You are here

Primitives and Schemes for Non-Atomic Information Authentication

Title: Primitives and Schemes for Non-Atomic Information Authentication.
Name(s): Jakimoski, Goce, author
Burmester, Mike, professor directing dissertation
Desmedt, Yvo, professor co-directing dissertation
Van Hoeij, Mark, outside committee member
Gallivan, Kyle, committee member
Mascagni, Michael, committee member
Department of Computer Science, degree granting department
Florida State University, degree granting institution
Type of Resource: text
Genre: Text
Issuance: monographic
Date Issued: 2006
Publisher: Florida State University
Place of Publication: Tallahassee, Florida
Physical Form: computer
online resource
Extent: 1 online resource
Language(s): English
Abstract/Description: The digital revolution, fired by the development of the information and communication technologies, has fundamentally changed the way we think, behave, communicate, work and earn livelihood (the World Summit on the Information Society). These technologies have affected all aspects of our society and economy. However, the Information Society developments present us not only with new benefits and opportunities, but also with new challenges. Information security is one of these challenges, and nowadays, information security mechanisms are inevitable components of virtually every information system. Information authentication is one of the basic information security goals, and it addresses the issues of source corroboration and improper or unauthorized modification of data. More specific, data integrity is the property that the data has not been changed in an unauthorized manner since its creation, transmission or storage. Data origin authentication, or message authentication, is the property whereby a party can be corroborated as a source of the data. Usually, message authentication is achieved by appending an authentication tag or a digital signature to the message. The authentication tag (resp., digital signature) is computed in such a way so that only an entity that is in possession of the secret key can produce it, and it is used by the verifier to determine the authenticity of the message. During this procedure, the message is considered to be an atomic object in the following sense. The verifier needs the complete message in order to check its validity. Presented with the authentication tag (resp., digital signature) and an incomplete message, the verifier cannot determine whether the presented incomplete message is authentic or not. We consider a more general authentication model, where the verifier is able to check the validity of incomplete messages. In particular, we analyze the cases of erasure-tolerant information authentication and stream authentication. Our model of erasure-tolerant information authentication assumes that a limited number of the message ``letters' can be lost during the transmission. Nevertheless, the verifier should still be able to check the authenticity of the received incomplete message. We provide answers to several fundamental questions in this model (e.g., lower bounds on the deception probability, distance properties, optimal constructions, etc.), and we propose some constructions of erasure-tolerant authentication codes. Streams of data are bit sequences of a finite, but a priori unknown length that a sender sends to one or more recipients, and they occur naturally when on-line processing is required. In this case, the receiver should be able to verify the authenticity of a prefix of the stream, that is, the part of the stream that has been received so far. We provide efficient and proven secure schemes for both unicast and multicast stream authentication. The security proof of one of the proposed multicast stream authentication schemes assumes that the underlying block cipher is a related-key secure pseudorandom permutation. So, we also study the resistance of AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) to related-key differential attacks.
Identifier: FSU_migr_etd-3667 (IID)
Submitted Note: A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Computer Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
Degree Awarded: Spring Semester, 2006.
Date of Defense: March 30, 2006.
Bibliography Note: Includes bibliographical references.
Advisory Committee: Mike Burmester, Professor Directing Dissertation; Yvo Desmedt, Professor Co-Directing Dissertation; Mark Van Hoeij, Outside Committee Member; Kyle Gallivan, Committee Member; Michael Mascagni, Committee Member.
Subject(s): Computer science
Persistent Link to This Record:
Owner Institution: FSU

Choose the citation style.
Jakimoski, G. (2006). Primitives and Schemes for Non-Atomic Information Authentication. Retrieved from