, as in Awadh, Edmonstone was able, in state after state, to convince would-be rajas to replace their armies with troops loyal to the Company. This tactic allowed the British to make more conquests, for they knew that the states they left behind were unable to rise against them; support of the Company's subsidiary forces was too great to allow it to be paid and the rulers' own armies maintained simultaneously. At the same time, British residents were encouraged to build up large numbers of informants to keep them, and thereby Calcutta, apprised of political manoeuvring on the part of the Company's reluctant allies. When needed, the top positions in the allied states, even the position of diwan as in Hyderabad, were packed with British supporters. The rulers were made aware that, should they cause their British advisors any serious difficulties, they could always be replaced as Tanjore's and Awadh's monarchs had been, or their countries annexed as in the case of the Carnatic. The whole complex system was something that possibly no one else in India could have created and managed, as only someone with an intimate knowledge of the Indian courts, their key players and their intrigues could have wielded such a subtle diplomatic weapon, and only someone of Edmonstone's particular temperament would have thought to do so. The British brought as much land under their
sway in India by diplomacy as by war, and much of that was done under Edmonstone's
direct supervision.

Edmonstone's period as Minto's most trusted advisor saw the gains of the Wellesley
period consolidated and the Company's finances stabilized. It also provided an
opportunity for him to advance the careers of his chosen subordinates--men such as
Metcalfe, Elphinstone, Raffles, Ricketts and Adam--who would assure that his view of
the subcontinent was the same as that of the future leaders of the Company. In all,
Edmonstone was the *eminence grise* behind most of the administrations of his thirty-four
years on the sub-continent. In the Company's ever-changing Indian administration, he
was an important constant. Leading figures would come and go, but year after year,
Edmonstone remained in top positions. His friendship with a succession of governors-
general, his many friends and acquaintances in the Company's hierarchy, and his
supervision over new Company men as a professor at the College of Fort William and
head of the Governor-General's Office, added to his influence. The cumulative effect of
more than three decades of decisions, some small, some large, but all moving in the
same direction, was immense. As Edmonstone himself put it,

> I may venture to assert the arduous character & extended duration of the duties
which devolved upon me in my capacities of Persian Secretary & Secretary in the
Secret, Political & Foreign Department, more especially during the progress of
those great measures and achievements which in perhaps the most perilous &
critical times of Indian History saved the British Empire in the East from
destruction and laid the foundation of its present Supremacy, have not had their
parallel in the career of any other Civil Servant of the Company.\(^{60}\)

Sir George Barlow certainly agreed, commenting that

> if great talents, inflexible integrity, just and comprehensive views of the public
interest, and a long course of distinguished service had been deemed the sole
qualifications for presiding over the affairs of our Indian Empire, I cannot doubt
that he would have been called to the discharge of that high trust.\(^{61}\)

As Barlow knew from personal experience, knowledge of India had become less
important in obtaining the governor-generalship than political connections in Britain, but
undoubtedly Edmonstone influenced Company policy more in his career than any single
governor-general was able to do.

Many people were concerned in the creation of Britain's Indian empire, but it would
be difficult to find another whose influence was so pervasive and continued over so long
a time. In all, Edmonstone devoted fifty-seven of his seventy-six years to the Company.
He formed its policy, guided its decisions, and continually worked for its
aggrandizement. His is not a well-known name in history, perhaps because his methods
were those of the boardroom and not the battlefield. Yet his lifelong battle to support
imperialism in India was more effective than any single conflict could have been.
Through patient and single-minded diplomacy, he not only helped to conquer a
continent, but insured its stability for generations to come.
APPENDIX A: GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Adalat—a court.
Amil—The official in charge of the collection of the taxes and the chief administrative official of government in an area, dispensing justice and readying troops for service.
Auruzebegi—Lord of Petitions, i.e. the master of ceremonies at the court of Hyderabad.
Ayah—a nurse for children/a nanny.
Bakhshigari—paymaster.
Banians—accountants.
Bhisty—servant.
Bibi—courtesan.
Budgerow—a barge equipped with a flat-roofed cabin over two-thirds of its length.
Chauth—1/4 of the revenues of Mughal crown and jagir lands, house and market taxes, customs, transit duties, and license fees. It was originally imposed only on areas outside Maharashtra conquered by the Marathas.
Chobdar—an attendant on a prince or other important individual who served as a symbol of his rank and kept order in his household. They preceded their employer wherever he went, carrying five-foot-high silver staffs.
Chokey Boat—a small Indian craft used for making quick journeys.
Chowk—a street.
Chunam—oyster shell plaster with a high gloss, used largely in Calcutta.
Coss—a unit of measurement that varied from place to place around India; anywhere from 1 ½ miles to 3 miles. In the area of Bengal, it usually meant two miles.
Cranny—slang term for young East India Company civil servants in India.
Crore—one million of something, often money.
Dacoit—robber, thief.
Daftar—an office, a repository for documents and records.
Daftardar—head of an office.
Dandis—rowers.
Dawk—bearers arranged at stages to quickly carry someone or something (often the mail) quickly from place to place.
Deodad—God-given.
Dewan—finance minister/department.
Diwan—chief minister.
Diwani—the right conferred on the Company to collect the revenues and to administer Bengal for the Mughal emperors.
Durbar—a public audience given by a ruler to receive petitioners or ambassadors.
Durga Pujas—a Hindu festival.
Farman—a royal order, decree or grant.
Fauj—an army.
Faujdar—commandant of an army or part of an army.
Ghat/Ghaut—platform, often meaning the platform and steps leading down to a river from it.
Harkara—a messenger.
Haveli—fortress.
Hookah—water pipe.
Imambara—religious theatres connected to mosques in which a play is enacted depicting the deaths of the three Imams—Ali, Hassan and Hussein.
Irani—a Mughal noble whose family originated in Iran. Irani nobles had the reputation for being great administrators.
Jagir—a land assignment from which the holder collected revenue.
Jagirdar—holder of a jagir.
Khiladar—a military title, a commander.
Khilat/khillat—robes of honor, presented with titles or with appointments to nobility.
Kobbradool—a type of gauze used to keep away insects.
Kusbeen—prostitutes.
Leadenhall Street—The location of the East India Company’s London administration.
Lakh—100,000 of something, often money.
Muharram—Shi’ite commemoration of the martyrdom of Imam Hussein at Karbala.
Munshi—clerk, often also a language tutor in this era.
Musnud—throne.
Nabob—English corruption of the term nawab, meaning governor. Nabobs were men who had made fortunes in India and were not reluctant to spend their wealth on their return to Europe in pursuit of advanced social position.
Nautch—a display of dance, usually accompanied by song.
Nawab—Mughal title (see below), meaning governor.
Nizam—title of the rulers of Hyderabad.
Padshah—king/sovereign monarch.
Palanquin—sedan chair.
Peshcush—tribute.
Peshwa/Peshwah—originally the prime minister of the raja of Satara (descendants of Shivaji), later head of the Maratha confederacy.
Punkah—a room-sized fan, worked by a servant pulling on a rope.
Sadr diwani adalat—a civil court that tried appeal cases exceeding 500 rupees in value.
Sarcar—Persian for head of affairs, meaning a personal accountant.
Sardeshmukhi—a 10% tax imposed by the Marathas on the ryots, or peasant farmers, of an area, that was originally designed for use only in Maharastra, but after 1719 was also imposed on areas already paying chauth.
Sati—a Hindu widow burned on her husband’s funeral pyre.
Subah—a province.
Subahdar—governor of a subah.
Taluk—division of a revenue district.
Talukhdar—revenue collector.
Tatti—window screens of woven grasses.
Turani—a Mughal noble whose family originated in Turkistan; Turani nobles had a reputation for being great warriors.
Vakil—an ambassador, agent or representative.
Wazir/Vizier—chief minister of the Mughal emperors; a title of the nawabs of Awadh, who traditionally held the office.
Zamindar—landholder.
Zenana/zenanah—women’s quarters/harem.

An Explanation of Titles

Many states in India followed the old Mughal forms. Status was usually dependent upon the size of the mansab held by the individual. These were originally military commands with estates or revenues attached to enable payment of those troops. In Hyderabad these were later converted into pensions or assignments of revenue, without actual military commands being attached to them. The hierarchy of titles also followed Mughal forms and was generally additive, i.e. each ascending rank was added to existing titles rather than replacing them. These titles, in ascending order, were as follows:

Muslims:
Khan
Khan Bahadur
Nawab
Jang
Daula
Mulk
Umara
Jah
Jah
The formal style of rendering the titles for a Muslim of the highest rank was as follows - (personal title) Jah, (personal title) ul-Umara, (personal title) ul-Mulk, (personal title) ud-Daula, Nawab (personal name) Khan Bahadur, (personal title) Jang. However, in normal parlance, the style of address would be Nawab (personal title) Jah Bahadur, or Nawab (personal title) Jang Bahadur.

Hindus:
Rai
Raja
Raja Bahadur
Raja Rai Bahadur
Raja Rai-i-Rayn Bahadur
Vant
Maharaja
Maharaja Bahadur
APPENDIX B: NOTES

INTRODUCTION


2 Richard Colley Wellesley, at Burlingham House, to the Court of Directors, August 16, 1837, Elmore.


CHAPTER ONE


5 Ibid., 228.


11 Genealogy, 42.

12 Will, 6


14 Genealogy, 88; Will, 12.


16 Birth and Baptismal Records, Oriental and Indian Office Collection, N/1/8/f.6.

17 Genealogy, 56.


24 Marshall, 54.


26 Ibid., 352.

27 Ibid., 353.

28 Marshall, 56.


30 Bearce, 14.

31 Metcalf, 7-8.


34 Luis de Camoens, *The Lusiads; or, the Discovery of India* (Oxford: 1778), xi-xii.


The Travels of Several Learned Missionaries of the Society of Jesus, into Divers Parts of the Archipelago, India, China, and America (London: 1714), 37.


Vaughn, 68.


The Tales of the Genii, or, the Delightful Lessons of Horam, the Son of Asmar, faithfully translated from the Persian Manuscript by Sir Charles Morrell, formerly Ambassador from the British Settlements in India to the Great Mogul (London: J. Wilkie, 1764); J. Z. Holwell, Interesting Historical Events, Relative to the Provinces of Bengal, and the Empire of Indostan, Part I (London: J. Becket, 1765).

Ibid., 6, 7.

Marshall, 50.

The description comes from an advertisement of the work in the Derby Mercury, 24 September-1 October, 1779, 4.

The fact is mentioned in Neil Edmonstone's Will, f. 71.


Ibid., 219.


54 Ibid., 2.


56 Metcalf, 19.

57 Valentine, 286-287.


59 Mr. Burke's Speech on the 1st December 1783, Upon the Question for the Speaker's Leaving the Chair, In Order for the House to Resolve Itself Into a Committee on Mr. Fox's East India Bill (London: J. Dodsley, 1784), 2, 105.

60 Valentine, 286-287.


63 Portius [pseud.], "To the Right Hon. the Earl of Shelburne," The Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser, 13 February, 1783, 1.

64 Thomas Barlow, in England, to George Barlow in India, 12 August 1785, OIOC, Mss. EUR F 176/12, f. 1.


66 Mr. Parker, of Lincoln's Inn, Evidence of our Transactions in the East-Indies, with an Enquiry into the General Conduct of Great Britain to Other Countries from the Peace of Paris, in 1763 (London: Charles Dilly, 1782), 2, 31.

68 Will, 12.


70 Will, 2.

71 Duntreath Castle is still in the Edmonstone family, owned by the present Sir Archibald Edmonstone, who graciously permitted the author a tour.


73 Genealogy, 51.

74 Ibid., 15.

75 Ibid., iv.

76 Ibid.,31.

77 Ibid.,38.

78 Burton, The Register of the Privy Council of Scotland, 525.


80 Will, 2.

81 Ibid., 13.

82 Ibid.

83 The description is taken from a painting in the collection of the British Library Prints and Drawings.

84 Will, 7.

85 Ibid., 10.

86 Ibid., 12.

87 Ibid., 11.

89 Will, 5.

90 Ibid.

91 Ibid., 7.


93 Will, 5.

94 Ibid., 15.

95 Ibid.

96 Genealogy, 56.

97 Ibid., 43.

98 Ibid.

99 Will, 9.

100 Ibid. 12.

101 Neil Edmonstone's Will, f. 79.

102 A General History of Sterling: Containing a Description of the Town and Origin of the Castle and Burgh (Stirling: C. Randall, 1794),73.


105 Ibid., 77.

106 Vade-Mecum, 24.

CHAPTER TWO


3 Graham, 63.

4 Ibid., 407, 181; Thomas Williamson, *The European in India* (London: Edward Orme, 1813), note on plate XVIII.

5 Noted in the *Asiatic Mirror* (September 25, 1816), 2.

6 Losty, 36; *Sketches of India*, 200.


8 The description is taken from a number of sources, such as an ad for a typical house in *Hickey's Bengal Gazette* (July 22-July 29, 1780), 2, and a detailed description of a house bought by Philip Francis in 1775 in Alexander MacKrabie's papers (MacKrabie in Calcutta to "My dearest Father & Friends," in Scotland, 24 February 1775, Mss. EUR/E 25, OIOC, f. 61).

9 Losty, 38, 13; *The European in India*, 8.

10 Henry Truit in Calcutta to William Adam at Lincoln's Inn, London, April 9, 1798, Oriental and India Office Collection, afterwards OIOC, Mss. EUR F 109/80.

11 "A Wanderer," in a letter to the editor in the *Asiatic Mirror* (September 18, 1816), 3.


13 Ibid., 266, 179, 180.

15 Description comes from advertisements for cargos on ships recently arrived from Europe and China, in the *Calcutta Gazette* (January 5, 1792), 2.


17 Williamson, *The European in India*, note on Plate III.


19 0/6/3 Personal Records, OIOC, f. 159; Neil Edmonstone's *Autobiography*, f. 25.


21 0/6/3, Personal Records, OIOC, f. 155.

22 Ibid., f. 99.

23 Kopf, 14.

24 Ibid., 28.


26 William Barlow to his son George Barlow in Calcutta, 29 June 1782, OIOC, Mss. EUR F 176/1, f. 4 (v).


28 0/6/3, Personal Records, OIOC, f.159; Neil's Persian *munshi*, or tutor, may have been the Mirza Bauker mentioned casually in one letter, but the reference is too vague to be certain (Neil Edmonstone, in Hyderabad, to William Edmonstone, in Calcutta, 31 January 1788, Elmore).


31 Spear, 96.

33 William Barlow in London to George Barlow in India, April 25, 1781, OIOC, Mss. EUR F 176/1, f. 1.


36 The library collection is detailed in Neil's *Will*, f. 3.


41 From the Council at Calcutta to George F. Cherry at Lucknow, 29 May 1795, in *Correspondence With the Resident at Lucknow, Home Misc Series 448*, OIOC, ff. 255-256.

42 Robert H. Butcher, in England, to George Barlow, in Calcutta, 30 November 1791, Mss. EUR F 176/18, OIOC.


45 Ibid., 85.


47 "To the Right Hon. Wm. Pitt, Esq.," *World* (February 26, 1787), 4.
48 Ibid.

49 "Oriental Delinquents," The Morning Post and Daily Advertiser (February 12, 1788), 3.


51 Major John Scott [Waring], A Reply to Mr. Burke's Speech on the First of December, 1783, on Mr. Fox's East-India Bill (London: J. Debrett, 1784), 21.


54 Ibid., 32.


56 William Barlow in England to George Barlow in Calcutta, 2 August 1787, OIOC, Mss. EUR F 176/1.

57 Wickwire, 32.

58 Seton-Karr, 121.


60 Ibid.


66 *Sketches of India* (London: Black, Parbury and Allen, 1816), 212-213.


68 Diary of Lady Francis Chambers, dated 1784, OIOC, Mss. EUR A/ 172.


72 Williamson, *The European in India*, 9; Spear, 79.

73 Spear, 133-134.

74 Quoted in Kincaid, 97.

75 Goldesborne, notes, 315.


78 Goldesborne, 68, 316.


80 Quoted in Brown, 146.


83 Quoted in Brown, 115.


Neil, 72. A *lakh* is 100,000 of something, in this case rupees.


Margaret Baillie in Inverness to Neil Edmonstone in Calcutta, May 23, 1811, Elmore.

Williamson, *Vade-Mecum*, 413.

The last recorded birth was that of Frederick (Eliza's birth record was never made or does not survive) on August 11, 1800, *Ecclesiastical Returns, Baptisms, Marriages and Burials*, N/1/6, OIOC, f. 7.

John was born August 28, 1796 and christened Feb. 11, 1797, *Ecclesiastical Returns, Baptisms, Marriages and Burials*, N/1/5, OIOC, f. 4.


Margaret Baillie in Inverness to Charles Edmonstone in London, February 4, 1814, Elmore; *Ecclesiastical Returns, Baptisms, Marriages and Burials*, N/1/13, OIOC, f. 527.

99 Margaret Baillie in Inverness to Neil Edmonstone in Calcutta, July 7, 1812, Elmore.

100 Alexander Elmore in Inverness to Neil Edmonstone in Calcutta, May 29, 1815, Elmore; Margaret Baillie in Inverness to Sir Charles Edmonstone, Sept. 17, 1813, Elmore.

101 Quoted in Spear, The Nabobs, 64.

102 Home Misc Series 536A, OIOC, ff.112-113.

103 Sketches of India, 165.

104 George Robinson to Major William Yule, April 1827, in Yule Collection, Mss. EUR/E 357/7, OIOC, f. 17 (v); James Hare at Calder Hall, Edinburgh, to George Robinson, Nottingham Place, London, 11 May 1806, in Letters about William Scott's illegitimate children, Mss. EUR/F 142/8, OIOC.

105 Ibid., James Hare at Calder Hall, to George Robinson, Nottingham Place, 10 September 1806.

106 Ibid., James Hare at Calder Hall, to George Robinson, Nottingham Place, 4 November 1807.

107 Ibid., James Hare at Calder Hall, to George Robinson, Nottingham Place, 25 November 1807. The young man's appointment was to the 2nd Battalion of the 25th Regiment of Infantry.

108 M.M. Stuart, "The Baillies of Leys," a Scottish genealogist's report contained within the Elmore Letters. Baillie had several illegitimate children by an Indian mistress before he married his Indian wife.

109 Williamson, Vade-Mecum, 457, notes that "no lady, native of India, even though her father should have been of the highest rank in the King's or Company's service, and though she be married to a person of that description, is ever invited to those assemblies given by the governor on public occasions."

110 Ecclesiastical Returns, Baptisms, Marriages and Burials, N/1/44, OIOC, f. 190.

111 Alexander Elmore in Inverness to Neil Edmonstone in Calcutta, May 29, 1815, Elmore; Margaret Baillie in Inverness to Neil Edmonstone in Calcutta, undated, probably 1813, Elmore; A note included with the Elmore letters by M. Browne, a great-grandchild of Edmonstone's, notes "the existence of the "Elmores" was probably never known to any of the children of N.B.E. & C.A.E.--certainly not
even suspected by the younger ones, for I have ascertained that the only survivor of that generation never heard the name of Elmore in her life."

112 Margaret Baillie in Inverness to Neil Edmonstone in Calcutta, July 7, 1812, Elmore.


114 Colonel David Woodburn in Calcutta to John Woodburn in England, 7 July 1794, OIOC, Mss. EUR/ F 184/1.

115 John Malcolm to William Kirkpatrick, 2 December 1801, Kirkpatrick Collection, OIOC, Mss. EUR F 228/83, f. 17.


117 Ibid., 11.


119 C.A. Bayly, Empire and Information, 92.

120 John Malcolm to William Kirkpatrick, 2 December 1801, OIOC, Mss. EUR F 228/83, f. 17.

121 Ibid., Philolethes to Wellesley, ff. 14-14 (v).

122 Ibid., Neil Edmonstone in Calcutta to James Kirkpatrick in Hyderabad, 29 August 1802, f. 51. For an in-depth treatment of the marriage and its aftermath, see William Dalrymple, White Mughals: Love and Betrayal in Eighteenth Century India (London: Harper Collins, 2002). After a year of mourning, Khair decided to make a journey to visit her husband’s grave in Calcutta (he had died while on assignment there). Lonely and far from home, she was seduced by the only man she knew in Calcutta, James’s former assistant Henry Russell. Russell preferred to marry a wealthy heiress over her and the news of her affair reached Hyderabad causing her banishment. She was allowed back into Hyderabad in 1813 to die where she had once been happy: in the zenana of the Residency that James built for her years earlier.

123 The assumption comes from the fact that Neil mentions a "pocket book of instruments" that had belonged to his wife in his Will, f. 4.


127 The marriage was recorded in the *Supplement to the Calcutta Gazette*, (Dec. 22, 1803); Neil's legitimate children born in India have their births and/or baptisms recorded in *Ecclesiastical Returns, Baptisms, Marriages and Burials, 1801-1803, Bengal*, OIOC. They were: William Archibald, baptized December 19, 1804; Charlotte Anne, baptized August 28, 1805; Henrietta Dashwood, born Dec. 7, 1806; Susanna, born March 21, 1808; Neil Benjamin, born June 13, 1809; Charles Welland, baptized March 19, 1811; George Frederick, born April 11, 1813; Louisa Macleod, born November 26, 1814; Anne Craigie, baptized Dec. 19, 1817. Two other children are mentioned in Sir Archibald's *Genealogy*, who were born after Neil's return to Britain: Alicia Augusta (1818 or 1819) and James Harene (1820).


129 Goldesborne, notes 359.

130 Ibid., 352.

131 Wickwire, 28.

132 The quote comes from *Hickey's Bengal Gazette* (December 23-30, 1780), 1.

133 Wickwire, 28.

134 Moorhouse, 50.

135 Ibid., 49.

136 Quoted in Brown, 45.

137 Goldesborne, 43.


140 *Calcutta: A Poem*, 115.
141 Goldesborne, notes, 358.

142 *Hickey's Bengal Gazette* (February 17-24, 1781), 3.

143 Fay, 207; Goldesborne, notes, 349.

144 Neil's letters home contained such comments as, "Capt. A. Hunt . . . fell a sacrifice to one of those rapid fevers that so frequently and fatally attack newcomers." (Neil Edmonstone, at Calcutta, to Archibald Philip Edmonstone, in London, August 18, 1798, Elmore.)

145 The obituary was listed in the *Supplement to the Calcutta Gazette* (September 8, 1803), 1.

146 Edmonstone's son by Charlotte Anne, whom he named William Archibald after his brother, did no better, dying in the Company's service in 1827 at age 23.

147 David Woodburn in Calcutta to John Woodburn, at Airel near Kilmarnock, Ayrshire, 24 May 1794, OIOC, Mss. EUR/ F 184/1.


150 Fay, 189.

151 Kincaid, 92; Busteed 145.

152 Goldesborne, 36.


156 Williamson, *The European in India*, 5-6.


159 Moorhouse, 48.


161 Ibid.

162 Fay, 182.


164 Amales Tripathi, ed., Fort William, India House Correspondence and Other Contemporary Papers Relating Thereto, Vol. XII, 1793-95 (Delhi: National Archives of India, 1978, paper # 58.


166 Neil Edmonstone, at Calcutta, to Lord Minto, June 28, 1812, in "Memorandum and Correspondence between Lord Minto and Mr. Edmonstone, 1809-1813," National Library of Scotland, Mss. 11305, f. 56.


168 Calcutta: A Poem, 14, 16.


CHAPTER THREE


2 John Kennaway's Indian Diary from April 3, 1788-July 4, 1788, Devon Record Office, 961M/Add/B10, entry for 26th April 1788, f. 4.

3 Ibid.
Ibid.


Hyderabad had an army of 80,000-100,000, Mysore of 100,000, the Marathas of 100,000 and the Company and Carnatic, 84,000 in the south, all according to William Hollingberry, *A History of his late Highness Nizam Alee Khaun, Soobah of the Dekhan* (Calcutta: J. Greenway, Hurkaru Press, 1805), xx.

Hyderabad obtained the services of the French generals Raymond and Piron, who trained troops in European tactics; the latter would later serve the Maratha chief Mahadaji Sindhia, who also employed other French, Portuguese and a few British officers; and the rulers of Mysore used French help to establish Western-style arsenals and factories for making European armaments.

The Turani nobility were the Turkestan Sunni faction in Mughal politics.

The title translates as "Regulator of the State."


The *subhadar* of the Deccan in Mughal hierarchy outranked the *nawab* of the Carnatic, and had the right to appoint and remove the holder of that office. Nasir Jung and Chanda Sahib, both claiming to rule Hyderabad, each made a different appointment to the throne of the Carnatic, resulting in a two-fold power struggle. The Carnatic was freed from Hyderabad's control in a treaty signed between the nizam and the English in 1763.

Briggs, 65.


In the Mughal hierarchy, Mysore was subject to the *subahdar* of the Deccan.


21 Sheik Ali, 3-4.

22 Both types of taxes were devised by Shivaji. *Chauth* was 1/4 of the revenues of Mughal crown and *jagir* lands, house and market taxes, customs, transit duties, and licence fees. It was originally imposed only on areas outside Maharashtra conquered by the Marathas. *Sardeshmukhi* was a 10% tax on the *ryots*, or peasant farmers, of an area, that was originally designed for use only in Maharashtra, but after 1719 was also imposed on areas already paying *chauth*. For an excellent overview of the economic system operable in the Deccan, see M. A. Nayeem, "The Workings of the Chauth and Sardeshmukhi System in the Mughal Provinces of the Deccan (1707-1803 A.D.)," *The Indian Economic and Social History Review*, 14, no. 2 (April-June 1977): 153-206.


24 Briggs, 59-70.


26 Several thousand French troops under General Lally had been in Basalat's service until, as part of his agreement with the Company in 1778, he agreed to dismiss them. His brother quickly offered them employment in Hyderabad; Cornwallis at Fort William to John Kennaway in Calcutta, 28 April 1788, in *The Surrender of the Guntoor Circar to the Company*, Home Misc Series 264, OIOC, f. 24 (v).

27 Sheik Ali, 190.

28 Ibid., 191.

29 Ibid., 192.

31 John Kennaway's Indian Diary, 13 April 1788, f. 1-2.

32 Ibid., f. 2.


34 Ibid., f. 15.

35 Ibid., f. 21 (v).

36 Ibid., f. 25.

37 Cornwallis in Calcutta to Archibald Campbell in Madras, 16 June 1788, OIOC, Home Misc Series 264, f. 43.

38 John Kennaway's Indian Diary, 1 May, 1788 entry, f. 5.


42 Ibid.


44 John Kennaway's Indian Diary, 16 June 1788 entry, f. 16.


46 Ibid., 4 & 5 June, 1788 entry, f. 11.

47 Ibid., f. 11-12.

48 Ibid., f. 11.
49 Ibid, f. 12.

50 Ibid., 14 June 1788 entry, f.16.

51 Ibid., 23 June 1788 entry, f. 21.

52 Ibid., 11 June 1788 entry, f. 15.

53 Hollingberry, 1.

54 Ibid., iv.


56 Hollingberry, 167-168.


60 Leonard, 572.

61 Ibid., 573.

62 The party was visited by Raja Ram Pundit in Orissa "accompanied by so many of his Chiefs & Relations that it was not without great difficulty we could get seats for them." (John Kennaway's Indian Diary, 31 May 1788 entry, f. 9.)


64 John Kennaway, in Hyderabad, to Cornwallis, in Calcutta, 10 December 1788, OIOC, Home Misc Series 264, f. 549.


69 Ibid.

70 Neil Edmonstone, in Hyderabad, to William Edmonstone, in Calcutta, 1 November 1788, Elmore.


72 Hollingberry, 181.

73 Ibid.


75 Margaret Fowke at Cossimbazar to her Uncle, 20 September 1783, Ormthwaite Collection, OIOC, Mss. EUR/D 546/11, f. 71.

76 Cromwell Massey, *Diary of Colonel Cromwell Massey, Late of the Hon'ble East India Company's Service, Kept While a Prisoner at Seringapatam* (Bangalore: Higgenbotham & Co., 1912), OIOC, Mss. EUR/ B 392, ff. 14, 17.

77 Ibid., f. 18.

78 Letter from George Latham, a factor at Madras, imprisoned by Hyder Ali, Mss. EUR F 128/142, OIOC, ff. 7, 8.

79 Ibid., ff. 9, 11.

80 Biddle, 60.

81 Captain Henry Oakes, *An Authentic Narrative of the Treatment of the English, who were taken prisoners on the Reduction of Bednore, by Tippoo Saib* (London: G. Kearsley, 1785), 61.

82 Forrest, 225-226.

83 Archer, 10.
84 Oakes, 61.


86 Ibid., 73.

87 Ibid., f. 84.

88 Ibid., f. 145.

89 James Bristow, *Narrative of the Sufferings of James Bristow, Belonging to the Bengal Artillery, During Ten Years Captivity with Hyder Ally and Tippoo Saheb* (Calcutta: 1828), 39.

90 Sir Charles Malet Collection, Subscription book, dated 12 March 1794 from Bombay, OIOC, Mss. EUR/F 149/97, f. 1.

91 Ibid.

92 *The Captivity, Sufferings, and Escape of James Scurry, who was Detained a Prisoner During Ten Years, in the Dominions of Hyder Ali and Tippoo Saib* (London: Henry Fisher, 1831), 158-159.

93 Ibid., 159.

94 Ibid., 103-104.

95 Ibid., 113.


97 Anti-British poster of Tipu's, OIOC, Mss. EUR F 228/41, f. 1.


99 Ibid., 28.

100 Anti-British Poster of Tipu's, OIOC, Mss. EUR F 228/41, f. 3.


102 *Manifesto*, 30.
The issue of the law in India and its reform along British lines was a sensitive topic in Bengal in the 1780s, see chapter 2.

*Hickey's Bengal Gazette*, no. 58, February 24-March 3, 1781, 3.

*Manifesto*, f. 28.

Edward Moor, *A Narrative of the Operations of Captain Little's Detachment, and of the Mahratta Army, Commanded by Purseram Bhow, During the Late Confederacy in India, Against the Navab Tippoo Sultan Bahadur* (London: George Woodfall, 1794), 193.

James Bristow, *Narrative of the Sufferings of James Bristow, Belonging to the Bengal Artillery, During Ten Years Captivity with Hyder Ally and Tippoo Saheb* (Calcutta: 1828), 201.

Ibid., 195.

Habib, xxxiii.

Major Dirom, *A Narrative of the Campaign in India which terminated the war with Tippoo Sultan, in 1792* (London: W. Bulmer & Co., 1793), 249-250.

John Kennaway's Diary of the Second Mysore War, 1781-1783, OIOC, Mss. EUR C 156/A, f. 25.

Ibid., f. 15 (v.)

Ibid., f. 15.

Ibid., 48 (v.)-49.

Ibid., 49 (v.)

Ibid.


Ibid.


124 Cornwallis in Calcutta to John Kennaway on the road to Hyderabad, 3 July 1788, OIOC, Home Misc Series 264, ff. 99-100.

125 Ibid., f. 100.

126 Cornwallis, in Calcutta, to Archibald Campbell, 16 June 1788, OIOC, Home Misc Series 264, f. 92.

127 Ibid.

128 Ibid.

129 Sir Robert Abercromby, at Fort St. George, to John Kennaway, in Hyderabad, 28 August 1788, OIOC, Home Misc Series 264, f. 185.

130 John Kennaway in Hyderabad to Charles Cornwallis in Calcutta, 9 September 1788, OIOC, Home Misc Series 264, f. 177.

131 Ibid., f. 178.


133 John Kennaway in Hyderabad to Cornwallis in Calcutta, 9 September 1788, OIOC, Home Misc Series 264, f. 179.

134 Ibid., f. 180.

135 Archibald Campbell in Madras to Cornwallis in Calcutta, 31 August 1799, OIOC, Home Misc Series 264, f. 189.


137 John Kennaway in Hyderabad to Cornwallis in Calcutta, 18 September 1788, OIOC, Home Misc Series 264, f. 293; "Translation of the Nizam's Order to Seyf
Jung, "in A Collection of Treaties and Engagements with the Native Princes and States of Asia, Concluded on Behalf of the East India Company by the British Government in India (London: E. Cox and Son, 1812), 121.


139 Chaudhuri, 23.

140 Ibid., 22.

141 Ibid., 23.


143 John Kennaway in Hyderabad to Cornwallis in Calcutta, 30 October 1788, OIOC, Home Misc Series 264, f. 276.

144 Ibid.

145 Ibid.

146 John Kennaway in Hyderabad to Cornwallis in Calcutta, 10 December 1788, OIOC, Home Misc Series 264, f. 549.


149 Forrest, 122.


151 Ibid. The war came about because of a series of events precipitated by Tipu's journey with an army into Malabar in 1788 to quell an insurrection there. The Raja of Travancore, worried about the sultan's proximity to his state, bought two Dutch forts on his borders in 1789 to increase his defenses. Tipu charged that the forts belonged to his tributary, the Raja of Cochin, and that the Dutch, who had only leased them, could not sell them. This does not appear to have been the case, as the forts were actually captured by the Dutch from the Portuguese in 1662 and
had never been rented to anyone, but it gave Tipu the excuse to invade when Travancore refused to return them.


153 Ibid; The Tripartite Treaty was ratified by Cornwallis on July 5, 1790, but was generally accepted some months before, see A Collection of Treaties and Engagements with the Native Princes and States of Asia, 126-129.


164 Ibid.
CHAPTER FOUR

1 The Persian word *Nawab* is the plural of *Naib*, which denoted a deputy or subgovernor of the Mughal empire. The rulers of Awadh also used the title *Wazir*, referring to the fact that they occupied the hereditary office of first noble of the Mughal court.


7 Ibid.

8 The quote is from Henry Crossley Irwin, *The Garden of India: or, Chapters on Oudh History and Affairs* (Lucknow: Pustak Kendra, 1973), 75.


12 Shore wrote, "I have no fears about Zemaun Shah[the Amir of Afghanistan]: he was at Lahore on the 17th of January: and if he come to Delhi this year, he must make haste. I think the . . . danger, a very good instrument in promoting my
views with the Vizier." The quote is cited in Lord Teignmouth, *Memoir of the Life and Correspondence of John Lord Teignmouth in two volumes by his son* (London: Hatchard and Son, 1818), 405-406.

13 From Robert Barker to Jhanda Singh, August 19, 1791, quoted in Birendra Varma, *English East India Company and the Afghans, 1757-1800* (Calcutta: Punthi Pustak, 1968), 35; for Shore's agreement with this viewpoint, see Varma, 81, 85. The belief in the Sikh ability to protect India from the Afghans was proved correct in 1797, when their resistance, coupled with succession problems in Afghanistan, resulted in Zeman Shah abandoning a short-lived campaign in the Punjab.

14 Marshall, 479.


16 Furbar, 30, 127, 289.


19 Sir John Shore at Fort William to G.F. Cherry in Lucknow, April 21, 1795, PRO 30/11/206, f.19.

20 Teignmouth, 133.

21 George Cherry's untitled account of the action on the 3rd of May 1747 of his ship, the *Namur*, and the British fleet in a sea battle with the French, Stubton 3/E/7, Lincolnshire Record Office.

22 Ibid.

23 Neil Edmonstone in Calcutta to G.F. Cherry at Lucknow, Sept. 26, 1794, Elmore.

24 Neil mentioned in a letter to his father that he had always enjoyed "free access to [Shore's] house and table." Neil Edmonstone in Calcutta to Archibald Philip Edmonstone in London, August 18, 1799, Elmore.

26 Neil Edmonstone in Calcutta to G.F. Cherry in Lucknow, July 14, 1795, Elmore.


28 Neil Edmonstone, at Hyderabad, to William Edmonstone, at Calcutta, letter #38, no date, probably fall 1789, Elmore.


30 Ibid., f. 30; Amales Tripathi, ed., *Fort William, India House Correspondence and Other Contemporary Papers Relating Thereto, Vol. XII, 1793-95* (Delhi: National Archives of India, 1978), 393.

31 Minute of the Governor General, January 27, 1797, Cleveland Public Library, John G. White Collection, (afterwards, White) Minutes to the Secret Committee from the governor-general, John Shore, 1797-1798, W q091.92 Ea77m5, f. 69.

32 Minute of the Governor-General, January 23, 1797, White, Minutes to the Secret Committee from the governor-general, John Shore, 1797-1798, W q091.92 Ea77m5, ff. 45, 47. Apparently, Neil's command of Persian was much more subtle than Shore's, who had attained a working knowledge but not fluency.

33 Ibid, ff. 45-49.

34 [Anonymous] in Oude to Sir John Shore in Calcutta, August 1, 1793, contained within John Ashworth, Letter to Henry Dundas, transmitting a series of letters mostly to Sir John Shore, which had appeared in a Calcutta newspaper in 1793 on the conditions in Oudh, 1795, Wq091.92 As39l, ff. 49-56.


36 Ashworth, White, June 1793 letter, ff.13 and 15. A crore denotes a million of something, in this case rupees.

37 Ashworth, White, June letter, f. 13; Ashworth, White, August 1 letter, f. 49.


39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.

41 Ashworth, White, August 1 letter, f. 50.

42 Ibid., 53; Ashworth, White, June letter, f. 13.

43 Minute of the Governor General, Jan. 20, 1797, in Minutes to the Secret Committee from the governor-general, John Shore, 1797-1798, White, W q091.92 Ea77m5, f. 28, 20.

44 Ibid., f. 29.

45 Irwin, 74.

46 Barnett, 76-77.

47 A widely spread rumor at the time told a different story--that Shuja was stabbed to death by a Rohilla princess whom he had molested. It was repeated by Dean Mahomet in a letter written in 1794, and its accordance with Shuja's reputation made it widely believed, but it remains unsubstantiated. See Dean Mahomet, *The Travels of Dean Mahomet: An Eighteenth Century Journey Through India*, ed. Michael Fisher (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 89-90.

48 See Barnett, 113-120 for a full account of the attempted coup.


50 Ibid., 143.


52 Ibid., 64.

53 Barnett, 105; Santha, 67.

54 Santha, 67, 72, 75, 76.

55 Ibid., 87.

56 Quoted in Moon, 214.

57 Santha, 68.

58 For an in-depth discussion of Asaf's ministerial changes, see Fisher, ch. 2.
Quoted in Barnett, 109.

Fisher, 62.

Ibid., 66.


Fisher 67; Talib, 9-10.

Talib, 9.

Fisher, 68. Hindus from scribal *jatis* were used in finance, as it was considered inappropriate work for Muslims.

Ibid., 80.

Rajah Tickayt Ray to Shore, August 31, 1794, in Persian Correspondence, July-September, 1794, British Library, Add. Mss. 13, 504, f.57; Talib, 88.


Shore to Asaf-ud-Daula, September 12, 1794, in Persian Correspondence, July-September, 1794, British Library, Add. Mss. 13, 504, f. 60.

Talib, 88 and 90.

Moon, 271.

The wazir noted to Cherry that "agreeably to the practice in Hindostan . . . a Jaggur is only tenable during the life of the incumbent and after his death reverts with his property to the State it were proper and requisite so to sequester it." Yet he agreed to make a provision for Fyzullah's sons out of part of their father's holdings, to insure "the peace and quiet of the people." Enclosure from the Resident at Lucknow--Copy of a Shookka from his Excellency the Vizier addressed to G.F. Cherry, Esq., in Persian Correspondence, October to December, 1794, British Library, Add. Mss.13, 505, f. 4

Teignmouth, 305.
74 G.F. Cherry in Calcutta to Charles Cornwallis, January 29, 1794, PRO 30/11/131, f. 20.

75 Talib, 90.


78 Ibid.

79 Cherry, from Camp at Barelly, to Abercromby, 28 December 1794, Correspondence with the Resident at Lucknow, Home Misc Series 448, OIOC, f. 62.

80 Robert Abercromby, from Camp on the Surka Nulla, 23 October 1794, Correspondence with the Resident at Lucknow, Home Misc Series 448, OIOC, f. 90.

81 Ibid.

82 Talib, 90.

83 Enclosure received from Lucknow, 18 December 1794: Translation of preliminary articles of a treaty between the Navaub Vizier . . . Assuful dowla . . . and the English Company on one part and the Rohilla tribe on the other, Persian Correspondence, October-December 1794, British Library, Add. Mss. 13, 505, f. 66.

84 Cherry, from camp at Barelly, to Robert Abercromby, 28 December 1794, in Correspondence with the Resident at Lucknow, Home Misc Series 448, OIOC, ff. 57-58.

85 Asaf-ud-Daula to Shore, received January 20, 1795, in Persian Correspondence, January-March, 1795, British Library, Add. Mss. 13, 506, f. 66.

86 Neil Edmonstone to G.F. Cherry, September 2, 1795, Red Book letters, Elmore.

87 Neil Edmonstone to G.F. Cherry, July 14, 1795, Red Book letters, Elmore.

88 Ibid.

89 Barnett, 154-55.
90 Irwin, 85.
91 Moon, 226.
92 Fisher, 75.
93 Diary of Sophie Elizabeth Prosser, entry for 20 March 1788, Mss. Eur F 127/94, OIOC, ff. 52-52 (v).
94 Ibid, f. 53.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid., f. 53 (v).
97 Ibid., entry for 18 February 1788, f. 48.
98 Ibid., entry for 20 February 1788, f. 49.
99 Ibid., entry for 8 October 1788, f. 71.
100 Ibid., f. 71 (v).
101 Ibid., entry for 20 March 1788, ff. 53 (v)-54.
103 Forbes, 284.
104 Fisher, 76.
105 Mahomet, 89.
106 Charles Madan, Two Private Letters to a Gentleman in England from His Son Who Accompanied Earl Cornwallis to Lucknow In the Year 1787 (Peterborough: J. Jacob, 1778), 42. Abu Talib puts the numbers higher, at 1200 elephants and 2-3,000 horses, see Talib, 30.
107 Spear, Nabobs, 83.
108 Prosser, entry for 18 September 1788, f. 69.
Talib, 30.

Forbes, 284.

Ibid., 281-284.

Talib, 86.


The estimate comes from the British themselves, [Anonymous] in Oude to Sir John Shore in Calcutta, July 15, 1793, Ashworth, White, f. 24. Talking about pensioning the wazir off, the letter reads, "This would be a million pounds sterling, as much as the King of Great Britain receives, and is nearly double what the Nawab receives at present from his ministers."

Sharar, 47.

Talib, 104.

G.F. Cherry to Sir Robert Abercromby, 13 October 1794, Home Misc Series 448, f. 24.

Cited in Edmonstone in Calcutta to Cherry in Lucknow, 20 April 1795, Elmore.


Barnett, 103.

Prosser, entry for 18 February 1788, f. 48.

Ibid.

Fisher, 75.

Moon, 272.

Prosser, entries for 20 March 1788 (f. 52 (v)), 15 June 1788 (f. 61) and 18 September 1788 (f. 69).

Forbes, 284.
Neil is quoting a letter Cherry sent to him, NBE in Calcutta to Cherry in Lucknow, 20 September 1794, Red Book letters, Elmore.

Ibid.

Ashworth, White, June letter, f. 13.

The description is by Sleeman, quoted in Crossley, 86. Awadh was divided for tax purposes into *parganas*, several of which were under the control of an *amil*, who not only saw to the collection of the tax assessment, but also was the chief administrative official of government in the area, dispensing justice, readying troops for service, etc. Almas was the most powerful of the *amils* of Awadh.

Santha, 75, 79.

Ray, 41.


See Barnett, 142-163, for a detailed account of the ways adopted by Asaf and his ministers to avoid payment of much of the subsidy.

Extract Bengal Consultations, 20th April 1787, Governor General's Minute, Home Misc Series 235, OIOC, f. 411.

Extract of a letter from Cornwallis to the Vizier, 15 April 1787, Home Misc Series 235, OIOC, f. 414.


CHAPTER FIVE


*Sketches of India*, 19.

NBE in Secrole to William Edmonstone in Calcutta, 3 February, 1797, Elmore.

Madan, 26.

Ibid, 8.

7 NBE in Benares to William Edmonstone in Calcutta, 6 February 1797, Elmore.

8 Edwardes, *Glorious Sahibs*, 35.

9 NBE, from Camp at Peynteahmulla about 23 miles from Juanpore, to William Edmonstone at Calcutta, 14th February 1797, Elmore.

10 NBE in Benares to William Edmonstone in Calcutta, 6 February 1797, Elmore.

11 Shore in Benares to Lady Shore in Calcutta, 8th February 1797, quoted in Teignmouth, 404-405.

12 Ibid, 405.

13 NBE from Camp at Peynteahmulla, to William Edmonstone at Calcutta, 14th Feb 1797, Elmore.


15 NBE from Camp at Peynteahmulla, to William Edmonstone at Calcutta, 14th February 1797, Elmore.


17 NBE from Camp at Peynteahmulla, to William Edmonstone at Calcutta, 14th February 1797, Elmore.

18 Ibid.

19 The quote is Shore's, cited in Teignmouth, 406.


21 *The Asiatic Annual Register for 1800* (London: J. Debrett, 1801), 97; the description of the gardens comes from Prosser, f. 48 (v).


23 *Sketches of India*, 151.

24 Madan, 39-40.
25 NBE in Lucknow to William Edmonstone in Calcutta, undated, #53 Elmore letters.


27 Ibid, 97-98.


29 NBE in Lucknow to William in Calcutta, undated, #53 Elmore letters.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.


33 NBE in Lucknow to William Edmonstone in Calcutta, undated, #53 Elmore letters.

34 Ibid.

35 Talib, 30.

36 NBE in Lucknow to William in Calcutta, 10th March 1797, Elmore.

37 NBE in Lucknow, to William in Calcutta, 14 March 1797, Elmore.

38 Ibid.

39 Forbes, 284.

40 NBE in Lucknow to William in Calcutta, undated, #53 Elmore letters.

41 Teignmouth, 407.

42 Ibid.


44 Cherry in Lucknow to Cornwallis in England, 12 August 1795, PRO 30/11/131, f. 25.

45 Shore to Cornwallis, 10th November 1793, PRO 30/11/122, f.55; Talib 84.


PRO 30/11/131, Cherry to Cornwallis, May 4, 1796, f. 23.


Extract of a Letter from the Resident at Lucknow to the Governor General in Council, April 5, 1795, PRO 30/11/206, f. 5.


Extract of a Letter from the Resident at Lucknow to the Governor General in Council, April 5, 1795, PRO 30/11/206, ff. 8-9.

Cherry at Lucknow to Cornwallis, 22 June 1796, PRO 30/11/131, f. 10 (v).

Cited in NBE in Calcutta to Cherry in Lucknow, 20 April 1795, Elmore.


Statement of the Nabob Sujah ud Dowlah's Army in March 1768, OIOC, Eur F 218/19, f. 19-20.

62 Cherry to Cornwallis, May 4, 1796, PRO 30/11/131, f. 23.

63 Talib, 91.

64 Neil is quoting Cherry's letter to him, NBE in Calcutta to Cherry in Lucknow, September 20, 1794, Red Book Letters, Elmore.

65 Cherry to Cornwallis, 12 August 1795, PRO 30/11/131, f. 22.


67 Talib, 91.

68 Cherry to Cornwallis, May 4, 1796, PRO 30/11/131, f. 31.

69 Talib, 93.

70 Ibid.

71 Cherry to Cornwallis, May 4, 1796, PRO 30/11/131, 29, 31.

72 Fischer, 70; The Asiatic Annual Register for the Year 1803 (London: 1804), 185.

73 Fischer 70; Talib, 1-2.

74 Mahomed Ali Khan, Life of Tuffuzzool Hussain Khan, Khan-I-Alluma, Minister of Nawob Vazeer of Oudh (Secunderabad: Cheekoty Veerunnah & Sons, 1908), part II, 3.

75 Ibid., part I, 7.

76 Neil Edmonstone in Lucknow to William Edmonstone in Calcutta, April 6, 1797, Elmore.

77 Tufuzzool Hussein Kahn to Shore, received 18th April 1794, British Library Manuscripts, Add. Mss. 13, 503, Persian Correspondence April-June 1795, f. 36.

78 Neil Edmonstone in Calcutta to George F. Cherry in Lucknow, 26 September 1794, Elmore.

79 Neil Edmonstone in Calcutta to G.F. Cherry in Lucknow, 20 September, 1794, Elmore; NBE to GFC, 26 September 1794, Elmore.
NBE to CFC, 26 September 1794, Elmore; NBE to GFC, 28th to the 30th September, 1794, Elmore.

NBE to GFC, 26th Sept. 1794, Elmore.

The description is by Sleeman, quoted in Crossley, 86.


Awadh was divided for tax purposes into parganas, several of which were under the control of an amil, who not only saw to the collection of the tax assessment, but also was the chief administrative official of government in the area, dispensing justice, readying troops for service, etc. Almas was the most powerful of the Amils of Awadh.


Cherry in Lucknow to Shore in Calcutta, 13 June 1795, Correspondence With the Resident at Lucknow, India Office Library, Home Misc Series 448, f. 289.

Copy of a letter from Cherry to the Wazir, received May 5, 1796, British Library, Add. Mss. 13,511, Persian Correspondence April-June 1796, f. 57.

Talib, 94.

Tuffazzul Hussein Khan to the Customs Master, Calcutta, received 4th January 1796, British Library Manuscripts, Add. Mss. 13, 510 Persian Correspondence, January-March 1796, f.6. The note requests that Reza not have to pay tax on the supplies he was taking on his journey. It seems, however, that he did not go, as he was back at the Awadh court several months later, but still out of favor.

Talib, 92.

Fischer, 69.

Talib, 15.

Fischer, 69.

Vizier to Shore, June 1, 1796, British Library, Add. Mss.13, 511, Persian Correspondence April-June 1796, f. 94.

Basu, 112.
96 Cherry to Shore, April 23, 1796, British Library, Add. Mss. 13, 522, ff. 143-144.
97 NBE in Calcutta to GFC in Lucknow, September 20, 1794, Red Book Letters, Elmore.
98 NBE to GFC, 14 July, 1795, Elmore.
100 Ibid, 148.
101 Ibid, 149.
102 Extract of the Political Letter from Bengal, June 30, 1796, British Library, Add. Mss. 13, 522, f. 16.
103 Extract of Bengal Political Consultations, June 13, 1796, from the Vizier received May 29, 1796, British Library, Add. Mss. 13, 522, f. 244.
104 Ibid.
107 Shore to the Vizier, May 2, 1796, British Library, Add. Mss. 13, 511, Persian Correspondence April-June 1796, f. 85.
108 Ibid., Vizier to Shore, May 17, 1796, f. 81.
109 Cherry in Lucknow to Cornwallis in England, 22 June 1796, PRO 30/11/131, f. 41.
110 Shore to Cornwallis, July 6, 1796, PRO 30/11/122, f. 80.
111 The description comes from an engraving published May 10, 1819 by W.J. Newton, dedicated to NBE. British Library Prints and Drawings, C.III, p. 4.
112 From the Vizier received 26 August 1796, British Library, Add. Mss. 13, 512, Persian Correspondence July-September 1796, f. 49.
113 Ibid, f. 24.

Ibid.


Ibid, Shore at camp at Husseinpore, February 1797, to Speke, f. 18.


Forbes, vol. IV, 82--the author of the passage was Mr. Cruso, a doctor who accompanied Charles Malet on a journey from Surat to Calcutta in 1785.


NBE in Lucknow to William Edmonstone in Calcutta, 6th April 1797, Elmore.

NBE in Calcutta to Cherry in Lucknow, 28 April 1796, Elmore.

NBE from Camp at Peynteahmulla, to William Edmonstone at Calcutta, 14th February 1797, Elmore.

NBE in Lucknow to William Edmonstone in Calcutta, 6th April 1797, Elmore.


Quoted by Shore, Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ray, 24.

Ibid. John Shore in Lucknow to Peter Speke, Vice President in Council in Calcutta, April 5, 1797, f. 47.

Ibid, f. 43.

Ibid., f. 42.

NBE in Lucknow to William Edmonstone in Calcutta, 6th April 1797, Elmore.

British Library Manuscripts, Add. Mss. 13, 523, John Shore in Lucknow to Peter Speke, Vice President in Council in Calcutta, April 5, 1797, f. 47.

The quote is from Neil in NBE in Lucknow to William in Calcutta, 6th April 1797, Elmore; the settlement between the Company and the wazir provided that Asaf would pay for two regiments of cavalry at a cost of no more than 5 and a half lakhs of rupees per year (Translation of an Agreement entered into by his Excellency the Nawaub Vizier with the Noble the Governor General, at Lucknow executed the 20th of March 1797, British Library, Add. Mss. 13, 523, f. 32).

British Library Manuscripts, Add. Mss. 13, 515, Persian Correspondence April-June 1797, from Tafazzal Hasan Khan to the Persian Translator, received 8 June 1797, f. 46.

British Library Manuscripts, Add. Mss. 13, 523, John Shore in Lucknow to Peter Speke, Vice President in Council in Calcutta, April 5, 1797, f. 46.

Ibid., from Rajah Jaoo Laul received 2nd June 1797, f. 39.

British Library, Add. Mss. 13, 516, Persian Correspondence, July-September 1797, Shore to the wazir, written 10 August 1797, f. 27.

Barnett, 233.

Neil to Kennaway, Calcutta, 13 November, 1797, Elmore.

Ibid.

British Library, Add. Mss. 13, 522, Extract of Bengal Political Consultations, June 13, 1796, from the Vizier received May 29, 1796, f. 244.

Santha, 71.

British Library, Add. Mss. 13, 516 Persian Correspondence, July-September 1797, Mirza Vizier Alli to Shore, received 30 September 1797, f. 107.
CHAPTER SIX

1 Neil Benjamin Edmonstone, *The Narrative of the Revolution at Lucknow*, Elmore. This manuscript is not foliated.


3 Ibid., from Mirza Vizier Ali, received 30th September, 1797, f. 105.


6 Madan, 33.

7 Ibid.

8 John Shore to Sa'adat inviting him to a ball in commemoration of the King's birthday, British Library, Add. Mss. 13, 506, *Persian Correspondence January through March 1795*, f.55; John Shore to Cherry, 20 May 1795, *Correspondence With the Resident at Lucknow*, India Office Library, Home Misc Series 448, f. 217.

9 Letter from Sa'adat Ali Khan, received 4 July 1797, British Library Manuscripts, Add. Mss. 13, 516, f. 5.

10 Ibid., f. 6.

11 Ibid., Shore to Sa'adat Ali Khan, 19 July 1797, f. 7.


13 Ibid.

14 Ibid., f. 13.

16 Fisher, 75.


18 Secret Minute of the Governor General to the Council, 13 January 1798, White Collection, Wq 091.92 Ea77m5, f. 239.

19 Sophie Elizabeth Prosser's Diary, 1787-88, entry for 20th February 1788, India Office Library, Mss. EUR F 127/94, f. 48 (v).

20 Ibid., March 20, 1788, f. 53 (v).

21 Ibid., f. 54.

22 Minute of the Governor General, 29 September 1797, White Collection Wq 091.92 Ea77m5, Minutes to the Secret Committee from the Governor General John Shore, 1797-98, f. 214.


24 Talib, 87.

25 Minute of the Governor General, 13 January 1797, White Collection, Wq 091.92 Ea77m5 f. 333.

26 Minute of the Governor General, 29 September 1797, White Collection, Wq 091.92 Ea77m5, f. 215; Ibid., Minute of the Governor General, 20 October 1797, f. 243.


28 Minute of the Governor General, 20 October 1797, White Collection, Wq 091.92 Ea77m5, f. 243.

29 Ibid., f. 254.

Ibid., Ali to Shore, 25 October 1797, f. 27.

Ibid., Bahu Begam to Shore, 17 October 1797, f. 24.

Ibid., Shore to Bahu Begam, 24th October 1797, f. 25.

Santha, 96.

Munshi Totaram, *Tilism-i-Hind*, 327; Secret Minute of the Governor General, 13 January 1798, White, Wq 091.92 Ea77m5, f. 352.


Edmonstone, *Narrative of the Revolution at Lucknow*.

Tafazul Hussein Khan to Shore, received 8th June 1797, British Library, Add. Mss. 13, 515, *Persian Correspondence April through June 1797*, f. 44.

Quoted in Mahomed Ali Khan, Nawab Syed, *The Life of Tuffuzzool Hussain Khan, Khan-i-Allum, Minister of Nawob Vazeer of Oudh* (Secunderabad: Cheekoty Veerunnah & Sons, 1908), part I, 3; Tafazul Hussein Khan to Shore, received 8th June 1797, British Library, Add. Mss. 13, 515, *Persian Correspondence April through June 1797*, f. 44.

Mohammed Ali Khan, Part II, 12.


Ibid.


Letter from Vizier Ali Khan, received 29th November 1797, British Library, Add. Mss. 13, 517, f. 64.


Ibid.

Edmonstone, *Narrative of the Revolution at Lucknow*.

Ibid.


Edmonstone, *The Narrative of the Revolution at Lucknow*.


Ibid., f. 67.

Secret Minute of the Governor General to the Council, 13 January 1798, White Collection, Wq 091.92 Ea77m5, f. 316.

Edmonstone, *Narrative of the Revolution at Lucknow*.

Ibid.


Ibid.
66 Ibid., Shore to Almas, 24 October 1797, f. 26.

67 Edmonstone, *Narrative of the Revolution at Lucknow*.

68 Gore Ouseley in Lucknow to Neil Edmonstone at Jaunpur, 6 December 1797, in *The Asiatic Annual Register for 1798-9*, 37.


70 Ibid., Vizier Ali to Shore, received 15 December 1797, f. 77; Ibid., Vizier Ali to Shore, received 16 December 1797, f. 78.

71 Edmonstone, *Narrative of the Revolution at Lucknow*.

72 Shore in Jaunpur to Peter Speke, Vice President in Council, in Calcutta, 4 December 1797, British Library, Add. Mss. 13, 523, *Sir John Shore's Correspondence Relative to Oudh, 1796-1798*, f. 51.

73 Bahu Begam to Shore, received 29 December 1797, British Library, Add. Mss. 13, 517, f. 64.

74 Shore in Jaunpur to Peter Speke, Vice President in Council, in Calcutta, 4 December 1797, British Library, Add. Mss. 13, 523, f. 56.

75 Edmonstone, *Narrative of the Revolution at Lucknow*.

76 Neil Edmonstone to William Kirkpatrick, 31 January 1798, OIOC, Mss. EUR F 228/69, f. 3.


80 Ibid.

81 Ibid., "Substance of a Verbal Communication from Mohubbut Khan . . . to the Persian Translator, 28th December 1797," 36.
82 Edmonstone, *Narrative of the Revolution at Lucknow*.

83 Ibid.

84 Secret Minute of the Governor General to the Council, 13 January 1798, White Collection, Wq 091.92 Ea77m5, f. 320; Edmonstone, *Narrative of the Revolution at Lucknow*.


86 Paper delivered by Tafazal Hussein Khan from Shums unissa Begam to him, received 20 December 1797, British Library, Add. Mss. 13, 517, f. 85.

87 Edmonstone, *Narrative of the Revolution at Lucknow*.

88 Ibid.


90 Quoted in Mohammed Ali Khan, Part I, 5.

91 Lumsden's opinions are not recorded at the time, but as his attitude in 1800 aligned with Neil's (as demonstrated in later chapters), it is likely that it did so here as well.

92 Edmonstone, *Narrative of the Revolution at Lucknow*.

93 Ibid.

94 Ibid.

95 Ibid.

96 Neil Edmonstone to William Kirkpatrick, 31 January 1798, OIOC, Mss. EUR F 228/69, f. 3.

97 Edmonstone, *Narrative of the Revolution at Lucknow*.

98 Ibid.

99 Ibid.

100 "Copy of the Minute of the Governor General of Bengal, of the 13th January, 1798," in the *Asiatic Annual Register for 1798-99*, 21.
Ibid., 27.

Edmonstone, *Narrative of the Revolution at Lucknow*.

Ibid.

Edmonstone, *Narrative of the Revolution at Lucknow*.

Ibid; Asaf had built a hunting lodge at Biebiapur which was also used to house British Residents when they first arrived at Lucknow before the Residency was made ready for them. It was to this house that the delegation went. (*A Brief History of Lucknow*, British Library unbound books 1568/5007, 1860, 6.)


Ibid., Enclosures in a letter from Major General Robert Stuart to the Governor General, received 21 December 1797, including a translation of a letter from Stuart to Almas (no date), f. 86.

Ibid., Almas Ali Khan to Robert Stuart, 2 December 1797, f. 86.

Edmonstone, *Narrative of the Revolution at Lucknow*.

Secret Minute of the Governor General to the Council, 13 January 1798, White Collection, Wq 091.92 Ea77m5, f. 362.

Edmonstone, *Narrative of the Revolution at Lucknow*.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid., Shore in Biebiapur to Ibrahim Bey Darogha, one of the Parks of Artillery & Officers and Servants of the late Nabob Assof ud Dowlah's Household, in
Lucknow, 18 January 1798, f. 17; Ibid., from Shore to Shums unissa Begam, 18 January 1798, f. 16-17; Ibid., Proclamation Addressed to all the Respectable Inhabitants of Lucknow, 18 January 1798, f. 18.

120 Edmonstone, *Narrative of the Revolution at Lucknow*.

121 Vizier Ali Khan in Lucknow, to Shore at Biebiapur, received 10 January 1798, British Library, Add. Mss. 13, 518, f. 11.

122 Ibid., 20 January 1798, f. 19.

123 Ibid., Substance of a Communication made to the Resident thro' Molavy Aboul Kaudir in a paper delivered to the Resident at Lucknow, received 25 January 1798, f. 26.

124 Edmonstone, *Narrative of the Revolution at Lucknow*.


126 Edmonstone, *Narrative of the Revolution at Lucknow*.

127 Ibid.


129 Edmonstone, *Narrative of the Revolution at Lucknow*.

130 Ibid.

131 Sophie Prosser's Diary, OIOC, Mss. EUR F 127/94, f. 61.


133 Secret Minute of the Governor General to the Council, 13 January 1798, White Collection, Wq 091.92 Ea77m5, f. 357.

CHAPTER SEVEN


Ibid.


K.K. Datta, 141.

Quoted in Moon, 275.

Neil Edmonstone in Calcutta, to Sir Archibald Edmonstone in Britain, 18 April 1798, Elmore.

The directors were represented in parliament, most notably by Richard Sheridan, but Wellesley's friends were in positions of great authority. The prime minister, Henry Addington, the head of the board of control, Henry Dundas, and the powerful government figures William Pitt and Lord Grenville, all supported Wellesley; Wellesley's comment on Pitt is found in Wellesley at Fort William, Calcutta, to the Speaker in London, 19 November 1798, the Wellesley Papers, series II., vol. IX, British Library, Add. Mss. 37282, f. 67.


Ibid., vi.


Quoted in Moon, 263.
16 Neil Edmonstone from Calcutta to Sir Archibald Edmonstone in Britain, 18 April 1798, Elmore.

17 Pierce, vol. I, 137.

18 Kirkpatrick's Reply to Carnatacus [pseud.], "A Letter on the Present War with Tippoo Sultan" (London: 1792), from Fort St. George, 30 July 1792, OIOC Mss. EUR F 228/24, ff. 24,25, 28, 28 (v.).

19 Ibid, ff. 27 (v.)-28.

20 See frontspiece, Hyderabad Correspondence Relating to the Intrigues of Tippoo Sultan at that Court, 1796-7, OIOC, Mss. EUR F 228/8.

21 Kirkpatrick to Shore, 3 December 1796, OIOC, Mss. EUR F 228/8, f. 234 (v.).

22 Kirkpatrick to Shore, 29 January 1797, OIOC, Mss. EUR F 228/8, f. 292 (v.)-293.

23 Copy of Answers to Certain Queries Proposed by Lord Mornington to Major Kirkpatrick Relative to the French Forces in the Service of the Nizam, 31 January 1798, OIOC Mss. EUR F 228/27, f. 2.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid., f. 5.

26 Ibid., f. 6.

27 Ibid.


29 Ibid., 1.

30 Neil Edmonstone in Calcutta to Sir Archibald Edmonstone in Britain, 18 August 1798, Elmore.

31 Neil Edmonstone in Calcutta to Charles Edmonstone in Britain, 20 April 1798, Elmore.

32 Quoted in Gardner, 140.
33 Neil Edmonstone in Calcutta to Charles Edmonstone in Britain, 20 April 1798, Elmore.

34 Neil Edmonstone in Calcutta to Archibald Edmonstone in Britain, 18 August 1798, Elmore.


42 Ibid.


44 Ibid., 64.

45 Moon, 280.


47 Wellesley to Tipu, 14 June 1798, contained in the Wellesley Despatches (1840 edition), 59.

48 Minute of the Governor-General, August 1798, contained in the Wellesley Despatches (1877 edition), 23.
Nizam Ali's French general, Raymond, had died earlier that year, so disbanding troops that had no effective commander was less of a sacrifice than he made out to Wellesley.

Minute of the Governor-General, August 1798, contained in the Wellesley Despatches (1877 edition), 53.

Wellesley from Amlingham House, to the directors in London, 16 August 1837, Elmore.

Quoted in Moon, 282.


The quote comes from Neil Edmonstone in Madras to William Edmonstone in Calcutta, 3 January 1799, Elmore.

Ibid.


Graeme Mercer in Benares to Neil Edmonstone, 18 January 1799, Lincolnshire Archives, Stubton 3/E/7, Cherry Correspondence.

Hubert Cornish in Benares to John Shore in Britain, 19 January 1799, British and Foreign Bible Society, Sir John Shore's Letterbook, f. 49.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid.


Graeme Mercer in Benares to Neil Edmonstone, 18 January 1799, Lincolnshire Archives, Stubton 3/E/7, Cherry Correspondence.

Wellesley at Fort St. George, Madras, to the Court of Directors in London, 12 February 1799, Lincolnshire Archives, Stubton 3/E/7, Cherry Correspondence.
66 Ibid.

67 Graeme Mercer in Benares to Neil Edmonstone, 18 January 1799, Lincolnshire Archives, Stubton 3/E/7, Cherry Correspondence.

68 Hubert Cornish in Benares to John Shore in Britain, 19 January 1799, British and Foreign Bible Society, Sir John Shore's Letterbook, f. 50.

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid.

71 Ibid.

72 Ibid.

73 Ibid.

74 “An Account of the Late Horrid Massacre at Benares,” 111-112.

75 Ibid.

76 Ibid.

77 Ibid.

78 Ibid.

79 Ibid.

80 Ibid.

81 Neil Edmonstone in Madras to Shore in Britain, 18 May 1799, British and Foreign Bible Society, Sir John Shore's Letterbook, f. 61.

82 Hubert Cornish in Benares to Shore, 9 September 1798, British and Foreign Bible Society, Sir John Shore's Letterbook, f. 53.
83 Graeme Mercer in Benares to Neil Edmonstone, 18 January 1799, Lincolnshire Archives, Stubton 3/E/7, Cherry Correspondence.

84 Hubert Cornish in Benares to John Shore in Britain, 19 January 1799, British and Foreign Bible Society, Sir John Shore's Letterbook, f. 50.

85 Datta, 4.

86 Hubert Cornish in Benares to John Shore in Britain, 19 January 1799, British and Foreign Bible Society, Sir John Shore's Letterbook, f. 52.

87 Graeme Mercer in Benares to Neil Edmonstone, 18 January 1799, Lincolnshire Archives, Stubton 3/E/7, Cherry Correspondence.


89 Ibid.

90 Graeme Mercer in Benares to Neil Edmonstone, 18 January 1799, Lincolnshire Archives, Stubton 3/E/7, Cherry Correspondence.

91 Hubert Cornish in Benares to John Shore in Britain, 19 January 1799, British and Foreign Bible Society, Sir John Shore's Letterbook, f. 52.

92 Valentia, vol. I, 82, 89.

93 George Barlow in Calcutta to Shore in Britain, 8 February 1799, British and Foreign Bible Society, Sir John Shore's Letterbook, f. 4.


95 Graeme Mercer in Benares to Neil Edmonstone, 18 January 1799, Lincolnshire Archives, Stubton 3/E/7, Cherry Correspondence.

96 Hubert Cornish in Benares to John Shore in Britain, 19 January 1799, British and Foreign Bible Society, Sir John Shore's Letterbook, f. 52.

97 Mukherjee, "Life and Career of Wazir Ali Khan, the Rebel Nawab of Oudh," 325.

98 George Barlow in Calcutta to Shore in Britain, 8 February 1799, British and Foreign Bible Society, Sir John Shore's Letterbook, f. 4.

100 Graeme Mercer in Benares to Neil Edmonstone, 18 January 1799, Lincolnshire Archives, Stubton 3/E/7, Cherry Correspondence.

101 Ibid.

102 Ibid.

103 Ibid.

104 Neil Edmonstone in Madras to Shore in Britain, 18 May 1799, British and Foreign Bible Society, Sir John Shore's Letterbook, f. 76.

105 Datta, 141.

106 Neil Edmonstone in Madras to Shore in Britain, 18 May 1799, British and Foreign Bible Society, Sir John Shore's Letterbook, f. 77.


108 Neil Edmonstone in Madras to Shore in Britain, 18 May 1799, British and Foreign Bible Society, Sir John Shore's Letterbook, f. 60.


110 Neil Edmonstone in Calcutta to Charles Edmonstone in Britain, 3 December 1800, Elmore.


112 Neil Edmonstone in Madras to Shore in Britain, 18 May 1799, British and Foreign Bible Society, Sir John Shore's Letterbook, f. 60.

113 Ibid., f. 62.


115 Ibid., 326.

116 Datta, 138.

117 Ibid.

119 Datta, 138.


122 Neil Edmonstone in Madras to Shore in Britain, 18 May 1799, British and Foreign Bible Society, Sir John Shore's Letterbook, f. 66.

123 Ibid.

124 Ray, 70.

125 Neil Edmonstone in Madras to Shore in Britain, 18 May 1799, British and Foreign Bible Society, Sir John Shore's Letterbook, f. 67.


128 Ibid.


130 Ibid.

131 Ibid.


133 Wellesley at Fort St. George, Madras, to the Court of Directors in London, 12 February 1799, Lincolnshire Archives, Stubton 3/E/7, Cherry Correspondence.

134 Bayly, Empire and Information, 146.

135 Quoted in Moon, 284.

Harris, marching from Bombay, had 37,000 troops under his command; another force, comprised of 6,000 men, was under the command of Lieutenant-General James Stuart, marched from Bombay. Nizam Ali had supplied 10,000 cavalry, counterbalancing Tipu's well-trained cavalry units. Tipu also had approximately 37,000 men under his control, but had not prepared for war and was therefore at a considerable disadvantage.

Moon, 285.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Tipu in Seringapatam to Harris in camp, received 20 April 1799, The Wellesley Despatches (1840 edition), 538.

Moon, 288.


Letter from Wellesley to Harris, April 30, 1799, The Wellesley Despatches (1840 edition), 565.


Gardner, 146.


The Asiatic Annual Register for 1799, 257.


Narrative Sketches of the Conquest of Mysore, 99.

Ibid., 101.


Quoted in Forrest, 310-311.


M. Wood, A Review of the Origin, Progress, and Result, of the Late Decisive War in Mysore, in a letter from an Officer in India, by M. Wood, Esq., M.P., Colonel, and Late Chief Engineer, Bengal (London: 1800), 9, 25.

Authentic Memoirs of Tippoo Sultaun, Including his Cruel Treatment of the English Prisoners, by an Officer in the East India Service (London: 1799), 95.

The Wellesley Papers, 121.

Neil Edmonstone in Calcutta to George Edmonstone in Britain, 20 January 1800, Elmore.

“Vizier Ally,” Newspaper article from unknown paper, dated January 1818, Lincolnshire Archives, Stubton 3/E/7, Cherry Correspondence.
Neil Edmonstone in Calcutta to Charles Edmonstone in Britain, 8 September 1800, Elmore.

Wellesley at Fort St. George, Madras, to the Court of Directors in London, 12 February 1799, Lincolnshire Archives, Stubton 3/E/7, Cherry Correspondence.

CHAPTER EIGHT

1 *Narrative Sketches of the Conquest of Mysore*, 100, for the quoted passage; the fact that NBE ended up with much of Tipu’s library in his possession was recorded in a letter he sent to Archibald Edmonstone, 8 September 1800, Elmore.


5 Neil Edmonstone (ed.), *Official Documents, relative to the Negotiations Carried on by Tippoo Sultaun, with the French Nation, and other Foreign States, for Purposes Hostile to the British Nation* (Calcutta: 1799), ix.

6 Ibid., x.

7 *Narrative Sketches of the Conquest of Mysore*, 100.

8 Neil Edmonstone at Madras to William Edmonstone in Calcutta, 5th June 1799, Elmore.


10 *The Wellesley Despatches* (1877 edition), 144.

11 Ibid., 141.

12 John Malcolm in Tehran to William Kirkpatrick in Hyderabad, 13th January 1801, OIOC, Mss Eur 228/29, f. 41 (v.).


15 Ibid.

16 Richard Wellesley to Lady Anne Barnard at the Cape, 2 October 1800, quoted in Forrest, 312; The Wellesley Papers, 121.

17 Letter from Tipu to Sultan Selim, contained within The Wellesley Despatches (1877 edition), 81.


19 Wellesely at Amlington House to the Board of Control, 16 August 1837, Elmore.


22 Full title is Meherban Shrimant Maharaja Amirsinha [Ramaswami] Bhonsle Chhatrapati Maharaj.

23 Full title is Meherban Shrimant Maharaja Sarabhoji II Bhonsle Chhatrapati Maharaj.

24 Full title is Meherban Shrimant Maharaja Shivaji Bhonsle Chhatrapati Maharaj.

25 Extracts from a Letter from Gholam Ali Khan and Ali Reza Khan to Tipu Sultan, 15th June 1792, in Letters and other Documents relative to the Intrigues of the two former Nabobs of the Carnatic with Tippoo Sultaun, as discovered by the Papers found in Seringapatam, OIOC, Home Misc Series 293, f. 23.

26 Extract from a letter from Gholam Ali Khan and Ali Reza Khan to Tipu Sultan, 11th August 1792, OIOC, Home Misc Series 293, f. 34.

27 Ibid., f. 36.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid., ff. 41, 44.
Extract from a letter from Tipu Sultan to Gholam Ali Khan and Ali Reza Khan, 12th July 1792, OIOC, Home Misc Series 293, f. 275.


Mr. Edmonstone's Report, 6 April 1800, OIOC, Home Misc Series 293, f. 159.

Extract from a letter from Tipu Sultan to Gholam Ali Khan and Ali Reza Khan, 12th July 1792, OIOC, Home Misc Series 293, f. 276.

Ibid., f. 278.


Extract from a letter from Gholam Ali Khan and Ali Reza to Tipu Sultan, 23rd July 1793, OIOC, Home Misc Series 293, f. 75.

Ibid., f. 76.

Extract of a letter from Gholam Ali Khan and Ali Reza to Tipu Sultan, without date, OIOC, Home Misc Series 293, f. 81.

Extract of a letter from Gholam Ali Khan and Ali Reza to Tipu Sultan, 31st August 1793, OIOC, Home Misc Series 293, f. 86.

Ibid., f. 87.

Ibid., ff. 88-89.

Ibid., f. 91.

Translation of a letter from Mohammed Ghyaus and Mohammed Ghore Khan, ambassadors from Tipu Sultan to Nawab of the Carnatic, 17th December 1795, OIOC, Home Misc Series 293, ff. 106-108.

Translation of a letter from Mohammed Ghyaus and Mohammed Ghore Khan, deputed by Tipu Sultan to the Nawab of the Carnatic, without date, OIOC, Home Misc Series 293, ff. 111-112.

Mr. Edmonstone's Report, 6 April 1800, OIOC, Home Misc Series 293, ff. 121-122.
Ibid., f. 122.

Key to a Cypher found among the Records at Seringapatam received in Calcutta the 2nd March 1800, OIOC, Home Misc Series 293, f. 47.

Mr. Edmonstone's Report, 6 April 1800, OIOC, Home Misc Series 293, f. 142.

Ibid., f. 123.

Ibid., f. 163-4.

Ibid., f. 159.

Ibid., f. 161.

Ibid., ff. 165-166.

Ibid., f. 124.

Ibid., f. 137.

Ibid., f. 137.

Ibid., f. 123.

Ibid., f. 142.

Ibid., f. 153.

Ibid., ff. 194-195.

Ibid., f. 195.

Translation of a letter from Mohammed Ozman, Vakil to Haidar Ali Khan, received 30th January 1773, OIOC, Home Misc Series 293, f. 283.


Ibid., f. 288.

Ibid.

Ibid., f. 291.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., f. 299 [footnote].

Ibid., 295.

Ibid., ff. 305-306.


Ibid., f. 308.


Ultimate Report from the Persian Translator, OIOC, Home Misc Series 293, f. 487.

Ibid., f. 499.

Ibid., f. 491.

Ibid., f. 492.

Ibid., f. 500.


Ultimate Report from the Persian Translator, OIOC, Home Misc Series 293, f. 496.

Ibid., f. 505.

Ibid., ff. 513-514.

Ibid., f. 507.

Ibid., f. 508.

Ibid., f. 509.


94 Ibid.


100 Ibid., 116.

101 Ibid., 108, 112; *Additional Supplement to the Calcutta Gazette*, April 15, 1802, recounts details of Wellesley's visit to Awadh.


103 Captain Frith from camp at Patab Gurh to James Law in London, 20 December 1801, Home Misc Series 235, f. 561.


105 Ibid.

106 Ibid.

107 Ibid., f. 45.


111 The Wellesley Despatches (1877 edition), 206.


113 Captain W.D. Knox in Benares to William Kirkpatrick, 12th March 1801, OIOC, Mss Eur F 228/29, f. 13 (v.).

114 Ibid., f. 15.

115 Captain W.D. Knox in Benares to Neil Edmonstone, 18 April, 1801, OIOC, Mss Eur F 228/29, f. 24.

116 Neil Edmonstone in Patna to William Kirkpatrick, 22nd October 1801, OIOC, Mss Eur F 228/29, f. 50.

117 Ibid., ff. 51 (v.)-52.


119 Lieutenant Colonel Scott to Mornington, 18 February 1800, OIOC, Home Misc Series 235, f. 530.

120 Sa'adat Ali Khan in Lucknow to Richard Wellesley in Calcutta, 14th January 1801, OIOC, Mss. Eur 228/29, f. 32 (v.).

121 Ibid., f. 32 (v.)-33.

122 Ibid., f. 33 (v.).


124 Ibid., f. 14.

125 Extract of a letter from Lieutenant Colonel Scott Resident at Lucknow to Mr. Edmonstone, 2 July 1801, OIOC, Home Misc Series 235, f. 509.
126 Ibid., ff. 509-510.

127 Ibid., f. 511.


129 Ibid., ff. 86, 89.

130 Neil Edmonstone in Calcutta to William Kirkpatrick in Kanpur, 1st May 1801, OIOC, Mss. Eur F 228/29, f. 3.


133 Valentia, vol. I, 108, 112; Additional Supplement to the Calcutta Gazette, April 15, 1802, recounts details of Wellesley's visit to Awadh.


135 Additional Supplement to the Calcutta Gazette, April 15, 1802.


139 Sinha, 36.
CHAPTER NINE


6 *Sketches of India*, 2.

7 Sir James Mackintosh to Mr. Sharp, June 1804, quoted in Pierce, 283.

8 *Calcutta Gazette Extraordinary*, April 19, 1802, 1.

9 *Calcutta Gazette*, November 4, 1802, 2.

10 *Calcutta Gazette*, May 6, 1802, 3.

11 See the *Calcutta Gazette Extraordinary*, May 4, 1802, 1, for a report of Harris’s gift; and the *Calcutta Gazette*, May 6, 1802, 2, for an account of the breakfast.

12 *Calcutta Gazette*, May 5, 1803, 3.

13 *Calcutta Gazette*, Nov. 4, 1802, 2.

14 Curzon, 109.

15 *The Asiatic Annual Register for the Year 1803* (London: 1804), 72.

16 Valentia, vol. 1, 37.

17 *The Asiatic Annual Register for the Year 1803*, 72.

18 “Splendid Fete, given by Marquis Wellesley, in honour of the Peace of Amiens,” *The Asiatic Annual Register for the Year 1803*, 70.
19 Valentia, vol. I, 37; The Asiatic Annual Register for the Year 1803, 70.

20 The Asiatic Annual Register for the Year 1803, 70.

21 Curzon, 109.

22 Ibid.


24 Ibid., 38.

25 The Asiatic Annual Register for the Year 1803, 70.

26 Ibid., 71.

27 Ibid., 72.

28 Curzon, 210; The Asiatic Annual Register for the Year 1803, 71.

29 NBE to Charles Edmonstone, 10 December 1802, Elmore.

30 NBE Autobiography, ff. 37 (v.)-39.

31 Curzon, 118.

32 NBE to Charles Edmonstone, 3 December 1800, Elmore.

33 Ibid.

34 NBE Autobiography, f. 34.

35 The Asiatic Annual Register for the Year 1801 (London: 1802), 45.

36 Ibid., 31-32.


38 NBE in Calcutta to William Kirkpatrick, 1 May 1801, OIOC, Mss. EUR F 228/29, Edmonstone and Wellesley’s Negotiations with Oude, f. 5-6.


40 Ibid.

41 Ibid., f. 7.
Ibid., ff. 7-8.

NBE from Calcutta to James Achilles Kirkpatrick in Hyderabad, 30th July 1803, OIOC, Mss. EUR F 228/70.

“Proceedings of the College of Fort William,” in Home Miscellaneous Series, DLIX (October 31, 1801), Indian National Archives, New Delhi, 12; Ibid., April 24, 1801, 1-6.

The Calcutta Gazette, Feb. 11, 1802, 2.


Ibid., 22, 34.

Edwardes, Glorious Sahibs, 52.

Ibid., 82.

Henry Truitt in Calcutta to William Adam, 16 July 17, OIOC, Mss. EUR F 109/81, f. 96.

John Adam in Calcutta to his father, Aug. 4, 1795, OIOC, Mss. EUR F 109/81.

In addition to formal occasions, Neil, as was common with most senior Company men, kept a "table," or regular dinner parties to which favored young employees were invited.

Edmonstone, Autobiography, f. 35.

NBE to his father, 6 March 1800, Elmore.

NBE’s Autobiography, f. 35.


An East-India Register and Directory for 1803 (London: Cox, Son, and Bayliss, 1803), 1.

NBE’s Autobiography, f. 36.
60 Ibid., f. 34 (v.).

61 Ibid., ff. 36-37.

62 *The Asiatic Mirror*, #1699 (September 18, 1816), contains an advertisement for the sale of this house.

63 NBE’s *Autobiography*, f. 39.

64 Ibid., f. 39 (v.).


66 Ibid., f. 30.

67 Ibid.

68 Ibid.

69 Ibid., f. 31.

70 Ibid, ff. 33-34.

71 Ibid., ff. 34-36.

72 Ibid, ff. 38-41.

73 Ibid., f. 43.

74 Ibid., ff. 43-46.

75 Ibid., ff. 50-51.

76 NBE’s *Autobiography*, f. 36.

77 NBE in Calcutta to Achilles Kirkpatrick in Hyderabad, 2 July 1803, OIOC, Mss. EUR F 228/70, ff. 30-31.

78 NBE to Charles Edmonstone, 23 February, 1803, Elmore.

79 NBE’s *Autobiography*, ff. 36-37.

CHAPTER TEN

1 Neil Benjamin Edmonstone (afterwards NBE), in Calcutta, to James Achilles Kirkpatrick (afterwards JAK), in Hyderabad, 24 January 1803, OIOC, Mss. EUR F 228/70, f. 3.

2 NBE, in Calcutta, to JAK, in Hyderabad, 26 April 1803, OIOC, Mss. EUR F 228/70, f. 11.

4 NBE to JAK, 29 August 1802, OIOC, Mss. EUR F 228/83, f. 50.

5 JAK, Political Memoir on Mysore, November 1799, OIOC, Mss. EUR F 228/28, ff. 3-5.

6 Ibid., ff. 5 (v.)-6.

7 Ibid., ff. 6 (v.)-7.

8 Ibid., f. 12.

9 Ibid., f. 12 (v.).

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid., ff. 18-18 (v.).


13 NBE, in Calcutta, to JAK, in Hyderabad, 23 May 1801, OIOC, Mss. Eur F 151/107, f. 47 (v.).

14 NBE, in Calcutta, to JAK, in Hyderabad, 8 December 1803, OIOC, Mss. EUR F 228/70.


17 NBE, in Calcutta, to JAK, in Hyderabad, 26 April 1803, OIOC, Mss. EUR F 228/70, f. 12.

18 NBE, in Calcutta, to JAK, in Hyderabad, 22 May 1803, OIOC, Mss. EUR F 228/70, f. 13.

19 NBE, in Fort William, to JAK, in Hyderabad, 23 May 1803, OIOC, Mss. EUR F 228/70, f. 16.

20 JAK, in Hyderabad, to NBE, in Calcutta, 27 May 1803, OIOC, Mss. EUR F 228/70, f. 20.
21 Ibid., f. 21.
22 Ibid., f. 22.
23 NBE, in Calcutta, JAK, in Hyderabad, 2 July 1803, OIOC, Mss. EUR F 228/70, ff. 26-27.
24 Ibid., f. 31.
25 Ibid., f. 34.
26 JAK, in Hyderabad, to NBE, in Calcutta, 19 July 1803, OIOC, Mss. EUR F 228/70 f. 47.
28 Ibid.
29 *Glorious Sahibs*, 36-37.
31 Ibid, f. 97.
33 Ibid., f. 105.
35 Richard Wellesley, in Calcutta, to Gerard Lake, 1 August 1803, OIOC, HMS 485, Secret Consultations on the Marathas, ff. 142-143.
37 William Scott, in Lucknow, to NBE, in Calcutta, 10 September 1803, OIOC, HMS 485, Secret Consultations on the Marathas, 491.
38 Ibid., f. 493.

320
39 Ibid., f. 495.


41 The Asiatic Miscellany, W. Chambers and Sir W. Jones (ed.) (Calcutta, 1777), 149.

42 Ibid.


44 Estimate based on the observations in 1801 of George Thomas. From William Francklin, Military Memoires of Mr. George Thomas who . . . rose from an Obscure Situation to the Rank of General in the Service of the Native Powers in the North-West of India, (London: Stockdale, 1805), 297.

45 Ibid.


48 Ibid., f. 5.

49 Ibid., f. 6.

50 Ibid.

51 NBE, in Calcutta, to Captain Baillie, Agent to his Excellency the Commander in Chief in Bundelkhand, 2 February 1804, British Library, Add. Mss. 13591, Papers Relating to Bundelkhand, f. 11.

52 Ibid., f. 12.


55 Ibid.

56 Ibid., f. 8.


58 John Baillie, in Banda, to NBE, in Calcutta, 30 November 1806, OIOC, HMS 636, f. 326.


60 Moon, 321.

61 Ibid., 322.

62 Ibid., 326.

63 NBE, in Calcutta, to JAK, in Hyderabad, 9 January 1804, OIOC, Mss. EUR F 228/71, Kirkpatrick Collection, f. 1.


65 Ibid.


67 Ibid.


69 Ibid., 471.

70 Lord Castlereagh, in London, to Richard Wellesley, in Calcutta, 9 September 1803, cited in Martin, vol. IV, 32. Castlereagh informed Wellesley that the Company’s stock had fallen since the commencement of the Maratha wars from 215 to 160.

71 Martin, vol. IV, 520.


73 Ibid.

NBE, in Calcutta, JAK, in Hyderabad, 16 August 1804, OIOC, Mss. EUR F 228/70, f. 43-45.

Ibid., f. 45.

JAK, in Hyderabad, to Richard Wellesley, in Calcutta, 7 December 1804, OIOC, Mss. EUR F 228/64, f. 35.

JAK, in Hyderabad, to NBE, in Calcutta, 9 March 1804, OIOC, Mss. EUR F 228/64, f. 2.

Ibid.

JAK, in Hyderabad, to NBE, in Calcutta, 11 July 1804, OIOC, Mss. EUR F 228/64, f. 8.

JAK, in Hyderabad, to NBE, in Calcutta, 9 March 1806, OIOC, Mss. EUR F 228/70, f. 17.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Translation of a letter from Meer Alam to Major Kirkpatrick, Resident at Hyderabad, received 8 July 1804, OIOC, Mss. EUR F 228/64, f. 41.

NBE, in Calcutta, JAK, in Hyderabad, 22 May 1804, OIOC, Mss. EUR F 228/70, f. 25.

NBE, in Calcutta, to JAK, in Hyderabad, 16 June 1804, OIOC, Mss. EUR F 228/70, f. 30.

Translation of a Verbal Statement made by a Female Intelligencer in Hyderabad, 20 June 1804, OIOC, Mss. EUR F 228/64, f. 49.

Ibid.

JAK, in Hyderabad, to NBE, in Calcutta, 29 July 1804, OIOC, Mss. EUR F 228/64 f. 15.

Translation of a verbal statement made by the same female Intelligencer in Hyderabad, OIOC, Mss. EUR F 228/64, f. 50.

Ibid., f. 50 (v.).
Statement made by Rajah Toog Teewan Dos of Intelligence which was verbally communicated to him by Syed ood Dowlah, a near relation of Meer Aulum, August 14, 1804, OIOC, Mss. EUR F 228/64, No. 3, f. 51.

Ibid., f. 52.

Ibid., f. 54.

Translation of a written Statement delivered by Gholoamee Sahib, of Information which he received from Kysur Jung the former Aruzbeyu of H.H. Secunder Jah, August 28, 1804, OIOC, Mss. EUR F 228/64, f. 61.

Translation of a letter from Shuhgur ool Moolk to Major Kirkpatrick, Received 25 September 1804, OIOC, Mss. EUR F 228/64, No. 20, f. 73.

JAK, in Hyderabad, to NBE, in Calcutta, 9 October 1804, OIOC, Mss. EUR F 228/64 f. 94 (v.).

Ibid., f. 95 (v.).

JAK, in Hyderabad, to Richard Wellesley, in Calcutta, 7 December 1804, OIOC, Mss. EUR F 228/64, f. 34 (v.).

Ibid., f. 26.

Ibid.

Ibid., f. 34.

NBE in Calcutta, to JAK, in Hyderabad, 6 July 1805, OIOC, Mss. EUR F 228/70, f. 49.

NBE, in Calcutta, to JAK, in Hyderabad, 21 August 1805, OIOC, Mss. EUR F 228/70, f. 63.

Ibid., f. 65.


NBE, Secret and Confidential Notes on Holkar, Fort William, 28 July 1804, OIOC, HMS 626, f. 21.
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2 Ibid., Cornwallis to Ross, 18 December 1803, in Ross, 508; Cornwallis to Ross, 14 October 1804, in Ross, 518.

3 Wickwire, 265.

4 Ibid.

5 Kaye, 183.

6 Papers Presented to the House of Commons Relating to East India Affairs viz. Copies of all letters from the late Marquess Cornwallis, Governor-General of Bengal, ordered to be printed 19th February, 1808, 3.

7 Kaye, 239.

8 Ibid., Mr. Robinson to George Barlow, October 1, 1805, 185.


10 Ibid., f. 41.

11 Ibid., f. 43.
12 Copy of Testimonial from George Barlow, September, 1837, attached to Neil Edmonstone's Autobiography, f. 20 (v.)

13 Ibid., f. 20.

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16 Testimonial from Sir George Barlow, September 1837, contained within Edmonstone's Autobiography, f. 20-21.

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19 Charles Cornwallis to the directors, August 28, 1805, Cornwallis Papers, 6.

20 Quoted in Kaye, 237.

21 Neil Edmonstone on the Ganges near Berhampore to Colonel James Achilles Kirkpatrick, August 21, 1805, Cornwallis Papers, 12.

22 The Wellesley Despatches (1877 edition), 811.

23 Cornwallis to Arthur Wellesley, 16 August 1805, in Ross, 541.


27 John Collins in Lucknow to Barlow, 19 October 1805, OIOC, Mss. EUR/F 176/28.

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64 Ibid., f. 42.
65 Claudius Buchanan at Ramnadpooram, 29th September 1806, OIOC, Mss Eur D 122, f. 52.
66 Ibid., f. 58.
67 Claudius Buchanan at Tanjore, 2nd September 1806, OIOC, Mss Eur D 122, f. 48.
68 Claudius Buchanan at Trivandram Palace of the King of Travancore, 27th October 1806, OIOC, Mss Eur D 122, f. 69.
69 Buchanan, Memoir, 13.
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72 Claudius Buchanan at Cochin, 5th December 1806, OIOC, Mss Eur D 122, ff. 79-80.
73 Ibid., f. 82.
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76 Ibid., f. 107.
77 Claudius Buchanan, Christian Researches in Asia (New York, 1812), 68, iii.
78 Claudius Buchanan at Cochin, 5th December 1806, OIOC, Mss Eur D 122, f. 108.
79 Ibid., 109.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid., ff. 109-110.
82 Ibid., 113.
83 Claudius Buchanan at Cochin, 23rd January 1807, OIOC, Mss Eur D 122, f. 127.
84 Ibid., f. 126.

85 Ibid., f. 127.

86 Claudius Buchanan at Bombay, 10th February 1808, OIOC, Mss Eur D 122, ff. 142-143.

87 Ibid., f. 144.

88 Ibid., ff. 144-145. The inquisition was ended permanently in Goa in 1812.

89 Buchanan, *Memoir*, 27.


91 Copy of a Testimonial from George Barlow, September 1837, attached to Neil Edmonstone's *Autobiography*, f. 21.


93 Thomas Sydenham from Hyderabad to George Buchan, Chief Secretary to the Government at Fort William, 14th September 1806, OIOC, Home Misc Series 509, f. 348.

94 Ibid., f. 349.

95 Translation of an Arzee found in the Palaces of His Highness the Nizam, transmitted to Calcutta by Thomas Sydenham, resident at Hyderabad, OIOC, Home Misc Series 509, f. 352.

96 Ibid., f. 352.

97 Thomas Sydenham from Hyderabad to George Buchan, 14th September 1806, OIOC, Home Misc Series 509, f. 343.

98 Ibid., 344. The two sepoys involved were Kulas Singh of the 15th regiment and Subah Singh, regiment not given in the letter.

99 Ibid.

100 Ibid., ff. 345-346.

101 Neil Benjamin Edmonstone, "Report on the Subject of the Freedom of the Press in India," fol. 130; Testimonial from Sir George Barlow, September 1837,


103 Neil Edmonstone to Thomas Sydenham, 1st September 1806, OIOC, Home Misc Series 509, f. 372.

104 Ibid., f. 373.

105 George Hilaro Barlow in Calcutta to Richard Wellesley in Britain, 19th February 1807, OIOC, Home Misc Series 509, f. 147.

106 Neil Edmonstone to Thomas Sydenham, 1st September 1806, OIOC, Home Misc Series 509, f. 373.


111 Neil Edmonstone, Proclamation to the Muslim Residents of Calcutta, 19th February 1804, OIOC, Mss Eur F 228/70, f. 12.

112 Ibid., f. 13.

113 NBE to James Achilles Kirkpatrick, 21 February 1804, Mss Eur F 228/70. f. 9.

114 NBE to Carey, 8 September 1807, letter, OIOC, Home Misc. Series 690, fol. 56.


117 John Adam, Minute in Answer to Objections Against Permitting the Establishment of a Christian Press at Surat," OIOC, the Adam's Papers, Mss Eur F 109/56, f. 3.


119 Ibid.

120 NBE to Thomas Sydenham, 1st September 1806, OIOC, Home Misc Series 509, f. 373.

121 George Hilaro Barlow to Thomas Grenville at Fort William, 12th February 1807, OIOC, the Barlow Papers, Mss Eur 176/29, f. 135.


123 Philips, The East India Company, 160.


125 Scott-Waring, A Letter to Owen, 33; David Hopkins, The Danger to British India from French Invasion and Missionary Establishments (London, 1809), 14.


127 Scott-Waring, Observations, xiv.

128 Id., xlv; Hopkins, Danger to British India, 26.

129 Hopkins, Danger to British India, 50.

130 Claudius Buchanan at Kirby Hall to the Court of Directors, 25th May 1813, OIOC, Home Misc Series 59, f. 536.

131 Twining, ii.

132 Scott-Waring, Letter to Owen, 81, 8.

133 Scott-Waring, Observations, xii, xxxvi.

135 Hopkins, *Danger to British India*, 3.


138 Ibid., 73 (emphasis in original).


140 Buchanan, *Christian Researches*, 142.


143 John Shore, Baron Teignmouth, *Considerations on the Practicability, Policy, and Obligation of Communicating to the Natives of India the Knowledge of Christianity* (London, 1808), 4, 7, 9, 13.

144 Edward Perry to Henry Dundas, Memorandum Transmitted by the Chairs to Dundas, 26th August 1808, OIOC, Home Misc Series 59, Buchanan's Letters, f. 465 (v.).

145 Henry Dundas at Melville Castle to Edward Perry, 6th September 1808, OIOC, Home Misc Series 59, f. 473.

146 C. Buller to the Court of Directors, 10th May 1813, OIOC, Home Misc Series 59, f. 497 and following.

147 Claudius Buchanan at Kirby Hall to the Court of Directors, 25th May 1813, OIOC, Home Misc Series 59, f. 513.

148 Ibid., f. 535.

149 Ibid., f. 513 (v).
150 Ibid., f. 522.
151 Ibid., 529.
153 Hopkins, *Danger to British India*, 23.
154 East India Question, *Debates at the General Court of Proprietors of East India Stock on the 22nd and 26th June, 1813 on a Bill Pending in Parliament for a Renewal of the Company's Charter* (London, 1813), 185.
155 Ibid., 220.
156 Ibid., 221, 241; Charles Marsh, *Substance of a Speech by Charles Marsh Esq. in a Committee of the House of Commons, July 1, 1813* (London, 1813), 6.
157 *The Parliamentary Debates from the Year 1803 to the Present Time*, vol. 26 (London, 1813), 105.
158 Ibid., 827.
159 Ibid., 870.
CHAPTER TWELVE

1 Neil travelled to Diamond Harbor to meet Minto's ship, conveyed him via the state barge back to Calcutta, and then introduced him to the other members of government. As recorded in *The Asiatic Annual Register for 1808* (London: 1811), 8.

2 Minto in Barrackpore to NBE in Calcutta, 26 January 1813, Memorandum and Correspondence between Lord Minto and Mr. Edmonstone, 1809-1813, National Library of Scotland, Mss. 11305, f. 81.

3 Ibid.


5 Ibid., 183.

6 Minto in Barrackpore to NBE in Calcutta, 25 January 1813, Memorandum and Correspondence between Lord Minto and Mr. Edmonstone, 1809-1813, National Library of Scotland, Mss. 11305, f. 66.

7 Ibid, f. 67.

8 Ibid., ff. 67-68.

9 Ibid., f. 69.

10 NBE to Minto, 25 January 1813, Memorandum and Correspondence between Lord Minto and Mr. Edmonstone, 1809-1813, National Library of Scotland, Mss. 11305, f. 72.

11 Ibid., f. 73.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 Neil in Calcutta to Minto in Barrackpore, 26 January 1813, Memorandum and Correspondence between Lord Minto and Mr. Edmonstone, 1809-1813, National Library of Scotland, Mss. 11305, f. 87.

15 NBE to Minto, 25 January 1813, Memorandum and Correspondence between Lord Minto and Mr. Edmonstone, 1809-1813, National Library of Scotland, Mss. 11305, f. 75.

16 Ibid., f. 76.
Ibid., f. 75.

18 Minto in Barrackpore to NBE in Calcutta, 26 January 1813, Memorandum and Correspondence between Lord Minto and Mr. Edmonstone, 1809-1813, National Library of Scotland, Mss. 11305, f. 81.

19 Neil in Calcutta to Minto in Barrackpore, 26 January 1813, Memorandum and Correspondence between Lord Minto and Mr. Edmonstone, 1809-1813, National Library of Scotland, Mss. 11305, f. 93.

Ibid.


22 Quoted in Curzon, *British Government in India*, 212.

Ibid.


25 Sir George Hilaro Barlow to Lord Minto, 28 July 1806, Cleveland Public Library, John G. White Collection, Wq 091.92 B249l, Letters to Lord Minto, f. 3.

26 Minto in Fort William to Barlow in Madras, 15 July 1809, National Library of Scotland, Mss. 11286, Copies of Letters from the Governor-General from 1809-1812, f. 27.


28 NBE in Fort St. George, Madras, to Captain J. Sydenham in Hyderabad, 24 March 1810, National Library of Scotland, Mss. 11668, The Minto Papers, f. 47.

Ibid., f. 48.

Ibid.

Ibid., ff. 48-52.


Ibid., f. 45.
34 Ibid., f. 51.

35 NBE to Minto, both in Calcutta, 28 June 1812, National Library of Scotland, Mss. 11305, Memorandum and Correspondence between Lord Minto and Mr Edmonstone, 1809-1813, ff. 56-57.

36 Ibid., f. 56.

37 Ibid., f. 57.

38 Minto, Minute on Quitting the Government of India, National Library of Scotland, Mss. 11336, f. 4.

39 Minto in Barrackpore to Colebrooke, 9 July 1810, National Library of Scotland, Mss. 11286, Copies of Letters from the Governor-General from 1809-1812, f. 174, discusses a friendly dinner engagement; Minto in Barrackpore to NBE in Calcutta, 20 March 1808, National Library of Scotland, Mss. 11283, Copy Book of Letters Written by the Governor-General, 1807-1808, f. 252, discusses the prisoner exchange.

40 Minto in Barrackpore to NBE in Calcutta, 24 December 1807, National Library of Scotland, Mss. 11283, Copy Book of Letters Written by the Governor-General, 1807-1808, f. 122.

41 Ibid., f. 123.

42 NBE, Memorandum Regarding Sindh, 3 March 1808, National Library of Scotland, Mss. 11721, The Minto Papers, f. 45.

43 Ibid., f. 49.

44 Ibid., f. 51.

45 Ibid., f. 64.

46 Ibid., f. 65.

47 Ibid., f. 66.

48 NBE, Memorandum, 10 March 1808, National Library of Scotland, Mss. 11721, The Minto Papers, f. 68.

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid., f. 70.
Ibid., f. 71.  
Ibid.  
Ibid., f. 74.  
*Glorious Sahibs*, 43.  
NBE in Fort William to Mountstuart Elphinstone, 6 March 1809, OIOC, Home Misc Series 657, f. 190.  
NBE in Calcutta to Charles Metcalfe in the Punjab, 20 June 1808, OIOC, Home Misc Series 592, f. 25.  
Ibid., f. 27.  
Ibid., f. 29.  
Ibid., ff. 39-40.  
Ibid., ff. 40-41.  
Ibid., ff. 42-43.  
Ibid., ff. 47-50.  
Ibid., f. 50.  
Ibid., f. 51.  
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Ibid., f. 58.  
Ibid., f. 61.  
71 NBE, Memorandum Respecting the Credibility of the Supposed Intrigue Between Rajah Runjeet Sing and Amrut Row, 25 August 1808, Home Misc Series 592, f. 257.

72 Ibid.

73 Ibid., f. 259.

74 Ibid., f. 260.

75 Ibid., f. 265.

76 Ibid., ff. 267-268.

77 NBE in Calcutta to Charles Metcalfé in the Punjab, 20 June 1808, OIOC, Home Misc Series 592, ff. 63-64.

78 NBE in Calcutta to Metcalf in the Punjab, 29 April 1809, OIOC, Home Misc Series 595, ff. 78-79.

79 Ibid., f. 76.


83 Ibid.

84 NBE, Autobiography, f. 39.

85 Ibid.

86 Selections from the Calcutta Gazettes of the Years 1806 to 1815, volume IV, ed. Hugh David Sandeman, (Calcutta: 1868), 185.

87 NBE in Calcutta to Mounstuart Elphinstone, 19 August 1808, OIOC, Home Misc Series 657, f. 61.

88 Ibid.

89 Ibid.
90 Mounstuart Elphinstone in Peshawar to Gilbert Elliot, Lord Minto, in Calcutta, 8 March 1809, OIOC, Home Misc Series 657, f. 200.

91 Mountstuart Elphinstone, in camp at Vizierabad, to NBE in Calcutta, 3 August 1809, OIOC, Home Misc Series 657, f. 517.

92 NBE in Calcutta to Mounstuart Elphinstone in Peshawar, undated, probably May 1809, OIOC, Home Misc Series 657, f. 396.

93 Ibid., f. 400.

94 Ibid., f. 403.

95 Ibid., f. 404.

96 Ibid., f. 406.

97 Neil Edmonstone to Minto, 26 February 1811, Memorandum and Correspondence between Lord Minto and Mr. Edmonstone, 1809-1813, National Library of Scotland, Mss. 11305, f. 5. Neil asked that Minto issue a memorandum stating clearly that he had been left in Calcutta because the governor-general needed him there, not because he was out of favor, to prevent anyone from misunderstanding the issue. Minto readily complied with this request.

98 NBE, Autobiography, f. 50.

99 Ibid., f. 51.

100 NBE in Calcutta to Minto, 26 June 1811, National Library of Scotland, Mss. 11620, The Minto Letters, f. 117.

101 Ibid.

102 NBE, Autobiography, f. 47.

103 NBE in Calcutta to Minto, 26 June 1811, National Library of Scotland, Mss. 11620, The Minto Letters, f. 118.

104 Thomas S. Raffles, in Batavia, to NBE in Calcutta, 2 October 1815, National Library of Scotland, Mss. 12120, f. 76.

105 Thomas S. Raffles, in Batavia, to NBE in Calcutta, 2 October 1815, National Library of Scotland, Mss. 12120, f. 68, 75.

107 Ibid., ff. 52-53.


110 *Selections from the Calcutta Gazettes of the Years 1806 to 1815*, volume IV, ed. Hugh David Sandeman, (Calcutta: 1868), 324.


112 *Selections from the Calcutta Gazettes of the Years 1816 to 1823*, volume V, ed. Hugh David Sandeman, (Calcutta: 1868), 11.


114 NBE in Calcutta to Lord Moira, 26 January 1815, Cleveland Public Library, John G. White Collection, F091.92 bEa77L2, Letters from Lord Moira and others, chiefly on finances and the Nepalese war, f. 102.

115 Ibid., f. 109.

116 Lord Moira, from Camp at Agra, to NBE in Calcutta, 26 February 1815, Cleveland Public Library, John G. White Collection, F091.92 bEa77L2, Letters from Lord Moira and others, chiefly on finances and the Nepalese war, ff. 188-190.

117 Ibid., f. 189.

118 Ibid., f. 192.

119 Ibid., f. 195.

120 Ibid., f. 197.

121 Ibid., ff. 197-198.

122 Lord Moira, in Futtyghur, to NBE in Calcutta, 20 March 1815, Cleveland Public Library, John G. White Collection, F091.92 bEa77L2, Letters from Lord Moira and others, chiefly on finances and the Nepalese war, f. 199.

123 Ibid., f. 205.

NBE in Calcutta to Mounstuart Elphinstone in Peshawar, undated, probably May 1809, OIOC, Home Misc Series 657, f. 404.

NBE, Minute by Mr. Edmonstone, 22 April 1815, OIOC, Home Misc Series 604, f. 12.

Ibid., f. 19.

Ibid.

Minute by Mr. Edmonstone, 22 April 1816, OIOC, Home Misc Series 604, f. 41 and 45.

Ibid., f. 5. Neil is quoting a Minute he received from Moira.

Ibid., f. 6.

Extract of a Secret Letter from Bengal, 18 August 1811, quoted in Papers Respecting the Pindarry and Mahratta Wars (London: J.L. Cox, 1824), 1.

Extract from Captain Sydenham's Memorandum on the Pindarries, 1809, quoted in Papers Respecting the Pindarry and Mahratta Wars, 1.

Ibid., 2-3.

Ibid., 41.

NBE, Minute on the Pindarries, 31 March 1814, OIOC, Home Misc Series 598, f. 53.

Ibid., f. 54.

Ibid., f. 57.

Ibid., f. 73, 84.

NBE is quoting Hastings in a Minute Neil issued on 30 May 1814 concerning Amir Khan, OIOC, Home Misc Series 598, f. 388.

Ibid., f. 389.

Ibid., f. 391.
CONCLUSION

1 Supplement to the Government Gazette, no. 139, June 22, 1818, 1.

2 Neil Edmonstone to Charles Milner Ricketts, 17 January 1818, OIOC, Mss. EUR D 1234/6, Miscellaneous Correspondence.


5 The Government Gazette Extraordinary, January 10, 1818, Elmore.

6 Neil Edmonstone to C.M. Ricketts, 4 December 1817, OIOC, Mss. EUR D 1234/6.

7 Neil Edmonstone to C.M. Ricketts, 17 January 1818, OIOC, Mss. EUR D 1234/6.

8 The Government Gazette Extraordinary, January 10, 1818, Elmore.

9 Ibid.

10 The account of Mrs. Edmonstone's "At Home" was given in the Supplement to the Government Gazette, no. 125, October 16, 1817, 2; Neil's dinner was mentioned in the government Gazette, no. 116, August 14, 1817, 2.

11 Account from the Government Gazette, no. 136, January 1, 1818, 2.


13 Ibid., f. 60.

14 Ibid.
15 All were mentioned in the Last Will and Testament of Neil Edmonstone, Public Record Office, Prob/11/1947.

16 One of Neil's daughters would later recall Baillie visiting her father and that Neil possessed a large emerald ring given to him by his friend.


18 Francis Rawdon Hastings, Lord Moira, Address on Operations in India with their Results from the 30th April 1814 to the 1st January 1823, British Library, Add. Mss. 38411, f. 177.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid., f. 180.

21 Ibid., ff. 180-181.

22 Debate on February 8, 1826, over Hastings' Expose, in Debates at East India House, 23 March 1825 to 22 December 1830, vol. II (London: Black, Parbury & Allen, 1830), 423.

23 Ibid, First Debate on Hastings' Expose, 23 March 1825, 261.

24 Ibid, Debate on February 8, 1826, 420.


26 Debate on the 23 March 1825, in Debates at East India House, 23 March 1825 to 22 December 1830, vol. II (London: Black, Parbury & Allen, 1830), f. 245.

27 Ibid., f. 248.

28 Ibid., f. 246.

29 Ibid., 247.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid., f. 255.

32 Ibid.

34 Ibid., ff. 5, 17.

35 Ibid., ff. 5, 94.

36 Ibid., ff. 105-107.

37 Ibid., ff. 20-21.

38 Ibid., f. 8.

39 Ibid., ff. 13-14.

40 Ibid., f. 32.

41 Ibid., ff. 33-34.

42 Ibid., f. 31.

43 Ibid., 15.

44 Ibid., f. 130.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid., f. 131.

47 Ibid., f. 123.

48 Ibid., f. 134.

49 Ibid., f. 139.

50 Ibid., ff. 140-141.

51 "John Adam's Statement as to the Allegations in Mr. Buckingham's Petition," OIOC, Mss. EUR F 109/70, f. 4.

52 East India House, 19th July 1824, from The Sun, on the "Liberty of the Press in India," OIOC, Mss. EUR F 109/64, f. 49 (v.).

53 "Copy of a Minute From His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor-General dated 7th October 1822 respecting the state of the press in India," OIOC, Home Misc Series 532, f. 723.

55 Neil Edmonstone, from India House, to Sir John Cam Hobhouse, 20 January 1840, letter attached to Autobiography, ff. 4-5.


57 Ibid.

58 Ibid.

59 Quoted in above article.


61 Copy of a Testimonial from Sir George Barlow, September 1837, appended to NBE's *Autobiography*, f. 21.
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*The Edinburgh Review*

*The Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser*

*The London Chronicle*

*The Morning Post and Daily Advertiser*

*World*
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

EDUCATION

Ph.D. studies, Florida State University, 1995-2003

--Major Professor Dr. Bawa Singh
--My major field is British Imperialism, with an emphasis on the British in South Asia.
--My minor fields are early modern England, Chinese history and the Middle East.

M.A., University of Central Florida, Summa Cum Laude, 1995

--Major Professor Dr. Elmar Fetscher
--My major field was European history.

B.A., University of Central Florida, 1993, in History

PUBLICATIONS AND RESEARCH IN PROGRESS

Publications:


Research and Conferences:

--I recently completed a study on the life of Neil Benjamin Edmonstone, a senior East India Company civil servant in India from 1783-1818.
--I presented the paper, “Rethinking the Reign of Asaf-ud-Daula, Nawab of Awadh” at the 2002 Southeastern Conference for the Association for Asian Studies in Knoxville, Tennessee.
--I presented the paper “Images of Empire: Prejudice, Politics and Penury at the
Round Table Conference, 1931” at the 2001 Southeastern Conference of the Association for Asian Studies in Tallahassee, Florida.

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

--Assistant Professor of History, Lingnan University, Hong Kong, 2003-2004 academic year. I taught Twentieth Century Europe (HST 357), World History to 1500 (HST 111), and The Historical Experience in Film (GEB 262) in the Fall semester. In the Spring I taught World History Since 1500 (HST 112) and Environmental History.

--History Lecturer, Lingnan University, Hong Kong, 2002-2003 academic year. In the Fall semester, I taught World History to 1500 (HST 111) and The World Since the Industrial Revolution (HST 192); in Spring semester I taught Nineteenth Century Europe (HST 356) and World History Since 1500 (HST 112).

--Adjunct Assistant Professor of History at Appalachian State University in Boone, North Carolina, 2001-2002 academic year. In the Fall semester I taught World Civilization to 1500 (HIS 1101) and The Modern Middle East (HIS 3336). In the Spring semester, I taught Modern India (HIS 3332) and World Civilization from 1500 (HIS 1102).

--Florida State University, Teaching Assistant, Spring 2000. I had full classroom responsibility for one section of American Civilization (AMH 1000).

--Florida State London Study Center, Teaching Assistant, Spring 1998. I had full classroom responsibility for one section of World History from 1815 (WOH 1030) and one section of World History to 1815 (WOH 1023).

--Florida State University, Teaching Assistant, Fall 1997. I had full classroom responsibility for one section of World History from 1815.

AWARDS

--I received the J. Leitch Wright Award in 1997 for excellence in historical writing.

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MISCELLANEOUS

Service:

2002-3: I am web site manager for the History Programme at Lingnan University and secretary for the Policies and Curriculum Committee.

2001: I gave four presentations on the Afghan conflict in 2001, including discussions on Islam, the Middle East and the policies of the United States in the area. I also served on the newsletter committee for Appalachian State University’s History Department.

Scholarly Societies:

I belong to the Association of Asian Studies, the American Historical Association and Phi Alpha Theta. I also participate in several e-mail lists dealing with history—H-Asia and H-Albion—to stay current on recent trends and publications.