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FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

THE FAILURE OF THE ENTENTE: PROTECTION OF POLAND'S VOLHYNIAN UKRAINIAN MINORITY, 1921-1939

Ву

SUZANNE ELIZABETH SCOTT

A Thesis submitted to the Department of History in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Degree Awarded: Summer Semester, 2009 The members of the committee approve the thesis of Suzanne Elizabeth Scott defended on June 24, 2009.

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For Bernard Szabo

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Endecja Narodowa Demokracja (National Democrat Party)

KOP Korpus Ochrony Pogranicza (Border Protection Corps)

KPZU Komunistychna Partiia Zakhidnoï Ukraïny (Communist Party of West Ukraine)

OUN Orhanizatsiia Ukraïns'kykh Natsionalistiv (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists)

OZN Obóz Zjednoczenia Narodowego (Camp of National Unity)

PPS Polska Partia Socjalistyczna (Polish Socialist Party)
PSL Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (Polish People's Party)

RSUK Revizienyi Soiuz Ukraïnskykh Kooperatyv (Audit Union of Ukrainian

Cooperatives)

Sel-Rob Selians'ka Robitnycha Partiia (Socialist Workers' Party)

UNDO Ukraïns'ke Natsional'no-Demokratychne Ob'iednannia (Ukrainian National

Democratic Alliance)

UNR Ukraïns'ka Narodna Respublika (Ukrainian National Republic)

UPA Ukraïns'ka Povstans'ka Armiia (Ukrainian Insurgent Army)

ZUNR Zakhidno-Ukraïns'ka Narodna Respublika (West Ukrainian National Republic)

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the relationships between the government of the Second Polish Republic, the Ukrainian minority in Volhynia, and the Entente powers. After World War II ended, the Entente required the Polish government to sign a Minority Rights Treaty to ensure the protection of the state's minorities. Poland signed the treaty and even incorporated its tenets into the 1921 Constitution. However, government officials did not follow the treaty's stipulations, which provided for protection of religion, language, education, voting privileges, and private property – all the rights accorded to a citizen of a modern state. The Ukrainians in Volhynia, a territory annexed by Poland with the Treaty of Riga (1921), experienced a great deal of discrimination and disregard for the rights allotted to them in the Minority Rights Treaty. During World War II, Volhynia was the location of an ethnic cleansing of 40,000-60,000 Poles committed by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (*Ukraïns'ka Povstans'ka Armiia*, or UPA).

If the Entente powers had enforced the Minority Rights Treaty and investigated claims as they were required to do, World War II and post-World War II Volhynia possibly could have been different. This thesis explores Polish-Ukrainian relations in Volhynia during the interwar period in hopes of shedding some light on the reasons behind UPA's attacks.

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

The creation of a Ukrainian nation-state was a very long and complicated process, and the period between World War I and World War II was not without its set of challenges for Ukrainian state-builders. Ukrainians, who were territorially divided at the outset of World War I among Russia, Rumania, Germany, Austria, and Hungary, viewed the war as their chance to combine their territory into a Ukrainian nation. To the Ukrainians, the Russian Revolution, Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, and American President Woodrow Wilson's "Fourteen Points" message to Congress all marked significant steps in the establishment of an independent Ukraine. During World War I, members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia banded together and attempted to form a government based on these treaties and the goals set forth by Wilson and the Entente Powers.

Unfortunately, these government experiments encountered many difficulties and were short-lived. In March 1917, shortly after the Russian Revolution broke out, the Ukrainian Central Council was formed. In November of that year, the Council became the Ukrainian People's Republic (*Ukraïns'ka Narodna Respublika*, or UNR). To counter the UNR, the Bolsheviks set up their own version of a Ukrainian government in December 1918 in anticipation of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (signed March 1919) recognizing the independence of the UNR. The UNR initially had a lot of support, but lacked the means to keep the public involved and happy. First of all, its delegates were not elected, they were appointed from various congresses around the country. This led to bickering within the delegation and little support from the population. compound this, Ukrainians themselves were divided over what type of government they ought to have: liberal or conservative? Which countries, and to what extent, should they seek support from? Secondly, and most importantly, wars were still being fought on Ukrainian soil. When the UNR was established, Russian and German armies occupied the territory intermittently and parleyed across the nation; this naturally greatly impeded the development and control of the UNR.

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¹ Andrew Wilson, *The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation*, 2nd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 122.

Disenchanted with the UNR's governing, the public helped the German army overthrow the UNR and establish a Hetmanate with the anti-Bolshevist Russophile Pavlo Skoropads'kii as its head. Skoropads'kii was a puppet of the Germans; he catered to the large landowners and helped the German government as much as possible. On the other hand, he also allowed anti-Bolshevist Russian troops to come to Kyiv to fight against the Germans and the Bolshevists.² In response to the Hetmanate, the UNR was recreated by its liberal members. A conservative Ukrainian nation-state, the West Ukrainian National Republic (*Zakhidno-Ukraïns'ka Narodna Respublika*, or ZUNR), was also established in October, and supporters of the ZUNR and the UNR then overthrew Skoropads'kii and the Germans in November 1918. With this triumph, the ZUNR and the UNR agreed to combine into one government, but this union did not last long.³

Tension rose between the Soviets and Poles and by February 1919, war broke out between them. The newly-recognized Polish state's legislators wanted to expand and reclaim their historical territory from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (1569-1795) that was not recognized by the Treaty of Versailles; Soviet Ukraine wanted to unite with Western Ukrainian lands. Although the Bolsheviks signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which provided for an armistice with Ukrainian armies and an agreement to not invade Ukrainian territory, this did not hinder Soviet Russia's decision to support Soviet Ukraine militarily. The UNR aligned with Poland to fight against the Soviet armies, and the ZUNR disagreed with this policy. Its members refused to recognize the UNR-ZUNR union any longer. Ukrainians' faith in and support of their government was tested again in April 1920 when UNR leader Symon Petliura ceded Western Ukrainian territory to Poland so Poland's military would fight with the Ukrainians instead of against them. In March 1921, the war ended when Russia sued for peace. The Treaty of Riga (also known as the Peace of Riga) was signed by Poland and Russia, and excluded Ukrainian representatives from the talks. Therefore, western Ukrainian lands became

² Oleksander Ohloblyn and Arkadii Zhukovsky, "Pavlo Skoropadsky," Encyclopedia of Ukraine, http://encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?AddButton=pages\S\K\SkoropadskyPavlo.htm (accessed January 18, 2009).

January 18, 2009).

³ Vasyl Markus and Matvii Stakhiv, "Western Ukrainian National Republic," Encyclopedia of Ukraine, http://encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?AddButton=pages\W\E\WesternUkrainianNationalRepublic. htm (accessed January 18, 2009).

⁴ Timothy Snyder, *The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569-1999* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 139.

Polish territory and eastern Ukrainian lands became Russian territory. territory covered in this thesis, Volhynia, was part of the western Ukrainian lands that went to Poland with the signing of the Treaty of Riga, and the Polish-Soviet conflict was a war, I am defining the interwar period as the time from the signing of the Treaty of Riga (March 1921) to the Soviet occupation of the lands in September 1939.5



Figure 1: Map of Interwar Poland, 1921-1939⁶

⁵ Volhynia is the transliterated version of the Polish Wołyn, Ukrainian Volyn', Russian Volyn', and German Wolhynien (also Wolynien). It will be referred to throughout this thesis as Volhynia. Place names, save for those presently located in Poland, will be referred to as their Ukrainian names. ⁶ Polish Genealogical Society of America, *Poland 1921-1939*, http://www.pgsa.org/images/Pol1921.gif.

At the outset, the Ukrainians inhabiting the land granted to Poland by the Treaty of Riga were unhappy. Not only were they not allowed to participate in the peace settlement, they feared they would be forced to adhere to Polish cultural norms and that their own culture would be quashed. To alleviate the Ukrainians' and other minorities' fears throughout Eastern Europe, a Minority Rights Treaty was written into the Treaty of Versailles and each new country established by the Treaty of Versailles was required to sign it before they would be recognized as an official country by the Entente. The Minority Rights Treaty provided for protection of all cultural aspects of minorities within each country by ensuring their freedom to practice their own religion, speak their own language, participate in government, and have their own schools and cultural organizations. However, while the Entente did set up the apparatus to investigate claimed abuses, they did not protect the minorities: the Entente rarely followed through with a thorough investigation or dismissed the claims altogether.

Thus, during the interwar period, Ukrainians were at the mercy of the Polish government and military. The Ukrainian population Poland gained with the Treaty of Riga – eastern Galicia, western Volhynia, southern Pidlissia, Polissia, and Kholm – experienced their new government's policies of "Polonization". Ukrainian schools had to instruct in the Polish language, and they were frequently closed or had their department members replaced by Poles; labor and farm organizations were closed; newspapers and journals were heavily censored; mail and travel was restricted; voter disenfranchisement and outright election rigging was rampant; cultural groups like children's scout organizations, literary circles, and sports clubs were restricted or closed; and churches were destroyed, closed, or converted to Roman Catholic churches.

Ukrainians during the interwar period either tried to work with the government in hopes that it would grant them concessions, or they participated in groups which attacked Polish governmental figures and their supporters. Galicia was certainly a

⁷ Oscar I. Janowsky, *The Jews and Minority Rights*: 1898-1919 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1933), 342.

⁸ Pablo de Azcárate y Flórez, trans. Eileen E. Brooke, *League of Nations and National Minorities: An Experiment*, Studies in the Administration of International Law and Organization 5 (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law, 1945), 131.

⁹Paul Robert Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1998). Timothy Snyder, *The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569-1999* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 583.

hotbed of Ukrainian nationalism during this period, but the Volhynian territory is of particular interest. First of all, Volhynia was divided between Russian rule and Polish rule in the interwar period. The Ukrainians in the eastern part of the territory became part of the Russian-controlled Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (UkSSR) in 1922 in accordance with the Peace of Riga, while the Ukrainians in the western part of the territory stayed with Poland. Poland and the UkSSR did not want Volhynia's population – or their political ideologies – to mix, so border security was very important. Despite this, a fair amount of information did exchange hands, which played a significant role in many of the uprisings, revolts, and unrest in both Polish and UkSSR territory. Secondly, Volhynia's Ukrainian population dwarfed its Polish population in 1921 by nearly 750,000 and in 1931 by over 1,000,000.¹⁰

TABLE 1: National Composition of the Population of Volhynia¹¹

Nationality	The 1921 Number	Census %	The 1931 Number	Census %
Ukrainians	983,596	67.9	1,448,000	69.8
Poles	240,922	16.6	325,000	15.5
Jews	164,740	11.4	207,792	10.0
Germans	24,960	1.7	34,000	1.7
Czechs	24,405	1.8	30,977	1.5
Russians	9,450	0.6	32,000	1.5
Total	1,449,073	100.0	2,077,769	100.0

According to Raymond Pearson, "Statistics, elections and plebiscites can be – and in [E]astern Europe often were – rigged. Almost all the official censuses of the pre-1914 empires and post-1919 states exaggerated the demographic dominance of the establishment and minimized the representation of national minorities." One must keep in mind that these census numbers are from the *Polish* census taken by *Polish* officials during a time period when they most certainly wanted to underplay the minority

5

¹⁰ Shmuel Spector, *The Holocaust of Volhynian Jews, 1941-1944* (Jersualem: Yad Vashem, 1990), 11.

¹¹ Spector, 11, table 1.

¹² Raymond Pearson, *National Minorities in Eastern Europe, 1848-1945* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), 17.

representation and inflate the Polish population. Even with the census data that was supposedly favorable to the Polish population, the Ukrainian population of Volhynia was still over four times greater than the Polish population in the voivodeship. 13 Because of this, the Polish government was very wary of what the Volhynian Ukrainian population could do should they unite cohesively with each other or with Ukrainians from other voivodeships. Many of the Polish government's actions regarding the Volhynian Ukrainians were aimed at preventing them from uniting; part of these plans involved separating them from other Ukrainians, and part were attempts to Polonize them so they would denounce their cultural ties to a Ukrainian nation. Thirdly, during World War II in 1943, Volhynia was a territory in which the ethnic cleansing of 40,000 to 60,000 Poles by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (*Ukrains'ka Povstans'ka Armiia*, or UPA) took place. Clearly, the Ukrainians of Volhynia were unhappy as Polish citizens during World War II, and this leads one to question the prior history between the two ethnic groups that would lead to such a fierce hatred which would warrant a need "to cleanse the entire revolutionary territory of the Polish population."¹⁴

An ethnic cleansing and the events surrounding it are obviously significant events in the respective ethnicities' histories, and these would shape relations between the groups (and those who supported/undermined the groups when said ethnic cleansing occurred) for years to come. Yet there are very few publications from Western Europe and North America specifically about Volhynia's history. Western European countries, the United States, and Canada all have large Ukrainian and Polish Diasporas; one would think their influence alone would cause an interest in the topic. If one couples the Diasporas' power with the multitude of area studies during the Cold War, it is astonishing there are so few publications. We must ask "Why?" It appears that Volhynia studies were superseded by those which were deemed as more important. Indeed, on the surface, Volhynia appeared insignificant in comparison to other nearby areas like Galicia.

¹³ The term "voivodeship" is the transliterated version of the Polish word *województwo*. A voivodeship is a province. Likewise, a "voivode" is the transliterated version of the Polish word *wojewoda*. A voivode is a governor of a voivodeship.

¹⁴ Snyder, *The Reconstruction of Nations*, 165.

Galicia versus Volhynia

Although Galicia directly borders Volhynia, and they were actually part of the Galicia-Volhynian Kingdom, it is still studied much more frequently than Volhynia.¹⁵ It is important to understand the two territories in relation to one another, so a brief discussion of Galicia is necessary. Galicia is significant in Eastern European studies because different cultural groups expanded and prospered in the territory relatively unhampered after the Partitions of Poland in the late eighteenth century.

Of the three Partitions, the Austrian Empire received territory from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth with the First Partition (1772) and the Third Partition (1795); in both of these agreements, Austria received huge chunks of Galicia. Compared to the parts of Poland that went to the Prussian and Russian Empires, the Austrian Partition's population was treated wonderfully. In the Prussian and Russian Partitions, policies of "Germanization" and "Russification", respectively, ran rampant. This was not the case in the Austrian Partition; Galicia was practically an autonomous region whose peoples could do as they pleased. While Galicians still had to answer to the Austrian Emperor, they were allowed local self-rule, representation in the empire's government, and control over their own business and educational institutions. This freedom gave Galicians a chance to experience governmental policymaking again and prepare for governing an independent country in the future. The populations of the Prussian and Russian Partitions experienced varying degrees of self-rule and participation in the government, but it was often meaningless and symbolic and at no time was it near the extent granted to the Austrian population.

At the time of the partitions, Western Galicia was overwhelmingly populated by Poles and Eastern Galicia was overwhelmingly populated by Ukrainians. Regardless of which half of Galicia a person resided in, the Poles almost always owned the landed estates and the Ukrainians were peasants. Therefore, although Galician territory was incorporated into the Austrian Empire while the Austrian government instituted massive reforms to streamline bureaucracy, and the Galician population benefited from this, most of these benefits went to the more noticeable and wealthy Polish population.

¹⁵ While the two territories were part of the same kingdom, this kingdom only existed from the twelfth to fourteenth century

fourteenth century.

16 Norman Davies, *God's Playground: A History of Poland, 1795 to the Present*, vol. 2, rev. ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 204.

Concessions were made for every ethnicity, but the Poles – who had the means to travel to Vienna and lobby – received the majority share. Initially, the laws applied to all ethnicities. 18 However, after the Revolution of 1848, Polish standing in the Empire quickly rose above other Galician ethnicities. A Polish count, Agenor Goluchowski, became the Viceroy of Galicia and a close confidante of the Emperor. During his time as Viceroy, Goluchowski awarded government positions to his friends and established Polish as the official language of education, business, and legal matters in Galicia. 19 Other minorities still had rights and were legally allowed to participate in the government, but Gołuchowski and his successors' massive influence lasted well after Gołuchowski's death in 1875. Their shadows left a noticeable mark that was not forgotten when Poland campaigned to add Galicia to their territory during the Paris Peace Conference following World War I.

Volhynia, on the other hand, was guite different. First of all, it became part of the Russian Empire during the Partitions of Poland. While the Galician population had political autonomy in the Austrian Empire, the Volhynian peoples were very much subjects of the tsars and subject to the tsars' whims. The policy of Russification began in the late 1830s and lasted until the fall of the Empire. With this policy, the Ukrainian language was banned and Russian became the official language. The Ukrainians of Volhynia were also forcefully converted to Eastern Orthodoxy, whereas the Ukrainians of Galicia were allowed to practice their Greek Catholic religion freely.²⁰ The population of Volhynia, regardless of ethnicity, was much more rural than their Galician counterparts: almost ninety percent of Volhynians owned or worked the land, were relatively apathetic to nationality questions, and had only one town with a population over 40,000; Galicia had several universities and a correspondingly burgeoning

¹⁷ Snyder, *The Reconstruction of Nations*, 122-123.

¹⁸ For example, Joseph II made primary education in the vernacular compulsory in Galicia. Magocsi, 390-391. ¹⁹ Magocsi, 422.

Jan T. Gross, Revolution from Abroad: The Soviet Conquest of Poland's Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia, exp. ed. with a new preface by the author (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 4. Empress Maria Theresa renamed the Uniate Church the "Greek Catholic" Church in 1774. I will refer to this church as the Greek Catholic Church. In practice, the religion is most commonly called Greek Catholicism or Byzantine-Rite Catholicism.

intelligentsia, a developed news press, large urban centers, and a nationally conscious population. 21

Likely because the Volhynians were so different from the nearby Galicians, the interwar Polish government took special care to Polonize them. The government needed to convince the Entente Powers that the Volhynian territory belonged with Poland. At the time, religion and language could easily define which nationality a person belonged to: Jews practiced Judaism and spoke Yiddish, Poles practiced Roman Catholicism and spoke Polish, and Ukrainians practiced Greek Catholicism or Eastern Orthodoxy and spoke Ukrainian.²² The Greek Catholic Church has a large key difference from the Orthodox Church, which is that the Greek Catholic Church answers to the Pope in Rome and uses the rites and practices from Orthodoxy, but the Orthodox Church does not adhere to Roman edicts.²³ To make the Orthodox adherents appear more Polish (or at least less Ukrainian or Russian), members of the Orthodox Volhynian population were forcefully converted to Roman Catholicism during the interwar years.²⁴ Use of the Ukrainian language was also repressed; the Ukrainian language was actually banned from schools, businesses, and the legal system at times. Other aspects of Volhynian Ukrainian culture were attacked, as mentioned previously, but language and religion were the most frequent targets of Polish oppression.

The Volhynian Ukrainians found a savior in Henryk Józewski, Polish President Józef Piłsudski's hand-picked voivode of the province from 1928-1938. promoted Ukrainian rights and encouraged Ukrainian nationalism because he truly believed these things should exist, but also as a buffer against Soviet influences.²⁵ Unfortunately, because Józewski was disliked by most Poles and the Organization of

²¹ Snyder, *The Reconstruction of Nations*, p. 145. See also Alexander J. Motyl, *The Rural Origins of the* Communist and Nationalist Movements in Wolyn Wojewodsztwo, 1921-1939 Slavic Review 37 no. 3 (Sep. 1978), 414. ²² Gross, 4.

²³ Fr. John Matusiak, "The Word Uniate," Orthodox Church in America,

http://www.oca.org/QA.asp?ID=199&SID=3 (accessed May 10, 2009)

24 Timothy Snyder, Sketches from a Secret War: A Polish Artist's Mission to Liberate Soviet Ukraine (New Haven: Yale University Pres, 2005), 4, 147-48. ²⁵ Ibid., xxi.

Ukrainian Nationalists (*Orhanizatsiia Ukraïns'kykh Natsionalistiv*, or OUN), his policies were often mismanaged by his peers or wholly ignored.²⁶

The international press, parliaments, and organizations did speak up about Polish abuses against Ukrainians (and other minorities) during the interwar period, but the vast majority of these actions went unnoticed. Not only was Volhynia considered as backwards and rustic in comparison to places like Galicia, the world was preoccupied. After World War I, the Entente powers were exhausted. They wanted to help their own countries recover from the destruction and handle the big problems as quickly as possible. This included pacifying groups who were known provocateurs, like the Serbs; setting up an apparatus to investigate minority claims of misdeeds; and doing their best to ensure that another "Great War" would be a long time coming. After the Treaty of Versailles was signed, each country focused on its own population. The Great Depression came, World War II destroyed Europe again, and the Cold War began. Not only was the world sidetracked by other huge events like Vietnam and the space race, the "Iron Curtain" of the Cold War era made it nearly impossible to access documents regarding any atrocities in Soviet satellite countries. Volhynian Ukrainian history slipped through the cracks.

Historiography

The time period with the most significance is the interwar period, as this is when Volhynia was part of the Second Polish Republic and its Ukrainian population was subject to Polish rule. The publications concerning interwar Volhynia fit into three categories: the first set include the interwar history in a larger volume on an overarching history of Ukraine, Poland, or Eastern Europe in general; the second set are solely about interwar history; and the third set discusses the interwar period and World War II with the main focus being the ethnic cleansing of Jews, Poles, and/or Ukrainians. The majority of the publications are books, but there are several articles and government declarations that are also important and fall into the same categories listed above.

The harsh treatment the Ukrainians received from Poles during the interwar period and the ethnic cleansing of Poles by Ukrainians during World War II still causes

²⁶ One of the OUN's goals was "to discredit the Polish government and especially those Ukrainians who favored an evolutionary political or an economic (cooperative) solution to the problem of their existence in

much grief between the two groups. Unfortunately, this means that bias in publications is extremely prevalent. I have done my best to discard those that show partiality, but I still think it is important to mention them, if only briefly, to warn potential readers to be wary of their contents. If bias does appear in the publications I use, I will make note of it.

The first grouping of publications is by far the most populous, with several publications of import. The books in this group that have been the most helpful to my research are Paul Robert Magocsi's A History of Ukraine and Timothy Snyder's The Belarus, 1569-1999.²⁷ Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Magosci's book was particularly helpful because he discussed all of the peoples who lived at one point within the boundaries of present-day Ukraine; this allowed him to discuss minority relations in great detail.²⁸ He traced the development of Ukraine as a country beginning prior to the founding of Kievan Rus' to present day and included a thorough discussion of how other ethnic groups viewed Ukraine and Ukrainians, paying close attention to the Poles and Russians. His book was therefore perfect for my study, as Russia and Poland were the two biggest contributors to shaping lives in interwar Volhynia. Snyder's study of Belarus, Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine also discussed minority relations in the respective nations. His book's foci include "when modern nations arise, why ethnic cleansing takes place, [and] how nation-states make peace," which aides in one's understanding of the trigger points on both the Ukrainian and Polish sides that eventually led to the ethnic cleansing during World War II.²⁹ Other books in this category include Norman Davies' Heart of Europe: The Past in Poland's Present, Andrew Wilson's The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation, and Philip Longworth's The Making of Eastern Europe from Prehistory to Postcommunism. 30 These last three books all briefly discuss Polish-Ukrainian relations in Volhynia, but they focus more on Galicia and do not go into as much detail as Magocsi's and Snyder's publications.

Poland." Magocsi, 598.

²⁷ Magocsi, A History of Ukraine.

²⁸ Ibid., vii-viii.

²⁹ Snyder, *The Reconstruction of Nations*, 3.

Norman Davies, *Heart of Europe: The Past in Poland's Present*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). Andrew Wilson, *The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation*, 2nd ed. (Yale: Yale University Press, 2002). Philip Longworth, *The Making of Eastern Europe: From Prehistory to Postcommunism*, 2nd ed. (London: MacMillan Press Ltd, 1997).

The second category of publications, those concerning solely the interwar years. were all published during the time period, with the exception of Timothy Snyder's book about Henryk Józewski and Antony Polonsky's book about politics in the Second Republic. Going chronologically by publication date, the first of this category is Arthur L. Goodhart's Poland and the Minority Races, which was published in 1920.³¹ In 1919, a committee was appointed by American President Woodrow Wilson at the request of the President of the Council of Ministers of Poland to travel to Poland and investigate the international press' reports of Jewish pogroms. This committee consisted of Goodhart, Henry Morgenthau, Brig. Gen. Edgar Jadwin, and Homer H. Johnson. Goodhart himself was a practicing lawyer and founder of the Cambridge Law Review; Morgenthau was the American Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire during the Armenian Genocide and was very active in spreading word about the genocide to American and international news sources: Jadwin was a career Army officer who served with the Corps of Engineers in the Spanish-American War and World War I; and Johnson was a well-known lawyer.³² The result of the investigations was the Morgenthau Report, which had a mixed reception: some said the report was too harsh, others said it was not honest enough.³³

<u>Poland and the Minority Races</u> is essentially Goodhart's travel journal. The majority of the book is about "investigating the condition of the Jews, ...Lithuanians, White Russians, and Ruthenians [Ukrainians] concerning their relations with the new Polish State,"³⁴ but Goodhart wrote quite frequently about his leisure activities, travel between cities, and the effect World War I and the Polish-Soviet War had on the

³⁴ Goodhart, 8.

³¹ Arthur L. Goodhart, *Poland and the Minority Races* (New York: Brentano's, 1920).

³² Goodhart: Ruth Burchnall, "Biographical Sketch," Catalogue of the Papers of Arthur Lehman Goodhart (1891-1978), Department of Special Collections and Western Manuscripts, Bodleian Library, University of Oxford, http://www.bodley.ox.ac.uk/dept/scwmss/wmss/online/modern/goodhart/goodhart.html. Morgenthau: Rouben Paul Adalian, "Ambassador Henry Morgenthau, Sr.," Armenian National Institute, http://www.armenian-genocide.org/morgenthau.html. Jadwin: At the time of appointment to the Committee, Jadwin was a Brigadier General. By his retirement, he had become a Major General. Michael Robert Patterson, "Major General Edgar Jadwin Chief of Engineers," Arlington National Cemetery Website, http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/ejadwin.htm. Johnson: Frank D. Welch, *Philip Johnson and Texas*, foreword by Philip Johnson (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2000), p. 3.

Neal Pease, "This Troublesome Question," in *Ideology, Politics, and Diplomacy in East Central Europe*, ed. M.B.B. Biskupski (Rochester, New York: University of Rochester Press, 2003), 59. For the text of the report, see "Fixes Blame for Polish Pogroms; Morgenthau Puts it on Polish Troops, but Finds Extenuating Circumstances," *New York Times*, January 19, 1920,

http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9904E5DF103AE033A2575AC1A9679C946195D6CF (accessed January 5, 2009).

economy and population. This book has limited usefulness for this thesis because it never specifically addresses Volhynian grievances. Some of the towns they mention border Volhynia, so these notes are somewhat useful. More importantly, however, Goodhart recorded his interactions with Polish military men and government figures. This information sheds much light on how the Polish government and military felt about the minorities in its eastern provinces.

The next three books were published in 1931, shortly after the "Pacification" campaign during the elections of November 1930.35 The first of these is M. Felinski's The Ukrainians in Poland. 36 Felinski's book is incredibly informative, as it discusses the political, economical, social, cultural, and educational life of the Ukrainians throughout Poland and compares the data from each voivodeship. Felinski took care to use both Ukrainian and Polish sources and carefully weighed the accuracy of each that he used.³⁷ He also provided a detailed comparison between the terms "Ruthenian" and "Ukrainian", as this was a huge source of debate at the time. His last chapter, "Foreign Influences upon Ukrainian Life in Poland", is very applicable to my study of Volhynia because many of the Polish regulations in Volhynia stemmed from the fact that the district bordered the UkSSR.

Felinski's book is translated, the translator is unknown, and I could not find a copy of the book in its original language. To the best of my knowledge, the translator adhered to the original wording, except where noted. The only note that caused worry was the one concerning the use of Eastern Galicia versus Eastern Małopolska.³⁸ The translator wrote that the term "Eastern Galicia" was used during Austrian rule, and "Eastern Małopolska", the more contemporary and preferred term, would replace Eastern Galicia throughout the book.³⁹ "Małopolska" literally means "Little Poland". This term was actually disliked by the inhabitants of Eastern Galicia because they were predominantly Ukrainian and viewed being called "Little Poles" in Poland as irksome as "Little Russians" within the Russian Empire. Their national consciousness told them they were not Poles or Russians, but Ukrainians. On top of this, Małopolska was the

The "Pacification" campaigns are discussed in-depth in Chapter 3.
 M. Felinski, *The Ukrainian Minority in Poland*, trans. unknown (London: M. Felinski, 1931).
 Ibid., 14.

³⁸ The Polish phrase for this territory is *Wschodnia Małopolska*, which means Eastern Little Poland. Felinski's translator refers to the territory as Eastern Małopolska. Felinski, footnote 1, 8.

name of one of the earliest acquisitions of Mieszko I, a ruler of Poland in the late tenth century during the Piast Period. 40 Therefore, it recalled the time when Eastern Galicia was part of the Polish Kingdom. The name was thus insulting to Ukrainians on two levels: they were referred to as "little brothers" to an ethnicity they did not think they belonged to, and they were forced to live in an area under the Polish name for it, even though they viewed the territory as historically Ukrainian.⁴¹

On the surface, the next publication, V.J. Kushnir's Polish Atrocities in the West Ukraine, reeks of bias. First of all, at the time of publication, Kushnir was the ex-President of the Union of Ukrainian Journalists and Authors. This immediately sends a red flag because the book was published during the time period when censorship was rampant and some literary societies and unions were forbidden. It is entirely possible that Kushnir was personally affected by this. Secondly, the book contains a foreword by Cecil Malone, a communist member of Britain's Parliament who was most notable for advocating a worker's revolution and calling for "a few Churchills or Curzons on lamp posts...or against a wall". 42 Despite these initial red flags, the contents of the book are all taken from eyewitness and newspaper reports and photographs. Some of the stories are even relayed in correspondence by the United States Ambassador to Poland A.J. Drexel Biddle, Jr. to the United States Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg in 1939.⁴³ Most of Kushnir's book is about Galician repression, but he mentions Volhynia occasionally. If the book was only sparingly helpful for this thesis, it is certainly suggested for further reading on the subject of the Pacification campaign during the elections of 1930.

The last 1931 publication, Emil Revyk's Polish Atrocities in Ukraine, was by far the most helpful in determining the reactions of international bodies to the reports of

⁴⁰ Davies, *Heart of Europe*, 249-251. Wilson, 70.

⁴² "Hold British Officer on Sedition Charges; Liet. Col. Malone is Charged with Preaching Bolshevism and Murder - Gives 2,000 Bail," New York Times, November 13, 1920, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=950CE5DE1631EF33A25750C1A9679D946195D6CF

⁽accessed January 5, 2009).

A.J. Drexel Biddle, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to Poland, to Frank B. Kellogg, U.S. Secretary of State, Warsaw, March 14, 1939, pp. 1-86; No. 1001, 860E.01/168; Folder 860E.01/141-175; Box 6612; Decimal File 1930-1939; General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.

wrongdoing.⁴⁴ Firstly, I knew the book would have no bias because Revyk was the editor of *Svoboda*, a very popular and respected Ukrainian-American daily newspaper. He used eyewitness interviews, correspondence from his readership and their family in Western Ukraine, and international news reports to write his book. He discusses Polish repression of Ukrainians via chapters on scouting organizations, literary circles, freedom of the press, education, Polish settlers, and land distribution. Within these topics, he documents the changes in Polish policy from before it had reached the international press to the information becoming more and more public. The scope of the book covers all Western Ukrainian territories, but most of the material concerns Eastern Galicia.

The next publication, from 1932, is <u>The Polish and non-Polish Populations of Poland; Results of the Population Census of 1931.</u> This was first published in the journal *Questions Minoritaires – A Quarterly Review of Research and Information*, and then published by The Institute for the Study of Minority Problems in Warsaw. In the book, the Polish census of 1931 is explained by Chief of the General Census Bureau at the Central Statistical Office M. Raymond Buławski, Minister of Interior Affairs Bronisław Pieracki, and population scholar Dr. Alfons Krysiński. There is such a need to explain the census because Polish officials removed the category of "nationality" and replaced it with "mother-tongue", which many of the minority groups found offensive and a violation of the Minority Rights Treaty. Pieracki explained the need for the change:

...the heading "Nationality" gave no truthful and objective picture of the numerical relation of the nationalities in Poland. The question as to nationality was not everywhere properly understood. ...In the north-eastern voivodeships [mostly in Polissia] several tens of thousands of persons declared their nationality to be "of this place" or local", in the eastern voivodeships the declaration "ruski" was frequent, which could equally well mean the White Ruthenian, Ukrainian, or Russian nationality, lastly there were frequent cases of confusing nationality with state citizenship. 46

The article began with an interview of Dr. Buławski by an unknown representative of the Institute for the Study of Minority Problems, concerning all the

⁴⁴ Emil Revyk, ed., *Polish Atrocities in Ukraine* (New York: United Ukrainian Organizations of the United States, 1931).

⁴⁵ The Polish and non-Polish Populations of Poland: Results of the Population Census of 1931(Warsaw: Institute for the Study of Minority Problems, 1932)

changes implemented in the 1931 census, like the exclusion of the nationality question and having bilingual forms. This interview is followed by a Parliamentary Interpellation from the Jewish Circle claiming that the census styled without the nationality question is a "flagrant violation" of their rights; this is answered by a short notice from Minister Pieracki.⁴⁷ The last section of the article contains the results of the census and an analysis by Dr. Krysiński.

Overall, the article is insightful. It has documentation from both sides – the government and a national minority, and Dr. Buławski was very frank during his interview. It is especially interesting to compare what the international press and the minorities in Poland write in response to Dr. Buławski's interview and Dr. Krysiński's analysis.

The last item written during the interwar time period is S.J. Paprocki's 1935 book Minority Affairs and Poland: An Informatory Outline. 48 Paprocki made it clear in his introduction that he was not interested in waging political battles with his book, he just wanted to present political and cultural information about each of Poland's minorities and discuss how the state treated each minority.⁴⁹ His book is timely because in 1934, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Józef Beck announced that the Polish government would no longer adhere to the Minority Protection Treaty. In his first chapter, Paprocki discussed the need for a Polish Minority Protection Treaty, but he also tried to explain why Poland disobeyed the treaty and why Beck denounced it. The second chapter was a romanticized discussion of Poles who are minorities in other countries and "yearn...for the cradle of culture to which they are so deeply attached."⁵⁰ The third chapter contains vast amounts of nuanced information about the national minority groups of Ukrainians, White Russians [Belarusians], Lithuanians, Russians, Germans, Jews, Czechs, Tartars, and Karaites; Paprocki focused the most on Ukrainians and Germans. The book is most helpful because it shows the Poles', minorities', and international governments' reactions to the Minority Protection Treaty.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 29. Emphasis is author's. Ibid., 28.

⁴⁸ S.J. Paprocki, ed., *Minority Affairs and Poland: An Informatory Outline* (Warsaw: Nationality Research Institute, 1935).

⁴⁹ Ibid., 7. ⁵⁰ Ibid., 34.

Antony Polonsky's <u>Politics in Independent Poland</u>, 1921-1939: The Crisis of <u>Constitutional Government</u> is about the hectic politics in the Second Republic. ⁵¹ Polonsky is a very well-known scholar of Polish Jews and as such, <u>Politics in Independent Poland</u> contains a wealth of information about Poland's Jewish population and other minority populations. The third largest population in Volhynia was Jews, and they therefore play a crucial role in understanding state relations in the voivodeship. Polonsky frequently analyzed the rights and laws the Polish state applied to Jews and compares these to other minority populations, most often the Ukrainians. One of his main topics is how the state used cultural attributes of minorities to control them and make them politically malleable. Polonsky most discussed topics include religion, education, and land reform, and he tied all of these into Poland's political structure. His book was incredibly insightful and a very big help for my research.

Timothy Snyder's <u>Sketches from a Secret War: A Polish Artist's Mission to Liberate Soviet Ukraine</u> is about Józewski and his attempts to foster Ukrainian culture and nationalism for two reasons: to encourage Ukrainian support of Poland and to weaken Ukrainian support of the Soviet Union (and thereby cause the downfall of the Soviet Union). Snyder's book is helpful because Józewski was a good friend of Piłsudski, which means that much of the book discussed government ideas and relations in Volhynia and compared this with the government's policies in the other formerly Western Ukrainian voivodeships. Snyder also analyzed the political and cultural tendencies of the Volhynian population and compared these with the Ukrainian-dominated voivodeships as well. Józewski's policies arguably paved the way for Volhynian support of Ukrainian nationalist groups like the OUN and UPA, and hence the population's collaboration with the Nazis and the ethnic cleansing of Poles during World War II.

The next set of books is those which deal with the interwar years in regards to World War II's ethnic cleansings. The first of these is dated from 1919-1945; two are specifically about the Holocaust; and one is dated from September 1939-June 1941. The majority of the first, Shimon Redlich's <u>Together and Apart in Brzezany: Poles, Jews, and Ukrainians, 1919-1945</u>, is about the district of Brzezany (Galicia) during the

⁵¹ Polonsky, Antony. *Politics in Independent Poland, 1921-1939: The Crisis of Constitutional Government.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972.

years of Polish (1919-1939), Soviet (1939-1941), and German occupation (1941-1944). Redlich also provided insight into ethnic relations in the interwar years and after the war, which is helpful because it shows how the relations morphed over the course of Polish, Soviet, German, and again Soviet rule during the book's time period. When discussing collaboration, Redlich took care to note how receptive each ethnicity was to successive occupiers and why they responded they way they did. He, like Snyder, but to a lesser extent, compared Polish governmental policies in each voivodeship and discussed how the minorities responded. He also covered the creation and influence of the OUN and UPA in Brzezany and each groups' connections in other voivodeships.

The three other books in this category, Jan T. Gross' Revolution from Abroad: The Soviet Conquest of Poland's Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia, Shmuel Spector's The Holocaust of Volhynian Jews, 1941-1944, and Martin Dean's Collaboration in the Holocaust: Crimes of the Local Police in Belorussia and Ukraine, 1941-1944, are all helpful because they show how and why the Ukrainians (and Poles, for that matter) responded during the Soviet and/or Nazi occupations. Gross and Dean's books were the most helpful in this respect; whereas Spector's book provided more logistical information: pre-war relations, areas where the most collaboration (and resistance) occurred, and numerical details of liquidations.

Taking material spanning from the creation of the Polish and Ukrainian nations to the end of World War II, these sources combined to lay a solid outline of interwar relations between Poles and Ukrainians by explaining the background behind the interwar conflict and the result of such agitation and disagreement between the two groups. Adding the numerous references from international sources like the Ukrainian-American newspaper the *Ukrainian Weekly*, Congressional/Parliamentary and Entente declarations, and archival material from America's National Archives and Records Administration at College Park and the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, it is easy to piece together the history of Poland's Ukrainian minority and see the steps the

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⁵² Snyder, *Sketches from a Secret War*, xxi.

Shimon Redlich, *Together and Apart in Brzezany: Poles, Jews, and Ukrainians, 1919-1945* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002). The town and district of Brzezany, Poland are now the town Berezhany and the district Berezhanskyi, Ukraine.

Entente powers could have taken to ameliorate discontent in the area. This thesis fits into Polish, Ukrainian, Russian, and Soviet historiographies, but is most fitting to a contemporary liberal Ukrainian historiography.

I have structured this thesis to provide a detailed history of Poland's Volhynian Ukrainian minority during the interwar period. The following chapters will discuss the historical background and ownership of the Volhynian territory up to the Treaty of Riga, Polish treatment of Ukrainians during the interwar period, international and Entente reactions and Polish responses. I will conclude by briefly covering Volhynia during World War II and its aftermath, with my main concern being how the turmoil from the interwar period has affected relations between Ukraine and Poland from World War II through the present day.

⁵⁴ Gross, *Revolution from Abroad*. Shmuel Spector, *The Holocaust of Volhynian Jews*. Martin Dean, Collaboration in the Holocaust: Crimes of the Local Police in Belorussia and Ukraine, 1941-1944 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000).

CHAPTER 2 WHOSE LAND IS IT ANYWAY?

When discussing European interwar history, it is important to have background information about the historical "owners" of the areas in question because so many borders shifted with the Treaty of Versailles (and the numerous treaties, alliances, and conquests prior to it). With the Treaty of Versailles, President Wilson wanted to create new states "along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality." Each new state that was created with the treaty wanted as much land for its country as possible, and the governments justified their requests for certain territories by pointing to whichever time period best suited them. For example, the Poles looked toward the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the seventeenth century, the Serbs to the Serbian Empire in the fourteenth century, and the Greeks wanted to re-create the Byzantine Empire.⁵⁶ Of course, each of these states had minorities in them, and each of these minorities claimed a section (or all) of the territory for themselves. It is therefore necessary to look back into Polish, Ukrainian, and Russian history to see which group could lay claim to Volhynia in order to deduce the reason for the bickering during the interwar period.

Early Modern Ukraine and Poland

Ukraine and Poland both have a long history, tracing back to the ninth and tenth centuries, respectively. Ukrainians claim the founding of Kyivan Rus', in 880, as their beginning; Poles say the establishment of Poland coincided when a ruler from the House of Piast, Mieszko I, adopted Catholicism in 965.⁵⁷ Shortly thereafter, in 981, the Kyivan ruler Volodymyr the Great conquered Galicia and Volhynia in a war with the Poles.⁵⁸ Magocsi, in A History of Ukraine, writes:

⁵⁵ Albert Bushnell Hart, ed., Selected Addresses and Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, with an introduction by the author (New York: Boni and Liveright, 1918), 249. ⁵⁶ Longworth, 102.

⁵⁷ Both nations trace their roots much farther back, but these are the commonly accepted official dates for

each group.

58 According to Magocsi, the first mention of Galicia and Volhynia are from the *Primary Chronicle*, a history of Kievan Rus' from the ninth to the eleventh centuries. Magocsi, 115.

The Rus'-Polish struggle continued, with the result that during the century following Volodymyr's acquisition these cities changed hands at least five times. The conflict subsequently produced a still-unresolved historical debate. Rus' tradition suggests that the ... settlements (located on both sides of today's Polish-Ukrainian border) were 'taken back' in 981; Polish historiography asserts they were originally part of a Polish patrimony and simply 'taken away.'59

The territory, of course, did not stay in Rus' hands for very long after the initial swapping between Poles and Volodymyr's heirs. After continued Mongol attack – which the Rus' rulers initially rebuffed – the Galicia-Volhynia Principality collapsed and Volhynia was annexed by the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (1344) and Galicia by the Kingdom of Poland (1349).

Over the next two centuries, not much land changed hands between Lithuania and Poland until the two countries decided to unite and form the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1569. By the Lublin Union (1569), Lithuania ceded most of its Slavic parts of conquered Rus' territories – Bratslav, Kyiv, and Volhynia – to Poland, but kept Belarus for itself. The year saw another important change as well. The Polish language was elevated above all other languages in the Commonwealth, becoming the standard language for all education, business, and politics. Ukrainians in the newly Polish territories were expected to adhere to this change, and many of the nobles did.

Religion was another problem – that lasted until World War II – between Ukrainians and Poles. Most Ukrainians were Orthodox and most Poles were Roman Catholic. Orthodoxy was abolished and reinstated at various points during the Commonwealth, and conversion to Catholicism was always encouraged to the nobles via incentives like positions in the government, business opportunities, and land distribution. Polish settlers – and clergymen, Jesuits included – moved into the former Rus' territories and intermarried with the local Ukrainian nobles. In response, many Eastern Orthodox Ukrainians started religious brotherhoods and brotherhood schools to keep their culture intact and hinder Polonization. However, given the incentives

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⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Snyder, *The Reconstruction of Nations*, 106.

⁶¹ Ibid, 110-111.

⁶² Petro Polischuk, "Brotherhood schools," Encyclopedia of Ukraine, http://encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?AddButton=pages\B\R\Brotherhoodschools.htm.

offered and the quick in-migration rate of Polish settlers, it is no wonder most of the Ukrainian nobles converted to Roman Catholicism.⁶³

Shortly after the Commonwealth was created, some parts of the Orthodox Church signed the Union of Brest (1596) with the Holy See; this created the Greek Catholic Church which maintained the Orthodox Rite and the autonomy of the Kyivan metropoly, but recognized the Roman Pope as head of the Church. The Orthodox members who signed the Union did so to increase the standing of the Orthodox Church within the Commonwealth, moderate Polonization policies, and keep their distance from the newly created Moscow patriarchy. The Union was warmly accepted by the Roman Catholic Polish population but many of the Ukrainians, especially the Cossacks – staunchly Eastern Orthodox – were incensed. The Cossacks considered revolting and they did what the Greek Catholic patriarchy tried to avoid with the Union of Brest: the Cossacks looked toward Moscow for guidance and potential military support.

After years of the Polish Crown taking land and rights away from Ukrainian nobles and peasants alike, and the Cossack fighting groups being underpaid, ignored, or dismissed, revolt was bound to occur. Several revolts did indeed erupt, with the most famous and effectual being the revolt of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi. While Khmel'nyts'kyi's revolt did not reach its heights in Volhynia, it did have far-reaching consequences for the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the rest of Ukrainian territory.

In 1654, Khmel'nyts'kyi, Cossack representatives, and Russian representatives signed the Treaty of Pereiaslav. The treaty ensured Russian military support against Poland and granted the Cossacks their own state after the rebellion, but this came at a high price. The Cossacks swore allegiance to the tsar and acknowledged his authority. This allegiance, according to the Russian court and military, essentially gave them the right to meddle in Ukrainian affairs until the fall of the Empire in 1917.

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⁶⁵ Davies, *Heart of Europe*, 264.

⁶³ Wilson, 49.

⁶⁴ Atanasii Velyky, "Church Union of Berestia," Encyclopedia of Ukraine, http://encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?AddButton=pages\C\H\ChurchUnionofBerestia.htm.

⁶⁶ Although the treaty was signed by Khmel'nyts'kyi and Zaporozhian representatives, the original Hetmanate territory was a grouping of Cossack territory farther north than the Zaporozhian Sich. For simplicity's sake, and because this is a short history, I shall refer (as Magocsi does) to all Cossack lands and their various name changes – the Army of Zaporozhia, the Army of Lower Zaporozhia, and Little Russia eventually became parts of the Hetmanate, Sloboda Ukraine, Zaporozhia, and the Right Bank – as the "Cossack State". Magocsi, 231.

Russian historians view this as the first undisputed step in their claim to Ukrainian territory.

The Cossack-Polish War lasted until 1657, when Khmel'nyts'kyi died and a Hungarian General fighting with the Cossacks was forced to sign a peace treaty with the Poles.⁶⁷ By the time the war-ending treaty was signed, however, a huge chunk of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had either been conquered by other territories that participated in the melee or had been ceded by the Cossacks for their new state.

Once the Cossacks realized how much the tsar demanded of them, their leaders wanted to abandon their agreement with Russia. They believed they could gain more concessions from a weakened Poland, and negotiations for the Hadiach Accords began in 1659. The Hadiach Accords would have made the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth a triumvirate with the Ukrainians, but the Cossack groups refused to align with Poland because of religious differences and their memories of Polish repression. As a result, Eastern Ukraine remained in the Cossack state as a protectorate of Moscow and Western Ukraine stayed in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. 68

The Ukrainian negotiations with Poland for the Hadiach Accords went against the Cossacks' agreement with the tsar in the Treaty of Pereiaslav, which disallowed foreign policy endeavors without the tsar's direct consent. Therefore, Muscovy declared war on the Cossack state and Poland. The Cossacks, Poland, and Muscovy continually fought over the land until Poland and Muscovy signed the Treaty of Andrusov (1667). This divided the Cossack state, with the territory on the Right Bank going to Poland and the Left Bank to Muscovy. While the Cossacks sporadically resisted this treaty, most notably under the leadership of Hetman Ivan Mazepa (1639-1709), it stayed in effect until the Partitions of Poland began in 1772.

Volhynia under the Partitions

The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth steadily declined after the Cossack-Polish War, partly because of the territory lost in the War (and along with it, workers, farmers,

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⁶⁷ Wilson, 60-62. Davies, *Heart of Europe*, 267. Oleksandr Ohlobyn, "Cossack-Polish War," Encyclopedia of Ukraine,

http://encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?AddButton=pages\C\O\Cossack6PolishWar.htm.

and industries), and partly because of its politicians' own doing. The Parliament was very corrupt and many of its members were easily persuaded through bribes; hence, the Russian, Prussian, and Austrian Empires all had sway in Poland. With the Reform sweeping through Poland and civil war threatening in Russia's Eastern Ukrainian holdings, Empress Catherine the Great of Russia decided to mobilize the military against Poland to weaken the Polish government. However, if Russia invaded Poland, Austria and Prussia could turn their forces against Russia. The three empires settled on a deal: Prussia and Austria helped Russia in its war, and in return Austria received Galicia and Prussia received Polish West Prussia. Of course, the Russian Empire also received a large part: Livonia and Western Belarus. 70

Poland was held in check for nearly twenty years, until it again tried its hand at reform. The King reconstructed the government so the Parliament was more functional and not rife with corruption, then the Parliament passed a liberal Constitution and signed a military treaty with Prussia (1791). As these changes could have brought Poland back as a power in the area, Russia decided to invade Poland again in 1793 to quash the new wave of reforms, and Prussia joined the invasion in support of Russia. This time when Poland was defeated, Poles not only had to give a lot of western territory to Prussia and eastern territory to Russia (including Volhynia), they had to annul their Constitution as well.71

The Third Partition occurred shortly after the Second, in 1795. Poles provoked Russia yet again when a hero of the American Revolution, Tadeusz Kościuszko, announced an uprising against Russia to recover Poland's lost lands. The revolt was put down in less than a year via the combined forces of Prussia, Russia, and Austria, and Poland's remaining territory was completely divided between the three conquering powers.⁷²

⁶⁹ Because the Dnipro River flows from the north to the south, if one stands looking in the direction the river flows, the "Right Bank" refers to the territory west of the river and "Left Bank" refers to the territory east of the river.

To Davies, *Heart of Europe*, 271.

⁷¹ lbid., 273. 72 lbid.




Figure 2: The Partitions of Poland⁷³

Each of the three empires spread their culture and developed former Polish territory as they would when incorporating any other territory or colony. Much has already been said about Galicia under the Austrian Partition, but I am concerned about Volhynia in the Russian Partition. How did Russia change Volhynia, if at all?

The key difference between Polish Volhynia and Russian Volhynia was religion. While Volhynia was part of Polish territory for nearly two centuries, most of the population either converted to Roman Catholicism or Greek Catholicism. After the Polish Revolt of 1830, Russification policies from the tsar went on full tilt and punished all former Polish territories. The tsar redacted nobles' privileges, Russian became the strictly enforced national language, and Orthodoxy was elevated above other religions. As a result, only the richest Polish nobles and landlords were able to keep their high

standing, thus creating a "staggering [economic] gulf between a tiny group of Polish lords and the mass of Ukrainian peasants." The situation was reversed for the Polish nobles (who oftentimes in Volhynia were assimilated Ukrainians) because now they were forced to convert from Roman Catholicism to Orthodoxy and speak Russian to regain some of their privileges. While some rights were allotted to the "reorganized" Roman Catholic Church, the Greek Catholic Church was completely abolished in 1839.

After the Russian Empire hopelessly lost the Crimean War (1853-56), its government saw the need for modernization.⁷⁷ With this modernization came many networking opportunities between different parts of the country that were not previously present. The Ukrainian intelligentsia shared their culture and political thoughts with each other more freely than before, but only until the Russians realized what was happening. The Empire thought the murmurs of nationalism from Ukrainians were based on Polish intrigue, and the Empire refused to admit their "Little Russians" were anything but Russian.⁷⁸ Hence, decrees were issued which forbid the Ukrainian language (1863) and the publication of Ukrainian literature (1876), and the Ukrainians were forced to find another place to express their ideas: Galicia.

Volhynian Nationalism

Volhynia remained largely unaffected by these cries for Ukrainian nationalism. First of all, the vast majority of Volhynian Ukrainians were poor peasant farmers. Secondly, Volhynia was the farthest westward guberniya in the Russian Empire. This meant that when the intelligentsia was still located in Ukrainian territory, Volhynians were so far away from the intellectual centers of Kyiv and Kharkiv that information about the nationalist movement rarely reached them. When it did, it had little impact because the Volhynians were usually more concerned about having a harvest and food than they

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⁷³ Map resized from Halibutt, "Rzeczpospolita Rozbiory 3," Wikimedia Commons, http://wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Rzeczpospolita_Rozbiory_3.png

Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations, 120.

⁷⁵ Magocsi, 374.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 375.

⁷⁷ Snyder, *The Reconstruction of Nations*, 121.

⁷⁸ Magocsi, 369-370. The text of the Valuev Decree (1863), which forbade the use of the Ukrainian language by stating the language "has not, does not, and cannot exist", is reproduced on these pages.

⁷⁹ *Guberniya* is the transliterated Russian word for "province".

were about nationalist poetry and the like. When the base of the movement changed to Galicia, Volhynians were still in the same situation. Now the movement was located in a different empire, not just a different guberniya, and the Volhynian peasants' farming situation was the same. The peasants considered the land *theirs*, but only in so much as it was part of their family's heritage, not part of their Ukrainian heritage.

When the Polish-Ukrainian War began in 1919, Volhynians joined the fray with Ukrainian fighters moving from Galicia through Volhynia. They learned about Ukrainian nationalism, and they learned how to apply it. Volhynian Ukrainians noted that most estate owners were Polish and most peasants were Ukrainian, and started to act against the landholders because they were Polish and not because they were landholders.

And so we see that, at the time the state boundaries were being drawn up by the Entente, the fight over Volhynia had lasted almost a millennium. Poles, Ukrainians, and Russians all considered the territory to be theirs. One more treaty certainly was not going to alleviate the problem.

CHAPTER 3

The Constitutional Period, 1921-1926

Poland's treatment of Ukrainians in the interwar period varied with each new governmental regime. With each successive administration, the plight of the minorities worsened, and the Volhynian Ukrainian's fate was no exception. The first era, from 1921-1926, was a time of relative calm for the minorities because the unstable government could not pass many bills and because Poland was still sorting out land acquisitions (namely, Eastern Galicia) with the Entente. The second period, from 1926-1935, is the time of Piłsudski's Sanacja regime. 80 Piłsudski initially supported some freedom for the minorities, but his government's policies became increasingly pro-Polonization throughout his term in power. When he died in 1935, his supporters formed a new government known as "the Colonels' regime", as it was run by a small group of Colonels who were in Piłsudski's government and fought in his Polish Legions. The Colonels were hardliners and their right-wing group, the Camp of National Unity (Obóz Ziednoczenia Narodowego, or OZN) gained much support in the years leading up to World War II. In this chapter and the following two chapters, I will discuss each period chronologically and note their treatment of the Volhynian Ukrainians along with the international reactions.

Characteristics of the Constitutional Period

The Constitutional Period of Poland was a time of recovery and learning. Europe on a whole was destroyed by World War I, but this was especially true for Poland because it went through not one, but three wars.⁸¹ The loss of human life was staggering, as was the damage done to agriculture and industry. Farming in Poland, particularly in the east, was especially hard hit from the Polish-Soviet War because of the Soviets' scorched earth policy. The economy was in shambles and needed urgent attention.

⁸⁰ Sanacja means "sanation". The term Sanacja will be used in this thesis instead of its English translation.

⁸¹ Arguably four wars, if one includes the Polish-Lithuanian War (August-October 1920). The Polish-Lithuanian War is usually considered part of the Polish-Soviet War.

Compounding these problems, the Polish government was also faced with the daunting task of cohesively uniting the territory and peoples from three separate empires. For example, the railroad system was constructed by the three empires for military purposes, which meant that each part of the system had different gauges and signaling systems than the others and they connected in few places that were often not convenient to trade routes. Be an each former Partition things varied: from the currency, to the school curriculum, to the duties of local government, to the language of street signs. All of these needed to be changed to help the new Poland function – and of course, every politician thought they had the best idea to reform and unite the country.

The politics in the Constitutional Period were cutthroat. The first noticeable problem was the conflict between the supporters of Piłsudski and those of Roman Dmowski, the co-founder of Poland's National Democratic Party (*Narodowa Demokracja*, or Endecja). Whereas Piłsudski was a military leader and affiliated with the Polish Socialist Party (*Polska Partia Socjalistyczna*, or PPS), Dmowski was a fierce nationalist who supported complete Polonization. During World War I, Dmowski formed a government-in-exile, but Poland's population granted Piłsudski the position of Head of State until a Constitution was drawn up. Dmowski anticipated that Piłsudski would also be elected as President after the Constitution was finalized, so his supporters in the Polish Constituent Assembly made the legislative branch very strong and the executive branch weak when they designed the May Constitution (1921).⁸³ In response, Piłsudski refused to be in the election.

Elections proved difficult. The three areas of the country were still unfamiliar with each other, and people did not know much about candidates' backgrounds. As a result, there were over one hundred twenty political parties and none of them received a majority representation in either house of the National Assembly. Instead of a popular vote, the National Assembly internally voted for the President. The National Assembly, after five rounds of voting, finally elected Gabriel Narutowicz over Endecja's candidate. There was a huge backlash and an Endecja supporter, claiming Narutowicz represented the minorities, assassinated him less than one week after his swearing into

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⁸² Longworth, 101.

⁸³ Edward D. Wynot, Jr. *Caldron of Conflict: Eastern Europe, 1918-1945* (Wheeling, Illinois: Harlan Davidson, 1999), 34. See also: Sections II and III of "Constitution of the Republic of Poland," *Current History: A Monthly Magazine of the New York Times* 14 (April-September 1921): 358-367.

office.⁸⁴ The next President elected, Stanisław Wojciechowski, acted as more of a figurehead while his Ministers and the Assembly handled most matters of state.⁸⁵ Due to the bickering between parties, bribery, personal favors in the Parliament and a weak executive branch that had virtually no power, Poland had fourteen different governments from the declaration of independence in 1918 until Piłsudski's *coup d'etat* in 1926.

The Minorities Treaty

Poles did not want to sign a Minority Rights Treaty, but as it was a precondition for signing the Treaty of Versailles (which recognized their statehood), they signed it. Dmowski and other representatives explained their hesitancy in signing the treaty by noting that the new Poland would contain a large amount of minorities who could be swayed by their original mother countries to rise up against Poland, as had happened in the past during Poland's "long subjection to alien rule". Be Many Poles also believed that the Minority Treaty was a way for the Entente to meddle in the affairs of the Polish government — which Poland was all too familiar with from the time of the Partitions. Poles felt if the new states had to sign the treaty, then the Entente powers (who also had minority populations) should sign the treaty as well. This suggestion was completely dismissed by the Entente.) The Paris Peace Conference President, French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau, tried to assuage the Poles' fears in a letter to one of Poland's Conference delegates, Ignacy Paderewski:

The territories now being transferred both to Poland and to other States inevitably include a large population speaking languages and belonging to races different from that of the people with whom they will be incorporated. Unfortunately, the races have been estranged by long years of bitter hostility.... These populations will be more easily reconciled to their new position if they know that from the very beginning they have assured protection and adequate guarantees against any danger of unjust

⁸⁷ Paprocki, 20-21.

⁸⁴ Sources disagree on when Narutowicz was assassinated, with Longworth (103) writing two days after his inauguration and Snyder, *The Reconstruction of Nations* (68) writing a week after the election. Supposedly the elections began November 11, 1932 and ended December 9, 1932. He was sworn in the 11th and assassinated the 16th. Regardless of the small disagreement on dates, both sources agree he was assassinated very shortly after taking office; this illustrates how divided the country was.

⁸⁵ Wynot, *Caldron of Conflict*, 34.

New York Times, "Poland Four-Square for the Future," Current History: A Monthly Magazine of the New York Times 14 (April-September 1921): 356.

treatment or oppression.... It is believed that these stipulations will not create any obstacle to the political unity of Poland....⁸⁸

Clemenceau recognized that each new country would inevitably contain minority populations who would dispute the borders, but the Minority Rights Treaties would help to assure them they could have the same privileges as the majority population and possibly prevent protests. The Entente's main goal for Poland's treaty was protection of the Jewish population, which was about ten percent of Poland's population in 1921. The Entente thought Jewish protection was of utmost importance because of the numerous reports of pogroms during the Polish-Ukrainian War and the Polish-Bolshevik War. Although the cause of the Jewish pogroms had been settled by Morgenthau's report in 1920, the international press still frequently wrote about Polish abuses against its minority populations. Arthur Goodhart noted in his Poland and the Minority Races that although his mission was in Poland to meet with members of the Jewish community, several Germans, Ukrainians and White Russians would also tell them their personal stories about Polish misconduct.

Therefore, the treaty included clauses for all ethnicities in Poland about citizenship and protection of language, religion, education, cultural societies, and voting.⁸⁹ In order to gain the trust and support of the Entente, the Poles wrote the treaty's stipulations into their 1921 Constitution. After all, the Polish government still needed the Entente to recognize its possession of Eastern Galicia, Volhynia and the other territories it received in the Treaty of Riga.

The Role of the Treaty of Riga

Polish politicians themselves were divided on the borders and minorities issues, but the most vocal politicians – members of Endecja – took the national stance and wanted a Polish state with a "subordinate place for ethnic minorities within it". 90 Piłsudski. on the other hand, wanted to reinvent a federation of nations similar to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. This *Międzymorze* ("Intersea") federation of independent states would include Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, and Poland. However, nationalists

Longworth, 99-100. Italics added.See Appendix for full text of the treaty.

were the majority in the governments of these nations and they did not want to unite in a new federation; they wanted their own countries. Endecja dominated the Polish delegation at the Treaty of Riga negotiations and they played a crucial role in establishing Poland's borders, answering the minorities question, and determining the fate of Piłsudski's *Międzymorze*.

Stanisław Grabski was the main spokesperson for the Polish delegation during the treaty negotiations. Grabski disliked minorities and was a nationalist. In fact, when the Polish-Ukrainian alliance during the Polish-Soviet War was announced, Grabski resigned his position as chair of the parliamentary foreign affairs committee in protest. 91 This was a strong indication of how he would act during the treaty negotiations.

While Piłsudski and most of his supporters occupied Soviet territory, Endecja representatives overpowered the meager Piłsudskiite representation at the treaty negotiations. Grabski ignored the agreement with the Western Ukrainians and Petliura and freely gave Polish-occupied Ukrainian and Belarusian territories to the Soviets. In negotiations, Grabski sought the territories which had "what he considered manageable populations... [which could be] assimilated in the next generation." Therefore, only territories Poland desperately wanted, like Eastern Galicia, and those with little national consciousness, like Volhynia, were annexed to Poland as a result of the Treaty.

The Entente did not approve of the Treaty of Riga, as a commission had already spent a lot of time deciding what Poland's eastern boundary ought to be. The United States' main concern was that the Bolsheviks did not represent all of Russia, and therefore could not sign treaties as a Russian representative.93 In fact, the United States' Department of State issued the following announcement to the Entente powers and Poland:

- 1. The Department of State did not recognize, approve, or acquiesce in the frontier laid down by the Treaty of Riga.
- 2. The Department regarded the Curzon line [the line established by the Entente's commission] as the boundary of "ethnic Poland" but considered it

⁹⁰ Paul G. Lewis, Eastern Europe, 1918-1953: From Versailles to Cold War (Bedford, England: Sempringham Books, 1999), 35.

Snyder, *The Reconstruction of Nations*, 139.

⁹²Ibid., 144.

Department of State, "The Origins of the Curzon Line", March, 6 1944; T Documents Box 66, Folder T-459-469, T-462, p.25; General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59; NARAII.

subject to possible revision in Poland's favor if Poland's claims to any territories to the east of it should be recognized as valid, after an investigation of ethnic and other factors, by the Allied Powers, included a restored Russia.94

The Entente never again pushed for this investigation, and Poland had free reign over the territories gained from the Treaty of Riga. 95

Implementation of the Treaties

Despite signing the Minority Rights Treaty, the Polish government still managed to repress its minorities. During the Constitutional Period, most action was taken against land distribution and education, particularly in Galicia and Volhynia. distribution in Volhynia had always been a problem. When the Entente questioned Poland's eastern borders, this brought the land distribution and population problems to the forefront. Education played into the border disputes because the government could point to the schools to demonstrate the minority population: if there were not a lot of minorities, most of the schools' instruction language would be Polish. government took action, but not exactly how the Ukrainians wanted. The action (and inaction, at times) of the Polish government led Ukrainians to have a skewed view of the political system, and their political inclinations clearly demonstrate their disenchantment with the system.

Land Distribution Policies and Their Results. As mentioned previously, Volhynians did not really have a national consciousness until the Polish-Ukrainian War. During this war, national consciousness spread throughout Volhynia with the transfer of ideas between men in the military (who were often intelligentsia as well) fighting across Volhynia. The led to Volhynians seeing the wealthy land holders as wealthy *Polish* land holders. Although peasants in Volhynia faired better than their Galician counterparts because there were less Polish landowners, Volhynian soil was richer, and there were slightly larger peasant plots, the peasants still saw the huge discrepancy between their plots and the Poles' plots.96

 ⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 24.
 95 After the Entente granted Eastern Galicia to Poland in 1923.
 96 Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History* (Buffalo: University of Toronto / Canadian Institute for Ukrainian

Since the Polish-Ukrainian War, and especially after the signing of the Treaty of Riga, Polish presence in the area increased. The government encouraged retired military personnel to move to the border areas. The increased ratio of Poles to Ukrainians in the area had two main purposes: the former military personnel would help maintain order and the higher Polish population would rebuff the Entente's inquiries should they ever ask (which they did not) - into which country should possess the territory.

In protest, many Ukrainians (mostly Galicians) boycotted the 1922 elections. As Felinski explained, Polish sovereignty over Eastern Galicia had not been fully decided on by the Entente yet (i.e., there was still a chance, albeit small, that Eastern Galicia could become the foundation for a Western Ukrainian state). However, Polish sovereignty over Volhynia had been completely established by the Treaty of Riga. Many Galicians boycotted the elections because they did not feel Poland had jurisdiction in Galician territory, whereas Volhynians had essentially become resigned to their fate as a Polish voivodeship. In the 1922 elections, Volhynia was the only voivodeship which had high Ukrainian voter turnout at the polls, and the amount of Volhynian deputies elected to the Sejm and Senate showed this. 97 Volhynians voted for the politicians who promised to end colonization and reallocate the land to the peasants.98

Table 2: Ukrainian Deputies Elected to the Polish Seim, 1922⁹⁹

Territory		Number of Seats
	Volhynia	12
	Stanisławów ¹⁰⁰	4
Voivodeship	Lublin	4
	Polissia	2
	L'viv	1
State List	N/A	2
Total		25

 ⁹⁷ Felinski, 95.
 ⁹⁸ Snyder, *The Reconstruction of Nations*, 146.

¹⁰⁰ Known as Stanyslaviv in Ukrainian. Now it is Ivano-Frankivsk.

Table 3: Ukrainian Deputies Elected to the Polish Senate, 1922¹⁰¹

Territory		Number of Seats
Voivodeship	Volhynia	4
voivouesiiip	Polissia	1
State List	N/A	1
Total		6

In order to have more impact in the Seim, the representatives voted together in "Clubs": twenty deputies elected from the Bloc of National Minorities formed the Ukrainian Club and five members (all from Eastern Galicia) formed the Ukrainian Peasant Club. These Clubs soon splintered though, when several deputies joined forces with the Polish People's Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, or PSL). The leader of the PSL, Wincenty Witos, was also the Prime Minister of Poland in 1920-1921, 1923, and 1926. Witos wanted the PSL to have more influence in the Sejm as well, so in 1923 the PSL began supporting Endejca-sponsored bills and reforms. The PSL-Endecja team effectively ended any hopes of land reform in favor of the minorities. Instead, redistribution vastly favored the Poles. Some of the Polish farm land was allocated for redistribution, but territory from the larger minority-held farms in Volhynia was as well. Although Ukrainians received the largest percentage of redistributed land (50%), the Poles (who only constituted 16.7% of Volhynia's population) received 48.9% of the redistributed land. 102

Colonization slowed in 1923, but Volhynian Ukrainians were already realigning their political views by this point. The Volhynian voivode, who was a prominent Polish politician, strictly opposed the policy. The Entente also officially recognized Poland's claim to Eastern Galicia this year, which meant that Poland did not need to make the Western Ukrainian territories seem more "Polish" to appease the Entente. Regardless, by 1923 about 8730 holdings composed of the best land had already been created for the military settlers – and many of them went unoccupied because the settlers did not want to leave their original homes. 103 For the settlers who did reside on their new farm, they were given financial subsidies and served as petty officials or in local

¹⁰¹Ibid.. 97.

¹⁰² Snyder, Sketches from a Secret War, 62, fn 10. His source is "Wołyń – Sprawozdanie," June 1937, 14, Biblioteka Uniwesytetu Warszaawskiego, Dział Rekopisów (Warsaw University Library, Manuscripts Department).

103 Polonsky, 140.

administrative jobs like postal and railroad positions. Of course, the Polish settlers replaced the locals, usually Ukrainians, who held the jobs before them. 104 Despite the voivode's denunciation of colonization policies, damage to Volhynia's Polish-Ukrainian relations had been done.

The increased Polish presence in Volhynia caused a lot of resentment from the Ukrainian population, but also from the Soviets just across the border. The Soviets began raids on Polish settlements and offices shortly after the Treaty of Riga was signed. 105 In November 1924, in response to an attack on Stołpce in Nowogródek, the first three units of the newly created Border Protection Corps (Korpus Ochrony Pogranicza, or KOP) were sent to Polissia and Volhynia. Three more brigades were sent to Polissia, Galicia, and the Lithuanian-Latvian-Polish border by the spring of 1926. Władysław Sikorski, Minister of War, gave the KOP "full powers to deal with the situation". The KOP built new barracks and police stations near the border areas and spent over 3.5 million zloty doing so by the end of 1924. Orest Subtelny's review of Ukrainian sources shows that by 1938, there were approximately 200,000 Poles (composed of colonists and KOP troops) in East Galician and Volhynian villages and about 100,000 in the towns. Polish sources estimated there were no more than 100,000 Poles in total. 107 Even so, if we take an average of this number and say there was an influx of 200,000 Poles overall, this is still a noticeable rise from the pre-war amount – and the Ukrainians certainly noticed.

Seton-Watson claims the guards often used the "Communist excuse" to mistreat the local population. Since the KOP were stationed in the border areas to defend from Communist raids, they could claim the local populations supported the Communists in order to punish them. Unfortunately for the Poles, this wanton violence led the local population to seek a different means for justice than through the typical political parties Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance (Ukraïns'ke Natsional'no-Demokratychne Ob'iednannia, or UNDO). Volhynians instead worked with the leftist parties, which were more prevalent in Volhynian because of the sheer size of the peasant population and because of the proximity to the UkSSR. En masse, Volhynians

¹⁰⁴ Subtelny, 430. 105 Snyder, 148. 106 Polonsky, 142.

¹⁰⁷ Subtelny, 429.

joined political parties like the Communist Party of Western Ukraine (*Komunistuchna Partiia Zakhidnoï Ukraïny*, or KPZU) and the Socialist Workers' Party (*Selians'ka Robitnycha Partiia*, or Sel-Rob). The Volhynian Ukrainians' support of these parties was to later having a damaging effect in their relationships with both the Polish government and the UNDO-favoring Galicians.

In 1925, Ukrainians and other minorities in the Sejm tried to push legislation through which would reallocate more land to the minorities, but these measures were blocked by the same Stanisław Grabski involved in the Treaty of Riga negotiations, who received extra government support because his brother was the Prime Minister. After this failure, the pressure from the deputies' constituencies and disagreement amongst the deputies themselves caused the Clubs to splinter. Following this breakdown, the Ukrainians in the Sejm had virtually no power.

Education Policies and Their Results. Aside from the establishment of the KOP, 1924 was an important year for another reason: the *Lex Grabski*. These reforms, pushed forward in the Sejm by the current Minister of Education and soon-to-be Minister of Religion, Stanisław Grabski. Grabski's reforms were related to the use of language in state institutions like the legislature and courts, but also education. His laws, passed in July 1924 and enacted in January 1925, allowed government entities to provide bilingual forms and translators, which was a good thing, but it also created bilingual schools. *Prima facie*, the law enabling bilingual schools was good, too. The law went above and beyond the Constitution, which only contained a clause regarding compulsory primary schooling, and applied to elementary and secondary schools, teachers' colleges, and public and technical schools. The law stipulated that a public school must be bilingual if demands from the parents or guardians of the students met the following criteria:

In elementary schools, if there are forty children within the school area,
 and if the school is in a village where at least twenty percent of the

¹⁰⁸ Seton-Watson, 153-154. See also Motyl, 415.

¹⁰⁹ Snyder, 144.

The new groups were as follows: Ukrainian Club (10 deputies), Sel-Rob Club (5 deputies), Ukrainian Peasant Club (2 deputies), Communist Group (4 deputies), and 4 additional deputies who were not attached to any club.

- inhabitants belong to the nationality of the language in which the petitioners wish the children to be taught;
- In State secondary schools, if there is an officially confirmed demand from the parents or guardians of 150 pupils of Ukrainian or White Ruthenian nationality;
- In State technical schools, if there is a demand from the parents of Ukrainian or White Ruthenian pupils, representing forty percent of the pupils at the school.¹¹¹

This law was particularly damaging to the minorities in Western Ukraine, especially in Volhynia. First of all, many Ukrainian children in Volhynia did not attend school at all, so the percentage of Ukrainians in school was small to begin with. Most Ukrainian children who went to school attended a free state (i.e. public) school instead of a private school, which meant that they were mixed with all of the other ethnicities in their schooling area. The influx of Polish settlers only increased the amount of Polish children in the state schools. Even if Poles were not the majority in the school, only twenty percent of the students' parents/guardians needed to submit requests for a certain language to be taught – and Polish was always preferred over the minorities' languages. If the Ukrainian students' parents/guardians (who were more often than not illiterate) did manage to request courses in their language, the local school often decided the language of instruction regardless of what the law stipulated.

The language of instruction was left up to the administration to decide in private schools. Private schools did exist, and several more were created after the *Lex Grabski* went into effect, but many Ukrainians could not afford the tuition and were thus relegated to attend public schools. Polish officials used Volhynian schools as their example that the *Lex Grabski* worked and that Ukrainians had no resentment to bilingual schools. First of all, despite attempts from Ukrainian nationalists, Ukrainian parents would not sign letters calling for the Ukrainian language to be taught at schools. Perhaps this was because the students' number was too small to fill the requirements of the bill, or perhaps the parents were cowed by the Poles and feared reprisal. Felinski claims the absence of private Ukrainian schools in Volhynian meant the children and parents were pleased with the situation, which is certainly one way to interpret the

data.¹¹² Regardless, the school statistics for Volhynia show that the bilingual schools vastly outnumbered the solely-Ukrainian schools:

Table 4: Elementary Schools in Volhynia, 1925-1926¹¹³

Language	Number of Schools
Polish	821
Bilingual	523
Ukrainian	7
Polish	6
Other	116
Total	
	Polish Bilingual Ukrainian Polish Other

However, it is important to note that once the *Lex Grabski* went into effect, membership for societies that taught alternative education classes in the Ukrainian language, like Prosvita societies or cooperatives, skyrocketed. Although Felinski writes that Volhynian Ukrainians appreciated the *Lex Grabski*, his figures for cooperatives show differently. Membership in the largest group of cooperatives, the Audit Union of Ukrainian Cooperatives (*Revizienyi Soiuz Ukraïnskykh Kooperatyv*, or RSUK), continued to grow: from 1925-1929, there was a 185.2% increase in the amount of cooperatives in all Western Ukrainian voivodeships and from 1928-1929, there was a 67.7% increase in the amount of cooperatives in Volhynia.¹¹⁴

Conclusion

Despite land reform and the *Lex Grabski*, Volhynian Ukrainians still participated in politics and kept their culture afloat. These laws and their consequences – the KOP, for example – caused a backlash from many Volhynian Ukrainians and they began to join more leftist political groups. Membership in these groups, along with their Orthodox religion, increasingly alienated them from the local Poles, who subsequently viewed the Ukrainians with even more distaste.

¹¹¹ Felinski, 42.

¹¹² Ibid., 133.

¹¹³ Ibid., 132.

Felinski's own table shows the percentage increase from 1925-1929 on page 120. On page 121, he shows that the amount of cooperatives in Volhynia on 1 January 1928 at 65 and the amount on 1 January 1929 at 109. This is a 67.7% increase.

The next period, when Piłsudski held power, brought about some initial changes for the Volhynians and an easing of restrictions. Piłsudski controlled the government and replaced local Poles with his favorites, who often saw eye-to-eye with him and recognized that a strong Ukrainian nationalist sentiment would prevent a union between Volhynian Ukrainians and Soviet Ukrainians (which could have disastrous consequences for Poland as a whole). In the early 1930s, Piłsudski increasingly granted more power to his Colonels and began to step out of political life. With the Colonels in power, much more nationalistic laws were passed that had a detrimental effect on Ukrainian cultural life.

CHAPTER 4

THE SANACJA REGIME, 1926-1935

The hectic domestic Polish politics of the Constitutional Period were muddled even more by foreign relations with Poland's neighboring countries. The Treaty of Rapallo (1922), the Locarno Treaties (1925), and the Treaty of Berlin (1926) all had huge impacts on European foreign policy and Polish domestic policy. The Treaty of Rapallo, between the Soviet Union and Germany, normalized relations between the two countries and also included clauses that renounced territorial and financial obligations placed on each other from various World War I treaties. Poland's government was very discomforted by its two biggest enemies, located on either side of its border, now working on friendly terms. The Locarno Treaties and the Treaty of Berlin only served to worsen the sentiment.

The goal of the Locarno Treaties was to normalize western European relations with Germany and prevent future wars by each country's military agreeing to help each other if they came under attack. While this was achieved for the western European countries, the Locarno Treaties put Poland on the defensive. This set of treaties was signed between Germany, Belgium, Britain, Czechoslovakia, France, Italy, and Poland. One of the stipulations in the Locarno Treaties was that Germany's western border was officially established. However, none of the agreements mentioned Germany's eastern border – the majority of which was with Poland. The Polish government viewed this as the Western European countries agreeing that the German-Polish border was open for revision.

In order to reassure the Soviets that the Germans were still allied with them despite signing the Locarno Treaties with Western European governments, Germany and the Soviet Union reaffirmed their alliance with the Treaty of Berlin. Poles viewed these negotiations between their main aggressors and their allies, essentially without Poland's consent, as unacceptable. Public dissatisfaction with the Polish government increased exponentially, particularly after the Locarno Treaties were signed, and made the political situation more unstable.

After the Locarno Treaties were signed in November 1925, the government of Prime Minister Władysław Grabski was replaced by two new governments in the span

of six months; each of these governments had less support from the Sejm and the Polish population than the one before it. Directly before the fall of the first post-Grabski government, the Minister of Military Affairs ordered that drills be conducted by the troops in preparation for the likely transition of governments. When the new government, led by an increasingly rightist Wincenty Witos, did come to power on May 10, 1926, the new Minister of Military Affairs cancelled the drills – but the troops did not recognize his authority. The civilian supporters of Piłsudski increased anti-government sentiment on May 11 by organizing protests in Warsaw, and on May 12, Piłsudski and his military supporters marched on the capitol. Two days later, Piłsudski forced the President and Prime Minister to resign.

Piłsudski's relatively bloodless *coup d'etat* changed Poland drastically. Most of his supporters during the coup were military men, but he received wide support from minorities, socialists and communists as well. In fact, his coup may not have succeeded had the socialist Union of Railwaymen not started a strike that prevented pro-government military reinforcements from reaching Warsaw. Many of Piłsudski's former allies – including the President he deposed – did not support his coup, and a not insignificant part of the Polish population thus lost faith in their former hero. (He was instrumental in establishing the Second Polish Republic, after all.)

Although Piłsudski wanted to increase minority rights, he saw the need to be wary in wake of the German-Soviet treaties. To this end, he installed his trusted military friends as voivodes and local administrators in border areas with Germany and the UkSSR. Policy in the areas bordering the UkSSR was based on a delicate balance: the administration was to encourage Ukrainian nationalism enough to cause a backlash in the UkSSR and weaken the Soviet Union, but not enough to cause problems for the Polish government.

To further this goal in Volhynia, Piłsudski appointed his like-minded friend Henryk Józewski as voivode in 1928. Józewski aimed Ukrainian nationalism in the direction the government wanted: towards the Poles and away from the Soviets. He encouraged the Ukrainization of the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church, the reinstatement of Ukrainian-language schools, and the growth of cultural organizations like literary societies, co-operatives, and scouting groups. At the same time, he tempered this

surge in Ukrainian nationalism by banning Soviet radio stations and newspapers, communist-leaning political groups and societies, and prevented the sharing of information between Galicia and Volhynia by strictly enforcing the Sokalski Line. Volhynians had mixed feelings about the new Polish government, and the peasants became even more ambivalent about politics during the Great Depression and once news spread from the UkSSR about Soviet mistreatment, like the Soviet-instituted Ukrainian famine. ¹¹⁶

Polish administrators, the KOP, and Ukrainian nationalists and communists disliked Józewski's actions, and openly worked against him by undermining his decrees and terrorizing the local population. The Great Depression caused Piłsudski's leaders and Ukrainian nationalists alike to increasingly gravitate toward nationalist rhetoric in the early 1930s, and the attacks from all groups became more flagrant. Piłsudskiites in the government, like Minister of Foreign Relations August Zaleski, openly called for more nationalist policies to tame minorities. In a January 1930 speech in the Sejm, Zaleski tried to win support by noting that "...the Minority Treaties are used as an instrument of agitation against the State, and not as a legal element for assuring a guarantee of culture and of nationalism to minorities." Despite these attacks towards the end of the Sanacja period, Volhynian Ukrainians' cultural institutions increased under the auspices of Józewski.

Józewski's main goal was to orientate Volhynian Ukrainians away from the Soviets. As such, politics played an important role in the Sanacja period. However, Ukrainian culture was a tool used to puppet Volhynian Ukrainians by both the Polish and Soviet governments. For example, if the Polish government tried to convert Orthodox Churches to Catholic Churches, but Soviet agents helped prevent this, then the population would show more support for the Soviets and less for the Poles. Politics and culture were thus very much intertwined in the Sanacja period.

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¹¹⁵ Davies, *Heart of Europe*, 109.

Megan K. Stack, "The World; Ukraine no longer silent about famine; Survivors of the 'death by hunger' and others are speaking out about a topic long smothered by Soviet-era denial." Los Angeles Times, June 3, 2008, http://www.proquest.com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/ (accessed May 16, 2009).
 Speech of August Zaleski to Foreign Affairs Commission of the Sejm on January 31, 1930; enclosure

[&]quot;' Speech of August Zaleski to Foreign Affairs Commission of the Sejm on January 31, 1930; enclosure to despatch no. 2978 of February 4, 1930; Warsaw (National Archives Microfilm Publication T1243, roll 1); Records of the Department of State Relating to Political Relations of Eastern Europe, 1930-1939, Record Group 59; NARAII.

Volhynia pre-Józewski

Prior to 1928, the voivodes in Volhynia changed frequently. During the Constitutional Period there were five different voivodes, only one of whom helped the Ukrainians (Stanisław Srokowski, who helped to slow military colonization in 1923). The four other governors, especially General Bolesław Kajestan Olszewski, used increasingly brutal military force to keep Volhynia's population in order. Olszewski was the last voivode during the Constitutional Period and while he was in office, he undid the good Srokowski, his predecessor, did. Olszewski's replacement, Aleksander Dębski, further aggravated the Ukrainian population because it was Dębski's duty to enforce the Polonization of the school system. 118

Governance was also difficult for these men because they found themselves in the midst of a religious war, of sorts. The "war" involved the Polish government, and Polish, Soviet, and Constantinople's branches of the Orthodox Church and their patriarchates. When the Treaty of Riga was signed and Poland incorporated Western Ukrainian and Belarusian territory, they also incorporated a large amount of Orthodox believers. The Polish government refused to recognize the authority of the Orthodox Church until its Metropolitan would agree to some demands from the government. Thus, the Orthodox believers still looked toward Moscow's patriarchate for guidance, which the Polish government found quite disagreeable. So, in an attempt to remove Soviet influence from Poland's population and force the Metropolitan to agree to their demands, Poland's government lobbied the Church to ask for separation from the Moscow patriarchate and declare Polish autocephaly, which they did in 1922. The Moscow patriarchate granted some autonomy to the Polish branch, but he refused to grant autocephaly. In response, the Polish Metropolitan was assassinated in 1923 and succeeded by a bishop who refused to break from the Moscow patriarchy. Poland's government then went over the bishop's head and discussed the issue with the Constantinople patriarchate, whom they found much more agreeable to their cause. The Constantinople patriarchate accepted a generous monetary donation from the Polish government and blessed the new Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church in

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¹¹⁸ Snyder, *Sketches from a Secret War*, 65.

November 1924.¹¹⁹ The Orthodox Church continued to have issues with the Polish government throughout the interwar period, but Józewski managed to resolve most of these while he was the Volhynian voivode and the Minister of Internal Affairs (1929-1930).

Once Piłsudski had taken power, he began to take measures to improve the lot of the minorities. He called on the Minister of the Interior, Kazimierz Młodzianowski, to establish a Committee of Experts on the Eastern Provinces and National Minorities. Piłsudski accepted Młodzianowski's proposal, which contained policies to increase land reform, bring back local self-rule, grant amnesty for political crimes committed before 1923, teach in minority languages, and allow minority representatives to sit on government counsels and inform them of the desires of their constituency. Unfortunately, these ideas were quickly dismissed by the more rightist people in the government, who continued to conduct pro-Polish land reform policies and also modified the law pertaining to Eastern Galicia's autonomy (effectively shelving it for the remainder of Piłsudski's rule). In October 1926, Młodzianowski was replaced by a more rightist minister. 120

In Volhynia, Piłsudski installed one of his friends who had the same viewpoint as himself and Józewski, Władysław Mech, as voivode. Mech helped warm the Volhynians to Polish rule. Not only did he refer to Ukrainians as "Ukrainian" and promise them more toleration (on the condition of their support for the Polish government), he also helped the Jewish communities gain autonomy. Both the Jewish and Ukrainian populations of Volhynia were grateful to Mech, and would soon see that their lives under Józewski's policies would improve. ¹²¹

Volhynia during Józewski's Governance

Józewski arrived in Volhynia shortly after the celebration of the tenth anniversary of Poland's independence or, as Ukrainians viewed it, the tenth anniversary of their lack of a Ukrainian state. Thus, he was initially met with hostility by a group who increasingly agreed with the views of Dmitri Levitsky, an UNDO spokesperson, who

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 148-149. See also, Catholic Near East Welfare Association, "The Orthodox Church of Poland," Catholic Near East Welfare Association, June 25, 2007,

http://www.cnewa.com/eccbodypgus.aspx?eccpageID=24&IndexView=toc (accessed May 12, 2009). Polonsky, 213-214.

said, "We Ukrainians are not loyal as regard the Polish state, and we do not want to be. Certainly, [we want to secede], and without any doubt." Józewski's governing was also complicated by events in Galicia, particularly during election boycotts and the government's "pacification" of the unruly boycotters and/or Ukrainian nationalist agitators.

Therefore, Józewski immediately tried to win over the Volhynian Ukrainian population. Snyder found evidence that Józewski hung portraits of Petliura and Piłsudski together, sang Ukrainian national songs, personally answered Volhynian's letters in Ukrainian, and helped fund Ukrainian reading rooms and cooperatives. While he was doing this, he also targeted aspects of Ukrainian culture he believed the Soviets had infiltrated. For example, he shut down several hundred cooperatives and *Prosvita* reading rooms he thought the KPZU controlled. 124

Cooperatives were an essential part of Ukrainian life. Although Galicia had many more than Volhynia (about ninety percent of all cooperatives were located in Galicia), they were still very important in Volhynia. Cooperatives were mostly for farmers and peasants, but they had a wide range of services. They functioned as banks, stores, and educational meeting places, and had high membership in the rural Volhynia, where these conveniences were not readily available. So, when Józewski targeted cooperatives as places that harbored KPZU members, local populations reacted strongly. In response, he did not shut down the cooperatives entirely; instead, he placed people he could trust in the leadership positions. This proved to be good foresight on his part, as a bill the Sejm suggested that would ban nationalist literature and force cooperatives to work with non-Ukrainians, caused considerable protests in 1934.

The Prosvita Society, or Enlightenment Society, was founded in Galicia in 1868 as an organization to promote Ukrainian scholarly work and education. It was wildly popular, and spread to Volhynia in the early twentieth century. By the time Józewski completely banned Prosvita's reading rooms in 1932, Luts'k still had 134 branches and

¹²¹ Snyder, *Sketches from a Secret War*, 65.

¹²² Polonsky, 263.

¹²³ Snyder, *Sketches from a Secret War*, 67.

¹²⁴ Ibid., 69.

¹²⁵ For percentages, see Felinski, 120-121.

E. Lachowich, "The Ukrainian Question (15)," *Ukrainian Weekly*, July 6, 1934.

reading rooms that it was forced to close. Ukrainian intelligentsia bristled at this, but at least Józewski established other reading rooms. As he did want to promote a distinct Ukrainian culture, the reading rooms often had the same material, with the exception of the noticeably communist-leaning literature and the inclusion of some pro-Polish publications. He also encouraged the spread of organizations sponsored by Ukrainians that offered alternative schooling like the Ridna Shkola and Ridna Khata. 127

Education was an aspect of Ukrainian culture in which Józewski had much positive influence, despite state laws. Certain laws essentially prohibited teaching in the Ukrainian language, while others made it nearly impossible to find teachers who were ethnically Ukrainian or could speak Ukrainian. This made it very difficult to establish schools that taught entirely in Ukrainian. This problem stemmed from the limits placed upon students at universities and teachers' colleges. In order to teach in a public or private school, a teacher was required to have a state license, which one received either by taking classes at a university or attending a specialized teachers' Ukrainian students who wanted to attend Polish universities were often college. refused admission, and there was not a separate Ukrainian university. Ukrainians tried to establish a university, but they wanted it to be in L'viv, which the Poles refused. Negotiations went back and forth, but a stalemate ensued for the rest of the interwar period. 128 A "secret university" was established in L'viv by the Ukrainian professors who were fired from Polish universities, but the school was raided and completely disbanded in 1925. 129 This only resulted in the further radicalization of the intelligentsia.

The teachers' colleges were also strongly affected by legislation. As these were also schools, the Lex Grabski applied to them as well. The Lex Grabski, in addition to creating "bilingual" schools, called for the eventual closure of all teachers' colleges. From the law's implementation in 1925 until all of the teachers' colleges were closed, they were to be "bilingual". Paprocki skirted the issue carefully. He wrote that there were two types of colleges: those where instruction was in either Polish or Ukrainian and schools where Ukrainian was included as a subject. In the 1933-1934 school year, there were seven colleges in total; five fell into the first category and two in the last.

B. Kravtsiv, M. Borovsky, V. Markus, and A. Shtefan, "Prosvita", Encyclopedia of Ukraine, http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?AddButton=pages\P\R\Prosvita.htm.
Polonsky, 215.
Subtelny, 439.

Therefore, five of the colleges instructed in either Polish or Ukrainian. Snyder, in Sketches from a Secret War, is more straightforward: "Polish seminaries ceased to prepare teachers for Ukrainian schools in 1932." The Sjem expanded the Lex Grabski in 1933 when its representatives passed a law requiring all private schools to use the same textbooks as public schools (whose language of instruction was effectively Polish). 132

The Lex Grabski was reaffirmed by a presidential decree in November 1930. While the *Lex Grabski* in writing allowed for plebiscites in which parents could vote on the language of instruction, but was completely ignored in practice, Piłsudski's decree prevented the plebiscites from occurring until 1937. His decree was likely part of the pacification campaign and announced as punishment for the Galician Ukrainian's boycott of the 1930 elections.

Thankfully for the Volhynian Ukrainians, Józewski found a way around these laws. He did not break the law, but he twisted it a little. Many schools with a large Ukrainian minority had versions of main courses, like mathematics and sciences, in Ukrainian. With this system, the private schools still used the same textbooks as public schools, just not in all of the classes. During in the interwar period, teachers who taught in Ukrainian or a course concerning Ukrainian culture were usually ethnic Poles who learned the Ukrainian language. If the courses taught entirely in Ukrainian were not present, Józewski ensured the Ukrainian language or history was taught as a course in as many schools as possible. 134

Józewski was also active in reforming the new Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church. He wanted to create a distinctly Ukrainian version of Orthodoxy so the Soviets would have less influence in Volhynia, where the largest Orthodox constituency in Poland resided. To this end, Józewski encouraged the Volhynian Ukrainians to lobby the Church to reconstitute itself democratically and to conduct services in Ukrainian (instead of Russian). They lobbied, and the Metropolitan relented in 1934; he allowed

¹³⁰ Paprocki, 75.

¹³¹ Snyder, *Sketches from a Secret War*, 68.

¹³² E. Lachowich, "The Ukrainian Question (15)," *Ukrainian Weekly*, July 6, 1934.

133 London Ukrainian Bureau, "Ukraine Under Poland," *Ukrainian Weekly*, February 12, 1938. The article discusses the presidential decree and notes how the current government refuses to allow plebiscites from occurring despite the decree allowing them. ¹³⁴ Snyder, *Sketches from a Secret War*, 68.

for the creation of the Volhynian diocese, with its seats in Luts'k and Krzemeniec. All clergy selections were subsequently overseen by Józewski, who made sure they were agreeable to his interests. 135 By working with religion, Józewski influenced the peasants, who were the majority of the Ukrainian population. His work brought religion closer to the masses and allowed them to have a say in church functions. It also, as he had intended, brought the Polish state into a more favorable light for the Volhynian Ukrainians.

However, Józewski could not direct everything in Volhynia. There were still Ukrainians who did not want to be part of a Polish state. When necessary, Józewski punished the Ukrainians who went against his and the government's will. Most of these people were members of the KPZU or communist-front organizations. Due to Józewski's actions, Polish domestic policy, Soviet policy, and the internal disagreements within these groups, their influence diminished greatly during Józewski's governorship.

The KPZU initially had a lot of support in Volhynia – over half of the population in some villages, but its popularity declined quickly in the late 1920s. Firstly, following a Soviet-enforced purge in 1928, the party's members disagreed on what their response to the new policies ought to be. Secondly, the Polish government banned the party and arrested as many members as it could find. Thirdly, the Soviet policy of collectivization led hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians to flee the UkSSR in 1930, bringing stories of harsh treatment with them. 136 When word spread about the Soviet-instituted famine, this sealed the fate of a Soviet-sponsored communist party.

The peasants were torn, though. The Great Depression caused agricultural prices to plummet, so they thought the solution to increase their pay was to have more land to farm. Campaigning for more land, the Soviets said, was an indication of support for communism. However, the increasingly popular nationalist group, the OUN, claimed that if the peasants had their own independent country, they could have their own large farms. Sel-Rob members, many of whom were former communists, placed themselves in the middle: the peasants could be nationalistic and support an independent Ukraine, but they could also have private property. Sel-Rob quickly gained popularity and in the

¹³⁵lbid., 150-153. ¹³⁶ Motyl, 417.

1928 and 1930 elections, rigged though they were, the party still won seats in the Sejm. 137

Surrounding the 1930 elections, the Polish government conducted a massive "pacification" in Galicia. This was done in response to the OUN's terrorist actions, which mostly consisted of political assassinations, armed robbery of government offices (especially post offices), burning Polish crops and buildings, and cutting telephone and telegraph wires. 138 The military closed dozens of schools, ransacked hundreds of villages, confiscated nearly one thousand weapons, and arrested thousands of political This caused an outpouring of sympathy from the international press opponents. (especially the British press), and Galicians filed an official complaint with the Entente after the Polish government did nothing to punish the Polish military. Japanese officials ruled on the complaint and found that the Polish government was justified in its actions because it needed to suppress the OUN. 139 However, they recommended that the Polish government help pay for repairs to the cooperatives, reading rooms, homes, and churches that were destroyed during the pacification. As of July 1934, the Polish government still had not responded to this request. 140 The Polish government continued its tactics, and so did the now-illegal OUN.

Dmitri Pronin, who was responsible for overseeing some of the land reform policies in Western Ukraine, recalled anti-land reform riots in Northern Volhynia in the summer of 1932 in which the rioters were people "armed with Soviet-made tommy guns and hand grenades" who attacked non-Communist officials and policemen. In response to these riots and in preparation for the November elections, it was likely not a coincidence that the government banned Sel-Rob publications and the party itself in Poland in September 1932. Once the Sel-Rob members were arrested, the only legal political party in Volhynia was the one Józewski created, the Volhynian Ukrainian Alliance.

¹³⁷ Snyder, *Sketches from a Secret War*, 73.

¹³⁸ Polonsky, 374.

¹³⁹ Ibid., 372.

¹⁴⁰ *Ukrainian Weekly*, "English Lords Petition League of Nations Concerning Damages to 'Pacification' Victims." August 17, 1934.

Victims," August 17, 1934.

141 Dmitri T. Pronin, "Land Reform in Poland: 1920-1945," *Land Economics* 25, no. 2 (May 1949): 139, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0023-7639%28194905%2925%3A2%3C133%3ALRIP1%3E2.0.CO%3B2-9 (accessed December 2, 2007).

¹⁴² Snyder, *Sketches from a Secret War*, 73.

Starting around 1933, most of the Ukrainian intelligentsia began to realize they needed to negotiate with government if they ever wanted any Polish support of Ukrainian cultural endeavors. This realization came about from the population seeing how the government reacted to right-wing Ukrainian groups (OUN) and left-wing Ukrainian groups (KPZU) – with brute force and hostility. In a January 1934 Sejm meeting, the Prime Minister discussed relations with Ukrainians and admitted that the problems were caused by mistakes made by both Poles and Ukrainians. UNDO leaders saw this as a sign that the government wanted to come to an agreement.¹⁴³

In the summer of 1934, the negotions appeared they may flounder. In June 1934, OUN members assassinated the Minister of Internal Affairs, Bronisław Pieracki. The assassination gave Ukrainian leaders a chance to connect with the government, and they took advantage of the opportunity: UNDO leaders and Ukrainian bishops openly condemned the act. Piłsudski, however, wanted to ensure no other terrorism would occur. He opened a concentration camp at the Bereza Kartuska prison in Polissia in July. The government arrested thousands of right- and left-wing political opponents as well as journalists and held some indefinitely, until the prison was taken over by the Soviets in 1939. In late July 1934, the *Ukrainian Weekly* reported that Ukrainian political opponents were among the first people arrested, but that the prison housed detainees from areas besides just the Western Ukrainian territories. 144

Two months after the prison opened, in a move that alarmed all of Poland's minorities and the Entente, Poland's Minister of Foreign Affairs announced to the League of Nations that his country would no longer abide by the Minority Rights Treaty. His declaration was conveniently announced several days after the Soviet Union joined the League of Nations, a move which the Polish government was strongly against. The denunciation of the treaty did not have much effect on the Ukrainians in Poland because despite all of the arrests, voter fraud, and raiding of societies, only one petition had been submitted to the League of Nations by the Ukrainians. The Minority Rights Treaty had never been strictly adhered to by the state, either. Still, the announcement

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¹⁴³ Subtelny, 431.

¹⁴⁴ *Ukrainian Weekly*, "Ukrainians Sent to Polish Concentration Camps," July, 27, 1934.

by Minister Beck resonated within the minority populations as the official end of their "equal" rights. 145

The opening of Bereza Kartuska and Beck's dismissal of the Minority Rights Treaty sent a strong signal to the Ukrainian intelligentsia that they needed to work with the government. UNDO representatives and government leaders began a series of discussions, and they reached an agreement in 1935. In exchange for UNDO representatives voting for the budget in the Sejm and Ukrainians accepting Polish authority, the Poles would free most Ukrainian Bereza Kartuska prisoners, improve Ukrainian aspects of schools and universities, increase funding for Ukrainian cultural activities, and allow the election of UNDO candidates. The Ukrainians upheld their end of the bargain, but the Poles did not. In actuality, some (not most) Bereza Kartuska prisoners were released, there were no improvements in schools, the funding only increased because the Ukrainian tax money actually funded those organizations instead of other Polish programs, and not all UNDO candidates were elected. The Ukrainian officials tried to negotiate with the government, but failed.

In May 1935, the government was again thrown into chaos when Piłsudski died. His Colonels, who had become increasingly nationalistic during the last nine years, formed a new government based on rightist principles. Minorities' rights during the Colonels' regime were almost non-existent, and the people in favor of minority rights laws, like Józewski, were removed from their offices at the whims of those in charge.

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¹⁴⁵ Roman Debicki, *Foreign Policy of Poland, 1919-1939: From the Rebirth of the Polish Republic to World War II* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), 84-85. ¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 92.

Seton-Watson, 336.

CHAPTER 5 THE COLONELS' REGIME, 1935-1939

After Piłsudski's death, there was a scramble for power. Piłsudski and his Ministers always governed with a stronger executive rule than legislative, despite the 1921 Constitution. In 1935, his supporters in the Sejm revised the Constitution to reflect this change. Piłsudski's three top men, Józef Beck, Marshal Edward Rydz-Śmigły, and President Ignacy Mościcki gained power after his death and ruled as a triumvirate until internal bickering between the leaders broke out. Rydz-Śmigły and Mościcki tried to unite Sanacja followers behind them in different groups, but both men failed. In 1937, OZN, with an emphasis on nationalism and the military, was created by another Colonel. The OZN political party was joined by Rydz-Śmigły and Mościcki, but Beck refused to join. Thereafter, Beck still had some influence, but the government was dominated by OZN supporters.

The Colonels' government was marked by authoritarian rule, and nationalist OZN members brutally quashed any resistance they encountered. They focused their attention on Polonization, particularly in Western Ukraine, and reformed government jobs, church policy, land distribution, cultural institutions and schools to reflect this. Józewski was allowed to stay as voivode of Volhynia until 1938, but his Ukrainization policies were resisted by an increasingly hostile Polish government and local population.

Volhynian Ukrainians under the Colonels

The first step the Colonels took to weaken minority representation in the Sejm was to pass a term limit law. The government claimed the law would make a "less partisan" Sejm because it would remove those politicians who were elected repeatedly. This law would have a disastrous effect on the Ukrainians because so few of them had any experience in government, and Ukrainians therefore voted for the same officials each election. Indeed, a less partisan Sejm was created. UNDO and other minority parties boycotted the elections wholeheartedly. Seton-Watson estimates that during the 1935 elections, only 46.5 percent of the voters participated, as compared to

seventy-five percent in the 1930 elections (which were also boycotted). After this election, minority representation from the Sejm and Senate was negligible. When the government ceded Transcarpathia to Hungary in 1938, the Ukrainian representation realized its power was lost, and the right-wing OZN members could do as they pleased.

There were few changes in the following two years as OZN organized the state and local governments by replacing deputies with their friends. By 1937, the government recognized that Józewski was a very capable man, but found his pro-Ukrainian policies irritating and thus closely monitored his actions. He was forced to allow more Polonization in the school system and arrest more political dissidents.

The summer of 1937 was the beginning of a flurry of anti-government activity. In August 1937, in response to an influx of Polish colonists, peasants refused to bring their crops to town. Industrial workers joined the strike in solidarity. The government took the opportunity to assert its power and quickly suppressed the strikes, killing at least forty-two strikers in the process.¹⁴⁹

In his 1930 educational decree concerning plebiscites, Piłsudski stated that plebiscites could be held again in seven years. Exactly seven years later, when Ukrainians began organizing the plebiscites, the General Council of Ukrainian Private Schools received a letter from the district governor of L'viv stating that no plebiscites were to be held in Polissia or Volhynia. The governor further stated that if plebiscites were held, the Council would be abolished.¹⁵⁰

Unsurprisingly, the prisons in Luts'k filled up quickly, and reports of mistreatment ran rampant. The *Ukrainian Weekly* reported in early October that the prisoners often had their food rations reduced and for several weeks could not receive food or clothing packages as punishment for singing a nationalist Orthodox hymn in Ukrainian. ¹⁵¹ In the following two years, many more Volhynian dissidents would be arrested after protesting the drastic changes implemented by the government.

Beginning in February 1938, sweeping reforms were issued. The month began with an announcement by Prime Minister General Skladkowski in the Sejm that the "the fate of Poland largely depends on the attitude of the Poles to their minorities." This

¹⁴⁸ Seton-Watson, 165.

lbid., 169. The number 42 is from government reports. The reports do not discuss wounded individuals. The likelihood that more people were killed and many more wounded is high. London Ukrainian Bureau, "Ukraine under Poland," *Ukrainian Weekly*, February 12, 1938.

initially seemed like a good sign to the few minorities present in the Sejm, but the Prime Minister's speech as a whole focused on all the good the Polish government had done for minorities in the past and how the minorities ought to be grateful for such allocations. He did not address the government's future plans for the minorities. However, as an indication of the government's plans, the Bureau of Censorship issued a statement which forbade the use of the term "Eastern Galicia" and required the use of "Małopolska" instead. The arrival of Polish colonists in Luts'k and Kovel followed shortly thereafter. These colonists were given land that the government promised Polish and minority citizens they could buy, but minorities were barred from the land auctions by local officials. Polish citizens were already favored above minorities before 1935, but this government's policies were more extensive that their predecessors'.

At this time, the government also increased its control over jobs they deemed important to the state, like railroad and oil refinery workers. Most of the local administrative offices had already gone to the Polish colonists, but now an increasing amount of industry jobs were given to Poles as well. A *Ukrainian Weekly* article reported on the stalled delivery of newspapers in Dubno, and the author mused that it was probably the doing of the station master of the Kamenytsia-Volynska railroad. This station master, Wladzimierz Kozolowski, was the "notorious" leader of the Polish Riflemen. While he was in charge of the railroad, he replaced Ukrainian workers with Polish workers unless the Ukrainians converted to Roman Catholicism. ¹⁵⁵

Likewise, forced conversions occurred more and more frequently during the Colonels' rule. If the parishes would not convert, the KOP forced the services to be held in the Polish language, confiscated the church for use by the Roman Catholics, or burned the church down. Subtelny noted that in 1914, there were 389 Orthodox Churches in Volhynia. The number increased under Józewski, but after he was transferred to the Łódz voivodeship (where there was a much smaller Ukrainian population) in late 1938, the government increased its raids. Directly before the Soviet

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¹⁵¹ Ukrainian Weekly, "Mistreatment of Ukrainian Political Prisoners," October 2, 1937.

¹⁵² Ibid., "Polish Premier on Minorities," March 5, 1938.

lbid., "Polish Government's Bureau of Censorship: Halichyna (Galicia) Must be Called Malopolska (Little Poland)" March 26, 1938. The event was also reported in Poland's *Novy Czas* on February 21, 1938. The announcement was made February 14, 1938.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., "Colonization of Ukrainian Land," March 5, 1938.

occupation in 1939, there were only fifty-one Orthodox Churches left in Volhynia. The *Ukrainian Weekly* article describing these events in Galicia, Polissia, and Volhynia made a special note that the use of the Polish language was enforced "even in Volhynia." This is of special interest because it shows that Józewski's reforms had a significant impact, but that the police and KOP overpowered his changes. In November 1938, Mościcki announced that the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church was autonomous, but reminded its parishioners that the state would not allow anything that "would hamper the natural expansion of Polish culture into the eastern lands." Several priests who refused to use Polish during services or for other official business were imprisoned in Bereza Kartuska to set an example. 159

The government did not curtail its policies despite the growing threat of Germany or the Soviet Union in 1939. Instead, they increased their diligence. Prior to 1939, cultural societies were refused funding allocated from the National Cultural Fund, which Poles and minorities alike contributed to with taxes. In 1939, many cultural societies were banned outright. Colonization and conversions became a main priority of the state, and protesters and saboteurs were often refused trials and held in prison indefinitely.

All of these actions produced little response from the Entente. The press in France, Britain, and America occasionally wrote about the German or Ukrainian minorities in Poland, but most of their attention was focused on the growing power of the Soviet Union and Germany. Ukrainian émigrés tried to raise their respective governments' awareness about the situation in Poland, as evidenced by the hundreds of letters and telegrams from Ukrainian groups to the State Department and President present in the National Archives, but the Entente governments were preoccupied. 162

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¹⁵⁵ Ibid., "Ukraine under Poland: Confiscation of Newspapers," July 2, 1938.

¹⁵⁶ Subtelny, 432.

¹⁵⁷ Ukrainian Weekly, "Confiscation of Churches in Poland," August 20, 1938.

Wynot, The Camp of National Unity and the Struggle for Power, 228.

¹⁵⁹ W. Bukata and V. Soborny, "The Truth about Poland: Polish Treatment of Ukrainians, How Poland Applied the Principle of National Self-Determination in Her Relations with Ukrainians?," *Ukrainian Weekly*, December 3, 1938.

¹⁶⁰ Ukrainian Weekly, "Unfair Allotment of Public Funds," March 26, 1938.

For cultural societies and colonization and conversion policies, see *Ukrainian Weekly*, "Polish Persecution of Ukrainians," August 12, 1939. For prisoners in Rivne, see *Ukrainian Weekly*, "Trial of Ukrainians," June 4, 1939.

See all folders marked 860E in Box 6612; Decimal File 1930-1939, General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59; National Archives at College Park, MD.

CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION

Overall, the response of the Entente powers to the Ukrainian situation in interwar Poland was minimal. Their initial efforts after World War I, namely the border discussion and the Minority Rights Treaty, were a step in the right direction, but they were not enforced. The eastern border was changed drastically with the Treaty of Riga, and the Entente did nothing to change the border back to what they had recommended (which was close to the actual division of ethnicities). The Minority Rights Treaty allowed for minorities to appeal mistreatment, but the process was complicated to such an extent that few appeals went through the system. The Entente did their job negotiating the peace after World War I, but essentially left the countries to govern themselves during the interwar period.

This raises a series of important questions. If the Entente had insisted Poland's eastern border remain intact and negated the Treaty of Riga, what would have happened to the Ukrainian and Belarusian populations? The Entente did not intend to create states for these nationalities, so they likely would have been absorbed into the Soviet Union. However, if they had created independent states, would this have served as a bulwark against the Soviet Union?

Much of the Soviet Union's food supply and manpower came from its Ukrainian and Belarusian territories, so if the pieces of land that went to Poland with the Treaty of Riga were united with the rest of the Soviet Union, it would have been stronger. On the other hand, if independent countries were created from Ukrainian and Belarusian territory, this would have significantly weakened the Soviet Union (if these new countries did not join the Union).

Accordingly, if Ukraine had its own country, the history of World War II might have been different. Ukrainian nationalists wanted to disrupt the Polish state in hopes that a Ukrainian state would be created from the aftermath, and the German government obliged. Of course, Germans and Ukrainians had different aims for the OUN terrorism, and they both hoped they could outsmart the other when the time for an alliance arrived. The Germans wanted to keep the Polish government unstable so its population would be more amenable to a German takeover, while the Ukrainian

nationalists just wanted their own state. Neither group really wanted to ally with the other: the Nazis wanted to liquidate the Slavs along with the Jews, and the Ukrainian nationalists wanted to use the Nazi's money to help fund their state-making efforts. The OUN received funding from the German foreign office by 1931, and likely earlier. Members of the OUN and other Ukrainian nationalists willingly joined forces with the Nazis and welcomed them with open arms in 1941, and the nationalists from Galicia and Volhynia were the most fervent supporters. If Ukrainians had their own country, the likelihood of their collaboration with the Nazis would have diminished greatly. They joined for two main reasons: they hoped that the German government would grant them an independent state and, if this failed, they wanted to train their military to be as effective as possible in order to resist a German takeover. If It is a state of the other collaboration is the property of the property

If the Entente had more closely monitored the Polish government's adherence to the Minority Rights Treaty, or forced them to adhere to it in spite of Beck's 1934 announcement, the extent of Ukrainian collaboration with the Nazis during World War II may have also changed. The most obvious solution would have been granting the Western Ukrainian territories autonomy, as the Polish government promised to do in 1922. Based solely on this promise, the Entente recognized Poland's claim to Eastern Galicia and allowed Poland to officially incorporate the territory into Poland. However, Eastern Galicia never became autonomous and the autonomy bills that came before the Sejm were immediately snuffed out by the opposition. If Western Ukraine operated with no interference as an autonomous region in Poland, Ukrainians would have very little reason to act against Poland.

As it was, the constant interference of the Polish government and military in Ukrainian cultural life hindered cooperation between the two nationalities during World War II and after. Disagreements about which nationality is at fault for the strained relations have continued, but the governments have been more agreeable with one another recently. For example, in 2002, Poland's government apologized for the forced resettlement of about 150,000 Western Ukrainians during 1947's *Akcja Wisła* (Operation Vistula). In 2003, Polish and Ukrainian government officials gathered in Volhynia for a remembrance ceremony of UPA's ethnic cleansing during World War II.

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¹⁶³ Polonsky, 373.

John Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism* (Littleton, CO: Ukrainian Academic Press, 1980), 65-67.

Finally, in 2005, Ukrainians and Poles jointly commemorated a World War I cemetery in L'viv in which both Polish and Ukrainian fighters were buried. Following this event, Poland became the chief advocate for Ukrainian entrance into the European Union. 166 The ties between the nations are stronger today, but the actions of the Entente during the interwar period could have prevented the need for any reconciliation.

Dean, 31.

166 Wojciech Kosc, "Poland and Ukraine: Where Eaglets Lie," *Transitions Online* (June 27, 2005).

APPENDIX

PROTECTION OF ETHNIC, LINGUISTIC, AND RELIGIOUS MINORITIES

- **Article 1.** Poland undertakes that the stipulations contained in Articles 2 to 8 of this chapter shall be recognized as fundamental laws, and that no law, regulation or official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation or official action prevail over them.
- **Article 2.** Poland undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Poland, without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion.

All inhabitants of Poland shall be entitled to the free exercise, whether public or private, of any creed, religion or belief, whose practices are not inconsistent with public order or public morals.

Article 3. Poland admits and declares to be Polish nationals *ipso facto* and without the requirement of any formality, German, Austrian, Hungarian or Russian nationals habitually resident, at the date of this coming into force of the present treaty, in territory which is or may be recognized as forming part of Poland, but subject to any provisions in the treaties of peace with Germany or Austria respectively, relating to persons who became resident in such territory after a specified date.

Nevertheless, the persons referred to above who are over 18 years of age will be entitled under the conditions contained in the said treaties to opt for any other nationality which may be open to them. Option by a husband will cover his wife and option by parents will cover their children under 18 years of age.

Persons who have exercised the above right to opt must, except where it is otherwise provided in the Treaty of Peace with Germany, transfer within the succeeding 12 months their place of residence to the State for which they have opted. They will be entitled to retain their immovable property in Polish territory. They may carry with them their movable property of every description. No export duties may be imposed upon them in connection with the removal of such property.

Article 4. Poland admits and declares to be Polish nationals, *ipso facto* and without the requirement of any formality, persons of German, Austrian, Hungarian or Russian nationality who were born in the said territory of parents habitually resident there, even if at the date of the coming into force of the present treaty they are not themselves habitually resident there.

Nevertheless within two years after the coming into force of the present treaty, these persons may make a declaration before the competent Polish authorities in the country in which they are resident, stating that they abandon Polish nationality, and they will then cease to be considered as Polish nationals. In this connection a declaration by a husband will cover his wife, and a declaration by parents will cover their children under 18 years of age.

- **Article 5.** Poland undertakes to put no hindrance in the way of the exercise of the right which the persons concerned have, under the treaties concluded or to be concluded by the Allied and Associated Powers with Germany, Austria, Hungary or Russia, to choose whether or not they will acquire Polish nationality.
- **Article 6.** All persons born in Polish territory who are not born nationals of another State shall *ipso facto* become Polish nationals.

Article 7. All Polish nationals shall be equal before the law and shall enjoy the same civil and political rights without the distinction as to race, language or religion.

Difference of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice any Polish national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as for instance admission to public employments, functions and honors, or the exercise of professions and industries.

No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any Polish national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the press or n publications of any kind, or at public meetings.

Notwithstanding any establishment by the Polish Government of an official language, adequate facilities shall be given to Polish nationals of non-Polish speech for the use of their language, either orally or in writing, before the courts.

Article 8. Polish nationals who belong to racial, religious or linguistic minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as the other Polish nationals. In particular they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at their own expense charitable, religious and social institutions, schools and other educational establishments, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their religion freely therein.

Article 9. Poland will provide in the public educational system in towns and districts in which a considerable proportion of Polish nationals of other than Polish speech are residents adequate facilities for insuring that in the primary schools the instruction shall be given to the children of such Polish nationals through the medium of their own language. This provision shall not prevent to Polish Government from making the teaching of the Polish language obligatory in the said schools.

In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of Polish nationals belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, these minorities shall be assured an equitable share into the enjoyment and application of the sums which may be provided out of public funds under the state, municipal or other budget, for educational, religious or charitable purposes.

The provisions of this article shall apply to Polish citizens of German speech only in that part of Poland which was German territory on August 1, 1914.

Article 10. Educational committees appointed locally by the Jewish communities of Poland will, subject to the general control of the State, provide for the distribution of the proportional share of public funds allocated to Jewish schools in accordance with Article 9, and for the organization and management of these schools.

The provisions of Article 9 concerning the use of languages in schools shall apply to these schools.

Article 11. Jews shall not be compelled to perform any act which constitutes a violation of their Sabbath, nor shall they be placed under any disability by reason of their refusal to attend courts of law or to perform any legal business on their Sabbath. This provision, however, shall not exempt Jews from such obligations as shall be imposed upon all other Polish citizens for the necessary purposes of military service, national defense or the preservation of public order.

Poland declares her intention to refrain from ordering or permitting elections, whether general or local, to be held on a Saturday, nor will registration for electoral or other purposes be compelled to be performed on a Saturday.

Article 12. Poland agrees that the stipulations in the foregoing articles, so far as they affect persons belonging to racial, religious, or linguistic minorities, constitute

obligations of international concern, and shall be placed under the guaranty of the League of Nations. They shall not be modified without the assent of a majority of the Council of the League of Nations. The United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan hereby agree not to withhold their assent from any modification in these articles which is in due form assented to by a majority of the council of the League of Nations.

Poland agrees that any member of the Council of the League of Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction, or any danger of infraction, of any of these obligations, and that the Council may thereupon take such action and give such direction as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances.

Poland further agrees that any difference of opinion as to questions of law or fact arising out of these articles, between the Polish Government and any of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, or any other Power, a member of the Council of the League of Nations, shall be held to be a dispute of an international character under Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Polish Government hereby consents that any such dispute shall, if the other party thereto demands, be referred to the Permanent Court of international Justice. The decision of the Permanent Court shall be final and shall have the same force and effect as an award under Article 13 of the Covenant.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

The author, Suzanne Elizabeth Scott, was born in New Orleans, Louisiana. As a child in an Air Force family, she moved frequently throughout the United States. Suzanne completed her Bachelors of Arts degree in History with a minor in Pure Mathematics from Florida State University in April 2006. In May 2006, she began studies for a Master's degree in Modern Eastern European History with a minor in Historical Administration and Public History. During summer 2007, she received a Dorot Fellowship with the International Archival Programs Division in the Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C. She received a full tuition scholarship in summer 2008 to attend a Beginning Ukrainian Language course at the Harvard Ukrainian Summer Institute in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

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