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Attitudes in Time and Space: The Role of Context in Explaining Support for European Integration

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ATTITUDES IN TIME AND SPACE: THE ROLE OF CONTEXT IN EXPLAINING SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

By

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To my Family,

I dedicate my dissertation to my family. To my wife, Semra, whose love, support, and endless encouragements made finishing possible. To my children, Bahadir, Yusuf, and Ibrahim, who kept asking me when I would come home. To my parents, Cuma and Zehra who always believed in and supported me. To my brothers, Ishak and Osman and to my sisters Emine, Muhterem, Yuksel and Songul, who provided endless love and support and to my uncle, Suleyman, who has always been a role model to me. To my in-laws who always supported me and facilitated my achievements.

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ABSTRACT

This project investigates the role of the “context” in explaining support for European integration. The main goal of the dissertation is to assess the formative effect of time and space (i.e. context) on individual attitudes.

First, the project introduces the meaning and importance of support in the European Union. Next, a theoretical framework, regarding the role of context and its interaction with attitudes, is developed borrowing from research in psychology. Second, a brief history of integration is provided to assess how the evolution of the European project shapes supportive or non-supportive attitudes for integration. A series of multinomial logits are estimated utilizing the data from the standard Eurobarometer surveys between 1974 and 2002. The results provide supportive evidence regarding the temporal changes related to support for integration.

Third, some economic and political characteristics of members of the European Union are used to assess the effects of spatial differences on individual attitudes. This project unfolds the effect of institutional (i.e. corporatism and consensus democracy), economic (i.e. fiscal transfers from/to EU, trade dependency, and macroeconomic performance) and cultural (i.e. religion) differences in understanding support for integration. The results of the hierarchical linear model (HLM) demonstrate that public support is higher in consensus democracies, in the catholic nations as well as in those members receiving financial aid from the EU whereas level of support for integration runs low in corporatist nations.

This research fills a gap, neglected so far, in public opinion research in the EU: the effect of context on individuals’ support for integration. As such, it contributes to our understanding of public opinion in the EU and elsewhere, where time and space play a formative role on individuals’ attitudes and beliefs.
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

European integration was launched after the Second World War as an enthusiastic elite project aiming to bring peace, security and prosperity to the nations of Europe. European nations have successfully achieved economic integration, realized the first steps toward political unification and united 25 nations within half a century.

Not unexpectedly, for many years, integration has progressed as an elite project with an assumed permissive consensus with respect to public opinion. However, as this project deepened and widened over time, the losers and the winners of integration game clearly delineated from each other. When the six nations of Western Europe realized that trade liberalization and economic integration were benefiting all of them, they decided to extend economic cooperation into other areas and support this new structure with political institutions. However, as elites continued to push for deeper integration, public opinion, albeit sporadically, emerged as a more salient factor, and in some cases, a powerful brake to elite initiatives.

Public opinion is important not only in the European Union (EU)\(^1\) but in any political system for two well-known reasons. Firstly, public support has clear implications about the legitimacy of a political system. Blondel et al. (1998) believe that the legitimacy of a political system can be evaluated in two ways. One can assess the legitimacy of a system by relying on some normative criteria as a yardstick, as Dahl (1971) did by looking at

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\(^1\) The terms European Union and European Community are used interchangeably throughout the dissertation.
certain normative ideals and as Rawls (1971) did by considering the principle of fairness. Legitimacy can also be evaluated by the attitudes and support of citizens towards the political system. This assessment requires that a political system should have the support of its citizens to enjoy legitimacy. This issue becomes more relevant in the EU to the extent that European project lacks some normative ideals of democratic governance. In other words, the elite dominance (albeit decreasing) and the democratic deficit\(^2\) of the European project, makes public support important, because without a considerable level of support for EU, the legitimacy of its political system is at stake.

Secondly, public opinion provides cues to the policy-makers. This property is especially important in the political system of the EU. The policies decided within the institutional structure of this system are usually implemented in all member states making all citizens subject to the decisions of a supranational authority. In a traditional democratic system, attitudes about the outcome of policies as well as about the institutional structure producing them are likely to affect the content of the same policies. However, in the EU, this argument may be a difficult one to defend given the so-called democratic deficit problem (Weiler et al. 1994; Hix 2005). The democratic deficit refers to the increasing powers of the executive authority in Brussels in the lack of parliamentary control. In other words, this concept relates to the non-existence of the responsible party model, which assumes a government responsible to public via a popularly elected assembly.

Consequently and in the lack of any direct means of control over policy-makers, public opinion gains importance due to the fact that it provides a means through which citizens voice their concerns about certain policies. Public opinion provides fresh information to these national leaders, who make decisions at the EU level, about their electoral fortunes in the national arena. These leaders will eventually be held responsible to their own publics in national elections (not in the European Parliament elections considering their irrelevance at national level and their second-order character). Public opinion polls, in this sense, provide opportunities for citizens to signal their preferences and for the leaders to learn about those preferences to make proper adjustments.

\(^2\) See the discussion about democratic deficit below.
As mentioned previously, European integration started as an elite initiative and for many years public opinion is assumed to be in the mood of *permissive consensus*. The first public opinion shock reminding relevance of citizen attitudes was the rejection of Maastricht Treaty in Denmark in 1992. However, it was not only the backlash to the Maastricht treaty that made elites more attentive to public opinion, but even before that, *euroskepticism* has emerged as a prominent issue dividing major parties in some nations (e.g. UK and Denmark) (Taggard and Szczerbiak 2004).

The debates surrounding prominent issues like the single currency and the stability and growth pact (both imposing restrictions on national governments as well as tempting the national leaders to use the requirements imposed by these issues as *excuses* in the domestic arena) mobilized public to a greater extent. A second rejection in a referendum within the same decade in Denmark (i.e. referendum over joining the Euro), Swedish citizens’ “NO” vote to euro, and more surprisingly, a rejection to the Nice Treaty in Ireland in 2001, raised even more concerns about the future course of public opinion.

As discussed above, public opinion in the EU not only communicates to the EU level policy-making but it also relates to the national electoral fortunes. As such, elites reacted to public opinion shocks by becoming more attentive to citizens’ attitudes over time. In this sense, public support is considered to be an important determinant of the future course and speed of the integration process. As the referenda result in certain members show, elites can no longer rely on a given consensus of the public and they need to consider the citizens’ opinion in integration issues. For example, the steps taken in the Amsterdam and Nice treaties are less significant compared to those taken in the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty. This slowdown might be seen as a consequence of elite caution in response to a reluctant public as well as a public challenge to the fast steps taken towards European integration. It is unlikely that the future course of European integration and the changes in the institutional structure of the European Union can follow a path, *independent* of public attitudes. Governments, in agreeing on
intergovernmental treaties that shape the future course of the EU, need to consider public attitudes and to seek at least a certain level of support from the European people.

Given the major integrative steps taken in the last decade, one can easily conclude that public opinion will become more influential in the EU. The consequences of the last and future enlargement (Central and Eastern European nations and possibly Turkey’s membership) in existing members, the stand of certain leaders in foreign policy at the EU level (especially during the war on Iraq) creating a new divisive issue in domestic politics, and the ratification of the new constitution which resulted in a new controversy between the elites and public, all of these issues make it necessary to understand, explain, and predict the role of public support for integration. For instance, recently, citizens of France and the Netherlands rejected the EU constitution sending strong signals to the elites about the future of Europe.\(^3\) Public opinion, without a doubt, became an important aspect of European integration.

Keeping the increasing significance of public opinion in mind, this dissertation aims to investigate the determinants of public support for integration. This research starts from the fact that “attitudes do not form in a vacuum” and explores the effect of national factors and the temporal context on citizens’ attitudes toward integration. In a nutshell, I argue that integration is an evolving project, better known as a \textit{moving target}, which implies that in forming their attitudes individuals will be faced with different stages of integration. Different periods of integration are considered to be \textit{temporal contexts} within which individuals form their attitudes. In addition, I also examine the \textit{spatial context}, namely the differences related to national factors, in explaining individual attitudes. The European Union is defined as a multi-level governance system encompassing nation states (Hooghe and Marks 2001). As such, I argue that political,

\(^3\) French voters rejected the EU constitution with 55% “non” votes while the “nee” votes were 62% in the Netherlands. In both countries, some elites and the media, to a large extent, tied the vote to issues like the Turkish membership, Islamic fundamentalism and immigration. Following these referenda, it became evident that publics of the Europe were determined to brake integration. After the two rejections, some European leaders called for the cancellation of the ratification process while some others talked about the possibility of an EU-wide referendum.
economic and cultural differences are likely to shape individual attitudes related to integration.

Before investigating the role of context in understanding support for integration, I discuss the meaning of support in Chapter 2. After briefly summarizing the research about the conceptualization and operationalization of this concept, I develop a working definition of support. I also conduct a factor analysis to demonstrate that there is a single factor underlying a general notion of support.

In Chapter 3, I review different streams of literature investigating the determinants of support at the individual and aggregate level. Following this review, I point to the main shortcomings of the past studies, which neglect the effect of context, and develop a theory of attitude formation in the EU borrowing from research in psychology.

Chapter 4 evaluates the impact of time on attitudes toward integration. After briefly summarizing the history of integration within a stimulus-response-outcome framework, I define three periods of integration and I specify testable hypothesis about the effect of these periods as temporal contexts of attitudes. I use multinomial logit estimation with 56 Eurobarometer surveys to test the individual level hypotheses as well as the hypotheses related to the effect of time in shaping individual attitudes.

In Chapter 5, I examine the impact of political, economic and cultural differences in shaping attitudes toward integration. I argue that differences related to democratic traditions (consensus versus majoritarian democracies), market institutions (liberal versus corporatist economies), culture (Roman Catholic versus Protestant) as well as the level of transfers received from EU, macroeconomic performance and intra-EU trade are shape individual attitudes about integration. Given the nested structure of the model (i.e. country level differences and individual attitudes), I use Hierarchical Linear Modeling to investigate the country level and individual level determinants of support for integration.
In the Conclusion, I summarize the findings and outline the possible directions that future research may utilize.
CHAPTER 2
THE MEANING OF SUPPORT

Introduction

Support is an essentially contested concept that has created much controversy among the students of public opinion. Scholars have defined support generally from a legitimacy perspective in relation to a political object like regime, government or an institution. The intellectual curiosity about support mostly focused on the determinants of support. Following Easton, students of comparative politics have spent a considerable amount of ink investigating the determinants of public support in different settings.

In this chapter, I briefly review the literature explaining support at a conceptual level. Based on the insights derived from this review, I develop a working definition of support and test the practicality of this definition by using a factor analysis.

Easton’s Theory of Support

Easton’s (1965) theory of political support is a part of his grand theory explaining the “political system.” He believes that support is crucial for the stability and continuation of a system and that each system requires a minimal level of support to function properly.

In his classification, Easton distinguishes not only between the specific and diffuse modes of support but also among the main objects of support, namely, political community,
political regime and political authorities. Easton argues that diffuse support is oriented towards the first two and specific support toward the last object (Easton, 1965).

In his earlier work, Easton (1965), defines support either as a favorable act or an orientation directed toward a person, a group, an ideal or an institution. In the revision of his earlier work on public support (1975), he brings a clear definition that prioritizes the attitudinal aspects of support over its behavioral indicators. In his own words, support is “an attitude by which a person orients himself to an object either favorably or unfavorably, positively or negatively” (1975, 436).

However much clearer the definition of support in Easton’s and in the subsequent scholars’ work may be, the meaning of this concept within a political system remains vague. For instance, support may take many different forms, it may change over time or remain steady despite some undesired consequences. To simplify the complexity of the concept in the real world, Easton differentiates between specific and diffuse support. The latter is a general evaluation of the system and represents the long-term attachments to certain political objects whereas the former refers to an immediate, short-term evaluation that is related to the output produced by an object of a political system.

Easton defines diffuse support as “the reservoir of favorable attitudes and good will” (1965, 273) that makes it possible for individuals to maintain their loyalty to the system in the existence of outcomes that may not be compatible with their preferences. Specific support, on the other hand, is related to a feeling of satisfaction obtained from policy outcomes or satisfaction related to the performance of authorities. As Easton states “the

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4 Political community is the most general object of support and it refers to a community with its members bounded together with a political division of labor. Political regime includes the values, norms and structures of political authority and political authorities refer to those who occupy the authority roles defined in a regime (Easton, 1965).

5 The distinction between attitudinal and behavioral aspect of support refers to the strength of opinions/feelings that individuals may have about a certain object. For instance, an individual may support a political party, but may not have strong enough feelings to participate in a march organized by the same party, whereas another individual may actively engage in partisan activities and show her/his support in form of actions.

6 Although Easton accepts the possibility of expression of this attitude in form of an action compatible with the content of the attitude, his own emphasis and the research on public support has used this concept less as an action than attitude.
uniqueness of specific support lies in its relationship to the satisfactions that members of a system feel they obtain from the perceived outputs and performance of the political authorities” (1975, 437).

Easton’s theory of public support is widely used by students of public opinion to explain citizen attitudes toward political objects in different systems. However, it has problems regarding conceptual clarity, theoretical completeness and measurement of the concepts. Easton himself addresses some of these problems in his re-assessment of the theory of political support by pointing to the measurement problems (i.e. operationalization) encountered in the relevant literature, as well as by revising his initial conceptualization. (1975).

The difficulty in operationalizing public support becomes more evident when one attempts to apply Easton’s theoretical framework to real political systems. In fact, most research on public support focused on the proper measurement strategies in addition to the meaning and different aspects of support in different settings (Miller 1974a, 1974b; Citrin 1974; Easton 1975, Muller and Jukam 1977; Finkel, Muller and Seligson 1989; Muller, Jukam and Seligson 1982; Seligson 1983).  

According to this research, the conceptualization of public support and its operationalization based on the *specific/diffuse dichotomy* have always been troublesome. Pointing to this problem, Canache (2002) divides the past studies into three groups according to their views about the relation of specific and diffuse support. The first group, she believes, employs Easton’s distinction and debates the methodological particulars; the second group of research accepts the theoretical relevance of Eastonian concepts, but claims the impossibility of operationalization; finally, the third group tries

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7 Diffuse support, on the contrary, is not about a specific outcome or a performance, but it has rather “a general meaning” that a person attributes to an object. Specific support is based on short-term evaluation of the outcomes produced by certain institutions whereas diffuse support is considered to be a long-term affective attachment to the system as a whole. Diffuse support is more durable and it is characterized by deep loyalties to the political system. Hence, even with a lack of specific support oriented toward the regime and the authorities, order can be maintained with some level of diffuse support.

8 See Canache (2002) for the details of different measurement strategies and controversies regarding the operationalization of public support.
to go beyond the categories of Easton and develops a new typology of supportive attitudes.

Canache believes that each group reflects a different view of support with the first group depending on the idea of independence (no relation) or of a weak relation between specific and diffuse support, and the second group assuming a strong relation between the two concepts. The third group, on the other hand, develops new categories, ordered in a hierarchical manner, and moves away from Easton’s theoretical distinction (Canache 2002, p. 34-35).

Starting from the assumption that attitudes are directed to political objects which represent the different levels of generalization of the political system, Canache “organizes these levels in a hierarchy of support in which each level represents a higher level of generalization than its immediate predecessor” (p. 39). Similarly, Norris (1999) develops a hierarchical model that presumes a hierarchy for the objects of support. In her model, the objects of support are ordered from the least general to the most general categories which include political actors, institutions, regime performance, regime principles and political community. Both scholars develop conceptualizations that define support with respect to its object to go beyond the troublesome distinction proposed by Easton and to overcome the problems caused by this distinction.

Some scholars believe that the distinction between the two modes of support is tautological. Craig (1993), for instance, argues that if support varies with loss of affection then it is not diffuse and if support declines with unhappiness about certain outcomes creating a demand for systemic change then it is not specific. As a result of this, it is almost impossible to test the implications of Eastons’s distinction (1999). Building on this argument, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995) believe that when diffuse

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9 This approach is useful since it allows the researcher to produce testable hypotheses regarding the relationship of different supportive attitudes directed to certain objects in different contexts. Canache defines a full and a loose hierarchy among three types of attitudes directed to three different objects at different levels. These attitudes and objects are “support for democracy as a form of government”, “support for the nation’s political system” and “support for the incumbent government” (p. 40-41).
support has a propensity to vary conditioned on the changes in specific support, it lacks the property of being a long-term affective attachment.

Following this research, I believe that the conceptual framework developed by Easton creates a false dichotomy between different aspects of support. Separating specific and diffuse support from each other does not really provide a useful tool to better understand this concept in any political system. Support is a general concept related to an individual’s beliefs, feelings, and attitudes about a certain object. This notion of support can also be expressed by the famous metaphor, “running tally”, which describes the human cognition as a continuously updated tally encompassing favorable or unfavorable features regarding an object (Fiorina, 1981; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995).

The understanding of support as a general concept implies incorporating the different aspects of support into a single concept instead of creating dichotomies. For example, an individual may have negative feelings about a policy outcome but may maintain his/her affection or good intentions about a given political system. This definition of support made allows one to capture both positions with a single underlying notion rather than creating a false dichotomy between them. Sometimes, an individual may lean favorably toward an object or there may be occasions causing that individual to update the “tally” of support when he/she encounters undesirable outcomes. Yet, on average an individual will lean either favorably or unfavorably toward an object and this general condition is a result of beliefs, long-held values, and the impact of old events.10

This notion provides some flexibility for defining support in relation to political objects. This understanding, if utilized in public opinion research on the EU or in established political systems, may bring conceptual clarity and reliable operational definitions to the field. In addition, in conceptualizing and operationalizing support in the EU politics, one should remember that integration is a unique object of support that is fundamentally different from the objects of support that are to be found in national political systems

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10 Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995) come to a similar conclusion by defining support as a general concept and defining it as a concept that is more than single reactions to specific events. They argue that change in support is an empirical issue to be investigated.
(e.g. political community and political authorities). For instance, European integration is a process that evolves over time and its history involves different stages. Additionally, the European Union is not a political system in which institutional design is clearly defined within a constitutional framework. It is imperative to keep this uniqueness in mind for a better account of public support in the EU. In short, in addition to Easton’s problematic distinction about the two modes of support in an established system, the unique nature of integration requires a better definition in the EU context. Thus, in the next section I develop a working definition of support for integration in terms of a general tendency directed toward, what I call, a dynamic object.

Conceptualizing Support in EU

Notwithstanding the problems related to Easton’s conceptualization of support, students of public opinion in EU have generally used his distinction (Lindberg and Schiengold 1970; Niedermayer and Westle 1995; Caldeira and Gibson 1995; Gabel 1998b). For instance, Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) differentiate between utilitarian versus affective support, two categories that resembles the specific and diffuse support respectively. Niedermayer and Westle (1995), on the other hand, attempt to incorporate the multiple dimensions of political support by extending the categories within the modes and objects of support. They define the modes of orientation as “anything people have in mind with respect to a particular object” (p. 44); and order the modes of orientations hierarchically in three groups: psychological involvement, evaluations and behavioral intentions. 11 Within this categorization, they keep Easton’s distinction between specific and diffuse support as sub-categories of evaluations. 12

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11 This order reflects a hierarchy of intensity and involvement of individuals regarding their attitudes toward a certain object. This hierarchy can also be interpreted as an increasing closeness to political behavior if one accepts the assumption that as attitudes get stronger the likelihood of them to turn into actions increases.

12 They define five categories of objects that do not have a hierarchical order: Object as a whole refers to a specific form of internationalized governance (e.g. NATO, EFTA, EU etc.). They suggest that orientations (i.e. modes of support) can also be directed to the certain components of the “object as a whole”. The components they define (other objects of support) are political collectivity, political order, political authorities and policies.
Gabel (1998) is another scholar who makes use of Easton’s distinction to understand support for integration. He uses a factor analytical technique and finds some evidence supporting the applicability of Easton’s model to the EU. However, Gabel relies on a single *Eurobarometer* survey conducted in October 1985. He relies on the face validity of certain items from this survey to match them with either utilitarian (specific) or affective (diffuse) dimensions of support.\(^{13}\) However, his argument regarding the face validity of these items is not very compelling. For instance, for justifying the use of membership and benefit items, he argues that these items ask the respondents “[to] evaluate the membership in the European Community (the precursor to the European Union) and current stages of integration at the time of the survey. Responses to these questions should therefore represent tangible appraisals of integration and be generated by the latent utilitarian dimension of a citizen’s attitudes toward integration” (p.20).

However, it is far from clear why the responses to these questions should represent the “tangible appraisals of integration” and why they should be “generated by the latent utilitarian dimension” but not by the affective dimension. In short, Gabel’s discussion of face validity lacks rhetorical strength and it hardly justifies the existence of two dimensions of support in the EU.

As mentioned previously, students of public support in different settings moved away from Easton’s problematic distinction. Support should be defined in an object oriented way considering specific features of objects like integration, European Parliament, European Council and the Commission. More importantly, public opinion research in EU should define support as a general concept involving favorable or unfavorable dispositions, feelings and attitudes of individuals regarding a political object. For the

\[^{13}\] Gabel picks membership and benefit items as indicators of utilitarian dimension. The membership item asks the respondents to evaluate their country’s membership to the EC, whether it is good, bad or neither good nor bad. The benefit item asks the respondents whether their country has benefited or not from a being a member. For the affective dimension, he picks items like “feeling as a European”, “willingness to make personal sacrifices for other nations”, and “being for or against the efforts to unify Europe”. To further strengthen his case, Gabel creates an *integrative policy support item* (from some questions asking the respondents whether they approve EU’s involvement in certain policy-making areas or not) and correlates this with the membership item (utilitarian dimension) as well as support for the Maastricht Treaty (affective dimension) and again finds support for Easton’s twofold distinction.
author of this dissertation, any effort aiming to construct conceptual and operational
definitions of support, should begin from a general and object-oriented understanding of
this notion rather than focusing on different modes of support.

As mentioned above, support is a general concept that includes an individual’s beliefs,
dispositions and attitudes about a certain object. Support for integration should also carry
the same characteristics and it should be defined as an individual’s favorable or
unfavorable orientations about the European integration. These favorable/unfavorable
orientations are the sum of personal beliefs and attitudes. As such, they are not subject to
a fundamental change with a single event or an outcome in the short run unless
individuals’ long-held beliefs about integration change.

Notwithstanding this, one should also remember that integration is a moving target and it
may correspond to different images like economic cooperation, the single market or
political unification over time. In other words, integration as a political object changes
over time. As such, the change in the political object of support (i.e. integration) may
entail an impediment for an individual to form long held beliefs or attitudes. I believe
this cautionary approach should not pose a serious challenge to my argument to the extent
that support is considered as a running tally updated by evolving integration.

I propose a scheme that moves away from the troublesome distinction of Easton by
defining support as a running tally subject to updates, and formed of beliefs and attitudes
an individual may have about integration. I assume that a certain degree of stability in
attitudes, even for the ever changing character of integration, should exist. This
definition also involves the tailoring of any new belief or disposition to the already
existing favorable/unfavorable tendencies an individual may have about integration.
Finally, I argue that there should be a single, general underlying notion of support for
integration.

In the next section, I explore the existence of a single underlying notion of support using
factor analysis.
Support as a General Concept: A Factor Analytical Approach

I conducted a factor analysis to test whether there is a single underlying factor defining support for integration. However, one should remember that, the analysis presented below is not a direct test of implications following the above discussion about the meaning of support. The argument made above is mostly done at a “rhetorical” level and as such it involves assumptions about human thinking, the ways of human cognition and more importantly the speculations about the things that take place in human mind. It would be extremely hard, if not impossible, to test all the implications of this rhetorical debate, but luckily it would be easy to test one of the substantial conclusions of this debate, namely that there is a single underlying dimension of support for integration.

Since 1970 four general questions have been asked to measure the attitudes toward integration. Table 2.1 includes these questions. The responses are ordered from negative to positive attitudes for all items below.

### Table 2.1: Items Measuring Support in Eurobarometer Surveys

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Unification:</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In general, are you for or against the efforts being made to unify Western Europe? If for, are you very much for or to some extent? If against, are you only to some extent against or very much against?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Against-Very much 2. Against-To some extent 3. For-To Some extent 4. For –very much</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Regret:</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>If you were to be told tomorrow that the European Community(Common Market)(^{14}) had been scrapped, would you be very sorry about it, indifferent or (very) relieved?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{14}\) “European Community” is replaced with “European Union” after 1992.
Table 2.1- Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Membership:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Generally speaking, do you think that (your country’s) membership of the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Community (common market) is….?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. A bad thing  2. Neither good nor bad  3. A good thing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benefit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (your country) has</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Common Market, EU)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Not benefited  2. Benefited</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Previous research has utilized the *benefit* question as an indicator of specific (or utilitarian support) for integration (Gabel 1998), whereas the *membership* question is used as an indicator of both specific (Inglehart, Rabier and Reif 1987) and diffuse support (Hewstone 1986; Gabel 1998). The *unification* item, on the other hand is regarded as a diffuse (affective) evaluation of support by many scholars (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970; Inglehart, Rabier and Reif 1987; Hewstone 1986). Gabel (1998) relates this item to both specific and diffuse evaluations of support in his factor analysis. Finally, the *regret* indicator is considered to tap attitudes considered to reflect diffuse support (Niedermayer 1995).

The assignment of above items to specific or diffuse support, most of the time, depends on a discussion of face validity and occasionally some empirical evidence is provided for the choice. Given that three of the four items above start with expressions like “in general”, “generally” or “taking everything into consideration”, one can argue that they are likely to produce a response measuring an average or overall assessment of integration. Regret question, despite lacking a general phrase, is likely to condition the possible responses in favor of an overall assessment by introducing a catastrophic case scenario regarding integration.

In addition, two items that have been most frequently used in the eurobarometer surveys, membership and benefit items, ask the respondents to generally evaluate their country’s membership or the gained benefits related to integration and as such are likely to increase
the likelihood of a response that taps an omnibus assessment of integration (i.e. country generally benefits or country’s membership is generally a good thing)

I argue that the distinction between specific (utilitarian) support and diffuse (affective) support for integration remains superficial and efforts aiming to match one of these items with either specific or diffuse support ignores the generality of the notion as well as its indicators. It is more appropriate to talk about a general assessment of support for integration and the items in Table 2.1 are better suited for measuring support defined in this manner. Thus, I expect that all four items will load on a single factor in the factor analysis.

Of these four items, membership and benefit questions are the two most widely asked questions. They were asked in all eurobarometers between EB22 and EB57.1. Regret and unification questions are included less frequently and the latter has not been asked after EB43.1. All four items have been included simultaneously in eurobarometers 22-240, 42 and 43.1. Therefore, the factor analysis includes the data between 1984-1995.

The descriptive statistics are reported in Table 2.2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics for Items Measuring Support for Integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Deviation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N =183,913        Alpha = .8070

All measures of central tendency but the median for regret question are closer to the
positive end of the responses. The median for the regret item is 2 (indifferent), but the mode and the mean are closer to the positive end of the responses. Cronbach’s Alpha has a value of .807 representing a high reliability score.

Table 2.3 reports the correlation coefficients for the indicators of support.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Correlation Coefficients*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Membership with Benefit</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regret with Benefit</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unification with Benefit</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership with Regret</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership with Unification</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regret with Unification</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*All coefficients are statistically significant below .001 level

All items are positively and strongly correlated with each other and they are statistically significant. Of the six bivariate correlations, five are greater than .50 and this magnitude can be considered relatively high for categorical data. The highest correlation coefficient is between membership and regret items (.64) and this is followed by the correlation coefficient between the membership and benefit items (.58). The weakest correlation has a magnitude of .37 (unification item with benefit item).

The results of the factor analysis are reported in Table 2.4 and Table 2.5. I expect that

---

15 I used generalized least squares factor analysis with varimax rotation. A factor is extracted only if it had an eigenvalue greater than 1 according to the Kaiser’s Criterion. The Kaiser’s criterion suggests that as many factors should be extracted as variables with eigenvalues greater than or equal to one. The idea is that any factor that does not explain as much variation as a single variable is of suspicious value and should not be counted as a factor. Given the categorical nature of the data some assumptions of factor analysis related to the input data may be violated. However, in the existence of normality, the results of factor
all four indicators will load on a single underlying factor, namely general support for integration.

**Table 2.4: Factor Matrix for Indicators of Support**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Factor Loading</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benefit</td>
<td>0.670109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership</td>
<td>0.844597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regret</td>
<td>0.788228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unification</td>
<td>0.643352</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Eigenvalue=2.61
Total variance explained 65.46%
Extraction Method: Generalized Least Squares.

As Table 2.4 demonstrates a single factor is extracted using varimax rotation and this factor alone explains more than 65% of the total variance caused by these four items. Eigenvalues for other factors are smaller than 1, indicating that none of the remaining factors can explain the total variance at least as much as any single indicator included in the analysis.

These results combined with the correlation coefficients are supportive of my argument about the existence of a general notion of support rather than a two-dimensional view. There is a single underlying dimension of support related to all four indicators. It seems that individuals respond to these questions in a general manner rather than breaking down their utilitarian and affective attachments. This conclusion is also supported by the face validity of these items. That said, as discussed above, all four items include general phrases like “in general”, “generally speaking” or “taking everything into consideration”, and these phrases are likely to give way to responses that reflect overall view of the respondents.

Analysis are robust to these violations. I also ran Q-Q plots to check normality, and all indicators were found to have a normal distribution.
Of the four items included in the analysis, membership item has the strongest factor loading (.845) whereas unification item has the weakest loading (.643) on the latent factor (general support for integration). If specific and diffuse support had actually existed, either benefit item or the other three items should have loaded weakly on this single factor and a second factor explaining a considerable amount of total variance should have emerged. However, the results of the factor analysis are at odds with such an expectation.

I also ran the factor analysis across countries and eurobarometer surveys to control over time and across country effects. I only report the results of the factor analysis for member countries, but similar results also hold across time as well. Table 2.5 reports the results for 15 members.

Table 2.5: Factor Analysis of Indicators of Support by Nation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Benefit</th>
<th>Membership</th>
<th>Regret</th>
<th>Unification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.554777</td>
<td>0.793561</td>
<td>0.770234</td>
<td>0.667102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>0.652273</td>
<td>0.78245</td>
<td>0.645747</td>
<td>0.635324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0.642544</td>
<td>0.759424</td>
<td>0.682003</td>
<td>0.524693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Germany</td>
<td>0.684864</td>
<td>0.825505</td>
<td>0.835459</td>
<td>0.698549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>0.589653</td>
<td>0.750607</td>
<td>0.668469</td>
<td>0.571305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>0.590803</td>
<td>0.710594</td>
<td>0.745386</td>
<td>0.500191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0.792671</td>
<td>0.920568</td>
<td>0.856342</td>
<td>0.694003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>0.735853</td>
<td>0.837537</td>
<td>0.741625</td>
<td>0.425107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Britain</td>
<td>0.71869</td>
<td>0.859922</td>
<td>0.82602</td>
<td>0.584721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0.810522</td>
<td>0.897804</td>
<td>0.793308</td>
<td>0.766457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0.46777</td>
<td>0.765811</td>
<td>0.731227</td>
<td>0.604079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0.65504</td>
<td>0.807647</td>
<td>0.66346</td>
<td>0.563565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Germany</td>
<td>0.685695</td>
<td>0.778663</td>
<td>0.815701</td>
<td>0.704633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>0.721042</td>
<td>0.870142</td>
<td>0.739426</td>
<td>0.826091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0.83738</td>
<td>0.880116</td>
<td>0.863609</td>
<td>0.788429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0.866476</td>
<td>0.892863</td>
<td>0.892279</td>
<td>0.844801</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Extraction Method: Generalized Least Squares.
In Table 2.5, cell entries are factor loadings for the single factor extracted by varimax rotation. For all countries, the indicators of support for integration load on a latent general dimension of support. The factor loading for benefit question is greater than .50 in all countries except for Spain (.467). Membership and regret items load strongly and in positive direction on this single factor, whereas unification has the smallest factor loadings in many countries.

Two conclusions can be drawn from the results of the factor analysis presented above. The first one regards the existence of a single underlying dimension, which I argue is a general notion of support for integration. The second conclusion is about the robustness of the membership item as an indicator of the general support for integration. In all cases, membership item has loaded strongly on the latent factor defining support. As such, one can utilize this item as a good indicator of support when other measures are missing. Luckily, membership item has been asked in all standard eurobarometers conducted since 1974.

One criticism might state that the items used in the analysis are not strong at face validity, because all items ask the respondents to evaluate their *country's membership* to the EU rather than asking them to assess their *own condition as being citizens of the EU*. Only regret item directly asks the respondents to evaluate the EU by starting with a phrase in form of “would you…”. If one accepts this criticism then previous literature would suffer from a serious shortcoming related to conceptualization of support (i.e. the problem of validity). In other words, while the researcher assumes that any four of these items measures an individual’s support for integration, this item may be measuring the same individual’s assessment about his/her country’s membership to the EU, which does not necessarily overlap with his own support. In the lack of an assumption that presumes a direct link or an overlap between the assessment of country’s membership and a person’s assessment of his/her condition, this problem becomes more serious.

Luckily, two items asked in EB53 and EB55.1 ask the respondents to evaluate their own conditions. These two items are as follows:
Image:
In general, does the European Union conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?

Personal Benefit:
Do you think you, yourself, have got more advantages or more disadvantages from (OUR COUNTRY) being a member of the European Union?

The image item like the previous items starts with a conditional phrase (in general) and hence is compatible with the idea of general assessment of support. Respondents who support integration should have a more positive image of the EU and those who are not supportive should have a negative assessment of EU. The personal benefit question, asks the respondents to evaluate their personal conditions by emphasizing a personal connotation with the phrases of “you, yourself”. As such, this item should allow the respondents to distinguish between their personal benefit and their country’s benefit. Since, the use of the benefit or membership questions requires an implicit assumption that necessitates an overlap between one’s own country’s benefit and his/her personal benefit, the personal benefit question removes this restrictive condition. Thus, this item should be a better indicator of individual support for European integration.

I ran the correlations and the factor analysis of these items with only membership and the benefit items. Unfortunately the regret and unification items are not available in those surveys including the image and the personal benefit question. The correlation coefficients are reported in Table 2.6.
Table 2.6: Correlation Coefficients for General and Individual Indicators of Support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Correlation Coefficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>membership by benefit</td>
<td>0.673816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>membership by image</td>
<td>0.643376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>membership by personal benefit</td>
<td>0.57047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>benefit by image</td>
<td>0.594985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>benefit by personal benefit</td>
<td>0.575556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>image by personal benefit</td>
<td>0.641241</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All correlations are significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Cronbach’s alpha .8447

The correlations among all variables are strong and positive. The items asking the respondents to evaluate their country’s membership to the EU and those that ask an evaluation of personal condition are highly correlated among themselves (correlation coefficient for membership by benefit is .67 and for image by personal benefit is .64). However, membership item is highly correlated with image item as well, again suggesting that this item should be the best indicator of support for integration.

Cronbach’s Alpha for these four items is slightly larger than the same measure for the previous four items (.845 against .807) showing that the personal benefit and advantage items with membership and benefit questions are more reliable indicators compared to the regret and benefit items. Of course, one should be cautious about this tentative conclusion, for it is impossible to test whether the difference is caused by the addition of the two new indicators or by a different sample.

I ran the generalized least squares factor analysis of these four items with varimax rotation. The results are reported in Table 2.7.
Table 2.7: Factor Matrix for General and Individual Indicators of Support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Factor Loading</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Membership</td>
<td>0.824951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefit</td>
<td>0.778132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image</td>
<td>0.813825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Benefit</td>
<td>0.757205</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Eigenvalue 2.87, Total Variance explained 71.90%
Extraction Method: Generalized Least Squares

The results of the factor analysis are not much different from the first analysis. Only one factor is extracted and all four items load positively on a single underlying factor. Compared to initial factor analysis, the total variance explained is slightly higher (almost 72% compared to 65% of the first analysis). These results suggest that a latent dimension, which represents a general meaning of support, generates the responses to all four items. Additionally, a possible criticism about the validity of the most widely used items like the membership and benefit items may not pose a serious problem, because it seems like the general items capture the latent dimension of support as good as the individual items.

Overall, the above analysis supports my argument (and of those like Craig (1993), and Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995)) regarding the conceptualization of support at a general level. In addition, the results of the factor analysis and correlation coefficients suggest that the membership item has a larger factor loading compared to the loadings for any of the other five items. Moreover, the use of membership item is also an issue of convenience to the extent that it is the only item available in all surveys since 1974. Therefore, for the statistical analysis conducted in Chapter 4, I preferred to use the membership item as a measure of support for integration.

In this chapter, I discussed the meaning of support and ran a factor analysis to statistically validate the existence of a single underlying concept of support. In the next chapter, I
review the literature explaining the determinants of support for European integration. Following this review, I develop a theory explaining the formation of attitudes in time and space. I also introduce individual level hypotheses in this section.
CHAPTER 3

A THEORY OF PUBLIC SUPPORT IN THE EU

Introduction

Most research on the determinants of public support in the EU aims to explain support for integration. Although defined in different ways and measured by different items from Eurobarometer surveys, integration as a grand concept captures the general process of European unification. Early research by Inglehart and his colleagues, research in the early 1990s which gained momentum with the post-Maastricht environment, the breadth brought by the work of Gabel beginning in the mid 1990s and the recently burgeoning literature on identity aims to understand public support for European integration.16

In the next section I summarize this research to introduce the determinants of public support and to introduce the background for my theoretical model.

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16 Another trend in public opinion research in the EU investigates the determinants of support for other objects like institutions and policies. Beginning as early as the work of Niedermayer and Sinnot (1995) who investigated support for the European Parliament, and Caldera and Gibson’s (1995) piece on the legitimacy and determinants of public support for the European Court of Justice, some scholars started to investigate support for specific institutions and policies in the EU. This research is now cumulating in a way that directs the attention to the more specific objects of support and moving the agenda from explaining support for integration to explaining support for the EP (Gabel 2003, Bowler et. al 2003, Smith and Ciftci n.d.), for the president of the commission (Gelleny and Anderson 2000), for EMU and Euro (Kaltenhaler and Anderson 2001; Anderson 2002), and for fiscal policy (Gabel 2000).
The Determinants of Public Support for Integration

Previous research about the determinants of public support for integration can be tabulated along two dimensions: the level of analysis and the determinants of public support. Table 3.1 summarizes the previous research along these dimensions.

### Table 3.1: The Determinants of Public support in the EU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of analysis</th>
<th>Determinants of Support</th>
<th>Non-economic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Policy appraisal model (income and human capital hypothesis, including education)</td>
<td>Cognitive mobilization/Political interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Factor endowments/skills</td>
<td>Political values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic perceptions</td>
<td>Partisanship/party identification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aggregate/National</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>National economic indicators (inflation, growth and unemployment)</td>
<td>Socialization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International economic indicators (intra-EU trade, trade balance, net contributions to/from EU budget etc.)</td>
<td>Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Political events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Political stability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In Table 3.1, the first cell (I) summarizes individual level economic determinants of public support for European integration. The policy appraisal model (Gabel 1998a, b) and economic perceptions hypothesis are two explanations provided for explaining how individuals link their current conditions to the assessment of integration. For instance, Eichenberg and Dalton (1991) and Gabel and Whitten (1997) investigate how individual perceptions of the economy affect their assessment of integration.

The policy appraisal model developed by Gabel (1998b) suggests that citizens differ in their support for integration due to the different welfare gains they obtain from market liberalization (as a result of economic integration). Gabel (1998a, b) finds that the most educated respondents, skilled workers and those with higher incomes are more supportive of integration. In a similar vein, Gabel and Palmer (1995) argue that economic consequences of EU market liberalization influence public support for integration by producing differential benefits for EU citizens. They find supportive evidence for the variation in individual support according to the level of education, occupational skills, income level\(^{17}\) and nearness to a border.\(^{18}\)

The research that falls into the second cell models support for integration as a function of non-economic individual level factors. Cognitive mobilization/political interest, political values, partisanship and recently national identity are the most important explanations developed by this group of research.

The political values hypothesis suggests that citizens’ political attitudes are shaped by the socioeconomic conditions surrounding their pre-adult years. These conditions generate certain values that tend to persist for a lifetime. “Materialist” values are instilled by economic and physical security priorities and “postmaterialist” values, basically, are representative of intellectual satisfaction and belonging (Inglehart, 1970). Inglehart, Rabier and Reif (1991) argue that integration reflects an egalitarian and less nationalistic

\(^{17}\) Their argument depends on the anti-inflationary tendency of EMS and the benefits of this tendency for capital. Freiden (1991) also finds a similar relationship.
\(^{18}\) Citizens near borders may be more supportive of integration since they are more likely to obtain more benefits.
process and those who have postmaterialist values are more likely to support the idea of a unified Europe and support integration.19

The cognitive mobilization hypothesis, on the other hand, asserts that political awareness and developed skills in political communication enables citizens to identify themselves with the EU. In other words, as cognitive mobilization and political involvement increases, public support should increase, because the integration process becomes more familiar and acceptable for citizens (Hewstone 1986; Inglehart et al. 1991; Janssen 1991). Two assumptions underlying this argument are that all information is message independent and that all information about integration promotes support.

A second group of research, again falling into the second cell of Table 3.1 has investigated the link between partisanship and support for integration (Franklin, Marsh and Wleizen 1994; Franklin, Marsh and McLaren 1994).20 A general argument states that citizens’ attitudes toward integration reflects the position of the party they support (Siune and Svensson 1993). Inglehart, Rabier and Reif (1991) examined public support by partisanship and they found that supporters of left parties are less favorable toward integration then the supporters of right wing parties.21

Some recent studies look at national and European identity (Taggart, 1998; Carey 2002; Hooghe and Marks, 2003) and the cultural threat (De Master and Le Roy, 2000; McLaren, 2002) as the two other dimensions of public opinion in the EU.

These studies rely on the previous research on voting behavior that prioritizes the societal-needs to the individual needs (see Funk, 2000 for a review) as well as the

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19 Anderson and Reichert (1996) and Gabel (1998a, b) find mixed results about the political values hypothesis. Both studies find evidence that supports this hypothesis in old member states, but they find that postmaterialists support integration less than materialists in new member states.

20 Gabel (1998b) uses the distinction between the proletariat and bourgeoisie parties (developed by Gallagher, Laver and Mair 1992) and he classifies the respondents according to their identification with that party that is coded either as a proletariat or a bourgeoisie party.

21 However, left parties have gradually changed their positions over time and they have become more pro-Europeanist. This change is at odds with the partisanship approach.
research about the prominence of the national identity (Taggart, 1998) and the idea that national institutions may serve as proxies in shaping public opinion (Anderson, 1998). For example, McLaren (2002) utilizes the research on socio-tropic voting behavior as well as the cognitively based research of ‘symbolic politics approach’ to argue that hostile attitudes toward the EU are in great part determined by the perceived cultural threat imposed by integration. Carey (2002), examines how identities formed at different levels (e.g. regional, national) differently affect support for integration.

The third cell in Table 3.1 contains the research utilizing aggregate/national level economic indicators as determinants of public support for the EU. Inflation, growth, unemployment, international trade indicators like intra-EU trade, trade balance and net economic benefits from integration are some of the variables used by these studies (Inglehart and Rabier 1978; Smith and Wanke 1993; Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Bosch and Newton 1995; Anderson and Kaltenhaler 1996; Gabel 1998b; Matilla 2004).

Some of this research finds evidence confirming the relationship of support and macroeconomic indicators and trade (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Kaltenhaler and Anderson 1996). However, Bosch and Newton (1995) do not find consistent empirical support for the relationship between macro economic indicators and support for integration in certain members, and find only a weak relationship in some others.

Considering the differences in wealth across member states, Smith and Wanke (1993) investigate the consequences of economic heterogeneity, created by the inclusion of the Southern states, in terms of the conflict over the distribution of economic gains. They conclude that the relatively rich members are less supportive of integration compared to the relatively poor members due to the opportunities provided to citizens of the former. Some of these opportunities are accession to the capital and to the market of richer members, free movement of labor, and increased regional assistance to poorer members.

Using aggregate level indicators in his extended policy appraisal model, Gabel (1998b) tests the effect of national economic and intra-EU trade indicators on the level of support
for integration. Although he does not find sufficient empirical evidence for all national economic indicators, his empirical analysis confirms that the intra-EU trade dependence and intra-EU trade balance are significant factors affecting support for integration.\textsuperscript{22}

The fourth group of research investigating the determinants of public support for integration falls within the fourth cell, which contains the research looking at the aggregate level non-economic indicators of support for integration. National or international level political factors, socialization process and security concerns are some of the factors that are used in this group of research to model support for integration.

Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) test the impact of significant political factors and political events like East-West conflict, the existence of a referendum, the 1979 Election to the EP and national traditions. However, their results do not provide strong evidence for the relationship of support for integration and those aggregate political factors.

Inglehart and Rabier (1978) suggest that socialization might be related to support for integration and they measure this indicator with the length of membership. Despite its individual level connotations, socialization, in this sense refers to the changes in the general attitudes of citizens toward integration.\textsuperscript{23}

Gabel (1998b) and Gabel and Palmer (1995) believe that the existence of a threat to the democratic system and the demand for security are also important determinants of public support for integration. They measure the threat for democratic order by the strength of anti system parties (i.e. Communist parties) and they find empirical support for their hypothesis suggesting a negative relation between the strength of anti-system parties and support for integration. As for security concerns, Gabel (1998) uses the number of deaths per nation during the WWII to test his hypothesis that as the level of a nation’s suffering this war increases, the individual’s should favor cooperative and peaceful ways among

\textsuperscript{22} In a recent study, Ciftci (2005) found that indicators of trade have erratic and non-significant effects on aggregate support for integration.

\textsuperscript{23} The same socialization measure is also used by Gabel (1998b) in his extended policy appraisal model.
European nations and hence support integration. The results of his aggregate level analysis lend support to this hypothesis.²⁴

**Context and Attitudes**

This research is extensive and most of the time it is quantitatively sophisticated. However, it ignores the role of context on attitude formation. Any model of public opinion must begin with a systematic understanding of attitudes. An attitude can be defined as “a person’s general evaluation of an object” (O’Keefe 1990:18) and this object can be a person, an event, an institution, a policy or an idea. Objects, especially in politics, may have more than one attribute and consequently, individuals may have multidimensional orientations toward these objects (Druckman and Lupia 2000). Individuals in forming their attitudes take different attributes of objects into account.

As already summarized in the first section, public opinion research in the EU has examined those factors that are related to economic and non-economic dimensions. In their attempts to explain individual attitudes regarding their support for integration, economically oriented studies argue that market liberalization tends to favor individuals with high levels of income, education and occupational skills and penalizes those with low levels of income, education and skills. As such, skilled workers and highly educated citizens end up with more opportunities as a result of the mobility created by market liberalization compared to the manual workers and poorly educated people who face job insecurity and less mobility (Anderson and Reichert 1996; Gabel 1998a, b).

²⁴ In the same study, Gabel also considers the decaying impact of the war deaths over time. As such he also controls for this decaying effect with a variable that multiplies the ward deaths with year starting from 1974 (the beginning year of the data). He finds supportive evidence for a negative relationship between this variable and support for integration.
This research is deductively strong in explaining support for integration, but it does not account for multiple attributes of integration and subsequently it lacks the multidimensional character of individual attitudes. For instance, some individuals may support integration for its economic consequences but may not like it for its political implications. Economically oriented studies ‘narrowly’ focus on the economic aspect of integration.

Some of the individual level hypotheses tested by this literature are as follows:25

**Hypothesis 1:** Skilled workers (professionals/managers) and farmers are more likely to support integration than manual workers.

**Hypothesis 2:** Individuals with high income are more likely to support integration than individuals with low-income.

**Hypothesis 3:** Individuals with high levels of education are more likely to support integration than individuals with low levels of education.

**Hypotheses 4:** Individuals who have a positive perception of the economy are more likely to support integration.

However, attitudes are multidimensional and an individual’s attitude may not be determined only by economic benefits. That said, economic calculus may not be as salient when non-economic factors condition individual attitudes. Sometimes, multiple dimensions about a certain phenomenon may come into play. In the EU, for instance, economic as well as political dimensions of integration may influence human cognition and hence attitudes. An individual may support integration for the economic benefits he/she is likely to obtain, but the same individual may not like the political implications of integration. Sometimes economic preferences and non-economic preferences might have opposing effects on preferences and attitudes held by an individual. An individual’s

25 Since the rationale behind these hypotheses is provided in the literature review section, I do not provide further explanation for each hypothesis. Later in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 I test these hypotheses in different models. Unfortunately, the data limitations do not allow to test all hypotheses, presented in this chapter, in a uniform model over time.
overall attitude is likely to be determined by multiple effects that influence his/her calculus.

As mentioned above some studies have utilized non-economic factors to explain support for integration. Some of the hypotheses tested by these approaches are as follows:

_Hypothesis 5:_ Individuals with extreme ideology are less likely to support integration than individuals with moderate ideology.

_Hypothesis 6:_ Individuals that have a rightist ideology (supporting a right party) are more likely to support integration than individuals with a leftist ideology (supporting a left party).

_Hypothesis 7:_ Supporters of extreme parties are less likely to support integration than supporters of the center parties.

_Hypothesis 8:_ Those who have postmaterialist values are more likely to support integration than those who have materialist values.

_Hypothesis 9:_ Those who are deeply attached to their national identity are less likely to support integration.

_Hypothesis 10:_ Those who feel exclusively European are more likely to support integration than those who do not feel exclusively European.

_Hypothesis 11:_ Those who are satisfied with democracy are more likely to support integration than those who are not satisfied.

_Hypothesis 12:_ Those with higher levels of political interest and involvement are more supportive of integration compared to those with low levels of political interest.

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26 This hypothesis is derived from the literature on representation and political parties (Schmidt 1998). However as recent work of Hix and Lord (1997) shows, the gap between left and right parties narrows after the 1990s.

27 It should be noted that Hypothesis 5 and Hypothesis 7 are introduced separately based on the rationale of “tactical voting.” For instance, a person who has an extreme ideological stand may not necessarily vote for a party that is closest to her ideological preference, but may vote strategically for a non-extremist party, to increase the electoral fortunes of that party, which she prefers more than other parties with a high chance of winning (e.g. a person with an extreme left ideology may vote for social democratic party).
In short, an individual may do an “economic calculus” to compare costs and benefits of integration as they relate to his/her life and can decide whether to support integration or not. Alternatively, an individual may determine an attitude relying on his/her political and cultural values. Both approaches, discussed above, have their own individual level assumptions and both require some sort of human calculus that has an economic character at some times and a non-economic character at others.

So, what is wrong with these approaches? Can’t we just combine the two approaches and test all these hypotheses in a single research design? Certainly we can, and this has been done by some scholars. However, all these studies lack an important aspect of individual attitudes, namely the effect of the context in which individuals are born and live.

The influence of economic and non-economic determinants in affecting attitudes toward integration should change over time and across space. I argue that, the national context is likely to shape individuals’ orientations about economic and non-economic attributes of integration and the temporal context is likely to determine which determinants gain more importance. In either case, the propensity of individuals’ beliefs, attitudes and preferences about integration are likely to be conditioned by context (time and space).

In other words, to provide a complete picture of attitudes about integration at the individual level one should explain variation in two levels

1. Over time
2. Across space

The first level refers to different stages of integration that may shape the attitudes of citizens by providing an organized political environment. The second level is the spatial environment referring to national differences that might shape the individual attitudes. Context, either temporal or spatial, matters, yet the effect of context on individual attitudes in the EU has not been systematically investigated. This underdevelopment is caused by two factors. First, past research had an inadequate account of the differences among nations, an account which neglects the theoretically relevant differences, be these
cultural, political or economic, among nations. Secondly, previous research, most of the
time ignores the temporal dynamism of integration.

As for the latter, there are three studies considering the changing nature of integration
over time. Firstly, Anderson and Reichert (1996) criticize the prior research for assuming
that integration is constant over time and that citizens’ attitudes are shaped by economic
benefits in the same way at different time points. Secondly, as Eichenberg (2000) shows,
the magnitude and the signs of the coefficients for public support are not the same in
different periods of European integration. A third study by Genna (2002) takes the
different phases of integration into account and argues that European integration is a
process moving from economic integration to political unification while at the same time
creating an attitudinal change which shifts the attitudes from an economic-utilitarian axis
to a solidarity-community axis.

As for the former, I am not aware of any studies that empirically test the effect of the
spatial cleavages along with the more general predictors like GDP per capita, growth,
inflation, security concerns and length of membership (but see Eichenberg and Dalton
1993; Rohrschneider 2002). However, as Simon Hix (1999) insightfully argues,
differences among nations in the EU can be expressed in terms of cleavages like the
North versus South, old members versus new members, Catholic versus Protestant
nations, rich versus poor nations, and consensus versus majoritarian democracies.

These spatial cleavages may be considered very important if one accepts the assumption
that “context shapes attitudes”. As such, these cleavages may help us understand
individual attitudes better in the EU where continuous strategic bargaining with
multilevel decision-making takes place among countries which do not culturally, socially,
politically and economically form a homogenous entity, but which may choose to
coalesce with countries closer to them in various aspects. In such a complicated
structure, the impact of context on attitudes may be more relevant to explain the variation
regarding support for integration.
In short, students of public opinion in the EU have generally ignored the context, and how it is related to individual attitudes. Therefore, theorizing about the effect of context may bring new insights to the field. But just a statement like “context matters” does not provide an explanation or causal mechanism about individuals’ attitudes toward integration. How does context matter? How do individuals use information from the context to obtain their orientations toward certain objects?

To answer these questions, two approaches developed in the psychology research may be helpful.

First, the developments in cognitive science tell us that what we perceive as objects are “conceptual creations that result from an equilibrium between brain, body and world” (Druckman and Lupia 2000: 7). Human beings derive their preferences about certain objects from their evaluations which depend on their beliefs. Beliefs, on the other hand, are formed as a result of human interaction with environment, an interaction that creates an equilibrium between brain, body and world (Lupia and Druckman 2000; Churcland and Sejnowski 1992).

This line of reasoning does not tell a story where context is everything, but rather it reminds us that in developing their beliefs, attitudes and preferences, human beings interact their internal cognitive procedures with their surroundings. I expect the same argument to be true for European citizens who form their beliefs and orientations within the spatial and temporal contexts that surround them.

Yet, one still needs to explain how individuals evaluate different attributes of an object, given the assumption that this object has multiple attributes. This is also a question about how a rational economic or any other sort of calculus works in human cognition. Cognitive psychology provides an explanation that depends on the idea that people make up their minds about a certain object with the help of a probability distribution (or simply a belief) regarding certain characteristic of that object attribute (Druckman and Lupia 2000; Churcland and Sejnowski 1992).
But how do people really make use of these “neurally held probability distributions” (Lupia and Druckman 2000: 5) or beliefs? One explanation is provided by a second approach, namely the “cognitive heuristics”, developed in psychology literature (Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky 1982; Nisbett and Ross 1980). According to this approach, despite being limited information processors, human beings can simplify the cognitive processing and make reasonable decisions by help of cues. Following this research some students of American public opinion, beginning in the late 1980s and accelerating in 1990s, argued that citizens can make good judgments in the lack of information with the help of cues taken from the areas in which citizens feel more competent (Brady and Sniderman, 1985; Carmines and Kuklinski 1990; Lupia 1994; Lupia and McCubins 1998; Mondak 1994; Mutz 1998; Popkin 1991; Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock 1991).

The two approaches discussed above provide some cues in regards to the role of context in attitude formation. In the subsequent chapters, I introduce the different periods of integration as the temporal context and the political and economic differences between nations as the spatial context. It is argued that individual attitudes are formed according to neurally held probability distributions created by the interaction of cognition and the real world. I argue that the temporal and spatial contexts provide the real world side of this interaction.

Additionally, if human beings simplify the decision-making process by using “informational short-cuts” or “cognitive heuristics” then the “cues” or “short-cuts” serving to this end, are likely to be taken from the national context or from the environment that they face during different periods of integration. Some of these cues are likely to be invoked from the old beliefs developed with respect to national institutions. Most of the time, when people encounter a new object, or an old object in a new form, they form/change their attitudes by invoking those attitudes about similar objects which they have encountered before (Druckman and Lupia 2000; Clark 1997; Holland et al. 1986). As Clark (1997) puts it, “new cognitive garments seldom are made
of whole cloth; usually they comprise hastily tailored amendments to old structures and strategies” (p. 81).

In the European Union, political, cultural, and economic differences among member states (i.e. spatial context) are likely to serve as a reservoir of cues (see Anderson 1998). In other words, if individuals form their new attitudes by taking cues from their old beliefs about similar objects, then national economic policy and national institutions should provide some cues for individuals. Furthermore, if one accepts that European integration is an evolving process that continuously shifts the object of attitudes that is of interest here (i.e. integration), then individuals’ attitudes should also be shaped by a temporal context that might involve different periods of integration.

To sum up, based on the theories derived from psychology and public opinion research, I argue that attitudes toward integration will be shaped by the changing features of integration as well the differences among nations. In the next chapter, I summarize the history of EU to assess the impact of different periods of integration on individual attitudes related to support. I survey 56 Eurobarometer surveys from 1974-2002 and use multinomial logit regression to statistically test the effect of time on supportive attitudes for integration.
CHAPTER 4
INTEGRATION AND ATTITUDES OVER TIME

Introduction

Theories of regional integration once occupied a large space in International Relations Theory and a considerable amount of this research was devoted to the European integration (see Smith and Ray, 1992). In 1960s, the main debate in this research agenda was the controversy between transactionalism and neo-functionalism, both of which aimed to explain the environment, conditions and procedures that give way to a peaceful emergence of an international organization.

After a slow-down in research, the re-emergence of integration theory, however, witnessed a new axis of debate in the 1990s between liberal-intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik, 1993, 1998) and supranational institutionalism (Sandholtz and Sweet Stone 1998). While these theories aim to explain the same process, the divergence in the perspective they start from to explain this process creates a false dichotomy between the two prominent theories.

28 Liberal intergovernmentalism explains integration with national preferences and asymmetrical power structures and makes the argument that the fate of integration is decided at intergovernmental bargaining tables. Moravcsik (1998), for instance, does not consider supranational institutions and actors as important initiators of integration. Supranational institutionalism, on the other hand, explains integration to be created by initiatives of supranational actors and makes the argument that spill-over effects may move integration to a further position than the position intended in intergovernmental treaties. Proponents of this approach widely cite the effect of the Commission, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice in areas like telecommunication in pushing integration beyond the intentions of national governments (Sandholtz and Sweet Stone 1998). Moravcsik, in response, brings examples about multi-track integration, new ways of controlling delegated power, the weak effect of supranational institutions in shaping the intergovernmental conferences and increasing reversibility (i.e. taking the power back from supranational institutions) to demonstrate the importance of national preferences and nation-state dominance in the integration process (Moravcsik 1998; Moravcsik and Nicolaidis 1999).
In recent years, however, *neo-institutionalism* has made inroads into European Union studies. The institutionalist paradigm penetrated into research on integration to the extent that by now it has become the dominant approach (Aspinwall and Schneider, 2000; Dowding, 2000). This paradigmatic shift has especially challenged liberal intergovernmentalism for its short-time horizon perspective ignoring important past decisions (Pierson 1996). Institutionalist research focuses on the formal and informal rules, structures, norms and sometimes culture (as in the case of sociological institutionalism) for explaining integration (Aspinwall and Schneider 2000). The research examines how agent (institutional choice) and structure (formal and informal institutions) interact to shape the integration process. Consequently, with the increasing weight of institutionalist research, EU studies have entered a new phase of normal research where theorizing about integration is enriched significantly.

Although theories of integration are useful for highlighting the different aspects of integration as well as for telling us how and why integration happens, they do not particularly explain the *course of integration*. Only the institutionalist perspective has some clear implications about the history of integration. For instance, it directs our attention to different periods in EU history as well as the changing pace of integration resulting from various institutional choices (Pierson 1996). In fact, even before the dominance of this new paradigm, Schneider and Cederman (1994) defined integration as a *stop-and-go* process with changing pace. They employ a rational choice institutionalist perspective and discuss the effect of information uncertainty on creating more or less integrationist outcomes. They argue that the incentives of laggard and integrationist states under uncertainty are likely to produce stagnation (as in 1970s) or more integration (as can be seen after the signing of the Single European Act).

It is essential to investigate integration with a *historical approach* to understand how it progresses over time and how different stages within this progression differ from each other. This attempt may also provide a framework for understanding citizen attitudes in a
dynamic way, because as integration moves forward public preferences may change as well.

As discussed previously, the assumption that public support for integration will be constant among individuals with the same characteristics over time is not very realistic given the fact that integration, as the object of support, is a “moving target”. For instance, the claim that high income earners are more likely to support integration in 1973 and 1999 to the same degree may be a hard one to defend, because over time the preferences of high income individuals with respect to EU may have changed as well as integration as the object of support. Perhaps, one can still claim that the direction of the support will be the same for individuals with the same characteristics (even this assumption may not be very viable given that many changes have occurred over time), but the magnitude of support is far from being constant over time.

In the next section, I develop a stimulus-response model to explain the stages of integration. I describe three periods of integration between 1951-2002 each of which are defined as contextual environments that shape individual attitudes.

The second section demonstrates how attitudes, at the individual and aggregate level, might be different because of the conditions that exist in different integration periods. The third section tests the implications of temporal dynamics of integration for individual attitudes. The objective of this section is to demonstrate that individual attitudes are not constant but they change in magnitude and direction over time. I use multinomial logit estimation to conduct the statistical analysis.

**Stimulus-Response-Outcome Model and Different Stages of Integration**

Different scholars have specified different stages of integration looking at the history of this big project (Nugent 2003; Genna 2002; Smith and Ray 1992). In all stages, certain characteristics underlie integration. As some scholars convincingly argue, European integration starts from economic integration and moves toward a political unification
This property implies that European integration is a *teleological process* in which the *telos* is a *unified polity*.

Another property of integration is its *non-comprehensive* and *flexible* character, which helps to overcome the problem of reaching a decision by allowing opt-outs as happened for Denmark after the first referendum for Maastricht and for UK, Sweden and Denmark for the single currency. In this sense, integration in its fullest form does not necessarily exist in all states in an equal fashion and it may have different pace across members (Nugent, 2003; Moravcsik and Nicolaidis, 1999). This is a property that helps the teleology of integration operate in the lack of unanimous agreement among the members of the EU.

The third property of integration, incrementalism, refers to the idea that integration started from less controversial issues and moved with incremental gains until more significant steps were taken (Nugent, 2003; McCormick, 1999). The incrementality of integration makes the digestion of the new steps easier for citizens, member-states and the institutions of the EU.

With these three properties in mind, I approach European integration within a *stimulus-response-outcome framework* based on the idea that stages of integration are defined by responses to some stimulus (i.e. external shock) that distorts the existing outcome. The responses also interact with the already existing internal dynamics so as to create a new outcome. This model may help us understand how citizen attitudes are formed and how they change over time by providing a *story* of integration. 29

In the following section, I provide a brief history of integration for supporting the viability of this model with an eye on the probable stages of integration, which might

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29 Stimulus refers to the external economic or political shocks that create a response from the European Union. These external shocks may interact with internal dynamics which refer to the positions of the member states and their relations with each other on certain issues. The outcome will be reached when the direct and indirect effects of the stimulus jointly shift integration to a new position. Outcome in time $t$ will impact the outcome in time $t+1$ and this will add a teleological mode to integration.
provide some insights about the character of public opinion with respect to the temporal environment. 30

First Period: Coal, Steel and Security (1951-1970)

Stimulus

The origin of the European Union goes back to the Treaty of Paris that formed the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. To understand the motives behind the formation of the ECSC and later the European Economic Community (EEC), we need to understand the conflict between the large nations of West Europe. Conflicts between the two largest nations of Continental Europe since the 17th century (Thirty Years War of 1618-1648) has devastated the region periodically. This conflict resembled a lever, the fulcrum of which has shifted with the changing weights of the two nations, a shift that also deeply impacted the small and the mid-sized nations in the region. The culmination of this conflict, two World Wars, were the consequences of France’s and other nations’ governments unwillingness to give in to a strengthening Germany (House of Austria and Prussia in historical context).

In the 19th Century, France and Germany had fallen into a new state of conflict mostly caused by the fundamental changes in economic production systems and partly by the political turmoil caused by the French revolution. Also in early 1870s the German government found tremendous instrumental value in provoking a war against France for the sake of a unified Germany. However much political value this had for Germany, the lion share of the explanatory power should be given to the economic motives, which are also closely tied to the political utilities on Germany’s part. To expand its steel industry, the political will in Germany always needed to combine the iron ore deposits in Lorraine with the coal of the Ruhr basin. On France’s part, apart from the nationalist feelings for Alsace and Lorraine, similar economic motives were true as well (Toddy 1997).

30 My historical account of information is largely derived from Toddy (1997), Wood and Yesilada (2003), and Nugent (2003).
The economic and political rivalry between the two nations has also defined much of the conflict in the twentieth century. In the post WWII environment despite the cool down in the conflict, the very same reasons creating the rivalry were still true. In the 1950s, coal was still the dominant resource for energy accompanying the significance of the steel industry\(^{31}\). The German Republic was yet again busy with forming a new \textit{reich}\footnote{Thody (1997) reports that 70\% of the energy needs were met from coal in 1950s.} under international supervision while a wounded France was trying to heal her national pride and recover the economic damages. Small and mid-sized nations of the West Europe were still seeking more security and a stable fulcrum that would increase their economic prosperity and reduce their vulnerability. The memories of the two devastating wars combined with these concerns created a stimulus which made the call of Schuman, inspired by Jean Monnet, extremely appealing to the six nations of Western Europe, by virtue of bringing forth an equation where economic interdependence/cooperation would eventually lead to more security in the region. In 1951, the six, Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands (the last three known as BeNeLux) founded the ECSC in Paris, a treaty that has provided a road map and has been a continuous inspiration for future attempts. The success of this treaty completed the stimulus for establishing an economic union by helping the six realize that they can actually do well without a balancing Britain and henceforth, pushed them to sign the Two Treaties of Rome to form the EEC in 1957\(^{32}\).

\textbf{Response}

The first response of the six nations to this stimulus was joining forces and liberalizing trade in the areas of coal and steel. Despite the diminishing role of the coal as an energy resource, the success of the ECSC opened the way for the EEC which aimed to extend the removal of barriers to other areas, especially to manufactured goods to achieve a customs union and later economic integration. In the long run, basic goals were the free movement of capital and people, a common monetary policy, a common social policy...
and more importantly a political union. All these objectives were part of the telos of integration and incremental gains had paved the way for the achievement of these goals.

The response had not been easy because of the divergence of the political and economic interests that interacted with the stimulus and in turn affected the response in different ways. The German government, understandably, wanted to extend the removal of the barriers to manufactured goods whereas the French insisted on a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) that would subsidize her farmers. The Italian government, on the other side found certain benefits in increasing the structural funds in order to develop the less developed regions within the country as the nation’s economic production was moving from agriculture to manufactured goods. All three nations with the BeNeLux countries wanted more economic benefits with more security and they somehow achieved this by applying the template reached in the ECSC to the Treaty of Rome that was largely reflecting a consensus in accordance with new economic interests.

**Outcome**

Reaching outcome took a lot of negotiations and a few crises. It was not only the psychological impediments largely caused by the negative memories about Germany or technical difficulties associated with the customs union, but the problem was the complication of the picture by the conflict of interest fed by domestic politics of each nation.

The “empty-chair crisis” burst out when the Commission president Hallstein came up with a proposal that would increase the powers of the Commission and the European Parliament to accelerate the transition to the customs union. To understand the implications of Hallstein’s attempt, one needs to look at the conflicting interests more closely.

According to the Rome Treaty, financing the CAP budget should have been operational by June 1965. The problem with the CAP was that it was putting an extra burden on
taxpayers in order to subsidize the farmers in other nations to protect the European farmers against the international competition. France would get the lion’s share from that budget and this was crucial for De Gaulle since his electoral success depended on the farmers (Wood and Yesilada 2003). Hallstein wanted to get the support of Germany and the other members to achieve the customs union and CAP objectives simultaneously. The formula he found was transferring the administration of the CAP finances to the commission, increasing the powers of the parliament and the commission and proposing a majority-rule in the council for an easy transition to the customs union.

All these changes would not only empower the supranational institutions and actors, but also would bring the possibility of a winning coalition of small nations in the council. This, in fact meant the amendment of the Treaty of Rome. Seeing this move, De Gaulle challenged the proposal by calling an end to the council meeting and leaving France’s chairs empty in the council. The famous empty chair crisis left the community in a non-operational status for one year, until the French ministers returned to their seats in 1966. Ironically, the French farmers, one of the main reasons behind the crisis, supported Mitterrand against De Gaulle in the first ballot to punish the latter for being responsible for the crisis that might have risked their likely benefits from the CAP.33

Following the Luxembourg compromise,34 the community has completed its ordinary agenda without any serious problems. After the CAP agreement, the customs union was achieved in 1968, earlier than the scheduled date of 1970; a common value added tax was accepted between 1967-1973 among the six; in 1967 the executives of the ECSC, Euratom and EEC were combined to create a single commission.

33 Although De Gaulle won in the second round, his image had been damaged (Wood and Yesilada, 2003).

34 The Luxembourg compromise, an agreement reached after the empty chair crisis, has given a veto power to a member state when a vital interest of that nation state was at stake. But the most important effect of the crises has been on the agenda setting and the decision-making powers in the EC. The proposals that were put on the agenda by the commission were to be accepted by all member governments after 1966. The newly established Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) has worked as a filtering institution between the commission and the council to accelerate the decision-making.
The final outcome came after the resignation of De Gaulle in 1969, when his stubborn stand regarding the entry of the UK as well as the decision-making authority of the council and the commission got out of the way. After De Gaulle left, Pompidou called for a summit and the resulting Hague summit of 1969 has not only institutionalized the agenda-setting summit meetings, but also paved the way for the entry of three new members, UK, Denmark and Ireland.

In short, a story starting with the conflict between the two major powers in Western Europe has ended with a customs union extending beyond the coal and steel, a very debatable CAP that would create much controversy in integration, an intergovernmental impetus that set the agenda periodically against supranational institutions and a decision about the first wave of enlargement. However, a real common market was still not achieved, because the removal of barriers in all areas as well as the completion of monetary union were still in a distance future and the stimulus of the next integration period would shape the outcome resolving these issues along with the second wave of enlargement.


The stimulus-response set of this period is characterized by two external shocks, namely the end of Bretton-Woods and the oil crisis. Coupled with the internal disagreements within the community, this period started with big economic problems and created a huge pessimism about integration. Yet, the hard years of the response resulted with an outcome that moved integration one step further in a teleological fashion.

**Stimulus**

When President Nixon declared that US responsibilities with respect to the Bretton Woods system are revoked as result of a balance of payments deficit in 1971, monetary
stability in all EC members took a serious blow. Since all European currencies were anchored to the US Dollar, the end of the stable exchange rates disturbed the exchange rates of each member with the other members in the EC. This blow, especially, threatened the small European economies, for their economic well-being depended on stable exchange rates within the community. If there were less economic interdependence among the member countries, the impact of that event would have not been as serious as it turned out to be in the mid 1970s. Now that the customs union was achieved and the trade became more intertwined, floating exchange rates implied more uncertainty for trade within the community.

The pessimistic mood doubled when the 1973 oil crisis reminded the European countries that their declining dependency to coal as an energy resource and the new dependency to oil might have nullified an important motive behind integration.\textsuperscript{35} When Muslim Arab countries quadrupled the oil prices, the second blow to the EC economy was severe for all members whose economies were dependent on the oil as a cheap energy resource.

The situation got even worse in the early 1980s. It became evident that European economies had fallen behind the two competing economies, namely the US and Japan. In addition, the US demanded from two big economies of the time, Japan and West Germany, to contribute to the overall development of the world economy by adjusting their currencies. With the already existing negative effects of the first two blows, the European community seemed to be at the end of the road.

On the political front, the end of the authoritarian regimes in southern Europe created a motive for the European leaders to contribute to the further democratization of Greece, Spain and Portugal. Perhaps, this motive would have not led to a political action unless there were concerns about the increasing influence of Japan and the US economies in this region.

\textsuperscript{35} In 1970, 25\% of the energy needs were met in by the resources of EC compared to 75\% in 1950 (Thody, 1997).
However, despite these conditions and the now-more-intensified negotiations among the members, the response of the EC had been a very constructive one that improved economic union and helped to digest the second wave of the enlargement.

**Response**

The idea of a monetary union was hardly new for the European leaders. This idea was put on the table by the German chancellor Willy Brandt and was accepted by the others in the 1969 Hague summit. The Werner plan of 1970 was a first step sketching the European Monetary Union (EMU). However, when the earthquake created by the collapse of the Bretton Woods doubled its impact with the addition of the oil crisis, European economies started to worry foremost about their own economies.

Countries like France, Britain and Italy were among the most affected ones when the unstable exchange rates put inflationary pressures on their economies. Yet, the long-term impact of the instability was felt more seriously on the distorted trade figures within the community. Especially, Germany was pressed by the Smithsonian agreement in the second half of 1971 to take most of the burden according to a plan that would increase the Deutsche Mark and Japanese Yen in value so as to produce an impact equivalent to the devaluation of the US Dollar that would, in turn, reduce the trade deficit of US (Wood and Yesilada 2003).

The US devalued the dollar by 10% in 1971 and the EC responded with a plan called the “snake” to reduce the 10% rate to 4.5% by keeping the EC currencies within 2.25% interval on the negative and positive sides of the Dollar exchange rate (Wood and Yesilada 2003). To keep the snake within the walls European central banks would support the currencies of countries that were in a difficult situation. However, the snake did not last more than a year when Britain left the snake followed by Ireland, Denmark and Italy. It was more than obvious that the snake would fail when European central banks declared that they would no longer support the other countries to keep their exchange rates within the walls of the snake vis-à-vis the American Dollar. Perhaps, it
was not only economic reasons behind the failure of the first snake project, but the lack of credible commitments and the rules that would enforce the snake to float within the walls also contributed to the failure. This fact has provided a motive for future regulations.

The situation got no less complicated with the second and third devaluations of the Dollar and the added impact of the oil crisis. As a result of these conditions, the call for a common monetary policy came from the British who, ironically, would eventually have an opt-out from joining the Euro. The monetarist position taken by Britain and some other nations emanated from the empirical invalidity of the Phillips curve which became an issue in the late 1970s. The idea that there should be a tradeoff between inflation and unemployment had simply proven not to be true in those years, as the major European economies (especially France and Italy) experienced both problems simultaneously. This condition was partly caused by global monetary instability and partly by the impact of the oil crisis on certain industries in Europe, which were now heavily dependent on the oil as their main energy source.

It was not only the British who called for a common monetary policy, but also the Germans, for both the same and some other reasons, came up with the same proposal. In the late 1970s Carter’s plan to make West Germany and Japan follow expansionary policies and assume more responsibility for the development of world economies had alarmed Germany, because this plan was likely to increase already existing pressure on DM by accelerating the rush to the currency as a new stable anchor.

Despite the willingness of Germany and Britain, with the added support of small countries, the most important move to a European Monetary Union (EMU) was not achieved until the victory of Giscard d’Estaing’s party in 1978 French legislative elections. Himself being a supporter of EMU, d’Estaing faced criticism from left and right mostly on the grounds of the loss of French sovereignty due to the EMU. On the other side of the coin, Germany preferred to share economic leadership with France to make an easier transition to the monetary union and remove the pressure on the DM.
Apart from these reasons, it was then apparent that the attempts like the “snake” were not likely to work unless backed up by more credible rules as the two attempts to stabilize the exchange rate system within the EC have failed following two major devaluations of the Dollar. Now that the three largest countries agreed on the necessity of a common monetary system, perhaps noting the reluctance of Britain, the next stop would be to agree on a proposal that would compromise different positions of the members. The agreement was reached in 1978 which created the European Monetary System (EMS) that created a basket currency named ECU with an exchange rate mechanism (ERM) that resembled the “snake” but with more strict regulations and the pooling of asset reserves.

Perhaps, EMS was a very important step on the way to a common currency, but the European leaders were aware of the fact that unless accompanied by a real single market, the objective of a common monetary system would not be achieved. To achieve that objective, the plans for a single market were already on the way, but it would take a serious crisis over budgetary issues to agree on the common denominators of the single market.

When Thatcher came to power in 1979, Britain was already in political turmoil with the recent strikes against the Labor government, which cut government spending and imposed limits on wage increases. Thatcher, mostly concerned with the unfairness in the CAP budget, made her position very clear by stressing that British citizens would not subsidize French farmers and that they could not afford to pay more for food as a result of unfair CAP regulations. This was intimidating the other leaders for it was not only a major challenge to the already agreed upon norms of the community but also was making it hard to reach a decision (Wood and Yesilada 2003).

By the time Britain’s opposition has reached its climax in an attempt to revoke the empty chair crisis in 1982, France had already undergone a major change in the government when Mitterrand was elected as the president defeating d'Estaing. The budgetary crisis over the CAP worsened when Mitterrand made his Euroskeptic position on integration
clear. Mitterrand started an extensive reforms package largely aiming to privatize the big national industries. The European Community was once again on the edge of a serious threat to its own existence when Thatcher insisted on her position and Mitterand started not to support the German government in a pro-integrationist way. Adding to the persisting problems of unemployment and inflation in many European economies and the not yet observed outcomes of the EMS, the atmosphere of the community was now one of “pessimism”.

It was not until Mitterrand’s realization that his enthusiastic reforms were very costly and decreasing his popularity that the community solved the budgetary crisis and achieved a huge step on the way to a single market. Despite the pressures from the left-wing members of his government to leave the EMS in the face of a weak Franc against the DM, Mitterand decided to stay in to divert the attention from his failure regarding domestic reforms and to gain popularity by playing a leadership role in European integration.

The main problem of the budgetary crisis was emanating from the fact that the British leaders wanted to contribute less to what she called an unfair system of the CAP, but other countries, especially Germany were unwilling to accept the Britain’s proposal for reducing her contribution to the CAP budget. One reason for this reluctance was the idea that Britain’s proposal was at odds with the current state of \textit{acquis communautaire} and accepting this proposal would undermine the community norms. The other reason was accepting that the British proposal would mean more financial burden on the other members, especially Germany.

When Mitterrand accepted to share the burden of Germany in an attempt to reduce Britain’s contribution to the CAP, a very important step was taken to reach an agreement over the budget crisis. The solution of this crisis would not only give way to a single market, otherwise known as “1992 project”, that would further the monetary union but also it would coincide with a second wave of enlargement following the collapse of the
dictatorships in Southern Europe. The outcome, as in the first case, moved integration to a further step as would be foreseen by the teleological course of integration.

**Outcome**

The Fontainableau Summit (1984) resolved the budgetary crisis largely due to the constructive part Mitterrand played during the summit. This summit also marked a significant step toward a single market. Once the budget issue was resolved, the leaders agreed on taking further steps toward a single market.

The single market has been on the agenda for a long time, but in the mid 1980s it was more attractive to the community members than it used to be. There are a couple of reasons for that development. Firstly, the increasing competition from Japan and US and within the community made the single market more desirable. The removal of all barriers in front of a unified market would strengthen the community against two major competing powers and further the trade liberalization within the community. Secondly the objective of the common monetary system could be achieved only if there was a real single market, and the achievement of a common monetary system would solve many problems contaminating the European economies since the collapse of the Bretton Woods and the oil crisis. Finally, now that Japan and US had more investments in Southern Europe to threaten EC investments, the single market could be used as a step to integrate Greece, Spain and Portugal to increase community competitiveness against two major competitors (USA and Japan). In addition, the last motive would also help these countries to democratize and give the opportunity to the EC to extend the norms of democracy to its southern periphery.

The outcome was reached with the contribution of the supranational entrepreneurialism of the new commission president Jacques Delors. The Single European Act which was agreed upon by the ten members of the community at the 1985 Luxembourg summit was ratified in 1987 by all members, and by that time, Spain and Portugal were already in the community.
The Delors plan helped take significant steps in practically achieving the objectives of the SEA. With the realization of this plan, all the barriers to a single market were removed and this plan helped to complete the full economic union by preparing the base-structure for a single currency and monetary union. This new outcome represented by the SEA brought a new optimism to the community about further integration. Most importantly, the outcome pointed to the next stage that would add another step in reaching the telos of integration as early as 1989, as can be seen in a report prepared by economic and social council:

“Even once it is reinforced by the establishment of a barrier-free internal market, the [EC] will not be able to withstand competition from the two main strategic areas of America and Asia unless it expands its economic area and market. To create this strategic European area, the [EC] will have to turn to its neighbors: European Free Trade Association (EFTA), central and east Europe, and the Mediterranean (cited from Wood and Yesilada 2003, p. 118).

Third Period: From Economic Integration to Political Unification
(1990-2002)

Stimulus

The collapse of the communist order and the end of the cold war is the main stimulus that transformed the European Community to the European Union. In addition, the outcome in the last period of integration also contributed to the developments that brought the community to Maastricht and beyond in a way that conforms to the logic of a teleological process, but the collapse of the communist world created the main motives in the deepening and the widening of the community. The upheaval in the central and eastern Europe was likely to disturb the current economic and political balances not only for the EC but also for the neutral countries, which up to that point chose to remain outside the community.

Economically, on the EC’s part, central and eastern European countries were providing new opportunities and incentives by opening a new market. Politically, the big transformations were read as the victory of Western Democracies. A region always
thought as part of Europe now had the opportunity of transition to democracy in which
the EC was more than ready to provide support. But EC had to deal first with the
framework that would best fit to the new conditions as well as the completion of old
promises aiming to realize a complete single market with a single currency and political
organization. To achieve both deepening and widening took a lot of bargaining in a more
complicated environment with the increased relevance of the public opinion.

Response

The initial response of the community was filtered through two considerations. The first
consideration was the implication of this big transformation for the existing plan of
integration that was aiming to complete the single market, to have a single currency, and
open the avenues for political unification. Especially, the likely impacts of widening on
the existing outcome and on the future of the community were seriously considered.

The second consideration was about the probable consequences of the willingness of
West Germany to unify two parts of the nation. The promptness of German re-
unification was invoking memories of the two world wars and reminding the Europeans
that a unified Germany would disturb the existing balance of power.

The response of the community to the first was very enthusiastic and bold in the sense
that as early as 1989 a plan for including rich but neutral countries like Austria, Sweden
and Finland as well Central and East European countries was declared in a council report.
The European Community launched an economic reconstruction program called PHARE
in 1989 to support newly emerging democracies. Despite this enthusiasm, there were
divergences in the preferences of actors. Delors was more supportive of deepening
integration before any eastern enlargement took place in opposition with the Britain’s
position defending an eastward enlargement to prevent German hegemony within a well
developed community.
The community’s response to the second consideration refreshed the centuries old memories of the *German problem*. When Kohl announced his intentions for the early unification of Germany, both Mitterrand and Thatcher started to raise their doubts, yet they had slightly different perspectives. Thatcher wanted to prevent an early unification and strengthening of relations with post-communist countries to reduce the power of a unified Germany that would shift the balances. Alternatively, Mitterrand did not see a delay in unification feasible and hence defended a *deepening* perspective that would lock Germany into a strengthened community. Once again Mitterrand’s move solved the *knot* and Germany and France called for a summit that would define a new agenda for the European Community.

The agenda of the special meeting included both deepening issues (the completion of the monetary union, a social charter and steps toward political unification) as well as widening (inclusion of Sweden, Finland, Norway and Austria as a prelude to eastern enlargement and the prospect of central and eastern Europe). The talks entered a faster stage when Thatcher was overthrown by her fellow party members and left the stage to a John Major who was not as irreconcilable to the European project as she was.

The resulting agreement not only defined the future plan for integration, but it also added two new pillars to the economic pillar, namely common defense and security policy, and justice and home affairs. Among the most important decisions of the treaty were the strengthening of the European Parliament and more concrete steps to a single currency. When an agreement was reached and later signed in Maastricht in February of 1992, everybody though that the treaty would be ratified by the end of the year, but the ratification process witnessed the rise of a new actor in the community affairs: public opinion.

The voice of the public in Denmark and France echoed in Brussels, reminding the elites that public opinion needs to be taken into account. The Danish voters rejected the treaty and in France the acceptance came only with a small margin. The problems encountered in Britain in ratification of the treaty and a crisis of European monetary system in 1992
made the members come together by the end of that year. Special additions were made to
the Maastricht agreement stressing that the treaty would not intervene in the sovereign
rights of the states and it was only after these additions that the treaty was ratified in
Britain and approved in a second referendum in Denmark the following year.

The Maastricht treaty is a crucial step in the history of integration. After Maastricht the
EC was named the European Union (EU), a name indicating that political unification was
now on the agenda. EU now had three pillars that went beyond economic integration;
supranational institutions, especially the EP increased their powers; very important steps
were taken toward Euro; and finally the way for the third wave of enlargement, which
would come in two strikes, was opened. It was only after the ratification of the
Maastricht treaty that the EU slowly ended up with a new outcome in deepening and
widening of integration.

**Outcome**

After the ratification of the Maastricht, the accession of three members, Austria, Sweden,
and Finland was completed. The end of Cold War and the success of the EU made these
countries more eager to join the community and the low costs associated with their
accession created no problems for their acceptance within the union. Citizens of Norway
once again refused to join.

Two important intergovernmental negotiations in Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (2001)
marked the final stages of the outcome. Two treaties signed after these
intergovernmental conferences concerned the eastward enlargement, the institutional
implications for a Europe of 25, and the European monetary system. Each treaty
furthered the steps taken by previous treaties and served the cause of the teleological
progress of European integration. The powers of the EP increased significantly during
this period and some progress was made in the new pillars of the EU. Two important
events marking the new outcome, the launch of EURO in 2002 and the accession
agreements with ten new members defined the new Europe as they created at least as
much enthusiasm as controversy. In the new millennium it is now apparent that the problems facing the Europe will be on the political front as can be seen over the debates about the EU constitution, the common defense and security policy, and the continued expansion.

Integration Periods and Public Opinion

The brief history of integration introduced within the stimulus-response-outcome framework gives one some clues about the role of public opinion in the EU.

The issue of whether public opinion is relevant or not in a given polity is not unique to the EU, but for many years it has been assumed that a permissive consensus among the public exists about integration affairs (Lindberg and Scheingold 1971). The aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty ended the long-enduring false-image of the permissive consensus by introducing public opinion as a new power. However, the history of integration implies that the picture of public support might be more complicated even before the Maastricht treaty. The implications of the history of integration for public opinion and public support can be summarized as follows.

Firstly, public opinion and public support for integration is not independent of the stimulus, response and the resulting outcome in each integration period. That is, individual attitudes are likely to be shaped by the conditions of each period, because the same problems that shape integration also define an environment in which individuals’ beliefs, preferences and attitudes are likely to be formed.

Secondly, given the above assumption, one can expect that attitudes will not be constant throughout the integration process. As the conditions surrounding the individuals and the object of attitudes change, so will individual beliefs, preferences and hence attitudes. As discussed before, the assumption of constancy is not viable, because it would be unrealistic to assume that attitudes remain constant as the object of these attitudes changes. In other words, integration as an object of support changes more than an
established polity would do and therefore it may be considered a moving target. As discussed previously, the psychology research found that beliefs, preferences and attitudes are formed as a result of interaction between human cognition and the external world (see Lupia and Druckman 2000). Therefore, it is hardly possible to accept the assumption that attitudes will be constant over time. Based on this argument I propose the non-constant effects hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 13: The effects of individual level determinants of support, economic and non-economic, have non-constant effects such that their effect and direction on support for integration will change from one integration period to the other.**

Thirdly, and more specifically, one can expect that the public will be more supportive of integration in the early years of integration and that questions will arise in the minds of individuals as integration expands from peripheral economic issues to core economic and new political issues in a way that increases the involvement and relevancy of the EU in the daily lives of individuals.

For instance, the memories of the second World War and the desire for security and peace in Western Europe may have fostered the approval of regional economic cooperation and created a permissive consensus on citizens’ part. This mood must have been in effect until the first major challenge to the community from the external world, namely the collapse of the Bretton Woods and the oil crisis. Perhaps, high levels of public support for integration can also be considered as a result of the success in integration matters as well as the initial positive economic outcomes of this cooperation.

However, when community failed to develop a fast response to the stimulus of the second period and to prevent the downward trends in all macroeconomic indicators, the public must have fallen into a pessimistic mood about the existing conditions. At this point, one needs to make an additional assumption relating the public mood to integration, but this

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36 Gabel (1998b) found empirical support for the relation between the desire for security and public support for integration. He found that individuals living in countries with more war deaths (a sign for a desire for a more secure Europe) have higher support than those who live in countries which suffered less from WWII.
would be an easy assumption to make, because the failure of national governments in solving these problems left the EC as the main actor to cope with economic problems and made its actions more relevant to the daily lives of people. The failure of the EC to respond effectively to these problems as well as the budgetary crisis fought openly in front of the public eye in the early 1980s probably increased the negative attitudes regarding integration. The rationale for an individual at this period should be something like “if a community cannot solve the economic problems caused by big economic powers and if the same community cannot even agree on its budget, why do we need it?” While this rationale may have been true for the first half of the second integration period, as community leaders started to appear more cooperative and solved the budget crisis and as the economic indicators got better, the rationale might have taken an opposite direction favoring integration.

In the last period of integration, on the other hand, the effects of the single market became real in the daily lives of individuals, yet differentially. Some individuals started to gain more and some others became losers as they experienced the outcomes of the economic integration. The colors of this picture became sharper and more contrasted as the impact got deeper with the last stages of the EMS as well as the demands for further liberalization to complete the Single Market financial and services sector. The economic effects of single currency as well as the shift to a liberal Europe as opposed to a social Europe should have made public more attentive to the consequences of integration during these years (1997-2002). A more significant turn regarding individual attitudes was taken when people began to realize that integration is moving to political areas and transforming their weltanschauung by intruding into areas controlled by national sovereigns. All these, combined with the idea of expanding to a community of 27 and may be even 30, are likely to increase the relevance and significance of public attitudes, because in this period, the sphere of public attitudes resembles a polity in transition affecting the lives of people more than ever.

37 A more detailed discussion related to the tension between corporatist traditions and liberalization is provided in Chapter 5.
The question remaining to be answered is how the conditions in different integration periods will shape individual attitudes for integration. It is hard to answer, for there is so much complexity to public sphere and hence to public attitudes, but one can expect that certain segments of the public will be more careful, more concerned and even more skeptic about further steps toward integration. In other words, as integration moves forward, the winners and losers will delineate from each other. This delineation allows one explain and predict support for integration based on individual characteristics that define the winners, losers, supporters and the skeptics. It will be harder to explain and predict supportive attitudes under a “permissive consensus” or a “presumed obedience”, because individuals will differ, to a lesser extent, from each other with respect to their attitudes for integration. However, as permissive consensus diminishes over time, individual characteristics are likely to increase their explanatory power as determinants of support. As integration progresses, the individual characteristics should become more important (i.e. increase their significance and impact as explanatory variables) in explaining/predicting support for integration. Therefore I propose a temporal saliency hypothesis:

_Hypothesis 14: The individual level determinants of support for integration should gain more importance (i.e. statistically significant) and should have larger impacts in the last period of integration compared to the earlier years._

The fourth implication of the history of integration, which is mostly subject to empirical confirmation, is related to the explanatory power of economic and non-economic determinants of support for integration. As summarized in Chapter 3, while earlier research focused on cognitive mobilization/political values, partisanship and generally macro level economic indicators, the utilitarian explanations became the dominant approach in EU during 1990s. Although, recently, identity theories are utilized to provide alternative explanations for individual attitudes (see Hooghe and Marks 2003 for a review), the role of self-interest in explaining support for integration is at the center of this research program. However, elsewhere and as summarized below, it has been shown that the role of self-interest in explaining public opinion is limited.
Research in American Public Opinion has slowly come to the conclusion stating that self-interest is hardly a motivator of public opinion (see Kinder (1998) for an excellent review). The claim of utilitarian explanations is that “in forming opinions in political matters, citizens fix their attention on what is in it for them. They support parties and policies that seem likely to advance their own material interests…” (Kinder 1998, 800). A large body of research questioned the easily assumed role of self-interest and they demonstrated that the effect of utilitarian factors in explaining American public opinion is relatively unimportant (Sears et. al 1980; Kinder and Sanders 1996; also see Citrin and Green 1990; Sears and Funk 1991 for reviews). Some studies attempted to explain this fact by the lack of information or citizen incompetence, or the socialization effect of the political life teaching people to act in accordance with general interest (Citrin and Green 1990). However, despite this finding, self-interest still may be important in certain cases. As Kinder (1998) states “self-interest matters, or seems to, when the material benefits or harms of a proposed policy are substantial, imminent and well publicized” (p. 802).

I argue that the assumption that individuals can easily figure out their self interest and can link the policy outcomes to their material gains is overrated and hardly ever questioned in the EU public opinion research. Self interest matters, but when the environment motivates individuals to focus on their gains and when information is sufficient enough allowing individuals to figure out their wins and losses. In other words, self-interest is likely to matter in only those situations where the issues are well-publicized and are prioritized on the agenda. For instance, during 1985-1989, a time when the Single European act was well publicized or after 1997 when the effects of single currency affected the lives of European citizens and when the liberal-bias against Social Europe became more visible, the saliency of self interest as a motivator of public opinion may have gained more saliency. Otherwise, self-interest, in the long-run, may not be as prominent as emotional dispositions (e.g. identity, religion) or political values in explaining public attitudes. Thus, I propose that:

38 See Chapter 5 for a discussion about Social Europe.
Hypothesis 15: Economic determinants of support for integration should be salient sporadically whereas non-economic indicators are expected to be more persistent in saliency over time.

In the next section, I introduce the data and the statistical analyses to test the individual level hypothesis introduced in Chapter 3 and the three hypotheses, developed in this chapter, about the effect of integration periods on individual attitudes. As mentioned previously, the data are available after 1974 and hence I test the individual level hypotheses for only two integration periods (1970-1989 and 1990-2002).

**Data and Analysis**

I surveyed the 50 standard Eurobarometer surveys over a 28-year span (from 1974 to 2002) to test the individual level hypotheses as well as the hypotheses related to the temporal effects. The Eurobarometer surveys have been conducted by the European Commission since 1973 in all member states every six months. There has been a great deal of change with respect to the number and content of items asked in these surveys. The items tapping individual attitudes have not been asked in all surveys and sometimes the wording of the questions has changed significantly. Therefore, I ran two different models, base models and extended models, to test the individual level and temporal hypotheses. Table 4.1 describes the independent variables used in the analysis. The boldfaced variables are used only in extended models.

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39 Individual level hypotheses were introduced in Chapter 3 whereas temporal hypotheses were developed in this Chapter following the historical narrative about European integration.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</table>
| Discuss Politics          | When you get together with friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally or never?  
1. Frequently  
2. Occasionally  
3. Never                                                    |
| Persuade Friends          | When you hold a strong opinion, do you ever find yourself persuading your friends, relatives or fellow workers to share your view? Does this happen?  
1. Often  
2. From time to time  
3. Rarely  
4. Never                                                |
| Postmaterialism           | An index of materialist-postmaterialist values based on Inglehart’s typology including items like maintaining order in nation, giving people more say in government issues, fighting rising prices and freedom of speech. The index has three categories: 1 materialistic, 2 mixed and 3 postmaterialistic |
| Satisfaction with Democracy in the EU | On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in <Country>, (EU):  
1. Very satisfied  
2. Fairly satisfied  
3. Not very satisfied  
4. Not at all satisfied                                         |
| Vote Intention            | Three dummy variables- vote left, vote right and vote extreme- are created based on an item asking the respondents for which party they intend to vote in the next elections. The parties were assigned to left, right, extreme and other parties (special interest, regional etc.) based on the ZEUS party families code. “Vote intention for other parties” is the reference category. |
| Extremism Score           | From the item asking the respondents to locate themselves on the ideological continuum from left (1) to right (10), a new scale (0-4) is created where values in the middle (5, 6) are assigned a value of 0; 4 and 7 are assigned a value of 1; 3 and 8 are assigned a value of 2; 2 and 9 are recoded as 3 and 1 and 10 are assigned a value of 4. Then, the new scale is squared to measure the extremism score for each individual. |
| Income                    | Three dummy variables for low, low-middle and high-middle income; high income is the reference category.                                      |
| Identity                  | Three dummies are created from the following item; “nationality only” is the reference category  
In the near future, do you feel yourself as...?  
1. Nationality only  
2. Nationality and the European only  
3. European and nationality only  
4. European only                                                  |
| National Pride            | Would you say you are very proud, quite proud, not very proud, not at all proud, to be <nationality>  
1. Very proud  
2. Quite proud  
3. Not very proud,  
4. Not at all proud                                                   |
| Economic Perceptions/Expectations and Satisfaction with Life | A set of items asking the respondents their perception of personal and national economic situation, financial situation as well as their future expectations at individual and country level (all responses ordered from positive to negative) |
Table 4.1 - continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>Dummy variables for professional, executive, manual, business, farmer, White Collar, Student, retired, unemployed (housewife, small business, and other occupations form the reference category)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Years spent in education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Age of the respondent at the time of survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>1 female 0 male</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on the results from factor analysis in Chapter 2 and given the fact that most items tapping individual support for integration have not been asked continuously in Eurobarometer surveys, I use the membership question as a measure of support for integration. This question has been asked in most surveys since 1974.

Generally speaking, do you think that (your country’s) membership in the European Union (common market, European Community) is….?
1. A bad thing
2. Neither good nor bad
3. A good thing

Many past studies used this variable with OLS or TSCS regression ignoring its categorical nature. However, using a categorical variable with any of these techniques may result in biased estimates. I prefer to use multinomial logit for estimation.\(^{40}\) When the parallel regression assumption is violated, ordered logit produces bias estimates. Although multinomial logit will produce inefficient estimates, they are unbiased and

\(^{40}\) However, one could claim that the dependent variable has an ordinal nature and ordered logit would be a better option. The choice between ordered logit and multinomial logit is not a trivial one. One cannot conclude that a variable is ordinal simply because its categories are ranked. Whether a variable is ordered or not depends on its purpose and a variable might be ordered differently in various dimensions (Long and Freese 2001). In addition to these concerns, one needs to make sure that "parallel regression assumption" holds in ordered logit. I ran the models with ordered logit and tested for both a likelihood ratio test and a Wald test, otherwise known as Brandt test in Stata, and this assumption was violated in most cases.
under the circumstances, a better choice.\textsuperscript{41} Moreover, the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) was not violated in any model and this is another factor encouraging the use of multinomial logit.\textsuperscript{42}

I ran multinomial logits for each year, combining two surveys of the same year, for 1974-2002 period. An extended model was ran in addition to the base model for certain years. In Multinomial logit estimations, the second response, “membership is neither good nor bad”, is selected as the reference category.

Before presenting the results I repeat the individual level hypotheses reported in Chapter 3.

\textit{Hypothesis 1}: Skilled workers (professionals/managers) and farmers are more likely to support integration than manual workers.

\textit{Hypothesis 2}: Individuals with high income are more likely to support integration than individuals with low-income.

\textit{Hypothesis 3}: Individuals with high levels of education are more likely to support integration than individuals with low levels of education.

\textit{Hypotheses 4}: Individuals who have a positive perception of the economy are more likely to support integration.

\textit{Hypothesis 5}: Individuals with extreme ideology are less likely to support integration than individuals with moderate ideology.

\textit{Hypothesis 6}: Individuals that have a rightist ideology (supporting a right party) are more likely to support integration than individuals with a leftist ideology (supporting a left party).

\textsuperscript{41} One can also run generalized ordered logit (Clogg and Shihadeh 1994; Long and Freese 2001) or the stereotype ordered regression model (Anderson 1984). I chose multinomial logit, because it is known and applied more than these other two models in political science research.

\textsuperscript{42} I used the Hausman and Small/Hsiao tests for checking the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), and in both cases the results confirmed that the null, stating that the odds of the outcomes are independent of alternatives, can be accepted.
Hypothesis 7: Supporters of extreme parties are less likely to support integration than supporters of the center parties.

Hypothesis 8: Those who have postmaterialist values are more likely to support integration than those who have materialist values.

Hypothesis 9: Those who are deeply attached to their national identity are less likely to support integration.

Hypothesis 10: Those who feel exclusively European are more likely to support integration than those who do not feel exclusively European.

Hypothesis 11: Those who are satisfied with democracy are more likely to support integration than those who are not satisfied.

Hypothesis 12: Those with higher levels of political interest and involvement are more supportive of integration compared to those with low levels of political interest.

I only compare the coefficients across two integration periods: 1974-1989 and 1990-2002.\(^{43}\) Table 4.2 reports the multinomial logit estimation results for the pooled data.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-economic Indicators</th>
<th>Bad/Neither Good nor Bad</th>
<th>Good/Neither Good nor Bad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coeff.</td>
<td>Robust Std. Err.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persuade Friends</td>
<td>0.948</td>
<td>-0.053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Discussion</td>
<td>0.843</td>
<td>-0.171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postmaterialism</td>
<td>1.124</td>
<td>0.117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with democracy</td>
<td>1.245</td>
<td>0.219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote Left</td>
<td>0.696</td>
<td>-0.362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote Right</td>
<td>0.534</td>
<td>-0.627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote Extreme</td>
<td>2.089</td>
<td>0.737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme Ideology</td>
<td>1.017</td>
<td>0.017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{43}\) Unfortunately the data for the first integration period are not available.
### Table 4.2 – Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Indicators and Control Variables</th>
<th>Relative Risk Ratio</th>
<th>Coeff.</th>
<th>Robust Std. Err.</th>
<th>P-Value</th>
<th>Relative Risk Ratio</th>
<th>Coeff.</th>
<th>Robust Std. Err.</th>
<th>P-Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low Income</td>
<td>1.128</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.763</td>
<td>-0.271</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-mid Income</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.854</td>
<td>-0.157</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-mid Income</td>
<td>1.084</td>
<td>0.081</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>1.001</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>1.007</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.783</td>
<td>-0.245</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.853</td>
<td>-0.159</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.759</td>
<td>-0.276</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>0.911</td>
<td>-0.093</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>0.206</td>
<td>1.557</td>
<td>0.443</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive</td>
<td>0.915</td>
<td>-0.089</td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td>0.251</td>
<td>1.625</td>
<td>0.485</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual</td>
<td>1.077</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.844</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>0.989</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.823</td>
<td>0.983</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>0.939</td>
<td>-0.062</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>0.333</td>
<td>1.132</td>
<td>0.124</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Collar</td>
<td>0.983</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.607</td>
<td>1.111</td>
<td>0.105</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>1.057</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>0.234</td>
<td>1.272</td>
<td>0.241</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>0.974</td>
<td>-0.026</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.470</td>
<td>1.082</td>
<td>0.079</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>1.112</td>
<td>0.106</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.959</td>
<td>-0.042</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.192</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 168473
Wald Chi2(114) = 26505.12
Prob> chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.1259

* Country and year dummies are reported in Appendix 4-A

As Table 4.2 demonstrates, in both panels, most coefficients reach statistical significance in the expected direction. The first eight variables in both panels are measures of non-economic determinants of support for integration and they include indicators of political interest, values and ideology. Individuals that discuss politics less frequently and that do not persuade their friends in political matters are less likely to believe that their country’s membership to EU is a bad thing rather than being indifferent (neither good nor bad) compared to individuals that discuss politics and persuade their friends frequently.

Surprisingly, an individual with the same characteristics is also less likely to believe that his/her country’s membership to the EU is a good thing rather than thinking that it is neither good nor bad. More substantively, an individual who often persuades his/her friends is 15% less likely to believe that his/her country’s membership is a bad thing (and 21% less likely to believe that membership is a good thing), compared to being indifferent (neither good nor bad), than an individual who never persuades his/her friends in political
matters.\textsuperscript{44} Similarly, an individual who discusses politics frequently is 32\% percent less likely to have negative attitudes about integration (and 36\% less likely to have positive attitudes about integration), as opposed to remaining indifferent, than an individual who never discusses politics with his friends. These results imply that frequently getting involved in political discussions and frequently persuading friends substantively decreases the likelihood of having a non-attitude about integration.

\textit{Postmaterialism} is statistically significant and has a positive sign for both comparisons indicating that having any value, materialist or postmaterialist, increases the likelihood of having supportive/non-supportive attitudes for European integration compared to staying indifferent. An individual with materialist values is 24\% more likely to think that his/her country’s membership to the EU is a bad thing (30\% more likely to believe it is “a good thing”) than a postmaterialist individual as opposed to staying indifferent to integration.

Coefficients for the ideology and party identification (vote intention) variables are statistically significant and mostly in the expected direction. The reference category for these variables is \textit{other parties} (vote intention for special interest, regional or other parties). Individuals who intend to vote for parties of the left and right are less likely to believe that their country’s membership is a bad thing rather than remaining indifferent compared to individuals who support other parties and extreme parties. Inversely, the supporters of the center right or center left parties are more likely to believe that their country’s membership is a good thing rather than remaining indifferent to European integration. Individuals who intend to vote for extreme parties are less supportive of integration as the high relative risk ratio in the first panel indicates (2.08). Supporters of the extreme parties are 51\% less likely to support integration compared to the supporters of center parties and other parties. The degree of extremism in ideology score has a statistically discernable effect in both comparison groups, nevertheless this effect

\textsuperscript{44} Odds ratios are used to obtain the percentages. For instance, relative risk ratio for \textit{Persuade Friends} is .948 in the first panel indicating that one unit increase in this variable decreases the odds of choosing the response of “membership is bad” as opposed to “neither good nor bad”, by a factor of .948 (or 100*(1-.948)=~5\%), holding all other variables constant. Since this variable has four categories, a change from minimum to maximum will result in a total decrease of 3*5=15%. 
decreases the likelihood of both negative (membership is bad) and positive (membership is good) responses in comparison to an indifference response (neither good nor bad).

Finally, satisfaction with democracy is statistically significant and in the expected directions in both panels. Since responses to this item were ordered from positive to negative (very satisfied to not at all satisfied) on a four-point scale, the coefficient for this variable has a positive sign in the first and a negative sign in the second panel. An individual who is not at all satisfied with democracy in his/her country is 75% less likely to have non-supportive attitudes for integration compared to an individual who is very satisfied with democracy. An individual who is very satisfied with democracy is 72% more likely to think that his country’s membership is a good thing rather than staying indifferent compared to an individual who is not at all satisfied with democracy.

Other variables in Table 4.2 are economic indicators and usual controls included by past studies. Utilitarian explanations assert that individuals with higher incomes, high levels of education and skilled labor are more likely to support integration, because these groups are more likely to benefit from market liberalization. Results in Table 4.2 generally support the utilitarian argument. The economic indicators include three categories of income (high levels of income is the reference category), education, and occupation dummies. Coefficients for income dummies are statistically significant and they are in the expected direction. An individual with low income is 13% more likely to have a non-favorable attitude about integration than an individual with higher (low-middle) income. The odds of not supporting integration is 8% higher for an individual with low-middle or high-middle levels of income compared to an individual with higher income. As demonstrated in the second panel of Table 4.2, individuals with lower levels of income are less likely to support integration (the odds of supporting integration decreases by 28%, 24% and 15% from low to high-middle levels of income) compared to individuals with higher levels of income. Higher education increases the level of support for integration. Ten years of increase in time spent for education decreases the likelihood of choosing a negative response (bad thing) as opposed to remaining neutral (neither good nor bad) by 10%. The same amount of change increases the likelihood of supporting
European Integration (membership good) as opposed to staying neutral by 10%, however this impact is not statistically significant. Most occupation dummies do not reach statistical significance for the bad/neither good nor bad comparison, yet an opposite pattern emerges in the good/neither neither good nor bad panel. Only being a manual worker or unemployed increases the likelihood of having a non-favorable attitude for integration in a statistically meaningful way. The coefficients for good/neither good nor bad comparison show that individuals with skilled jobs (professionals, executive, white collar), farmers and students are more likely to have favorable attitudes about their country’s membership in the EU.

Finally, the results for the control variables, age and gender, demonstrate that older people and females are less supportive of integration. However, the coefficient for age does not reach statistical significance for good thing/neither good nor bad comparison.

Overall, the results are in line with the findings of past studies. However, three points need to be noted. Firstly, one should remember that the significant results may be due to the large number of observations that creates an over-fitted model. Secondly, the results show that some variables reach significance in only one comparison and hence suggesting that, using models that do not take the categorical nature of the dependent variable into consideration may result in misspecification and hence bias. Finally, the results reported by models using pooled data are likely to neglect contextual effect of time (i.e integration periods) on individual attitudes. With all of these in minds, I first report the results of multinomial logit estimations that divide the integration into two periods and compare the changes in the effect of economic and non-economic variables. Then, I provide a summary of the results from multinomial logit estimation for each year between 1974 and 2002. This summary includes the results for the variables in the base model reported above, as well as an extended model which adds identity and economic perception variables to the base model.

Table 4.3 reports the multinomial estimation results for two periods of integration, 1970-1989 and 1990-2002.
Table 4.3: Determinants of Individual Support for European Integration over Two Periods*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Good/Neither Good nor Bad</td>
<td>Bad/Neither Good nor Bad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>rrr* Coeff. Robust Std. Err. P-val</td>
<td>rrr* Coeff. Robust Std. Err. P-val</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persuade</td>
<td>0.952 -0.049 0.012 0.000</td>
<td>0.943 -0.059 0.019 0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Discussion</td>
<td>0.820 -0.198 0.018 0.000</td>
<td>0.920 -0.083 0.030 0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postmaterialism</td>
<td>1.151 0.141 0.018 0.000</td>
<td>1.062 0.060 0.029 0.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left</td>
<td>0.697 -0.361 0.062 0.000</td>
<td>0.733 -0.310 0.107 0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right</td>
<td>0.453 -0.792 0.064 0.000</td>
<td>0.751 -0.286 0.109 0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote Extreme</td>
<td>2.276 0.823 0.037 0.000</td>
<td>1.727 0.546 0.051 0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme Ideology</td>
<td>1.018 0.018 0.002 0.000</td>
<td>1.014 0.014 0.003 0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with Democracy</td>
<td>1.237 0.213 0.013 0.000</td>
<td>1.290 0.255 0.023 0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Income</td>
<td>1.125 0.118 0.041 0.004</td>
<td>1.081 0.078 0.056 0.161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-mid Income</td>
<td>1.087 0.084 0.036 0.020</td>
<td>1.010 0.010 0.051 0.851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-mid Income</td>
<td>1.078 0.075 0.035 0.033</td>
<td>1.028 0.027 0.050 0.588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>1.007 0.007 0.001 0.000</td>
<td>1.007 0.007 0.001 0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.969 -0.031 0.026 0.237</td>
<td>0.993 -0.007 0.003 0.111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.846 -0.167 0.025 0.000</td>
<td>0.872 -0.136 0.038 0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>1.002 0.002 0.095 0.987</td>
<td>0.809 -0.213 0.123 0.085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive</td>
<td>0.939 -0.063 0.088 0.476</td>
<td>0.834 -0.182 0.179 0.308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual</td>
<td>1.036 0.035 0.038 0.364</td>
<td>1.098 0.094 0.065 0.149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>1.004 0.004 0.061 0.954</td>
<td>0.960 -0.041 0.091 0.654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>0.929 -0.073 0.075 0.325</td>
<td>1.033 0.033 0.130 0.801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Collar</td>
<td>0.987 -0.013 0.040 0.742</td>
<td>0.938 -0.064 0.063 0.309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>1.083 0.080 0.065 0.219</td>
<td>0.988 -0.012 0.094 0.900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>0.948 -0.054 0.044 0.228</td>
<td>0.996 -0.004 0.068 0.952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>1.147 0.137 0.053 0.010</td>
<td>1.058 0.056 0.081 0.486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_cons</td>
<td>0.270 0.131 0.039</td>
<td>-0.745 0.190 0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Good/Neither Good nor Bad</td>
<td>Good/Neither Good nor Bad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persuade</td>
<td>0.931 -0.071 0.008 0.000</td>
<td>0.908 -0.096 0.014 0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Discussion</td>
<td>0.819 -0.200 0.013 0.000</td>
<td>0.801 -0.222 0.020 0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postmaterialism</td>
<td>1.119 0.112 0.012 0.000</td>
<td>1.202 0.184 0.020 0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left</td>
<td>1.066 0.064 0.051 0.206</td>
<td>1.418 0.349 0.086 0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right</td>
<td>1.593 0.466 0.051 0.000</td>
<td>1.796 0.586 0.086 0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote Extreme</td>
<td>0.504 -0.685 0.030 0.000</td>
<td>0.470 -0.755 0.042 0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme Ideology</td>
<td>1.007 0.007 0.001 0.000</td>
<td>1.002 0.002 0.002 0.262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with democracy</td>
<td>0.785 -0.242 0.010 0.000</td>
<td>0.677 -0.389 0.016 0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Income</td>
<td>0.713 -0.338 0.028 0.000</td>
<td>0.718 -0.331 0.039 0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-mid Income</td>
<td>0.762 -0.271 0.024 0.000</td>
<td>0.757 -0.279 0.035 0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-mid Income</td>
<td>0.852 -0.160 0.023 0.000</td>
<td>0.866 -0.144 0.034 0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>1.001 0.001 0.001 0.088</td>
<td>1.000 0.000 0.001 0.711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>1.007 0.007 0.003 0.037</td>
<td>1.000 0.000 0.001 0.915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.794 -0.231 0.018 0.000</td>
<td>0.759 -0.276 0.026 0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>1.658 0.506 0.067 0.000</td>
<td>1.391 0.330 0.080 0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive</td>
<td>1.608 0.475 0.055 0.000</td>
<td>1.691 0.525 0.110 0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual</td>
<td>0.850 -0.162 0.027 0.000</td>
<td>0.840 -0.175 0.045 0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.3 – continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bad/Neither Good nor Bad</strong></td>
<td><strong>Bad/Neither Good nor Bad</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>rrr</strong></td>
<td><strong>Coeff.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>1.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>1.322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Collar</td>
<td>1.114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>1.209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>1.085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed _cons</td>
<td>0.933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.037</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of obs = 116030
Wald chi²(96) = 19922.51
Prob> chi² = 0.0000
Pseudo R² = 0.1395

Number of obs = 52443
Wald chi²(86) = 7236.26
Prob> chi² = 0.0000
Pseudo R² = 0.109

* Country and year dummies are reported in Appendix 4-B

Table 4.3 demonstrates that non-economic indicators of support are consistently significant and in the expected direction in both periods. Individuals with low levels of political involvement, political discussion and persuade friends, are less likely to have a negative attitude as opposed to remaining neutral compared to those with high levels of interest in both periods. However, the same effect also holds true for the good versus neither good nor bad comparison in both periods. A similar effect appears to be true for political values as well. Individuals with postmaterialist values are more likely to have both negative and positive attitudes compared to remaining neutral. Coefficients for the indicators of vote intention, vote left, vote right and vote extreme, as well as ideological extremism score are statistically significant in the expected directions with the exception of extremism score for the comparison of good versus neither good nor bad responses. Finally, individuals who are less satisfied with democracy in their country are less likely to support integration and more likely to have negative attitudes about integration.

45 To test the significances of differences between the coefficients in the two periods presented in Table 4.3, I ran a unified model interacting each variable with a dummy variable created for each period. The multiple tests were used to test whether the differences between the coefficients were due to the chance. In almost all cases the t-tests were statistically significant indicating that the coefficients, are indeed, statistically different from each other and the difference between the two periods is not due to the chance. The differences between the coefficients and the probabilities presented in Table 4.3 and the following Figure 4.1 are significantly different from each other.
Indicators of utilitarian explanations, however, do not demonstrate consistent patterns in both periods with the results in the pooled model, particularly for the first comparison (bad thing versus neither god nor bad responses). While all coefficients for income dummies reach statistical significance in the first period, none of these coefficients are statistically significant in the second period. Coefficients of occupation dummies do not produce effects discernable from zero in both periods with respect to the first comparison group. Additionally, education and dummies for business, retired and unemployed are not statistically significant. These results support non-constant effects hypothesis, especially for economic variables, suggesting that the impact and the sign of the coefficients for support change over time. These results also partly support the temporal saliency hypothesis as the relative risk ratios for each variable, generally, gets larger over time (if a coefficient has a negative sign, relative risk ratios get smaller to show an increase in impact).

To demonstrate the substantive effect of these variables, I report the percent change in the predicted probability of having a positive attitude (responding as membership is a good thing) with a change from minimum to maximum value of each variable, holding all other variables at their mean. Figure 4.1 reports the change in predicted probability for the “membership good” response.
Based on my theoretical expectations, the impact of each indicator should change over time (non-constant effects hypothesis) and the substantive effect of all variables should increase over time (saliency hypothesis).

As Figure 4.1 demonstrates, the results support the non-constant effects hypothesis, however there is mixed evidence for temporal saliency hypothesis. For all non-economic indicators the substantive impact of each variable gets smaller between 1990-2000 compared to years between 1974 and 1979. For education, the change in the predicted
probability of having a positive attitude toward integration is .16 in the first period whereas the same change drops to .03 during the second period. In other words, the difference between a non-educated individual and a highly-educated individual (post-secondary education) with respect to supportive attitudes toward integration gets smaller over time. Similarly, the change in the probability for low-income individuals gets smaller over time. The predicted probability for supporting integration, for an individual with low income, is smaller by a factor of .082 than an individual with higher levels of income between 1974-1989 whereas the same difference drops to .07 during 1990-2000 period. The impact of occupation appears to decrease over time with the exception of Manual. While the change in the probability of outcome “good thing” is 6% higher for a farmer than an individual with other occupations in the first period, the same figure takes an opposite direction and a farmer becomes 6.2% less likely to support integration during the second period. The change in the predicted probability of the “membership good” response in the first period drops from .095 for executive, .097 for professional, and .023 for unemployed to .092, .067, and .006 respectively during 1990-2000 period. Generally, the results presented for economic indicators in Figure 4.2 do not support the temporal saliency hypothesis.

The change in the predicted probability of “membership good” outcome, however, gets larger over time for most of the non-economic indicators. As Figure 4.2 demonstrates, the second bars for 1990-2000 period are consistently higher than the bars for 1974-1989 period for discuss politics, persuade friends, postmaterialism and satisfaction with democracy. In the first period, when an individual who frequently discusses politics and one who never discusses politics are compared, the change in the predicted probability of having a supportive attitude of integration is .06. The same figure increases to .07 during the second period of integration. The change in the predicted probability of supporting integration, when an individual who never persuades his/her friends is compared to an individual who frequently does so, is .037 in the first and the same change increases to .044 in the second period. Although the substantive impact of political interest variables is relatively small, the difference between the change in probability in the two periods is 3% for postmaterialism (.031 in the first and .061 in the second period) and 7% for
satisfaction with democracy (a change of .19 to .26 over time). These figures demonstrate that having postmaterialist values and being less or more satisfied with democracy have stronger effects on attitudes toward integration between 1990 and 2000 compared to the earlier years of integration.46

Figure 4.1 also demonstrates interesting patterns with respect to the vote intention and ideological extremism score. Supporters of extreme parties become less opposed to integration over time (a decrease from -.22 to -.20 in the predicted probability over time), while for those with extreme ideological preferences the change is .007 during the first period and .011 in the opposite direction during the second period. From 1974-1989 to 1990-2000, left becomes more supportive of integration while right becomes less supportive. However, one should note that, supporters of a center-right party are 13% more likely to support integration than supporters of other parties whereas supporters of a center-left party are only 8% more likely to be supportive of integration during the second period. Although, as left became more supportive of integration and the difference between the two diminished over time (Hix and Lord 1999), the results demonstrate that right is still more supportive of integration.

Results in Table 4.3 combined with those in Figure 4.1 show that, time, as a context, matters in shaping attitudes. The figures for “change in the predicted probabilities” support the non-constant effects hypothesis but they provide weak evidence for temporal saliency hypothesis.47 Over time, non-economic indicators are more influential and their impacts are more persistent compared to the economic indicators. Economic issues, during 1990s and even today, are significantly related to attitudes toward European

46 Although supportive of the temporal saliency hypothesis, the impact of these variables should be considered cautiously to the extent that the signs of the coefficients for these variables did not differ in both comparison groups.

47 Although the results are not strongly supportive of the temporal saliency hypothesis, it should be kept in mind that the statistical analyses do not provide a direct test of this hypothesis. To test whether public opinion is more salient or not over time, one needs to develop models that put some measure of public attitudes on the right hand-side of the equation in order to explore if any change in public opinion affect certain outcomes like policy, the content of treaties or the decisions. Although my analysis shows that most predictors increase their substantive effects on support, the results do not directly test whether changes in public mood become more important over time. This caveat should be kept in mind in the interpretation of the results.
unification, however, their impacts are sporadic and more vulnerable to the changes in the context of integration. This last conclusion, although indirectly, supports hypothesis 15 proposing that self-interest is not a very significant motivator of public opinion in the EU.

However, two caveats should be kept in mind. Firstly, even though the data are divided into two periods for estimating multinomial logits, the number of observations is still very large in each period and the estimates are averages of 15 years in the first period and of ten years in the second period. The problem of over-fitting discussed previously may be still valid for the above analysis. Secondly, given that the models include only the base models involving variables that are to be found across a 28-year span (1974-2002), indicators of national or European identity, which clearly became more important in the second period of integration, as well as variables like economic expectations are not included in those models. To further test the impact of time as a contextual factor shaping individual attitudes, I ran multinomial logits for each year since 1974 with both base models and extended models. Given the large number of coefficients associated with yearly multinomial logit estimates, I present the summary results from all models.

First, I examine the performance of economic and non economic indicators for the base models. Figure 4.2 summarizes the overall performance over time, based on the rate of significance and expected sign. Rate of significance is the ratio of the number of significant coefficients in each year to the total number of economic or non-economic variables. In the case of economic variables, there are 12 indicators including income, education as well as occupation dummies. There are 10 non-economic variables including political discussion, satisfaction with democracy and postmaterialism among others. The rate of expected sign is the proportion of the total number of significant coefficients in the expected direction, within the total number of economic or non-economic variables in the model.

48 It should be noted that the total number of coefficients is 24 for the economic indicators and 20 for non-economic variables given in the two panels for each multinomial logit estimation.
The first panel in Figure 4.2 demonstrates the rate of significance for both groups of variables over time. The line for non-economic indicators of support is higher than the line for economic indicators in all years until 1999. This difference implies that the indicators of political interest, postmaterialism, and satisfaction with democracy have larger effects on support for integration than that of the utilitarian indicators. Similarly, in terms of the expected signs (the second panel), coefficients for non-economic indicators, generally, perform better. This indicates that non-economic variables not only have substantive effects on support for integration but also these effects are in the expected direction whereas utilitarian indicators lag behind. Another interesting pattern emerging from Figure 4.2 is that in most years, the two lines look like the mirror-images of each other. This may be indicative of a trade-off between the two sets of variables. However in certain years (e.g. Post Maastricht era) all indicators perform poorly. Interestingly, the gap between the performances of the two sets of indicators became
smaller, and economic indicators outperform non-economic indicators with respect to expected sign rate given the significance after 2000.

These results are consistent with the non-constancy hypothesis, but they only moderately support the proposition that the determinants of support increase their substantive effects and the hypothesis about the moderate role of self-interest. However, although the gap between the two lines decline over time, the performance of non-economic indicators is higher in the long-run. The increase in the performance of economic indicators after 1999 can largely be attributed to the impact of single currency in daily lives of the EU citizens, a fact that created a big debate and negative sentiments among the public. Additionally, the declining EU economy relative to the US economy as well as the intrusion of liberal economic policies in “Social Europe” may have brought the economic incentives to the forefront of the debate. However, I still approach the performance indicators cautiously, because they are averages of different variables that have different signs and impact on attitudes toward integration. To assess the impact of each variable over time, I present the scatter plots showing the dispersion of relative risk ratios for all significant variables in the base model.

Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 demonstrate the dispersion of relative risk ratios (only for statistically significant coefficients) for each variable over time by two outcome categories (membership bad and membership good). Each figure has two panels one for economic and the other for non-economic indicators of support. In these figures, there are two reference lines. The reference line for the relative risk ratios passes through ‘1’ implying that on that line the coefficients are equal to zero. The dots below this line represent the coefficients with a negative sign whereas observations above this line are positive coefficients. The second reference line cuts the X-axis at year 1990, the beginning of the last integration period. If non-constant effects hypothesis is true, there

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49 See Appendix 4-C for the average performance of each indicator in base and extended models.
50 To test whether the differences among significant variables are different or not, a sample of surveys, for every fifth year was selected. Variables were interacted with dummies for each of these surveys and a unified model was run. The results of the t-tests, once again demonstrated that most coefficients are statistically different from each other. Only some occupation dummies were found not to differ from each other. However, some variables were dropped from the model due to collinearity.
should be a large variance across both reference lines. To support \textit{temporal saliency} hypotheses, there should be more density (i.e. large number of significant variables) and wider dispersion (i.e. large impact) after 1990.\footnote{Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 include a series of scatter plots that map the distribution of relative risk ratios. Relative risk ratio is the equivalent of odds ratio showing the likelihood of one event in comparison to another. For instance, the relative risk ratio for “left” will show the likelihood of choosing an outcome (bad or good) compared to “neither good nor bad” for an individual who intends to vote for a party of left as opposed to an individual who does not. Relative risk ratios can range from one to infinity for a positive coefficient and from zero to one for a negative coefficient. In either case, as the distance of the relative risk ratio from one increases, the impact of the associated variable gets larger.} Finally, the density in the dispersion of the relative risk ratios for economic indicators should be more sporadic and for non-economic variables more consistent over time to support the proposition that the role of self-interest in determining support for integration is relatively unimportant.

For instance, in the two figures below, the scatter plot for \textit{left} get denser with wider dispersion from 1970 to 2000 suggesting that, for this variable, the number of coefficients with statistical significance and their impact gets larger over time. It should be noted that below the horizontal reference line, the maximum range of relative risk ratio is 0-1, whereas the maximum range for the positive coefficients (above the line) may range from 1 to infinity. This should be kept in mind in assessing the impact of each variable on support for integration.

Figure 4.3 shows the dispersion of the relative risk ratios for both type of indicators for the outcome of “membership is bad” as opposed to “neither good nor bad” response. The difference between the explanatory power of the economic and non-economic indicators regarding non-supportive attitudes toward integration is strikingly apparent. The density and dispersion of relative risk ratios for the economic determinants of support is much smaller than that of non-economic indicators demonstrating that non-economic determinants are better predictors of support for integration. The distribution for education, income and occupation dummies does not provide enough information to conclude whether temporal saliency hypothesis holds or not. However, both panels show that \textit{non-constant effects} hypothesis is true for both sets of variables given the changing sign and magnitude of each coefficient over time.
More specifically, in the base models, being a farmer, having an executive or manual job, or being unemployed or professional hardly effect being non-supportive of integration compared to remaining indifferent to the European unification. In the long run, a farmer becomes more likely to believe that his/her country’s membership is a bad thing (less supportive of integration) as opposed to having a neutral attitude, whereas an individual with lower level of income becomes less likely to have a negative attitude compared to remaining indifferent to his/her country’s membership to the EU. As an individual spends more years in education, s/he becomes more likely to have a negative attitude for integration compared to holding a neutral attitude, however the predicted power of education diminishes over time.

As for the non-economic indicators, the distribution of relative risk ratios is denser with wider dispersion. Of political interest variables, discuss politics has more explanatory power than persuade friends; however, this effect is not in the expected direction until mid 1990s. An individual who more frequently discusses politics with his/her friends is less likely to be non-supportive of EU rather than staying indifferent compared to an individual who gets less involved in political discussion. As the level of satisfaction with democracy decreases, individuals become more likely to be non-supportive of integration compared to remaining neutral to their country’s membership. Similarly, individuals who intend to vote for extreme parties are more likely to have negative attitudes about European integration, however this effect becomes smaller over time. Having an extremist ideological preference significantly decreases the likelihood of supporting integration (individuals with extreme ideology are more likely to have a negative attitude). However, this impact is not substantively large. Supporters of center left and right parties are more likely to support integration, yet, somehow, there are opposite occasions. An individual with postmaterialistic values is more likely to believe that his/her country’s membership is a bad thing compared to staying indifferent, however, this effect diminishes after 1990s. This is at odds with the theoretical expectations, but the same result was also observed in the models with pooled data.
Overall, the impact of both economic and non-economic determinants of support on likelihood of having negative attitudes about integration gets smaller over time compared to the likelihood of staying neutral. Therefore, when the distribution of risk ratios for all variables is considered, the results hardly support temporal saliency hypothesis. Yet, *non-constant effects* hypothesis as well as hypothesis 15 (relative unimportance of the self-interest as the motivator of public opinion) are strongly supported.
Figure 4.4 compares the distribution of relative risk ratios for the *membership good* outcome compared to the *neither good nor bad* outcome.
Figure 4.4: Scatter Plots of Relative Risk Ratios for Base Model
Membership Good/Neither Good nor Bad

A similar pattern emerges in this figure about the explanatory power of economic and non-economic indicators. Highly educated individuals, professionals and those who have
executive jobs are more likely whereas those with lower income and manual jobs are less likely to support integration. However, being highly educated, or having an executive or professional job as well low levels of income have larger substantive effects on the likelihood of viewing membership in the EU as a good thing compared to the same effects for the “membership is bad” outcome (see Figure 4.3). With the exception of education, relative risk ratios are widely dispersed indicating larger effects. Finally, farmers and professionals become less supportive of integration over time.

The distribution of relative risk ratios is denser for non-economic determinants of support, however the impact of these variables on likelihood of having a positive attitude for integration is relatively small for the political interest variables, postmaterialism, and the ideological extremism score. The partisanship variables have large substantive effects on supportive attitudes. Individuals who intend to vote for center left or right parties are more likely to believe that their country’s membership to EU is a good thing whereas the supporters of extreme parties are less likely to have a positive attitude about integration in comparison with having a neutral attitude. Individuals who are less satisfied with democracy are also less likely to have a positive attitude toward integration.

Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 provide supportive evidence for non-constant effects hypothesis. The determinants of support for integration have different effects, in sign and magnitude, over time. As expected, in both figures, the dispersion of the odds ratios around the horizontal reference line has a larger variance in post-1990 years compared to the dispersion in the period between 1970 and 1989. Nonetheless, the density of the risk ratios (number of significant variables) around the 1990 reference line does not change significantly over time. Furthermore, the figures show that the explanatory power of non-economic indicators holds for both comparisons, while, economic determinants of support seem to motivate the likelihood of positive attitudes (good versus neither good nor bad). This result partly supports the hypothesis suggesting a relatively unimportant role for utilitarian accounts of support.
However, as mentioned previously, base models do not include the indicators measuring identity and economic perceptions. Given the increasing importance of identity as a motivator of attitudes in the post-Maastricht era, extended models may provide a fuller account of the determinants of support for integration. However, the extended models do not have a common specification over time, because the same indicators are not available in all surveys. For instance, identity related items entered the Eurobarometer surveys only after 1990s and have not been included in all surveys. Additionally, certain items underlying the same attitude (e.g. economic expectations) differ from survey to survey making it impossible to use them as indicators of the same attitude. Therefore, the extended models were formed to include the variables left out of the base model, but they did not have the same specification in all estimations. Notwithstanding this, in all specifications, the extended models incorporate a set of left-out variables providing a cross-check for the base models.52

Figure 4.5 is a scatter plot of the odds ratios over time comparing the economic and non-economic indicators from the extended models.

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52 The average proportion of correct signs and significance for the variables in the extended model is provided in Appendix 4-C.
As in Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4, there are two reference lines cutting each axis. The economic variables are rarely significant in bad versus neither good nor bad panel and there is no substantial change over time. The pattern in the good versus neither good nor bad panel demonstrates more density, yet somehow smaller variance compared to the same panel for non-economic indicators. However, it should be noted that the “gestalt” for the dots below the horizontal reference line is misleading to the extent that the maximum range is 0-1. As such, one can argue that there is a substantial variance in the distribution of relative risk ratios after 1990 for the southwest quadrant of the graph for “economic, good” intersection. The results for economic variables support the temporal saliency hypothesis for good versus neither good nor bad outcome, as the density and
variance of these indicators increases in the last integration period (1990-2002) compared to the earlier years. Most predictors have larger substantive effects on support for integration in this period.

As for non-economic determinants of support for integration, in both panels (bad and good), the number of significant variables is very large (high density), whereas in the good versus neither good nor bad panel, the relative risk ratios are more widely dispersed around the reference line. Attitudes related to integration become more salient over time when non-economic determinants of support are considered.

Figure 4.5 also demonstrates that non-economic measures more consistently motivate attitudes toward European integration over time compared to the economic indicators which sporadically increase their saliency. Non-economic determinants of support consistently have more explanatory power as well as larger substantive effects than economic determinants in terms of affecting the attitudes toward European integration. This finding puts doubt on the highly regarded role of the self-interest (the findings of Gabel and others) as a motivator of public opinion in the EU.

Summary

In this Chapter, I tested the contextual effects of time (i.e. different integration period) on attitudes related to support for European integration. Starting from the history of integration described within a stimulus-response-outcome framework, I divided integration into three periods. The early years of integration between 1951-1970, the second period starting with the stagnation years in the early 1970s and ending with the significant steps toward completion of the single market in 1989, and the last integration period between 1990 and 2002.

Using multinomial logit estimation, I have found supportive evidence for most of the individual level hypothesis in the estimation using pooled data as well as in those models ran for two integration periods.
More importantly, the analysis in this chapter showed that the effects of individual level determinants on supportive attitudes are far from being constant and that their direction, statistical significance and substantive impact change over time. This finding supports the non-constant effects hypothesis and demonstrates that individuals may change their attitudes over time. I have also tested how the substantive effects of different predictors on support change over time. The results only partially supported this hypothesis, however, generally most predictors become more salient over time as integration moves from peripheral areas into core economic as well as political areas.

Finally, the results also provide evidence putting some doubt on the overrated importance of self-interest in the EU public opinion research. Similarly to what have been found in the American public opinion research (Kinder 1998), my analysis showed that non-economic indicators are more important determinants of support for integration and the economic indicators effect attitudes only sporadically. Especially, during the heyday of the single market and in the post-Maastricht era as well as the late 1990s (a time when the single currency had produced a big controversy among public), utilitarian indicators of support gained more importance. This finding puts some doubt on the dominant paradigm (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Gabel 1998b) in the EU public opinion research.

Overall, these results also support the findings of psychology research reporting an interaction between the external world and human cognition (Druckman and Lupia 2000; Churchland and Sejnowski 1992). In the next section, I move from the temporal context to the spatial context to investigate how one’s environment shapes individual attitudes toward European integration.

53 The evidence for this finding is presented in Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4.
CHAPTER 5
ATTITUDES IN SPACE

Introduction

In Chapter 4, I have discussed the effect of time as a contextual factor shaping individual attitudes in the EU. European integration has a *teleological* course that does not necessarily have a linear trend. In other words, over time it moves forward in an integrative fashion, however, with moments of “stop” and “go”. As mentioned previously, neo-functionalist theory explained integration as a phenomenon that progresses linearly around functionally defined issues and with the logic of spillover. However, by the early 1970s scholars in the field realized that the idea of linear progress was not realistic (Haas 1975). As European leaders successfully responded to the external shocks and moved integration forward, the scholars started to conceptualize integration as a process with ‘stop and go’ moments (Schneider and Cederman 1994) and with differing speeds (Nugent 1994). By the 1990s, it was evident that the historical progress of the EU was far more complicated than the idea of *integrating Europe around functionally defined issues with the push of spillover effects and with the involvement of supranational actors*. Although this powerful neo-functionalist argument has always been a component of theories explaining European integration, the new theories explained integration either by considering the preferences of nation-states, formed in the domestic arena, as the main “cause” of integration (Moravcsik 1999) or the role of supranational actors and institutions pushing integration beyond the intentions of nation-states (Sandholtz and Sweet Stone 1998).
My historical analysis in Chapter 4, partly, relied on these theories to give an account of integration over time. Nonetheless, I have also argued that, historically, integration should be defined as a teleological process involving, stimulus (external shock) and response (by actors at both intergovernmental and supranational levels). I have defined three periods of integration, between 1957-2000, each with a different incentive structure and various pace. This historical analysis suggests that European integration can be conceptualized as a project with changing properties over time. I have also demonstrated that attitudes are not constant and that the saliency of public opinion changes over time.

In this Chapter, I move from the temporal context to the territorial context, namely to the country level, to explain support for European integration. As discussed previously, time and space are two important factors shaping individual attitudes. The EU is a multilevel system encompassing nation-states and hence differences among member states are likely to shape individual attitudes. The main goal of the following analysis is to demonstrate the institutional, social and economic differences among member states are factors that shape individual attitudes related to integration.

The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. First, I briefly review the rationale for the necessity of incorporating country level indicators for explaining individual attitudes. Next, I describe the key differences among members and their importance as shapers of individual attitudes related to European integration. This section of the chapter also includes model description, the construction of the dependent variable (i.e. factor scores derived from four items presented in Chapter 2), and the operationalization of the variables at country and individual levels. Then, I introduce the data and the Hierarchical Linear Model (HLM). Finally, I present the results, discuss their implications, and conclude.
Theory and Hypotheses

In Chapter 3, I argued that students of public opinion in the EU have generally ignored the context, and how it is related to individual attitudes. The cognitive psychology literature asserts that human beings derive their preferences about certain objects from their evaluations, which depend on their beliefs. Beliefs, on the other hand, are formed as a result of human interaction with environment, an interaction that creates equilibrium between brain, body and world (Lupia and Druckman 2000; Churcland and Sejnowski 1992). Additionally, previously held beliefs about certain objects or their attributes can be considered as cognitive anchors helping to form new or change old attitudes. In other words, individuals form their new attitudes by taking cues from their old beliefs about similar objects. As such, national economic policy and national institutions should provide some cues for individuals in forming their attitudes about EU (see Anderson 1998; Sanchez-Cuenca 2000).

There are significant cultural, economic and political differences among the members of the EU and these differences are likely to shape attitudes related to support for integration. Some of these national differences relate to religious cleavage (Catholic versus Protestant-dominant nations), democratic institutions (consensus versus majoritarian democracies), the degree of corporatism, and finally economic performance. When 15 members of the EU are considered, there are significant differences with respect to their political institutions (electoral system, party system, executive-legislative interaction, administrative system, etc.), economic performance and market institutions (wealth, inflation, unemployment, type of capitalism, corporatist institutions, etc.), and cultural characteristics (religion, ethnicity, language). Certainly, the picture gets more complicated considering the 10 new members joined in 2004 and the possible members including Bulgaria, Romania, other Balkan states and Turkey.
For example, when GDP per capita index, based on purchasing power standard in 2004, is considered\(^{54}\), Portugal has the lowest score of 74.7 followed by Greece (81.2) and Spain (97.8) within EU15. Other EU15 members have scores above 100 with Ireland (132.5), Denmark (122.6) and Austria (121.9) being the highest scoring countries. These countries also display some variation in terms of macroeconomic performance. In 2003, average unemployment rate in the EU15 was 8% and the country-specific rates ranged from a low value of 3.8% in Netherlands to a high value of 11.3 in Spain. During the same year, Greece (9.7%), France (9.5%) and Germany (9%) had high unemployment rates while Austria (4.3%), Ireland (4.6%) and the UK (4.9%) had lower rates. EU15 countries also vary in terms of the intra-EU trade figures. In 2003, the share of EU15 trade in the total trade of Belgium, Luxembourg and Portugal was larger than 70%, while the same figure was around 50% in Greece and the UK.

As for the differences related to political institutions, the members of the EU display a large variance. All EU15 countries are representative democracies, however, there are significant differences with respect to electoral rules, party systems, executive-legislative interaction as well as the geographic organization of the government (i.e. federal versus unitary). With a quick glance at 15 members, Germany and Belgium have federal systems, most members use proportional representation but of difference variants, and four members (France, Finland, Austria and Portugal) have parliamentary presidential systems while others are parliamentary systems. European countries are also different from each other with respect to market institutions. Most Scandinavian countries, Austria and Germany are known for their strong corporatist institutions whereas the UK is known for its liberal oriented market institutions.

Finally, there are significant cultural differences among European nations. When 25 nations are considered, there are 20 official languages in the EU as well as numerous ethnic and religious groups. In terms of religious orientation, Austria, Belgium, France,

\(^{54}\) To construct this index, the EU average for the current 25 members is set to 100. All economic statistics are taken from Eurostat webpage at \(\text{http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/portal/page?_pageid=1090,30070682,1090_30298591&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL}\)
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain and Portugal are dominantly catholic nations, whereas
the UK, Denmark, Sweden and Finland are dominantly protestant. Countries, like
Germany and the Netherlands have more balanced catholic and protestant populations.
However, one should also remember that Greece is dominantly Orthodox, that there are
between 5-10% Muslims in France and 2-3% Turks in Germany and more than 40% of
Netherlands’ population reporting themselves to be unaffiliated.\(^{55}\) In short, European
territory is far from being homogenous when it comes to cultural characteristics.

In this chapter, I examine the country level differences among the 14 members of the EU,
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, and UK.\(^{56}\) I also restrict my analysis to certain
country level characteristics based on two criteria: theoretical relevance and the
availability of data. The first set of characteristics are economic performance and trade
figures including the ratio of intra EU trade to total trade, and the misery index (a
multiplicative term of inflation and unemployment). I also include the net balance of
payments related to the EU budget for each country. The second set of characteristics is
related to political and economic institutions. I utilize Lijphart’s (1999) distinction
between consensus and majoritarian democracy to account for variation in political
institutions and an index of corporatism developed by Vergunst (2003) to consider the
variation in market institutions. Finally, to account for cultural differences I use a
variable measuring the percentage of Catholic population in the total population of a
country.

In the next section, I explain my theoretical expectations about country level indicators
(level 2) and develop hypotheses. After introducing the full model (individual level and
country level), I explain hierarchical linear modeling, the statistical technique used for
analysis. Then, I describe the variables and provide some descriptive statistics. The
section ends with the presentation of the results for the two-level model.

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\(^{55}\) The figures are taken from CIA World Fact Book, Adherents.com and Catholic Almanac of 1998.

\(^{56}\) I exclude Luxembourg from my analysis due to its size and some data limitations.
National Economic Differences

As discussed before, past studies associated macroeconomic performance and trade figures to support for the EU. Previous research exploring the effect of aggregate level indicators on public support argues that individuals somehow relate economic performance not only to the policies made by national governments but also to those enacted by a supranational authority. Additionally, this research assumes that individuals carry over their perceptions about economic performance to their attitudes (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993). Smith and Wanke (1993) relate support for integration to different sectoral gains and losses and conclude that support should be higher in those countries that economically win in the long run. Bosch and Newton (1995) find erratic results for the effect of macroeconomic indicators like inflation, unemployment and growth.

The EU is characterized as a multilevel governance system (Hooghe and Marks 2001) where a significant portion of policy decisions are made at the systemic, or EU, level (Paterson and Bomberg 1999). After the Single European Act and the Maastricht treaty, not only were more policy areas decided at the EU level, but also the policy competence of the EU has enlarged vis-à-vis national governments. National governments are constrained by the requirements of EU level policy (e.g. stability and growth pact) and faced by a process called Europeanization (Ladrech, 2004) which requires that national governments implement policies decided at the EU level and adjust national policies accordingly to bring them in line with EU standards. Most of the time national leaders use this as an excuse to justify unpopular policies or low macroeconomic performances and put the blame on EU institutions. Thus, I expect that as macroeconomic performance drops, average public support for EU should decrease.

\textit{Hypothesis 16: Macroeconomic performance is positively related to public support for integration such that good macroeconomic indicators are likely to increase average support}
I use the misery index, a multiplicative term of inflation and unemployment, to measure macroeconomic performance. The data are for 2002 and taken from the EUROSTAT online database. The average unemployment figure for 14 nations included here is 6.81% with a minimum rate of 2.70% in Netherlands and a maximum rate of 11.3% in Spain. Greece has a very high unemployment rate (10.30%) as opposed to the unemployment figures in Austria (4.20%) and Ireland (4.30%). As for inflation, the mean inflation in EU14 is 2.61% running as low as 1.30% in Germany and the UK and as high as 4.70% in Ireland. As mentioned previously, misery index is created by multiplying inflation and unemployment rates in each country and high numbers represent lower levels of macroeconomic performance. This measure has a mean score of 17.59 and its values range from 6.63 in UK to 40.68 in Spain. Greece is also at the high end of this measure with a value of 40.17, while Austria (7.14) and Sweden (9.80) have better macroeconomic performances.

The second variable related to economic characteristics is the amount of intra-EU trade. Trade liberalization has always been a major component of economic integration. As discussed in Chapter 4, the customs union was completed as early as in 1968 and all physical, technical and fiscal barriers in front of the single market were removed by implementation of the SEA. Trade liberalization provides economic benefits to members and hence it is argued that a nation’s trade dependency on the EU is positively related to support for integration.

*Hypothesis 17: As a country’s share of intra-EU trade within its total trade gets larger, average support for integration is likely to increase in that country.*

A country’s share of intra-EU trade is measured in the following way. 
*Share of intra-EU Trade = (X_{EU} + I_{EU}) / (X_T + I_T),* where $X_{EU}$ is total exports to EU, $I_{EU}$ is total imports from EU, $X_T$ is the total amount of exports and $I_T$ is the total amount of the exports in million Euros.
Finally, I consider the fiscal distribution in the European Union as an important economic characteristic that may affect support for integration. The fiscal transfers among the member states make certain countries receivers and the others contributors. Fiscal transfers in the EU are motivated by an economic rationale. As Mattila suggests, “the EU acts as a benevolent policymaker who takes money from the rich member countries and redistributes it to the economically less prosperous regions and countries in the interest of common good” (2004, 2). However, this normative understanding of the fiscal transfers in the EU, which is known as the theory of economic needs, has been questioned by Carruba (1997) who argues that some countries benefit more from fiscal transfers than their level of economic wealth or needs would justify. Similarly, Hix (1999) argues that EU budget represents an equilibrium reached in intergovernmental bargains related to the benefits and costs of trade liberalization. This theory, in a nutshell, explains asymmetrical fiscal transfers as side payments made to the likely losers in the process of trade liberalization by the export oriented countries (i.e. winners) for the sake of the economic benefits. A third theory, vote trading, argues that fiscal transfers are determined by the voting weights in the council which largely favor small nations (Matilla 2004; Baldwin et al. 2001; Rodden 2002; Matilla and Lane 2001).

Regardless of the rationale behind the fiscal transfers, citizens living in those countries who are net receivers of the EU funds should be more supportive of the EU than those who live in contributor nations. The funds received from the EU help those regions and nations lagging behind in economic development and help them to catch up with more prosperous members. It is likely that citizens living in receiver nations will be more supportive of EU for the benefits associated with them. Therefore:

*Hypotheses 18: The fiscal transfers a country receives from the EU budget is positively related to support for integration such that high levels of per capita fiscal transfers from EU should increase the level of public support for integration.*
Institutional Differences

European countries have various political and economic institutions that are outcomes of historical experiences. All West European nations are economically developed stable democracies. However, the developments in 19th and during the first half of the 20th centuries created different institutional paths in these countries. UK, the oldest democracy of the globe, has diverged from the continental democracies as a result of its unique geographic location. Scandinavian countries formed a distinct group with respect to their economic institutions creating highly efficient social policies. There is significant variation in the way democratic institutions work and political actors interact in these nations.

Current economic and political institutions of European nations can be considered as equilibrium conditions reflecting an agreement over the rules of game. Institutionalist research defines institutions as the structures, formal and informal rules and norms (March and Olsen 1984). As such, institutions, once agreed upon, form a context in which actors’ preferences are shaped. This argument is also compatible with the previously discussed cognitive theory suggesting an interaction between the world and human cognition (Druckman and Lupia 2000).

The political and economic institutions are formed within the national territories, but the EU imposes new institutions and reshapes the old ones in a transnational territory. In developing their attitudes about EU institutions, individuals are likely to judge them by using their national institutions as yardsticks. As discussed previously, research in political psychology has found that human beings are likely to judge new phenomena with the help of judgments they have about familiar objects. I argue that individuals are likely to use their beliefs about national institutions as proxies for informing their attitudes about the EU (Anderson 1998; Sanchez-Cuenca 2000).

One important feature of the European countries is their liberal democratic tradition. Democracies have been classified in different ways including the liberal versus populist
democracy (Riker, 1982), majoritarian versus consensus democracy (Lijphart, 1999), and majoritarian vision versus proportionate vision of democracy (Powell, 2000). Lijphart’s distinction of consensus and majoritarian democracies has been widely accepted in political science. The argument underlying Lijphart’s classification is that the main institutional rules and practices of representative democracy can be measured on a continuum of majoritarian and consensus values. Lijphart consumes ten features of representative democracy into two dimensions (executive-parties dimension and federal-unitary dimension) to evaluate two distinct types. Using factor analysis, Lijphart found that the effective number of parliamentary parties, the existence of minimal-winning one-party cabinets, executive dominance, electoral disproportionality and interest group pluralism load on to the executive-parties dimension. Federalism-decentralization, bicameralism, constitutional rigidity, judicial review and central bank independence load on the federal-unitary dimension. Lijphart uses these two dimensions to show that consensus democracy is a better and gentler system.

Lijphart elaborates on some European democracies (Belgium, Netherlands) as well as the European Union as ideal cases of consensus democracy. The main difference between the two forms of democracy is that consensus democracy involves more participation, equality, and bargaining and that it requires a higher degree of compromise. The decision-making structure of the EU involves a high degree of bargaining at various levels and it requires a large amount of consensus in decision-making. For instance, the EU legislation process involves multiple readings of draft bills (preparing by the Commission) by the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers at the supranational level. Additionally, some decisions require unanimity in the council whereas some other decisions are made by qualified majorities in both the EP and the Council. Legislation also involves national actors, representatives of policy networks at sub-systemic level and interest groups. The administrative system of the EU is closer to a

57 Conventional wisdom asserts that majoritarian democracy is better at governing and consensus democracy is a better option in representing everyone more accurately. Lijphart does not say anything different from this view but develops the idea of a kinder, gentler democracy, which does not prove that majoritarian view is better in terms of democratic governance. However, the idea of kinder and gentler democracy is important in the sense that it increases women participation, political equality, government-voter proximity and satisfaction with democracy. In the long run, these characteristics may increase government performance in consensus democracies.
federal structure than it is to a unitary system. All these properties create a consensus culture in the EU.

I have put forward two theoretical arguments up to this point. First, I argued that individuals will inform their beliefs based on their attitudes about national institutions or by using short-cuts from the institutions with which they are familiar. Second, in accordance with the institutional research, I developed the argument that institutions are likely to shape beliefs and preferences of individuals by providing a contextual environment. Since the EU is considered to be a consensus democracy, individuals living in consensus democracies are more likely to support integration. The reason is that individuals living in consensus democracies will find the institutional culture of EU more familiar with their cognitive maps than the individuals living in countries with a tradition of majoritarian institutions. This familiarity enhances the cue-taking process which in turn simplifies the cognitive processing of the old beliefs. In other words, and as discussed previously, most of the time, when people encounter a new object, or an old object in a new form, they form/change their attitudes by invoking those attitudes about similar objects which they have encountered before (Druckman and Lupia 2000; Clark 1997; Holland et al. 1986). As Clark (1997) puts it: “..new cognitive garments seldom are made of whole cloth; usually they comprise hastily tailored amendments to old structures and strategies” (p. 81). Accordingly, I propose the following hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 19:** Support for integration will be higher in countries with consensus democracy compared to those with majoritarian democracy.

A similar argument can be made for the economic institutions of the EU. European economic institutions were formed after a long history of class conflict. These economic institutions signify an equilibrium comprising the preferences of various actors. Thus,

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58 Of course, one needs to make the assumption that all individuals have a preferential bias about their national political institutions. The existing political institutions are constructs of long-term experiences of the nations and they can be defined as a static equilibrium reached by compromise of all citizens. As such, it may not be that hard to make this assumption in the stable political systems of the EU14.
individuals living in countries with economic institutions closer to the European market institutions can be hypothesized to be more likely to support integration.

Recently, types of capitalism literature (Hall and Gingrich 2001; Hall and Soskice 2001) is utilized to explain variation in support for integration across member states. One argument of this research is that European Union capitalism is closer to the Rhine model which is the model accepted in the core countries. More importantly, the proponents of this research claim that the EU model is the middle ground between the liberal model, with weak redistribution policies, and social democratic model with strong distributive policies (Hooghe and Marks 2003; Brinegar, Jolly and Kitschelt, forthcoming). As such they hypothesize that individuals living in countries that have economic institutions that proximate the EU median will be more supportive of integration. While Brinegar et al. (forthcoming) find strong support for this hypothesis, Hooghe and Marks (2003) find a significant weak effect of market institutions on levels of support. They explain this “surprise” by the weakness of the measure. I argue, however, that the weakness is related to the two main assumptions made by this research rather than to the measurement problems. The assumption that the EU forms the middle ground between the two types of capitalism is as problematic as the assumption that the Rhine model will be more influential by virtue of being the home model of the core countries.

I challenge both assumptions based on two interconnected facts, namely that business interest is asymmetrically more influential, vis-à-vis trade union interest, at EU level and that unemployment policy has been prioritized to social policy in the EU since the early 1990s. Social policy has been a major concern in EU since mid 1980s, when Delors announced a social plan involving the approval of industry and labor at supranational level. Under the “social agreement” institutionalized with the Maastricht treaty, the Commission is required to consult both business and labor before drafting any social

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59 There is a long standing concern in Europe about working conditions and social welfare. When the SEA and removal of barriers were discussed in 1980s, Commission president and a former French Socialist Delors wanted to add a social dimension to Europe. With French support, the Commission issued a Social Charter listing the rights of workers, bargaining process, freedom of association, working conditions etc. A document attached to the Maastricht Treaty allowed qualified majority voting in the council about social issues, however, Britain did not sign any of these until 1997.
legislation. Additionally, if business and labor reach an agreement, it becomes a substitute for EU legislation (Hix 2005). Although some scholars argue that post-Maastricht regulation is the adoption of the classic corporatist model in EU (Obradovic 1996; Falkner 1996), some others argue that social agreement has never been a complete success for the labor interests (Hix 2005; Compston and Greenwood 2001). Simon Hix (2004) argues that labor interests are less influential compared to their stance at the national level, and “hence feel aggrieved by the gradual erosion of national corporatism by the process of EU economic integration and passing of labor market regulation competencies to the European level.  

Another interrelated fact is that unemployment has become a major concern for policymakers in the EU. After 1990, the EU economy started to fall behind the US economy and the EU average for unemployment jumped over 10%. Part of the problem was related to the non-completion of the single market, especially, in network services. With the initiatives of UK and Spain under the presidency of Portugal, the liberalization of network services was carried to the agenda. The resulting Lisbon strategy specified important goals such as making EU the most competitive, knowledge-based economy in the world and creating millions of jobs in ten years by completing the single market in financial sector, transport, and energy. However, especially Germany and France, playing the card of Social Europe, challenged this goal and were able to add the social policy dimension to this document. The Lisbon summit has deepened the dichotomy between the proponents of real structural reforms hoping to create more jobs and flexibility and those who stayed away from the Lisbon goals for the sake of a Social Europe and welfare policies. However, one year after the Lisbon summit, under the presidency of France, a committee of wise-men, Lamfallusy Committee, was formed. The Lamfallusy report criticized the slow decision-making powers and called for the completion of the single market in politically sensitive network sectors. As this report and the slow progress of reforms regarding liberalization in financial services sector has

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60 To reach this conclusion Hix relies on different streams of literature arguing that with social agreement business interests gained a veto power over social policy legislation which they would not have in the existence of left dominated EU council or EP (Branch and Greenwood 2001) and that there is no European wide agreement in particular industrial sectors (Martin and Ross 2001).
demonstrated, the EU leaders once again had to give priority to liberal policies (for solving unemployment problem) over the idea of Social Europe.

In the 1990s and during the first years of 21st century, policy preferences at the EU level became more liberal-market oriented and the social policies at EU level as well as national corporatism continued to erode with post-Lisbon measures increasing the policy competences of the EU in more areas. I argue that EU market institutions are moving away from their assumed median position and from national corporatist models to the liberal-market model. This is likely to decrease the level of support in corporatist nations to the extent that people living in those countries will find the EU moving away from the corporatist institutions they have been familiar with. Therefore:

*Hypothesis 20: Support for integration will be lower in countries with corporatist systems as opposed to those with mixed and liberal systems.*

**Cultural Differences: The Catholic Core**

Among many cultural differences, religion played an important part in the history of Europe. Christianity, has not only been a foundation of unity (i.e. Christendom) but also the source of bloody conflicts separating the European nations for centuries. As early as 1306, some proponents of a unified Europe (i.e Pierre Dubios) suggested the formation of a “Christian Europe” which resembled a confederal structure (Heather 1992). In fact, as Delanty (1995) argues, in those years, *Christian Unity* was associated with the revival of Holy Roman Empire to prevent a Muslim, and later a Turkish conquest of Europe.

With the development of individualistic ideas as well as the religion based conflicts in Europe after the fifteenth century, the proposal of *Christian Unity* was discarded and the idea of a unified Europe was developed around political terms (McCormick 2002). However, Catholicism, as a cultural force, continued to nourish the idea of Christian universalism throughout the centuries. In the first half of the twentieth century, it emerged as a political force in the form of the Christian Democratic parties.
Nelsen and Guth (2003a) argue that historical development of Catholic culture helped the integration proposals after WWII. More specifically, they rely on such ideas as the unity of the Catholic Church, centralization around the authority of Pope, the appearance of Christian Democratic parties, and the shared Catholic culture of the founding fathers to explain how European integration succeeded. Nelsen and Guth (2003a) provide historical examples, -the dividedness among the left parties as opposed to Christian Democrats who were able to push integration further and the Euroskepticism in the dominantly protestant nations like UK and Nordic countries-, as evidence supporting their hypothesis that Catholic nations are more supportive of integration. They even claim that “Catholicism provided the sense of community-the “we-feeling that according to Karl Deutsch was necessary to successful integration ” (p.19). In another study Nelsen and Guth (2003b) found that Catholic youth is more supportive of integration as a result of exposure to Catholic culture.

Combined with the theory of attitude formation, Nelsen and Gutt’s argument has clear-cut implications about support for integration. If their argument is true then individuals living in dominantly Catholic nations should find it easier to map the process of European unification into their cognition. Factors like the universalistic culture and the centralization around the authority of Pope should make integration more approvable.

_Hypothesis 21: As the proportion of Roman Catholics living in a nation increases, support for integration should increase_\(^6\).  

**Data, Model Specification and Analysis**

In this chapter, I use Eurobarometer 58.1 conducted in fall of 2002 by the European Commission. This particular survey includes many questions including the items tapping

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\(^6\) Given the lack of an individual level question asking the respondents their religious affiliation, I include only a country level indicator to test the effect of religion on support for integration. Ideally, the models should include an individual level predictor of religious affiliation along with an aggregate level measure to account for the subnational differences (e.g. dominantly catholic nation as opposed to a more balanced nation with respect to religious divisions).
respondents’ support for European integration, identity, future economic expectations, satisfaction with life, and satisfaction with democracy among many other questions. Additionally, this survey includes four items tapping individual support for integration, namely membership, benefit, image and advantage questions.\(^{62}\)

Additionally, I have introduced seven country level indicators to account for differences at the national level. Since my model includes variables at the individual and country level, I use a Hierarchical Linear Model (HLM) otherwise known as multilevel model to account for the effect of indicators at the two levels. HLM makes use of multilevel indicators in one model without violating some important statistical assumptions discussed below.

Although statistical techniques that work well with multilevel (or hierarchical) data are well developed in educational research (Bryk and Raudenbush 1992; Goldstein 1995) and sociology (Mason, Wong and Entwistle 1983), political scientists, particularly scholars investigating public opinion in EU, have not widely exploited these techniques. Only recently some students of public opinion in the EU have utilized these techniques (Steenbergen and Jones 2002; Rohrschneider 2002; Hooghe and Marks 2003).

Multilevel models explain the lowest level (generally individual level) variance in the dependent variable by taking information from all levels into account. These models allow comprehensibility by combining different levels in one model; they make the test of causal heterogeneity possible; and increase the generalizability of the statistical findings (Raudenbusch and Bryk 2002; Steenbergen and Jones 2002). Statistically, these models avoid the violation of the assumption that errors are independent in the existence of multilevel data. Using the conventional techniques (OLS and ANOVA) with nested data may not be statistically desirable, because the use of these models may produce incorrect standard errors and possibly inflated type-I errors due to the non-independence.

\(^{62}\) Also, EB 58.1 was the most recent survey that was available for analysis at the time the analysis was conducted.
of observations clustered in the same level (i.e. “cluster correlation” for observations gathered from the same neighborhood, nation or time frame).

In multilevel models, observations are correctly treated as taken from different levels that are nested into each other. These models account for the impact of the predictors at each level on the dependent variable (measured at the lowest level) by combining the models from different levels into a single model. This is an improvement over a dummy variable approach and interactive modeling in the sense that these models combine the statistical advantage of the dummy variable approach with the theoretical advantage of interactive modeling.\textsuperscript{63} In addition, if the outcome variable is measured at a higher level, one cannot use the indicators measured at the lowest level (mostly individual level). HLM avoids this problem by incorporating indicators from both levels.

I use a two-level model including country and individual levels. The statistical model takes the following form:\textsuperscript{64}

\[ Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \sum_{p=1}^{P} \beta_{pj} x_{p ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}. \]  

[I], is Level-1 Model, where there are P level-1 predictors given by \( x_{p ij} \) (p=1, 2, ……P).

\[ \beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \sum_{q=1}^{Q} \gamma_{0q} z_{qj} + \delta_{0j}. \]  

[II], is the level-2 Model for the intercept, where there are Q level-2 predictors given by \( z_{qj} \) (q=1, 2, ……Q).

\[ \beta_{pj} = \gamma_{p0} + \sum_{q=1}^{Q} \gamma_{pq} z_{qj} + \delta_{pj}. \]  

[III], is the level-2 Model for the slope

The General model can be obtained by substituting II and III into I:

\textsuperscript{63} See Steenbergen and Jones (2002) for an excellent discussion about the advantages and disadvantages of different approaches in comparison with the multilevel models.

\textsuperscript{64} My discussion and notation is largely drawn from Raudenbush and Bryk (2002) and Steenbergen and Jones (2002)
\[ Y_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \sum_{q=1}^{Q} \gamma_{0q} z_{qj} + \sum_{p=1}^{P} \gamma_{pq} x_{pij} + \sum_{p=1}^{P} \delta_{pj} x_{pij} + \varepsilon_{ij} + \delta_{0j} \]  

[IV]

In this equation, the first term is the intercept, the second term gives the effect of level-2 predictors, the third term is the effect of level-1 predictors, the fourth term gives the effect of interaction terms across two levels if there are any, and the remaining terms constitute the disturbance terms at two levels. The full model takes the following form:

**LEVEL 1:**

Support for Integration \( (Y) = \beta_0 + \beta_1^*\text{(EDUCATION)} + \beta_2^*(\text{AGE}) + \beta_3^*\text{(EXTREM LEFT)} + \beta_4^*\text{(EXTREM RIGHT)} + \beta_5^*(\text{FARMER}) + \beta_6^*(\text{BUSEINES}) + \beta_7^*(\text{PROFFESIONAL/EXEC}) + \beta_8^*(\text{MANUAL}) + \beta_9^*(\text{FEMALE}) + \beta_{10}^*(\text{SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY (NATION)}) + \beta_{11}^*(\text{SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY (EU)}) + \beta_{12}^*(\text{SATISFACTION WITH LIFE}) + \beta_{13}^*(\text{POLICY PREFERENCE}) + \beta_{14}^*(\text{ATTCHMENT TO COUNTRY}) + \beta_{15}^*(\text{PERSONAL EXPECTATIONS}) + \beta_{16}^*(\text{SOCIO-TROPIC EXPECTATIONS}) + \beta_{17}^*(\text{KNOWLEDGE}) + \beta_{18}^*(\text{EXCLUSIVE EUROPEAN IDENTITY}) + \varepsilon \]

**LEVEL 2:**

\[ \beta_{0} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}^*\text{(LENGTH)} + \gamma_{02}^*(\text{CONSENSUS DEMOCRACY}) + \gamma_{03}^*(\text{CORPORATISM}) + \gamma_{04}^*(\text{EU TRADE}) + \gamma_{05}^*(\text{MISERY INDEX}) + \gamma_{06}^*(\text{NET TRANSFERS}) + \gamma_{07}^*(\text{ROMAN CATHOLIC}) + \delta \]

The dependent variable is formed of the factor scores obtained from one of the factor analyses conducted in Chapter 2. The four items used to create the factor scores are membership question, benefit question, advantage question and image question. The dependent variable is later transformed to a 0-100 scale for interpretation purposes. High values represent higher levels of support. The mean for the dependent variable is 64.78 with a standard deviation of 24.26.

The theoretical rationale for level-1 indicators was introduced in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. In addition to the variables related to individual level hypotheses introduced previously, I include some additional variables based on past studies and the availability

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65 It should be noted that at this point slope homogeneity (slopes for each variable do not vary across countries) is assumed. Later, I check the chi-square statistics for a decision about slope heterogeneity for specific variables

66 I have also run a two-level Hierarchical Multinomial Model using the membership question as the dependent variable. The results at level 1 and level 2 are very similar to those with the factor score as the outcome variable.
of the measures in the particular survey used here. Table 5.1 introduces individual and country level variables used in the analysis.

### Table 5.1: Variables In The Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVEL 2</th>
<th>LEVEL 1</th>
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| **Corporatism Index** | **Opinion leadership**  
A measure of corporatism including four items. *Source: Vergunst (2003)*  
**Consensus Democracy**  
A standardized index of ten items measuring various institutions in a democratic system. *Source: Lijphart (1999)*  
**Catholic**  
The percentage of Catholic population in each country. *Source: The percentages are extracted from three different sources: CIA World Fact Book, [http://www.adherents.com](http://www.adherents.com), and 1998 Catholic Almanac.*  
**EU Trade Dependency**  
The ratio of intra-EU trade ($X_{EU} + I_{EU}$) and total trade ($X_{T} + I_{T}$) measured in million Euros. *Source: EUROSTAT*  
**Misery Index**  
A multiplicative term of unemployment and inflation in 2002. *Source: EUROSTAT*  
**Net Transfers**  
A variable measuring the net transfers as percentage of GDP in member states. *Source: Matilla (2004)*  
**Length**  
A variable measuring the length of a country’s membership in years.  
**Opinion leadership**  
A four-point index of two variables asking the respondents (i) to what extent they discuss politics (ii) to what extent they persuade their friends.  
**Exclusive European Identity**  
A variable measuring whether the respondents exclusively feel European or not. 1=Feel European 0=Feel attachment to other type of identity  
**Knowledge**  
An objective knowledge scale counting number of correct responses to five questions  
**Personal Expectations**  
An index of three items asking the respondents about their future expectations  
**Socio-tropic Expectations**  
An index of two items asking the respondents the economic situations in their country  
**Policy Preference**  
A variable created from 27 items asking the respondents at which level they would prefer specific policies be decided (EU and/or national).  
**Satisfaction with Life**  
An item measuring satisfaction with life on a 4 point scale ranging from not at all satisfied (1) to very satisfied (4)  
**Satisfaction with Democracy in nation**  
A respondent’s level of satisfaction with democracy in his/her country on a four-point scale ranging from not at all satisfied (1) to very satisfied (4).  
**Satisfaction with Democracy in EU**  
A respondent’s level of satisfaction with democracy in the EU on a four-point scale ranging from not at all satisfied (1) to very satisfied (4).  
**Attachment to Country**  
A dummy variable measuring a respondent’s attachment to his or her country (1=attached 0=not attached)  
**Extreme Left and Extreme Right**  
Dummy variables measuring the respondents own ideology placement. (1=extreme left/right 0=left, right, center)  
**Education**  
The average years of education a respondent has; **age** is the respondent’s age; **gender** (1 female, 0 male) and **occupation** dummies (farmer, business, professional executive and manual).  

To assess the impact of economic institutions on support for integration, I use the corporatism index developed by Vergunst (2003). The index represents the mean scores for 1993-1998 period and it is the sum of the standardized scores of four items: centralization, coordination, union density and coverage rate. Centralization measures the level of wage bargaining (centralized, intermediate, and decentralized) and data is collected from OECD 1997; Calmfors and Driffil (1988) and IPD (1996). Coordination is a measure of employer and union coordination. Vergunst collects the data for this measure from OECD Employment Outlook (1991) Calmfors and Driffil (1988) and IPD (1996). Union density is the percentage of labor force membership of a trade union taken from Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000). Coverage rate measures the level of union involvement in collective bargaining and it is simply the percentage of labor force covered by collective agreement. Vergunst uses OECD (1997), Golden, Wallerstein and Lange (1998) and Traxler, Blaschke and Kittel (2001) as the data source.

Figure 5.1 is a scatter plot summarizing the distribution of 14 countries for the corporatism score and average support for integration (mean of factor scores). The dependent variable, average support for integration, is the mean of the factor scores (0-100 scale) for each country.
As figure 5.1 demonstrates UK appears as an outlier with the smallest corporatism score and lowest level of support. UK’s position is related to two facts. Firstly, UK is the most liberal market oriented member and despite the increasing trend of liberalization at EU level her market system is still far from the EU average. Secondly, the division within the two major parties helps fuel the Euroskepticism in this country (Taggard and Szczerbiak 2004). Another outlier is Ireland, with relatively high corporatism score yet the highest level of support for European integration. However, four countries with the highest scores of corporatism (Germany, Austria, Finland and Sweden) have very low levels of support. In accordance with the proposed relationship, Netherlands, Greece, Italy and Portugal have low scores for corporatism and high levels of support for integration. Overall, on average the relationship between corporatism and the level of support appear to be negative.
As mentioned previously, *Consensus Democracy* is an index developed by Lijphart (1999) based on ten items. Using a factor analysis, Lijphart clusters the ten items into two dimensions: Executive-Parties dimension (including effective number of parliamentary parties, minimal winning one-party cabinets, executive dominance, electoral disproportionality, interest group pluralism) and federal-unitary dimension (including federalism-decentralization, bicameralism, constitutional rigidity, judicial review and central bank independence). The majoritarian-consensus democracy index is the sum of the standardized scores for all items in these dimensions. The standard scores are coded such that consensus democracies get higher values and majoritarian democracies gets lower values on this index. Figure 5.2 shows the distribution of countries for support and *consensus democracy*.

![Figure 5.2: Consensus Democracy and Support for Integration](image-url)

**Key:** at=Austria, be=Belgium, de=Germany, dk=Denmark, es=Spain, fi=Finland, fr=France, gr=Greece, ie=Ireland, it=Italy, nl=The Netherlands, pt=Portugal, se=Sweden, uk=The United Kingdom
As Figure 5.2 demonstrates, there is a slight positive relationship between consensus democracy and support for European integration. The distribution of countries is very similar to that shown in Figure 5.2 (for support-corporatism pair). Once again UK and Ireland are outliers whereas the locations of Spain and France (also Greece) are incompatible with my theoretical expectations. Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, Denmark and Austria have high consensus democracy scores and relatively high levels of support for integration. Finland and particularly Sweden have relatively high consensus democracy scores but lower levels of support than almost all other members.

*Roman Catholic* is a variable measuring the percentage of catholic population in each country. The percentages are extracted from three different sources: CIA World Fact Book, [http://www.adherents.com](http://www.adherents.com) and 1998 Catholic Almanac. In cases where the numbers were in contradiction, the figures in the CIA World Fact Book were taken. When there was no number reported in this source, the priority was given to the website (adherents.com) over the Catholic Almanac. Figure 5.3 demonstrates the distribution of countries by support and *percent catholic*. 
As Figure 5.3 shows, nations with a large or substantial Catholic population have higher levels of support. While the level of support is high in countries like Ireland, Spain, Italy, Belgium and Portugal, despite their large Catholic populations, support for integration runs low in France and Austria. Dominantly protestant nations like Finland, Sweden and UK have lowest levels of support. As expected Greece has a high level of support with its Orthodox population. Countries with more balanced populations generally have medium levels of support.

Net Transfers is a variable measuring the net transfers as a percentage of GDP in member states. The numbers are taken from Matilla (2004) and the source of data is a Commission report published in 2001. Net Transfers measures the budgetary balance (difference between national contributions to the EU budget and the EU expenditure.
allocated per nation) as a percentage of GDP in each member state for the period of 1995-2000. Figure 5.4 shows the distribution of countries for net transfers-support pair.

As Figure 5.4 demonstrates, there is a fairly strong positive relationship (R-Square linear=.212) between net transfers and support for integration. The level of support for European integration runs over 50% in the largest recipients from the EU budget (Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and Greece). Italy, Belgium, France, Denmark, Finland, and UK have an even balance close to zero and the first three remain above regression line while the last three stay below. Of those countries with a negative balance, Netherlands and Germany have higher levels of support than Austria and Sweden do.
Two other economic variables used in the model are the ratio of intra-EU trade to total trade and the *misery index*. The ratio of intra-EU trade to total trade is above 50% for all EU-15 countries with a mean ratio of .60 (60%) and a low value of .50 to a high value of .79. *Misery index* is a multiplicative term of inflation and unemployment with 2002 figures. This measure has a mean score of 17.59 with a minimum value of 6.63 in UK and a maximum value of 40.68 in Greece.

At level-1, the variables in the model are selected based on the literature on the individual level determinants of support for integration. Individual level variables include indicators of economic perceptions and expectations, satisfaction with democracy, political interest, political knowledge, ideology, as well as control variables like gender, age and occupation. The variables that were not used in previous chapters were constructed as follows.

*Opinion leadership* is an index of two variables asking the respondents (i) to what extent they discuss politics (ii) to what extent they persuade their friends. This index ranges from low (1) to high (4) levels of leadership. An individual who has low scores on this index never or rarely discuss politics and persuade his/her friends while an individual with high scores is frequently involved in political discussions and s/he often tries to persuade his friends. *Exclusive European Identity* is a variable measuring whether the respondents exclusively feel European or not. Two items are used to create this variable.

In the near future, do you see yourself as….?

1. (Nationality)
2. (Nationality) and European
3. European and (Nationality)
4. European Only

People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country or to European Union. Please tell me how attached you feel to the EUROPEAN UNION?

1. Very attached
2. Fairly attached
3. Not very attached
4. Not at all attached
Two dummy variables are created, one for those who feel exclusively European (1 if feels only European, 0 otherwise) and one for attachment to the EU (1 if respondent feel very or fairly attached to the EU, 0 otherwise). *Exclusive European Identity* is the interaction of these two variables.

*Knowledge* is a variable that counts the number of correct responses to five factual questions related to the EU. These questions ask the respondents about such issues as the formation of the European Community, elections to the EP, number of members, Europe Day and whether EU has an anthem or not. Individuals that answer more questions correctly are assumed to be more knowledgeable about EU.

*Personal Expectations* is an index of three items asking the respondents their expectations about life in general, financial situation of the household, personal job situation. All items have the same three-item response scale (worse, same and better). *Sociotropic Expectations* is an index of two items asking the respondents their expectations about employment and economic situations in one’s country. Both items have the same scale of worse, same and better.67 *Personal Expectations* has a range between 2 and 9 while *Sociotropic Expectations* ranges from 2 to 6.

*Policy Preference* is a variable measuring whether the respondents prefer various policy areas to be decided at exclusively national level or at both EU and national levels. Policy preference items ask the respondents whether they prefer certain policy areas to be decided at exclusively the national level or both at the EU and the national level. Two variables, one counting the number of times a respondent prefers a policy to be decided at national level and the other counting the number of policy areas preferred to be decided at both EU and national levels, are created. *Policy Preference* is the difference between the two counters, with high values representing support for making policies with the involvement of EU.

---

67 These two indices were also used by Hooghe and Marks (2003).
Three variables measuring respondents’ satisfaction in various areas are used. 

Satisfaction with Life is an item measuring an individual’s satisfaction with life on a 4 point scale ranging from not at all satisfied (1) to very satisfied (4). Satisfaction with Democracy measures a respondent’s level of satisfaction with democracy in his/her country and Satisfaction with Democracy in EU measures a respondent’s level of satisfaction with democracy in the EU on a four-point scale ranging from not at all satisfied (1) to very satisfied (4).

Attachment to Country is a dummy variable coded as 1 if a respondent feels that s/he is very attached or fairly attached to his country and 0 if s/he feels that s/he is not very attached or not at all attached to his/her country. I used this item in the absence of question asking the respondents whether they feel proud or not when it comes to their nationality.

Table 5.2 reports the descriptive statistics for all the variables in the model.

**Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics for the Variables in the Model**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVEL 2</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Length of Membership</td>
<td>30.71</td>
<td>18.12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consensus Democracy</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>-2.58</td>
<td>2.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Corporatism</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intra-EU trade</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Misery Index</td>
<td>17.59</td>
<td>10.89</td>
<td>6.63</td>
<td>40.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Net Transfers</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>-0.56</td>
<td>3.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>49.74</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>97.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| LEVEL 1                  | Education                    | 16.66 | 6.92               | 0       | 35      |
|                          | Age                          | 45.02 | 17.21              | 15      | 92      |
|                          | Extreme Left                 | 0.08  | 0.27               | 0       | 1       |
|                          | Extreme Right                | 0.05  | 0.22               | 0       | 1       |
|                          | Farmer                       | 0.02  | 0.13               | 0       | 1       |
|                          | Business                     | 0.06  | 0.24               | 0       | 1       |
|                          | Professional/Executive       | 0.05  | 0.22               | 0       | 1       |
In the next section, I present the results from the HLM estimation and discuss the implications of the analysis. This section ends with a conclusion that puts the analysis provided in this chapter into perspective.

## Results

The results of the two-level model estimation are provided in the following tables.\(^{68}\) I start with presenting the results for the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) model which serves as a useful baseline model providing the within and between country variance. The model takes the following form:

### Level-1

\[
\text{Support for Integration} (Y) = \beta_0 + \varepsilon,
\]

where the first term is the fixed effect (mean) and the second term is the level-1 random effect.

---

\(^{68}\) HLM-5 Statistical software package by Raudenbush and Bryk is used for analysis.
Level-2

\[ \beta_0 = \gamma_{00} + \delta, \]
where the first term is the level-2 intercept on the level-1 intercept (fixed effect) and second term is the level-2 residual.

Table 5.3 reports the results from ANOVA.

\textit{Table 5.3: ANOVA Estimation}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fixed Effect</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>T-Ratio</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \gamma_{00} )</td>
<td>64.89</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>30.76</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Random Effect</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Variance Component</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Chi-square</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \delta )</td>
<td>8.13</td>
<td>66.15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>881.39</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| \( \varepsilon \) | 23.06 | 531.72 |

Intra-class Correlation (\( \rho \)) = .11

The mean level of support (country mean) is 64.89 with a standard error of 2.19 yielding a 95% confidence interval of (60.6, 69.18). At the individual level the total variance is 23.06 (within country variance). At country level, the variance of the true country means, \( \beta_{0j} \), around the general mean \( \gamma_{00} \) is 66.15. With this number, 95% of the country means are expected to fall within the confidence interval of 48.95 and 80.83. This represents a relatively high degree of variability across countries with respect to support for integration. The Chi-Square value of 881.39 with 13 degrees of freedom is highly significant allowing reject the null hypothesis that “all countries have the same level of support.” About 11% of the variance in support is between countries\(^69\) justifying further investigation of country level indicators.

\(^{69}\) Between country variance is simply the intraclass correlation that is the ratio of variance explained at country level to the total variance.
Table 5.4 reports the fixed effects for two level model.

### Table 5.4: A Two-Level Model of Support for Integration

#### Fixed Effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Level-2</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>26.914</td>
<td>5.665</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consensus Democracy</td>
<td>3.607</td>
<td>0.527</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporatism</td>
<td>-3.537</td>
<td>1.114</td>
<td>0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intra-EU Trade</td>
<td>6.283</td>
<td>6.529</td>
<td>0.373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misery Index</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>0.600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net transfers</td>
<td>4.046</td>
<td>0.380</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Level-1</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.081</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme Left</td>
<td>-4.483</td>
<td>1.915</td>
<td>0.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme Right</td>
<td>-2.020</td>
<td>1.454</td>
<td>0.188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>-3.059</td>
<td>2.344</td>
<td>0.215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>-1.060</td>
<td>1.338</td>
<td>0.443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional/Executive</td>
<td>1.860</td>
<td>1.141</td>
<td>0.127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual Worker</td>
<td>-2.712</td>
<td>0.827</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-1.521</td>
<td>0.615</td>
<td>0.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with Democracy in Nation</td>
<td>2.719</td>
<td>0.801</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with Democracy in EU</td>
<td>12.492</td>
<td>1.306</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with Life</td>
<td>4.490</td>
<td>0.872</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Preference</td>
<td>0.495</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attachment to Country</td>
<td>0.354</td>
<td>1.106</td>
<td>0.754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Expectations-Personal</td>
<td>0.790</td>
<td>0.282</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Expectations-Country</td>
<td>1.261</td>
<td>0.230</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge</td>
<td>1.082</td>
<td>0.319</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusive European Identity</td>
<td>5.051</td>
<td>1.151</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opinion Leadership</td>
<td>2.057</td>
<td>0.341</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this model, only the parameter for the level-1 intercept (β<sub>0</sub>) is allowed to vary at country level. The individual level coefficients represent the average slopes on support for integration. The level-2 intercept (γ<sub>00</sub>) represents the level of support when the values...
of all country level indicators are set to zero and its value equals to 26.91. The coefficients at level-2 are the fixed effects of each variable on the level-1 intercept ($\beta_0$).

At the country level Corporatism, Consensus Democracy, Net Transfers and Roman Catholic are statistically significant in the expected direction. Neither intra-EU trade and macroeconomic performance nor the length of membership has significant effects on the mean level of support. One standard deviation increase in the consensus democracy score changes the average intercept of the country means by a magnitude of 3.6. Individuals living in consensus democracies are likely to find the decision-making structure of the EU familiar to their national models and hence, on average will be more likely to support integration.

As mentioned before, individuals living in countries with corporatist traditions are expected to be less supportive of integration given the increasing distance between the number of liberal market oriented policies at EU level and the models they are familiar with in their nations. One unit increase in the corporatism score (which would roughly be equal to the difference between UK and France, France and Germany, or Ireland and Austria with respect to their level of corporatism) decreases the level of support by 3.54 units. The mean level of support ($\beta_0$) increases by four units with every one percent increase in the net transfers as a percentage of GDP. Given the benefits distributed to the poorest regions of the EU, the mean level of support is likely to be higher in countries which are receivers from the EU budget. As expected, a one percent increase in the Catholic population of a country increases the mean level of support by .045 units. This effect is substantively small. In countries with over 90% Roman Catholic population (Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Italy), support for integration is only about 4 points higher than the same figure for countries with less than 10% Roman Catholic population (Greece, Finland, Sweden, and Denmark).

To compare the substantive effect of each country level variable on the level-1 intercept, I calculated the change in level-1 intercept as each variable moved from its minimum to
maximum value as well as the change created with one standard deviation increase from the mean, while other level-2 variables are held constant.

**Figure 5.5: Substantive Effects of Level –2 Indicators on Support for Integration**

Consensus Democracy and Net Transfers have by far the largest impact on the mean level of support (the difference in the level-1 intercept between the least consensual and the most consensual democracy is more than 19% (3% for standard deviation change) while the same figure is about 18% (8% for standard deviation increase) for the difference between the biggest contributor and largest receiver from the EU budget. The average difference in the mean level of support for integration ($\beta_0$) between the most liberal and most corporatist state is more than eight points. Despite its significance, the impact of the *Roman Catholic* is the smallest compared to the other three. However, as mentioned
previously, the effect of Catholicism does not really reflect the subnational differences among different nations with respect to the distribution of religious groups.\footnote{Additionally, it should be kept in mind that, dominantly catholic nations are also, most of the time, the poorest southern members. As such, this variable may also reflect the overlapping effects of Catholicism, wealth as well as Southern culture of the EU.}

The level-2 indicators clearly show that political and economic institutions as well as religion affect the level of support for integration. Individuals living in countries with consensus democracy are likely to find the political system of EU more familiar (i.e. closer to the system they are used to) and hence develop positive attitudes toward integration. As the EU adopts more liberal oriented policies, individuals living in corporatist systems will find this system less familiar in their cognitive maps and, on average, be less supportive of integration.\footnote{Perhaps, my argument regarding the “familiarity” with a system is not mutually exclusive with utilitarian approach to the extent that familiarity represents an equilibrium condition where individuals are aware of their economic benefits. In other words, individuals living in corporatist nations may combine the familiarity with utility maximization by being less supportive of liberal market oriented EU, given the assumption of full information (i.e. individuals can know and calculate their self-interest). However, when this assumption fails, theories derived from psychology literature provide more robust explanations.} The results also demonstrate that Roman Catholic culture, although not the best measure to be found, is a factor increasing overall support, however the substantive effect of this indicator is relatively small. The amount of fiscal transfers to EU also substantively increases the level of support for integration. Some of the usual suspects used by past research, length of membership, macroeconomic performance and intra-EU trade appear to be poor predictors of support.

At the individual level, all variables are statistically significant except for the three occupation dummies (farmer, professional/executive and business person) and, surprisingly, the variable measuring attachment to the country. These results are partially at odds with the utilitarian (Gabel 1998b) and identity theories of support for integration (Carey 2002; Hooghe and Marks 2003). The results only partially support these theories.

The occupation dummy for manual worker is statistically significant. A manual worker’s support for integration is 2.78 point less than the support of persons with any other occupation, holding all other level-1 variables constant. On the other hand, a person who
feels exclusively European is more supportive of integration (a coefficient of 5.05) than an individual who does not feel exclusively European. Individuals who are satisfied with democracy in their nation are 2.71 points more supportive of integration than those who are not satisfied. On the same scale, the difference between the two groups for satisfaction with democracy in the EU is 12.49 units, holding other variables constant. Those who are satisfied with their lives are 4.49 units more supportive of integration or than those who are not satisfied with their lives. This impact is in the expected direction and statistically significant. A one unit increase in the personal expectations (an increase representing a move toward a positive attitude) increases support for integration by .79 holding all level-1 variables constant. Every one unit increase in the future expectations an individual has for his/her country (in a scale of 2 to 6) increases support by 1.26 points, holding other variables constant. Both impacts are statistically significant. Coefficients for the indicators of knowledge and level of political interest are statistically significant in the expected direction. A one unit increase in the knowledge of an individual increases support for integration by 1.08 points, while the one unit increase in the opinion leadership index (an individual who discusses politics more frequently and who tries to persuade his/her friends) increases support for integration by 2.05 points, holding all level-1 variables constant. Finally, the coefficient for the policy preference has a discernable effect on support for integration.

Policy preference has a statistically significant effect on support for integration. With each policy area preferred to be decided jointly at national and EU levels, support for integration goes up by .49 points. Finally, age and gender (female) are negatively and education is positively related to support for integration with statistically significant effects.

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72 A problem related to direction of causality is in order here. European identity may be an outcome of an individual’s support for integration. However, there is enough evidence from the previous literature to believe that the direction of causality may be working the other way around.

73 The analysis in Chapter 4 showed that political interest as well as political values have impacts decreasing the likelihood of having non-attitudes more than changing the direction of support. Since I use a continuous dependent variable in this chapter, the effect of the opinion leadership variable may be neglecting this unique feature. In the Multinomial HLM model using the membership item as the dependent variable, the sign of this indicator does not change in two panels confirming the same effect. Therefore, I interpret the results associated with the opinion leadership index cautiously.
Figure 5.6 demonstrates the substantive effects of individual level variables. The bars represent either the change in support for integration created by one standard deviation increase from the mean (for continuous and ordinal variable) or a change from the minimum to maximum (dummy variables) for each variable, when other variables are held at their means.

Figure 5.6: Substantive Effects of Level-1 Indicators

* A change from 0 to 1.

Policy Preference and Satisfaction with Democracy have the largest substantive effects on support for integration followed by the European Identity and Satisfaction with Life. Having an extreme left ideology and being a manual worker also have large effects in
decreasing support for integration. Other variables related to economic expectations, opinion leadership, an individual’s level of education and his/her age as well gender have relatively smaller substantive effects on integration. These results are generally in accordance with the findings of past research and the findings in Chapter 4.

Overall the small substantive effect of education as well as insignificant results for most occupation dummies show that when controlled for factors related to policy preference, European identity and the level of satisfaction with democracy, utilitarian indicators no longer remain as strong predictors of support. Additionally, only European identity but not national identity (i.e. attachment to country) appears to be a good predictor of support when level 2 indicators are taken into account.

To further investigate the impact of level-1 variables, one needs to look at the variance components. HLM produces variance components with certain test-statistics for checking the slope homogeneity across level-2 units. It is essential to check variance components, because a significant statistic related to these components may be indicative of slope heterogeneity. Table 5.5 reports the variance components estimates from the two-level model.

| Table 5.5: A Two-Level Model of Support for Integration |  |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Variance Components | HLM Final Estimation Results* |  |
| **Variance Components** | **Random Effect** | **Standard Deviation** | **Variance** | **df** | **Chi-square** | **P-value** |
| Intercept | 10.21 | 104.28 | 4 | 35.424 | 0.000 |
| Education | 0.12 | 0.01 | 11 | 13.291 | 0.274 |
| Age | 0.04 | 0.00 | 11 | 11.780 | 0.380 |
| Extreme Left | 6.53 | 42.59 | 11 | 64.606 | 0.000 |
| Extreme Right | 4.00 | 15.99 | 11 | 20.026 | 0.045 |
| Farmer | 5.89 | 34.68 | 11 | 13.895 | 0.238 |
| Business | 3.71 | 13.80 | 11 | 19.125 | 0.059 |
| Professional/Executive | 2.13 | 4.54 | 11 | 8.379 | >.500 |
| Manual Worker | 1.98 | 3.91 | 11 | 13.306 | 0.273 |
| Female | 1.66 | 2.75 | 11 | 18.114 | 0.079 |
Table 5.5 - Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Random Effect</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Variance</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Chi-square</th>
<th>P-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with Democracy in Nation</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>5.15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15.991</td>
<td>0.141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with Democracy in EU</td>
<td>4.52</td>
<td>20.41</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>81.319</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with Life</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>5.24</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16.860</td>
<td>0.112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Preference</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>132.928</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attachment to Country</td>
<td>2.84</td>
<td>8.08</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11.887</td>
<td>0.372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Expectations-Personal</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>27.075</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Expectations-Country</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10.723</td>
<td>&gt;.500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>32.729</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusive European Identity</td>
<td>3.35</td>
<td>11.21</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>24.579</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opinion Leadership level-1, $\varepsilon$</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13.100</td>
<td>0.286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18.33</td>
<td>335.86</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The shaded cells are significant variance components

As Table 5.5 shows, the variance components for Extreme Left, Satisfaction with Democracy in EU, Knowledge, and Exclusive European Identity produce statistically significant Chi-Square statistics indicating that, for these coefficients, the probability of slope homogeneity across countries is less than 5 percent. However, as Raudenbush and Bryk (2001) argue the Chi-Square tests provide only approximate probability values for two reasons. Firstly this test is a simple univariate test ignoring the other random effects in the model. Secondly, this test utilizes only those level-2 cases that have sufficient data to compute separate OLS regressions. In this model, 12 of 14 countries are used to estimate the Chi-square statistics. However, there is no theoretical reason for expecting slope heterogeneity for any of these variables. Nevertheless, to further investigate the variability in slopes for these variables, I have specified models with random slopes for these variables based on the country level predictors. In all level-2 models specified for these variables, only Roman Catholic produced statistically significant impact on the slopes of these variables (with the exception of the model with a random slope for Satisfaction with Democracy where none of the level-2 variables were statistically significant.)

The only theoretically relevant slope heterogeneity can be claimed for the level-1 intercept and this is modeled in the analysis presented in Table 5.4.
significant). Additionally in these models, the substantive effect of religion was very small.

Finally, the results also demonstrate that level-1 variance explained by this full model is reduced from 531.72 in the baseline ANOVA model to 335.86. The proportion reduction in variance (variance explained) with the inclusion of all variables at individual level is 37%\(^7\). At country level, variance is reduced from 66.15 to 10.211, indicating that proportion reduction in variance is 85%. The variables in the level 2 model explain the 85% of the total variance at country level. These results show that a substantial amount of variation remains to be explained at individual level in contrast to country level variance. In other words, the level-2 indicators explain a significant portion of variance to be explained at country level.

**Conclusion**

In this Chapter, I have investigated the role of nation-level differences in shaping attitudes toward integration. The results of the two-level analysis have shown that political, economic and cultural characteristics of member states significantly affect the level of support for integration. For instance, the level of support runs high in nations with consensus democracy whereas the level of support is low in nations with corporatist democratic traditions. The results also demonstrated that nations with strong corporatist traditions tend to be less supportive of European integration. However, macroeconomic indicators, trade and length of membership do not appear as good predictors of support.

I have basically relied on the theories developed by the students of psychology who argue that human attitudes will be shaped by the interaction of external world and human cognition. The results of the two-level models demonstrate that there are significant differences across nations with respect to attitudes related to European integration. More importantly, the results also show that a significant portion of this variation can be explained by the model used.

\(^7\) The proportion variance explained=(variance explained by full model - variance explained by ANOVA)/variance explained by ANOVA.
The analysis also showed that, at individual level, the impact of self-interest and national identity is not as substantial in explaining support for integration. Especially, combined with the finding related to the sporadic effects of utilitarian indicators over time, the results imply that the role of self-interest may not be as prominent as the indicators related to European identity and preferences related to policy-making authority. However, I also noted that the effect of some national level differences like the corporatism score may depend on some rational calculation of benefits. Additionally, net transfers received from the EU have very large substantive effects on the level of support for integration. Overall, the analysis provided in this chapter demonstrated that national differences among the members matter when it comes to attitudes. Students of public opinion in the EU should consider the role of contextual differences, national and temporal, in predicting support for integration.
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

Individual attitudes do not form in a vacuum. Human beings interact with the world surrounding them when forming their beliefs and attitudes. The European Union provides a perfect setting for testing the effect of context on individual attitudes in two aspects. Firstly, European integration is not static over time and different periods of integration can be considered as temporally changing environments. Secondly, the EU encompasses nation-states and individuals residing in these states are surrounded by different political, economic and social environments that interact with their cognition. This dissertation investigated the role of context in understanding attitudes toward integration. More specifically, I examined the effects of temporal and spatial contexts on individual support for integration.

While I found supportive evidence confirming the findings of the past research at individual and aggregate levels, the results also demonstrated that context has a substantial role in shaping individual attitudes for integration.

Conceptualizing Support

In Chapter 2, I attempted to conceptually clarify the meaning of support which has troubled the scholars of public opinion for many years. Starting from Easton’s definition, I argued that the distinction between specific and diffuse support does not lead to a conceptual clarification to better understand this notion in either an established political system or the EU. To move away from the Eastonian typology, I proposed two strategies. First, I argued that support needs to be defined in an object oriented way to
account for the specific features of entities like regime, system, government, and institutions to which attitudes are related. Secondly, I defined support as a general phenomenon characterized as a running-tally which is updated with significant events, changing conditions or certain outcomes. For the purpose of this dissertation, I suggested that European integration can be conceived of as a moving target and individuals will update their attitudes about it as this project evolves over time. Instead of categorizing their attitudes about integration based on their long or short term beliefs, individuals will keep a running tally (representing the general notion of support) in their cognition which will be updated continuously. This understanding of the concept is also compatible with the on-line model of attitude formation (Hastie and Park 1986; Lodge 1995).

The factor analysis in Chapter 2 showed that the above conceptualization has empirical viability. Overall, the results confirmed that not only the most widely used indicators of support, the membership, benefit, unification, and regret questions, but also some items tapping support at a more personal level, the advantage and image questions, underlie the same latent factor. Past studies generally used the membership or benefit question; however, the former appears to be a better measure of support for integration. Future studies should be cautious about using certain indicators\textsuperscript{76} and proper measurement strategies need to be applied.

**Attitudes over Time**

In Chapter 3, I summarized the previous research investigating the determinants of support in Table 3.1. Past studies can be tabulated along two dimensions: level of analysis (individual and aggregate) and the type of predictor (economic and non-economic). Different theories were developed by these studies ranging from cognitive

\textsuperscript{76} Some scholars (Hooghe and Marks 2003) use two other items, one asking the respondents to assess the current speed of integration and the other aiming to learn how fast or slow they would prefer integration move forward. Both items are rated with a 7-point scale and these items are combined to measure supportive attitudes for integration. I ran a factor analysis including these items and the questions I used in Chapter 2. The results demonstrated that the items measuring speed of integration are not good indicators of support, because they load very weakly to the single factor extracted.
mobilization to utilitarian and recently to identity theories, however a major shortcoming plagues these studies. None of them addresses the issue of attitude formation. To overcome these problems, this research not only investigates how individual attitudes change as integration evolves over time but it also combines the two levels of analysis to account for the nested structure of the real world (i.e. individuals nested in nations within the multilevel governance structure of the EU) for examining the role of national differences on attitudes. As such, this study takes one step back and looks at how place and time affect individual attitudes before developing any model testing how indicators at the individual (self-interest, identity, perceptions of democracy, values and political interest) or aggregate (macro economic performance, culture, political institutions) level affect individual support for integration. In addition, my analysis also aims to combine the levels of analysis to develop a more comprehensive approach to the study of public opinion in the EU.

I borrowed from two streams of psychology research to develop a theory of attitude formation in the EU. The first stream of literature relies on the observation that human beliefs are formed as a result of interaction between external world and human cognition. The second stream is the cognitive-heuristic research which is exploited to a great extent in the American public opinion research. I developed a framework explaining how temporal (integration periods) and spatial (national differences) circumstances form a contextual environment interacting with human cognition to shape attitudes toward integration. I also defined a mechanism (i.e. cue-taking) explaining how attitudes and context may interact.

However, certain restrictions should be considered in the application of this theory. Firstly, it is hard to define what type of cognitive heuristics would be applied when temporal context is considered. The teleological progress of integration is quite unique to the extent that there may be no familiar object that could be used to inform individual attitudes. Notwithstanding this, the first stream of psychology research, discussed above, appears to be more useful in explaining the formation of attitudes in the EU. Secondly, the linkage between the external world and human brain may be considered like a black
box. Most of the time a researcher will know that there is such a box, but it will require much investigation to open it and decode the information inside. For example, it may be easily proposed that individuals living in consensus democracies are more likely to support integration given the similarity of the political system of EU to their national institutions. However, a causal explanation is required to show how this similarity, by virtue of creating a familiarity in human cognition, will affect an individual’s attitudes. In cases where some sort of economic calculus is involved, the situation becomes more complex by interconnecting the context, economic benefits and attitudes (see Chapter 5 on corporatism, liberalization in the EU and support for integration). Future research should pay more attention to develop more specific causal mechanisms within this theory.

With these restrictions in mind, I tested the implications of the contextual theory to investigate the role of time and space in the formation of attitudes. A brief history of integration is provided in Chapter 4. Three periods of integration, 1951-1970, 1970-1989 and 1990-2002, are specified as contextual environments within which individual attitudes are formed. In addition to the individual level hypotheses developed in Chapter 3, I also specified three hypotheses, non-constant effects, temporal saliency and the minor role of self-interest, based on the implications of the historical narrative.

I ran a series of multinomial logit estimations with more than 50 Eurobarometer surveys as well as an HLM to test individual level hypotheses. Generally, the individual level hypotheses introduced in Chapter 3 are confirmed in these estimations. For instance, political values and the level of cognitive mobilization have significant affects on an individual’s support for integration as found by Inglehart and his colleagues (Inglehart et al. 1991). However, the multinomial logit estimation has shown that individuals with high levels of cognitive mobilization or those with materialist or postmaterialist values do not differ from the others with respect to the direction of support but they differ from the others by having a smaller likelihood of holding non-attitudes. Additionally, the results presented in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 demonstrated that the level of income and educational attainment increases individual support for integration. Although these
results are in line with the findings of the utilitarian approach (Gabel 1998a,b; Gabel and Palmer 1995), only partial evidence was found for the hypotheses relating occupational skills to individual support for integration. The results are also in line with the findings of partisanship theory proposing a link between party identification and support for integration (Franklin, Marsh and Wleizen 1994; Franklin, Marsh and McLaren 1994; Siune and Svensson 1993). While I found strong evidence showing more support among the followers of center left and center right parties as opposed to those who support extremist and other parties, the results are at odds with Inglehart, Rabier and Reif’s (1991) conclusion finding that the left is less supportive of integration than right. The multinomial logit and HLM estimations demonstrate that both left and right are supportive of integration. This finding agrees with Hix and Lord’s (1998) argument that the gap between the left and right has decreased over time and both groups became more supportive of integration. Finally, identity, at the national and individual level is found to be a strong predictor of support (Hooghe and Marks 2003; Carey 2002); however, the multilevel estimation results presented in Chapter 5 show that the effect of European identity is stronger than that of national attachment.

The analysis presented in Chapter 4 shows that the determinants of support for integration have non-constant effects over time. Even the difference between the second (1970-1989) and the third periods of integration (1990-2002) is striking as the results demonstrate that the magnitude as well as the direction of the effects associated with each indicator of support changes from one period to the other. This finding is in agreement with Anderson’s (1998) research.

Given the large number of observations used in the models presented in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3, I ran yearly multinomial logit estimations to avoid the problem of overfitting. In addition to the confirmation of the hypothesis rejecting the constant effects, I have also found that public opinion has become more salient over time and that economic indicators have sporadic effects in contrast to the more consistent effects produced by non-economic variables. In American public opinion research, it has been found that self-interest plays only a minor role as a motivator of public opinion (see Kinder 1998 for
an excellent review) and the results show that utilitarian motives gain importance only in
the end of 1980s and in the late 1990s when the single currency created a controversy
among Europeans. This finding is important, because it implies that the role of self-
interest (Gabel 1998b) may be overrated in public opinion research in the EU. The
performance of non-economic indicators like political interest, values, satisfaction with
national institutions, and possibly European identity is noticeable over time and future
research should reconsider the impact of these indicators on support for integration.

Methodologically, the results show that it is essential to use the proper statistical models
for the categorical dependent variables, because the outcome variables used by previous
studies are generally ordered or nominal. Using OLS regression or time-series cross-
sectional analysis may produce biased estimates. For example, it has been argued, and
found, that individuals with postmaterialistic values are more likely to support integration
than those with materialistic values (Inglehart et. al 1991). The analysis presented in
Chapter 4 showed that having any of these values decreases the likelihood of having non-
attitudes (remaining neutral), but it has no effect on the direction of support. The positive
relationship may be an artifact of improper statistical techniques.

One restriction about the model specification applies to the analysis reported in Chapter
4. The base model includes only a limited number of variables, because the items that are
consistently asked in all eurobarometer surveys since 1974 are very rare. However, I
have also applied some extended models including variables related to identity and
expectations and the results are not very different from those in the base models.

Future research should pay more attention to the effect of time on individual attitudes as
integration evolves in time. The generalizations made by past studies are certainly
bounded by temporal context and it is necessary to address this limitation in developing
theories and testing their implications. Additionally, more research is required for
explaining the sporadic effects of utilitarian indicators on support for integration. It is
necessary to conduct an in-depth analysis of certain periods to understand when and why
self-interest becomes more salient as a motivator of attitudes. Another avenue that could
be exploited by future studies is the examination of support for integration as an aggregate trend (see Ciftci 2005 for a time-series analysis of aggregate public opinion in the EU). Explaining the correlates of collective public opinion over time may provide new insights for supportive attitudes related to integration. Finally, one interesting finding about the effect of political values and political interest on support for integration stands out. As mentioned previously, being a person with high levels of political interest or participation as well as having materialistic or postmaterialistic values do not change the direction of individual support, but these predictors decreases the likelihood of non-attitudes. This is an important finding pointing to the methodological shortcomings of past studies failing to use proper designs with categorical dependent variables (e.g. logit, ordered or multinomial logit). Additionally, this finding opens an avenue for future research that should deal with holding attitudes and non-attitudes as has already been done in American public opinion research (Zaller 1992).

The results associated with the effect of temporal context also have some important implications for policy-makers. In the near future, some countries will hold referenda to ratify the EU constitution and there have been some debates about the timing of referendum to avoid a possible rejection vote (especially in France). Similarly, Tony Blair delayed the referendum on joining the EURO until more favorable conditions arise in the UK. To understand the temporal dynamics of public opinion may help the leaders to strategically choose the timing of a referendum to avoid an undesired outcome. Additionally, given the increasing interconnectedness of national and EU level decision-making, the temporal analysis may inform the leaders to develop campaign strategies that are most appropriate given the saliency of economic or non-economic indicators as they are associated with support for integration.

One important finding of the previously reported analysis is that public opinion has become more salient over time and it is likely that this trend will continue in the near future. Policy-makers should consider this while making-decisions at the EU-level.

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77 Spanish citizens already ratified the constitution in Spring of 2005 and French voters will vote by end of May 2005.
because they need to make policy decisions that needs to be approved by their constituency. In other words, ignoring the increasing saliency of public opinion at EU level may have adverse consequences for their electoral fortunes at the EU level. *Europeanization* literature has already addressed the important dynamics of the interaction between the EU and domestic levels (Ladrech 2004; Olsen 2003; Radaelli 2000). Students of public opinion should exploit these theories for developing new models of support for integration.

A similar argument can be made for the formative effect of spatial differences on attitudes toward integration. For instance Tony Blair may come up with an excuse for his electorate about why the *Lisbon* goals were not achieved while Chirac has to explain why France had to sign the *Lisbon Strategy* in the first place. In deepening integration, the leaders of each nation should think more carefully about the implications of EU law in their nations. Therefore, one needs to know how national differences affect the level of support for integration to predict the response of people to the decisions made at EU level.

**Attitudes in Space**

The analysis in Chapter 5 demonstrated that some of the aggregate level indicators do not have statistically discernable effects on support for integration. For example, contrary to the findings of Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) and Gabel (1998b) macroeconomic performance and trade dependency do not have statistically significant effects on the level of support (see Bosch and Newton 1995 and Ciftci 2005 for similar findings).

More importantly, the results show that political, economic and cultural differences matter in understanding public opinion in the EU. Country level differences have an important role in shaping individual attitudes. The two-level model estimation has demonstrated that the level of support is higher in countries with consensus democracy and Roman Catholic culture (in accordance with the findings of Nelsen and Gutt (2003) on Catholic youth) whereas integration is less supported in nations with corporatist institutions. From a utilitarian perspective, citizens living in countries which are the net
recipients of EU funds have higher levels of support than those who live in net payers. Overall, in forming their attitudes about integration, individuals use their beliefs formed in their interaction with the national context.

Not surprisingly, and in line with the previous studies (Bosch and Newton 1995; Ciftci 2005), macroeconomic performance, trade and the length of membership did not produce any statistically significant effects on the level of support. This result implies that macroeconomic differences as well as the amount of intra-EU trade do not have substantive effects on individuals’ supportive attitudes for integration.

The HLM analysis also demonstrated that instead of a single public opinion at EU level, there are *public opinions* at the country level. This is an important implication as the European Commission and the European Parliament, recently, have aimed to reverse the negative image of the EU in public’s eye. A good way of increasing support for integration is to develop plans at the national level rather than pursuing a single uniform strategy for the whole community.

Similarly to the impact of temporal context, the effect of country level differences on support may also provide cues to the national leaders on issues like the ratification of the constitution as well as Turkish membership. Especially the institutional and cultural differences should be more relevant in these issues. For instance, not only religious but also national identities should influence public opinion about possible Turkish membership. In Germany, the leaders of Christian Democratic party voiced their concerns about accepting Turkey to the club as a result of the pressure coming from their constituency. Austria, a dominantly Catholic nation, announced a possible referendum on Turkish membership. Perhaps, historical conflicts between Austria and Turkey (i.e. Ottomans) may be an important factor creating negative sentiments about Turkish accession. Finally, aggressive but protective of its culture, French politicians openly raised their concerns about Turkey’s inclusion. French opposition may also be related to

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78 In this chapter, I also suggest that a more complex causal mechanism may be in effect with respect to the impact of corporatism on individual attitudes.
the state of *radical laicism* which may create a fierce opposition to the full membership of a populous Muslim nation. In any case, cultural differences are likely to be more salient in shaping attitudes in the near future and this *certainly* provides a fertile ground for the students of public opinion.\footnote{See McLaren (2002) for an individual level of analysis of cultural threat as a determinant of support for integration.}

The HLM estimation presented in Chapter 5 also has interesting implications for the individual level hypotheses. European identity appears to be an important predictor of support for integration. Hooghe and Marks (2003) found that exclusive national identity has a large substantive effect on support for integration (especially in the existence of referendum providing opportunities to mobilize citizens). My specification is slightly different from theirs, however, in both cases, either national or European, identity is a stronger predictor of support than any of the economic indicators.

Additionally, HLM estimation also demonstrated that the level of satisfaction with democracy in the EU as well as the policy preference has larger substantial effects than any other individual level indicator. Individuals who prefer a joint authority, EU and national, for policy-making are more supportive of integration than those who exclusively prefer national authorities. The level-1 model also showed that those with extreme left ideology and unskilled workers (manual) are less supportive of integration.

A multilevel model uses national and individual level information to predict support for integration. However, certain restrictions about this statistical technique should be noted. In the HLM estimation, the *degrees-of-freedom* problem imposes limitations (there were only 14 observations at the country level). For example, robust standard errors are not reliable and certain test statistics will be computable only for those countries with a sufficient number observations (some of the test statistics were computed using 12 countries). However, the data in hand were balanced and alternative techniques were used (e.g. OLS) to cross-check the validity of the results. The OLS estimation did not significantly differ from the multilevel modeling estimation. In addition, no interaction
term between country level and individual level indicators were used in the model (e.g. an interaction between corporatism and party identification). This is an important restriction that needs to be addressed by future research.

Concluding Remarks

Overall, the analysis conducted throughout this dissertation has confirmed that individual attitudes are shaped within a specific context. The European Union provides a unique opportunity to assess the effect of context, temporal or spatial, on attitudes. Specifically, the analysis shows that integration periods and national differences have formative effects on attitudes related to support for integration. Future research should break these aggregate features into sub-national components to account for the variance associated with the differences within each nation. For example, future studies should look into how various religious groups within nations with different Catholic populations shape their attitudes. Another interesting puzzle concerns how class based attitudes differ from each other in corporatist or liberal market oriented nations.

This dissertation should be considered as a first-step of a larger research agenda. In the long-run, this agenda, aims to unfold the interconnectedness of supranational and domestic politics as it relates to public opinion. Exploiting the findings of previous research about policy-making (Wallace 2004; Scharpf 2002) and Europeanization (Ladrech 2004), future research should investigate the determinants of support for integration based on how institutions and actors at the domestic level coexist/interact with their counterparts at EU level given the constraints and opportunities emanating from public opinion.

To develop this research agenda, certain issues, - implementation of EU policy, the role of supranational decision-making in determining the electoral fortunes of existing governments, and the conservative stand of national institutions/actors (e.g. German Lander) against the increasing competences of EU-, need to be explored. At the core of
this agenda lies the relationship between policy-making and public opinion. The analysis provided in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 provides insights about the relation of policy and public opinion. In putting policy into the center of this endeavor, this research agenda should deal with the fact that there are separate public opinions across member states, a fact that will be more relevant as the number and diversity of members increase with each enlargement.
## Appendix 4-A: Year and Country Dummies for Table 4.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bad/Neither Good Nor Bad</th>
<th>Relative Risk Ratio</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Robust Std. Err.</th>
<th>P-Value</th>
</tr>
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## Appendix 4-A - Continued

### Good/Neither Good Nor Bad

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## Appendix 4-B.1: Year and Country Dummies for Table 4.3 (Period 1)

### PERIOD 2 (1990-2002)

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<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Robust Std. Err.</th>
<th>P-Value</th>
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# Appendix 4-B.2: Year and Country Dummies for Table 4.3 (Period 2)

## Period 1 (1974-1989)

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[147]
### Appendix 4-B.2 - Continued

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### APPENDIX 4-C.1: Performance of Indicators in Base Models

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<td>61%</td>
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### APPENDIX 4-C.2: Performance of Indicators in Extended Models

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Pride</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Economic Situation</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persuade</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Discussion</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postmaterialism</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with democracy</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with democracy in EU</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote Extreme</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>90%</td>
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Sabrí Çiftçi was born in Siverek and he was raised in Elazig, two small towns in Southern and Eastern Turkey. Following high school, he attended Ankara University, where he studied Public Administration and Political Science. After earning his B.A., he began his masters degree in Political Science at Ankara University. At that time, he served as a researcher and instructor in Cumhuriyet University, Turkey. He took the opportunity to study on classical and contemporary political theory during his education at Ankara University and he earned his first masters degree in 1997. He was awarded a scholarship by Turkish Higher Education Council to pursue a PhD in political science. Sabri enrolled in the doctoral program in Political Science at Florida State University in 2000, where his teaching and research mainly concentrated on comparative politics and quantitative methods. More specifically, he focuses on political institutions, public opinion, West European Politics, European integration and applications of advanced quantitative techniques. In 2004, he earned his Master of Science degree. He published in the European Union Politics and The Journal of Liberal Thought.